DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT

EXTREMISM IN AFRICA:
Conflict Ecosystems, Political Ecology and the Spread of the Proto-State
Research Paper

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03
CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8

Summary recommendations . .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Understand ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Act................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 11

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Purpose . ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13

DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Violent extremist groups (VEGs) .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
VEGs claiming inspiration from ideologies espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh .......................................................................................................................................................... 14
Global, transnational and local VEGs .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Reform champions .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
Organized criminal groups and money-laundering ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15

DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA .................................................................................................................. 16

“VISION IS GLOBAL, GRIEVANCES ARE LOCAL” .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27

Local versions of global goals 27
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Operating in an ecosystem of violence 30

...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Intentional instability 31
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Mobilization messages for local VEGs 35

.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Land, climate and conflict 37

..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Misogyny, gender and the social fabric 39

................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Does form follow function? The operational structures of local VEGs 40

......................................................................................................................................................................................

Strategies and operational modalities 42

.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

Impact of global events on local VEG approaches 43

........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

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RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 45

BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 47

Understand .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 47
Act........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 49

METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 52

ANNEX A: PREVENTING THE NEXT WAVE .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 53

Anticipating the inevitable and preventing the next wave of recruitment: capturing climate
breakdown in ideological narratives ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 53

ANNEX B: HYPOTHESES FOR FURTHER INQUIRY . ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 56

The involvement of Al-Qaida and Daesh makes ending conflict harder, but some form of negotiation
remains inevitable for peace. ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 56
Local VEGs shift from “Big Man” to “Big Idea” as resources permit. This enhances their resilience. ....................................... 56
Resisting the entry of Al-Qaida or Daesh requires shifting the cost-benefit calculations of local VEGs ���������������������������� 57

ANNEX C: METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 59

ANNEX D: DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 61

Extremism ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 61
Insurgency ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 61
Violent Extremist Groups (VEGs) .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 61
VEGs claiming inspiration from the ideologies espoused by Al Qaida or Daesh ....................................................................................................................................... 62
Global, transnational and local VEGs ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 62
Reform champions ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 62
Organized criminal groups and money-laundering ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 62

ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 65

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TABLE OF
ABBREVIATIONS
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data

AML Anti-money-laundering

AQIM Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

ASWJ Ahlul Sunna wa Jamma

AU African Union

CB Crisis Bureau

CPPRI Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Responsive Institutions

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

FGS Federal Government of Somalia

ILLP Initiatives for Land, Lives and Peace

ISGS Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

ISWAP Islamic State West Africa Province

JAS Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad

JNIM Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen

MNLA Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad

PVE Prevention of Violent Extremism

RBA Regional Bureau for Africa

SALW Small arms and light weapons

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

VDP Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie

VE Violent extremism

VEG Violent extremist group

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research paper was prepared in a process co- the places and people affected by this challenge
led by UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA) informed so much of what we learned. Particular
and Crisis Bureau (CB) Conflict Prevention, thanks go to UNDP Niger (Abdoulaye Balde,
Peacebuilding and Responsive Institutions Aziza Albachir), UNDP Nigeria (Ashraf Usman,
(CPPRI)/Prevention of Violent Extremism Chinpihoi Kipgen, Chukwuma Ume, David
(PVE) Team. The paper was developed by the Micro, Matthew Alao), UNDP Mali (Benedicte
lead researcher Peter Rundell and supporting Storm, Filippo Di-Carpegna), UNDP Lake
researchers Olivia Lazard and Emad Badi under Chad (Chika Charles Aniekwe), UNDP Somalia
the editorial direction of Noura Hamladji, Deputy (Doel Mukerjee, Nadja Wuensche), UNDP
Assistant Administrator and Deputy Regional Mozambique (Eduardo Shigueo Fujikawa,
Director of Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA), Florian Morier, Habiba Rodolfo), UNDP DRC
and Samuel Rizk, Head of CPPRI at UNDP’s (Jean-Francois Dubuisson, Joseph Oji, Laurent
Crisis Bureau. The process was coordinated Rudasingwa, Oana Mihai, Shighata Coulibaly),
and guided by Nika Saeedi and Nirina Kiplagat UNDP Chad (Lacina Barro), UNDP Burkina
with additional support from Heesu Chung, Faso (Martin Bisoka Mbanda, Stephanie
Mohammed al-Qussari and Tomas Kral at UNDP. Anderson) and UNDP RBA (Joelle Seme Park).
Thanks also go to colleagues from UNOCT,
This paper development was also supported UNICRI and UNODC.
by external steering committee members from
Member States—Matthias Kennert from the From outside the UN, we benefited from the
German Federal Foreign Office; Helena Sterwe generosity of a number of colleagues from regional
from European External Action Service; and Laria bodies, including Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-
Sotian from the Embassy of Sweden. Ngoga, Ansoumane Samassy Souare, Esther
Daramola, Idriss Mounir, Inusah Ziblim, Malaz
Thanks also go to Roselyn Akombe and Jide Okeke Hassan, Mauna Bagwasi, Musa Yousif, Netsanet
from UNDP’s Regional Service Centre for Africa; Tekeda, and Simon Nyambura. We are also grateful
Njoya Tikum from the UNDP Subregional Hub for insights from a range of colleagues in civil society,
for West and Central Africa; Giordano Segneri including Andrea Abel van Es, Elwad Elman,
from the UNDP Regional Hub for the Arab Fonteh Akum, Gayatri Sahgal, Grace Onubedo,
States; and Simon Alexis Finley from the UNDP Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, Imam Muhammad Ashafa
Oslo Governance Centre for their ongoing support. and Pastor James Wuye, Mustapha Alhassan and
Nicolas Florquin. Five researchers, in particular,
The paper benefited from additional reflections at provided important advice and insights: Amanda
several UN inter-agency forums, whose members Coakley, Boubacar Ba, Friederike Bubenzer, Kessy
are comprised of diverse representatives from UN Ekomo and Luc Damiba.
entities across the three founding pillars of the
UN system: peace and security, human rights and Finally, we appreciate the following peer reviewers
development. for their comments and feedback: Colonel
Christian Emmanuel Mouaya Pouyi and others
The authors are grateful to a wide range of from the African Centre for the Study and Research
colleagues in the UN family who took part in on Terrorism (ACSRT), Matthew Dixon
interviews and whose detailed knowledge of (FCDO), and Peter Tinti (Global Initiative).

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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The global violent extremist groups (VEGs) Despite persistent and costly national and
Al-Qaida and Daesh have spread into all the international efforts, States in most regions seem
regions of study in this report―Sahel (Liptako- not to be winning the competition with them for
Gourma), Lake Chad Basin, DR Congo, Somalia control of their territory.
and Mozambique―and many local groups have
pledged their loyalty to one or the other. We observe that:

their progress must be

viewed in the context they seem to be
these groups operate
of the relationships evolving from small
in the complex,
between populations bands towards proto-
shifting conflict
and their ecosystems state competitors
ecosystems of
as well as between for communities’
these regions;
competing political allegiance.
elites; and

We also observe that VEGs in these regions are both Through their local presence, they generate the
global and local, both ideological and economic. (usually illicit) revenues required to operate group
structures. Those activities bring them into contact
Reform champions (and VEGs) operate within with purely criminal groups, with whom they
a wider political economy characterized by the share an interest in weakening state capacity in
“business models” of patrimonial elites. Insecurity, the areas they control, regardless of their different
poverty and violence are no accident of limited motivations and ultimate goals.
capacity, but a product of elite interests. These
elites depend on the persistence of identity group Common threads running through these
grievances and fears to bolster their positions— conflicts include:
grievances they may create as well as manipulate.
That context means that agendas of reform, • remoteness from the capital city (and
modernization or countering instability and a resulting sense of marginalization,
violence need to be realistic, reflecting the true exacerbated by a capital-centric allocation of
room for reform within the balance of power among state resources);
these competing forces. That, in turn, entails an up-
to-date understanding of what enables or impedes • a sense of unfairness, discrimination or
the expansion and entrenchment of VEGs. victimization among communities (which is
readily appropriated for VEG recruitment),
VEGs prey on local grievances, which cement often related to abuses by state forces or
their foothold within aggrieved communities. associated militias;

8
• perceptions of corruption (in the broadest sense
of the word) among a wide spectrum of elites
and power-holders;

• grievances over (perceptions of) unfair land VEGs also take advantage of environmental
management, which is inextricably linked to water degradation and unfair land management to position
resource access, and associated land degradation themselves as righters of wrongs, regulators of
(exacerbated by climate change); and access to natural resources and providers of justice
and administrative services, as well as livelihood
• slow or ineffective state provision of justice and substitutes. Conflict analysis should include not only
dispute resolution. the political dynamics between various identities,
livelihoods, political groups and violent mobilizers
but also the “political ecology” relationship between
human populations and their ecosystems.

Each place is different and each has its own story.

However, the situation seems to be generally
evolving towards effective competition with the
State. The strategic threat may be shifting from the
radicalization of individuals—as explored in
UNDP’s ground-breaking Journey to
Extremism1—to include this new dimension.

As they get bigger and richer, some of these

groups build local structures that are very like
a State. Indeed, they begin to compete with
Governments not only through coercion but also
by promising some of the most essential local
services that people want, like safety and swift
decisions on disputes. They may do so cruelly
and oppressively, but even that may initially
be attractive to communities that are weary of
lawlessness and insecurity. This is more evident
in longer-standing groups like Al-Shabaab in
Somalia than in newer groups like those in Cabo
Delgado in Mozambique, while those in the Sahel
are developing towards the type of capacity seen
in Somalia. None is yet a “caliphate,” as Daesh
(unjustifiably) proclaimed itself to be, nor are any
yet in power like the Taliban in Afghanistan, but
©UNDP/Chad the response to threat they pose needs a strategy
that acknowledges this new state of affairs.

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These local VEGs claiming inspiration from return of what kind of State”? Over-militarized
ideologies espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh reflect responses may indeed exacerbate the problem.
a competitive version of a “mediated state”.2 Here
it is not the State alone, but also more deeply The leadership of these local groups have chosen to
structured local VEGs, that negotiate with (other) affiliate with a sanctioned global group. They may
non-state sources of authority to provide functions of do so for a range of reasons. Undermining the local
government. Indeed, the more deeply structured local strategy of global VEGs requires an understanding
VEGs have many of the characteristics of a “proto- of the cost-benefit calculations of local elites who
state”, as originally identified in pre-modern evolving join—or hold back from joining—global VEGs.
structures but more recently typified by Daesh.3
However, a reductionist picture of these groups
It is important not to imagine local VEGs as as purely economic actors—or, indeed as purely
one-dimensional opportunistic conflict grievance entrepreneurs—would lose sight
entrepreneurs. Their ideological grounding instead of the ideological aspects of their strategy,
affects their strategy and structure. Insurgent groups objectives and appeal, through which they filter
have often associated with terms such as “warlord”, local grievances to give them advantages in the
“patrimonial”, or “Big Man”. Some local VEGs carry competition with other elites. Although each
the name of their central figure (e.g. Katiba Macina group is different and its messages and objectives
or “Koufa’s Boys”) but there is also some indication are specific to its context, VEGs’ positioning
that VEGs are shifting structurally from being classic as part of global ideological movements is a
“Big Man” patron-client organizations to “Big Idea” common theme.
formations that derive their cohesion from
ideological rather than personal alignment. Communities’ responses to VEGs’ strategies are
also shaped by Government policies, resource
allocations and messages. Limited capacity to
monitor the impact of VEGs makes it harder to
adapt policies and messages appropriately.

Deeper and more resilient VEG structures require

higher revenues. A detailed understanding of their
sources of income might enable disruption of those
income streams. Similarly, understanding how
VEGs use the money they acquire could enable Women and men experience weaknesses in
further disruption of their “business models”. governance, and the violence and economic
However, that disruption will only be effective if it dislocation wrought by VEG activities, differently.
avoids undermining the legitimate livelihoods and They often play, or are expected to play, different
social fabric of specific communities. social roles and experience ecosystem degradation
differently, and also have different roles in VEGs.
VEGs’ state-like behaviour poses a fresh challenge Women and young people—both girls and boys—
to existing authorities to identify strategic options also come to understand their situations through
to hold areas under Government control and retake different means or media and their agency when
areas under VEG control. Where the State has responding to these situations also varies. These
been experienced as abusive or ineffective, however, differences are important when identifying and
“the return of the State” presents a challenge: “the implementing response strategies.

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There are also gender (and generational) • In particular, support a gender-aware
differences in the way that individuals respond to political ecology analysis in areas threatened
the trauma of VEGs’ depredations. That trauma by environmental degradation to anticipate
is poorly monitored at present. However, locally the gender-differentiated effects of climate
adapted sustained support will likely be essential disruptions on livelihoods, violent mobilization
if perverse coping strategies are not to exacerbate and the bargains struck by local elites.
tensions and reinforce cycles of violence.
• Invest in continuing analysis of the ideological
Countering and preventing VEGs does not mean and grievance-based messaging that VEGs
departing from the agenda for accountable and use in each theatre and of its effect on women
responsive governance. The need is not to do and men (disaggregated by age), including
different things, but to do things differently, in a way local-language social media and other informal
that is more attuned to the political economy, that channels of communication. Build on the
challenges VEG business models more effectively capacity to deliver alternative messages and
and is more alert to ecological constraints, more monitor their effect.
aware of different impacts on people of different
identities and better coordinated.
Act
Summary recommendations • Apply realistic strategic analyses of the true
requirements for maintaining Government
To frustrate VEGs’ evolving strategies, a response control of areas and of the opportunities for
must first invest in understanding the context recapturing territory from the VEG. That
and the challenge and then act to implement the strategic analysis needs to go beyond the
strategies that emerge. In particular, this includes military-tactical assessment of combat options
attention to illicit financial flows, as they affect to consider the political economy of the relevant
VEGs, and responses to the trauma that VEGs elites and the communities for which they are
inflict. As noted above, both gender and generation the key patrons.
are factors that need to be taken into account
during both the analysis and action stages. • Review the opportunities to deploy
peacebuilding, governance and development-
based tools, prioritizing them through a VE lens
Understand and adapting them to the challenges of these
“conflict ecosystems”.
• Invest in a careful, gender-awarei political
economy analysis of the processes that enable • Explore the scope for supporting religious
VEGs to expand at the local, subnational, authorities in mediation at various levels,
national, regional and global levels (including enhancing the credibility of challenges to
Government actions and how they are VEGs’ claims to theological justifications for
experienced) and constantly update this analysis. their violence.
This will include the five dimensionsii identified
above, at the very least.

i. Meaning at least reflecting the different experiences, agencies and opportunities of women and men, including their formal
and informal rights and powers.
ii. Remoteness, unfairness (including abuses by state agencies), corruption, land management and justice provision.

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• In particular, build on understandings of incomes without devastating local economies.
political ecology by enabling national dialogues Draw on this information and an understanding
to create space for inclusive local “story of of how VEGs use their money to expand and
place” conversations to explore the economic, support strategies that effectively impede
ecological, cultural and social significance VEGs’ financial models without undermining
of localities, bringing generations together communities’ social or economic prospects.
and giving genders and other identities the
opportunity to engage. This should allow the • Invest in locally appropriate mental health and
exploration of opportunities for land restoration psychosocial support to tackle trauma, using
that also restores the social fabric and reduces approaches that are adapted to local challenges
the attractiveness of VEGs as apparent short- and community resources.
term solutions for grievances.

• Track the illicit financial flows within and

between countries that form the revenues
that VEGs depend on, to understand their
relationships and identify ways of impeding their

©UNDP /DRC

12
Introduction supporting the stabilization of the Sahel through
the establishment of stabilization facilities in
Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, the Lake Chad and Liptako-Gourma regions.
and there is no clear definition of it. It is neither UNDP has produced contextualized research and
new nor exclusive to any region, nationality evidence-based knowledge that help illuminate
or belief system. This study, however, looks the relevant drivers and conflict dynamics that
specifically at how trends in violent extremism enable VEGs to flourish in the affected African
in Africa impact local and regional situations, States. This has enabled policymakers to reach
in particular through linkages to local, regional a comprehensive understanding of the impact,
and global corridors. It starts by observing that causes and effects of violent extremism from a
certain global violent extremist groups (VEGs), macroeconomic perspective.
notably Al-Qaida and Daesh, have spread across
sub-Saharan Africa since 2010. Unlike other
transnational violent extremist currents present Purpose
elsewhere—such as white nationalism—these
global VEGs have been expanding the range of The nature of the global strategic corridors through
their local affiliates in the continent. which transnational VEGs migrate into fresh areas
of interest may not be fully revealed by a focus on
Much detailed material is already available on individual vulnerability, recruitment and retention.
the dynamics of VEGs. However, recent PVE This study therefore aims to understand these
overviews as yet lack an analysis of the dynamics processes through a greater focus on the dynamics
of local groups, especially their leadership, of groups and their leadership elites. It examines
strategies and their internal coherence in the strategic and operational implications of a shift
relation to global VEGs. Earlier analysis from radicalized individuals banding together
focused largely—though not exclusively—on the against the State to structured groups that credibly
individual member level and the drivers of their challenge the State.
induction into VEGs, while attending helpfully
to the pre-existing conditions that predisposed As far as possible, this analysis therefore seeks
potential adherents to recruitment. to include consideration of transnational crime
corridors (environmental resources, drug
UNDP has positioned itself to address the smuggling, human trafficking etc.), security force
persistence of violent extremism through deployments (army, police etc.) and administrative
prevention of violent extremism (PVE) and deployment (leading to corruption analysis). Where
stabilization programming. In 2017, UNDP possible, it also notes the impact of state security
produced Journey to Extremism in Africa: force actions on the conflict drivers in the study
Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point areas and the effect that these have on the local (and
for Recruitment. That pioneering report transnational and global) dynamics of VEGs.
strengthened UNDP’s role in promoting a
development response to violent extremism. The report concludes with recommendations for
Building on the work on PVE, and drawing the UN and the international community, state
lessons from Libya and Iraq, UNDP is currently authorities and civil society.

