PIMENTEL vs.

ERMITA (Exceptions on Mootness)

G.R. No. 164978

Facts:

(1) Then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued appointment of the respondents as Acting Secretaries of
specific departments in the government while the Congress in session
(2) The respondents took oath and assumed their duties.
(3) The petitioner filed a petition of certiorari challenging the appointment done by the President.
(4) The President issued AD INTERIM appointments to the respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments.

Issue:

Whether the President’s appointment of respondents without the consent of the Commission on Appointments
constitutional.

Ruling:

The Court find no abuse in the case. The President’s appointment is constitutional as the law expressly allows the
President to make such acting appointment.

Section 17 Chapter 5 Title I Book III of EO 292:

Power to Issue Temporary Designation. —

(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law,
when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence
or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy;

(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is already in the
government service in which case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his existing salary,
shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be
paid out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned.

(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

The President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Ad Interim:

-ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy
JOYA vs. PCCG (Proper Party)

G.R. No. 96541

Facts:

(1) Mateo A. Caparas with the signed authority of then President Corazon Aquino formed a Consignment
Agreement with Christie’s to auction off the 82 Old Masters Painting and silverwares that were seized
from the Malacanang Palace and the Metropolitan Manila Museum and put under the custody of the
Central Bank which were alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos.
(2) However, the Commission on Audit questioned the agreement through the audit findings and
observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement
(2.a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement
was of doubtful legality
(2.b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government
(2.c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S
(2.d) the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their
disposal was prohibited by law

(3) Director of National Museum Gabriel Casal issued a Certification that the item subjects of the
Consignment Agreement do not fall under the classification of protected cultural properties and do not
specifically qualify as Filipino cultural heritage
(4) The auction proceeded earning proceeds of 13, 302, 604. 86 US dollar which were turned over to the
Bureau of Treasury.

Issues:

(a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition
(b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure
of the nation" which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or
"cultural properties" contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as "The Cultural Properties
Preservation and Protection Act;
(c) whether the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of
through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress
(d) whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie's of
New York for the sale of the artworks
(e) whether, PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the
exportation and sale of the subject items
(f) whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above issues warrant
resolution from this Court.

Ruling:
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry

Legal requisites of Judicial Review:

(a) question is raised by proper party

(b) presence of actual case or controversy
(c) question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
(d) the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary for the determination of the case

The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.

Legal Standing “Locus Standing”- a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is challenged

Interest - material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest
- must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of
some third and related party

Taxpayer - A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy — one which involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.

Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction.
CHR EMPLOYEES Assoc. vs. CHR

G.R. No. 155336

Facts:

(1) Upon the passing of RA No. 8522 known as General Appropriations Act of 1999 providing Special
Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, the Commission on Human
Rights adopted an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected personnel in the commission.
(2) Additional to the upgrading and reclassification is the creation of ten additional plantillas.
(3) To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, authorized the augmentation of a
commensurate amount generated from savings under the Personnel Services.
(4) The CHR also collapsed the vacant positions to provide additional funds.
(5) This staffing modification was forwarded to the DBM or the Department of Budget and Management
with a request of its approval which eventually denied by the DBM with the justification that the
request involves the elevation of field units from divisions to services.

Issue:

Whether the CHR can validly implement upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in
the Commission without the prior approval of the DBM.

Ruling:

The petitioner CHREA is a legal standing who will sustain injury in the staffing modification scheme that the CHR
proposes. As CHREA is composed of rank-and-file employees and only a few select in upper-level positions will
benefit from the scheme.

The Commission on Human Rights do not have the fiscal autonomy to upgrade, reclassify, create and collapse
plantilla positions. It is not one of the main Commissions of the Government that enjoys Fiscal Autonomy –
COMELEC, COA, and CSC.

In case of the DBM, it was delegated by the President to administer the Salary Standardization Law.
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE vs. ROMULO

G.R. No. 157509

Facts:

(1) The petitioners, composed of 10 labor unions, called for the Court to exercise its judicial review on the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 185 on the ground of derogation of the constitutional
separation of powers.
(2) Executive No. 185 was passed authorizing the Secretary of Labor and Employment to exercise
administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations Commissions.
(3) The petitioners argue that NLRC was an integral part of Department of Labor and Employment under
the supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
(4) During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, and while she was endowed with legislative functions
after EDSA I, Executive Order No. 2922 was issued whereby the NLRC became an agency attached to the
DOLE for policy and program coordination and for administrative supervision.
(5) On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715
declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only while
the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, was turned over to the
NLRC Chairman.
(6) The subject E.O. No. 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision over
the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-Rep. Act No. 6715 set-up,
amending the latter law which only Congress can do.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners have locus standi to assail the validity of E.O No. 185

Ruling:

The petition is dismissed on the ground that the petitioners have no locus standi and failed to show that they
have sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of EO No. 185.
 TANADA vs. TUVIERA (Citizen Standing)

G.R. No. L-63915

Facts:

(1) The petitioner Lorenzo M. Tanada seek for petition on writ of mandamus for invoking the people’s right to
be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette compelling public official respondents to publish and/or cause
the publication of some presidential decrees, letter of instruction, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
(2) The respondents Hon. Juan Tuvera argued that the petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the petition.
(3) The petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel performance of public duty, they need not show specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner a legal personality or standing without sustaining any injury from the unpublishing of some
of presidential decrees.

Whether publishing in Official Gazette a prerequisite for a law to be found effective and valid

Ruling:

(1) While the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved.” Nevertheless, "when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
(2) The respondents are ordered to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
CHAVEZ vs. PEA and AMARI

G.R. No. 133250

Facts:

Through the issuance of former President Ferdinand Marcos of PD No. 1804, PEA was tasked to reclaim land,
including foreshore, and submerged areas and develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands. PEA was also directed to amend its contract with Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines. Prior to PEA, CDCP was tasked to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. With
the amended contract between PEA and CDCP, CDCP was now directed to give up all its development rights, title,
interest and participation of CDCP in the reclamation.

Under former President Corazon Aquino, parcels of land reclaimed under Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project were transferred to PEA. These lands covered the islands known as “Freedom Islands”.

PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands requiring the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the plan. The JVA was entered through negotiation without public bidding which was approved
by former President Fidel V. Ramos.

A controversy then broke out when then Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced JVA as the "grandmother of
all scams”. The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation and concluded that the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of
title covering the Freedom Islands are void and that the JVA itself is illegal.

Petitioner Frank I. Chavez, in his capacity as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. He contends that the government
will lose billions of pesos in the JVA. He sought for the public disclosure of the renegotiation of the JVA invoking
Constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern. He also assails that JVA is against the
Constitutional prohibition on the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations

A year after the petition, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. Former Joseph Estrada
then approved the Amended JVA.

ISSUES:

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;

RULING:

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is
to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information
which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA
from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. Moreover, the petition raises matters of
transcendental importance to the public.

Since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information
and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner
has the requisite locus standi.
KMU LABOR CENTER vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. 115381

FACTS:

In 1990, then DOTC Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued a Memorandum Circular to then LTFRB Chairman,
Remedios A.S. Fernando to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a
range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. This is in
line to the liberalization of regulations in the transport sector which the government to implement and
to make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.

Fernando finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible,” respectfully
adverts the Secretary’s attention to the Public Service Act requiring publication and notice to
concerned or affected parties in the territory affected and a public hearing for the fixing of the rates.

In December 1990, the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed
an application for an across-the-board rate increase which was granted by the LTFRB. In October
1992, DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memorandum to LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption
of rules and procedures to implement Department Order to lay down deregulation policies.

Availing itself of LTFRB guidelines, PBOAP announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent
without public hearing.

Petitioner KMU, opposing the move, filed a petition before LTFRB which was denied due to lack of
merit. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner KMU Labor Center has the legal standing to sue

RULING:

Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.

The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power.

Judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties who have the right to sue in the
courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is
directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue.

Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the
implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right
that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars
and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys every day, are directly affected by
the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who
comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.

Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this
barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised.
IBP vs. Zamora

G.R. No. 141284

FACTS:

Former President Joseph Estrada made a verbal directive ordering the PNP and the Marines to conduct a joint
visibility patrol for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In this joint patrol, the Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government were tasked to implement the order.

In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay,
formulated Letter of Instruction detailing the manner by which the joint visibility patrols called the Task Force
Tulungan would be conducted and be placed under the supervision of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

The President confirmed his directive on the Marines in his memo expressing his desire to improve the peace and
order in Metro Manila through an effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols further
stating that AFP is necessary to heighten police visibility. The President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

Tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the law and the Constitution, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
filed a petition annulling the LOI and declaring the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void.

The Solicitor General, in a resolution of the court, filed his comment on the petition, defending the constitutionality
of the act of the President in deploying the Marines.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner, IBP, has legal standing

Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review

RULING:

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the
petition.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. 13 The
term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.

The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.
Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial
interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and
cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has
duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered
or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP
purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. N
either is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the
deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement
which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not
only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to
satisfy the requirement of standing.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of
judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the
resolution of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues
raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out
the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace
and order and promotion of the general welfare.

For one, the realities on the ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or
anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter
part of this decision.

As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court
review.22 It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before
it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are
"political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of
the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch
unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision
is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA

G.R. No. 131719

FACTS:

In July 1995, RA No. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 took
effect. A year after, in April 1996, the Omnibus Rules and Regulations of Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino
Act of 1995 was then published in Manila Bulletin. Prior to the effectivity of the law, the Asian Recruitment
Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of Rules of Court before the
RTC of Quezon City. The alleged that Section 6(a to m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized
recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters . It contended that while the Labor Code
distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of
penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on
an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence,
such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.

