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Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

Impact Factor: 0.7 / 5-Year Impact Factor: 0.8 JOURNAL HOMEPAGE SUBMIT PAPER

 Free access Research article First published online October 26, 2021

ASEAN's economic security and regional economic cooperation: Past, present, and future

Su-Hyun Lee  View all authors and affiliations

Volume 7, Issue 1 https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911211032135

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Abstract
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Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has continuously increased its level of integration into the global
economy to enhance regional economic prosperity and stability. Given the conceptual fluidity of economic
security in international relations, however, ASEAN's firm commitment to promoting positive synergies Similar articles:

between economic and security interests warrants further attention. In this vein, this article examines the
Free access
evolving nature of ASEAN's economic security with a focus on regional economic initiatives, including trade
Economic security in Southeast
agreements and the ASEAN Economic Community. The article suggests that ASEAN can maximize its
Asia: An introduction
potential for economic security when it increases the credibility of its commitment to regional economic
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cooperation and integration. To do so, ASEAN should more effectively address the issues of weak
institutional capabilities and domestic political conflicts over regional economic governance. It should also
Restricted access
proactively respond to unexpected challenges from external factors, such as US–China rivalry and the
Under the shadow of the giants:
COVID-19 pandemic.
The ASEAN in search of a common
strategy in a fluid and perilous
Indo-Pacific region

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Introduction
Economic security is one of the fundamental principles that has driven the Association of Southeast Asian Restricted access
Nations’ (ASEAN) regional cooperation for political, economic, and security issues over the past decades. Conflicts, strategic divergences
After the end of the Cold War, the rise of regionalism based on multilateral economic institutions and and the survival of economic

market liberalism across the world has led ASEAN to invest a significant amount of time and resources in groupings: Will China–India rivalry
make BRICS obsolete?
institutionalizing regional economic initiatives. The establishment of ASEAN trade agreements not only
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within member states but also with other dialogue partners reflects ASEAN leaders’ expectations about the
mutually enhancing relationship between economics and security. Despite different levels of
industrialization and development across member states, ASEAN as a single entity shared a common View more

perception that the expansion of trade and investment based on the free movement of goods, services,
and capital will generate economic growth and prosperity and eventually promote peace and stability at Sage recommends:
both the national and regional levels.
SAGE Knowledge
Interestingly, ASEAN's ideals for regional prosperity and peace constitute one of the multiple facets of Book chapter
security perceived and pursued by other actors in the international political system. The conceptual
The Political Economy of East Asian
dimensions of economic security have been extended and elaborated, corresponding to the Regionalism
transformation of global orders and the changing interactions of two independent areas, including Show details 
economics and security. In this vein, this article aims to examine the evolution of ASEAN's economic
security with a focus on its economic liberalization and cooperation over trade issues. The article seeks to SAGE Knowledge
explain how ASEAN has enhanced regional economic cooperation and integration as goals and Entry

instruments of regional security and what it has achieved precisely from its efforts at regional economic Association of Southeast Asian Nations
integration. Show details 

The rest of this article proceeds as follows. I begin by outlining the conceptual formation and development
of economic security suggested in theories of International Relations (IR) and International Political SAGE Knowledge
Book chapter
Economy (IPE). I also examine ASEAN's perceptions about economic security and the origins of its historical
TPP and Market Access for Goods
commitment to the positive synergies between economic cooperation and regional stability. Then I discuss
ASEAN's path toward trade liberalization and regional integration, focusing on the characteristics of ASEAN Show details 

trade agreements and the ASEAN Economic Community. The following section discusses internal and
external challenges to ASEAN's economic security. The conclusion summarizes the findings of the article View more

with policy implications.

Economic security as a conceptual framework

Despite its centrality in ASEAN's policy priorities, the conceptualization of economic security has long been
debated in IR and IPE studies. Researchers and policy practitioners have developed and utilized various
definitions of economic security, corresponding to their views on the changing dynamics of geopolitics and
the global economy. The conceptual fluidity of economic security also stems from the fact that the
characteristics of security and economic issues have been continuously redefined and elaborated, as have
the theoretical and empirical implications of their interactions.

On the one hand, security scholars have regarded security itself as an ambiguous and contested concept.
Baldwin (1997) points out that security studies after the Cold War do not fully conceptualize security as an
analytical tool, equating security with power or with states’ policy objectives in military statecraft. Relying
on Wolfers’ (1952: 485) view on security as the “absence of threats to acquired values,” he suggests that the
meanings of security should be clarified further with questions regarding: security for whom; security for
which values; from what threats; by what means; and at what cost. Thus, while political independence and
territorial integrity still lie at the center of security studies, the concepts of security and securitization are
inherently diverse and multi-dimensional, which depends on the specifications of a referent object as well
as the characteristics of values and threats (Baldwin, 1997). In this vein, economic security has constituted
one substantive dimension of the security concept since international security studies began to embrace
the issues of economic, environmental, human, societal, and health securities more actively from the
1980s onwards (Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

The rise of economic security in the IR literature is also closely related to the establishment of postwar
global economic orders that has amplified the importance of economic affairs and their security
externalities. Multilateral economic institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO),
have significantly increased levels of global economic independence and cooperation over the issues of
trade, investment, and finance. While acknowledging its unipolar power during the post-Cold War era, the
United States offered hegemonic leadership to consolidate multilateral economic orders in which rule-
based agreements generate mutual benefits but reduce uncertainty and transaction costs (Ikenberry,
2013). Such institutional layers led Western democracies to share the norms of liberal internationalism and
facilitate cooperation over economic and security issues, at least before the presidency of Donald Trump
(Drezner, 2019; Ikenberry, 2018). Nevertheless, the relationships between economic and security issues are
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interactive rather than one-directional. Studies show that the post-war global economic orders have been
 shaped under the influence of the strategic interests of individual states. Whether states join multilateral
economic organizations in the formation and enlargement stages is significantly conditioned by their
geopolitical interests and foreign policy orientation revealed in democratic regime types (Davis and Wilf,
2017) and formal alliances (Davis and Pratt, 2021).

