EN BANC

[G.R. No. 246679. March 2, 2021.]

GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NORBERTO B. VILLAMIN and
SENANDRO M. JALGALADO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

GESMUNDO, J : p

On September 10, 2019, the Court promulgated its Decision in this

petition, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari;
ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolution issued on March 29, 2019
by the Commission on Elections First Division and the resolution
issued on May 9, 2019 by the Commission on Elections En Banc in
SPA No. 18-041 (DC) and SPA No. 18-137 (DC); DISMISSES the
consolidated petitions in SPA No. 18-041 (DC) and SPA No. 18-137
(DC) for the cancellation of petitioner Edgardo A. Tallado's Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of Camarines
Norte in the 2019 Local Elections; DECLARES this decision
immediately executory; and ORDERS respondents Norberto B.
Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 1

In due course, both private respondents and the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) filed their respective motions for reconsideration,
impugning the aforestated decision. The COMELEC raised the following
errors:
I. Â PETITIONER NEVER LOST TITLE TO THE OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR OF CAMARINES NORTE.
A. Â The doctrine in Aldovino, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC
and Asilo is clear. The temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, is not an effective
interruption of a term.
B. Â T h e non-final although executory nature of the
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases, which impose the penalty of dismissal,
proves the impermanence of the dismissal. Hence, it
is akin to a preventive suspension for all intents and
purposes.
C. Â Petitioner's dismissal resulted to a mere
temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor of
Camarines Norte.
 II. Â TERM LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 2