In their answer to the petition, petitioners asserted that the respondent is not the real party-in-interest as
petitioner in the trial court. It is inconceivable how the respondent, a non-stock and non-profit corporation,
could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law.

ISSUES:

Whether ARCO-Phil has no legal standing

RULING:

The Respondent Has Locus Standi

To File the Petition in the RTC in Representation of the Eleven Licensed and Registered Recruitment Agencies
Impleaded in the Amended Petition

The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the
legal identity of an association with that of its members.16 An association has standing to file suit for its workers
despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert
the concerns of its constituents.

The respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its
eleven (11) licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which approved separate
resolutions expressly authorizing the respondent to file the said suit for and in their behalf.

Under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting and
supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and international
levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general
membership; enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the
representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment
industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The
respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in
every practical sense identical. The respondent asserts that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights
of its members and the officers and employees thereof. The respondent is but the medium through which its
individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. It even
failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the
eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with
Section 2 of Rule 6320 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the eleven licensed and registered recruitment
agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the amended petition is
deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.
KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA

G.R. No. 113375

FACTS:

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office or PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Under the initiative of Berjaya Group Berhad,
PCSO entered into a Contract of Lease with Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Kilosbayan, a
non-stock corporation composed of “civic-spirited citizens” strongly opposed the on-line lottery system on
account of its immorality and illegality and filed petition as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Respondents
argued that the petitioner has no legal standing to file the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Petitioner Kilosbayan has the legal standing to challenge the act of contract of lease between PCSO
and PGMC

RULING:

We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount
public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications
of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest
barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners
deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural
barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of
ITF vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 159139

FACTS:

The Congress authorized the Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election
system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. However, the
implementation of demonstration failed due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some automated
ballots in one town.

The counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local positions were also done manually in May 2001
elections. Comelec adopted a modernization program for the 2004 elections in resolution resolving to conduct
biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
and executive order allocating the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the
request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

COMELEC issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid," for the procurement of supplies equipment,
materials and services needed for a comprehensive Automated Election System.

Out of the 57 bidders, MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) were found eligible.
However, in its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and
TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation.

Despite the failed marks, Comelec awarded the project to MPC. Petitioners protested the award of contract to
respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted.”

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner ITF has locus standi

RULING:

Locus Standi of the Petitioners:

We agree with petitioners. Our nation’s political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the
outcome of the 2004 elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest"; in other words, it is of "paramount public interest" and
"transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal
policy of this Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society." Petitioners’ legal
standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." In the
instant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a
qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain
respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any unwarranted expenditure of
public funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners possess locus standi.

TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 148344

FACTS:

COMELEC was called in a resolution to hold a special election with the regular elections to fill in the vacancy in
the Senate when Senator Teofisto Guingona was nominated by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for the
vice-presidency. In the resolution, twelve senators each with 6-year term are due to be elected and further
provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13 th highest number of votes shall serve only the unexpired
term of former Senator Guingona.

After the canvassing of votes in the election, Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan placed 12 th and 13th
respectively.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, in their capacity as citizen and taxpayers, filed a petition for
prohibition imploding only Comelec as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with
finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special
election for a single three-year term seat.

In their answer to the petition, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the seat
vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. Further raising preliminary issue on the
mootness of the petition and petitioner’s standing to litigate.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioners have standing to litigate

RULING:

"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. 15 The requirement of standing, which necessarily
"sharpens the presentation of issues," relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as
voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a "generalized grievance."
This generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted
in that election. Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the
petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 "tax money [was] ‘x x x extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power’ or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by
COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose."

Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement
of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the
locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus,
when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issues
involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.

OPLE vs. TORRES

G.R. No. 127685

FACTS:

In December 12, 1996, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued an Administrative Order on the adoption of a
national computerized identification reference system that will provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities.

Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople filed the instant petition against respondents then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies on two important constitutional grounds. One, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether the instant petition is justiciable to warrant a judicial review

RULING:

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate.
As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of
A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS
funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.
No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the
respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early
as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly
announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national
identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308
and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the
dissenter’s insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to
throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
PEOPLE vs. VERA

G.R. No. L-45685

FACTS:

Mariano Cu Unijieng was charged in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano
Cu Unjieng, et al.", in the Court of Instance in Manila. Unjieng filed for motion reconsideration or new trial but
were all denied. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States but the latter denied the petition. He then filed again for motion of reconsideration for new
trial but the case was sent back to its court of origin.

Unjieng filed for motion of reconsideration for probation under the provisions of RA No. 4221. Herein the
respondent Judge Jose Vera heard the petition and set the hearing. The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an
opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The prosecution also filed
an opposition alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section
2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. A supplementary opposition was filed alleging the
unonstitutionality of Act No. 4221 as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces.

Petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

whether or not there was undue delegation of legislative power

RULING:

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature.

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is
also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.

Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the
next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001 when he was forced to
vacate the presidency by people power and then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in
office.1 He was charged, in eight cases filed with the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in
office, among them plunder, for allegedly having amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or
less. He moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No. 7080, otherwise called the Anti-
Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information charges more than one offense.

ISSUE:

a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;

b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates
the rights of the accused to due process; and,
c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.

RULING:

RA 7080 is constitutional.

Unconstitutionality for vagueness

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though
defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities.
The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed
statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for
the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all
the details in advance as in all other statutes.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms."

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."

The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional”.

Less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in
all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in
the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information
to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum

Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.

Agreeing with Justice Mendoza with his statement that the constitutive crimes in Plunder are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information
alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the
Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in
se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
UMALI vs. GUINGONA

FACTS:

Petitioner Atty. Osmundo Umali was appointed as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. With the issuance of Administrative Order No. 152, he was suspended with forfeiture of
retirement and all benefits under the law. Petitioner filed for motion of reconsideration for his dismissal but the
Office of the President denied his petition. He filed for another petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction
before the RTC of Makati alleging that petitioner was suspended and dismissed from the service in violation of his
constitutional right of due process of law and that the constitutional right of security of tenure was violated by the
respondents.

This petition was again dismissed by the RTC Makati. Petitioner then filed for reconsideration theorizing that the
Presidential Commission of Anti-Graft and Corruption is an unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct
the investigation against him.

Respondents submitted their Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration. Then, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Inhibit Judge Inoturan on the ground that the latter was formerly a Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor
General and could not be expected to decide the case with utmost impartiality. The case was then re-raffled to
Hon. Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr. who, on December 13, 1995, handed down an Amended Decision, granting the petition
and practically reversing the original Decision.

In the interim that the administrative and civil cases against the petitioner were pending, the criminal aspect of
such cases was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152 VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE;

2. WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS IN THE ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 152;

3. WHETHER THE PCAGC IS A VALIDLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT AGENCY AND WHETHER PETITIONER CAN
RAISE THE ISSUE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY BELATEDLY IN ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION; AND

5. WHETHER IN THE LIGHT OF THE OMBUDSMAN RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST PETITIONER,
THERE IS STILL BASIS FOR PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL WITH FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS AS RULED IN ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 152.

RULING:

Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause and under the
Administrative Code of 1987,6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal.
Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure,
petitioner theorized.
After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first
three issues. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that
the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws
and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his
protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis.

Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to
petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure.
However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to
prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure
to do so is fatal.

Unconstitutionality of PGCAC

As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such
late stage of the proceedings below.
ARCETA VS. MANGROBANG

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case of Ofelia Arceta and Gloria S. Dy for the violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law.

Petitioner Arceta issued a check amounting to 740,000 but was dishonored for having insufficient funds while
Gloria S. Dy issued a check amounting to 2,500,000 and subsequently dishonored for account closed.

The petitioners did not file for dismissal of the cases or quashal of information filed against them on the ground
that BP 22 is unconstitutional.

Both Arceta and Dy raised the following questions:

[a] Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check subsequently dishonored by the bank for lack of funds?

[b] What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant to section 2 of BP 22?

[c] What is the effect if it is so paid?

[d] Does section 2 make BP 22 a debt collecting law under threat of imprisonment?

[e] Does BP 22 violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debt?

[f] Is BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the state?

ISSUE:

Whether BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional and invalid?

RULING:

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present:

1. an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists;

2. a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;

3. the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and

4. the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.
Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality
or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel’s spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to
agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met.

In a special civil action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Yet nowhere in these petitions is there
any allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is manifested.

Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court.
Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been
immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the
separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of
unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the
proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute
where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Taking into account the early
stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.

Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy
below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.
MACIAS vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented from implementing Republic Act 3040 that apportions
representative districts in this country. It is unconstitutional and void, they allege, because: (a) it was passed by the
House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished the Members at least three
calendar days prior to its passage; (b) it was approved more than three years after the return of the last census of
our population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.

ISSUES:

Whether a bill is valid if it does not pass through the House of Representatives without printed final copies?

Whether a bill approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of population is valid?

Whether RA 3040 infringes the Constitution?

RULING:

RA 3040 infringes the Constitution and therefore is void.

The printed-form, three-day requirement.

The Constitution provides that "no bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment."

Population Census.

According to the Constitution, "the Congress shall by law, make an apportionment (of Members of the House)
within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise." It is admitted that the bill, which
later became Republic Act 3040, was based upon a report submitted to the President by the Director of the Census
on November 23, 1960.