The conceptual extension of security and the structural transformation of global economic governance
have also contributed to contending perspectives on economic security. Researchers have offered
different explanations on the link between economic and security issues, depending on their identification
of key actors, types of threats, and values to preserve within different schools of IR theories. The neorealist
approach to economic security suggests that states use economic measures as a means to achieve their
aggressive and defensive goals. As shown in the supply of oil and resources or economic sanctions, states’
economic capability and performance serve as instruments for power projection and make the global
economy the venue of economic warfare (Cable, 1995). Such an instrumental view on economic policies is
more clearly addressed in Moran (1993), which suggests that the US's strategic primacy in the international
system should be maintained with the resolution of three economic issues: continuing imbalances in trade
and capital flows; declining competitiveness of US industries; and increasing dependence on foreign
industries and technologies.

The idea that states should strategically use economic measures for relative gains rather than mutual
benefits has been developed further in the study of “geoeconomics,” which was put forward in Luttwak's
(1990) seminal essay. While there are multiple interpretations and criticisms of the term, geoeconomics
suggests that states should pursue adversarial goals with the strategic application of economic measures
rather than military power (Scholvin and Wigell, 2018). The economic rise of states brings in the structural
shift in the international system, generating political chances and risks for other states (Baru, 2012).
Economic policies proposed by geoeconomics are thus fundamentally mercantilist, protectionist, and zero-
sum since states seek relative advantage in international economic competition (Vihma, 2018).

Conversely, neoliberalism extends the security concept from territorial integrity to “the absence of threat
of severe deprivation of economic welfare” (Nye, 1974: 588), given the declining efficiency of military means.
Economic security refers to clusters of values, including economic welfare, political and social autonomy,
and political status, rather than instruments, which can be collectively pursued through multilateral
economic institutions and intergovernmental cooperation (Krause and Nye, 1975). In a related vein, a long
line of research has examined the relationship between globalization and interstate relations. Relying on
the Kantian peace, commercial liberalism suggests that economic interdependence and connectivity
between states enhance mutual understanding for cooperation while reducing the likelihood of military
conflicts and violence (Gartzke and Hewitt, 2010; Hegre et al., 2010; McDonald, 2004; Mansfield, 1994; Oneal
and Russett, 1999). Domestic demands for economic prosperity through trade and investment enhance
countries’ commitment to commercial liberalization (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000). States are less likely
to be involved in political conflicts with their key trading partners since the opportunity costs linked to any
disruptions in trade and commercial relations are much greater than benefits to gain otherwise (Polachek
and Xiang, 2010). The depth and strength of trade ties allow a state to credibly signal its resolve without
relying on military forces (Kinne, 2012; Poast, 2019). There have been critical considerations of the
relationship between trade and interstate conflict (Barbieri, 2002; Barbieri and Schneider, 1999; Bussmann
and Schneider, 2007; Schneider, 2014). Nevertheless, several studies still offer empirical support for the
pacifying effects of global economic integration, with an emphasis on the features of liberal economic
processes (Gartzke, 2007), foreign direct investment (Lee and Mitchell, 2012), regional trade agreements
(Martin et al., 2012), trade network centrality (Kinne, 2012), trade integration (Lee and Pyun, 2016), and
economic interdependence (Gartzke and Westerwinter, 2016).

Instead of focusing on the link between economic openness and conflict at the dyadic level, another line of
research pays attention to structural mechanisms in which globalization generates security benefits and
costs. Kahler (2004) notes that integration into the global economy has redefined the meaning of economic
security, providing both opportunities and challenges to countries. Globalization extends the benefits of
economic interdependence, generating positive political externalities in the long run. Economic gains from
trade and investment allow domestic constituencies to effectively check on political elites’ reliance on the
use of military force while reshaping their perceptions about national security in a less threatening way.
Economic interdependence, however, has significantly amplified the magnitude of transnational security
threats and unexpected shocks generated by the global economy, as exemplified by the Asian financial
crisis, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the SARS outbreak (Kahler, 2004). More importantly, it is
frequently suggested that developing countries are specifically vulnerable to adverse shocks and volatility
associated with trade openness (Montalbano, 2011; Rodrik, 1997), financial liberalization (Kahler, 2004), and
rising income inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) due to the relative lack of credible institutions and
social protection (Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2015). What determines the net impact of globalization on economic
security is countries’ ability to effectively respond to adverse shocks and volatility at the national and
regional levels.

