World Development, Vol. 20, No. 7, pp. 921-945,1992. 0305-75Ow92 $5.00 + 0.

00
Printed in Great Britain. 0 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd

Hunger and Poverty in Iraq, 1991

JEAN DRi?ZE
London School of Economics and WIDER
and
HARIS GAZDAR*
University of Sussex, Brighton

Summary. - This paper examines the impact of economic sanctions, war and internal conflicts
on the well-being of the civilian population of Iraq during and after the Gulf war. Particular
attention is paid to the issue of food entitlements and nutritional deprivation. The paper is based
primarily on data collected by the authors in August/September 1991 through household surveys
and related investigations carried out in different parts of Iraq. Economic reasoning and
empirical analysis both point to very high levels of poverty, mortality and nutritional deprivation
in 1991. Further, the sharp decline in living standards in this period clearly relates to the collapse
of economic activity as a result of the war and economic sanctions.

1. INTRODUCTIONS especially the need for adequate nutrition. This

focus is quite natural, since (as we shall see)
(a) Motivation andfocu.s undernutrition and related deprivations have
become quite widespread in recent months.
The Gulf war has caused much devastation - Dealing with this problem of endemic poverty
human, environmental and material. Bombings and ‘hunger is surely the first priority in the
have been the most spectacular source of such immense task of economic reconstruction that
devastation, and their impact has received much Iraq has to face.
attention. But it is plausible that economic
dislocation (partly a result of the bombings
themselves) caused more widespread sufferings, *This study, sponsored by the World Institute for
especially among those who were more deprived Development Economics Research (WIDER) and the
and vulnerable to start with. As a poor woman London School of Economics, is a contribution to the
told us in Basra after describing the torment of International Study Team report on the effects of war
hunger during the war, “you can hide from the and sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq. We are
bombs, but you cannot hide from your stomach.” grateful to Ms. Rana Zobi and Mr. Jubran Ibrahim for
Unlike the bombings, economic chaos in Iraq skillful translation services, and to all members of the
is far from over. The continuation of economic International Study Team (especially Elisabeth Ben-
jamin, Bela Bhatia, Julia Devin, Steven Donziger, Eric
sanctions compound the delayed effects of the
Hoskins, Mary Kawar, Abdullah Matawi, Roger Nor-
war in retarding the process of economic recov- mand, Megan Passey, Mariam Shahin, Sarah Leah
ery. The current debate about the future course Whitson, and Sarah Zaidi) for help with the field work
of these sanctions largely motivates this study of as well as for their support and advice. We are also
the impact of war and sanctions on economic indebted to Robin Burgess, Curtis Doebbler, Jacques
activity and human well-being in Iraq. Aside Dreze, Sara Farnsworth, John Field, Stephen Howes,
from informing this debate, we hope that this Michael Lipton, Amartya Sen, Hans Singer, Nicholas
study will complement other contributions to the Stern and Sheila Zurbrigg for helpful comments on an
International Study Team’ report in providing earlier draft. Final revision accepted: January 29, 1992.
fThis paper was written in September 1991 as a
a reliable overall picture of the human conse-
contribution to the report “Health and Welfare in Iraq
quences of the Gulf war and the related After the Gulf War” produced by the International
embargo. Study Team on the Gulf Crisis. Throughout the paper,
Our study concentrates primarily on the ability the use of the present tense refers to the period of the
of the Iraqi population to satisfy its basic needs, field work (August-September 1991).

921
922 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

(b) Sources and methodology report deal with these public services in some
detail, we have decided to concentrate on what
The research underlying this paper is largely we regard as the most important form of public
based on independent field work carried out in involvement in the provision of basic needs in
Iraq during August 23 - September 7, 1991. Iraq: the system of public food distribution.
During this period, we traveled without restric- Employment and the public distribution sys-
tion throughout the country, and carried out tem, are, thus, the two central themes of our
diverse investigations with the help of an inter- analysis.
preter of our own choice.2 Aside from a large
number of interviews with household members,
(c) Outline of the paper
factory managers, UN personnel, relief workers,
government officials and others, our field work The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2
included a food consumption survey covering 58
describes the main features of the Iraqi economy,
households (more than 500 individuals) dispersed and its evolution through war and sanctions since
through the country. August 1990.5 The process of economic reces-
As far as secondary sources are concerned, we sion, and its impact on employment and wages, is
have made use of several statistical documents
examined more closely in section 3. We find that
produced by the Government of Iraq prior to the
real labor earnings (deflated by a food price
crisis, and of some independent reports written index) have dropped by a factor of at least 15
since the end of the war (e.g., the Ahtisaari during the last 12 months. A large majority of
report and the Aga Khan report3). We have also
workers in Iraq now earn real wages lower than
used secondary data gathered in Iraq from
those of, for example, agricultural laborers in
nongovernment sources (e.g., factories and relief rural India.
agencies). Statements and data obtained from
This finding leads us, in section 4, to consider
government offices in the course of our visit have
the role of the public distribution system in
been used sparingly, and always with an explicit
protecting the population from starvation. Our
mention of the source. Our aim has been to rely assessment is that, contrary to popular belief,
as much as possible on sources that are relatively Iraq’s public distribution system is an exemplary
immune from manipulation, and to use other
one in terms of coverage, equity, efficiency, and
sources with great circumspection.
amount distributed. As things stand, however, it
The analytical framework of this paper draws
covers at best one half of the nutritional require-
on notions that have been widely applied in
ments of the population.
recent research on hunger and poverty in de- Section 5 discusses the living conditions of
veloping countries.4 We consider that the ability Iraqi people during and since the war. There is
of households or individuals to satisfy their basic
every indication that famine conditions prevailed
needs (including adequate nutrition) depends on
during the war, when both market acquisition
their “entitlements” to the relevant commodities and public distribution of food were severely
(in the case of nutrition, these commodities disrupted. After the war, the general nutritional
would include food, drinking water, health care, situation improved somewhat, as food prices
sanitation, etc.). The entitlements of different declined from their war-time peak and public
households reflect what the system enables them distribution resumed. This momentary improve-
to acquire through various channels such as
ment, however, has not led to a sustained process
production (e.g., growing food), market ex- of economic recovery. Poverty and nutritional
change (e.g., buying food), or public distribution deprivation remain endemic, and for the poorest
(e.g., food rationing). sections of the population, life grows increasingly
In Iraq, households derive their entitlements difficult.
to food and other basic commodities from two Section 6 presents the conclusions, and relates
crucial sources: private income, and public provi- them to current debates about the future course
sioning. For most households, private income is of economic sanctions.
earned mainly through employment (either wage
employment or self-employment); entitlements
from this source depend quite crucially on vari- 2. BACKGROUND
ables such as production, labor demand, wages
and prices. Important forms of public provision- (a) The Iraqi economy6
ing in this context include health services, educa-
tional facilities, epidemiological protection, wa- (i) General features
ter supply and food rationing. Given that other Oil has dominated all areas of the Iraqi
contributions to the International Study Team economy at least since the 1960s. It made up over
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 923

90% of Iraq’s exports until the imposition of fact, army conscripts.’ Many others are in civilian
sanctions one year ago. At its peak the produc- public services including administration and the
tion capacity has been over three million barrels well-developed social services such as health and
a day, and Iraq has proven reserves of more than education. Social services in Iraq are acknow-
100 billion barrels. Most oil-related activities ledged by most observers as among the best in
take place within the public sector, and proceeds the region, and doubtless employ large numbers
from oil exports are the most important source of of people.
government revenue. Despite its financial pre- Taking together employment in public-sector
dominance, the oil sector provides direct employ- industries and in public services (excluding the
ment to just over 1% of the workforce. army), the government is by far the most
During the last 20 years, agricultural produc- important employer. Its capacity to function as
tion and employment have respectively stagnated such ultimately depends upon oil revenues.
and declined. At the time of the last census in These also indirectly support a great deal of
1987, agriculture (together with forestry and private-sector activity, to the extent that foreign
fishing) employed only around 12% of the exchange earnings from oil sales are used to pay
workforce.’ This decline reflects a rapid expan- for imported raw materials and equipment. The
sion of employment opportunities in the cities public sector therefore provides a direct and
and high rates of urbanization. Iraq, which was critical link between oil production (and export)
until only 30 years ago a predominantly rural and and the rest of the Iraqi economy.
agrarian society, now has over 70% of its (ii) Recent developments
population in urban areas. The long war with Iran had a distorting impact
Agricultural production has been plagued with on Iraq’s economy, and slowed down its develop-
instability, as the main food-growing areas lie in ment. For a period of 10 years high levels of
the rain-fed northern regions (nonfood produc- financial and human resources were diverted
tion represents only a very small part of the toward the war. Labor shortages were dealt with
agricultural sector). There is only one cropping by large-scale immigration of workers from
season, and the harvest is almost totally depen- Egypt, Sudan and other countries (a majority of
dent upon the timing and adequacy of rainfall. In these foreign workers left Iraq soon after the
the irrigated areas of the south, environmental invasion of Kuwait).
problems such as water-logging and salinization In the aftermath of the war with Iran, there
have held back production. was a brief period of reorganization and recon-
In a good year like 1988, which saw a bumper struction before the events of last year under-
harvest, cereal production in Iraq covers about mined the development prospects of the country.
40% of total consumption (the corresponding During these two peaceful years, substantial
proportion for wheat, the main staple, is about changes were initiated in the economy. Ambi-
25%). A poor harvest such as the one experi- tious privatization programs were implemented
enced in 1989 could barely cover 15%. In recent in both the agriculture and light manufacturing
years, food imports have tended to hover around sectors.
25% of total merchandise imports.* Starting in 1988, nearly all industries producing
Early industrial development was largely in the consumer goods for the domestic market were
public sector. This included both capital- handed over to private concerns (often with
intensive heavy industries, such as iron and steel, former managers retaining a key role). This
petrochemicals (centered around Basra which should not be taken to mean that state involv-
has Iraq’s main sea port), and fertilizers, as well ment with consumer industries ended; the private
as consumer-goods industries - many of which industrial sector continues to rely on the govern-
are involved in processing and packaging im- ment for foreign trade activities.
ported raw materials. Much of the industrial The economy was still in a process of transition
activity around Basra was disrupted during the at the beginning of the recent crisis in August
Iran-Iraq war with the destruction of the port. 1990. The state sector remained the main engine
Another consequence of that war was the rapid of economic activity, and the main linkage
development of industries related to military between national oil revenues and private in-
production. comes, in spite of the beginnings of change
The service sector (public and private com- toward greater market orientation.
bined) is by far the largest employer in Iraq.
Almost half the total workforce was in this sector (b) The impact of war and sanctions
in 1987. Though disaggregated data are not
available, it is fair to assume that quite a large (i) Initial terms of the embargo
number of the service-sector employees were, in The impact of war and sanctions on the
924 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