It reads:
 I have the honor to submit herewith a preliminary count of the population of the Philippines as a result of
the population enumeration which has just been completed. This is a report on the total number of
inhabitants in this country and does not include the population characteristics. It is the result of a hand
tally and may be subject to revision when all the population schedules shall have been processed
mechanically.

The Census of Population is the first of a series of four censuses which include housing, agriculture and
economics in addition to population. These four censuses together constitute what is known as the
Census of 1960. Like population, the housing and agricultural censuses are undergoing processing, while
the economic census is now under preparation.

Until the final report is made, these figures should be considered as official for all purposes.

This issue does not clearly favor petitioners, because there are authorities sustaining the view that although not
final, and still subject to correction, a census enumeration may be considered official, in the sense that
Governmental action may be based thereon even in matters of apportionment of legislative districts

Apportionment of Members

The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives "shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respective
inhabitants."

This provision was violated by Republic Act 3040 because (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger
number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got
three only; (c) Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members
having been assigned to it; (d) Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got
three only; (e) Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f)
Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.
TAN vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to
be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23,
1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections
from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for
January 3, 1986.

ISSUES:

Whether the residents of Negros be included in the plebiscite conducted by COMELEC

Whether BP Blg. 885 is constitutional and in complete accord to Local Government Code Article XI Section 3 of the
Constitution.

RULING:

BP 885 is unconstitutional.

LGC Article XI Section 3 states that:

See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained
"the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the
boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain
and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province
of Negros del Norte.

VETERAN’s FED PARTY vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations,
which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the
proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.

However, after passing upon the results of the special election, the Comelec en banc further determined that
COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered
186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first
nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.

Upon the petition of other party-list, Comelec also proclaimed the additional 38 party-list representatives despite
not obtaining the 2% of the total number of votes in pursuant of Section5(2) Article VI of the Constitution
mandating that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives should come from the party-list
representatives.

ISSUES:

Whether the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

Whether the 2% threshold requirement and 3-seat-limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

RULING:

The assailed resolutions of Comelec are set aside and nullified. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting
party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are
AFFIRMED

The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector."

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however,
is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances? Our short answer is "No."

A simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
BAGONG BAYANI vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the COMELEC. Petitioner seeks

the disqualification of certain major political parties in the 2001 party-list
elections arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented and not the mainstream political parties,
the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

Respondent Vicente Emano is holding a position as Governor of Misamis Oriental which Cagayan de Oro city is a
part of. Pero dahil independent city si Cagayan de oro, hindi naman sila pwede magvote. Si Emano as a governor is
residing in Cagayan de oro city. And he was planning to run as mayor in cdo since sabi niya its his residence naman
for a long time na he was governor of misamis oriental.
AQUINO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

MARCOS vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petition Imelda Romualdez Marcos filed for candidacy as a Representative of the First District of Leyte. However,
private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition,
private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 and in her Certificate of Candidacy.

Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate which was denied by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

Petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile
or residence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one
year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated
April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we
are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

TORAYNO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
REGULAR ELECTION

A regular election is one participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage and not otherwise disqualified
by law and who are registered voters.

RA NO 7166

Section 2. Date of Elections. - In accordance with the policy hereinbefore stated, there shall be an election for
President, Vice-President, twenty-four (24) Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and
all elective provincial, city and municipal officials on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thereafter, the President
and Vice-President shall be elected on the same day every six (6) years; while the Senators, elective Members of
the House of Representatives and all elective provincial, city and municipal officials shall be elected on the same
day every three (3) years, except that with respect to Senators, only twelve (12) shall be elected.

RA NO 10153

Elections for officials in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) are synchronized with the national
and local elections and are thus held on the second Monday of May.

SPECIAL ELECTIONS

The Philippines holds two types of special elections: those that were supposed to be held on election day but
were delayed, and those held after an office has become vacant.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881 – OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. – Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the Commission on Elections,
which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission, the election period shall commence ninety days before
the day of the election and shall end thirty days thereafter. The period of campaign shall be as follows:

1. Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election – 90 days;

2. Election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa and Local Election – 45 days; and
3. Barangay Election – 15 days.

The campaign periods shall not include the day before and the day of the election.
However, in case of special elections under Article VIII, Section 5, Subsection (2) of the Constitution, the campaign
period shall be forty-five days.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS

SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA

FACTS:

This is a petition for quo warranto filed by petitioners Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago and Sen. Francisco Tatad on
the alleged election of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as the minority leader.

In an election of the officers, Sen. Marcelo Fernan, nominated by Sen. Blas Ople, and Sen. Francisco Tatad,
nominated by Sen. Santiago, were vying for the position of Senate President. In a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
elected as the Senate President.

Sen. Tatad as the only member of the minority, assumed that he would be getting the position of the minority
leader. He explained that those who voted for the winning nominee comprise the “majority” while those who
voted for the losing nominee, which in this case, is Sen. Tatad, comprise the “minority.

However, in one of their discussions, Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP – numbering seven thus a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.

The majority leader received a receipt of letter signed by the seven members of Lakas – NUCD-UMDP stating that
they had elected Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case?

Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution?

Whether or not Sen. Guingona usurped, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate Minority Leader?

Whether or not the respondent Sen. Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the respondent Sen.
Guingona as the Senate Minority Leader?
RULING:

The petition was Denied by the Court.

First Issue: Jurisdiction over the petition

The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is,
questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules
of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of
legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies."

In Tañada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers to 'those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular
measure."

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was
not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority,"
but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and
determine the issue.

Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The
present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of
the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief
asserted. It is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of
the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second issue: Violation of Constitution

The interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the
Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.

The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
"majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution
had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is
that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is
there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof, at any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of
title or who is not entitled by law thereto.

The person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the
functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.

The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been
vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingona's assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan’s Recognition of Guingona

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as
the minority leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by
the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions
and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Article VI Section 16(1)

The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority of vote of all its
respective Members, Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

QUORUM

AVELINO vs. CUENCO

FACTS:

In a Senate session, Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada, quested for his right speak in the next session to formulate charges
against then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved.

On the next session, Senators Tanada and Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumerating the charges against petitioner Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. There was a sufficient
quorum for the session but the petitioner who was then the senate president delayed his appearance. When he
finally appeared in the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session but instead asked for the resolution filed
by Senators Tanada and Sanidad and read it slowly and carefully.

Senator Sanidad, following a long-established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator
Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make
use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.

There were then discursions resulting to the petitioner to walk out followed by 5 other senators while the others
remained.

Those who remained, they continued with the session with the Senate President Pro-tempore Aranz presiding. In
that session, Senator Tanada was able to deliver his privilege speech which is the Resolution No. 68. Senator
Sanidad then followed introducing Resolution No 67 which designated Senator Mariano Cuenco as Acting Senate
President.

The resolution was unanimously approved. Senator Cuenco took his oath.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case at hand?

Whether Resolutions 67 & 68 validly approved in terms of the quorum present in the session?

RULING:

The Court ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case at hand.

This is in view of the separation of powers of the state, the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might
lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino
people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action
inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.

For the second issue at hand, it would depend on the sub-questions:

(1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty-two
Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?

(2) Was there a quorum in that session?

There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore,
an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been
so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS:

Perfecto J

Illegal Adjournment

A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is under debate and, with certain restriction, it
has the highest privilege under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even questions of privilege and
the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to adjourn may be made after the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered
and before the roll call has begun, before reading of the journal. The motion is not debatable and, after the motion
is made, neither another motion nor an appeal may intervene before the taking of the vote.

Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he could adjourn the session under the rules of
the Senate, is not well taken. There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving petitioner such authority. The
provisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate President to take measures to stop disorder, but that power
does not include the one to adjourn.

The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.

Quorum

The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than thirteen.
Twelve is only half of twenty-four. Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the majority. Majority
necessarily has to be more than one-half.

The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his supporters, after petitioner and his nine
supporters had walked out from the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to transact business.

The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and choosing respondent as acting
President of the Senate, has been adopted in contravention of the Constitution for lack of quorum.

Tuason J

I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve senators who elected Senator Cuenco Acting
President of the Senate did not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his election was illegal.
Ferias J

But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be reconsidered, that there was a quorum in the
session of the Senate of Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of
1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to basethe majority, not on the number fixed or provided for the Constitution,but on
actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge
their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which
make attendance of the member concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house is
empowered to issue to compel itsmembers to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.

Rules of Proceeding

PACETE vs. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

FACTS:

Petitioner Felizardo Pacete was appointed as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato City by the then President of the
Philippines. He then assumed the office and discharge his duties as such. As his appointment was made during the recess of
Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session. He was then unanimously confirmed. He
was sent a congratulatory telegram by the then Senate President Ferdinand Marcos who was also the Chairman of the
Commission on Appointments. More than nine months after the confirmation, he was advised by the then Secretary of Justice
to vacate the position on the ground that his appointment has been by-passed and was not duly confirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s appointment as Municipal Judge by the President not valid?

RULING:

Rule 21 of the Commission on Appointments

"The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and air
forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may
by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments." 18 The other provision is worded, thus: "The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”

The constitutional requirement is clear. There must either be a rejection by the Commission on Appointments or
nonaction on its part. No such thing happened in this case. Petitioner, as pointed out, had instead in his favor a
unanimous vote of confirmation. He could thus invoke constitutional protection. For respondents to argue that the
mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the absence of any further action, is,
as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover tantamount
to imparting to a move of a single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority
were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and pernicious in operation. It can find no
shelter in the constitutional prescription. Rather it makes a mockery of what is therein ordained. Petitioner's stand
is thus unassailable.