ASEAN economic security

The conceptual proliferation of security has been well reflected in the study of Southeast Asia security and
ASEAN. Traditional security issues in the region, such as threat perceptions, military alliances, and the
great power rivalry, have been discussed primarily in realism (Rüland, 2000) and realist institutionalism
(Khoo, 2004; Peou, 2010). Nevertheless, it is commonly suggested that ASEAN's perceptions on the linkages
between economic security interests have significantly moved away from realist paradigms. ASEAN's
continuing emphasis on regional economic cooperation and integration over the past three decades
suggests that member states have embraced the liberal ideals of commercial peace (Bearce and Omori,
2005; Goldsmith, 2007; Haftel and Hofmann, 2017; Peou, 2002), albeit arguably, and extended the scope of
economic security into non-traditional security issues (Caballero-Anthony, 2018; Peou, 2014).

Three factors explain the key characteristics of ASEAN's economic security. First, ASEAN's collective identity
as a security community has significantly affected its views on the relationship between economic and
security interests gradually but consistently. Security communities share dependable expectations of
stable peace even if there is no clear sense of solidarity (Acharya, 2009; Mitzen, 2016). Member states within
a security community rarely rely on military force for dispute settlement, as they tend to develop a long-
term habit of peaceful interactions (Acharya, 2009). Relying on constructivism, Acharya (1997, 2009, 2011)
elaborates on the effects of transnational norms, values, and identity on the consolidation of ASEAN as a
security community in the Asia-Pacific. Despite historically different perceptions about external threats,
ASEAN states commonly saw communist insurgencies as a potential threat to national and regional
security, which could be further exacerbated by the involvement of external enemies, such as China and
Vietnam (Acharya, 1997). Nevertheless, the unique features of ASEAN's regionalism should be noted. While
initially inspired by the European Community's model, ASEAN envisioned a regional institutional framework
in which member states pursue their national interests without surrendering sovereignty or creating
“supranationalism” (Acharya, 1997, 2009). Thus, ensuring economic security in the “ASEAN way” implies
political and economic cooperation based on informality, consensus building, non-interference, non-
confrontation, and non-legalistic methods (Acharya, 2011).

Second and equally importantly, ASEAN members have developed shared preferences over regional
economic cooperation as a way to promote mutual benefits and gains. With the rise of multilateralism and
increasing economic interdependence, ASEAN states have embraced economic pragmatism as a principle
of foreign policy to dissolve historical antagonism in pursuit of the common good (Acharya, 1997; Cossa
and Khanna, 1997). To achieve such goals, ASEAN has strategically opted for regionalism and
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multilateralism as a driver of economic cooperation and development. Given the lack of great-power
 hegemony during the post-Cold War era, ASEAN states began to see regionalism as a way to reach a “Pax
Pacifica” in which states preserve their equal sovereignty and promote interstate cooperation (Almonte,
1997).

Earlier studies on ASEAN share optimistic views on multilateral dialogues that ASEAN created for regional
cooperation over security and economic issues. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994 was
praised as the regional security framework that connects five ASEAN states and major powers in the Asia-
Pacific, including the United States, Russia, China, and Japan (Almonte, 1997; Cossa and Khanna, 1997). The
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) were regarded as
strategic frameworks that led ASEAN states to redefine economic security. The fundamental principles
behind the APEC, such as private property and free markets, would enhance the competitiveness and
efficiency of states and non-state actors while bringing liberal, democratic politics and deepening levels of
cooperation to the region. AFTA would increase economic prosperity and political cooperation at the
regional level, promoting the cross-border movement of capital, labor, and natural resources between
ASEAN member states (Almonte, 1997). These institutions embody ASEAN's norms and ideas of open
regionalism, trade liberalization, and cooperative security on the basis of consensus, informality, and
voluntary efforts (Acharya, 2011). As will be discussed below, however, the ASEAN way of regional economic
cooperation has been subject to criticism due to the ongoing gaps between policy goals and outcomes
(Beeson, 2019; Kahler, 2004; Ravenhill, 2010).

Third, the scope of ASEAN's economic security has been continuously extended to non-traditional security
(NTS) issues, which are defined as non-military and transnational challenges to the survival and well-being
of people and states (Caballero-Anthony, 2018; Caballero-Anthony et al., 2006; Martel, 2017). ASEAN states’
experience of adverse shocks from transnational threats has led researchers to pay attention to a variety
of NTS issues, such as environmental degradation, labor migration, humanitarian assistance, and natural
disaster management (Caballero-Anthony, 2018) or human security (Peou, 2014). Moving away from
neoliberalism's simplistic view that a country's economic well-being increases its national security, these
studies actively explore the ways in which ASEAN can build and strengthen regional security governance
for NTS challenges through “deeper institutionalization” (Caballero-Anthony, 2008). Given the multitude of
actors and institutional frameworks for NTS challenges across issue areas, they emphasize ASEAN's
centrality in institutionalizing and diffusing norms, agendas, and practices through non-governmental
organizations, civil society organizations, and communities, and private sectors (Caballero-Anthony, 2018,
2014; Nesadurai, 2017). Similarly, Breslin and Nesadurai (2018) highlight the importance of transnational
governance in the Southeast Asian political economy, considering the roles of non-state actors in
regulatory schemes for strategic industrial sectors.