economy of Iraq goes back to early August 1990 involved in obtaining formal exemptions from
when, following the invasion of Kuwait, Resolu- the Sanctions Committee, and the Committee’s
tion 661 of the UN Security Council urged all extremely narrow interpretation of the term
member states to enforce a strict embargo on all “supplies intended strictly for medical
imports to and exports from Iraq. The only items purposes. “I3 The consequences were particularly
excluded from this embargo were “supplies tragic during the war, when disastrous living
intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in conditions prevailed inside Iraq and yet humani-
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.“*o The tarian supplies were almost entirely cut off (with
same resolution also set up a Committee of the a few exceptions including one UNICEF convoy)
Security Council (hereafter the Sanctions Com- as a combined result of bombings and the
mittee) , “consisting of all the members of the embargo.
[Security] Council,” to monitor the embargo and
“to report on its work to the [Security] Council (ii) The war and the ceasefire resolution
with its observations and recommendations.” The Gulf war gave the coup de grace to an
Oddly, food supplies and medical supplies are economy already crippled by more than five
treated very differently in Resolution 661. Re- months of rigorous sanctions. Bombings caused
solution 666, passed a few weeks later, clarified extensive damage to the economic infrastructure,
the circumstances and modalities under which including oil refineries, power plants, bridges and
food might be exempted from the embargo on telecommunications. War damage and continued
exports to Iraq. After “emphasizing that it is for sanctions led to a virtual collapse not only of
the Security Council, alone or acting through the general economic activity and employment but
[Sanctions] Committee, to determine whether also of basic public services such as health care,
humanitarian circumstances have arisen,” Re- water sup ly, food distribution, sewage and
solution 666 states: sanitation. p4
In March 1991, an official UN mission led by
if the [Sanctions] Committee, after receiving the Under-Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari visi-
reports from the Secretary-General, determines ted Iraq and Kuwait, and submitted a report to
that circumstances have arisen in which there is an the Secretary-General on the humanitarian needs
urgent need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait
in order to relieve human suffering, it will report
of these countries (hereafter the “Ahtisaari
promptly to the Council its decision as to how such report”) .I5 This report, echoing earlier reports of
needs should be met; . . in formulating its WHO/UNICEF and the Gulf Peace Team,
decisions [the Sanctions Committee] should bear in warned that “the Iraqi people may soon face a
mind that foodstuffs should be provided through the further imminent catastrophe, which could in-
United Nations in co-operation with the International clude epidemics and famine, if massive life-
Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate supporting needs are not rapidly met.” i6 After
humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or reviewing the damage caused by war and sanc-
under their supervision in order to ensure that they tions on essential civilian services, the report
reach the intended beneficiaries.”
recommended that Iraq should be allowed to
In the absence of a decision by the Sanctions import food as well as a number of other items
Committee to recognize the existence of urgent closely related to essential civilian needs (e.g.,
humanitarian needs, it was impossible, before spare parts and equipment to restore water
and during the war, to deliver any foodstuffs supply and sanitation systems).
(even baby milk) to Iraq without violating the Resolution 687 of the UN Security Council
embargo. This embargo, it should be mentioned, (the “ceasefire resolution” of early April! effec-
was strictly applied by the neighboring countries tively endorsed these recommendations.’ It de-
(these countries were all hostile to Iraq, with the termined that foodstuffs could henceforth be
exception of Jordan, whose position in the imported by Iraq on simple notification of the
conflict was far too delicate to allow any detect- Sanctions Committee, while “materials and sup-
able violation of the sanctions). Illegal smuggling plies for essential civilian needs as identified in
may well have taken place, but certainly not on the [Ahtisaari] report” could be imported under
the scale required to meet a substantial propor- a simplified “no-objection procedure.” On the
tion of the enormous food needs of the Iraqi other hand, the same resolution also reaffirmed
people - more than 10,000 tons per day for Resolutions 661 and 666. The general embargo
foodgrains alone. l2 on imports was to be reviewed every sixty days by
An effective embargo also applied to medical the Security Council “in light of the policies and
supplies until well after the end of the war. This practices of the government of Iraq.“18
was due to a number of factors including the As far as exports are concerned, Resolution
blockade of the port of Aqaba, the difficulties 687 states that the embargo continues until the
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 925

Security Council is satisfied that Iraq has comple- months. The proceeds of these sales are to be
ted all actions demanded by the same resolution spent on essential humanitarian imports under
(these actions relate mainly to the destruction of UN supervision, after deduction of an appropri-
weapons). It also, however, empowers the Sanc- ate sum for war compensation, weapons destruc-
tions Committee to approve exceptions to the tion and related purposes. The resolution states
prohibition against exports from Iraq “when that the size of the allowed sales should be
required to assure adequate financial resources “sufficient to produce a sum to be determined by
on the part of Iraq” to import essential commod- the [Security] Council following receipt of the
ities exempted from the embargo on humanita- report of the Secretary-General requested in
rian grounds. paragraph 5 of this resolution but not to exceed
1.6 billion United States dollars.“22 The report
(iii) Further developments requested in paragraph 5 is expected to describe
Since the end of the Gulf war, many assess- the measures necessary to implement the resolu-
ment missions have visited Iraq and produced tion, as well as “estimates of the humanitarian
reports on the living conditions that now prevail requirements of Iraq.“23
in different parts of the country. These reports The report in question was submitted in early
show an amazing degree of agreement on the September. As far as human requirements are
basic facts: the economy is devastated; public concerned, this new report essentially reaffirms
services have severely deteriorated; people are the findings of the Aga Khan report. Confining
ill, undernourished, unemployed, impoverished itself to the most basic humanitarian needs, it
and demoralized. l9 To cite only one study, the states:
report of the Harvard Study Team (May 1991)
estimated that the number of excess deaths In conclusion, taking into account food and agricul-
tural input needs, as well as requirements for
among children aged under five in 1991 might health, water, sanitation and supplemental feeding
turn out to be as high as 170,000. programmes, the total estimates of humanitarian re-
The latest report, produced by an official UN quirements is $1.73 billion net of deductions for the
mission led by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan in other purposes stipulated in resolution 706 ( 1991).24
mid-July 1991 (hereafter the “Aga Khan re-
port”), provides sector-wise estimates of Iraq’s The needed “deductions” are estimated in the
financial needs “not only concerned with same report at US$666.3 million. Bearing in
addressing immediate requirements of humanita- mind the limit of 1.6 billion imposed by Resolu-
rian scope and nature, but also with averting a tion 706, the report concludes with implacable
crisis in the next six to twelve months.“*’ A logic:
careful reading of the report suggests that the The amount of $933.7 million estimated to be
assessed “needs” include the resources required available for purchase of humanitarian assistance is
to repair war damage in essential sectors of the approximately $800 million below the revised esti-
civilian economy such as power generation and mates of $1.73 billion (for essential humanitarian
telecommunications. These needs, calculated requirements].25
over a one-year period, add up to US$22 billion Elsewhere, the Secretary-General’s report
(of which US$3.6 billion for food, health care, adds:
water and sanitation). Under a more conserva-
tive scenario of “greatly reduced services,” the In the light of these findings, the Security Council
report arrived at a total figure of US$6.85 billion may wish to review its earlier decision to limit Iraq oil
for a one-year period (of which US$2.4 billion for sales to $US 1.6 biNion.26
food, health care, water and sanitation). The In spite of this recommendation, the Security
report recommends that Iraq should be allowed Council reaffirmed the limit of US$1.6 billion
to use funds from limited oil sales (or from when it reviewed and approved the procedures
blocked accounts), under United Nations super- suggested in the same report for implementing
vision, in order to import a range of commodities Resolution 706. At the time of writing, these
(specified in the report) required “to alleviate the procedures remain a subject of disagreement
priority needs identified by the Mission in the between UN agencies and the government of
areas of food supply, health services, water and Iraq.
sanitation, and power generation, the oil sector
and telecommunications.“21 3. EMPLOYMENT AND INCOMES
It is partly in response to these recommenda-
tions that the Security Council adopted Resolu- (a) Overvied
tion 706 (August 15, 1991), allowing Iraq limited
sales of oil and oil products over a period of six As was explained in the introduction, the
926 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