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DEFINITIONS

Below concepts this report uses to categorise VEGs claiming inspiration

groups do not reflect official UN terminology.
The terms function as analytical framework to from ideologies espoused by
offer a nuanced and contextualized description of Al-Qaida or Daesh
the manifold dynamics of groups and actors the
report studies. They cater to the fact that groups The ideological inspiration of a VEG can vary
and actors operate at different geographic and widely – violent white nationalist groups, Black
strategic levels, with varying inspirations and Axe, or the Red Brigades of the 1970s all conform
aspirations. Hence, this report should be read with to the definition understood by most usage.
the understanding that a contextualized response However, the VEGs most relevant to sub-Saharan
to violent extremism and terrorism requires regular Africa, whose spread forms the focus of this
conflict analyses that take into account the volatile research, are those which claim inspiration from
and ever-changing threat picture. ideologies espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh.

Violent extremist groups (VEGs) Global, transnational and

One key term used widely in the literature and local VEGs
popular reporting is “violent extremism” (VE) and
the related term “violent extremist group” (VEG). The paradigmatic global VEGs considered in
The UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent this report are Al-Qaida and Daesh (the so-called
Extremism (2015) notes that “violent extremism is a “Islamic State”). These groups aspire to global
diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is reach and relevance and have a global agenda and
neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality narrative.
or system of belief. Definitions of ‘terrorism’
and ‘violent extremism’ are the prerogative of Transnational VEGs operate across the recognized
Member States and must be consistent with their borders of States. This may reflect tactical spread
obligations under international law, in particular (e.g. expansion in search of areas in which to
international human rights law.” recover, retrain or re-equip) or it may reflect a cross-
border theatre of operations. However, their focus
Some VEGs are also UN designated terrorist is geographically bounded.
organizations; however, such distinctions are
set aside for the purposes of this report as they Local VEGs operate primarily within the
are not relevant for the analysis. A more detailed borders of a national state. They may be very
discussion of definitions is found in annexe D. local – with operations restricted to a small

14
area or recruitment limited to a narrow identity Organized criminal groups
group – or they may aspire to national reach, but
their perspective remains within the confines of
and money-laundering
national boundaries. Organized criminal networks and groups are
distinguished from insurgent and terrorist groups
by their attitudes to the State. Both engage in illicit
Reform champions financial activities. Organized criminal activities may
lead to money-laundering—a concept focused on the
The societies and Governments in question are all source of funds, which may then be used for purposes
embarking on a range of reform and modernization that are not in themselves illegal. In contrast, terrorist
agendas. “Reform champions”—the actors driving groups may receive funds from legitimate sources for
these changes—are important partners for the purposes that are proscribed. Anti-money-laundering
international community as the latter seeks to (AML) mechanisms treat both types of transaction as
support progress. sources of risk to the financial system.

©UNDP/Chad

15
DYNAMICS OF
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
Affiliation with the global VEGs Al-Qaida and referred to in October 2021 as an “epidemic of
Daesh has spread into all the regions of study, coups d’état”.5
with local groups pledging loyalty to one or
the other. All these local groups were already They are also affected by other regional
operating in the complex and shifting conflict phenomena. “The proliferation of small arms and
ecosystems of these regions,4 and their leadership light weapons (SALW) constitutes both a cause
elected to affiliate with a sanctioned global and result of the prevailing insecurity and related
group for a range of reasons (see below). In some phenomena, such as armed conflicts, terrorist
cases, these conflict ecosystems are in some cases activities and transnational organized crime, which
reflected in Government instability, including jeopardize the development prospects in some
some instances of what the UN Secretary-General countries of the Sahel region.”6

FIGURE 1.

Military budgets have also grown sharply in many places in 2020, for example. 7

50

40

31%
30 29%
Per cent

23% 22%
20

10

0
Chad Nigeria Mauritania Mali

16
Global VEGs’ strategies for local expansion vary. The data in the graphics below are taken from
Al-Qaida now seems to take more of a “franchise” the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
approach, providing little support or guidance to its (ACLED) project data set. This reports both
affiliates and making relatively few claims on them. deaths and incidents consistently across time,
Daesh, in contrast, seems to have a relatively more using a transparent methodology that draws on
direct approach, in some cases, and provides more material from across the theatres of interest. This
resources for some of its affiliates and attempts to allows for credible comparisons of trends and
exert greater control on them. These resources may changes in levels of violence. Other data sets (e.g.
include funding; they are widely reported to include the Uppsala Conflict Data Program) constitute
training and foreign fighters who are dispatched to important sources of information on fatalities but
“support” local groups.8 This may in turn contribute they do not currently cover non-fatal violent events,
to the greater lethality demonstrated by Daesh so the quantitative material here draws on ACLED
affiliates: local custom imposes less restraint on material for consistent overviews.
militants from outside, and local fighters come
to hold kinship in less regard as foreign fighters’
approaches become normalized within the group.

FIGURE 2.

Combat incidents in Central Sahel

17
BOX 1.
MALI

Mali exemplifies the trends described in

this paper. Its more remote areas have
long been difficult for the Government to
control from Bamako, and the post-co-
lonial State has struggled to establish its
legitimacy. “The 2012 coup d’état in Mali,
and the political destabilization that fol-
lowed, brought an abrupt end to the coun-
try’s success story as a ‘donor darling’ and
as a model of successful democratization”.9
Despite signing a peace treaty, violent
extremist and terrorist groups that were
not party to the peace accord continue to
launch attacks in the country’s northern
and central territories and challenge
the Government and state institutions
of Mali. More recent coups have done
nothing to enhance the Government’s
legitimacy with its partners.

However, the seeds of the 2012 events

are argued to lie deeper. In 2020, Kanon
Tsuda, for example, suggested:

the state has largely failed to contain

the conflicts induced by armed militias,
ethnic rebels, terrorist groups and inter-
communal tensions—and today the na-
tion is once again marked by instability
and the flourishing of criminal activity.
This instability has caused Mali’s human
rights situation to rapidly deteriorate,
with Human Rights Watch reporting
in 2019 that 85,000 civilians fled their
homes as a result of violence, hundreds
were killed by ethnic self-defense
groups, and Islamic terrorist groups
and Malian security forces subjected
numerous suspects to degrading and
inhumane treatment with several dying
in custody or being forcibly disappeared
©UNDP/Mali
over the course of the year. …

18
 In the last two decades, Tuareg rebels have
sought greater autonomy for Northern Mali,
renaming it the Azawad region in an attempt
to establish a unified identity that transcends
the artificial borders left behind by European
colonialism. … Their January 2012 rebellion, a
protest against discrimination and marginali-
sation by the state towards their people, mar-
ked the fourth time the Tuaregs have rebelled
since independence.10

However, Tuareg dynamics are complex, and

they are not necessarily in the majority in all
parts of northern Mali. Moreover, internal
dynamics—some dating back to colonial days
and some deriving from tensions between elite
and subordinate social strata—also affect how
the conflict has evolved.11

As Tsuda argues, “a lingering post-colonial

legacy has been a catalyst for poor governan-
ce and socio-economic conditions and has
significantly contributed to the cultivation of
Mali and the Sahel region as fertile grounds
for terrorist activities. … Socioeconomic
insecurity too has inevitably exacerbated
these movements. Extremist groups have
purposely targeted their recruitment in rural
areas with food shortages and high unem-
ployment … Moreover, while there has been
a global investment in the combating of
Islamic terrorism in Mali, the long-standing
socio-economic instability driving it in the
first place has been given little attention by
the international community”.12

19
FIGURE 3.

Attacks against civilians in Central Sahel

Visible in these graphics is the acceleration in

civilian casualties following the end of the “Sahel
exception” and battles between Al-Qaida and
Daesh affiliates from 2019, and the greater lethality
of groups affiliated with Daesh despite their lower
number of attacks.13

©UNDP/Chad

20
BOX 2.
BURKINA FASO

Violent extremism is on the rise again in several influence communities. In the east, economic
regions of Burkina Faso after talks between factors play a significant role in both group
authorities and insurgent groups collapsed in allegiances and land disputes. In the centre-north
early 2021. An attack on the north-eastern village region, which is home to the majority of the
of Solhan in June 2021 resulted in the death of country’s internally displaced population, conflict
over 150 people and was carried out by children between local groups is often fuelled by ethnic
between the ages of 12 and 14, according to the grievances that were established before the Sahel
Burkinabe Government and the United Nations. crisis or exacerbated by it. The growing number
This atrocity was one of the most violent assaults of internally displaced persons has also created
on Burkina Faso since the security crisis started tension in this region.
in the country in 2015. The strategic location
of Burkina Faso in the heart of West Africa The introduction of the Volontaires pour la
means that its security situation is deeply linked Défence de la Patrie (VDP) in January 2020
to transnational trends. That said, the depth further added to the complexity of the security
of cohesion between global VEGs and their crisis in Burkina Faso. Created as auxiliaries
affiliates or regional offshoots remains unclear. to support the country’s beleaguered security
forces, these are essentially armed local groups
The two key regional VEGs are Jamaat that are given a little training and the authority
Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM), an to defend their community through force.
umbrella coalition of co-called Salafi-jihadist Instead of improving the security situation,
insurgents led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, and the they have often worsened it by targeting
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), pastoralists, such as the Peul (Fulani), using
whose leader, Adnan Abou Walid al-Sahrawi, their new powers for economic gain, or
is reported to have been killed by French exacerbating intercommunal tensions. They
forces in September 2021. JNIM has pledged have sparred with other self-defence groups
allegiance to Al-Qaida, ISGS to Daesh. such as the Koglweogo and Dozo, who are
also accused of abuses against civilians. While
Local VEGs are predominantly scattered the VDP’s official strategic goal is to fight
throughout the north and east of Burkina Faso violent extremism, their desire for influence
and—as with regional groups’ relationships with may not rule out their playing a role in criminal
global groups—the depth of their relationship networks, especially those engaged in the
with regional groups is often uncertain. Local smuggling of everyday goods.
groups often take credit for an attack that they
did not plan, target opposition groups without The situation may change rapidly due to
permission from regional group leadership or the failure of negotiations, generations-old
engage in violence rooted in ethnic grievances land disputes, control of strategic locations,
rather than ideological struggle. the implementation of religious ideology
or shifting alliances among VEGs. The
The behaviour and strategic goals of VEGs expansion of VEGs’ strategic goals is not the
in Burkina Faso also vary with geographical only factor that has led to the weakening of
location. In the northern Sahel region, religious security in Burkina Faso. Land degradation
ideology appears to be a key feature of violent due to the impact of climate change and
extremism, though it is unclear whether this is changing land ownership laws have also
driven by the groups’ control of key institutions triggered competition for natural resources
such as mosques, through which they can which has, in turn, benefited VEGs.14

21
FIGURE 4.

Attacks against civilians in Lake Chad

In the Lake Chad Basin, too, alliances shift rapidly, In Mozambique, long-standing local grievances
as do the tactics and approaches of local VEGs that have long been associated with local violence
such as the Islamic State West Africa Province formed the basis for Al-Shabaab, also known as
(ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati Ahlul Sunna wa Jamma (ASWJ). Al-Shabaab is
wal-Jihad (JAS). In this region, observers rarely claimed as a Daesh affiliate and sometimes linked
attribute an attack to one group or the other. with the Somali group of the same name, though
there is little evidence for these connections. Local
Similarly, in the Democratic Republic of the illicit income streams (e.g. drugs and timber) are
Congo (DRC), ADF (which is increasingly linked mainly linked to NSAGs, a category into which
rhetorically to Daesh) is one of a large number of Al-Shabaab fits.
local non-state armed groups (NSAGs) who prey
on income streams—both legal, such as mining and
agro-pastoralism, and illegal, such as timber, drugs
or wildlife products.

22
©UNDP/Somalia

Affiliation with the global VEGs Al-Qaida and

Daesh has spread into all the regions of study,
with local groups pledging loyalty to one or
the other. All these local groups were already
operating in the complex and shifting conflict
ecosystems of these regions, and their leadership
elected to affiliate with a sanctioned global group
for a range of reasons. In some cases, these
conflict ecosystems are in some cases reflected in
Government instability, including some instances
of what the UN Secretary-General referred to in
October 2021 as an “epidemic of coups d’état”.

23
FIGURE 5.

Number of “Islamist” attacks against civilians in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. November 2017–November
2021 (data as of 19 November 2021)

Violence can be seen spreading more widely nationalist character sets it apart somewhat.
following the proclaimed affiliation with Daesh in While evidence on its ties to Al-Qaida is thin
Cabo Delgado in 2018. and changes are not obvious to all observers,
one commentator concluded that “[b]y 2015, Al-
In Somalia, the local Daesh affiliate is small. Al- Shabaab had significantly downgraded its ties
Shabaab (originally an arm of the Islamic Courts to Al-Qaida central. While the group continues
Union—ICU) is internationally proscribed in to advertise its Al-Qaida allegiance, it now sees
the country, after forming in the violent context them as more of a marketing brand and source
of the fractured “warlord” politics of Somalia of general advice”.15 “Al-Shabaab continues to
from the early 2000s. However its relationship operate as both an insurgency and a proto-state
with Al-Qaida has evolved since it pledged power, controlling and governing wide swathes of
allegiance in 2012, it remains embedded in local land within the southern, central and western parts
contests (and local economies), and its highly of the country”.16

24
BOX 3.
AL-SHABAAB IN SOMALIA

“Al-Shabaab originally emerged as a remnant In theory, Al-Shabaab rejects the political

of al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI)—a Wahhabi settlement that frames the FGS. “Numerous
Islamist … organization which arose in attempts have been made to explore a
Somalia in the 1980s with the intention of negotiated settlement between Al-Shabaab
replacing the regime of Mohammed Said and the FGS, but to date, Al-Shabaab has
Barre with an Islamic State. In 2000, AIAI rejected those overtures: instead, it has
remnants—mostly young members—reformed effectively penetrated the FGS, and could be
into Al-Shabaab and were incorporated interpreted as having entered its own loose
into the ICU as its radical youth militia.”17 elite bargain with political actors, somewhat
However, the evolution of Al-Shabaab akin to a mafia protection racket. Its intra-elite
occurred in a wider Somali political context. ‘understandings’ with other political actors in
“The political settlement undergirding the Somalia constitute the most nuanced … forms
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) of elite bargaining in the country.”20
reflects a ‘limited access order’, an elite division
of spoils in which rival political cartels control Since 2018 much has changed, and the FGS
and divert financial flows to and through the may have played a greater role in rejecting
rentier state, in what is widely believed to be approaches to a negotiated settlement. The
the most corrupt country in the world.iii Elite FGS has played a continuing role in clan
bargaining over the terms of that political bargaining, while Al-Shabaab projects an
settlement of spoils is largely responsible for image of unity beyond clan (see Mobilization
the government’s chronic political paralysis and messages for local VEGs, below)—though it
episodic ‘embedded’ political violence. It is also may also play the clan bargaining game better
a major factor in the de facto clan partitioning than most competitors.21
of the country into autonomous regional states,
each of which enjoys its own “rent” in the form
of seaport customs and other opportunities.”18

Within this (clan) bargain, tacit

understandings include “the use of In most cases, state responses have been slow
embedded political violence (assassinations, to adapt to new local VEG tactics and changing
or orchestration of communal clashes), grievances—which, unlike persistent conflict
[which] remain a tool of choice in inter-elite ecosystems, may be a symptom of limited
competition but are constrained compared to capacity that gives violent groups greater
the years of open civil war; … [and] a generally opportunity. Agility in response to changing
(but not universally) shared commitment to conditions is a natural advantage for a group
maintaining weak rule of law.”19 seeking to attack existing structures, and state
structures have to develop fresh levels of agility
in response.

iii. Though Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2021 places it at 178/180, rather than 180, as
Menkhaus noted it was rated in 2018.

25
©UNDP/Cameroon

26
“VISION IS GLOBAL,
GRIEVANCES ARE
LOCAL” 22

Local VEGs in the region are both globally (drawing on the piety and radical preaching of its
connected and locally embedded; both key leader, Amadou Kouffa) that gained a foothold
ideological and economic; both “justice”- through such interest-group conflicts.
providing and criminal.
Some local groups had a local goal that required
a redefinition of state boundaries but not of the
Local versions of global goals concept of the State, such as the formation of
an independent state of Azawad—essentially a
An Al-Qaida-affiliated alliance of local VEGs in Tuareg project. In this case, groups which began
the Sahel, JNIM proclaimed a goal of creating with a nationalist goal—notably the Mouvement
conditions for a global caliphate, in line with Al- national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA)—
Qaida’s normal rhetoric. ISGS, however, looks to clashed with other supporting groups with a more
local caliphates—in keeping with typical Daesh definitively so-called Islamist ideology, notably
approaches. Despite these differences, both Ansar ad-Dine. Supported by the Mouvement
proclaim a global vision; neither endorses state pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest
boundaries in the longer term. (MUJAO), a breakaway from Al-Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar ad-Dine drove
Some local VEGs grew out of an entity that aimed MNLA out of Gao (the proclaimed interim capital
to govern the State (e.g. Al-Shabaab in Somalia, of Azawad) in June 2012. MUJAO was listed as a
which grew out of the Islamic Courts Union). terrorist organization by the UN on 5 December
Such groups seek control of the State itself, but it 201223, but MNLA retained an alignment focused
is not clear how far this is an end goal (reflecting, on Azawad rather than the globalist ideologies of
perhaps, the nationalist currents in their ideological Ansar ad-Dine and MUJAO.
messaging), a stepping stone to global ideological
goals of their own, or as their contribution to a Ansar ad-Dine gained prominence as a local VEG
wider global agenda. feature on the Azawad landscape, and in 2012 it
declared allegiance to the global VEG Al-Qaida.
Some local VEGs grow out of ethnic or livelihood Boko Haram, which had long been a regional
interest groups whose end goal was fairer treatment VEG, affiliated with Al-Qaida in 2010, and despite
within the existing state. Some aspects of Katiba its splits, it has always had a faction that remains
Macina’s recruitment strategy among Rimaibé and affiliated with Al-Qaida—currently JAS. The
other non-elite Fulani pastoralists are an example group known as Ansaru (formally amāʿatu Anṣāril
of this. However, especially given its role as a Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān) split from Boko
founding member of the JNIM alliance, it is fair to Haram in 2012 but has remained closely linked with
see Katiba Macina as essentially being a local VEG it and declared allegiance to Al-Qaida in 2021.