ASEAN economic cooperation and integration

The existing literature on ASEAN's economic security provides two important implications. First, the
concept of economic security for Southeast Asian states has been constructed socially and historically
rather than exogenously given. The securitization of issue areas occurs when state elites perceive them as
potential threats to national security (Ravenhill, 2013) or when state and non-state actors interact in the
dense web of networks against transnational security challenges (Caballero-Anthony, 2014; Kahler, 2004).
Second, ASEAN has placed a great deal of emphasis on regional economic cooperation and integration as a
strategic way to deal with traditional and non-traditional security issues (Aggarwal and Govella, 2013). The
development of ASEAN's regional economic initiatives over the past three decades suggests that ASEAN's
perceptions of economic security resemble the theoretical thrust of commercial liberalism that economic
interdependence promotes regional peace and stability.

ASEAN's institutionalization efforts for regional economic cooperation can be traced back to the creation
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, a minilateral trade agreement for preferential trading within
ASEAN member states. AFTA set ambitious goals for trade liberalization. The Common Effective Preferential
Tariff (CEPT) scheme required ASEAN states to lower tariffs on manufacturing and processed agricultural
imports to the range of 0–5%. The elimination of quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff protectionist
measures on imports receiving such tariff concessions was another essential part of AFTA (ASEAN, 2002;
Ravenhill, 1995). AFTA also clearly addressed its need to attract foreign direct investment for economic
growth by providing a regional space of investment and production through a single-regional market
(Nesadurai, 2003).

Since the establishment of AFTA, ASEAN has signed five free trade agreements (FTAs) with six dialogue
partners, including Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Japan, and Korea during the period 2004–2010 in
the form of “ASEAN + 1” deals. After the US's unexpected withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in
2017, four ASEAN states, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Vietnam, concluded the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a mega free trade
agreement with seven trading partners in the Asia-Pacific in 2018. All ASEAN member states have also
signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with ASEAN's five FTA partners in
November 2020 after eight years of 31 official negotiating rounds. Specifically, the RCEP provides more
flexibility to least-developed countries, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam, in the form
of timeline extensions and differential treatment, while including areas not fully covered by the ASEAN + 1
trade agreements, such as trade in services and investment (ASEAN, 2020a; Elms, 2021).

While participating in a series of regional trade agreements, ASEAN has also sought to realize the creation
of a single regional market through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which ASEAN leaders first
suggested as part of the ASEAN Vision 2020 at the ASEAN's 30th anniversary in 1997. As another pillar for
ASEAN's regional economic integration, the AEC's ideals were embodied by the AEC Blueprint 2015 adopted
at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 2007 (ASEAN, 2008) and were formally established through the
AEC Blueprint 2025 at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in 2015. The AEC Blueprint 2025 shows that the
AEC proposes the five key agendas: (i) a highly integrated and cohesive economy; (ii) a competitive,
innovative, and dynamic ASEAN; (iii) enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation; (iv) a resilient,
inclusive, people-oriented, and people-centered ASEAN; and (v) a global ASEAN (ASEAN, 2015a). The ASEAN
Community Vision 2025 charted then indicates that the AEC constitutes the ASEAN Community with the
ASEAN Political-Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community with a series of work plans
(ASEAN, 2015b). These documents address that the AEC's fundamental goal is to enhance ASEAN's trade
and production networks in the form of a single market, facilitating the seamless flows of goods, services,
investments, labor, and capital within ASEAN states through the effective elimination of non-tariff barriers.

Positive security externalities generated by ASEAN's commitment to regional economic cooperation have
been frequently acknowledged in the literature, but in different ways. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000)
maintain that ASEAN's preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) have reduced political and economic
antagonism between member states, serving as a venue for negotiation and bargaining. Trade gains from
commercial liberalization within ASEAN states are usually expected to be restricted, as ASEAN economies
are not highly complementary. Still, ASEAN had a strong motivation to form a preferential group of trade
as a way to attract foreign investment, which has consequently prevented the escalation of tensions to
interstate disputes. Mansfield and Solingen (2010) see ASEAN as the symbol of regionalism in which
governments promote political and economic cooperation through the creation of regional institutions
and practices. A series of PTAs signed by ASEAN or its member countries, including AFTA, ASEAN-China,
ASEAN-Japan, and the Singapore-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Free Trade Agreement, diffused
political and military tensions and promoted foreign investment and access to export markets. The ARF
has also served as a venue for confidence building and collective resilience through its dialogues and
communiqués while carefully moving onto practical security cooperation (Mansfield and Solingen, 2010).
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 Haftel (2010) examines ASEAN as a representative example of a regional economic organization (RCO) in
which developing countries institutionalize the positive link between regional peace and foreign direct
investment (FDI). Specifically, he highlights the Indonesian government's strong support for the formation
of ASEAN in 1967. Despite political and economic costs associated with negotiations and bargaining,
Indonesian foreign policymakers viewed ASEAN as a critical chance to demonstrate its commitment to
regional stability and attract foreign investment and aid from economically developed countries. By
projecting a peaceful and reliable image, ASEAN has successfully reassured observers in other regions that
the political risk related to investments in the region is much lower than previously assumed and indeed
increased the inflow of much-needed foreign capital to ASEAN states (Haftel, 2010). The institutional
trajectories of ASEAN also suggest that ASEAN has successfully expanded regional economic cooperation
into substantial security cooperation over politically divisive issues (Haftel and Hofmann, 2017).

