Air Links and Syndicated Loans Impact
Air Links and Syndicated Loans Impact
December 2022
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Outline
1 Introduction
▶ Motivation
▶ Background
3 Empirical Results
▶ City-Level Analysis of Loan Spread and Number of Loans
▶ Loan Facility-Level Analysis of Spread, Diversification and Amendments
▶ Cross-sectional Tests at Loan Facility Level
▶ Other Syndicated Loan Characteristics: Covenants and Fees
4 Conclusion
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Motivation
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Motivation
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Motivation
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Motivation
1
Total outstanding debt of publicly listed firms is the sum of Total Debt (ITEM3255) in US$ from Worldscope.
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Motivation
6000 60%
5000
50%
4000
40%
3000
2000 30%
1000
20%
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year
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Motivation
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Motivation
1 The lead arranger signs a preliminary loan agreement with the borrower.
The preliminary loan agreement specifies the loan amount, a range of
interest rates, covenants, fees, etc.
2 After signing the preliminary loan agreement, the lead arranger then turns
to potential participant lenders to fund part of the loan.
3 Participants agree to sign the loan agreement and each participant is
responsible for a share of the loan.
4 Lead arranger receives a fee for arranging and managing the syndicated
loan from the borrower.
5 During the life of the loan, the lead arranger monitors the firm, governs
the terms of the loan, calculates interest payments, and enforces financial
covenants.
6 A borrower defaults on a loan if it misses any required interest payment
or if it violates any of the covenants listed in the agreement.
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Motivation
2
Other purposes include debt repayment, repurchases, acquisitions and etc.
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Motivation
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Motivation
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Background
3
Rank by The Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI) index, 2019
4
Rank by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) flights centrality, 1989-2019
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Background
London as Example
80
60
40
20
−20
Borrower
5500 Miles
−40 6000 Miles
6500 Miles
London
−60
−150 −100 −50 0 50 100 150
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Hypotheses Development
Research Question
Hypothesis 1.
When a borrower’s headquarters is in a city with higher centrality
in the global network of air links, interest spreads of its syndicated
loans arranged by lead lenders in those flight-connected cities will
be lower.
▶ ↑ Air network centrality ⇒ Information asymmetry ↓
• Information asymmetry ↓ ⇒ Cost of external financing ↓
Myers and Majluf (1984)
• Information asymmetry ↓ ⇒ Loan spread ↓
Agarwal and Hauswald (2010); Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012)
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Hypotheses Development
Research Question
Hypothesis 2.
When a borrower’s headquarters is in a city with higher centrality
in the global network of air links, its syndicated loans arranged by
lead lenders in those flight-connected cities have smaller but more
diversified lending syndicates.
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Hypotheses Development
Research Question
Hypothesis 3.
When a borrower’s headquarters is in a city with higher centrality
in the global network of air links, its syndicated loans arranged by
lead lenders in those flight-connected cities have fewer and more
flexible covenants.
▶ ↑ Air network centrality ⇒ Cost of monitoring ↓
• Restrictive covenants ↓
Hollander and Verriest (2016)
• Number of financial covenants ↓
• Tightness5 of financial covenants ↑
5
Tightness is a covenant that measures the additional debt that the lender allows the borrower to borrow in the
future. It’s the difference b/w the initial debt/EBITDA covenants and the actual debt/EBITDA ratio, normalized
by the std. dev. of the covenant ratio over the previous twelve quarters.
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Hypotheses Development
Research Question
Hypothesis 4.
When a borrower’s headquarters is in a city with higher centrality
in the global network of air links, lead arrangers in those flight-
connected cities ask for lower fees associated with granted syndi-
cated loans.
▶ ↑ Air network centrality ⇒ Borrowing cost ↓
• Fees account for a substantial portion of borrowing costs.
Berg et al. (2016)
• Syndicated loan fees ↓
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Data Source
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▶ Syndicated Loan
• Lead Arranger :
Lenders are classified as lead arranger if the “Lead Arranger
Credit” is marked “Yes” or their roles are one of the following:
“Administrative Agent”, “Agent”, “Arranger”, “Bookrunner”,
“Lead Arranger”, “Lead Bank”, “Lead Manager”.
• Loan Spread:
The all-in-drawn spread over the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR) charged by the bank for the loan facility in basis points.
• Loan Maturity :
Months to maturity are given to the loan facility.
• Loan Size:
Natural logarithm of facility amount in USD.
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▶ Syndicated Loan
• Bank Term Loan:
“Term Loan A” typically held by banks. Ivashina and Sun (2011)
• Non-Bank Term Loan:
“Term Loan B” typically held by non-bank institutions.
• Revolver Loan:
Revolving loans may “revolve” (i.e., the firm may borrow, repay,
or reborrow) over the contract period.
• Annual Fee:
Fee paid on the entire committed amount, regardless of usage.
• Commitment Fee:
Fee paid on the unused amount of loan commitments.
• Standby Fee:
Fee paid to lender to compensate the syndication.
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▶ Syndicated Loan
• Initial Covenant:
Initial covenant is the initial debt/EBITDA ratio that the lender
allows the borrower to borrow from all lenders. See Hollander
and Verriest (2016).
• Tightness:
Tightness is a covenant that measures the additional debt that
the lender allows the borrower to borrow in the future. It’s
the difference b/w the initial debt/EBITDA covenants and the
actual debt/EBITDA ratio, normalized by the std. dev. of the
covenant ratio over the previous twelve quarters. See Demiroglu
and James (2010).
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▶ Borrower Fundamental
• Assets:
Natural logarithm of total assets in USD.
• Market Book Ratio:
(Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Liabilities) / Total
Assets.
• Profitability :
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets.