poorer sections of the Iraqi population earn their particular, increased by 1,500 - 2,000% be-
income predominantly through employment: tween August 1990 and August 1991. These
either wage employment (as in the industrial and sharp price increases have led to a corresponding
tertiary sectors) or self-employment (as in the collapse of real earnings in the secondary,
“informal” sector and much of the agricultural tertiary and informal sectors.
sector). Real earnings from employment depend In agriculture, a different scenario took place.
on three variables: the employment rate, the With output prices rising more or less at the same
level of money wages, and the price leve1.28 rate as the consumer price index, real earnings
At the risk of some simplification, and consid- must have been ap roximately proportional to
ering the workforce as a whole, one can say that, the level of output. 8)1 The latter was well below
since August 1990, these three variables have normal in most areas, due to poor rainfall and to
evolved as follows: (i) the level of employment other constraints directly related to the war and
has more or less stagnated, (ii) money wages sanctions (lack of power, spare parts, seedsferti-
have also roughly stagnated, and (iii) prices have lizers, pesticides, etc.). Available estimates sug-
increased very sharply. The net result has been a gests a decline in output of the order of 70-75%
dramatic reduction in real earnings. compared with the previous year. The implied
While examining the diverse forces that have decline in real earnings is not as large as for
produced these overall trends, it is convenient to other sectors of the economy. Given the rela-
begin by considering wage employment in the tively minor importance of agriculture in the
secondary and tertiary sectors. 9 Iraqi economy, however, the difference in the
In the private industrial sector employment has rate of decline of real earnings between agricul-
considerably declined during the last 12 months ture and other sectors could be ignored without
due to shortages of raw materials, spare parts and great loss of precision for the purpose of the
power supply. Over the same period, money present argument.
wages have risen only marginally. In both public To summarize, real private incomes from
sector industries and services, nominal wages and employment have been, as an approximation,
employment have been maintained at the pre- inversely proportional to consumer prices during
crisis levels, with the important exception of the last twelve months.32 In terms of purchasing
the armed forces, which have seen large-scale power over food, private incomes have dropped
demobilization. by a factor of 15-20 (i.e., 5-7% of their initial
In the absence of comprehensive social secur- levels) since August 1990.
ity provisions for the unemployed, the decline of
wage employment in the industrial and tertiary (b) Recent trends infoodprices
sectors has led to a roughly corresponding expan-
sion of self-employment in the “informal” sector Price movements in Iraq since the introduction
(especially street vending). Most of those who of sanctions have been primarily influenced by
lost their jobs in the industrial and tertiary three factors: (i) short-term local shortages and
sectors have taken up an informal income- speculation, (ii) quantity constraints on the
earning activity of some kind. Indeed, remaining supply of imported goods due to sanctions, and
idle is now a luxury that few can afford. (iii) depreciation of the unofficial exchange rate
Information collected in the course of our field of the Iraqi dinar.
work indicates that average monthly earnings in The first factor was certainly at work during
the informal sector are now similar to those of the war, when frequent air raids and extreme
unskilled workers in wage employment, and also petrol shortages disrupted the transport system
quite close to what they were one year ago. In and prevented markets from functioning nor-
other words, the “replacement income” earned mally. Though no price surveys were conducted
by those who shifted from wage employment to at that time, anecdotal evidence suggests that
the informal sector is quite similar (in money localized shortages and disruptions led to pheno-
terms) to their initial income. For those who have menal increases in food and other prices. Wheat
retained their initial occupation, incomes have was reportedly sold at over seven dinars per kg
also remained more or less constant. (about 140 times the mid-1990 price).
Thus, whatever the precise extent of the recent These war-time price increases caused acute
shift toward informal occupations, employment hardship. Prices did eventually come down in the
and monthly earnings in the secondary, tertiary aftermath of the war as markets started function-
and informal sectors combined must have ing again and transportation was restored. A
changed relatively little in the last 12 months.30 factor that almost certainly helped in this direc-
During the same period, consumer prices have tion was the removal of petrol rationing and a
considerably risen. The food price index, in drastic reduction in the price of petrol (the
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 927

current level is similar to the precrisis one, which for the period preceding the lifting of restrictions
is extremely low by international standards). on food imports in April 1991. According to a
Food prices nevertheless remained much market survey conducted by the World Food
above the presanctions levels. Some relevant Program, the average price of wheat flour stood
results of our price surveys, which covered rural at around six dinars per kg in March. Since then
as well as urban areas in most Governorates, are there has been a decline to the present level of 2-
reported in Table 1. 33 With the exception of 2.5 dinars. This price nevertheless remains 45
some fresh vegetables, we did not find much times higher than one year ago, and since April
variation in the prices of foodstuffs across the there has not been much movement (see Figure
country. The lack of significant interregional 1). The persistence of high food prices beyond
price disparities is indicative of a relatively April relates to drastic changes in the organiza-
efficient internal food market. tion of trade that followed the imposition of
Persistently high food prices after the war have sanctions.
been widely attributed to sanctions-induced Prior to the crisis, the government exercised
limits on the quantum of imports, leading to monopoly rights over imports of most foodstuffs.
supply constraints. This explanation is persuasive Officially it is claimed that the private sector was

Table 1. Food price increases in Iraq since sanctions began

Price per unit’ Percentage

(Iraqi dinars) increase
Food Item Aug 90 Aug 91 over 1 year

Wheat flour 0.05 2.42 4,431%

Milk (powdered) 0.75 27.33 3,561%
Bread (per piece) 0.01 0.33 2,757%
Baby milk (tin of 45Og) 0.45 10.00 2,122%
Sugar 0.20 4.42 2,108%
Cooking oil 0.48 10.33 2,038%
Rice 0.23 4.08 1,701%
Tea 1.70 23.67 1,292%
Tomato 0.27 1.25 369%
Chickpeas 0.65 2.92 349%
Potatoes 0.45 1.92 326%
Eggs (carton of 30) 3.83 12.50 250%
Onions 0.37 1.25 241%
Dates 0.52 1.75 239%
Meat (lamb) 7.00 16.33 133%
Meat (beef) 6.83 16.90 147%

All items? (high case) - - 1904%

All items? (low case) - - 1446%

Cost (at current prices) 66.00 1,010.00 1446%

of the average 1990 food
basket for a family of six
(“low case” assumptions)

Sources: Household and market surveys, August-September 1991;

FAO, 1977; unpublished data from the Ministry of Trade, Govern-
ment of Iraq. August 1990 prices were obtained by recall.
*The commodity unit is 1 kg unless stated otherwise. For each
commodity, the stated price is an unweighted average of the prices
reported in Mosul (northern Iraq), Baghdad (central Iraq) and Basra
(southern Iraq).
tFood price indices are weighted averages of individual commodity
prices; the weights are the corresponding shares of total food
expenditure in 1990. Incomplete information on 1990 expenditure
patterns was supplemented with more detailed information for 1971.
The “high case” and “low case” correspond to different assumptions
about the evolution of expenditure patterns between these two dates.
928 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

7.m

E 5.00
-

3.cxx 3.000 2 673

2.366 2 410

-eb Mar Aw MY JUn Jut Aw

991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991
Sources, Primary: Market surveys and recall August 1991.
Secondary: WFP market surveys i UN (1991b , 1991~)~ Gulf Peace Team (1991)

Figure 1. Market price for wheat j7our.

allowed to compete directly with public-sector other staple foods between Jordan and Iraq, we
food marketing, but high government procure- also find almost complete arbitrage at the unoffi-
ment prices and subsidized consumer prices cial exchange rate. This is a significant point,
made competition nearly impossible, at least in implying that nutritional deprivation in Iraq is
the case of the main staple items. not a question of deficient food supply, but one
With the imposition of sanctions in August of inadequate purchasing power.
1990, the private sector became a competitive The fact that food prices in Iraq are now quite
food importer for the first time. Traders had to close to competitive import prices has another
find their own sources of hard currency, and this important implication. It suggests that, in the
was only possible at the unofficial rates. Even future, food prices will come down only if the
prior to the sanctions the unofficial rate was exchange rate rises, or if the government resumes
about 13 times higher than the official one (the its system of comprehensive subsidies. Neither
price of the Iraqi dinar was fixed at US$3.2, while development seems likely as long as sanctions
in the black market four dinars would exchange remain in place in their present form.
for one dollar). With the onset of the sanctions The price-index calculations presented in
the dinar further lost value, and the present rate Table 1 indicate that food prices as a whole have
is around one dollar for eight dinars. For im- risen by a factor of 15-20 since August 1990.34
ported goods that were previously priced using The implications of these price increases for
the official exchange rate, market prices can be households can be easily seen from the last row
expected to have risen about 2.5 times since of this table. Whereas the average monthly food
August 1990 as a result of exchange rate move- basket for a family of six persons with one infant
ments alone. Observed increases for some such cost 66 dinars in August 1990, the same pur-
items (e.g., wheat flour) were in fact much chases cost over 1,000 dinars in August 1991.
higher. This is due to the loss of government Even after taking into account the provision of
subsidy, which compounds the effect of exchange low-price food rations through the public distri-
rate movements. bution system (on which see section 4), this
It is worth noting that the present price of figure remains as high as 800 dinars per month.
wheat flour is in fact close to the price that This estimated cost of maintaining precrisis nutri-
prevails in Jordan, which is Iraq’s main trading tional standards compares with monthly wages of
partner. This “arbitrage” suggests that quantity 12&250 dinars for most unskilled and semi-
constraints on import (and hence supply) are no skilled occupations.35
longer binding. Comparing market prices of In the next section we examine the other
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 929

important source of food acquisition, the public are collected by the agents from their customers,
distribution system, before summing up the who detach them from the ration cards.
implications of these economic changes for nutri- The agents, most of whom are ordinary grocers
tional well-being and other basic needs. with a small clientele, collect coupons every
month from their customers, pass them to the
government in exchange for food supplies, and
then supply the food to the customers. They
4. THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM charge the official ration prices and collect a
commission of 10% on sales (the remainder of
This section discusses the functioning of Iraq’s the proceeds belong to the government). In
public distribution system, and its contribution to August 1991, there were (according to the
the basic needs of the population. We shall Ministry of Trade) 48,023 agents serving local
concentrate primarily on the distribution of food, customers throughout the country.
partly because of the importance attached to The task of consumers is simply to present
nutritional issues throughout this report, and themselves every month at the local ration shop
partly because food accounts for the lion’s share with their ration card, give the required coupons
of commodities delivered through the public to the agent (one for each commodity), pay for
distribution system. 36The analysis is partly based their ration and take it home.
on a “food consumption survey” involving de- A few other features of the system deserve
tailed interviews with 58 households dispersed immediate mention. First every resident house-
throughout the country (this survey is further hold in Iraq is entitled to a ration card. The
discussed in Section 5). rations are identical for everyone throughout the
Our main findings are that Iraq’s public country, irrespective of age, sex, region, natio-
distribution system is remarkably comprehen- nality or any other criterion.39 The prices
sive, equitable, efficient and reliable. The suspi- charged for the rations, which are fixed by the
cions and criticisms it has attracted in public government, are also uniform.
debates are not well founded. Second, it is not so easy for agents to cheat
These findings, in fact, will not seem terribly their customers. They cannot claim food supplies
surprising to those acquainted with the recent from the government unless they can present
history of public provisioning in Iraq. Indeed, the coupons, and cannot obtain coupons from the
government of Iraq has a long record of active customers unless they give them a satisfactory
involvement in health care, education, food deal. Since prices and rations are uniform
distribution, social security and related fields. throughout the country, households tend to be
Notable achievements in these fields include free well informed about their entitlements, and
public health care for all, free education at all complaints are severely dealt with.
levels, food distribution at highly subsidized Third, the customers themselves also have a
prices, and income support to “destitute” house- strong interest in participating vigilantly in the
holds falling below a prespecified poverty line. system. Indeed, as will be shown shortly, food
The efficient management of food rationing since rations are a virtually indispensable means of
August 1990 is a predictable extension of these sustenance for a majority of Iraqi households.
earlier achievements.37 In conclusion, it is worth noting that Iraq’s
food distribution system relies on an effective
combination of public initiative and private
(a) Organizational and administrative features activity. The strong arm of the state allied with
the invisible hand of private incentives succeed
Iraq’s rationing system, in its present form, (as we shall see) in averting both the inequities of
was introduced in August 1990 - a few weeks market exchange and the inefficiencies of
after the inception of sanctions.38 The crucial bureaucratic control.
actors of this system are the government, the
consumers, and the private “agents” who act as
retail sellers on behalf of the government. (b) Size and implicit value of rations
The role of the government is to store ade-
quate amounts of food (either imported from What do food rations represent for the reci-
abroad or procured within the country), distri- pient households? A common way of
bute “ration cards” to the population, and supply approaching this question is to compare the
the agents. Food is supplied to the agents every quantities distributed with overall nutritional
month according to the number of “coupons” needs. In Iraq, public distribution accounts for
which they are able to produce. These coupons quite a large share of food consumption (Table 2
930 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Table 2. Composition, cost and implicit value of food rations, August 1991