Another strand of research attributes ASEAN's pacifying effects to the dynamics of domestic politics of
member states. In her in-depth study of variation in regionalism, Solingen (2007) argues that leaders’
strategies for domestic political survival and their relationships with ruling coalitions have generated
drastically different outcomes in regional security and interstate relations in the Middle East and Asia.
Political leaders in the Middle East pursued inward-looking policies based on self-sufficiency and import-
substitution industrialization, which favored state and military entrepreneurship with disproportionate
rents from political patronage. Such strategies frequently combined with government commitment to
military prowess and nationalism have intensified arms races and exacerbated conflicts between Middle
East states in terms of frequency and severity. In contrast, East Asian states and ASEAN were strongly
inclined to outward-looking strategies, such as export-oriented growth and integration into the global
economy with “prosper-thy-neighbor” policies. In doing so, Asian states could avoid unnecessary military
competition and reduce the likelihood of war, while increasing domestic and regional stability (Solingen,
2007: 773).

Later empirical studies, however, suggest that the explanatory power of commercial liberalism in
Southeast Asia is conditioned by the political and economic characteristics of ASEAN states. Given the
relative lack of democratic dyads and economic independence, Tang (2012) shows that militarized
interstate disputes in the region are significantly reduced by Southeast Asian states’ joint adoption of open
trade regimes, not by ASEAN membership per se. Hsueh (2016) shows that ASEAN membership decreases
the onset of interstate conflicts between ASEAN dyads only in combination with member states’ economic
performance.

Relying on a historical institutional approach, Stubbs and Mitrea (2017) maintain that ASEAN's durability as
a regional organization has been enhanced by the timing and nature of changes in the global economy
over the past decades. The influx of foreign aid and foreign investment from the 1970s through the early
1990s boosted ASEAN economies with major infrastructure projects, promoting political stability and social
progress. The expansion of trade in raw materials and manufactured goods and regional production
networks enhanced by China's economic rise have led ASEAN to form preferential trading arrangements
within members and with China, respectively. Thus, the continuous interactions with the global economy
have induced ASEAN to make institutional developments as a credible organization and enhance its ability
to function effectively for regional economic cooperation while overcoming adverse shocks from the 2008
global financial crises (Stubbs and Mitrea, 2017).

Nevertheless, there has been strong and consistent skepticism about the limitation of ASEAN's regional
economic cooperation and integration. One line of criticism suggests that the institutional framework of
ASEAN's trade agreements, especially AFTA, is not suitable for implementing the organization's unilateral
strategy for economic cooperation. The lack of specificity of provisions and weak institutional capabilities
of AFTA indicates that the agreement is just a political gesture of ASEAN states based on the principle of
“Agree First, Talk After” (Ravenhill, 1995: 859). Despite the extension of issue areas for collaboration, AFTA
had neither binding and precise obligations nor monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that would
enhance compliance with ASEAN's liberalization commitments (Kahler, 2000). Such institutional features
combined with the frequent rescheduling of target dates have led ASEAN states to see AFTA provisions as
non-binding obligations and reduced the credibility and relevance of ASEAN's commitment to creating a
free trade area (Ravenhill, 2008). Trade sectors’ low utilization rates for AFTA and the ASEAN-China Free
Trade Area suggest that ASEAN's regional trade agreements have been mainly driven by member states’
geopolitical and strategic considerations rather than by their incentives for economic liberalization
(Ravenhill, 2010). For these reasons, AFTA has been regarded as a “remarkably modest organization” in
trade matters, as it made only slow progress on tariff reduction for intra-ASEAN trade without significant
institutional deepening and widening (Aggarwal and Koo, 2008: 4). Unlike other bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements, ASEAN's regional economic initiatives made the linkages between trade and security
issues unstable and ambiguous since its reliance on soft law, consensus, and non-interference generated
only limited cooperation or even delinked regional economic cooperation from NTS issues (Aggarwal and
Govella, 2013). ASEAN members’ ongoing aversion to accepting legally binding commitments has resulted
in significant delays and missing deadlines in the implementation of a single market based on the free flow
of goods, services, investment, capital, and skilled labor (Dosch, 2017; Ravenhill, 2009). Similar criticisms
are found in the study of the AEC. While the envisioned AEC culminates ASEAN's ideals of regional
economic integration, substantial progress on economic integration has indeed been driven by private
actors and multinational corporations (Beeson, 2019; Narine, 2009).

Contending perspectives on the performance of ASEAN as a regional economic organization are closely
aligned with persistent debates on ASEAN's relevance in the region between proponents and skeptics.
Given the lack of a comprehensive analytical framework that assesses the success of regional
organizations, researchers evaluate the effectiveness, legitimacy, and efficiency of ASEAN differently,
depending upon whether they adopt realist, liberal, or constructivist perspectives (Stubbs, 2019).
Significant heterogeneity in politics, economy, and culture in the region often leads researchers to reach
different conclusions on the impact of ASEAN on regional peace and prosperity (Beeson, 2019). Specifically,
existing criticisms of ASEAN's regional economic initiatives frequently rely on comparisons with a few
specific cases from North America and the European Union or the gap between ASEAN's rhetoric and
practice (Beeson, 2020; Ravenhill, 2008, 2010).