ARROYO vs. DE VENECIA

FACTS:

This is a petition of certiorari on the amendments of some provisions on RA NO. 8240 or the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H No 7198 which was approved on the third reading and
transmitted to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on the third reading. The existence of the
disagreeing provisions of the versions of the bill was then handled by a bicameral conference committee.

In a session for the reading of the bill, petitioner Rep. Arroyo requested to adjourn for the lack of quorum which
was then denied through a roll call which declared a presence of a quorum.

Petitioner Arroyo then requested to interpellate to raise the issue on the quorum but until the end of his
interpellation, he never did.

On the same day, the bill was then signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. It was then signed into a law by then
President Fidel V. Ramos.

Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.

Petitioners charged the following:

1. in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years or nays, but simply asked for its
approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum;
2. in violation of Rule XIX, §112, the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify;
3. in violation of Rule XVI, §97, the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on
Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and
 4. in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, the Chair suspended the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged
motion.

ISSUE:

Whether the House of Representative committee a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition.

It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are
merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a
law.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has
been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rules were stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained.

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly.
Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry.”

As per Chief Justice Fernando’s comment,

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.

Each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without
upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests.

It is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,
respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power
as to amount to lack of power.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not
be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that petitioner was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Moreover, under the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.

When there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both
Houses that a bill has been duly passed.

Petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule. The due enactment of the law in
question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4).

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect.

OPINIONS

VITUG, J

In its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of
whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the
Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being
thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of
discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or
despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion.

ROMERO, J

Judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution.

The introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached.

PUNO, J

The Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless,
there is no any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting said petition.

It is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that the Court no longer give their unqualified
support to the enrolled bill doctrine. The enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in
England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the
United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with
our Constitution, laws and rules.

The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under
the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also
under a regime of truth.

DISCIPLINE of MEMBERS

ALEJANDRINO vs. QUEZON

FACTS:

This is a petition of mandamus and injunction by the petitioner Jose Alejandrino in regard to the resolution
adopted by the Philippine Senate composing of the respondents Manuel L. Quezon, et al, depriving petitioner of
the prerogative, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year.

The resolution states that the petitioner is guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violations of the privileges of
the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the
occasion of the debate regarding the credentials of said petitioner; that petitioner deprived of all of his
prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one year; and that petitioner, being a Senator
appointed by the Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be furnished said Governor-General
for his information.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the resolution of the Philippine Senate is constitutional

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over cases that are within the sphere of
the Legislative and Executive Departments.

OPINIONS

ARTICLE VI Section 16(3)

JOHNSON, J

There were three questions that can be raised from the petition and the demurrer presented in the case:

First. Is the resolution in question legal or illegal?

Second. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction even to consider its legality?
Third. Can the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?

Legality of the Resolution

It will be noted from the two quotations just given, that the power to expel a member of either branch of the
Legislature, by the Legislature, is limited to "elective members," while the power "to punish members for disorderly
behavior" applies to all members whether elective or appointive. In view of the fact that neither branch of the
Legislature can expel an appointive member, can either branch deprive such a member of all his "prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" under the power "to punish for disorderly behavior"? It will
be noted that the law contains no definition of the "punishment" which may be imposed for disorderly behavior.
Considering, however, that neither branch has the right to expel an appointive member, certainly no one will
contend that the punishment imposed for disorderly behavior may amount to an expulsion. If the punishment
amounts to an expulsion, then certainly the Legislature has exceeded its authority and has encroached upon the
power of the executive, for the reason that the power to expel belongs to the Governor-General.

The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a disciplinary measure. When a member of the
Legislature is removed either by the Governor-General or by the Legislature, a vacancy exists, and the law gives the
Governor-General the right to appoint, and the people of the district the right to fill the vacancy by election, so that
the people may again, under either case, be represented. A "suspension" of a member, however, does not create a
vacancy, and the people of the district are without a representative and the Governor-General cannot appoint one
and the people cannot elect one during the period of suspension. They are without representation during that
period. They are, for the period of suspension, taxed without representation. If a member, under the power to
punish, can be suspended for one year, for the same reason he may be suspended for ten or more years, thus
depriving the Governor-General of his right under the law, and the people of the district, of a representative, and
without a remedy in the premises.

A suspension from an office or a deprivation of the rights of an officer of all his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments, is in effect a deprivation or a removal from office for the time mentioned in the order of suspension.
It has been held that a suspension from office for an indefinite time and lasting for a period of six months, lost its
temporary character, ceased to be a suspension, and in effect became a removal from such office.

In the case of State vs. Chamber of Commerce, that the suspension of a member was a qualified expulsion, and
that whether it was called a suspension or expulsion or removal, it in effect disfranchised the person suspended.

In the case of Metsker vs. Nelly, it was held that a suspension or a deprivation for either a definite or indefinite
period is in effect a removal. In the case of Gregory vs. New York, it was held that the power to remove an officer or
punish him does not include the power to suspend him temporarily from his office.

In this connection it may be noted that the alleged "misbehavior" on the part of the petitioner was committed
outside of the legislative halls and at a time when there was no session of the Senate; that said alleged
"misbehavior" did not take place in or near the Senate chamber, nor cause any disorder, disturbance, annoyance,
or impediment whatever to the orderly and dignified procedure of any session of the Senate; that said
"misbehavior" did not interfere in any manner whatever with the honor, dignity, and efficiency, nor with the orderly
proceedings of the Senate; that the petitioner did not know, at the time of the alleged "misbehavior," that he had
been admitted as a member of the Philippine Senate. The question of his admission as a senator had been under
discussion for weeks theretofore.

The power to punish for disorderly behavior has never been exercised further than to impose a mere reprimand.
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE

The Court is compelled to decide that it is justified, authorized, and, under our oath of office, compelled to take
jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the petitioner has been deprived,
illegally, of a right guaranteed to him under the Constitution and laws of the Philippine Islands.

The courts will not measure their opinion with the opinion of the legislative department, as expressed in the
resolution or statute, upon the question of the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular law, but the wisdom,
justice, and advisability of a particular law must be tested by the provisions of the fundamental law of the state. It
is the sworn duty of the judicial department of the government to determine the limits, under the law and the
constitution, of the authority of both the executive and legislative departments.

CAN THE COURT GRANT REMEDY TO THE PETITION

The majority opinion decides that the petitioner and the people whom he represents have been illegally deprived
of their rights, but that he and they are without a remedy — damnum absque injuria. To that doctrine we cannot
give our assent.

OSTRAND, J

It has been suggested that to entertain an action against a coordinate department of the government would be an
unwarranted assertion of superiority on our part. I fail to see the validity of this observation. This is not a question
of departmental superiority or inferiority. This court asserts no superiority for itself; it only maintains the
superiority of the law to which all of us must yield obedience. The pronouncements of the court are simply the
voice of the law as understood by the court and are not personal matters. Even if this action were brought against a
coordinate department as a body — which it is not — the court would still be in duty bound to apply the law of the
land to the case and do its best to enforce that law irrespective of the rank or importance of the parties.

In the course of the argument of the case it was intimated that if the writ prayed for were issued its enforcement
might be the cause of disturbance and strife. The suggestion is almost an insult to the intelligence and patriotism of
the defendants and I feel sure that the fear thus expressed is entirely without foundation.

In the course of the argument of the case it was intimated that if the writ prayed for were issued its enforcement
might be the cause of disturbance and strife. The suggestion is almost an insult to the intelligence and patriotism of
the defendants and I feel sure that the fear thus expressed is entirely without foundation.

OSMENA vs. PENDATUN

FACTS:

Petitioner Sergio Osmena filed for petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.

It was alleged that petitioner Osmena made a malicious speech against the President of the Philippines charging
the latter with bribery. That if the charges were done without basis of truth, they would constitute a serious assault
upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of the President which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of
the Filipino people.
The House of Representatives formed a special committee with 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges
against the President, summoning the petitioner to substantiate his charges, and issue a subpoena to require the
attendance of witnesses. And if he fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by
the House.

After the committee gave the petitioner a chance to defend himself, the House declared him guilty and suspended
from the office for 15 months.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner’s speech constituted disorderly behavior for which he was punished

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no jurisdiction of the case in pursuant to the separation
of powers of the branches of the government.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. The House is the judge of
what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best.

OPINIONS

REYES, J. B.L.J

The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules is to protect the freedom of action of its members
and to relieve them from the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second thought, as a result of political
convenience, vindictiveness, or pressures. it is unrealistic to overlook that, without the immunity so provided, no
member of Congress can remain free from the haunting fear that his most innocuous expressions may at any time
afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment whenever a majority, however transient, should feel that the
shifting sands of political expediency so demand. A rule designed to assure that members of the House of the
House may freely act as their conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements the parliamentary
immunity from outside pressure enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly deserving of liberal interpretation
and application.

While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not
bar the members being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself for remarks made on the floor, that
disciplinary power does not include the right to retroactively amend the rules so as to divest a member of an
immunity already gained.

This Court possesses no power to direct or compel the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter
it from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and nullify of the questioned resolutions and of all action
that has been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues remain so important as to require adjudication by
this Court.
LABRADOR, J

The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish Congressman Osmeña immediately after its delivery, except
to have some part of the speech deleted, show that the members of the House did not consider Osmeña's speech a
disorderly conduct. The idea to punish Congressman Osmeña, which came 15 days after, was, therefore, an
afterthought. It is, therefore, clear that Congressman Osmeña is being made to answer for an act, after the time
during which he could be punished therefor had lapsed.