Quantity Ration Market Implicit

Supplies* price price value
Commodity (kg) (in dinars) (ID) (ID)

Wheat flour 8.00 0.115 2.417 18.416

Rice 1.50 0.325 4.083 5.637
Sugar 1.50 0.225 4.417 6.288
Cooking oil 0.25 0.410 10.333 2.481
Tea 0.05 2.000 23.667 1.083
Baby milk 1.80 0.750 22.222 38.650
Full ration basket for - 11.088 219.263 208.175
a family of six
(one child under 1 year)

Source: Household survey, August-September 1991; Ministry of Trade,

Government of Iraq. Data from these two sources on the composition and cost
of food rations are in close agreement.
*Per person per month. -

shows the quantities of different items included survey alone covered 58 households), making it a
in the monthly rations). For instance, rations of point to visit remote villages, impoverished
wheat flour (the main staple foodgrain) represent neighborhoods, displaced households, ethnic
about a half of average precrisis consumption. minorities and areas where tensions between the
Considering all food items together, individual local population and the government were
food rations provide about 1,400 calories per known to be rife. Not only did we fail to find a
day, or a little less than one half of average single household without a ration card, we also
precrisis calorie intake.@ failed to find a single person who knew a
Since rations are not distributed free of household without a ration card.
charge, however, a more economically meaning- An important exception needs to be made,
ful measure of the implicit value of food rations however, for Kurdish areas outside government
can be obtained by subtracting their value at control.43 In these areas, the government simply
official prices from their value at market prices.41 does not have the authority required to adminis-
The relevant calculations appear in Table 2. ter a public distribution system. At the moment,
From this angle, too, we find that food distribu- food distribution in these areas is carried out on
tion represents a major addition to the purchas- an ad hoc basis by UN agencies, often in
ing power of Iraqi households. The monthly cooperation or consultation with peshmerga
income-in-kind from food rations for a household relief organizations. The transition from these
of size six (208 dinars) is considerably larger than temporary provisions to a system that is compati-
the monthly salary of, for example, a soldier or ble with sustainable administrative arrangements
unskilled worker.42 The role of Iraq’s public for this territory requires close attention. This is
distribution system in protecting the most vulner- especially so in view of the intensity of humanita-
able households from destitution is evidently rian needs in these areas, and of the possible
crucial. departure of UN agencies at the end of the year.
This particular problem, however, is already the
object of a great deal of expert scrutiny, and in
(c) Coverage and equity this general report we can do little more than
mention it and stress its importance.
As was mentioned earlier, all households in Closely related to the question of coverage is
Iraq are entitled to equal per capita food rations. that of equity between different sections of the
This principle is undisputed, but how it applies in population (distinguished by residence, occupa-
practice is a different matter. tion, ethnicity, ideology or similar criteria). A
Addressing this issue was one of the principal good test, in this respect, would be to check
aims of our field work. In the course of this work, whether everyone receives the same quantity
we interviewed as many households as possible of wheat flour (the main component of food
throughout the country (the formal consumption rations), or whether some receive more than
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 931

others.44 As Table 3 indicates, out of 41 house- repressive and intolerant as that of Saddam
holds for which we have information on this, 36 Hussein should turn out to be so considerate and
reported receiving the official rations of eight kg impartial in matters of food distribution. There
per person per month. Four households reported is, however, nothing new in this observation.
slightly smaller rations (6-8 kg); one household Authoritarian rulers over the world, from
reported receiving larger rations (about 9 kg).45 Pinochet in Chile to Ershad in Bangladesh (not
Thus, all our respondents did receive food to forget the al-Sabah family in Kuwait), have
rations that are very close (in most cases, equal) not hesitated to utilize food hand-outs as a way
to the official norm. of defusing tensions and containing dissent. Nor
This is not to say that irregularities of distribu- has the potential of food as a political weapon
tion are completely absent. We cannot exclude, been lost sight of by either side in the Gulf
for instance, some regional discrimination based conflict.
on the quality of food distributed. Moreover, it
would be surprising if private agents invariably (d) Efficiency and reliability
gave their customers their exact due and charged
them the exact price (in fact, a number of Our food consumption survey included ques-
respondents mentioned the possibility of some tions about the perceptions of respondents re-
petty cheating and admitted that they did not garding the functioning of the public distribution
always check the weight of each item in their system. These questions, and the discussions that
rations). We could not, however, find any evi- surrounded them, gave us an opportunity to
dence of systematic discrimination against parti- probe into a number of possible shortcomings of
cular sections of the population on a significant the system, including delivery failures, delays,
scale. queues, red tape, deficient food quality and
It may seem surprising that a regime as corruption.

Table 3. Survey of the public distribution system: Summary results

Households’ experience of the PDS Number Proportion

(1) Delivery failures:

No delivery failures since August 1990 38 70%
Failures during the war and civil conflicts* 1.5 28%
Failures at other times 1 2%
(2) Delays in supply: -
No delays 24 50%
Short delays (l-7 days) 18 38%
Long delays (8-30 days) 5 12%
(3) Queues:
Queues develop from time to time 7 12%
No queues 50 82%
(4) Reported size of wheat flour rations in August 1991:
8 kg per person (official amount) 36 88%
Less than 8 kg 4 10%
More than 8 kg 1 2%
Sample mean : 7.93 kg
Standard
Ration price of wheat flour, August 1991 (ID/kg) Price deviation
Official 0.115
Sample mean 0.141 (0.026)
Sample mean, urban 0.139
Sample mean, rural 0.148

*Out of these 15 households, 6 reported that they were compensated during the month that
followed delivery failure.
Source: Household survey, August-September 1991. Since information was not obtained on
each topic from each respondent, the total number of responses for particular topics is
usually smaller than the sample size (58).
932 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

A very positive aspect of the public distribu- needs while market purchases were prohibi-
tion system is that delivery failures (in the sense tively expensive.
of a discontinuation of food rationing in a To conclude, the subjective assessments of
particular locality in a particular month) appear households provided further indications of the
to be extremely rare. As Table 3 indicates, only high standards of public distribution in Iraq.
one of the 58 respondent households stated that
it had ever failed to obtain monthly food rations
after the period corresponding to the war and the (e) Public distribution and the army
internal conflicts that followed. During the latter
period, delivery failures did occur quite fre- It is sometimes asserted that the army is the
quently, chiefly due to the collapse of transport chief beneficiary of food distribution in Iraq, and
and communications (in some cases, but not all, that supporting the public distribution system
losing households were compensated for these would amount to supporting the armed forces.
delivery failures the following month). For all On this question, a few observations are due.
months following this troubled period, 57 out of There may well be some truth in the notion
58 households report regular deliveries. that soldiers and their families get a somewhat
A related question is that of delays. In this disproportionate share of government-provided
respect, the record is not completely unble- food. This happens in two ways. First, families
mished. Occasional delays in delivery were re- with a member in the army can continue to claim
ported by 50% of the respondents (see Table 3). food rations from the public distribution system
The length of these delays, however, rarely in the name of this member, even though he is
exceeded a few days. also fed directly by the army. In other words,
Queues were reported to be rare. Most house- these families get somewhat higher food rations
holds emphasized that there was no need to per resident member than other families.
queue, or that queues were quite short, as they This bias, however, may or may not be a
were entitled to collect their rations from the seriously objectionable one. While it does appear
local agent at any time. Some respondents to introduce an element of inequity in the system,
pointed out that the absence of queues depends families with members in the armed forces may
critically on the efficiency of the local agent. well deserve some special support, in so far as
Many agents prepare parcels for their customers, they experience some important economic and
containing the whole bundle of rationed items in social handicaps (e.g., as female-headed house-
the prescribed quantities, and hand these parcels holds with high dependency ratios).49 The issue
to the recipients whenever they visit the shop. may not be a momentous one, given the rela-
Few allegations of corruption came up in the tively small size of the inequalities involved.
course of our survey. A number of households Second, interviews with demobilized members
stated that an unscrupulous agent can always of the armed forces suggest that, aside from
manage some cheating on the quantities. There is receiving their modest monthly pay, soldiers are
also some evidence that the prices charged by allowed to eat as much as they like (this is not
agents are slightly higher than the official prices surprising, since hungry soldiers can hardly make
(see Table 3).46 The sums involved, however, are a strong army). In this respect, soldiers certainly
quite tiny as a proportion of the total value of enjoy individual privileges. But this is not all bad
food rations. Harsh penalties seem to provide news from the point of view of international food
effective deterrents against the more serious aid policy. Indeed, the very fact that the Iraqi
forms of corruption.47 army is (in all likelihood) already well-fed also
When they were asked to state what they implies that any additional food aid channelled
perceived as the shortcomings of the public through the public distribution system would be
distribution system, and the scope for improve- consumed almost entirely by the civilian Iraqi
ments, most of our respondents had remarkably population. Here again, the danger that the Iraqi
little to say.48 The answers reflected general army might be eating up food sent through
satisfaction with the system, and an appreciation international efforts to help hungry children
of its relatively efficient functioning. The only seems to have been much overrated.
complaint we frequently heard related to the The possibility remains that influential military
poor quality of the food distributed (e.g. wheat or political leaders succeed in appropriating food
flour that needs to be mixed with higher quality aid or food imports intended for the public
flour purchased on the market in order to make distribution system (presumably to sell them at a
decent bread). Aside from this, there was a high price on the open market). “Leakages” of
general demand for larger rations, as existing this kind, however, are relatively easy to detect,
rations were deemed insufficient to meet food by maintaining precise accounts of the aggregate
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 933