• Leverage:
(Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Total Assets.
• Cash Flow Volatility :
Standard deviation of (Cash Flow from Operating Activities /
Total Assets) over the last five fiscal years.
• Tangibility : Net Property, Plant and Equipment / Total Assets.
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6
Link table provided by:Chava and Roberts (2008) and WRDS: https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/
get-data/linking-suite-wrds/dealscan-worldscope-link/
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Our final sample includes 4,887 loans and 1,867 borrowing firms in
263 cities and 59 countries.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev 25% Median 75%
Independent Variables
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Independent Variables
Closeness Centrality (10 Nearest Cities) 1,779 32.86 4.24 30.54 32.96 35.23
Degree Centrality (10 Nearest Cities) 1,779 1.52 1.77 0.39 0.93 2.01
Betweeness Centrality (10 Nearest Cities) 1,779 0.38 0.83 0.00 0.03 0.38
Eigenvector Centrality (10 Nearest Cities) 1,779 2.16 2.36 0.59 1.53 2.78
Maturity (Average) 1,779 51.37 28.73 36.00 49.11 60.00
LoanSize (Average) 1,779 19.08 1.17 18.42 19.15 19.86
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7
Flights above that limit require at least three pilots and an additional flight crew member (double
augmentation), as well as “adequate sleeping quarters” on the plane
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80
60
40
20
−20
Borrower
5500 Miles
−40 6000 Miles
6500 Miles
London
−60
−150 −100 −50 0 50 100 150
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Flight Distance < 6000 Miles Flight Distance > 6000 Miles
Obs = 540 Obs = 91
Control Variable Mean Std Mean Std Diff t-stat
8
Our regression discontinuity analysis is on city-pairs level, and the RD setting doesn’t need controls so the obs
in the regressions is larger
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where
• Ykj : the average loan spread between borrowers in city k and
lead lenders in city j .
• 1(Distancekj > 6, 000M iles): = 1 if distance measured by direct
fights b/w city k and city j > 6,000 miles, and = 0 o/w.
• g(·):
higher-order polynomials function.
We consider different kernel types following He et al. (2020).9
9
Three choices in RD design: the kernel function, the order of the polynomial, and the bandwidth. See
Cattaneo, M. D., Idrobo, N., & Titiunik, R. (2019). A practical introduction to regression discontinuity designs:
Foundations. Cambridge University Press. Within the bandwidth, it is common to adopt a weighting scheme to
ensure that the observations closer to the cutoff point receive more weight than those further away; a kernel
function determines the weights.
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Baseline Model
where
• Yc,t+1 :loan characteristics of interest in year t + 1 for borrowers
with headquarters in city c.
• Centralityc,t : city c’s centrality in year t.
• Xc,t : city-year control variables include:
• 10 nearest cities’ average centrality, average loan maturity, and
average loan size.(Lin et al. (2013))
• We include the country-year FE, city FE and cluster the stan-
dard errors at city level.
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Overall Results
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Baseline Model
Ykc,t+1 = β0 +β1 ·DirectF lightk,t /Centralityc,t +β2 ·Xk +β3 ·Xf,t +FE+ϵk
• Ykc,t+1 : loan characteristics of interest of facility k in city c.
• DirectF lightk /Centralityc,t :
direct flight of facility k from bor-
rower f to lead arranger or city c’s centrality in year t.
• Xk : facility control variables include:
• Loan maturity, loan size
• Xf,t : borrower-year control variables include:
• Assets, MarketBookRatio, Profitability, Leverage, CashFlowVolatil-
ity, Tangibility Lin et al. (2013)
• We include the country-year FE, industry-year FE, lender-year
FE, borrower FE, loan type FE and loan purpose FE.
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Overall Results
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▶ Analyst coverage
• Analyst coverage can reduce information asymmetry and lower
the cost of debt.
Lin et al. (2013); Hallman et al. (2022)
• The original lower information asymmetry implies lower bene-
fits from on-site visits and direct flights. On-site visits are less
important as much information has already been revealed by
analysts.
• The negative impact of centrality on spread should be weaker.
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▶ Earnings management
• Earnings management may indicate worse audit quality, earnings
reporting and less credibility. Li et al. (2021)
• We use discretionary accrual by Jones (1991) to proxy firm earn-
ings management.
• On one hand, worse audit quality implies lower benefits from on-
site visits and direct flights as the manager may hide information
from the visiting lenders.
• The negative impact of centrality on spread should be weaker.
• On the other hand, worse auditing quality may imply greater
importance for lenders to visit on-site because the numbers in
the financial statements are less trustworthy.
• The negative impact of centrality on spread should be stronger.
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10
Initial covenant is the initial debt/EBITDA ratio that the lender allows the borrower to borrow from all lenders.
See Hollander and Verriest (2016)
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Tightness is a covenant that measures the additional debt that the lender allows the borrower to borrow in the
future. It’s the difference b/w the initial debt/EBITDA covenants and the actual debt/EBITDA ratio, normalized
by the std. dev. of the covenant ratio over the previous twelve quarters. See Demiroglu and James (2010)
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Fee paid on the unused amount of loan commitments.
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Fee paid to lender to compensate the syndication.
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Fee paid on the entire committed amount, regardless of usage.
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References I
Agarwal, S. and Hauswald, R. (2010). Distance and private information in lending. The
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the loan market: Don’t ignore the fees. The Journal of Finance, 71(3):1357–1392.
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Financial Intermediation, 35:1–16.
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References II
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References III
Lin, C., Officer, M. S., Wang, R., and Zou, H. (2013). Directors’ and officers’ liability
insurance and loan spreads. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(1):37–60.
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions
when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 13(2):187–221.
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