The dichotomous debate on ASEAN's relevance in regional economic cooperation, however, often
overlooks the facts that institutional designs of international agreements do vary across regions and time
and that such variations are closely related to levels of cooperation. Relying on the Design of Trade
Agreements (DESTA) dataset established by Dür et al. (2014), Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of
trade agreements pursued by ASEAN and ASEAN member states in terms of depth and flexibility of
cooperation. Two indices of depth indicate the degree to which a given agreement constrains state
behavior. Depth (index) combines the number of provisions on seven areas, including tariff reduction,
services trade, investments, standards, public procurement, competition, and intellectual property rights.
Relying on latent trait analysis of 48 items in each agreement, Depth (latent) put more weight on relatively
rare provisions than ubiquitous provisions (Dür et al., 2014). On the other hand, flexibility denotes the
extent to which a trade agreement allows states to adjust policies for unexpected shocks without violating
the agreement (Baccini et al., 2015).

Table 1. ASEAN's trade agreements: Depth and flexibility.

Depth Depth
Name Years (index) (latent) Flexibility
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 ASEAN Free Trade Area 1992 2 −1.040 1

ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement 2004 2 −0.244 4

ASEAN-Republic of Korea Free Trade 2006 2 0.088 4

Agreement

ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 2008 3 −0.120 5

Partnership

ASEAN-India Free Trade Area 2009 2 −0.763 5

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 2009 6 1.526 4

Area

By ASEAN member states

Brunei (1) 2007 4 0.953 4

Indonesia (1) 2007 5 1.161 5

Laos (1) 1991 4 0.54 0

Malaysia (7) 2005– 4.714 1.079 5.714

2014

Philippines (2) 2006– 6 1.037 4.5

2016

Singapore (16) 2000– 6.063 1.348 5

2018

Thailand (5) 2004– 4.2 0.838 4.6

2013

Vietnam (5) 2000– 5.2 1.252 4.4

2019

Notes: Depth and flexibility indices for RCEP and CPTPP are not currently available in the DESTA database. The
numbers of bilateral PTAs signed by each ASEAN state are in parentheses.

Source: The Design of Trade Agreement (DESTA) database (Dür et al., 2014).

Table 1 offers several interesting findings. The depth of cooperation in ASEAN-led trade agreements has
increased over time gradually but persistently. Specifically, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade
Area (AANZFTA) shows the highest depth and flexibility, supporting the argument that the positive link
between depth and flexibility allows governments to effectively respond to protectionist reactions from
domestic constituencies (Baccini et al., 2015). Such tendencies are more prominent in bilateral agreements
individually signed by ASEAN economies. As in Table 1, Depth (index) and Depth (latent) for five ASEAN
economies that signed more than one bilateral agreement ranges from 4.2 to 6.063 and from 0.838 to
1.348, respectively. Flexibility for the same set of agreements ranged from 4.4 to 5.714. These results
suggest that ASEAN bilateral trade agreements present similar or higher levels of depth and flexibility
compared with 155 other bilateral trade agreements signed for the period 2000–2018, which are 4.382 for
Depth (index), 0.836 for Depth (latent), and 3.996 for Flexibility, respectively.

Thus overall, the distinct features of ASEAN's trade agreements and the AEC suggest the evolving nature of
ASEAN's economic cooperation and integration. The establishment of the AEC suggests that ASEAN seeks
to accelerate regional integration and liberalization in response to the economic rise of China and India as
alternative locations for investment and production and the spread of PTAs across regions (Elms, 2020;
Nesadurai, 2008; Ravenhill, 2008). It is worth noting that the AEC has surpassed AFTA in terms of
institutional deepening and widening. The AEC has extended the scope of issue areas from tariff
reductions to services, investment, the elimination of non-tariff measures, and the movement of skilled
workers. The adoption of a fast-track integration program for sectors and dispute settlement systems
suggests that the AEC has moved away from its reliance on the ASEAN way and traditional aversion to
legalization (Jones, 2016; Nesadurai, 2008). The AEC implementation is expected to generate huge benefits,
since a region-wide market for ASEAN encompasses 620 million people in 10 ASEAN economies with a
combined GDP of US$2.5 trillion (ASEAN Secretariat and World Bank, 2015). Using a general equilibrium
analysis, Petri et al. (2012) find that the full elimination of intra-regional tariffs through the AEC would
increase real incomes in ASEAN countries by 5.3%. The magnitude of such effects will increase to 11.6% if
the AEC promotes the negotiation of other trade agreements between ASEAN and other key trading
partners, such as East Asian countries, the United States, and Europe. Elms (2020) also suggests that
ASEAN's regional economic initiatives have significantly promoted trade and investment between Asia and
Latin America and might serve as reference points for economic connectivity and coordination at the
regional level.

Internal and external challenges

The patterns of ASEAN's economic integration and the changing landscape in the global economy suggest
that we should contemplate further the opportunities and challenges for ASEAN's economic security. On
the one hand, the political and economic consequences of the extensive web of PTAs on ASEAN economies
need to be evaluated more systematically. As discussed earlier, ASEAN as a single unity has participated in
six FTAs. ASEAN member states have signed 38 bilateral PTAs in which Singapore alone forged 16
agreements. Nevertheless, Johns and Peritz (2015) suggest that the complex networks of PTAs may
generate complicated and contradictory obligations while making members’ legal commitments unclear
and increasing trade disputes. The costs of such complexity and uncertainty would be much higher than
the benefits of PTAs if PTAs caused trade diversion rather than trade creation. Baccini et al. (2017) also find
that while PTAs deepen the linkages between trade and investment, the economic benefits of PTAs are
highly concentrated on powerful and dominant firms even within the same industries.