quantities of food that are absorbed in the both private and public channels of acquisition
system, and comparing these quantities with for a whole range of nutrition-related commod-
survey information on the rations actually ities, leading to greatly enhanced levels of
obtained by Iraqi households. A strong case can undernutrition. In this section, we examine this
be made for improved monitoring, but not for process with reference to food itself. This is
dispensing with the system altogether. partly because food is the most basic ingredient
of adequate nutrition, and partly because other
ingredients (especially health care and related
(f) Concluding comments public services) are dealt with in great detail in
other contributions to the International Study
Iraq’s public distribution system is quite an Team report.
exemplary one in terms of coverage, equity,
efficiency, and contribution to the nutritional
needs of the population. 5o Whatever the motives (a) War and famine
that underlie its long-standing commitment to the
provision of cheap food, the government of Iraq During the war, both private and public
is very unlikely to take the risk of withdrawing or channels of food acquisition were comprehen-
even reducing food rationing in the near future sively disrupted. As a result, a large majority of
(unless it runs out of resources); at a time of the population went hungry.‘l
much-eroded public support for the regime, the As far as market acquisition is concerned, one
political value of this widely appreciated program consideration is that economic activity came to a
is greater than ever. virtual standstill during the war as fuel, transport,
Iraq’s public distribution system is therefore an communications, power, raw materials and spare
asset that can and should bereckoned with in the parts were found wanting. Deprived of their
planning of humanitarian assistance. It is not a ordinary sources of income, households could
perfect system, but its weaknesses are easy to only buy food from their savings, or by selling
monitor and correct, and despite some imperfec- their assets (this they did on a massive scale). At
tions it can achieve enormously more than any the same time, however, exorbitant food prices
hastily built system of alternative distribution greatly restricted the scope and viability of such
under international auspices. The crucially transactions. As the continued bombing of roads
needed contribution of the international com- (including that linking Baghdad with Amman)
munity is not to feed the Iraqi population made transport and trade highly perilous activi-
directly, or even to act as a watchdog of the ties, local shortages quickly developed, and food
government’s efforts, but to ensure that the prices reached extremely high levels, with wide
government has the means to sustain, even disparities emerging between different regions.
expand, its own public distribution system. This, The situation was considerably aggravated by
surely, is the most viable way of relieving the temporary disruption of the rationing system.
nutritional deprivation in Iraq. With the breakdown of normal channels of
transport, communication and administration,
food distribution failed in many areas (including,
5. HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ at times, Baghdad).”
These “entitlement failures” led to widespread
The ability of households to satisfy their basic hunger. Very few of the households we inter-
needs depends on what they can acquire both viewed reported eating normally during the war.
through private purchases and through public Food deprivation ranged from eating a single
provisioning. In the case of nutritional needs, the daily meal of dates and tomatoes, or of barley
relevant commodities would include not only and wild spinach, to giving up meat and other
food but also health care, clean water, epidemi- “superior” foods. Our survey of 58 households
ological protection, etc. Indeed, the nutritional dispersed through the country strongly suggests
status of a person is not just a question of food, that the average Iraqi household had a highly
but also of these complementary inputs enabling inadequate diet during the war.53
him or her to achieve the efficient transformation The same survey clearly brings out that most of
of food intake into physical well-being. For the “indicators” that are now recognized in the
instance, contaminated water can cause diarrhea, economic literature as being commonly associ-
which substantially increases a person’s vulnera- ated with famine situations were discernible in
bility to undernutrition even without any change Iraq during the war: drastic reduction of food
in food intake. intake; exorbitant food prices; consumption of
War and sanctions in Iraq have threatened wild plants and other “famine foods”; large-scale
934 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

depletion of household assets; and even the much higher than the corresponding mid-1990
emergence of open conflicts between family prices. And, most importantly, the public distri-
members (sometimes leading to physical fights) bution of food quickly resumed.
over the allocation of food. The only related This momentary improvement, however, did
indicator of which we have no evidence is mass not lead to a process of sustained economic
migration in search of food. Most households, recovery. In fact, it is far from clear that the
however, could not have expected to gain much economic situation in Iraq has significantly im-
from migrating, since no public relief was avail- proved in recent months. Food prices have not
able anywhere. Their best bet was to remain in changed very much since April, when food
place and hope for a prompt resumption of public sanctions were lifted (see section 3). Lay-offs in
distribution through normal channels. the private sector have continued (as the pros-
Mortality data provide further indications of pect of continued sanctions made it increasingly
the intensity of food deprivation during the war. costly to “hoard” labor), while public-sector
The International Study Team’s mortality survey employment has stagnated. Money wages have
(which covered about 9,000 households) indi- remained fairly constant (although increases of
cates that infant mortality rates for the period the order of 30% in the public sector were
January-August 1991 were nearly three times as announced in early September). Increasing com-
high as during the precrisis period.54 Monthly petition has also kept the lid on individual
mortality rates are not available, but it is likely earnings in the “informal sector.” Some expan-
that mortality rates were particularly high during sion of public distribution has taken place, but
the war. Indeed, most of the respondents of our not on the scale required to compensate for these
survey stated that the war (and, in some areas, adverse trends.
the internal conflicts that followed) had been Living conditions in Iraq therefore remain
the period of greatest hardship in the last 12 extremely precarious. Although the threat of
months. famine has subsided (and is not likely to
This is not to say that these excess infant reemerge as long as the public distribution
deaths occurred mainly as a direct result of system functions), poverty and nutritional depri-
bombings. In fact, civilian casualties from bomb- vation persist on an endemic scale.
ings were reported to be very low in all the areas Telling indications of the extent of poverty and
we visited. Most of the babies who lost their lives hunger in Iraq today can be obtained by consid-
during the war period must have died from ering the current levels of real wages and
diseases related to poor nutrition, lack of clean incomes. Tables 4 presents some relevant data,
water and related deprivations. and some tentative comparisons of labor earnings
It is, in sum, not an exaggeration to say that with various benchmarks. These calculations
famine conditions prevailed during the war.55 suggest that real monthly earnings for unskilled
People did not migrate en masse, or die of labor as well as in most other occupations are?
starvation on the side of the road, as one often (i) less than 7% of what they were in August
witnesses in more spectacular famines. But mil- 1990;
lions experienced the quiet pangs of hunger (ii) lower than the benchmark used by the
inside their homes, and food deprivation contri- government of Iraq before August 1990
buted to the sharp increase of mortality. to identify “destitute households” eligible
The links between war and famine are familiar for social security payments;
to students of the grisly history of hunger in the (iii) much lower than the cost of purchasing
world. Most famines in the recent past have been the average 1990 food basket for Iraq;
associated with war, and few wars have failed to (iv) lower than the monthly earnings of un-
threaten the ability of the affected populations to skilled agricultural laborers in India (one
feed themselves. The Gulf war was no exception. of the poorest countries in the world);
(v) lower than the “poverty line” used by the
government of India (calculated for Iraq
(b) Recent developments in terms of calorie-purchasin -power
equivalence at current prices). 5B
The period that immediately followed the war If, instead of considering monthly earnings in
witnessed some easing of the constraints that had the usual sense, we consider “effective” monthly
made food acquisition so problematic during the earnings, in the sense of earnings inclusive of the
war itself. Some wage employment opportunities implicit value of food rations, these conclusions
reemerged, even though they remained much remain broadly applicable (although the
below precrisis levels. Food prices climbed down observed decline of earnings is somewhat less
from their war-time peak, though they stayed pronounced in that case).
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 935

The individual calculations presented in Tables durables, etc.) in order to maintain minimum
4a and 4b are, inevitably, somewhat tentative, consumption standards.58
and in the absence of reliable information on the The fact that many poor households in Iraq do
occupational distribution of the population they own assets, which they can sell in order to buy
do not enable us to determine precisely how food, is superficially comforting, to the extent
many households in Iraq fall under particular that it enables them to spend a little more than
income thresholds. The overall picture, however, what they earn in the short run. But it also means
of endemic poverty that emerges is certainly that they are vulnerable to running out of assets
quite robust, and some broad inferences can be to sell. In the course of our survey, we encoun-
made with some confidence. For instance, these tered many households who reported having
tables very strongly suggest that, in terms of reached that stage. The same respondents often
current income, a majority of Iraqi households stated that, for them, things had got worse rather
are now below the Indian “poverty line.” This is than better in the last few months. There is a
quite striking, especially if one remembers that serious danger that more and more households
the corresponding proportion in India itself is will face this predicament during the next few
now well below 50%. months.
As will be seen shortly, these drastically As assets gradually run out, it will become
reduced incomes have two consequences. First, more and more difficult for Iraqi households to
consumption standards have greatly deteriorated “live above their means” (i.e., to maintain
in 1991. Many households now spend virtually all consumption standards that bear little relation to
their income on food, and even then they’cannot their current incomes). Correspondingly, well-
afford diets comparable to those they enjoyed being indicators are likely to deteriorate toward
before August 1990. Second, households have to levels that reflect much-reduced entitlements.
sell their assets (jewelry, furniture, consumer Unless some regeneration of incomes and public

Table 4a. Nominal and “effective” earnings by occupation, August 1991

Monthly earnings (ID) for

6-member households with
2 earning adults
Nominal “Effective”
Occupation earnings earnings

Conscript, starting 170 378

Clerk, government 240 448
Casual street vending 240 448
Unskilled worker, public sector 260 468
Medical assistant 260 468
Conscript, experienced 330 538
Unskilled worker, private sector 3.50 558
Postman 360 568
Daily-wage labor (unskilled) 360 568
Primary teacher, public sector 360 568
Civil service official (middle ranking) 400 608
Professional soldier 440 648
Electrician, public sector 550 658
Semi-skilled worker, private sector 5.50 658
Skilled technician, private sector 1,200 1,408
Blacksmith 1,250 1,458
Bus driver, self-employed 2,000 2,208
Taxi driver, self-employed 2,750 2,958
Engineer, private sector 4,000 4,208