27
These groups’ connections with communities be overlooked. However, another component of
are local—indeed, one author24 describes those JNIM, Katiba Macina, has drawn on non-elite
of Katiba Macina as “hyperlocal”—and driven by Peul anger at the perceived complicity of elite
relationships of power and grievance at almost Peul in state abuses to construct a “bottom-up”
the village level. They are also very diverse. movement.25 These “top-down” and “bottom-up”
Thus the approach of one component of JNIM, appropriations of grievances within a single VEG
AQIM, reflects elite political entrepreneurs alliance also reflect their scope for appealing
positioning themselves in a “top-down” struggle to different audiences through contradictory
among shifting elite politics, although the offers. Both of these contrast with the highly
investment in theological depth and credibility nationalist messaging of Al-Shabaab in Somalia,
made by figures such as Iyad ag Ghali should not for example.

One common place the case if the actions of

observation among security forces breach local
commentators, both and international norms
academics and practitioners, and alienate communities,
is that responses based on especially if they are still
security actions alone do not unable to provide the
address the factors driving stability and security that
the spread. This is even more communities seek.

Thus, for example, ACLED reaches the following [The alliance] had adverse effects as violence
conclusions about the operations of an ad hoc increasingly took on inter-communal and inter-
alliance of local ethnically based militias in the ethnic proportions. The operations eventually
border strip between the Tillaberi and Tahoua spiraled out of control.
regions in Niger and the Menaka region in Mali:

28
 As a result, ISGS grew momentum due to ISGS’s
as it mobilized many disproportionate violence.
militants and attracted Paradoxically, some senior
other factions to the ISGS commanders are
group. … While Niger has former militiamen who
avoided the internal and initially took up arms to
rampant “militiafication” protect their communities.
of neighboring Burkina ISGS itself mobilized
Faso and Mali, arming support by making claims
civilians for self-defense of protection against the
appears to be gaining state and Malian militias.26

©UNDP/Cameroon

29
All these VEGs prey on grievances that give example, as Mikhael Hiberg Naghizadeh29 notes,
them a foothold within communities.27 Study “they [local VEGs] must be studied as complex
interviews28 confirmed that the mobilization political organizations emerging from local
of local grievances was the primary route of sociopolitical and economic contexts. Jihadists’iv
entry for local VEGs. Similar observations are support often comes from aggrieved groups seeing
commonplace in the literature: to take just one an opportunity for advancement.”

Many years of experience problem is to be resolved

have proven that short- in the long run. There is no
sighted policies, failed single pathway to violent
leadership, heavy-handed extremism. But we know
approaches, a single-minded that extremism flourishes
focus only on security when human rights are
measures and an utter violated, political space
disregard for human rights is shrunk, aspirations for
have often made things inclusion are ignored, and
worse. … The international too many people – especially
community has every right young people – lack
to defend against this threat prospects and meaning in
using lawful means, but we their lives.
must pay particular attention
to addressing the causes Ban Ki-Moon, UN
of violent extremism if this Secretary-General, 2016

Operating in an ecosystem they control,31 a process facilitated by remoteness

from central control. This shared interest may be
of violence simply economic on the part of purely criminal
groups, but for local VEGs it serves the dual
Through their local presence, local VEGs purpose of facilitating revenues and expanding their
generate the revenue they require to operate group ideological reach.32
structures, usually through illicit means.30 These
activities bring them into contact with purely Some of these activities link local VEGs with
criminal networks, with whom they share an organized crime networks, usually transnational
interest in weakening state capacity in the areas ones, such as through export networks for illicitly

iv. UNDP does not endorse the use of the term “jihadist” to apply to these currents.

30
logged timber or illicitly mined minerals.33 VEGs Although each group is different and its messages
may also provide protection for organized criminal and objectives are specific to its context, their
trafficking routes passing through territories positioning as part of a global ideological
they control, extracting fees for this service and movement is a common theme.
benefiting from these trafficking routes by receiving
weapons and materiel, and sometimes fighters, on The language of Al-Qaida and Daesh makes sense
the return leg. of communities’ experiences of marginalization
and victimization, giving a sense of meaning and
Local VEGs and organized criminal groups status. Groups benefit from presenting themselves
appear to collaborate while also competing for as authoritative interpreters of Islam, and some
control of illicit market share. Local VEGs’ local VEG leaders invest in scholarly credibility
role in these illicit markets is not perceived as as part of their path to power.37 This narrative
“corruption” in the same way as similar sorts of also explains social roles, including cases where
participation by state officials.34 a local VEG challenges traditional hierarchies by
recruiting from lower-status groups. lLocal VEGs
Although this activity was originally a means to can therefore take advantage of these ideological
their ideological end, in some cases it appears to narratives in their competition for power with
have become an end in itself,35 with those local other groups. Affiliation with Al-Qaida or Daesh
VEGs becoming indistinguishable from purely may reinforce the image of themselves that they
commercial organized criminal groups. In those project as adherents to a global ideology, adding
cases, it is not clear whether communities continue further competitive advantages.
to regard their activities in a different light to those
of “corrupt” bodies. However, local VEGs’ religious standing is also
contested, especially where educated and more
VEGs also benefit from the wider economic credible clerics can remain in position and can
dislocation they create.36 The erosion of other preach theologically grounded Islam. Local VEGs
livelihoods positions them as economic magnets in are not alone in being able to mobilize faith and
an emerging war economy, along with competing ideology in contested spaces.
criminal and insurgent groups. Abusive state
reactions to the actions of criminal or ideological
groups further contribute to economic dislocation Intentional instability
and, perversely, reinforce local VEGs’ positions
within communities. Local VEGs operate within a wider political
economy in which power-holders of all kinds—
Illicit economic activities such as kidnapping, official and unofficial, modern and traditional,
extortion (“taxation”), cattle theft and the private and public, overt and covert—contest
facilitation of illicit trade in goods ranging for resources in shifting alliances.38 Local VEGs
from drugs to minerals provide the means for find themselves embedded in these force fields
ideological action. But ideology mobilizes and are affected by the “business models” of
followers, gives local VEGs significance and political entrepreneurs of all sorts.39 One way to
potentially differentiates them from rival groups visualize the resulting “pathways of predation”
organized around ethnicity or livelihood. Indeed, is to see them as a triangular balance among
a reductionist picture of these groups as purely those power-holders who rely on patron-client
economic actors—or indeed as purely grievance relationships; the communities to whom they
entrepreneurs—would lose sight of the ideological relate; and the armed groups operating among
aspects of their strategy, objectives and appeal. those communities.40

31
This is not specific to low-income, weak or “fragile” states.

“Rather than working There are clear benefits

to resolve conflicts, it to engage in violence, and
is often powerful elites chief amongst them is that
that encourage shifts and it is an effective weapon
increases in violence to through which to garner
cement their positions or to political power. In short,
take advantage of changing politics causes political
political circumstances. violence.”41

It is also widely recognized that elites benefiting One should therefore not see these as one-
from war economies and violence overlap with dimensional conflicts between farmers and herders,
governing authorities. In 2020, PVE expert Peter or so-called jihadi groups and state authorities,
Baumann noted “I hope that greater focus is placed nor as an ineluctable slide into violent conflict. For
on state actors who promote and support VEGs. example, in Mali:
I would also like to see more research, analysis
and transparency on who benefits from violent more recently, however, many Dogon have formed
extremism, both financially and politically”.42 a counter-movement against the violent Dogon
militia, and [are] instead promoting peace and
“Reform champions”, or political actors who seek negotiations with Fulani groups including ‘jihadists’.
significant progress in governance, may find their This has led to an internal conflict among Dogon.
scope for action trammelled by these contexts. At the same time, there are fights for control over
Some elites may also speak out publicly in favour of pastures between armed groups dominated by
modernization and progress while acting to protect Fulani and associated with Al-Qaida on the one
interests threatened by stability and inclusion. hand and the Islamic State on the other.43
Discerning which actors are genuinely interested
in reform and which only pay lip service to it is a In eastern DRC, “conflict and violence are often
challenge for international partners, but doing so linked to the competition between different power
is important in devising successful strategies to networks. over resources, territory and political
support positive change. So is accurately assessing authority. A key characteristic of these networks—
the scope for reform in the face of the complex as is the case with the networks of the Congo
combinations of interests and powers engaged in wars—is that they are unstable, changing, and
the “pathways of predation”. constantly adapting and multi-scalar in essence”.44

32
FIGURE 6.

Pathways of predation

Compete for access in

Power-holders Public
administration

ce
s
es t
nan

Su
Elite interests

Ma
ter

pp
Service to
/Fi

nip
t in

ort
ort

Shared interest in conflict

ula
tec
pp

as source of leadership

te
Pro

Su

legitimacy

Vulnerability and poverty

as a business model for
elite competition

Communities
Armed Impoverish/intimidate/protect (manipulated
groups along identity and
Support economic lines)

Power-holders from all identity groups whose This undermines public service delivery, which is
position depends on their patrimonial relationship increasingly driven by private elite interests, and
with clients in “their” identity group benefit from further erodes communities’ trust in the State.
(indeed, may depend on) the persistence of identity Elite access to administrative controls generates
group grievances and sense of being threatened. such internal competition that local VEGs can
They therefore share an interest in continued readily use the ineffectiveness of public service as
instability and poverty. an entry point.

Hence their interests lie in fostering identity rifts Understanding this nexus of predatory incentives
between groups and undermining trust. In this, in local detail is essential in working out what
they readily collaborate with local VEGs who share prospects reform champions really have, given that
these interests, even while they compete with one vulnerability and poverty are the central business
another for control and influence. Shared elite model for these patrimonial elites.
interests in continuing grievance, insecurity and
poverty accompany acute intra-elite competition
both within and between identity groups.

33
BOX 4.
MUTUALITÉS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

In eastern DRC, elites compete for access and extraction. In northern Kivu, for example,
to regional government positions through the ministries for which elites compete
an elaborate shadow governance system include the Planning Ministry (for access to
called “mutualités”. Each major ethnic information on international organizations and
group possesses at least one mutualité, budgeting flows); the Ministry of Tourism
whose creation dates back to the start of (for access to information on the lootable area
the Congolese civil war in the 1990s. Each of Virunga Park, where biodiversity, mineral
mutualité is organized in a highly hierarchical and timber resources remain) and the cadastral
but informal structure, topped by a mixed- service (where elites compete for corrupt
gender committee that organizes strategies for access to vast land concessions).
access to economic and political resources.

One can read the dynamic between various

mutualités as resulting from the competition
between ethnic groups for access to and
means of power and resources. This is
certainly one dimension worth taking into Communities have neither democratic nor
account. But a more accurate reading is how judicial leverage against elites. The predation
elites from all ethnic groups find common system is thus based on two pillars at the local
interests in organizing competition within community level: insecurity and poverty. These
each and organize patronage networks that are the elements that make communities that
ensure they are seen as protectors of their are collectively organized around the identity
community even though they loot resources notion of ethnicity rather than citizenship
in the name of community protection. dependent on their respective elites.
For example, mutualités organize specific Communities support influential individuals
recruitment task forces in universities, where in positions of power, in the hope that elites
they cherry-pick individuals for ascent to the will protect them and serve the interests of
elite. Those individuals have a better chance their ethnic group. In the Kivus, some elites
of surviving and achieving social prestige if end up forming and supporting local armed
they reach elite status. University recruitment groups with a twofold objective: giving an
demonstrates that mutualités themselves impression to ethnic bases that armed groups
understand the recruitment opportunity in protect the interests of aligned communities;
youths’ quest for socioeconomic progress and and maintaining an armed competition and
better social status. therefore a chaotic state of insecurity that
enables the extraction of lucrative resources (e.g.
Elites play on competition for survival and timber, minerals, fertile land or biodiversity).
security within their own communities and Armed groups themselves end up falling into a
keep this competition in place to maintain their logic of predation on community vulnerability,
own position of power and, therefore, access leading to a toxic dependence–abuse
to resources. In other words, elites compete relationship between communities and localized
to maintain dependence networks that allow armed groups. All these elites have an interest
them to use institutions and private businesses in keeping the system in place and therefore
for organized—albeit informal—exploitation preventing stability.45

34
Mobilization messages for local VEGs
In each case studied, the local or regional VEG mobilizes communities through local grievances.46

These grievances may feel disadvantaged in

be ethnic (e.g. Fulani comparison with Catholic
perception of being Makonde in Cabo
targeted by state and state- Delgado).47 Indeed, in
supported forces in Mali), many cases, grievances
livelihood-based (e.g. may intersect, with a
pastoralists discriminated community perceiving
against by land policies), itself as being victimized
regional (e.g. Kidal is a on ethnic, religious
long way from the nexus and occupational lines
of power and wealth in simultaneously (e.g.
Bamako) or religious Muslim Fulani herders in
(e.g. Kimwane Muslims parts of Nigeria).

Local VEGs compete for allegiance in these la défense de la patrie (VDP). The group’s strategic
complicated and sometimes complex contexts. goal is thought to be a mix of rebuilding the ancient
Sometimes they seek to gain recruitment Peul empire Djeelgodji, thus establishing a safe haven
advantages across ethnic divides exploited by other for the community, and advancing JNIM’s influence
NSAGs, drawing on the ideology they espouse. through support, coordination, and collaboration.”48
They may also compete through class-based
appeal, such as Katiba Macina recruiting non-elite However, local VEGs’ mobilization of communities
Fulani who are alienated by the elite’s compliance often takes advantage of dysfunctional and abusive
or complicity with Government processes that state security operations. “Broad-based military
disadvantage them. Both of these can sometimes be operations accompanied by gross human rights
challenging when recruiting on an ethnic basis and violations alienate local populations and undermine
require complicated balancing acts. any short-term gains they might achieve. When
these operations end and security forces leave,
As Coakley observes, based on interviews with a militants inevitably fill the void and tighten their
human rights activist and international analyst in grip. If current dynamics persist, and local and
2021, among other sources, “The strength of Ansaroul international forces fail to establish a permanent
Islam [a Burkina Faso-based local VEG] has directly presence in contested areas that can bridge the gap
impacted civilian Peul communities who have been with key segments of the population, it will enable
branded ‘extremists’ by local self-defence groups such militant groups to continue to pose as ‘community
as the Koglweogo and later, the Volontaires pour protectors’ and further consolidate their control.”49

35
Journey to Extremism showed that state agency
abuse was a “tipping point” into violence for
individual recruits. It is also reported as a tipping
point for communities, either into organized “self-
defence” or to join existing groups contesting abusive One grievance expressed in all study countries
state power.50 For such communities, the experience is corruption (or at least the perception of it).54
of victimization and unfair targeting by state or state- This is an elastic term, ranging from local state or
associated bodies (such as “self-defence” militias) traditional office-holders soliciting bribes, to power-
based on identity—usually ethnic identity—is then holders abusing their position for personal or group
an avenue for the entry of local VEGs.51 A local gain, to participation in illicit activities such as drug
VEG that offers targeted communities protection smuggling.55 It also features in all reporting on local
from attacks such as those by state or state-assisted VEG mobilization messages. Corruption is not the
forces that identify those communities as “terrorists” exclusive preserve of Government officials, though
on ethnic, religious or livelihoods grounds is anger at official abuse of office is widely reported.
naturally welcomed by the community. Rather than State corruption therefore exacerbates insurgency
ideology, “the driving force behind the emergence alongside other forms of corruption, through loss
and resilience of non-state armed groups in the of value from public expenditure it also undermines
Sahel is a combination of weak states, corruption state capacity to contest local VEGs either
and the brutal repression of dissent, embodied in kinetically or through service provision.
dysfunctional military forces”.52
Many local VEGs have strong messaging on
Local VEGs offer credible power. Hyperlocal corruption, although this is not necessarily matched
dynamics allow them to attract adherents and by a strong track record. In some cases, local VEGs
strike deals with power brokers. Their longer time can claim righteousness because they are focused on
horizon and persistent objectives may also give their mission rather than on personal or community
them some comparative advantage in the medium gain. In cases where that claim is plausible, —it
term. The choices that local VEGs make between provides them with a ready foothold in communities
stressing their global vision, mission and identity as a result, or strengthens existing footholds.
and emphasizing their ability to address local
grievances, evolve and differ from place to place. Where VEGs occupy territory and drive out state
services through violence and threats, many of them
However, Al-Shabaab in particular is reported then impose a form of rule which offers “justice” in
as being “ruthless” to those who oppose it,53 a form that contrasts with state judicial services
and other local VEGs (e.g. ISGS and JNIM) in that it is swift and decisive, and is often seen as
have similar reputations for violence towards being free from corruption. Some VEGs, such as
those who stand against them. Consequently, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, also provide other state-
the “choice” by a group or its leaders to join a like public services—including even COVID-19
local VEG may be a highly coerced decision. prevention—within the ambit of their ideological
The comparative advantage of local VEGs over perspective.56 They contrast their payments to
other NSAGs may lie partly in their frightening militants and to the families of dead fighters with
reputation, derived in part from that of their the approach of state agencies, which are at best
global patron, and partly from the appeal of their slow to provide such payments.
ideological “offer” to potential elite allies. All
the same, they have by no means eliminated the The grievances through which local VEGs embed
competition, and the conflict ecosystem remains themselves in communities are, as noted, acutely
crowded and complex. locally specific and diverse. One common thread

36
in almost all cases, however, is the remoteness aspects (e.g. the relative sizes of security and social
from the capital cities, of the regions in which service allocations and outlays) affect the State’s
local VEGs operate, at least initially.57 Long- capacity to improve citizens’ lives, especially in
standing biases of public service provision towards more remote areas. Taken together with questions
the capital and its immediate surroundings are as to whether the government gets good value
familiar development concerns and undermine for money in its spending—which sometimes
any sense of “belonging” in more remote areas. reflect concerns over corruption and its impact on
Private investment, too, is limited in remoter areas, public spending—these affect the State’s reach in
except in extractive industries, which frequently addressing citizens’ priorities and may, indeed, be
undermine other local livelihoods and traditions determining factors in this.
instead of providing jobs.