In this vein, the impact of political dynamics between ASEAN governments and domestic interest groups on
ASEAN's regional economic cooperation deserves more attention. Jones (2016) maintains that the
persistence of ASEAN's limited, partial, and uneven liberalization across sectors reflects the conflicts
between socio-political coalitions within ASEAN states, who hold different preferences for economic
liberalization that accompanies the reallocation of resources and power. Despite economic technocrats’
continuing support for foreign investment and export-oriented growth, ASEAN's attempts to
institutionalize regional economic governance have been frequently challenged by the coalition of
uncompetitive sectors and conservative ruling elites relying on protectionism and nationalist sentiments.
The political clout of protectionist interests and their adverse impact on regional economic governance are
well exemplified in several cases, including the Malaysian government's refusal to liberalize its automobile
sector under AFTA, the rise of national tariffs in the petrochemical sectors in several ASEAN countries, and
Indonesia's resource nationalism (Jones, 2016). Similarly, Rüland (2016) emphasizes the impact of interest
group representation on ASEAN's regional economic cooperation. The legacy of state corporatism in
ASEAN economies gives only limited access to government decision-makers to micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises (MSME), while excluding labor completely but allowing large corporations and foreign
interests to articulate their policy interests. Such an unequal representation of economic interests
generates strong resistance from MSMEs at the implementation stage of the AEC, which leads political
leaders to renege on their commitment to regional economic liberalization and appease domestic
constituencies with policies deviated from agreements with other members (Rüland, 2016). These findings
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suggest that the slow progress in ASEAN's regional economic integration is closely related to the
 distributional consequences of economic liberalization. Such potential costs of PTAs might need to be
more proactively addressed by ASEAN to enhance its legitimacy on regional economic governance and
accelerate the liberalization process for a single regional market.

Equally importantly, ASEAN should effectively respond to the drastic changes in the global and regional
environments. Two external factors warrant extended discussion as adverse shocks to ASEAN's economic
security. One is the growing rivalry between the United States and China. The tensions between the two
countries are not entirely new. While pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), President Obama
sought to reaffirm the Asia-Pacific region's strategic priority in US foreign policy through the so-called
“pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia. Despite the legacy of the US–China engagement over global governance
issues, the Obama administration's moves were frequently regarded as the US's attempt to curb the
economic rise of China or its great power ambition (Christensen, 2015; Zhao, 2012) or even as a “thinly
veiled containment” among Chinese pundits and strategists (Canrong, 2016; Shambaugh, 2013). The
political and economic tensions between the United States and China escalated quickly into a trade war
between the two largest economies, as President Trump took a drastic turn toward protectionism. After
pulling the US out of the TPP on his first day in office, the Trump administration imposed a series of tariffs
on Chinese products to fix the US trade deficit that started to surge in the mid-2000s (Bown et al., 2005).
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) increased tariffs on US$250 billion worth of Chinese
products from 10% to 25% in 2018 and then from 25% to 30% in 2019 to resolve the issues of China's unfair
trade practices linked to technology transfer and intellectual property (Bown and Kolb, 2019). Despite
concerns from its trading partners and international economic organizations, the Trump administration
strongly defended the US's protectionist measures as the proper way to correct trade imbalances and to
provide Americans with “a society they want to live in” rather than relying on optimistic prospects on free
trade (Lighthizer, 2020).

The US–China trade tensions are still currently ongoing. Straight after the 2020 presidential election,
President Biden confirmed that he would not immediately remove Trump's protectionist measures,
including 25% duties imposed on about half of Chinese imports and the Phase 1 agreement that requires
China to purchase US$200 billion of US goods and services for the period 2020 and 2021 (Friedman, 2021).
While declaring America's return to multilateralism, the Biden administration shows that its priority lies in
American jobs while pressuring unfair trade practices by China with other major trading partners (Patrik,
2021).

The impact of the US–China trade war on ASEAN has been speculated in several ways, given ASEAN
countries’ strong economic ties with the two largest economies. Some suggest that ASEAN economies gain
from the US–China trade disputes, at least in relative terms. The US's tariff protection targeting Chinese
exporting sectors increases exports from other regions, such as the European Union and Southeast Asian
countries, to the US market, as China is more likely to divert its exports from the US to other countries
(Robinson and Thierfelder, 2019). The US's trade war with China may enhance US–ASEAN trade, since
China-specific protectionist measures promote trade diversion and the relocation of foreign firms from
China to ASEAN countries (Aslam, 2020).

Nevertheless, more recent empirical findings show that the economic consequences of the US–China trade
war indeed vary across ASEAN member states, depending on their levels of integration into the global
value chain and trade patterns. The reduction of Chinese exports to the US market came as adverse
shocks to several ASEAN countries that export intermediate products and raw materials to Chinese
sectors, as shown in economic downturns in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (Vu, 2000). Specifically, the
US–China trade war had a contractionary impact on Thailand's economy, shrinking its output and exports.
Trump's protectionist measures caused the slowdown of the global economy and of the economy of
Thailand's key trading partners, including the US, China, Japan, and ASEAN countries, which reduced world
commodity prices and demand for Thailand's products (Nidhiprabha, 2019). Thus, ASEAN economies are
more likely to be harmed by the US–China trade tensions. Even if trade diversion and relocation of foreign
firms from China might boost economic activities in some ASEAN economies, such gains might be
outweighed by the uncertainty and volatility that the trade war has added to the global economy. Iqbal et
al. (2019) note that disruptions in global value chains caused by the US–China trade disputes increase the
vulnerability of ASEAN economies with prominent shares of exports in global value chains. Freund et al.
(2020) show that the Phase 1 deal will make all other countries worse off under the escalation of US–China
tariffs and still adversely affect other countries if China implements the agreement by granting the US
privileged access to the Chinese market.