*Effective earnings are obtained by adding the implicit value of food

rations (see Table 2) to nominal earnings.
Source: Estimates based on household and factory surveys, August-
September 1991. The assumed labor-force participation rate of 33% is
based on the optimistic hypothesis a substantial increase compared to the
precrisis value of 25%.
936 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

provisioning takes place, it is quite possible that a reported that every month since the beginning of
large part of the population in Iraq will soon the war had been hard, and that things had not
experience rates of undernutrition, morbidity improved much. A regional pattern is evident in
and mortality comparable to those that prevail in the first two replies - households in the south
countries such as India. overwhelmingly found it difficult from January
until March, while those away from the “trou-
bles” had most serious problems in January and
(c) Insights from a household survey February only. What is worth noting is that
similar proportions of households in the south
A survey of 58 households scattered in diffe- and elsewhere stated that hardship continued or
rent parts of Iraq was conducted in late August was increasing.
and early September. The aim of the survey was It is also significant that, on the whole, the
to gather information on food consumption households for which hardship continued beyond
behavior during and since the war, as well as on March were also the poorer ones to start with
the public distribution system (our findings on (many of them had run out of assets to sell). For
the latter subject are reported in section 4). convenience, we shall refer to these households
No systematic sampling procedure was fol- as “most vulnerable.”
lowed. Our concern was not with formal statis- As Table 5 indicates, only 16% of the sample
tical inference, and we simply adopted the households consumed any meat during the har-
undemanding method of picking a household at dest period. By August 63% had resumed some
random from time to time (by knocking on the consumption, but in most cases at very modest
nearest door) in the areas we visited. These areas levels by precrisis standards. Among “most
were characterized by great diversity, as we vulnerable” households, only 17% were eating
wished to see the country in all its aspects any meat in August 1991.
(affluent neighborhoods were somewhat ne- A majority of the households (58%) skipped
glected, but they account for a small part of the meals during their difficult period. Among the
total population). While the sample cannot claim remaining households, many reported that they
to be representative, it is also unlikely to suffer had to prepare three meals a day for the sake of
from some devastating bias. children, but that the size of meals had been
To the question, what was the most difficult much reduced during that period.
period for the fulfillment of food needs, we Only 14% of sample households maintained
received a clear set of responses: 15 respondents their normal dietary patterns during the hard
said it was during the war, 22 mentioned the war period, while another 8% consumed close to
and the “troubles” (as the postwar internal their usual diets. One in 10 volunteered the
conflicts were referred to), and another 15 information that they had resorted to some form

Table 4b. Estimates of labor earnings in Iraq (August 1991), compared with various benchmarks*

Estimatet
Description of the estimated variable (ID/month) Index

Nominal monthly earnings, unskilled labor (public sector) 260 100

“Effective” monthly earnings, unskilled labor (public sector) 468 180
Monthly earnings of unskilled labor in India (in calorie-purchasing-power equivalent) 482 185
Value of the Indian poverty line in terms of “calorie-purchasing-power equivalence” 661 257
Value of the “destitution line” which the government of Iraq used before August 1990 to
identify households eligible for social security paymentst 835 321
Value of the average 1990 food basket* 1,010 388
Value of precrisis real earnings of unskilled labor (public sector)* 4,022 1,547

Sources: Calculated from Government of India (1985) and (1990), Acharya (1988), Minhas, Jain and Tendulkar
(1991), and data on Iraq presented elsewhere in this paper.
*Notes: The calculations for India are based on 1987 data for rural Uttar Pradesh (a slightly poorer-than-average
state). “Calorie-purchasing-power equivalence” is defined with reference to the local staple (wheat for both Iraq
and Uttar Pradesh). The Indian poverty line is defined as the level of income (more precisely, expenditure) at
which minimum calorie requirements are satisfied, taking into account observed expenditure patterns.
tAI1 figures are at August 1991 prices, in monthly terms, for a household of size six with two earning adults.
$The lower estimate of the food price index (see Table 1) has been used as deflator.
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 937

Table 5. Food consumption survey: Percentage of households in different groups with

particular characteristics

Households for
Households for which which hardship
Jan-March was the continues or
hardest period increases All households

Main diet during hardest period

Famine foods 6% 20% 10%
Bread, dates, tea 21% 27% 23%
Bread, rice, vegetables 48% 47% 48%
Near normal diet 9% 0% 6%
Normal diet 15% 7% 13%
Whether missed meals during hardest period
Missed 51% 73% 58%
Did not miss 49% 27% 42%
Meat consumption
Hardest period 20% 7% 16%
August 1991 79% 17% 63%
Asset sales
No sales reported 40% 0% 31%
Sales to buy food 50% 33% 46%
No assets to sell 10% 67% 23%

Source: Household survey (58 households), August-September 1991.

of “famine food” or other; for the most vulner- them have seen some improvement since then. It
able households the ratio was as high as 20%. A is a matter of great concern, however, that a
common famine food in the south was a spinach- substantial number see their conditions as de-
like wild plant called khabaas or tulu. People also teriorating, and do not see much prospect for
ate coarser cereals, and one household reported improvement in the near future.
having to extract edible matter from reed stalks.
Another one (in the south) mentioned being
totally deprived of food for seven days, during 6. OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION
the “troubles” - even the children had nothing
to eat for a whole week. During the hard period, (a) Overview of findings
the vast majority survived on low-cost foods such
as bread and dates, or bread and tea. (i) More than a year of sanctions, war and
During the informal discussions with several internal conflicts have had a disastrous impact on
respondents, we learned of open quarrels within the economy of Iraq. The termination of oil
the family (and even physical fights) over the revenues has undermined the extensive involve-
allocation of food. In one household we were ment of the government in the economy through
told that when the children cried of hunger, they public employment, public subsidies, public in-
were simply sent out to look for anything they frastructure and public services. Private econo-
could find. mic activity is greatly reduced by the lack of raw
Asset sales for the purpose of buying food materials, spare parts, power supply, and infra-
were also common among our respondents. structural services. A bloated “informal sector,”
Among the most vulnerable households, many providing extremely low real earnings, has be-
said that they had run out of assets to sell. A come the main source of livelihood for millions of
number of them survived almost exclusively from persons. The sustainability of this informal sector
the food rations they obtained from the public in the near future is threatened by the general
distribution system, and had severely restricted erosion of purchasing power.
their open-market purchases of most food items. (ii) As a result of this economic crisis, real
These results broadly confirm the existence of wages and private incomes in Iraq have fallen
famine conditions during and soon after the war dramatically since August 1990. In terms of
for the majority of households. A number of
938 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

purchasing power over food, they have declined reduced diet quality (for the majority of the
by a factor of 15-20 on average (i.e. 57% of population).
their initial levels). The driving force behind this (vii) Even after taking into account the implicit
decline has been the increase of prices, combined value of food rations, a majority of households in
with the stagnation of employment and money Iraq now earn real incomes below the Indian
wages. Real wages in Iraq are now among the “poverty line” (in terms of calorie purchasing-
lowest in the world. power). In that sense, the incidence of poverty in
(iii) Food rationing plays an invaluable role in Iraq today is greater than in India. The average
supplementing private incomes. The public dis- household subsists largely by dissavings and
tribution system is comprehensive, equitable, selling assets (gold, consumer durables, animals,
efficient and (as far as we can tell) relatively free etc.). There is a serious danger that, if economic
from corruption.5g It provides a very effective recovery fails to take place in the next few
“safety net” protecting the vulnerable sections of months, more and more households will be
the population from total destitution. The public driven to extreme poverty as their assets run out.
distribution system on its own, however, falls far
short of guaranteeing adequate food intakes.
(iv) The sharp decline of real incomes, inade- (b) Concluding comments
quately compensated by the expansion of food
distribution, has greatly reduced the ability of It is not our intention to defend a particular
Iraqi households to nourish themselves ade- position in the current debate on economic
quately (and to satisfy their other basic needs). sanctions against Iraq.60 Our enquiry, however,
Inadequate diets, along with the deterioration of would be incomplete if we failed to take note of
basic public services other than food distribution the implications of our findings for some impor-
(e.g., health care, water supply, sewage, and tant aspects of this debate.
sanitation), have led inter alia to sharp increases Before entering this discussion, one general
in mortality rates. Child mortality during the point deserves emphasis. The “effects of the
January-August 1991 period was 3-4 times higher sanctions” have often been analyzed in terms of
than during the corresponding eight-month what these sanctions do to aggregate commodity
period in 1990. supplies - how far food supplies, or medical
(v) The period of most intense deprivation supplies, or the supply of cement fall short of
since August 1990 was that of the war (and, in ordinary levels. What really matters, however, is
some areas, of the ensuing internal conflicts). how the sanctions affect the ability of households
During that period, famine conditions prevailed. (or enterprises, in the case of raw materials and
The comprehensive disruption of transport, com- intermediate inputs) to acquire the commodities
munications, power supply and administration in question. “Effective sanctions” in that sense
paralyzed economic activity and employment. In can be quite different from what sanctions look
the absence of income generation, and with food like, based on supply-centered analysis.
prices reaching their peak, market acquistion For instance, now that the embargo on food
became extremely difficult. The public distribu- imports has been lifted, it is tempting to assume
tion system also ceased to function in many that there is no need to worry about the food
areas. As a result, millions of people saw their situation in Iraq. Indeed, food seems to be
food intake reduced to unsustainably low levels readily available from neighboring countries and
(e.g., a single daily meal of dates and tomatoes, in that sense “food supply” is no longer a
or of barley and wild spinach). Famine conditions problem. As we saw in this report, however,
would have developed even further had the war nutritional deprivation remains endemic, and
not promptly come to an end. may even be increasing. Effective sanctions on
(vi) Immediately after the war, some improve- food remain, due to the crippling effects of
ment did take place, as the public distribution general sanctions on economic activity and em-
system resumed its normal functioning, food ployment, despite the formal exemption spelled
prices declined a little and some wage employ- out in Resolution 687 and the ready availability
ment opportunities reemerged. The continuation of food from neighboring countries.
of sanctions, however, has prevented this mo- The notion of effective sanctions is also re-
mentary improvement from leading to sustained levant to the much-discussed issue of “evasion.”
economic recovery. As a result, the purchasing The extent to which Iraq is able to evade the
power of wages remains negligible, and endemic sanctions through smuggling and covert imports
poverty persists. Food deprivation is still wide- has been the object of a good deal of speculation.
spread, in the form of both insufficient intake From the point of view of the “entitlement”
(for the poorer sections of the population) and approach followed in this report, however, these
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 939