Since the rule, that a member can be punished only before other proceedings have intervened, was in force at the
time Congressman Osmeña delivered his speech, the House may not ignore said rule.

If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House should observe its own rule and not violate it by
punishing a member after the period for indictment and punishment had already passed.

SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

In October 1988, petitioner Miriam Defensor Santiago, then CID Commissioner approved the legalization of the stay
of about 32 aliens which was a violation of Executive No. 324 prohibiting of the legalization of said disqualified
aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose
stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.

This violation is a ground for her disqualification to the position. Two other criminal cases were filed against
Santiago.

Respondent Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at
Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty as she was then recuperating from
injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.

A petition then was filed in Sandiganbayan to suspend Santiago from office who was a senator.

The Sandiganbayan ordered the suspension Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.

RULING:

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to
discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each —
 "House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty day"

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged
with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of
the statute provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding,
and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

ABBAS vs. SET

FACTS:

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest against the 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect congressional elections by the
Commission on Elections. Six of the 22 candidates are sitting as members of the Senator Election Tribunal.

The petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to
be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as
to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the disqualification of the Senator-elect, six of them are sitting as members of Senator Election
Tribunal, constitutional

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction
and powers.
 Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal Hall be its chairman.

It is clear that for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the
Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.

Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a
case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that
no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.

BONDOC vs. PINEDA

FACTS:

Petitioner Emigdio Bondoc and respondent Marciano Pineda were rival candidates for the position of
Representative of the Fourth District of the Province of Pampanga. Pineda was then proclaimed as the winner.
In due time, Bondoc then filed for protest in the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal contending the
victory of Pineda.

After the revision of ballots and presentation of evidences by Bondoc, a decision has been reached proclaiming
Bondoc as the winner by a margin of 23 votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of ballots resulted in the increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda by 107
votes.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Juanito Camasura then confessed to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose
S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for
Bondoc which stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to
neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

Congressman Camasura was then expelled from the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal for having
allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having
invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party which was a complete betrayal to the LDP
resulting to the withdrawal of his nomination and rescinding of his election to the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal.
Hence, the petition of prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the House of Representative can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the
House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority
party?

RULING:

The Court granted the petition.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It
is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission
applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.

The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained in the legislature.

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special
tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members
of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their
own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference.

The House Electoral Tribunal must be independent.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in
the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate,
Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole
judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of
the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as
well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

CODILLA vs. DE VENECIA

FACTS:

Petitioner Eufrocino Codilla and respondent Ma. Victoria Locsin were rival candidates for the position of
Representative of 4th District of Leyte. At that time Codilla was the mayor while Locsin was sitting as the
Representative of 4th District of Leyte.

Codilla won the highest number of votes with 71, 350. But his proclamation was suspended by the order of the
Comelec Second Division by reason of "the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification.

At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has
yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing.

Codilla was then disqualified for the alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code for using the equipment and
vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote
for him.

The COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution 35 in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty
of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the immediate proclamation of the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes.

Respondent Locsin then was proclaimed as the Representative of 4 th District of Leyte.

Petitioner filed for Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the COMELEC Second Division erred:

(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent
Locsin;

(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and

(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the
immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.'

He also filed a petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation assailing the validity of the respondent’s
proclamation.

Respondent Locsin, in her answer, alleged that:

(1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that
any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);

(2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly by
the Commission en banc; and

(3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes
of Codilla being stray.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC or the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal who has the jurisdiction to
review the validity of the proclamation of the respondent

RULING:

The Court granted the petition of mandamus.

Eufrocino Codilla was proclaimed as the Representative of the 4 th District of Leyte.

The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no
moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's
proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:

"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall
be decided by the Commission en banc."

The HRET does not have the jurisdiction to review the validity of the proclamation of the respondent on the
following grounds:

(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved
by the COMELEC en banc. The HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and
proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the
time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto
proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin.
PIMENTEL vs. HRET

FACTS:

Petitioner Senator Aquilino Pimentel wanted to restructure the composition of House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments to include the party-list representatives in pursuant to
Section 17 and 18 of Article VI after observing that the members of the HRET and COA are mostly coming from
different political parties with LDP dominating.

He filed for the petition of prohibition and mandamus on his oath to protect, defend and uphold the
Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners .

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE HRET.

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petitions.

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution 24 explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution,25 each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral
tribunal.

The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. 26 However, under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty,
absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.27 Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left
alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. 28 Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if
party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA.

DAZA vs. SINGSON

FACTS:

Petitioner Raul Daza was among of the chosen to have a seat as a member of the Commission on Appointments as
a Representative from the Liberal Party after the congressional election and the House of Representative
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber.
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Twenty-four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.

This caused the House of Representative to revise its representation in the Commission by withdrawing the seat
occupied by Daza and giving it to the newly-formed LDP. A new set of elected representatives consisting of the
original members were formed by the chamber including the respondent Luis Singson as the additional member of
LDP.

Hence the petitioner filed a petition to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent. The contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in
Cunanan v. Tan. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the withdrawal of the seat of Daza and the appointment of Singson as members of the
Commission on Appointments valid

RULING:

The petition was dismissed.

The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments
and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

In favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It
is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional
divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another.

COSETENG vs. MITRA Jr.

FACTS:

The House of Representative elected 11 out of 12 congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on
Appointments.

Upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the
twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was then organized as a political party which resulted to the
reorganization of the House of Representative as there are 158 out of 202 members of the House that are
affiliated with LDP.

Petitioner Anna Coseteng wrote to Speaker Raul Mitra requesting that she, as a representative of KAIBA, be
appointed in the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. She was endorsed by 9 others
representatives.
However, she was not appointed as one of the members of the newly reorganized appointed members of the
Commission on Appointments.

Coseteng filed for Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying to declare null and void the election of the
appointed members of the COA and HET on the ground that their election to the Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revision of the House representation based on the proportional representation valid

RULING:

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

The revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10)
members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as
the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
therein."

GUINGONA vs. GONZALES

FACTS:

A petition of Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondents Senator Wigberto Tanada et al, for the
decision of the Court ruling that the Senate committed grave of abuse of discretion for the nomination and
election of Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers.

Respondents alleged that:

1. The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions

2. It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to

function as a constitutional body.

3. The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties and
must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments.

4. The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which
contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the
Commission.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the election and nomination of Senators Tanada and Romulo to the Commission on
Appointment valid

RULING:

The Court denied with finality the petition for lack of merit.

The election of respondents Senators Tañada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional provision and
when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the
LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their
nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate
organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a
manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and
not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of
discretion is properly found to exist.

It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of the
political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:

LDP — 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN — .5
NPC — 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD — 1.5

Each of the party is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation
of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no
other manner of application than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing
one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo
gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party — either the LAKAS-
NUCD or the NPC.

TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

FACTS:

Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was issued to regulate
and supervise the Video gram industry. It took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
A month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the
National Internal Revenue Code providing that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette,
ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

The petitioner filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 on the following
grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a
RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by
Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board"
constitutional and valid

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition.

Petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged statute. There was no
clear violation in the Constitution to pronounce Presidential Decree No. 1987 unconstitutional and void.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to
the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title.

An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.”
The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed
as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than technical construction.

Section 10 of PD No. 1987 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory
Board as expressed in its title.

LIDASAN vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

House Bill 1247 was signed into law which is now Republic Act 4970 otherwise known as the “An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianation in the Province of Lanao Del Sur”.

In this law, 22 barrios from the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in the Province of Lanao Del Sur were to
be separated from the said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the
same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.

However, it was then realized that twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.

This prompted the Office of the President to suspend the operation of the statute until clarified by correcting
legislation.

COMELEC stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."

Hence, the petition of certiorari and prohibition of Bara Lidasan, in his capacity as a taxpayer, resident of Parang
and voter, challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 4790 on the ground of the constitutional mandate "No bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A No 4790 constitutional based on the title

RULING:

R.A No. 4790 is unconstitutional and void.

The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.

The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes
the spirit of command.”
The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive.

Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people
in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory
is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept
the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.

CRUZ vs. PARAS

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 84 was issued in the Bocaue Bulacan prohibiting the operation of night clubs for the reason that
they are the cause for the decadence of morality.

Night clubs will not be issued permits/licenses to operate within the municipality of Bulacan and no
permits/licenses will be issued to professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers for any
employment in the establishments.

Violation of any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three (3)
months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the discretion of the Court. If the offense is committed by a
juridical entity, the person charged with the management and/or operation thereof shall be liable for the
penalty provided herein.

Petitioners filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction alleging that the Ordinance 84 is null and void as a
municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No 84 as issued by a municipal null and void

RULING:

Ordinance No. 84 is null and void.

Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to
enact ordinances and make regulations.

An ordinance enacted, according to Justice Moreland, is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given
subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed
pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid.

It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent
with the laws or policy of the State.
If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the
test of validity.

It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or
property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property
in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.

TOBIAS vs. ABALOS

FACTS:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative
district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into
law on February 9, 1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A.
No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners are contending that R.A No. 7675 is being violative of three provisions of the Constitution:

1. R.A No 7675 contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule

2. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the
assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives

3. Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A No 7675 violates the “one subject-one bill” rule

RULING:

The petition devoid of merit.

The statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the
Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city.

The title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

In Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), the Court ruled that the constitutional requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should
be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21
SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand
that it informs the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis
supplied).