This sense of distance is noted in many study areas: Land, climate and conflict
in Cabo Delgado, for instance, the remoteness of
Maputo is more than a geographical phenomenon Annexe A sets out some details underlying at least
in reported local grievances—Pemba is closer to a few aspects of the land-climate-conflict nexus as it
Mogadishu than to Maputo and Maputo may also comes to bear on local VEGs. Many conflicts erupt
be culturally and economically very different from over land rights, which are closely linked to water
Cabo Delgado. The retreat of state service delivery management, usually outside urban areas.58 These
in the face of local VEG violence (or its reduction to are exacerbated when land management policy
security or repression) further facilitates insurgency, is perceived as favouring one identity group over
which local VEGs are immediately in a position to another, such as favouring sedentary farmers (who
capitalize on. are often Christian or animist) over pastoralists
(who are mainly Muslim). In Burkina Faso, for
Fiscal resource allocations are key government example,59 “[c]hanges to land laws introduced
choices. Both geographical aspects (e.g. the spatial capitalist frameworks, which in some cases
distribution of public expenditure) and sectoral abolished the tradition of familial land inheritance.

©UNDP/Somalia

37
Under these new rules, land could be sold to the Land governance is linked to violent extremism
highest bidder, who was often an outsider, [which] through both ecology and economy. In the former,
helped to create disenfranchised youths and areas where environmental degradation—often
hostility towards alien property investors.60” to the point of desertification—leads to disrupted
livelihoods or destitution are often perceived as
Land governance is also a vehicle for rent-seeking having been deliberately neglected by the State and
by both statutory and traditional local authorities, sometimes also by traditional leadership, the rich
which also adds grievances over corruption or world, and private capital. Land governance also
prolonged delay in dispute resolution—grievances encompasses control over water resources, another
that are readily exploited by local VEGs.61 key focus of conflict and one that is intimately
Regulation can also have perverse effects both bound up with the value of land and with its use for
on the environment and on social solidarity, as is cultivation, pasturage and livestock husbandry. In the
the case with tree preservation under the colonial north-eastern Central African Republic, for example,
Niger Forest Code. This can enable predatory accelerating desertification is seen as being linked to
behaviour by, for example, Forest Service officials marginalization and sparks a sense of injustice among
in remote areas. those affected by this. These are the areas where local
VEGs are mobilizing grievances.64 Similar patterns
Climate change is not in itself a cause of conflict. may be discerned in the bourgoutières of Mali, for
However, “climate disruption is a crisis amplifier and example. Overall, conflict and violence analysis should
multiplier,” to quote the UN Secretary-General.62 include not only the political dynamics between
As annexe A notes, “the destitution of livelihoods various identity, livelihood and political groups
due to desertification processes and environmental and violent mobilizers but also on the relationship
degradation play into the hands of VEGs in regions between human populations and their ecosystems.
already marked by structural marginalization”.
While the range of experiences across the arid and Economically, elites at the subnational, national and
semi-arid regions of West Africa demonstrates that international levels compete for control over land.
land-use policy and land governance can make a In a context like North Kivu, for example, elites
great difference, both socially and environmentally, compete to rig the cadastral system to gain access to
the pressures of climate change remain a factor to large land concessions that favour their own private
be weighed up as efforts to resist the spread of local accumulation at the expense of communities. The
VEGs are appraised. latter are often driven out of their ancestral lands,
which are the backbone of their livelihoods and
The consequences—land degradation, pressure on identity. These elites exploit the fissures between
pastures, shifts in migration patterns and reduced customary and statutory law to gain private control
soil fertility—leave communities impoverished. over land. This compounds the stresses from
This makes them vulnerable to malign offers and community dislocation, ecological extraction,
precipitates farmer-herder conflict when livestock structural marginalization and dependency on aid.
and arable uses contest the same land. Livelihoods
are often ethnicized (e.g. herders are typified as Local VEGs position themselves as righters of
Fulani, even if half the livestock may belong to wrongs, providers of justice, regulators of equitable
sedentary owners) so livelihood-based conflicts may access and livelihood substitutes. While weaknesses
carry ethnic baggage. Land governance policy and in land governance offer local VEGs entry points,
practice are often similarly perceived as ethnicized, better land management policy and implementation
which further enables local VEG narratives that offer the State a potential comparative advantage
seek to mobilize communities through grievances over local VEGs.65 However, this window of political
over restricted livelihoods.63 and ecological opportunity may be closing fast.66

38
Misogyny, gender and the Pastoralist groups in Somalia traditionally had
social fabric important economic and social decision-making
roles for (senior) women. Ethnic and clan militias
Misogyny is evident in local VEGs and also in reflected that deference within male-dominated
other insurgent groups. Despite reports of sexual military structures.69 However, despite Boko
abuse and exploitation of women, some local Haram’s tactically conditioned use of female
VEGs provide active roles for them as suicide suicide bombers, there is no available evidence to
bombers, scouts and in logistics and recruitment indicate that women occupy command positions
etc.67 In Chad, the most common role respondents in local VEG military hierarchies.
to a recent survey ascribed to women recruited
into local VEGs was as combatants.68 On the other hand, misogyny and exclusion
of women is evidently a key factor underlying
terrorist tactics and extremist violence.70 As one
study concludes:

we believe that there are at an extraordinary search for

least three pathways that economic resources that
help explain this outcome. may culminate in joining
One is that perpetration of terror or rebel groups that
… gender-based violence promise such resources.
is a bootcamp for learning The final pathway, which is
the use and functionality only indirectly addressed
of violence. The second, in our research findings,
also supported by our is that the specific
findings, is that chronic disempowerment of
structural marriage market those whose voices might
obstruction causes specific mitigate the allure of
and acute grievances for violence, lowers the barriers
men, which may catalyse to political violence.71

Communities affected by conflict—especially that trauma runs the risk of replicating the damaging
arising from the actions of VEGs—suffer deep conditions that caused it.73 However, mental health
and abiding trauma (one in five suffer some degree and psychosocial support need to be persistent and
of trauma, and one in twenty severe trauma72). locally adapted. One-off medicalized visits may do
Coping mechanisms often erode relationships and more harm than good if they raise expectations that
further damage the social fabric. If unresolved, such cannot then be met.74

39
Does form follow function? with local VEGs’ operational coherence. In the
The operational structures of Central African Republic, in contrast, insurgent
groups seem to exhibit more classic “Big Man”
local VEGs structures of patronage, in which adherents—
typically young men—are tied to a patron by
In many places, the operational structure of local expectations of gain.80
VEGs seems to mirror that of other insurgent
groups. Some are relatively diffuse, operating
more as “franchises” than as vertically structured
command-and-control units. Some (such as the JAS
faction of Boko Haram) seem to function much
like other marauding bands. These groups show
little structured provision for local governance. In
Somalia, however, Al-Shabaab offers a wide range
of state-like services in areas it controls. The depth
of its local organization, with structures reaching
down to the district level, also reflects much more
closely the structure of a classic state. “The extent to
which they differ, we hypothesize, is based on their
leadership profile; the resources available to them
through extraction, taxation, and trade; and their
level of external and internal economic support”.75

By this point, Al-Shabaab “has successfully replaced

the state in most functions where it has control.
It provides health care, COVID prevention, even
compensation for damage by its own cadres”.76
Overall, “Al-Shabaab has erected a shadow
government with reach throughout most of
southern Somalia that outperforms the government,
especially in dispute resolution and the provision of a
semblance of order”.77 Indeed “most people prefer to
take cases to Al-Shabaab’s courts”.78

In the face of Somalia’s pervasive clan structure, Al-

Shabaab capitalizes on widespread resentment—
especially among non-elite youths—at the persistent
clan-based hierarchy and the marginalization or
exclusion this results in. It emphasizes “unity in
©UNDP/Chad
faith” and consciously balances powerful positions
among clans to make the message of opportunities
beyond clan lines seem more real. It also delivers a In Mali, the components of JNIM seem to be
highly nationalist narrative that sets it apart from moving in a direction similar that of to Al-Shabaab
other local VEGs.79 The ideological coherence of a in Somalia. For example, the long-standing
message combining nationalism with a particular Sossobe-Salsalbe conflict in Mopti over access to
interpretation of their ideology seems to fit well the richer bourgoutières pastures was resolved by

40
both communities bringing the matter to a Cadi coercion by both bidders—such that both ordinary
(traditional Islamic judge) provided by Katiba citizens and their elite patrons may “buy in” to a
Macina. While at one point there were reports local VEG’s offer.
that Sossobe parties had denounced the April 2021
ruling, in November and December 2021 it became In the context of the “pathways of predation”
clear that the judgment was holding.81 business models of elites who depend on
instability and poverty for their leadership
The hypothesis advanced in annexe B suggests that positions, this development poses two striking
groups with greater resources can establish deeper challenges. First, while local VEGs may enter
structures with greater ideological coherence. If into deals with other actors with an interest in
correct, this is coherent with a general pattern of instability, local VEGs’ own interests do not
successful local VEGs evolving from insurgent bands require instability—indeed, they benefit from
by widening their areas of influence and coming stability in the areas they control, though they of
to compete with the governing authorities in the course benefit from instability in state-controlled
provision of the “survival functions” of a state.82 areas. In this respect, they offer communities
the relative predictability and security that both
This suggests that the seminal analysis in ordinary citizens and elite patrons may value.
Journey to Extremism of the factors tipping
individuals into violence may reflect a stage in The second is that as a local VEG expands its area
the evolution of local VEG expansion. While in of control, it becomes more and more like a state in
2016 few local VEGs in the region represented itself—an oppressive and partial state, admittedly,
serious competition for the State (Al-Shabaab in but one that demonstrates a quasi-monopoly
Somalia being the sole exception), by 2021 this of coercive force in its area of control and the
picture had been changed by the expansion of ability to enforce its “laws” reasonably promptly.
local VEG power, the retreat of state security and Although such bodies may not be recognized
justice provision and the deepening of internal by the international community or accepted by
political crises. It may now be more of a case of neighbouring states, at least initially, geopolitical
communities facing competition for their social interests may invite some parties to engage with
contract—a choice often made under a degree of them despite opposing them.

In this sense, local VEGs deeply structured local

reflect a competitive VEGs that negotiate with
version of a “mediated (other) non-state sources
State”. Here it is not the of authority to provide
State alone but also more functions of government.

Indeed, the more structured local VEGs have many its policies on policing, taxation, marriage, and
of the characteristics of a “proto-state” as originally education build clearly specified identities of
identified in pre-modern evolving structures but membership in the group and demonstrate its
also as more recently typified by Daesh: “in an arena authority, in ways that mimic statehood … Daesh
of extreme competition for loyalty and authority, exhibits classic characteristics of a proto-state,

41
trapped in a perpetual state of instability, flux, ethnic targeting (which is seen as tantamount to
and fluidity, and yet coalesces and finds form as it collective punishment)—particularly of Fulani in
challenges and forcibly remakes authority”.83 the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin—serves to drive
communities and individuals into welcoming
When VEGs expand their areas of control and local VEGs, which are perceived as defending
compete effectively for the allegiance of some them. Community elites then come under
communities, the State and its international triple pressure: from state agencies wreaking
partners may draw two conclusions. First, they retribution for failing to hold back local VEGs,
need to understand in detail why these shifts in from rival ethnic militias seeking revenge for past
governance and political economy have come hostilities, and from local VEGs seeking to deter
about and what aspects of State and VEG actions collaboration with the State.87
have led citizens in the areas they control to align
preferentially with the VEG. This is a difficult
question to answer when the areas are under the Strategies and operational
control of violent and potentially abusive forces.
modalities
Second, if the VEG in question has gained
control of significant areas of the country, realistic Differences between Al Qaeda and Daesh were
strategic analysis of the requirements for holding noted above, in the “Dynamics of violent extremism
areas under effective Government control is in sub-Saharan Africa” section. There may also
needed, along with an analysis of opportunities for be deeper differences in the ideological direction
recapturing territory from the VEG. This strategic of Daesh, which is perhaps more openly ready to
analysis needs to go beyond the military-tactical endorse killing civilians when opportunities to
assessment of combat options to consider the expand arise from the resulting chaos.
political economy of the relevant elites and the
communities for which they are the key patrons. Local VEGs’ actions seem to include deliberately
A rigorous analysis of the true implications of the undermining intergenerational trust (e.g. by
present strategic configuration will be needed undermining the position of traditional elders
to avoid optimism and confirmation bias in both and religious and social authorities). This fraying
assessment and planning. of the social fabric reinforces their control over
communities and is part of local VEGs’ offer of
Military responses have ejected local VEGs “belonging” to their alternative order instead. This
affiliated with Al-Qaida or Daesh from some may help them to appeal to youth, adding to their
spaces, allowing the “return of the State” that social base.
was widely described as the objective in earlier
theatres such as Iraq. UNDP COs expressed Specific regional studies give some indication
concern that this may actually be a return to of local peculiarities, such as Amanda Coakley’s
the “status quo ante”, including behaviours that contemporary work for ILLP (Initiatives for
previously precipitated local support for local Land, Lives and Peace) on Burkina Faso.
VEGs. Practitioners also noted the risk that However, each theatre is specific, contingent and
international assistance may focus on the ability to shifting rapidly. Even within a single, relatively
combat, but not contest, the threat.84 This point coherent movement, strategies may vary. For
was also reiterated by other analysts.85 Academic example, the Somalia interviews indicated that
commentary notes that local VEGs flow back Al-Shabaab’s priorities in Mogadishu have
in after heavy security presence declines, which become increasingly commercial; in other regions,
some communities acquiesce to.86 Recurrence of ideological objectives remain central.

42
Local VEGs have used violence against civilians Impact of global events on
and state forces to sustain control over areas. This
allows revenue extraction associated with activities
local VEG approaches
such as drug smuggling in Mali88 or gold mining The Daesh “caliphate” offered a model in which a
in Burkina Faso89, albeit probably not on the scale VEG holds territory, exploits resources to finance
suggested in media coverage. Revenues are in turn group operations, and defies “foreign” control.94
essential to sustaining local VEG structures (and/or Emulated in areas where Daesh-affiliated groups
to promoting their ideological goals). hold control, this may inspire affiliates elsewhere to
seek similar control.
Recent years have seen increased use of kidnapping
for ransom as a revenue strategy.90 In Nigeria, local Daesh’s focus on the “near enemy” (regional
VEGs compete with non-ideological “bandit” gangs Governments which defy its authority) is
and sometimes claim responsibility for attacks convenient for groups with local revenue streams
of uncertain provenance, sparking concerns that to protect (e.g. drug trafficking, illegal timber,
violent extremist ideology may be spreading into artisanal mining). Contests with state forces over
those areas. Competition between local VEGs area control and revenues are made easier by this
and between these and purely criminal “bandits” focus on the “near enemy”.
for control of territory does not, of course, prevent
collaboration either in sharing out territories or in The defeat of the Daesh “caliphate” in Iraq and
contesting state control where common interests Syria undermined some of its lustre. However, it
are judged to predominate.91 also brought foreign militants with experience in
holding and running territory to African zones.
Strong networks of informants (and fear) enable There is now some indication that Daesh HQ has
continued control of communities and thus of pressed affiliates to support a deliberate expansion
areas. This applies both to local VEGs and to into sub-Saharan Africa.
other violent criminal groups, such as smuggling
gangs. However, in areas that are supportive of The recent victory of the Taliban was a vindication
local VEGs, religious endorsement of controls of strategic patience in a campaign lasting 20 years
may reinforce pressure to affiliate, building on fear and showed the benefits of a longer time horizon.
and relatively generous funding (e.g. payments to It also appeared to validate Al-Qaida’s focus on the
families of “martyrs”, in contrast with minimal state “far enemy”95 (with Taliban negotiations with the
support for families of fallen soldiers92). US presented as a victory in this regard). However,
Al-Qaida affiliates in sub-Saharan Africa have
Local VEGs do not yet make use of global hitherto shown little interest in US targets. Given
narratives of climate change—though the French engagement in the Sahel, Berkhane is
opportunity to attribute deteriorations in land instead the most prominent external enemy in the
quality to the misdeeds of the “far enemy” and theatre of conflict.
former colonial masters cannot be far off.93
Similarly, shortcomings in global action on The “Sahel exception” to the conflict between
adaptation run the risk of providing local Daesh and Al-Qaida broke down in 2019. JNIM-
VEGs with a ready source of further grievance ISGS fighting in 2020 (which entailed over 100
around which to mobilize both individuals and battles and over 700 dead) demonstrates the depth
communities. Few Governments in the areas of the antagonism and rivalry between Al-Qaida
under threat from local VEGs have ready narrative and Daesh. However, JNIM and ISGS also
responses to such challenging discourses. collaborate against state and international forces.