speculations are quite irrelevant. Indeed, our cines, but also to imports (under the “accelerated
findings on the decline of real wages and purchas- no-objection procedure”) of “materials and sup-
ing power implicitly incorporate any easing of plies for essential civilian needs as identified in the
economic hardship that might be attributable to [Ahtisaari report] and in any further findings
smuggling and other covert operations. of humanitarian need by the [Sanctions]
With this background, we offer three conclud- committee.“64 It may be recalled that both the
ing remarks on the issue of the future course of Ahtisaari report of March 1991 and the Aga
economic sanctions. Khan report of July 1991 (which, as an official
UN report to the Secretary-General, surely
(i) Food rationing and the role of the state counts as “further findings of humanitarian
Sustaining the public distribution system in needs”) provided lists of materials and supplies
Iraq is clearly the key to famine prevention in the for essential civilian needs covering a wide range
short run. If the public distribution system runs of commodities. These included food, drugs,
out of supplies or breaks down for some other vaccines, medical equipment, fertilizers, pesti-
reason, widespread starvation is almost certain to cides, agricultural machinery and spare parts,
result. The system works well, and it would be generators, water treatment equipment, sewage
senseless to attempt to supplant it with a parallel disposal equipment, means of alternative com-
distribution system administered by the United munication, and the inputs required to regener-
Nations or other international bodies, as has ate essential domestic power su ply, fuel produc-
been suggested from time to time in public tion and telecommunications. 8
debates. ’ Rather, the crucial need is to ensure It is, therefore, hard to reconcile the stringent
that the government of Iraq has the financial limit of US$1.6 billion on oil exports imposed by
means to sustain (or, even better, expand) the Resolution 706 (of which less than US$l billion
existing system of public distribution.62 will be actually available for humanitarian purpo-
At a more general level, the pervasive involve- ses) with the stated principles of the embargo and
ment of the state in different aspects of the the conclusions of recent reports submitted to the
economy in Iraq is a fact that cannot be ignored. Secretary-General at the request of the Security
Whether one looks at food distribution, or Council. As was discussed in section 2 this limit
employment generation, or prices and wages, or falls far short of even the most conservative of all
international trade, the government is the crucial the estimates of Iraq’s humanitarian needs con-
actor. The cooperation of the government in the tained in these reports.
planning and implementation of relief efforts is Resolution 706 explicitly mentions that the
essential. limit on oil exports is “subject to review concur-
rently by the [Security] Council on the basis of
(ii) Public provisioning and export restrictions its ongoing assessment of the needs and
It is difficult to understand why a narrow limit requirements. 7’66The matter should not be consi-
should be imposed on Iraq’s exports of oil, if - dered closed.
as specified in Resolution 706 - the proceeds
from oil sales are earmarked for the provision of (iii) Sanctions and economic recovery
essential “humanitarian” needs under close UN While public provisioning can avert famine,
supervision. The government of Iraq has a epidemics, and other confined catastrophes, it
proven ability, and strong political incentives, to cannot - on its own - form the basis of the
expand public provisioning on a large scale - not economic transformation that is required to
only in the domain of food rationing but also in enable the population to satisfy its basic needs.
those of health care, education, water supply, Achieving that objective crucially depends on the
sewage, sanitation, and power supply, among regeneration of general economic activity and
others. Allowing this process to take place would employment.
not conflict with the current directives and stated Indeed, even in the unlikely event where
aims of the embargo.63 further export exemptions allowed the govern-
Indeed, Resolution 687 clearly empowers the ment to expand public provisioning much beyond
Sanctions Committee (in effect, the Security current levels, widespread deprivation would
Council) to authorize “exceptions to the prohibi- persist. Such exemptions might make it possible,
tion against the import of commodities and for instance, to increase food rations to levels
products originating in Iraq” when these are that cover minimum calorie requirements (or
“required to assure adequate financial resources even to restore the precrisis system of food
on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities subsidies). However, adequate nutrition, good
under paragraph 20”; these activities refer not health and decent human living are not just a
only to unrestricted purchases of food and medi- question of staple-food intake, but also one of
940 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

adequate health care, clothing, fuel, shelter, etc. (iv) Concluding comments
Economic activity and employment are indis- Perhaps the issue of sanctions goes beyond the
pensable means of generating the ability to basic considerations of this final section. The
acquire these complementary ingredients of basic force of that view, however, depends on what
living. This is so not only because many of the one accepts as the “humanitarian needs” of the
commodities concerned are typically acquired people of Iraq. If their essential needs are
through the market, but also because effective deemed to consist only of staple food, as with
public provisioning itself often depends crucially farm animals, then it may be possible to argue
on the availability of inputs that are the product that these needs can be met through ad hoc relief
of general economic activity. A hospital full of measures financed by a small exemption from the
imported drugs, for instance, is of little use ban on oil exports (as proposed in Resolution
without electricity, water supply, telephones, 706), while the general paralysis of the economy
vehicles, air conditioning, stationery, typewri- continues to deprive millions of their ordinary
ters, and many other items. Public provisioning means of living. But if the Iraqi people are
without economic regeneration can only trans- considered to have an inalienable right to the
form Iraq into a vast refugee camp. necessities of life in a broader sense - including
The private sector, despite its relatively small not only food but also clean water, health care,
size by international standards, has an inescap- shelter, education, clothing, etc. -then it would
able role to play in the process of economic be hard to reconcile the protection of this right
regeneration. Given the current structure of with the continuation of the embargo in its
Iraq’s economy (including its system of property present form. If humanitarian needs are those
rights), many commodities are most efficiently defined by our basic rights as human beings, they
supplied through market mechanisms. Also, do go much beyond what the Iraqi economy can
public-sector production and private-sector pro- deliver as things stand.
duction are inextricably linked through the econ- The implementation of the ceasefire resolu-
omy’s input-output system. One sector cannot tion, which officially motivates the continuation
operate without the other. of sanctions against Iraq, is a serious issue. The
The regeneration of the economy would also safe disposal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruc-
be impossible in the absence of some resumption tions, demanded by this resolution, is a particu-
of international trade. Indeed, as we saw earlier, larly legitimate concern (as is, indeed, the safe
pervasive linkages connect almost every part of disposal of weapons of mass destruction every-
the Iraqi economy with international trade. where). But it would be tragic if this concern
Imported raw materials and spare parts are unleashed the destructive power of another
crucial inputs in many sectors (from agriculture weapon of mass destruction - the effective
to most types of manufacturing). The supply of withdrawal of food and other necessities from the
consumer goods, which give money wages their Iraqi people.
real value, depends overwhelmingly either on the
processing of imported products (food, textiles, 7. POSTSCRIPT (FEBRUARY 1992)
construction materials, etc.), or on direct im-
ports. Even earnings from domestic labor servi- As this paper goes to press, there is little sign of
ces in the “informal sector” largely derive from any improvement in living conditions in Iraq, or
the purchasing power generated in sectors more of any easing of the political tensions that sustain
closely linked with international trade. In the the continuation of the embargo. The Zraqi gov-
absence of international trade, economic activity ernment has shown great reluctance to cooperate
stagnates at extremely low levels - especially with the implementation of the ceasefire resolu-
when the effects of sanctions are compounded by tion, or even with Resolution 706 relating to the
war-related destruction. limited sale of oil for humanitarian purposes. The
War and prolonged sanctions have caused such US administration, for its part, is committed to the
comprehensive damage to the Iraqi economy that enforcement of strict sanctions as long as Saddam
it is impossible to maintain these sanctions in Hussein is in power; an unfortunate consequence
their present form without perpetuating, and of this policy is that the Iraqi leader has little
perhaps even accentuating, the state of acute incentive to change his ways, since the sanctions
poverty in which a large part of the population is are likely to continue no matter what he does. The
now plunged. The debate about sanctions cannot Iraqi population remains hostage to this shared
ignore this simple truth. intransigence.
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 941

NOTES

1. See International Study Team (1991). 14. On this, see United Nations (1991a, 1991b) and
Harvard Study Team (1991), among others.
2. We personally collected information in 11 of
Iraq’s 18 govemorates, and visited each of the main 15. United Nations (1991~).
regions. We have also made use of information on the
other seven governorates collected with our guidance 16. United Nations (1991c), p. 13.
by other members of the International Study Team
during the same period. 17. In fact, a “letter dated 22 March 1991 from the
President of the Security Council addressed to the
3. See United Nations (1991a), (1991b). Secretary-General” (Security Council Document S/
22400) had already indicated that these recommenda-
4. See Drtze and Sen (1989, 1990), and the litera- tions were accepted by the Security Council.
ture cited there.
18. UN Security Council, Resolution 687, para 21.
5. No attempt is made in this report to distinguish
precisely between the effects of the Gulf war and those 19. See, for instance, Bhatia, Kawar and Shahin
of the internal conflicts that followed. While these (1991), Bloem, Farook and Kuttab (1991), Cainkar
conflicts may have had deep roots, their outburst was (1991a, 1991b), Dammers (1991), Dobson (1991),
not unconnected with the war itself. Further, the lasting Doheny (1991a, 1991b), Dreze (1991), Field and
effects of these internal conflicts on the economy were Russell (1991), Gottstein (1991), Grace (1991), Gulf
dwarfed by those of the Gulf war and the sanctions. Peace Team (1991), Harvard Study Team (1991),
This is not to deny that internal conflicts may well have Hoskins (1991a, 1991b), Kandela (1991), Lee and
taken a comparable or even greater toll in terms of Haines (1991), Medical Education Trust (1991),
direct casualties and immediate human misery. OXFAM/Save the Children Fund (1991), Rice (1991),
Save the Children Fund (1991a, 1991b), United
6. This section draws inter alia on Ockerman and Nations (1991b, 1991c), Zurbrigg (1991), among
Samano (1985), Economist Intelligence Unit (1990), others.
Farouk-Sluglett (1987), Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (1990a, 1990b), Hussain (1990), Government of 20. United Nations (1991b), p. 8.
Iraq (various years), and various contributions in
Niblock (1982). 21. United Nations (1991b). p. 9.