GUINGONA vs. CARAQUE

FACTS:

Then President Corazon Aquino approved the 1990 budget with an automatic appropriation budget of 98.4
billion with 86.8 billion for debt service and 155.3 billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 billion, while the appropriations for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service was authorized by three provisions:

1. P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)”

2. P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society," and

3. P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of
the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating
Funds for The Purpose

Petitioners, as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines, question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 General Appropriations Act.
The petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D.
No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant
to said decrees.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the appropriation of 86 billion in the 233 billion of 1990 budget violative of Section 5, Article XIV
of the Constitution

RULING:

No, the appropriation of 86 billion in the 233 billion is not violative of Section 5 Article XIV of the Constitution.

While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the
highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share
of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power
to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.

As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the
facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of
P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a
clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount
for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

LUNG CENTER vs. QUEZON CITY

FACTS:

The Lung Center of the Philippines, a non-stock and non-profit, was an entity established by the virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1823. It is a registered owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon Avenue corner
Elliptical Road, Central District, Quezon City. The lot has an area of 121,463 square meters and is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261320 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. A big space
at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or
professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their
professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue is
vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is
being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both
paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies
from the government.

Sometime in 1993, both the land and the building of the petitioner were assessed for the real property taxes
amounting to 4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City. Accordingly, 2 Tax Declarations were then issued
for the land and the hospital building. The petitioner then filed for Claim of Exemption from the real property
taxes to the City Assessor but was denied.

The petitioner alleged that the properties were exempted under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987
Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital
beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve
charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real
property taxes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property registered under the name of the Lung Center of Philippines exempted from the
real property taxes

RULING:

The petition was partially granted.

The petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The word
"charitable" is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. 14 The test of a charity and a charitable organization are
in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose
reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.

Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of
the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President of the Philippines with the Ministry of Health
and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people
principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines. The medical
services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all walks of life including those
who are poor and the needy without discrimination.

As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes
simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or
receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the
charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons
managing or operating the institution.

However, those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real
property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the
exception.

Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:

 (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the
petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its
real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. If real property is used
for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to
taxation.

The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly
and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of
patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof
are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen.

TAN vs. ROSARIO

FACTS:

The petitions are two consolidated special civil actions questioning the constitutionality of prohibition challenge,
in G.R. No. 109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and, in
G.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by public respondents
pursuant to said law.

Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory
legislation.

In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7496 violates the following provisions
of the Constitution:

Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

In G.R. No. 109446, petitioners, assailing Section 6 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, argue that public
respondents have exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A No. 7496 constitutional

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petitions.

Under Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation
intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the
whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through
such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation.

The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met by R.A No. 7496.

It has always been a prevailing rule in the income taxation that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" even
prior to R.A. No. 7496. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that
all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and
not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things
being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those
belonging to the same class.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being
violative of due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a
clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such
transgression is so evident to us.

In terms of the authority being exceeded by the respondents in promulgating Section 6, Revenue Regulations
No. 2-93, to carry out Republic Act No. 7496, there was no alteration but merely confirmed, the rule as now so
modified by Republic Act No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual
income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or
after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax
treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through
a general professional partnership.

GARCIA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five
percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including
crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently increased
from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No.
443, dated 3 January 1991.

The Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the process required by the Tariff and
Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and other petroleum products, covered by HS
Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended. Accordingly, the
Tariff Commission, following the procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a
public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of their
respective positions.

Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President on 15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional duty on
all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and
other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem. chan
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President a "Report on Special
Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" for consideration and appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President
issued Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the aforementioned
additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95
per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

Petitioner assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 arguing that the said orders are violative of
Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, he contends that since the Constitution vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. Further arguing that
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which Section
authorizes the President, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties only when
necessary to protect local industries or products but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the
government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Orders 475 and 478 violative of Section 24 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

No. Executive Orders 475 and 478 were not violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department.

However, it does not follow that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as
revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines.

Section 28(2) Article VI of the Constitution provided that the Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.

There is an explicit constitutional permission of Congress authorizing the President "subject to such limitations
and restrictions as Congress may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates and other duties or imposts.

The President invoked Section 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines in promulgating
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which provides that:

Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import duty under Section 104
of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments issued under Executive Orders and Presidential
Decrees are hereby adopted and form part of this Code.
Tariff rates are commonly established and the corresponding customs duties levied and collected upon articles
and goods which are not found at all and not produced in the Philippines.

Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be conceded to be substantially moved by the desire to generate
additional public revenues, are not, for that reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

JOHN HAY PAC vs. LIM

FACTS:

R.A. No. 7227, AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE
USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,
which was enacted on March 13, 1992, set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States
of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions
including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in the City of Baguio.

The said law provides the following:

1. created public respondent Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), vesting it with powers
pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in
accordance with the declared government policy;

2. created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were
to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines;

3. granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses
therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate;
and,

4. expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the
concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the
areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La
Union, and Camp John Hay

BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.)
Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under
the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro
Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four months later,
BCDA, TUNTEX, and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement whereby they bound themselves to put up a
joint venture company known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which
would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal
tourist and recreation spots.

The City of Baguio passed a number of resolutions in response to BCDA as the owner and administrator of John
Hay Camp. In one of the resolutions, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude
all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program
for its development and sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots
being occupied by residents of nine (9) barangays surrounding the military reservation.

BCDA, Tuntex and AsiaWorld agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of
the sanggunian.11 They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full
development in accordance with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.

Another resolution was then passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Baguio City requesting the mayor to order
the determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. It
intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared
a SEZ, it being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's property and the economic activity
therein from local or national taxation.

Then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 creating and designating a portion of the area covered by the
former John Hay reservation as defined in the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States of America, which was amended as John Hay Economic Zone.

Hence, the petition assailing the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation No. 420 as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public respondent BCDA and private
respondents Tuntex and AsiaWorld.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional or valid

RULING:

Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is null and void. However, Proclamation No. 420 cannot be declared as
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the Constitution.

The grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the
like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227
are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein.
Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other laws specified under
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the
enactment of R.A. No. 7227.

It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person
or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other
than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or local governments may pass
ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.

The claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the
language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to
be mistaken. Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed.

If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to
the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.

Moreover, the delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well
within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. 51 The requisite prior concurrence by the
Baguio City government to such proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly enacted resolution
by the sanggunian. The other provisions of the proclamation had been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.

FABIAN vs. DESIERTO

FACTS:

Petitioner Teresita Fabian was a major stockholder and owner of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation who participated in a bidding for government construction projects including those under First
Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) which the private respondent Nestor Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineer. Agustin, taking advantage of his official position, had an amorous relationship with petitioner
Fabian. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.

They then later had misunderstanding and disagreements that petitioner decided to terminate their
relationship. The respondent didn’t agree even employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Fabian
eventually filed for an administrative complaint against Agustin.

The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary
prayer for his preventive suspension.

Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the
approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.

The Office of the Ombudsman approved the resolution of Graft Investigator Benitez finding Agustin guilty of
misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. The Ombudsman then inhibited
himself after finding out that the new counsel of the respondent was “a classmate and close associate” and
transferred the case to Hon. Jesus Guerrero, who then exonerated the respondent from the administrative
charges.

Hence, the appeal for certiorari. Fabian invoked Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
However, she also pointed out that when a respondent is absolved in the administrative proceedings, the
decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. Hence, she filed the appeal under Rule 65 of the Rules of
the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has an appellate jurisdiction over complaints filed from a quasi-judicial body.

RULING:

The Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction over complaints filed from a quasi-judicial body. The case will
be transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government
and the judges are sworn to support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its
commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a
legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case
before them for
judgment.

While courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule
has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own
jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's
jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it
may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality
of the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless
the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any
time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point
in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction
in any proceeding.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

However, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the
Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body."

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.

A transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall
now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only.

It is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only
the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed.

It has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are
procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute
went into effect. The validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

GONZALES vs. MACARAIG

FACTS:
Th Congress filed House Bill No. 19186 or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it
eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President.

It was presented as a bill to the President and was signed into a law becoming R.A. No 6688. In the process,
there were 7 provisions and Section 55 as a “General Provision” were vetoed.

However, the Senate declared that the veto of the President on Section 55 is unconstitutional and void.

Meanwhile, another Presidential veto on Section 16 in the General Appropriations Act Bill 6831 was also
declared unconstitutional and void.

Hence, the petition for assailing the constitutionality of the President’s veto on Section 55 and Section 16 of the
GAA Bill 6688 and GAA Bill 6831.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President’s veto in Section 55 and Section 16 constitutional

RULING:

Yes. The President’s veto was constitutional.

The President was granted the statutory authority to augment any appropriation of the executive department in
the General Appropriations Act from savings as provided in Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177.
otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." It reads:j

Section 44

"The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in
the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or
agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the Constitution (now
Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI)"

Similarly, the use by the President of savings to cover deficits is specifically authorized in the same Decree. Thus:

Sec. 45.

“Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits. Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for
programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President be used to
cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. "

A more recent grant is found in Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the text of which is
repeated in the first paragraph of Section 16 (FY ‘90). Section 12 reads:
"Sec. 12. Use of Savings. — The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations."

When Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90), therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of
appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority of
the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. Library

There need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government adhere to the spirit of
the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with due deference to the constitutional responsibilities
and functions of the other.

BENGSON vs. DRILON

FACTS:

The petitioners, who are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, are questioning the
constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the
Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals.

They are receiving monthly pensions under the provision of R.A No. 910 as amended by R.A No. 1797.

R.A No. 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court
of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years-service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of
the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity
to discharge the duties of the office.