43
ISGS is itself a splinter from a JNIM component areas where they had not already engaged. In
(al Mourabitoun). This shows Daesh capitalizing Mali, Fulani disillusionment with state actions
on divisions within rival (but similar) local was led by elite elders, but younger poorer
VEGs. It has similarly capitalized on the split in herders resented their dominant and exclusive
Boko Haram (to which it probably contributed) position. This split the ethnic coalition that had
by forming ISWAP. Indeed, local VEGs in formed to contest state and state-backed militia
most regions have split (e.g. Boko Haram, al actions that were seen as oppressive. As noted
Mourabitoun, AQIM and others). Some of these earlier, this provided a receptive community base
splits have made space for global groups to enter for Katiba Macina.

©UNDP/Somalia

44
RECOMMENDATIONS

The key recommendations that follow from this The analysis contained in the sections entitled
analysis are: “Does form follow function? The operational
structures of local VEGs” and “Strategies and
• understand (including by exploring the operational modalities” particularly feeds into
hypotheses in annexe B); and then recommendations relating to the different strategic
challenges posed by groups as they evolve into
• act. proto-state competitors. These are found in both
the “Understand” and “Act” sections.
These recommendations are structured into
three blocks: Elements of the analysis of grievances, including
corruption (or perceptions of this), and the
operational structures and modalities both feed
• Political economy (which derives into the recommendations on “Follow the money”,
particularly from the analysis in which are set out as a specific section of action.
the “Operating in an ecosystem Similarly, the analysis of grievance and mobilization
of violence” and “Intentional messages feeds into the recommendations in the
instability” sections) section entitled “Ease the pain”.

It is striking how significant a gender lens is for

each recommendation. Ensuring that the different
• Political ecology (which derives experiences, perceptions, risks and needs of women
particularly from the analysis in the and men are reflected in the analysis at each stage
“Land, climate and conflict” section) will be essential for almost all recommendations.
One exception to this might be the tracking of the
income streams of local VEGs, for example, where
establishing what actually happens seems not to have
• Ideology and grievance (which a significant gender dimension, though of course
derives particularly from the analysis there will be a gender dimension to the assessment of
in the “Local versions of global the damage caused and counter-actions to be taken.
goals” and “Mobilization messages Moreover, it will be important to ensure that women
for local VEGs” sections) have agency in the execution of almost all actions
that draw on the “Understand” section.

45
“So what?”—what do we do with understanding?

So what? Caveats

First, do no harm. Then:

Identify promising “Traditional leaders” are often complicit or compromised or disabled by

partners “empty power”—titles and roles without resources to deliver.96

Identify interests Identify actors in the field (and at the national level, if possible) with
in peace an interest in peace, paying attention to the “business model” that they
actually operate.

Identify supporting This may mean policies, people, projects (and perhaps protection from
investments predators).

Identify policies For example, policies on tree preservation that unintentionally enabled
that enable corrupt rent-seeking by forestry officials etc.
predation

Identify policies For example, requiring traditional leaders to “deliver” communities to the
that incentivize State without providing them with resources, thus encouraging them to
predation “prey on their own”.

Help national Local governments are rarely predominant powers locally, but still have
authorities to important resources. Where conflicts are local, responses need locally
connect positively attuned efforts, which national authorities are unlikely to possess—but
with inclusive local national resources and permissions are still vital for conflict resolution and
processes community trust.

Develop Has to be real; promises that raise expectations which are then dashed do
messaging that more harm than silence.
makes alternative Service delivery is not a sufficient condition for “belonging”, but its
“belonging” absence is a strong message of “you don’t belong”.
credible and
attractive

Be realistic Recognize the limitations of international capacity to understand

and influence political economy at the local, national and regional
levels; understand limits to reform champions’ freedom of action in
the face of power-holders’ “business model” (see figure 5: Pathways of
predation, above).

46
BROAD
RECOMMENDATIONS
Each recommendation below is followed by the be integrated with other research (where,
actors to whom it applies (italicized, in parentheses). again, a gender perspective will be appro-
priate and essential) to provide a comprehen-
sive, up-to-date picture and extract key poli-
Understand cy insights (UN, international community,
state authorities and civil society).
Political economy
U. 4. There are specific challenges to understan-
U. 1. Understanding the political, economic and ding corruption—in all senses of the term—
security-related processes through which and its effects, including those of perceptions
VEGs gain footholds and then deepen con- and reports of corruption, and the different
trol in communities at the local, subnational experiences and perceptions of women and
and national levels is essential. This requires men, including the use of sexual services as a
tracking the alignments of key local power-hol- form of payment. This includes the opportu-
ders’ political, economic and security-related nities for corrupt conduct and the incentives
choices, along with the way that those actions that exist and can be created for non-corrupt
are received by others. It also includes an analy- conduct. UN family and civil society resear-
sis of conflict factors—at each level—and their ch already covers this field, which should be
implications. All of this is deeply gendered integrated with wider research to provide
(UN and international community). actionable insights (UN, international com-
munity, state authorities and civil society).
U. 2. The three hypotheses set out in annexe B
are, of course, avenues for early research U. 5. One important additional layer of analysis
efforts. In particular, understanding the is the spatial dimensions of conflict and
cost-benefit calculations of local local VEG violent extremism, which is facilitated by
leaderships—and that of Al-Qaida and Dae- developments in GIS mapping of events
sh in seeking or accepting their affiliation— and data. Overlaying geographical data on
has implications for other efforts to limit the poverty, fiscal allocation and expenditure,
expansion of those global groups. Ensuring service provision or land management,
women’s perspectives are heard and heeded for example, onto conflict event data (e.g.
will be especially important in this. ACLED, UCDP and other similar event
data sets) may offer fresh insights—along
U. 3. Such understanding also entails analysis with an understanding of what forms of re-
of accidental and deliberate damage to the moteness are associated with the spread of
social fabric. UNDP and other researchers violent extremism (UN, civil society resear-
are already doing work on this, which could chers, international community).

47
U. 6. Understanding the impact of public expen- Ideology and grievance
diture beyond its macroeconomic and tech-
nical indicators requires an examination of U. 1. Understanding the messaging through
its distributional effects. These may include which local VEGs propagate their vision
unintended spatial, generational or gender-re- at the local, subnational, national, regional
lated disparities, for example. Such disparities and global levels, especially that through
may further weaken the social fabric. Fiscal which global VEGs expand their influen-
impact analysis (including the spatial overlays ce. This requires social media monitoring
described above) would therefore help iden- (usually in local languages) to detect both
tify opportunities for the State to reduce the expansions of local VEGs’ ambitions and
appeal of local VEGs (international financial the spread of global VEGs’ messages
institutions, state authorities, civil society). and influence. It also requires a gender-
and age-differentiated assessment of the
U. 7. Understanding the political, economic and impact of VEG messaging and positive
security-related processes through which state counter-messaging. The UN is already
and regional actors seek to frustrate VEGs’ engaged in monitoring hate speech, for
strategies, and the effect those have on commu- example, and could expand its analytical
nities and their reception of local VEGs among capacity with additional resources. The
both women and men, will be important in UN, the international community, state
enhancing counter-measures (UN, internatio- authorities and civil society all have impor-
nal community, state authorities). tant roles to play in deepening understan-
ding, speeding up analytical turnaround
Political ecology and identifying key opportunities for coun-
ter-messaging (UN, international commu-
U. 8. Understanding conflict and violence analy- nity, state authorities, civil society).
sis includes not only the political dynamics
between various identity, livelihood and po- U. 2. Local non-state analytical capacity will be
litical groups and violent mobilizers but also important in obtaining valid and locally
the relationship between human populations attuned understanding. While some local
and their ecosystems. Analysis and follow-on capacity may be built simply by commis-
programming should include a political eco- sioning appropriate products and sup-
logy focus (UN, international community, porting quality assurance, further explicit
state authorities, civil society). capacity-building for local research bodies
may be needed. One important aspect may
U. 9. Specific political ecology analysis will be be the creation of safe forums in which lo-
particularly needed in areas menaced by en- cal researchers and civil society can engage
vironmental degradation, making it possible power-holders (including state authori-
to anticipate the effects of climate disrup- ties) in productive conversation. The UN
tions on livelihoods, violent mobilization and is already doing significant work in this
elite bargains (UN, international communi- field (UN, international community, state
ty, state authorities, civil society). authorities, civil society).

48
Act identify the forms of corruption that are
most actively exploited in VEG messaging
A. 1. Apply the outcomes of the “Understand” or found by work triggered by the “Under-
section to policy analysis and advice, stand” section to be most significant in en-
reflecting the various avenues of focus abo- couraging communities to engage with local
ve and maximizing opportunities to enhan- VEGs. These forms of corruption might
ce Government–civil society engagement merit the highest priority (UN, international
through supportive policy dialogue proces- community, state authorities, civil society).
ses that provide clear space for women’s
voices to be heard and heeded (UN, inter- A. 6. Specific applications of the understanding
national community, civil society). gained from the proposed analysis to the
challenges of corruption (in the broadest
A. 2. In view of the observations about grie- sense of the term) and unfairness could
vances in the analysis (as highlighted by include dialogue (including well-pre-
Journey to Extremism), apply that under- pared women’s groups) and advice on
standing to ensure that the actions of state correcting policies and regulations that
agencies and state-enabled armed groups incentivize rent-seeking, on re-allocation
at the very least comply with human rights of public expenditure to maximize the
obligations and, by preventing abuses, sense of inclusion and minimize the sense
avoid creating fresh openings for VEGs to of unfairness, and on messaging strategies
embed themselves in communities or mo- that communicate the benefits to citizens
bilize aggrieved elites (state authorities, flowing from state engagement with these
UN, international community). challenges. This will need to take account
of the “pathways of predation” diagnosis of
Political economy elites’ business model and therefore reflect
reform champions’ real freedom of action
A. 3. In particular, apply that understanding to (UN, international financial institutions,
the development of strategies to consolidate international community, state authorities,
Government control and recapture areas civil society).
where Government influence is thin, in
the light of local VEGs’ position along the A. 7. The UN already supports Governments
trajectory from bands of individuals to pro- in PVE-related aspects of the governance
to-state competitors for community social of security forces. Given that these forces’
contracts (state authorities, UN, internatio- conduct plays a central role in community
nal community). engagement with VEGs, local research
centres and civil society—including orga-
A. 4. Apply the outcomes of the “Understand” nizations that capture and reflect women’s
section to assess how realistic strategies to and young people’s experiences and con-
support reform champions are, in the light of cerns—could expand their monitoring of
political economy constraints (UN, interna- the effectiveness of that support, and the
tional community). support itself may need to be expanded and
deepened (UN, international community,
A. 5. The UN family also provides extensive state authorities, civil society).
support for anti-corruption efforts. Where
resources are limited and these efforts have A. 8. The UN family has supported regional
to be prioritized, one criterion may be to countries in developing PVE strategies and

49
 National Action Plans (NAPs). Further youths to explain the consequences that
gender-sensitive governance analysis of PVE traditional constraints have for them. Such
strategies, especially of the incentives and conversations can help to re-weave the
relationships affecting power-holders, could social fabric, bridging intergenerational
be a helpful additional focus to apply as the gaps. With suitable facilitation, they can
next generation of NAPs are developed and also help to identify, and eventually brid-
as countries provide periodic reporting on ge, gender inequities. Bringing identity
implementation and effectiveness to their ci- groups together in such conversations can
tizens (UN, international community, state then address some of the other divides
authorities, civil society). around land use in a context that addres-
ses the meaning of place for all parties
Political ecology as well as the interests it embodies and
enables (UN, international community,
A. 9. Supporting gender-sensitive improvements to state authorities, civil society).
land management policy and governance that
address community grievances on which local Ideology and grievance
VEGs prey, and that sustain environmental
regeneration to forestall further conflicts over A. 13. UNDP and other UN family agencies have
remaining high-value land, would help signi- explored the scope for religious authorities
ficantly to impede local VEGs’ appeal97 and and faith-based organizations to play a role
reduce conflict more generally (UN, interna- in challenging inappropriate interpreta-
tional community, state authorities). tions of religious teaching and in engaging
devout elites in more deeply grounded
A. 10. Applying the political ecology analysis to theological discourse. There may also be
areas threatened by environmental degra- opportunities to expand the role of these
dation should enable effective attention to religious authorities in mediation at various
be paid to land regeneration and environ- levels, enhancing the credibility of negotia-
mental peacebuilding, thus anticipating the tions (UN, international community, state
effects of climate disruptions on livelihoods, authorities, civil society).
violent mobilization and elite bargains
(UN, international community, state autho- A. 14. As myths about women’s role in local
rities, civil society). VEGs are dispelled, their voices need to be
heard in identifying the challenges they face
A. 11. National dialogue on ecosystem-economy and the contributions they can make. Their
interactions and their political implications agency, at the community and policy level,
can identify the key issues for Government can be an essential ingredient in shifting the
or social action. It can also provide the discourse on violence and governance. This
high-level political cover to enable local should include their opinions on public
conversations addressing land regeneration expenditure allocations. While entry points
and land management (UN, international will differ between the national and local
community, state authorities, civil society). levels and from place to place, specific at-
tention is needed to identify ways in which
A. 12. Inclusive local conversations to relate the women’s active participation can be made
“story of place” in a location can, for exam- “normal”, safe and effective (UN, interna-
ple, allow elders to explain the cultural tional financial institutions, international
and spiritual significance of a place and community, state authorities, civil society).

50
A. 15. Building on existing PVE/CVE communi- activities can be contested. Enforcement
cations, supporting enhanced gender-sensiti- efforts might be focused on illicit activities
ve communication of credible messages that which are particularly significant for VEG
provide positive opportunities for meaning, incomes. This requires an enhanced capacity
belonging and esteem through alternatives for the planning and execution of appropriate
to violent extremism—“Governments should responses (UN, international community,
be less concerned with reacting to the ter- state authorities).
rorists’ messages and more concerned with
building their own reputation and standing A. 19. Legislative action might include measures to
amongst the people”98 (UN, international deter the engagement of non-terrorist organi-
community, state authorities, civil society). zed criminal groups with VEGs. These might
include consideration of “guilt by association”
Follow the money with terrorism where appropriate and appli-
cable, within proper consideration of citizens’
A. 16. The UN already supports efforts by state au- proper human and civil rights (UN, interna-
thorities to identify how funds reach VEGs, tional community, state authorities).
such as through the CTF/AML mechanisms
and the Financial Action Task Force more Ease the pain
generally. However, tracking other more
local funding streams (e.g. revenue from cattle A. 20. While there is broad recognition of the general
theft or kidnapping and ransom) poses a significance of trauma resulting from conflict,
further challenge. Enhancing national capaci- and especially the actions of VEGs, there is
ty to trace such funds and coordinating such less locally specific understanding of the nature
tracing mechanisms at a regional level could of trauma in each theatre or of the nature and
bring significant benefits (UN, international implications of coping strategies that commu-
community, state authorities). nities and individuals adopt. Local capacity to
assess this and listen sensitively to victims will
A. 17. Fewer resources have been devoted to how be essential to understanding the priorities for
VEGs use the funds they acquire. Howe- support. Building that capacity—which will
ver, understanding their spending patterns need acute sensitivity to issues of shame and
(both spatially and sectorally) would help stigma, and to the differentiated experiences
to understand their strategies in practice. of women and men, boys and girls and the dif-
Again, national capacity will require resour- ferent expectations of them—will be an urgent
ce allocation by Government and internatio- need (UN, international community, state
nal support (UN, international community, authorities, civil society).
state authorities).
A. 21. Addressing the trauma experienced by vi-
A. 18. As VEG finances are better understood on ctims of VEG actions offers a potential way
both the revenue and expenditure sides, forward, using long-lasting and locally adap-
opportunities should emerge to frustrate ted mental health and psychosocial support
VEG strategies. For example, areas of VEG mechanisms that reinforce women’s agency.
spending might identify areas where either This may also create natural opportunities
the state “offer” of essential services, policy, re- for positive religious counter-messaging
gulation or safety and justice needs enhancing (UN, international community, state authori-
to rival that of the VEGs, or malign VEG ties, civil society).

51
METHODOLOGY

This report seeks to bring together academic and It reflects the search for “learning and creative
practitioner perspectives on the challenge of the organization wherein academics and practitioners
spread of VEGs in sub-Saharan Africa. It has can learn from each other”99 by combining insights
been compiled drawing on reviews of published from academic publications (both refereed and
literature and UN reports. It has combined these directly published) with those from practitioners
with interviews with UNDP country teams in the field. UN reports (including primary
and other relevant UN specialist agencies, key research such as Journey to Extremism) were
informant interviews with local researchers and important sources of both information and
activists, interviews with relevant regional and analytical insight.
African Union (AU) bodies, and interviews with
international experts working in the field, rather A specific report on VEGs in Burkina Faso was
than primary fieldwork or individual surveys. conducted for a global policy group at the same
time and informs this report, which contains an
This approach reflects the challenges of excerpt from the executive summary.
combining academic and practitioner perspectives
to best effect. The two communities have different Because of travel restrictions, no visits to the region
styles of discourse and engagement, but the were possible; all interviews were conducted via
methodology of this study seeks to bridge the gap. Zoom or other online platforms.