Another big challenge to ASEAN's economic security is the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the outbreak of the
virus in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, COVID-19 has come as unprecedented shocks to all ASEAN
countries economically and socially. The total number of confirmed cases in ASEAN countries was 49,900
as of 4 May 2020 (OECD, 2020a) and now reaches 4,448,233 as of 18 June 2021, with 86,543 deaths (CSIS,
2021). Several sources suggest that global disruptions to trade, investment, and tourism caused by COVID-
19 have increased the likelihood of economic crises and recession in ASEAN countries, hampering
economic performance. The policy report issued by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) shows that the spread of the virus caused a significant economic slowdown in all
member states. The rapid increase of infections immediately followed by stringent containment measures
and lockdowns adversely hit many industrial sectors, especially small-medium enterprises (SMEs), tourism,
and services (OECD, 2020a). Considering the gap between GDP growth in the year of the event and the
average rate during the previous three-year period, Vu (2020) demonstrates that, except for Brunei, GDP
growth rates plummeted in all ASEAN countries, with the range of 10.2 percentage points in Thailand and
4.3 percentage points in Vietnam. His findings show that ASEAN member states exhibit greater
vulnerability to the combined impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the US–China trade war at the
regional and the national levels than other Asian countries and that the vulnerability indexes for Thailand,
Cambodia, Singapore, and Malaysia are even higher than the world average.

The vulnerability of ASEAN countries to the COVID-19 crisis can be attributed to the patterns of ASEAN
countries’ participation in global supply chains and economic ties with the major economies. First, the
supply chain impact refers to the situation in which the production of inputs in one country is stalled by
the spread of the virus and the ensuing quarantine measures, which in turn interrupts or stops production
activities in other locations that rely on inputs from the affected location (OECD, 2020b). The adverse
shocks that started with the closure of factories and facilities in China in January 2020 have spread quickly
to ASEAN countries because their supply chains rely significantly on Chinese manufacturing sectors.
Moreover, the economic slowdowns of China, the US, and the European Union have adversely affected
most ASEAN countries, putting downward pressure on trade, investment, and tourism (OECD, 2020a).

ASEAN has collectively responded to the adverse shocks from the COVID-19 pandemic on multiple
occasions. While sharing concerns about the negative impact of COVID-19 on the well-being of people and
global socioeconomic developments, ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to “open markets for trade and
investment” and “cooperation among ASEAN countries and with ASEAN's external partners” at the Special
ASEAN Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) held in April 2020 (ASEAN, 2020b). The Hanoi Plan
of Action issued in June 2020 suggests that ASEAN member states should remove unnecessary non-tariff
measures against any other member states to secure essential goods and public health and that ASEAN
will strengthen supply chain connectivity to enhance trade and investment in the region (ASEAN, 2020c).
Nevertheless, the plan remains vague on the implementation of such commitments as it reemphasizes the
importance of trade facilitation and investment without details on institutional mechanisms. The recent
study suggests that despite the presence of the official platform for regional health security under the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, ASEAN has been showing limitations in coordinating a coherent
Now Reading:   
 response at the regional level, revealing discrepancies in member states’ capacity to deal with the
pandemic and rising socioeconomic inequalities (Djalante et al., 2020).

Conclusion
Existing scholarship shows that ASEAN has become one of the few successful cases of regionalism in the
developing world and strengthened the economic security of the region. While developing its collective
identity and norms as a security community, ASEAN has continuously sought to create positive synergies
between economic development and regional stability through multilateral cooperation. Therefore, during
the post-Cold War era, ASEAN has invested a significant amount of time and resources in building multiple
layers of regional economic institutions and trade agreements within and outside ASEAN member states.
Increased interconnectivity based on those institutional frameworks has allowed ASEAN countries to
enhance security in a traditional sense. The expansion of trade and investment across borders has
significantly reduced the likelihood of interstate conflicts, as it effectively deflates political and security
tensions in the region. ASEAN's strong commitment to economic liberalization has also paved the way for
economic growth and development in member states, while deepening levels of cooperation on non-
traditional security challenges at the regional level.

Nevertheless, existing criticisms on the ASEAN way of regional economic integration offer several policy
implications. The linkages between economic and security interests will be institutionalized and enhanced
further when ASEAN moves away from voluntary cooperation and informality. The trajectories of AFTA and
the AEC show that ASEAN states will generate more substantial outcomes when ASEAN's institutional
frameworks enhance compliance and cooperation from member states through binding obligations and
effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement. The rivalry between the US and China and the
COVID-19 pandemic have already started reshaping the environment for ASEAN's economic security. These
two factors will keep affecting ASEAN member states’ pathways to growth and development by reshuffling
global supply chains. ASEAN's economic security will therefore depend to a large extent on ASEAN's
systemic and institutional efforts to address these external challenges and promote member states’
compliance and cooperation at the group level.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Su-Hyun Lee

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