It was then amended by R.A. No. 1797.

Months later, it was repealed by then President Ferdinand Marcos by issuing P.D. No. 644 which authorized the
adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and
members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the
prevailing rates of salaries.

Subsequently, P.D. No. 1909 was issued providing the automatic readjustment of the pensions of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. While the adjustment of pensions of the AFP was restored, the adjustment of pensions
for the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Cour of Appeals were not.

This prompted the Congress to pass House Bill No. 16297 for the reenactment of the repealed provisions in RA
No. 1797 and RA No. 3595 with the impression that PD 644 became a law after it was published in the Official
Gazette.

President Aquino then vetoed HB No. 16279 on the ground that it would erode the very foundation of the
Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of
compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 and that the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement
benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil
service servants.

Hence, the petition of the petitioners assailing the constitutionality of the President’s veto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President’s veto on HB No. 16279 constitutional

RULING:

Yes. The vetoed provisions were valid and subsisting.

The President actually did not veto the provisions but the Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21,
1957 and the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-
CA.

It has to be stressed that no President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his
or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court
through the exercise of the veto power.

P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not
repealed and continues to be effective up to the present.

When the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing
Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to accomplish.

Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating
unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power is
merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.

MILLER vs. MARDO

FACTS:

These are appeals that originated from different Courts of First Instance but were treated together in a single
decision because they all question the validity of the Reorganization Plan No 20-A prepared and submitted by
the Government of Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of RA No 997 as amended by RA
No 1241 conferring jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in the Plan to decide
claims of laborers for wages, overtime, and separation pay.

The following are the appeals:

G.R. No. L-15138

Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint against Bill
Miller for the alleged unpaid separation pay. The petition was dismissed on the ground that the court holds that
Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No.
20-A issued pursuant thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first
instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from violations of labor standards.

G.R. No. L-16781

Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a complaint against Chin Hua
Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong for the alleged unpaid overtime and vacation leave pay. The
petition was dismissed on the ground that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void.

G.R. No. L-15377

Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint against appellees Sen Bee Trading
Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan for she was allegedly underpaid and was not given overtime, vacation
leave and sick leave. The petition was dismissed relying on the provision of Section 25, Article VI of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A.

G.R. No. L-16660

Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-
W) against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. The petition was
dismissed on the ground that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was not validly passed as a statute and is
unconstitutional.

G.R. No. L-17056

Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against
petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning
Department when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay.
The petition was granted on the ground that the Reorganization Plan No 20-A is valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Reorganization Plan No 20-A under RA No 997 as amended by RA No. 1241 valid

RULING:

No. Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than
these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect.

Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is defective as it was not approved by the Congress in pursuant to the provision
under Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 997, as amended. It is not merely the creation of the Reorganization
Commission, exercising its delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congress itself, a regular statute directly and
duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the enabling act.
The said plan, nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted
provision.

By specific provision of the Constitution —

No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final
form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly
(Congress), except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment.
Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final
passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-
[a], Art. VI).

Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If,
after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered
on its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like
manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in which case it
shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1].
Art. VI of the Constitution).

ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO

FACTS:

Jean Arnault filed for petition of writ of habeas corpus for him to be relieved from his confinement in New
Bilibid Prison for the charge of contempt of court.

This stemmed when the Government bought 2 estates, Buenavista and Tambobong, from one Ernest Hurt, a
nonresident American. The Government paid Hurt through his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, Arnault. The
two estates were originally sold to Hurt by San Juan De Dios Hospital who sold the Buenavista Estate for
5,000,000 while the Tambobong Estate was originally owned by Philippine Trust Company who sold the said
estate for 1,200,00.

The 2 estates were bought by Hurt in installment bases. However, he wasn’t able to fully paid the cost of the
estates. He was then issued a resolution for the cancellation of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company.
Moreover, he was ordered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal to cancel his certificate of title and the issuance
of a new one under the name of Rural Progress Administration from which the money used by the Government
to purchase the estates was borrowed.

A special committee was formed to investigate the irregularity of the Government’s payment of 1,500,00 to
Hurt. It sought to determine who were responsible and who benefited from the transaction.

The petitioner Arnault was under the investigation of the committed. However, he was mum and would not
reveal the name of the person he gave the 440,000 he himself cashed.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Legislative Department has the power to conduct an investigation

RULING:

Yes, the Congress has the power to conduct an investigation.

However, it is only if the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member and every
question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation.

The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS

FACTS:

This is a case in relation to Arnault vs. Nazareno where the petitioner Jean Arnault was put under the legislative
inquiry or investigation of the Congress for the charge of contempt for not revealing the name of whom the
440,000 was given by to.

In this case, the petitioner is in confinement in New Bilibid Prison after the investigation conducted by the
Senate Committee. He is now seeking for the writ of habeas corpus as he has already given a name in the form
of Jess D. Santos as the one, he has given the 440,000 to.

However, the Senate Committee still confined and detained him on the ground that he still has not changed
since he was detained for contempt on the Senate. And that the Senate Committee does not believe the
genuineness of his reveal.

The petitioner is contending that he has already purged himself and deserve to be freed from confinement and
that the Senate Committee has no authority to still execute his continued confinement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Senate have the power and authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued
confinement of the petitioner

RULING:

Yes, the Senate has the power and authority to still order the petitioner’s continued confinement.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its
respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently
of the other's authority and power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the
affronts committed against its authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with
by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from
the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment
which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the
latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concommitant of the legislative power
or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

Provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of the
legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be
supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary
power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to
judicial interference.
MANALO v. SISTOZA

FACTS:

Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by former President
Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police who were promoted to the
ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975
otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of the respondent senior officers of the PNP by President Aquino valid without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments

RULING:

Yes, the appointment of the respondent senior officers of the PNP without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments is valid.

Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be
appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Among the four groups, it is only the first group that requires the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

However, the Philippine National Police is different from the Armed Forces of the Philippines as differentiated by
the Constitution.

Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution,

The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo
military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the
security of the State.

On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that:

The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted Republic Act 6975 which states in part:

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote peace and
order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards the
effective delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and
competent police force that is national in scope and civilian in character. . . .

The policy force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police
functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall
be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.

Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military
are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP,
such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees
requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

SORIANO v. LISTA

FACTS:

Petitioner Enrique Soriano questioned the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments, made by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, of public respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard and
their subsequent assumption of office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the 1987
Constitution.

The petition impleads Hon. Emilia T. Boncodin in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for allowing the disbursement of the salaries and emoluments of respondent officers of the
PCG.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the permanent appointments made by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of public respondents
to the Philippine Coast Guard valid without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments

RULING:

Yes, the appointment of the PCG without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments is valid.

PCG used to be administered and maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5713.
It was subsequently placed under the direct supervision and direction of the Department of National Defense
pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a
major subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 54 of Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO
292, as amended.

However, PCG was then transferred by President Fidel Ramos, in pursuant to EO 475, from DND to the Office of the
President. Later on, from the Office of the President, it was transferred to the Department of Transportation and
Communication.
PCG, no longer part of the Philippine Navy nor of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that
matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.

It is clear from the provision in Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain
in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA.

IN RE: VALENZUELA

FACTS:

The case is a question on the validity of the appointment of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta
during the period of the ban.

The said members of the judiciary were appointed by the President before the election. The Chief Justice raised
the question of its validity in a letter to the President in pursuant to the provision in the Constitution prohibiting
the President to make appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term and the provision on the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary within ninety days from the occurrence
of the vacancy.

The President in his reply stated that the appointment of the members of the judiciary does not fall under the said
prohibition as it is only exclusive for the appointments in the executive department.

However, the Chief Justice cannot accept the reply as it is since it only made the provisions susceptible to different
interpretations. Hence, the question on the validity of the appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President can exercise his power to appoint two months before an election

RULING:

No, the President cannot appoint two months before an election.

There are two types of appointments that is directed by Section 15 Article VI – (a) those made for vote-buying and
(b) those made for partisan considerations.

The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are
similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code.

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15,Article VII consist of the so-called "midnight"
appointments.

There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a
new President so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications.”
However, the prohibition in Section 15 allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly
restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.

Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist
only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by
designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier
pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.

The appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta were made during the period of ban. Consequently, they
come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the
purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in
the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy
for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.

DE RAMA v. CA

FACTS:

The first order of the petitioner Conrado De Rama as the newly-elected mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon is to recall the
appointments of fourteen (14) employees.

Allegedly, the appointments of the employees were made through a “midnight appointment” by the former mayor
Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, which is a violation of Section 15 Article VII providing that the President or Acting President is
prohibited to make appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections except
temporary appointments to the executive department.

The CSC denied his objection on the ground that the prohibition of “midnight appointments” is only applicable to
an outgoing President and not to the local elective officials.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prohibition on “midnight appointments” by the President or Acting President applicable to the
local elective officials

RULING:

No, the prohibition on “midnight appointments” is only applicable to the President or the Acting President.

The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight appointments," specifically those
made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or
Acting President.
Midnight Appointment

- "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress."