52
ANNEX A:
PREVENTING
THE NEXT WAVE
Anticipating the inevitable The Central African Republic is one such
and preventing the next wave example. The north-eastern part of the country is
experiencing accelerating rates of desertification.
of recruitment: capturing Incidentally, this is also where insurgent groups
have attempted to use so-called jihadi ideology to
climate breakdown in mobilize local grievances. Desertification and loss
ideological narratives of economic opportunities (related to livelihoods
and beyond) resonate with more structural issues
Research on linkages between climate change, relating to marginalization and therefore echo
environmental degradation and violence has already sentiments of injustice among communities.v
unearthed clear connections that are unfolding Insurgent groups, including ones that have
across Africa. The focus has often been placed on attempted to use Islamist ideologies, have taken up
conflicts between farmers and herders, but the this sense of injustice and attempted to regulate the
growing intensity of conflicts between nomadic use of natural resources.
and sedentary populations is only one aspect of
the intersections between insecurity and climate Similarly, in central Mali, some VEGs have
change. Another concerns the links between violent positioned themselves as key regulators of access
extremism and climate change. On this particular to the larger bourgoutières ecosystem—a wetland
issue, the analysis must focus on highly contextual in the Niger river delta that has historically served
drivers of recruitment and evolving global dynamics, all clan-based structures in larger Mali. However,
in line with the analysis outlined in this paper. the health of the bourgoutières is deteriorating
as a result of unsustainable agricultural policies
It is well known that livelihood destitution due to promoted by Bamako, hydro-energy infrastructure
desertification and environmental degradation plays development and more generally rising
into the hands of VEGs in regions already marked temperatures due to climate change over decades.100
by structural marginalization. Such is the case for
certain regions of Somalia, where Al-Shabaab has The continued presence of violence in central
managed to tap into grievances related to poverty, Mali since 2012 can be correlated in large part
often linked to loss of soil fertility, drought and to the degradation of environmental resources.
tensions over land resources, which heighten the Both insurgent and violent extremist groups
vulnerability stemming from lack of social services have capitalized on grievances related to this
and public goods. Environmental degradation can degradation. These examples demonstrate that
therefore easily play into narratives of injustice that environmental degradation and climate disruptions
VEGs aim to position themselves as solutions for. should now actively be taken into account when

v. Field interview, O. Lazard, CAR, 2018

53
attempting to understand how livelihoods and have repercussions on wider environmental health,
communities fall into the type of vulnerability that structural marginalization and aid dependency. In
VEGs can leverage. So far, analyses seeking the all cases, VEGs aim to position themselves as rights
drivers and narrative construction that link violent of wrongs, regulators of access to natural resources,
extremism and environmental degradation or providers of justice and administrative services, as
climate change have remained largely localized. well as livelihood substitutes.

Such vastly different contexts have a common Global VEGs have not yet developed a narrative
pattern to them: conflict and violence analysis around climate change. This will likely change
should centre not just on the political dynamics rapidly, however. The impact, scope, pace and
between various identity, livelihood and political geographical reach of climate disruptions are
groups and violent mobilizers but also the going to intensify. Even the best climate models
relationship between human populations and underestimated the timeline for incoming impacts
their ecosystem. In other words, analysis and by an average of 20 years, according to the
follow-on programming should include a political estimates of the best climate scientists. Climate
ecology approach. disruptions will impact climate-vulnerable nations
more rapidly, beginning with many sub-Saharan
Another dimension that is central to understanding nations such as Zimbabwe, Somalia, Cameroon,
the links between land, natural resources and the Sahelian countries etc. Historically, climate
violent extremism is predation and corruption. negotiations have focused on mitigation and
Land is increasingly a resource that elites at the raising ambitions for transition planning. After
subnational, national and international levels are over 15 years of COP negotiations, there remains
competing for. In a context like North Kivu in a serious risk that the international community
eastern DRC, elites compete to rig the cadastral will collectively fail to rein in global greenhouse
system and have access to large land concessions gas emissions to stay within the 1.5°Celsius of
that favour their own private accumulation at the global warning that the Intergovernmental Panel
expense of communities. The latter are often driven on Climate Change identifies as the relatively
out of their ancestral land that is the backbone of safe threshold that should not be crossed. In
their livelihoods along with their administrative addition to failing on mitigation targets, COP26
identity. Once displaced, communities end up demonstrated that climate finance for adaptation
with little to no resources through which to obtain is still vastly inadequate.
means of justice or reparations, and they become
dependent on aid to survive. A country like Cameroon already spends more
than 9 percent of GDP per year on recovery
DRC provides some of the most egregious from and adaptation to climate disruptions. By
examples of land governance corruption, but comparison, the current contributions to the
many countries showcase similar patterns, Global Adaptation Fund register a total amount of
including in contexts where the effects of violent about USD327 million per year, amounting to no
extremism are endemic such as Mozambique and more than 5 US cents per person throughout the
the Sahel. Often, in these contexts, elites play on so-called developing world.101 This staggering gap
legal fissures between customary and positive is partially mitigated by various forms of aid that
law systems regarding land administration to may contribute to adaptation goals. This simple
gain access to private resources. This results in a equation reveals an inequity that fosters dangerous
compounding of risks regarding community stress trust gaps between highly climate-vulnerable
and ecological extractivism (in the form of timber, nations and more resilient ones (most of which are
biodiversity, minerals and other goods), which located in the developed world).

54
It is therefore highly likely that transnational VEGs manage to recruit more easily in areas marked by
will find it an easy task to craft a global narrative destitution and marginalization, such as peri-urban
positing climate change as the ultimate form of or cross-border areas. In this case, since this issue
structural violence imposed by developed countries is global, narratives may transpose that thinking to
upon the rest of the world. The climate justice global centres and peripheries, with the developed
agenda, which is incredibly important in the journey world being understood as the centre, and
towards greater global resilience in the face of a developing and highly climate-vulnerable countries
historic and global challenge such as climate change, being understood as the periphery. The dual nature
is likely to be characterized by complex negotiation of globality and locality for narrative construction
tensions between highly climate-vulnerable nations will remain, but they will align more evidently as
and those that are less so. The lack of positive and climate change—a global phenomenon—causes
concrete results is likely to generate growing pockets more and more disruptions at highly localized
of fragility, social tensions, misgovernance and, and regional levels and as it diminishes the global
ultimately, violence. One particular example already capacity for resilience while increasing polarization
comes to mind: the Maldives is a middle-income and widening political divides.103
country that acts as a canary in the coal mine, like
many small island States in the Indo-Pacific and
the Caribbean. The Maldives is already struggling
with violent extremism at home and abroad, and
up until a few years ago, the second-biggest foreign
fighter contingent in Syria stemmed from the
country.102 While many factors are driving leading
young men and women to fly into Syria to fight with
VEGs, the lack of economic and purely territorial
prospects in the Maldives is certainly one such factor.
Climate change plays into this story in a country
where disruptions are set to accelerate. As such, the
Government may experience growing difficulty to
deliver a vision and the means for a future that young
people can meaningfully project themselves into.

This annexe therefore posits a theory that the

ideological and narrative reach of VEGs will
increase over the coming years, and will increasingly
include grievances relating to lack of international
action on climate change, weak collective solidarity
and financial mechanisms for adaptation, loss and
damages and structural injustice. These narratives
will likely include a fundamental questioning
of the nation State’s effectiveness in providing
resilience and public goods. In other words, the
ideological narrative will reinforce a reading of
international relations compatible with the centre-
periphery theories which are central to analysing
the phenomenon of violent extremism. Journey to UNDP/Chad

Extremism, for example, highlighted that VEGs

55
ANNEX B:
HYPOTHESES FOR
FURTHER INQUIRY
Three hypotheses have emerged that merit There is evidence to indicate that conflicts
closer examination. These are separate from, involving ideologically motivated groups, foreign
and additional to, the continued investment in fighters and those that use terrorism last longer.105
the “Understand” section items set out in the Conflicts in which external actors provide support
Recommendations section, as they represent more to violent groups (sometimes described as “proxies”,
time-bound inquiries with a prospective conclusion although the relationships are rarely simple) are also
(“true”, “false”, or “uncertain”). understood to be more prolonged.106

Implication: preventing the entry of proscribed

The involvement of Al-Qaida global groups is likely to reduce the human cost of
instability. Detaching local VEGs that have become
and Daesh makes ending involved with Al-Qaida and Daesh may be difficult
conflict harder, but some but might perhaps contribute to bringing an end
to conflict.107 However, both policy-related and
form of negotiation remains practical challenges may make this acutely difficult
inevitable for peace. in specific cases. Defining what “detachment”
might mean would inevitably be both controversial
ACLED and other data demonstrate that local and locally specific—perhaps renouncing a global
affiliation with Al-Qaida or Daesh seems to mission and terrorist intentions might be different
increase the lethality of conflict, especially for from renouncing the imposition of a local VEG’s
civilians. It is also clear that the involvement interpretation of sharia law.
of Al-Qaida or Daesh is associated with
impediments to access to humanitarian aid
(though state forces may also impede access). Local VEGs shift from
However, it has not been possible to demonstrate
quantitatively that the involvement of such “Big Man” to “Big Idea”
global VEGs also prolongs conflicts.104 There as resources permit. This
is a plausible logic to such a hypothesis, given
the prohibition on engaging with proscribed enhances their resilience.
groups, but too few conflicts of either kind have
come to a definite end to allow a firm inference. It remains important not to imagine local VEGs
However, while no study has definitively linked as one-dimensional opportunistic conflict
VEGs to longer conflicts, many of these groups’ entrepreneurs. Their ideological grounding affects
characteristics and tactics are associated with their strategy and structure. Their resilience is
more enduring conflict. evident, but understanding how they achieve it

56
moves into realms of plausible hypotheses. These youth, with a sense of “meaning” that state agencies
require further investigation, which might be a may find hard to rival, although international
valuable aspect for future research to explore. partners are helping them to present alternative
positive narratives.111
Insurgent groups have often been associated with
terms such as “warlord”, “patrimonial”, or “Big Groups with deeper local (and subnational)
Man”. Some local VEGs carry the name of their structures may also be more resilient. If ideological
central figure (e.g. Katiba Macina or “Koufa’s groups are impelled to create such structures
Boys”) but there is also some indication that local for messaging and to provide dispute resolution
VEGs, especially better-funded ones, are more services and so on, this may contribute to their
structured and respond differently to the loss of apparent greater resilience. Local VEGs that
a leader figure. More refined data on succession embed through local grievances and also have
planning and internal dynamics would be needed largely local revenues may have deeper local roots
for a confident diagnosis. but less resilience through regional networks if
local bases are threatened. However, local VEGs
The interviews suggest that the structure of VEGs operate readily across national borders and seem
is shifting from classic “Big Man” patron-client able to combine local rootedness with regional
organizations to “Big Idea” formations whose connectedness for now, although this may be
cohesion derives from ideological rather than vulnerable to counter-messaging that draws
personal alignment, although there is not yet any attention to these inconsistencies.
conclusive evidence to this effect.108 This shift
requires resources, and so may lie beyond the reach Implication: taken together, these offer an explanation
of groups with less funding. However, some local for the persistence and resilience of VEGs in the face
VEGs (like Al-Shabaab in Somalia) have developed of the loss of central actors. They also suggest that
extensive subnational and local structures. These removing the leadership of such a VEG may not be
allow them to provide something like state effective in reducing the impact of its activities.
services—notably “justice” and dispute resolution—
and help them embed more deeply in local society.
They therefore compete with the state “offer”—an Resisting the entry of Al-
offer which international partners are helping to
enhance in many areas. Qaida or Daesh requires
shifting the cost-benefit
Affiliation with global VEGs like Al-Qaida or
Daesh provides a global narrative and an image of calculations of local VEGs
global reach. It also offers a long time horizon—
Al-Qaida and Daesh both speak in terms of a long Local VEGs affiliate with global VEGs, and
history reaching back to the Crusades—which global VEGs accept affiliation. It therefore seems
may be helped by the example of strategic patience clear that for both leaderships, the benefits of such
demonstrated by the Taliban in Afghanistan. This affiliation outweigh the costs.112 Since it is difficult
narrative also allows VEGs to explain (however to ascertain what Al-Qaida or Daesh think about
incompletely or anachronistically) the source of accepting affiliation, and affiliation appears to be
their grievances to communities in terms of global broadly consistent across regions, it is probably
actors109—“the West” or “Crusaders”—which best to focus on the cost-benefit calculations of
reinforce their justification of the VEG’s resistance the leaderships of local VEGs if affiliation is to be
to state authorities they condemn as kufr (infidel or discouraged by raising the cost or lowering the
unbelieving).110 It also provides adherents, especially benefit to them and their goals.

57
However, it would be helpful to understand and involving armed force, the initial cost of
whether global networks view groups as potential affiliation for the local VEG may seem low, unless it
franchises when they are on the rise, or whether discourages followers. In Somalia, the limited nature
groups instead seek alignment with global of Al-Shabaab’s use of its connection with Al-Qaida
networks to reclaim legitimacy when they are on the in its communications suggests that in Somalia,
back foot. Securing access to those involved in the at least, the global nature of the relationship may
process to learn who approaches whom would offer not help it in its relationships with local elites (or,
valuable insights into this question. perhaps, in its local recruitment efforts). However,
there may be a broader opportunity to impose a
This calculation is hard to observe, and more prospective cost on affiliation by excluding groups
research is needed to be confident about it.113 from local negotiations over economic and security
However, it seems clear that local VEGs benefit arrangements unless they credibly dissociate
from the image of the global group which they themselves from the proscribed global group in
are affiliated with114, in terms of both its global question—though both parts of that possibility
ideological standing and its frightening nature. remain fraught with difficulty.
There are reports (especially with respect to Daesh)
of some transfer of experienced fighters, skills and Implication: frustrating the local strategies of global
techniques as well as funding.115 VEGs requires an understanding of the cost-benefit
calculations of local elites who join VEGs or hold
Where local groups are already being targeted by back from doing so. That, in turn, requires detailed
national and international efforts, both economic local inquiry.

©UNDP/Chad

58
ANNEX C:
METHODOLOGY
The 2015 UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism recognized that

“[n]arratives of grievance, attractive where human

actual or perceived rights are being violated,
injustice, promised good governance is being
empowerment and ignored and aspirations are
sweeping change become being crushed”.

Much detailed material is already available on In From Freedom Fighters to Jihadists, Vera
the dynamics of VEGs, including numerous Mironova argues that the VEGs that “have less
overviews,116, 117, 118 regional thematic studies,119, 120 and corruption and provide more for their members
more recent country-specific studies,121, 122. Overview become the most popular with fighters”. Thurstone,
surveys of wider political violence123 also provide however, argues that recruitment into VEGs
valuable material on African case studies. and schisms within VEGs are “heavily shaped
by social networks, relationships between field
However, the PVE overviews as yet lack an analysis commanders and sheer contingency”. He suggests
of the dynamics of local groups in relation to global that “the jihadist field commander achieves the
VEGs, especially their leadership, strategy and greatest success when the distinctive promise he
internal coherence. Their analysis was largely— offers meets the needs of multiple constituencies;
though not exclusively—at the level of the individual it is then that the potential for a wide-ranging
members and the drivers of their induction into coalition appears, with one foot in the partly-
VEGs, while attending helpfully to the pre-existing realized jihadist counter-order and another foot
conditions that predisposed potential adherents still in the existing order. These coalitions and the
to recruitment. The 2018 UK Stabilisation Unit political projects are highly unstable”. Similarly, in
report,124 for example, identified four broad “steps”: Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa,
Woldemariam observes that VEGs “are coalitions
1. The existence of core vulnerabilities; that depend on cooperation among differentiated,
heterogeneous units”.
2. The creation of an ideological narrative;
There is some available literature on the
3. Group or social interaction; and relationships between NSAGs and VEGs. For
example, in Alliance Formation, Christia observes
4. The experience of “being” a violent extremist. that “the key actors vis-à-vis warring group alliance

59
formation and fractionalization are often local elites, attract repression, not only from the State but also
operating at a ‘meso level’ that links national-level from foreign forces”.
cleavages with individual-level motivations”, which
we might describe as “organizational” or “corporate” In addition to understanding the dynamics of
or “collective”. In Tribes and Global Jihadism, VEGs in the region, it will be desirable to try to
Collombier and Roy relate VEGs to tribes, understand their goals as far as possible. Do they
particularly tribes in conflict with state authority, seek, for example, to capture the State, to divide
as one of the key local elite formations in the areas it (capturing part), to disrupt and attenuate it (in
of their study. They argue that “by translating their pursuit of freedom of action), to subsume it in a
local struggle into a regional or even global one, wider regional or global polity (e.g. a caliphate or
tribes increase their agency. But this ‘rational actor’ a province of a caliphate), to eliminate authority in
explanation does not explain why tribesmen should favour of chaos (whether for criminal or ideological
stick to a jihadist agenda that might also backfire or reasons) or some other wider strategic goal?