7. Government of Iraq (1990). 22. UN Security Council, Resolution 706, paragraph

1. The rationale of the 1.6 billion limit is not explained
8. According FAO data for 1988, the most impor- in the resolution.
tant components of these food imports are food grains
(36%) meat products (16%) and sugar (10%). 23. UN Security Council, Resolution 706, paragraph
5.
9. In the course of our extensive contacts with
households and individuals in Iraq, we found that a 24. United Nations (1991c), Annex I, paragraph 22;
large proportion of them either had a male member in emphasis added.
military service, or included someone recently released
from service. 25. United Nations (1991a), paragraph 42; emphasis
added.
10. UN Security Council, Resolution 661 (August 6),
paragraph 3; italics added. 26. United Nations (1991a), Annex I, paragraph 15;
emphasis added.
11. UN Security Council, Resolution 666 (September
13, 1990), paragraph 5 and 6; italics added. 27. For a detailed sector-wise, analysis of economic
activity in Iraq in 1991, as well as for case studies of
12. This figure is based on Food and Agriculture selected industrial units, see Dreze and Gazdar (1991).
Organization (1990a, 1990b) data on precrisis food
consumption in Iraq. 28. For convenience of exposition, we refer to earn-
ings in self-employment as “wages.” The “employment
13. On the effective embargo on medical supplies rate” is defined here in terms of persons, rather than
before and during the war, see Hoskins (1991a, 1991b), person-days. Correspondingly, “money wages” refer to
and the wide-ranging professional testimonies con- wages per person, rather than per day of work.
tained in the documentary The Other War (produced by
Tessa Shaw and Christina Pearce). According to Dr. 29. For analytical purposes, the army can be consi-
Hoskins, imports of medical supplies between August dered, at this stage in the argument, as part of the
1990 and the end of the war were only about 3% of the “tertiary sector.” The large-scale demobilization of
normal levels. soldiers since the end of the war can be seen as one part
942 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

of the overall picture of reduced employment in that tion at subsidized prices. The public distribution system
sector in recent months. as it exists today builds partly on that earlier experi-
ence.
30. Two considerations somewhat qualify this general
argument in opposite directions: (a) skilled laborers 39. Children below the age of one do not receive the
who have shifted from formal to informal employment standard rations. Instead, they are entitled to monthly
may have experienced some decline in money earnings rations of milk-based “infant formula” (currently four
(however, skilled laborers have been relatively success- tins of 450 gm each), if the mother can produce a
ful in retaining their formal sector jobs); (b) labor force certificate stating that she is unable to breast-feed
participation rates may have increased a little, as a properly.
number of women and children joined the informal
sector to supplement household earnings. Note that the 40. This statement is based on our own calculations,
departure of many foreign workers from Iraq since based on information for precrisis consumption from
August 1990 does not affect the reasoning pursued in United Nations (1991c, Annex I) and United Nations
this section. (1991b, Annex 2). The latter study (and WHO/
UNICEF, 1991) suggests that the calorie content of
31. This statement applies to the combined real food rations has risen quite substantially since the war,
earnings of cultivators and laborers. We have no when it stood at 7%1,000 calories per day.
reliable information on possible changes in the distribu-
tion of income between these two groups. 41. Indeed, when a household acquires food rations,
it has to surrender a sum of money equal to the value of
32. It is worth noting that this statement also applies these rations at official prices, but it also acquires
to the recipients of pensions and other social security income-in-kind equal to their value at market prices
payments, since these payments have not increased in (i.e., it economizes the income that would have been
money terms since August 1990. needed to purchase these rations at market prices). The
difference is the net (implicit) income transfer.
33. The findings of these market surveys are in broad
agreement with those reported in earlier studies, e.g., 42. For a comparison with wages see Table 4a.
the Ahtisaari and Aga Khan reports (United Nations,
1991b, 1991~). 43. We did not visit these areas ourselves, but we
have benefited from observations made in these areas
34. The food price indices presented in Table 1 are by other members of the International Study Team.
based on presanctiom consumer expenditure patterns,
and it may be argued that they would, for that reason, 44. The test is more difficult to carry out (and also less
tend to overestimate the increase of food prices (since significant) for other commodities, because respon-
the scope for “substitution” in response to price dents are not always clear about the precise quantities
changes is ignored). The bias is, however, likely to be they receive for the secondary items, especially when
small, since compensated demands for essential food these quantities cannot be expressed in round numbers.
commodities are typically quite “inelastic.” Note also In the case of wheat, the norm of 8 kg per person per
that food price indices for poor households specifically month is generally understood.
would have risen to higher levels than those indicated
in Table 1, since these households tend to spend a 45. The plausibility of these reported deviations from
relatively large proportion of their income on staple the norm is somewhat questionable. In a number of
foods, which are precisely the items that have seen the cases, per capita rations had to be inferred by dividing
highest price rises since August 1990. the reported total quantity obtained by the reported
number of household members. This is not an entirely
35. See Table 4a for more detailed information on reliable procedure, as it compounds two possible
wage levels in different occupations. sources of error.

36. Other commodities that have been distributed 46, According to the survey results reported in Table
from time to time since August 1990 include soap, razor 3, agents charge slightly higher prices in rural areas
blades and tobacco. The rations distributed, however than in urban areas (although the difference is not
- and the implicit income transfers they represent - statistically significant). This may reflect the greatest
are small and of marginal relevance to the concerns of awareness of official prices, and lesser vulnerability to
this report. cheating, of urban residents.

37. The extensive involvement of the state in public 47. We were told, for instance, that attempts to
provisioning fits with the “socialist” ideology of the obtain a second ration card are punished with immedi-
Ba’ath party, but may also derive from other political ate exclusion from the public distribution system. Aside
or ideological motives. from the deterrent effects of penalties, it is worth
noting that the incentives to cheat are, in some respects,
38. Before August 1990, food was not rationed, but quite low. For instance, under the coupons system,
the Ministry of Trade already had a long record of agents have no incentive to sell the rations on the open
involvement in the importation of food and its distribu- market (as often happens under different administra-
 HUNGER AND POVERTY IN IRAQ 943

tive arrangements), since the implicit value of a coupon a country highly dependent on food imports) which
is the same as the market value of the amount of food it proved fatal. Many of our respondents commented
gives access to. that, during the Iran-Iraq war, they had not experi-
enced anything like the decline of living standards
48. This cannot be attributed to some general fear of which they suffered during the recent Gulf war.
criticizing the establishment. Indeed, many of the
respondents had a demonstrated ability for frankness. 56. Statements (i) and (ii) in the list are based on the
One of them was as eloquent in his tirades against food price index (“low case”) derived in Table 1. The
Saddam Hussein as in praising the public distribution other statements are independent of any particular
system. choice of price index.

49. In this connection, it should be remembered that 57. In India, this poverty line is calculated as the level
the monthly salaries of ordinary soldiers are, in of income (more precisely, expenditure) at which
comparative terms, very low - even lower than the calorie requirements are met, given observed expcndi-
monthly salaries of unskilled laborers in public sector ture patterns.
industries (see Table 4).
58. It should not be thought that households typically
50. For a useful review of public distribution systems cut down their consumption only affer their assets are
in other parts of the world, see Pinstrup-Andersen exhausted. In fact, empirical evidence strongly suggests
(1988). that, in times of famine and pronounced economic
decline, affected households often chose to endure
51. The following account of economic conditions quite drastic cuts in consumption - including that of
during the war is based partly on first-hand observa- food -in order to contain the loss of assets (see Drtze
tions by the first author of this report (who was in Iraq and Sen, 1989).
with the Gulf Peace Team from mid-November until
the end of January), and partly on extensive household 59. As was discussed in section 4 the public distribu-
interviews conducted in the course of our field work in tion system does not function in Kurdish areas outside
August and September 1991. See also Bhatia, Kawar the control of the government.
and Shahin (1991).
60. On the background of this debate, see section 2.
52. It should also be remembered that, during the
war, food rations only amounted to about 1,000 61. A recent editorial in the London-based Zndepen-
calories per person per day, when they were at all dent, for instance, suggests (after commenting on
distributed. Saddam Hussein’s reluctance to accept Resolution 706)
that “aid workers distributing food and medicines . . .
53. For first-hand accounts of war-time food depriva- could be sent in against his [Saddam Hussein’s] wishes,
tion by Iraqi women, see Bhatia, Kawar and Shahin backed by the threat of military action if he interferes”
(1991). It might be mentioned that very few households (Independent, September 13, 1991, p. 18).
had substantial food stocks during the war, which
followed six months of food scarcity and high prices.
62. The Aga Khan report (United Nations, 1991b)
reached a similar conclusion. Analogous remarks are
54. According to this survey, the infant mortality rate
likely to apply for other areas of public provisioning
rose from 32.5 per 1,000 live births during 1985-90 to
such as health care.
90.9 per 1,000 live births in January-August 1991. Data
indicate little seasonality in births or deaths, so that the
63. We need not concern ourselves, in this discussion,
sharp increase of mortality during the January-August
with the argument that the unstated aim of the embargo
1991 period cannot be interpreted as a seasonal effect.
is to drive the Iraqi people to desperation and,
While the direct recall method used in this survey may
ultimately, revolt. Such a strategy would be both
have led to some underestimation of infant mortality
during the precrisis period, the Gulf Child Health immoral and undependable, and cannot count among
Survey provides an independent estimate of 29 per reasoned arguments for the continuation of sanctions.
This is not to deny that the veto-holding members of
1,000 live births (also based on the direct method),
which is very close to the International Study Team’s the Security Council have the power to pursue such a
strategy if they wish (by obstructing any relaxation of
own figure of 32.5 per 1,000. The UNICEF estimate of
precrisis infant mortality, based on an “indirect” the sanctions).
method, is somewhat higher (41 per 1,000 live births),
but still implies an increase of well over 100% in 64. UN Security Council, Resolution 687, paragraph
January-August 1991. (Sarah Zaidi, International 23; emphasis added.
Study Team and Center for Population and Develop-
ment Studies at Harvard University, personal com- 65. See United Nations (1991c), pp. 7-12, and United
munication, February 12, 1991). Nations (1991b), pp. 910.

55. It should be emphasized that it is the combination 66. UN Security Council Resolution 706, paragraph
of implacable war and prolonged sanctions (imposed on l(d).
944 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

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