- an appointment to political office made during the last hours of the term of office of the person in whom the
right of making such appointment is vested

MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was the appointed as the Acting Director IV for Education and Information
Department by the COMELEC in a “Temporary” capacity question the legality of the appointments of the
respondents Alfredo Benipayo et al who were appointed in an ad interim appointment by then President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. She alleged that the ad interim appointment of Benipayo is invalid as it is only temporary and
there was no approval from the Commission of Appointments to such appointments making her reassignment
from the EID to the Law Department of the COMELEC invalid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ad interim appointment of Benipayo as COMELEC Commissioner without the approval of the
Commission on Appointment valid

RULING:

Yes, the ad interim appointment was valid.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. It being subjected to the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointment does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes it
permanent in character by making it effective until the disapproval of the Commission on Appointment or until the
next adjournment of the Congress. The ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee
and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that “no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." Thus, an ad interim appointment
becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of
an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies,
and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has
qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution.
He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

It can only be terminated in two causes: (1) disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on
Appointments and, (2) adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his
appointment.
Moreover, a by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission
on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.

There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment
as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of
a by-passed appointee.

Under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the
President renews the appointment. The President can renew the ad interim appointments of by-passed
appointees.

A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the
disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited
under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a
new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,
and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a
term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed
term nor an unexpired term.

LARIN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

Challenged in the petition is the validity of the petitioner Aquilino Larin’s removal from service as Assistant
Commissioner of Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal Revenue despite being a presidential appointee. His
dismissal from the service was for being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave misconduct.

He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers are concerned, the
President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. He likewise claimed that he was removed
as a result of the reorganization made by the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to Executive Order No. 132
or the Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner being a presidential appointee falls under the
disciplining authority of the President. And that Larin was not dismissed by virtue of the EO No. 132 but because he
was found guilty of grave misconduct in favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery, Inc
defrauding the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner Larin, as a presidential appointee who is a Career Executive Service Officer, can be
dismissed by the President

RULING:

No, the petitioner, as a presidential appointee who is a Career Executive Service Office, cannot be dismissed by the
President.
A presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he
comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President.

However, the power of removal of the President is not absolute.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as
contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose the employment was made.

As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure.

The petitioner as a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will
or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the
recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due
process.

BARRIOQUINTO v. FERNANDEZ

FACTS:

The petitioners Loreto Barrioquinto and Norberto Jimenez filed a petition for mandamus against the respondents
who composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.

The petition stemmed from a criminal case of Murder charged against the petitioners. Jimenez was sentenced a
penalty of life imprisonment while Barrioquinto was not yet arrested. Jimenez was able to learn of proclamation
No. 8 granting amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal
Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and
committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where
the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation which both petitioners
submitted their case.

However, after a preliminary hearing, the Amnesty Commission did not decide whether the petitioners were
eligible for the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor
Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino
who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are qualified for the grant of amnesty

RULING:

Yes, the petitioners are qualified for the grant of amnesty.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary
that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense.

It is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. It is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty
is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance."

Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits.

Whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions
should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits
of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not.

VERA v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petitioners Gaudenico Vera et al were charged with a complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo
Lozanes alias Azarcon. They invoked the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of 1946, the
case was referred to the Eighth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, which actually tried it.

However, the Commission denied the motion on the ground that the petitioners did not admit having committed
the crime charged. Vera may have taken the witness stand but instead of admitting the killing of the deceased
Lozanes, he denied it. The benefits of Amnesty can only be invoked defendants in a criminal case who, admitting
the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and
perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Amnesty Commission stating that the implied admission of the
petitioners is not acceptable because an admission can only be valid if it is made verbally or in writing.

Petitioners contend that it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged for them to
invoke the benefits of amnesty citing the case of Barrioquinto v. Fernandez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is not necessary for a defendant to admit the commission of the crime charged to be able to
invoke the benefits of amnesty

RULING:

No, it is necessary that the defendant admits the commission of the crime charged to be able to invoke the
benefits of the amnesty.
The case of Barrioquinto v. Fernandez has already been overruled by subsequent cases People v. Llanita, et al and
People v. Guillermo, et al.

Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a
crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this
case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in
the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him
but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would being the crime charged
uithin the scope of the amnesty proclamation.

CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR

FACTS:

Petitioner Miguel Cristobal questions the right of Teofilo Santos to vote arguing that his right to vote has not been
restored by the pardon granted by the president. Santos was impugned with a criminal charge of Estafa and
sentenced with arresto mayor and the accessory penalty attached to it. He was jailed for 5 months in a provincial
jail in Pasig, Rizal. He then applied for a pardon of the President which was then granted on a conditional basis that
his full civil and political rights will be restored except that with respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and
involving no money or property responsibility.

Cristobal argued that the pardon granted did not restore the said respondent to the full enjoyment of his political
rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the
pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and
(c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to
pardon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pardon granted by the President did not restore the right to vote of Teofilo Santos

RULING:

No, the pardon granted by the President also restored the right to vote of Teofilo Santos.

There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a)
that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment.

Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest
authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction.

While the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property
responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357,
does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of
the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to
the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through
legislative action.

PELOBELLO v. PALATINO

FACTS:

Petitioner Florencio Pelobello questions the pardon granted by the Governor-General to respondent Gregorio
Palatino for being convicted of attacking the authorities and their agents and sentenced for 2 years 4 months and 1
day of prision correctional in respect to Palatino’s right to be elected.

Argued by Pelobello, an absolute pardon does not have the effect of removing the disqualification incident to
criminal conviction under the Election Code the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date
fixed by law for assuming office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an absolute pardon restores the right to be voted for

RULING:

Yes, an absolute pardon can restore the right to be voted for.

Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting
from the conviction. And when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all
that is left of the consequences of conviction.

IN RE: MARCELINO LONTOK

FACTS:

Marcelino Lontok was a lawyer who was convicted of the crime of bigamy. However, he was granted a pardon by
the Governor-General Harrison. This prompts respondent Attorney-General Diokno to file the petition ordering the
removal of Marcelino Lontok from his office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands because of having been convicted of
the crime of bigamy, which is a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of pardon extends to the right of a court to disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony

RULING:

Yes, the grant of pardon extends to the right of a court to disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony.
Where proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute
making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe
out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted.

But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction
which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him
of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceedings, inasmuch as the
criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is
not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of
the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.

There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interest vested in
others in consequence of the conviction and judgement.

TORRES v. GONZALES

FACTS:

Petitioner Wilfredo Torres was convicted for 2 counts of Estafa and sentenced to imprisonment from 11 years 10
months and 22 days to 38 years 9 months and 1 day. He was able to avail a grant of pardon from the President.
However, the Board of Parole and Pardon recommended the cancellation of the pardon granted to him because it
was found that there were numerous crimes such as 20 counts of estafa, sedition and violation of BP 22 charged
against him.

The President cancelled the pardon and ordered the arrest and recommitment of Torres.

Torres impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment claiming that he did not violate his
conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa nor of
the crime of sedition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence

RULING:

Yes, the petitioner must be convicted by final judgment.

A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon."

SEPARATE OPINION:

Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. A prima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding
information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely
accuses the defendant of a crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is
considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but by the
judge.

The executive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence.
If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction.

AQUINO v. ENRILE

FACTS:

OLAGUER v. MC No. 4

FACTS:

Petitioners Eduardo Olaguer, et al were charged with the crime of subversion upon the recommendation of the
respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense. The
respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines created the respondent Military Commission No
34 to try the criminal case filed against the petitioners. There were 7 offenses that were charged against the
petitioners in an amended charge sheet.

Arguing that the military tribunals do not have the jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been
committed during the period of martial law, the petitioners filed the petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

Pending the resolution of the petition, Military Commission No. 34 passed sentence convicting the petitioners and
imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not military tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses while the civil courts are open
and functioning
RULING:

No, military tribunals do not have the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.

Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system. Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under general law are entitled to trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process.

Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly
established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have "exclusive power to hear and determine
those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen.

Since the Philippines is not an enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government and even on the
premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open
and have been regularly functioning.

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to
aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders
or those of his authorized military representatives.

Following the principle of separation of powers, the power and duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual
should be considered to have violated the law is primarily a function of the judiciary and not and cannot be a
function of the Executive Department.

NAVALES v. ABAYA

FACTS:

A petition of prohibition and writ of habeas corpus were filed for the unlawful detainment of the men of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines by virtue of the Commitment Order issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of
Staff of the AFP, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said commitment order, all the Major
Service Commanders and the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) were
directed to take custodial responsibility of all the "military personnel involved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny"
belonging to their respective commands.

The said July 27, 2003 was the Oakwood Occupation wherein the soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City taking over the Oakwood Premier Apartments and
planting bombs all over the building. This act was the way of the soldiers to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo which among of these grievances are the graft and
corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, the bombings in Davao
City which were allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain more military
assistance from the United States government, and the "micro-management" in the AFP by then Department of
National Defense (DND) Secretary Angelo Reyes.

The DOJ charged the 321 of those soldiers who took part in the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A
(coup d’etat) of the Revised Penal Code. Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. However, the
DOJ found a probable cause of coup d’ etat against 31 of the original 321 accused and dismissing the charges
against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence.

1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were earlier dropped as accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, were
charged before the General Court-Martial with violations of the Articles of War (AW) - AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the President, the Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64 (Disrespect Towards
Superior Officer).

Petitioners contend that respondents Gen. Abaya and the JAGO have no authority to constitute the General Court-
Martial, to charge and prosecute the petitioners because RTC has already declared that the offenses for which all
the accused were charged were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup
d’etat.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus

RULING:

No, the petitioners are not entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.

The Omnibus Motion which the petitioners sought the writs was already rendered moot and academic. They were
no longer parties to the case and no further relief could be granted to them.

The petitioners, who are no longer charged with coup d’etat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC that
the charges filed before the General Court-Martial against them were not service-connected.

Moreover, In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the General
Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President
etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected
offenses or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military courts have
jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.