©UNDP/Chad

60
ANNEX D:
DEFINITIONS
Extremism Insurgency
Astrid Botticher125 provides the following definition: UNDP’s RBAP 2020 report State of Violence
distinguishes violent extremism from other
extremism characterizes an ideological position forms of insurgency: “Violent extremists target
embraced by those anti-establishment movements, all members of the out-group for violence. The
which understand politics as a struggle for ingroup sees violence as the only way to secure
supremacy rather than as peaceful competition its future and political aims. … Insurgency, in
between parties with different interests seeking the sense of an organized movement aimed at
popular support for advancing the common good. the overthrow of a constituted government
Extremism exists at the periphery of societies through the use of subversion and armed conflict,
and seeks to conquer its center by creating is typically a non-state phenomenon, though
fear of enemies within and outside society. insurgencies can often be sponsored or succoured
Extremists, viewing politics as a zero-sum game, by States external to the insurgency.”
tend—circumstances permitting—to engage in
aggressive militancy, including criminal acts and
mass violence in their fanatical will for gaining Violent Extremist Groups
and holding political power. Where extremists
gain state power, they tend to destroy social (VEGs)
diversity and seek to bring about a comprehensive
homogenisation of society … At the societal Violent extremists can be purely individual, can form
level, extremist movements are authoritarian, into groups, or can be recruited into existing groups.
and, if in power, extremist rulers tend to become Individual violent extremists may pose a significant
totalitarian. Extremists glorify violence as a conflict security challenge, but VEGs, which pose a different
resolution mechanism and are opposed to the degree of threat, form the subject of this paper.
constitutional state, majority-based democracy, the
rule of law and human rights for all. On the other hand, a group may deploy violence –
indeed, may make violence a feature of its workings
Borrowing perhaps from Berger,126 UNDP’s – without any binding impulse other than financial
Misogyny: the Extremist Gateway? (2021) suggests gain; drugs gangs in many parts of the world are
“one way of understanding it is to think of it as the paradigmatic examples.128 However, the term VEG
belief that the very survival of a group depends on is typically used to denote a group which organises
enacting violence against their opponents.” Both around an extremist ideology (in the sense described
definitions allow for the possibility of a State itself above) and routinely deploys violence as part of its
being extremist. workings.129 This paper uses the term in that sense.130

61
VEGs claiming inspiration There are also non-state armed groups that
from the ideologies espoused may mobilize around grievances that give them
ideological form (e.g. occupation, ethnicity
by Al Qaida or Daesh or class), but which may be drawn into a
relationship with VEGs instrumentally (on either
VEGs may be inspired by a range of ideologies. part). This paper distinguishes them from the
While there are and have been many transnational VEGs claiming inspiration from the ideologies
VEGs (such as white nationalist groups in Europe, espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh which form the
or Black Axe spreading from Nigeria) and a focus of the research
number of global VEGs that espoused global
ideologies and sought global spans of action (such
as the Red Brigades in Europe in the 1970s and Reform champions
1980s, which forged a putative alliance with the
Japanese Red Army Faction), the global current The societies and Governments in question
of violent extremist action relevant to sub-Saharan are all embarking on a range of reform and
Africa today is that of groups claiming to be modernization agendas. “Reform champions”—
inspired by an ideology similar to that proclaimed the actors driving these changes—are important
by Al-Qaida or Daesh. partners for the international community as the
latter seeks to support progress. These reform
champions, whether leaders of formal Government
Global, transnational and processes or social movements, operate within the
constraints discussed in this paper. In doing so,
local VEGs their projects intersect with those of local VEGs
and other actors in the political economies of the
There are then three groups of actors to consider. regions in which they work.
The first are global VEGs. Al-Qaida and Daesh
represent the archetype of a global VEG. Such
global VEGs have a global agenda and global Organized criminal groups
aspirations; they also seek global reach.
and money-laundering
The second are transnational VEGs. These
operate across the recognized borders of a State. It is useful to distinguish between insurgents,
This may reflect tactical spread (e.g. expansion terrorists and organized criminal networks and
in search of areas in which to recover, retrain or groups. The latter are generally not explicitly
re-equip) or it may reflect a cross-border theatre anti-state groups that establish their own legal
of operations. However, they regard their remit as and ethical rules or enforce an ideology on
regional rather than global. constituencies. They do not seek to uproot state
authorities nor to completely upend state territorial
The third are VEGs whose operations are control over particular geographic areas. Instead,
confined broadly within the boundaries of a they leverage state weakness and deficiencies (at
single national state. They may be very local times exacerbating them) in a way that serves their
– operating in a single region of a country or interests. Organized criminal networks generally
mobilising from a single identity group – or they seek a degree of equilibrium between the public,
may operate across much or all of a country, but state authorities and their own private goals.
their remit is national. Indeed, they need an “organized” apparatus and

62
networks for crime, which is why they are generally political violence and terrorism when their interests
more inclined to establish relationships with state are significantly threatened (e.g. in Italy)—though
personnel that act as interlocutors or middlemen. here, too, they chose to wield this form of violence
The role of these state-level counterparts varies to force the State to make political choices rather
significantly, and so do the methods leveraged than to upend the State as such.
by organized criminal networks to establish
relationships with them. Some mean to ensure AML efforts are partly an acknowledgement
a political, military and judicial climate that is of the fact that one of the main weaknesses of
conducive to successful organized criminal activities, transnational organized criminal networks was
while others may be in charge of mobilizing state their need to use the legal channels of banking and
resources or levers to enhance organized criminal financial systems to transfer funds and conceal the
networks’ opportunities for revenue generation. The origin of their assets.
relationship between organized crime and the State
is often transactional—a dynamic that does not exist Money-laundering and terrorist financing are
with insurgents or terrorists, whose raison d’être is different, however. The former aims to make
often to confront the State, leveraging violence as the dirty money appear legal, while the latter aims to
primary method for doing so. obfuscate the end goal of asset transfers (some of
which may be of legal origin). The international
Organized criminal networks and insurgent or AML apparatus does not generally make this
terrorist groups therefore differ: the former tend distinction because both modalities represent threats
to prefer “using” the State to penetrate formal and to the financial system and public institutions, and
informal political, economic and social spheres, while the strategies that can be leveraged to fight criminals
the latter have an explicitly antagonistic relationship financially can be applied similarly when combating
with state authorities. Depending on how mature they terrorist financing. Moreover, the AML apparatus is
are, organized criminal networks may be predatory not concerned with the transaction that is intended
(selectively leveraging violence to penetrate the State to further money-laundering or terrorist financing
and maintaining a certain degree of monopoly on the as much as the money and the individuals or entities
illicit use of force), parasitic (where violence declines behind the transaction.
as relationships between organized criminal networks
and the State are cemented), or symbiotic (where However, there are problems for AML systems
organized criminal networks have become more that are due in part to the fact that transactions
powerful than the State, generally by penetrating the associated with money-laundering go through
State so deeply that the boundaries between criminal channels that are outside the purview and range of
networks and the State become obsolete, as in the control of law enforcement:
case of narco-States).
• For their money-laundering activities, criminal
These dynamics also explain why alliances between networks can secure the complicity of members of
organized crime networks and terrorists are the financial sector, upon which state authorities
generally unsustainable in the longer term—they depend for the exchange of information to detect
have long-term objectives that cannot be reconciled. and operationalize AML activities;
They are, however, amenable to striking ad hoc
agreements (as noted in the main report in terms • Terrorist networks can establish ad hoc
of providing protection for financial gains or relationships with criminal networks through
procuring illicit material). There are also historical which they leverage the organized criminal
instances of organized criminal groups leveraging networks’ ability to transfer funds.

63
AML efforts are also often siloed: for between organized criminal networks and terrorist
bureaucratic, procedural and compliance reasons, groups. Efforts could be focused on “divorcing”
these efforts are compartmentalized from more organized criminal networks and terrorists rather
“developmental” efforts to combat terrorists, than on lumping the two together. Such initiatives
particularly at the subnational level. There is an might include:
opportunity to improve coordination between
the global and local policy spheres. For instance, • Strengthening AML legislation at the national
one of the main sources of terrorist financing level and supporting the establishment of
globally is trafficking (through organized criminal legislation that would incriminate those who are
networks), and this financing mechanism can be “guilty by association” in terrorist financing (which
tackled in a multitude of ways at a more national could disincentivize organized criminal networks
level in light of the marriage of convenience from cooperating with terrorist groups).

©UNDP/Cameroon

64
ENDNOTES

1. UNDP (2017), Journey to Extremism: drivers, 8. Interview with regional security expert, interview with
incentives and the tipping point for recruitment, https:// Nigeria UNDP Country Office team.
journey-to-extremism.undp.org/
9. Schulz, D.E., Political Legitimacy in Post-Colonial
2. “A mediated form of statehood, in which governments Mali https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847012685/
rely on diverse strategies of negotiation with non-state political-legitimacy-in-postcolonial-mali/
sources of authority to provide certain functions of
10. Tsuda, K. (2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
government, including public security provision, justice,
humanrights/2020/03/20/continued-instability-in-mali-
and the management of local conflicts in the country’s
and-west-africa/.
periphery”. Menkhaus (2007), Governance without
Government in Somalia, https://www.researchgate. 11. Previous Tuareg-led revolts occurred in 1963, 1990,
net/publication/249564774_Governance_Without_ 2006, 2012. Tuareg dynamics are complex, however:
Government_in_Somalia_Spoilers_State_Building_ “the Kidal-based Kel Adagh resented their integration
and_the_Politics_of_Coping into a new Malian state that gained independence from
France in 1960. They quickly found themselves at odds
3. “In an arena of extreme competition for loyalty and
with the new Malian government that sought to curb
authority, its policies on policing, taxation, marriage, and
their freedom. Next to complaints about the central
education build clearly specified identities of membership
government, however, the Tuareg rebellions and their
in the group and demonstrate its authority, in ways that
aftermaths also reflected internal power dynamics
mimic statehood … Daesh exhibits classic characteristics
dating back to colonial alliances and hostilities, as well
of a proto-state, trapped in a perpetual state of instability,
as internal political conflicts pitting tribal traditionalists
flux, and fluidity, and yet coalesces and finds form as it
against the leaders of lower social strata and politically
challenges and forcibly remakes authority”. Brown K.E.
subordinate tribes in favour of more progressive
(2018), Violence and Gender Politics in the Proto-State
egalitarian society”. Clingendael (2019), https://www.
“Islamic State”. In Parashar et al. (2018), Revisiting
clingendael.org/pub/2019/legitimacy_traditional_
Gendered States, Oxford Scholarship Online.
authorities_mali_niger_libya/4-traditional-authorities-
4. “African jihadist movements are first and foremost local in-mali-armed-alliances-and-insecurity/
movements that arise from local social and political
12. Tsuda, K. (2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
dynamics, and their struggle is primarily geared toward
humanrights/2020/03/20/continued-instability-in-mali-
addressing local—not global—grievances”. Quoted in
and-west-africa/.
Ibrahim, I.Y. (2017), “The Wave of Jihadist Insurgency
in West Africa: Global Ideology, Local Context, 13. “The Sahel crisis entered 2021 following a record year of
Individual Motivations”, West African Papers No. 07, conflict and violence in 2020, during which more than
OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd-ilibrary. 6,200 fatalities were reported in Burkina Faso, Mali,
org/development/the-wave-of-jihadist-insurgency-in- and Niger. In 2020, more civilians were killed in Mali
west-africa_eb95c0a9-en. and Niger than in any previous year”, https://acleddata.
com/2021/08/05/mid-year-update-10-conflicts-to-worry-
5. https://www.reuters.com/world/an-epidemic-coups-un-
about-in-2021/#1612195879250-fd67dc25-cc2cc431-25b1
chief-laments-urging-security-council-act-2021-10-26/.
14. Excerpted from Coakley, A. (2021), ILLP.
6. UNREC/UNDP (2016), Assessment Survey on
Small Arms in the Sahel Region and Neighbouring 15. Shire, M.I. https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/now-
Countries, https://www.unrec.org/ged/download. is-the-time-to-engage-al-shabaab-religious-leaders-and-
php?itemId=161&language=en_GB. clan-elders-can-help/
7. SIPRI (2020), https://sipri.org/media/press- 16. Anzalone, C., and Warner, J. (2021), https://
release/2021/world-military-spending-rises-almost-2- www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/
trillion-2020#:~:text=Military%20expenditure%20in%20 obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0303.
sub%2DSaharan,Uganda%20(%2B46%20per%20cent) xml?rskey=56guqq&result=3

65
17. Agbiboa, D.E. (2014), Journalism of Terrorism Research. logistical and operational resources needed to carry
out attacks and sustain themselves”, ISS (2021), https://
18. Menkhaus, K. (2018), Elite Bargains and Political Deals
issafrica.org/iss-today/how-western-mali-could-become-
Project: Somalia Case Study. DFID Stabilisation Unit.
a-gold-mine-for-terrorists.
19. Menkhaus, K. (2018), Elite Bargains and Political Deals
34. Interviews with Somali civil society activists, UNDP
Project: Somalia Case Study. DFID Stabilisation Unit.
Mali CO.
20. Menkhaus, K. (2018), Elite Bargains and Political Deals
35. Al-Shabaab in Southern Mogadishu was cited as an
Project: Somalia Case Study. DFID Stabilisation Unit.
example (interview with Somali activist)
21. Interviews with Somali civil society activist and
36. “Porous borders between the Lake Chad Basin countries
country experts.
facilitate the penetration of SALW and other contraband
22. Interview with regional expert on security and goods that help sustain the inter-ethnic and farmer-
organized crime. herder conflicts exploited by extremist groups in order
to increase their grip on this fragile region. Rising Boko
23. See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/
Haram and ISWAP violence has harmed livelihoods in
aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/mouvement-pour-
a region that was already facing sustainability threats”
l%E2%80%99unification-et-le-jihad-en.
Frimpong, O.B. (2020), Climate Change and Violent
24. Thurstone, A. (2020), Jihadists of North Africa and the Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin: Key Issues and Way
Sahel, CUP, p.54, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108771160. Forward, Wilson Centre, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
25. “Violent extremist mobilization is rooted in deep-seated sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Climate%20
socio-economic and political grievances particularly Change%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20
among disadvantaged groups.” NUPI/UNDP, Local the%20Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Key%20Issues%20
Drivers of Violent Extremism in Central Mali https:// and%20Way%20Forward_0.pdf
www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/ 37. For example, Iyad ag Ghali, a Tuareg noble of the
Local-Drivers-of-Violent-Extremism-in-Central-Mali. Ifoghas who spent over a decade in theological
26. ACLED (2021), https://acleddata.com/2021/06/17/ study and self-representation alongside other
sahel-2021-communal-wars-broken-ceasefires-and- activities. Thurstone, A. (2020), Jihadists of North
shifting-frontlines/ Africa and the Sahel, CUP, p. 113, https://doi.
org/10.1017/9781108771160.
27. Repeated in the literature, both academic and
practitioner—see, for example, Bacon, T., and Warner, 38. ““The ways in which those involved in narcotics
J. (2021), The Threat in Africa—the New Epicentre trafficking position themselves within formal and
of Global Jihadi Terror, West Point, CTC Sentinel., informal political, economic and security structures
https://ctc.usma.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-threat- have changed to conform with the new realities on the
in-africa-the-new-epicenter-of-global-jihadi-terror/. ground. The result is a tenuous criminal equilibrium
“Above all, local social, political, and economic dynamics that allows drug trafficking through northern Mali
within African states have created the void that jihadi to continue, despite the fact that the region remains
actors have exploited post-9/11, and these conditions divided among rival armed groups”, ENACT (2020),
show no signs of improving.” Drug Trafficking in Northern Mali.

28. Interviews with UNDP Country Offices in Somalia, 39. “Despite the fact that the Malian government is barely
DRC, Nigeria and Mali; with civil society activists from present in northern Mali, illicit economies are, in fact,
Somalia; and with experts from CAERT and IGAD. quite highly regulated through systems of patronage
networks, protection economies and informal
29. Africa Report, 20 September 2021. agreements.” ENACT (2020), Drug Trafficking in
30. “Experts believe that JNIM-affiliated groups jointly earn Northern Mali.
between $18 and $35 million annually, mostly through 40. “An examination of the ways in which established
extortion of the transit routes under their control, patronage systems stop producing stability also helps
communities engaged in artisanal mining, and to a expose how neopatrimonialism can become an engine
lesser extent kidnapping for ransom.” Eizenger, D, and for perpetual crisis. When it breaks down, the lack of
Williams, W. (2021), The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant a more formally institutionalized structure can create
Islamist Groups in the Sahel, ACSS. fragmentation that sustains itself into possibly even
31. Confirmed in interviews with UNDP Country Offices deeper levels of fragmentation. … These systems of
in Mali, DRC, Mozambique, Somalia and Nigeria; governance rely on the utilization of violence for security,
with experts from GI-TOC, IGAD and CAERT; and resistance, and predation, but any understanding of
with expert observers in Burkina Faso and Mali. these armed groups must recognize the larger context
in which they are embedded”. Dunn, K.C., and
32. Interview with academic specializing in CVE. Bøås, M. (2017), The Evolving Landscape of African
33. “Groups operating in the Sahel are already tapping Insurgencies. In Africa’s Insurgents: Navigating an
into gold mining. This helps them obtain the financial, Evolving Landscape.

66
41. ACLED (2020), https://acleddata.com/2020/02/14/ 53. Interview with UNDP Country Office, confirmed by
global-conflict-and-disorder-patterns-2020/. interview with Somali civil society activist.
42. ISS (2020), quoting Peter Bauman, https://issafrica. 54. UNDP governance survey of Country Offices;
org/iss-today/time-to-rethink-the-prevention-of-violent- interviews with Nigeria, Mali, Mali, Somalia,
extremism-in-africa. Mozambique, DRC; interviews with civil society
activists in Nigeria and Somalia.
43. Benjaminsen and Ba (2021), https://doi.org/10.108
0/19392206.2021.1925035, which also observes that 55. “The Congolese state is a key actor in the eastern part
“there is in practice more cooperation than conflict of the country. Its weakness, and sometimes complicity,
between farmers and herders in the Sahel, and can exacerbate local conflicts.” Streans, J., The Africa
that most conflicts are peacefully solved”, Moritz Report https://www.theafricareport.com/73449/is-the-
(2010), https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ islamic-state-really-operating-in-eastern-drc/
download?doi=10.1.1.471.5037&rep=rep1&type=pdf )”.
56. This is not unique to Somalia; in the Lake Chad Basin,
44. GIC Insecure Livelihoods Project https://www. for example, “in contrast to government extortion,
gicnetwork.be/insecure-livelihoods-series/. cargo seizures, and crackdowns on trade, ISWAP’s
taxation of goods is generally accepted by civilians.
45. Lazard O. (co-author), unpublished field interviews,
Some of the population in the Lake Chad area even
DRC 2016.
credit ISWAP with fostering a better environment for
46. “A conflict-induced breakdown of customary business, primarily in the trade of rice, fish, and dried
arrangements for shared use coupled with state pepper.” Bacon, T., and Warner, J. (2021), The Threat
incapacity to regulate access to resources and in Africa—the New Epicentre of Global Jihadi Terror,
mediate between groups is a critical variable for West Point, CTC Sentinel.
intercommunal conflict, which can provide an
57. Interviews with Country Offices in DRC, Mozambique,
opening for violent extremist groups functioning as
Nigeria, Mali. Ibrahim Y Ibrahim 2017 notes “most
‘antagonists, mediators or suppressors of violence’
states in Africa have ‘consolidated statehood’ at least in
depending on the context.” Cater UNDP (2021),
their capital cities; that is, they possess the military and
Toward New Policies for the Climate Change and
administrative capacities to regulate social behaviour
Violent Extremism Nexus in Africa.
and resolve conflict in these places. This is different,
47. “The root causes of this insurgency are all Mozambican: however, in rural and remote areas where states may
inequality, abject poverty, local elite and ethnic politics, have only ‘limited statehood’. Jihadist entrepreneurs
and organized crime.” Vines, A. (2021), “Responding have tended to establish their bases in peripheral areas
to Mozambique’s Islamic Insurgency: Will Foreign where the state has only a limited statehood”. The Wave
Military Assistance Make a Difference”, Georgetown of Jihadist Insurgency in West Africa: Global Ideology,
Journal of International Affairs. Local Context, Individual Motivations, West African
48. Coakley, A. (2021), ILLP.
Papers No. 07, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/eb95c0a9-en.
49. https://acleddata.com/2020/05/20/state-atrocities-in-
58. “Violent extremist groups also use social tensions and
the-sahel-the-impetus-for-counter-insurgency-results-is-
frustrations linked to local land disputes—a grievance
fueling-government-attacks-on-civilians/.
that has formed fertile ground for them to take hold
50. One of many references in the literature reads “When the elsewhere in the Sahel.” ISS (2020), quoting Peter
security forces re-entered these areas, ‘ethnic profiling’ of Bauman, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/time-to-rethink-
Fulani herdsmen as ‘jihadists’ led to mass arrests, abuse the-prevention-of-violent-extremism-in-africa.
and torture … This event facilitated the development
59. Coakley, A. (2021), ILLP.
of the Katiba Macina, by generating frustration,
resentment, and humiliation among Fulani pastoralist 60. The Local Roots of Violence in Eastern Burkina Faso,
herdsmen, effectively catalysing their mobilization https://noria-research.com/the-local-roots-of-violence-
towards the group”. NUPI/UNDP, Local Drivers of burkina-faso/.
Violent Extremism in Central Mali.
61. “Local mediation efforts cannot replace the need
51. Interviews with UNDP Country Offices in Mali, for a political solution to the conflicts affecting the
DRC, Somalia, Nigeria and Mozambique; a civil Sahel region and an institutional solution to the
society activist from Somalia; experts from IGAD and marginalization of nomads.” CHD (2021), Agro-Pastoral
CAERT. Mediation in the Sahel
52. Pérouse de Montclos (2021), Rethinking the Response 62. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/
to Jihadist Groups Across the Sahel, Chatham House, statement/2021-02-23/secretary-generals-remarks-the-
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021- security-council-addressing-climate-related-security-
03/2021-03-02-response-jihadist-groups-sahel-perouse-de- risks-international-peace-and-security-through-
montclos.pdf. mitigation-and-resilience-building

67
63. “Pastoralists seem to support the jihadist take-over, 73. For example, a study from a similar conflict zone
because of an anti-state, anti-elite and pro-pastoral concludes that “exposure to unprocessed traumatic
jihadist discourse, because they have become events impede peaceful coexistence and healing,
increasingly fatigued and disgruntled by a predatory in such a way that if these psychological problems
and corrupt state, and because the development model are not addressed, it is not possible to life in
imposed by the state and international donors has peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, recovering from
not responded to pastoral priorities. Rent-seeking traumatic experiences is an essential foundation for
by government officials has been especially intense in [peacebuilding]”. Tankink, M. and Otto, B. (2019).
relation to conflicts over pastoral land, environmental “Peace Starts with Peace of Mind”: Study on the
management and the fight against desertification”. Intersection Between Post-Conflict Trauma and
Benjaminsen and Ba (2019), Why Do Pastoralists in Peacebuilding in Northern Uganda. Research report.
Mali join Jihadist Groups? https://doi.org/10.1080/0306 Uganda, TPO Uganda.
6150.2018.1474457
74. Interview with sectoral expert, November 2021.
64. Field interviews 2018, Lazard O. (co-author).
75. Dunn, K.C., and Bøås, M. (2017), The Evolving
65. Interviews with UNDP Country Offices in DRC, Landscape of African Insurgencies. In Africa’s
Mozambique; two Somali civil society activists; Insurgents: Navigating an Evolving Landscape.
CAERT.
76. Interview with Somali civil society activist.
66. Interview with expert on transnational and organized crime.
77. Bacon, T., and Warner, J. (2021), The Threat in Africa—
67. “Al-Shabaab also appears to rely on a network of trusted the New Epicentre of Global Jihadi Terror, West Point,
women to provide secure hiding places where fighters CTC Sentinel.
can organize operations. According to one former
78. UNDP Country Office survey response (2021).
militant, such women tend to be older, based in major
towns and paid for their work. Older women tend to 79. KII with UNDP country expert (2021).
elicit even less suspicion from government security
80. Field interviews by team members (2019).
forces. Al-Shabaab’s use of such women for this role
reflects the militants’ ability to exploit stereotypical 81. “Comme pour dire que la logique d’engagement de la
gender norms to operational advantage.” ICG (2019), Katiba Macina avec une nouvelle approche de gestion
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/ sensible des conflits fonciers anciens et nouveaux prend
b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency. corps dans le centre du Mali.” Message from Malian
researcher, December 2021.
68. “A relatively high proportion of respondents in
Nigeria thought that women from their community 82. DFID (2009), Building the State and Securing the
could play roles in extremist armed groups, Peace, https://gsdrc.org/docs/open/con64.pdf
including training (31 per cent), providing logistics 83. Brown, K.E. (2018), Violence and Gender Politics in
and domestic support (46 per cent), as collectors the Proto-State “Islamic State”. In Parashar et al. (2018),
of financial resources (44 per cent), intelligence Revisiting Gendered States, Oxford Scholarship Online.
gatherers (43 per cent), and combatants (40 per
cent). … In Chad the most frequently cited role for 84. “The drivers of the region’s [Lake Chad Basin] ‘violent
women was that of combatant (16 per cent), while extremism’ are rooted in opportunistic and criminal
only negligible proportions of Nigerien respondents enterprise that draws from the region’s distinct
assigned any of these roles to women.” Small Arms political economy. … Such groups actively exploit local
Survey (2021), Violent Extremism in the Southern grievances at the individual level centered around the
Libya Borderlands. region’s endemic poverty and marginalization as well
as the heavy-handed military approach to fighting the
69. Interview with Somali civil society activist. insurgency.” Connor, G. (2017), “Violent Extremism” in
70. See, for example, UNDP (2021), Misogyny: The the Lake Chad Basin: Understanding the Drivers of the
Extremist Gateway?, https://www1.undp.org/content/ Boko Haram Insurgency, NUPI.
oslo-governance-centre/en/home/library/misogyny--the- 85. See ICG, Coakley, A. (2021), ILLP.
extremist-gateway-.html
86. For example, West Point CTC Sentinel noted
71. Hudson, V.M., and Hodgson, K.B. (2020), Sex and that “Rather than treating jihadism as a complex
Terror: Is the Subordination of Women Associated combination of transnational affiliations and local
with the Use of Terror? https://doi.org/10.1080/0954655 drivers, capacity building efforts focused on the former,
3.2020.1724968 resulting in an emphasis on building security and
72. Charlson, F., van Ommeren, M., Flaxman, A., Cornett, military capability. But this investment was not matched
J., Whiteford, H., and Saxena, S. (2019), “New WHO by effective capacity building to improve governance
Prevalence Estimates of Mental Disorders in Conflict and address underlying grievances. In other words,
Settings: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis”, The capacity building may have built some local government
Lancet, p.240-48 capacity to fight jihadism but not to address what fueled

68
 it.” Bacon, T., and Warner, J. (2021), The Threat in 98. RUSI (2020), https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/
Africa—the New Epicentre of Global Jihadi Terror, publications/rusi-newsbrief/how-east-africas-terrorists-
West Point, CTC Sentinel. build-their-brand-strength.
87. Thurstone, A. (2020), Jihadists of North Africa and the 99. Barth, T.J., & Bartenstein, J. (1998). Fostering
Sahel, CUP, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108771160. a Learning, Innovative Government: the Role of
Academic/Practitioner Collaboration. The Public
88. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/26948.
Manager: The New Bureaucrat, 27(1), 21-26.
89. Interview with organized crime expert, 2021.
100. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/07/12/climate-security-
90. Notably in Mali and Nigeria, according to interviews conflict-prevention-and-peacebuilding-pub-84876.
with UNDP COs and regional security expert,
101. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/85791.
November–December 2021.
102. https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-maldives-the-new-
91. For example, in North-Western Nigeria, where “bandit”
kid-on-the-islamist-block/.
gangs and VEGs (JAS and ISWAP) are reported to
collaborate in impeding the return of effective state 103. Observations by Lazard, O. (co-author).
authority.
104. At best, there are analytical observations such as “the
92. Interview with Somali civil society activist. influence of foreign leaders [with Al-Qaida or Daesh
links] tends to push these local dimensions of the
93. See annexe A for more details.
jihadist insurrection into the background, making the
94. “IS claimed that state building is attainable and ideological facet more salient instead.” Ibrahim, I.Y.
should not be delayed. To implement its enduring and (2021), Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/
expanding strategy, IS used its ideological, militant, africa/sahel/la-mort-du-chef-de-letat-islamique-au-grand-
social, and economic instruments of power. AQ’s sahara-une-occasion-de-dialogue.
gradualist strategy dictates that the establishment
105. See, for example, Page Fortna, V. (2015), Do Terrorists
of such a state requires meeting several conditions,
Win? https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/
such as educating and gaining the support of Muslim
international-organization/article/abs/do-terrorists-win-
populations in those areas in which its affiliates, front
rebels-use-of-terrorism-and-civil-war-outcomes/4729B2
organization, and allies operate.” Almohammad, A.
B926904616190DC38DB3240C8F.
(2019), Seven Years of Terror: Jihadi Organizations’
Strategies and Future Directions, ICCT. 106. Elbadawi, I.A., and Sambanis N., (2000), External
Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars, https://
95. “Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had prioritized the
elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2433.
fight against the United States and the West—the
‘far’ enemy—while delaying attacking the regimes in 107. “Dialogue may also reveal key differences between the
Muslim-majority states—the ‘near’ enemy. By contrast, various militant Islamist group factions. Disparities
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and the Islamic State prioritized between Ag Ghali and Koufa’s goals, such as how to
the near war over the far war, while still seeking to interpret and implement Sharia, may further weaken
inspire attacks in the West.” Zimmerman, K. (2021), AQ the cohesion of their coalition. The willingness of
and ISIS 20 years after 9/11, Wilson Centre Ag Ghali and Koufa to engage in settlements with
national authorities may also split fighters seeking
96. In Mali, for example, “high-level traditional elites in
a political agreement from hardline factions within
northern Mali have become entrenched in armed
their ranks.” Eizenger, D, and Williams, W. (2021),
governance structures, either as founders of non-state
The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in
armed groups or as allies of these groups. At the lower
the Sahel, ACSS.
level of village and fraction chiefs, … while still seeking
to exercise their traditional governance functions, 108. Interviews with Somali civil society activist. Supportive
traditional authorities are in many cases hampered, comments from UNDP Country Offices in Mali, DRC,
sidelined and even threatened against the backdrop of Somalia and Mozambique.
a volatile security situation, their lack of enforcement
109. “In particular, Salafi-jihadist groups do not only benefit
power and the impact of armed governance on
from local grievances and poor governance but they have
their legitimacy.” Clingendael (2019), https://www.
also become responsive to local sentiments and broader
clingendael.org/pub/2019/legitimacy_traditional_
national politics: their rhetoric builds on anti-colonialism
authorities_mali_niger_libya/4-traditional-authorities-
and they present themselves as local actors expelling
in-mali-armed-alliances-and-insecurity/
foreign forces.” Faleg, G., and Mutsasilta, K. (2021),
97. Challenging Al-Shabaab’s videos asking “‘Are you “Salafi-jihadism in Africa”, https://www.iss.europa.eu/
content with Muslim lands being grabbed and usurped content/salafi-jihadism-africa.
by the Kuffar?”, referring to emotionally powerful
110. The fact that VEGs attribute these grievances to
grievances around unjust land ownership.” Quoted in
“Crusaders” should not be taken as meaning that they
RUSI (2020).
express a full political economy-oriented analysis of the

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 geopolitical forces at play in each theatre of conflict. the perception of insecurity are on the rise, and there
Instead, their rhetoric provides a narrative that suits their are three dynamics to this. The first is local sources of
mobilization of communities and individuals to their cause. insecurity. When community security needs are not
met, these lay the ground for recruitment to violent
111. “The armed groups in question consist mostly of
organizations. Civilians begin to wonder whether the
locals who have found in radical Islamist ideology a
state really cares about their security or just its own
way to make sense of local conflicts and mobilize local
power, and terrorists take advantage of this divide.
grievances. Ideology counts, and the US government
The second is intercommunal conflict, especially over
and its partners should explore ways to counter radical
resource management issues. Informal conflict resolution
ideology, or rather encourage friendly local actors
mechanisms between groups are breaking down,
to do so.” Shurkin, M., and Bernard, A., https://
creating distrust, and making peacebuilding difficult.
warontherocks.com/2021/08/ten-things-the-united-
The third is whether people believe there is an avenue for
states-should-do-to-combat-terrorism-in-the-sahel/.
change. Steadman then interrogated what is and is not
112. For example, “local leaders of a group may choose working in countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts.
to seek out closer engagement with a Salafi-jihadist What’s working is allowing civilians to decide their own
network and/or its regional province to get access future and good governance. What’s not working is
to better resources and/or build their own political under-scrutinized security assistance, and the heavy focus
leverage. In turn, the larger organization benefits from on eliminating today’s terrorists while not doing anything
viable local branches to maintain momentum, expand to stop tomorrow’s terrorists. Steadman recommended
networks of resources and increase power vis-à-vis its that policymakers focus on prioritizing local agency
strategic competitors.” Faleg, G., and Mutsasilta, K. and support—not supplant—local peacebuilding
(2021), “Salafi-jihadism in Africa”, https://www.iss. mechanisms. She also recommended adjusting CVE
europa.eu/content/salafi-jihadism-africa. narratives to recognize the humanity in affected people
and communities (something VEO narratives already
113. Interview with academic specializing in CVE.
do), and improving state behavior towards its citizens
Confirmed by interview with expert on transnational
by focusing on human security and the role of security
and organized crime.
services as protectors of the civilian population”
114. “There is analytical value in understanding AQIM’s,
122. https://icct.nl/publication/dynamiques-soutien-
Boko Haram’s, and Al-Shabaab’s adherence to a
participation-extremisme-violent/
global jihadist ideology as part of employing a ‘global
brand.’” Dunn, K.C., and Bøås, M. (2017), The 123. Guichaoua, Y. (2012), Understanding Collective
Evolving Landscape of African Insurgencies. In Africa’s Political Violence, Palgrave.
Insurgents: Navigating an Evolving Landscape.
124. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
115. Interview with regional security expert, December 2021 government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/766399/20160701_SU_Report_CVE_in_FCAS_O.pdf
116. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA543686.pdf.
125. Bottiger, A. (2017), Towards Academic Consensus
117. H. Allan, A. Glazzard et al. (2015), Drivers of Violent
Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review, Definitions of Radicalism and Extremism, Perspectives
on Terrorism, 11 (4).
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), http://
www.dmeforpeace.org/peacexchange/wp-content/ 126. Berger, J.M. (2018), Extremism, MIT Press Essential
uploads/2018/08/Drivers-of-VE-Hypotheses-and- Knowledge Series.
Literature-Review.pdf.
127. State of Violence: Government Responses to Violent
118. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/preventing_ Extremism in South-East Asia, UNDP 2020
violent_extremism_ZovDRwR.pdf. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/
publications/UNDP-RBAP-Violent-Extremism-in-SE-
119. Thurstone, A. (2020), Jihadists of North Africa and the
Asia-case-study-State-of-Violence-2020.pdf.
Sahel, CUP, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108771160.
128. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/
120. Faleg, G., and Mutsasilta, K. (2021), “Salafi-jihadism
aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/ansar-eddine notes
in Africa”, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/salafi-
its formal designation by the UN under UNSCR 2083
jihadism-africa.
(2012).
121. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/webcast-violent-
129. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220105-nigeria-le-groupe-
extremism-west-africa-are-current-responses-enough
ansaru-annonce-son-all%C3%A9geance-%C3%A0-aqmi
Wilson Centre reporting USIP “began by discussing the
drivers of recruitment to violent extremist organizations 130. It was added to the UN sanctions list under UNSCR
(VEO), which often cater to legitimate grievances, 2253 (2015) in 2020 https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/
injustice, and repression felt by civilians. She emphasized sc14118.doc.htm.
that while violence is not the answer, it is important
131. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59614595.
to consider what drives people to it. Insecurity and

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