For his part, private respondent Norberto B. Villamin raised the

following points for reconsideration:
3.1. Â In this Motion for Reconsideration, RESPONDENT
questions the Assailed Decision which held that the Ombudsman's
dismissal decisions against PETITIONER serve as valid interruptions in
his term of office so as to prevent the application of the three-term
limit rule. Particularly, RESPONDENT questions the following findings
of the Court:
3.1.1. Â PETITIONER lost title to his office when he was
dismissed therefrom;
3.1.2. Â PETITIONER'S dismissals resulted in
permanent vacancy; and
3.1.3. Â Developments in the appeals did not change
the fact that PETITIONER was dismissed. 3
Lastly, private respondent Senandro M. Jalgalado joins the COMELEC in
assailing the conclusions reached by the Court in its September 10, 2019
Decision. 4
In unison, all of the respondents argue that the Court erred in ruling
that petitioner's removal constitutes as valid interruption of his term
sufficient to break the three-term limit rule imposed on local candidates.
They point out that petitioner's resort to appeal and the eventual
modification of the administrative penalty imposed on him shows the lack of
permanence of his ouster as governor and should be insufficient to warrant
as an interruption of his term. Further, respondents urge the Court to
consider his absence in office as preventive suspension, as the Ombudsman
(OMB) Rules provide. Lastly, they claim that for the Court to allow such
construction to continue would reward corrupt and unscrupulous politicians
to escape the grasp of the three-term prohibition.
In response, petitioner, echoing the Court's arguments, prays for the
denial of the motions for reconsideration.
The Court DENIES all motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.
It does not escape the Court's attention that the issues raised by
respondents in their motions for reconsideration were already squarely ruled
upon. Thus, We reiterate our Decision promulgated last September 10, 2019:
"Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to
office, while interruption of the full continuity of the exercise of the
powers of the elective position equates to failure to render service. In
this regard, Aldovino is instructive, as follows:
From all the above, we conclude that the
"interruption" of a term exempting an elective official
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less
than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length
of time, however short, for an effective interruption to
occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8,
 Article X and its [strict] intent are to be faithfully served,
i.e., to limit an elective official's continuous stay in office
to no more than three consecutive terms, using
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of
what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by
operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held in
Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective
post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an
effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective
break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the
function[s] of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is
broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with
the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holder's term when he retains title
to the office but cannot exercise his functions for
reasons established by law. Of course, the [term]
"failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to
office is lost; without the right to hold office or to
serve, then no service can be rendered so that
none is really lost.
The COMELEC relies on the OMB's Rules to support its view that
the execution of the orders of dismissal against the petitioner did not
create a permanent, but only a temporary, vacancy.
A review reveals that the OMB's Rules did not justify the
COMELEC's reliance.
The OMB's Rules, promulgated in Administrative Order No. 07,
Series of 1990, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Series of
2003, stated in Section 7 of its Rule III as follows:
Section 7. Â Finality and execution of decision. —
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all
other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal,
 he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary
and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced
and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer.
Section 10 of Rule III of the OMB's Rules also stated:
Section 10. Â Penalties. — (a) For administrative
charges under Executive Order No. 292 or such other
executive orders, laws or rules under which the
respondent is charged, the penalties provided thereat
shall be imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman; (b) in
administrative proceedings conducted under these Rules,
the Office of the Ombudsman may impose the
penalty of reprimand, suspension without pay for a
minimum period of one (1) month up to a maximum
period of one (1) year, demotion, dismissal from the
service, or a fine equivalent to his salary for one (1)
month up to one (1) year, or from Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally
taken or lost, or both, at the discretion of the
Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances
that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or
employee found guilty of the complaint or charge.
The penalty of dismissal from the service shall carry
with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
re-employment in the government service, unless
otherwise provided in the decision.
Based on the foregoing, the OMB's Rules mandated that
decisions handed down in administrative cases should be
immediately executory despite being timely appealed. Thus, it was
clear that what were to be executed were the decisions of the
Ombudsman without consideration as to their finality.
That the second paragraph of Section 7 of Rule III of the OMB's
Rules, supra, characterizes the penalty of suspension or dismissal
meanwhile enforced as a preventive suspension should the public
officer later win his or her appeal of the OMB's decision is absurd and
illogical as to the penalty of dismissal. The characterization also lacks
legal and factual support. In his case, the petitioner was twice fully
divested of his powers and responsibilities as Governor by the DILG
immediately transferring the discharge of the office of Governor and
the exercise of the functions and powers thereof to another person,
Vice Governor Pimentel. The latter forthwith took his oath of office as
Governor and unconditionally assumed and discharged such office.
Without doubt, the execution of the OMB's dismissals in that manner
resulted in the petitioner's loss of title to the office of Governor.
Neither did the non-finality of the decisions render any less the
petitioner's loss of his title to the office. It would be unwarranted to
differentiate the dismissals enforced against him from the dismissal
based on and pursuant to a decision that was already final. Both
dismissals would produce the same effect — the ouster of the official
from his title to the office.
Indeed, even the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (2017 RACCS) imposes this effect of dismissal as the
"permanent separation" of the guilty civil servant from his or her title
to the office by explicitly providing in its Section 56(a), viz.:
Section 56. Â Duration and Effect of
Administrative Penalties. — The following rules shall
govern the imposition of administrative penalties:
a. Â The penalty of dismissal shall result in the
permanent separation of the respondent from the
service, without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the decisions directing
the dismissal of the petitioner included no indication of the petitioner
being thereby placed under any type of suspension. In fact, the
decisions did not state any conditions whatsoever. As such, he was
dismissed for all intents and purposes of the law in the periods that
he was dismissed from office even if he had appealed. In that status,
he ceased to hold the title to the office in the fullest sense.
The length of time of the involuntary interruption of the term of
office was also immaterial. The Court adopts with approval the
following excerpt from the dissent of COMELEC Commissioner
Parreño, which dealt with such issue, viz.:
It matters not that the duration of such loss of title
to office appears to be brief and short. In fact, in
Aldovino, it was held that the elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however
short, for an effective interruption to occur, thus:
From all the above, we conclude that the
interruption of a term exempting an elective official
from the three-term limit rule is one that involves
no less than the involuntary loss of title to office.
T h e elective official must have involuntarily
left his office for a length of time, however
short, for an effective interruption to occur.
(Bold and underscoring emphases are part of the
original text)
Verily, the COMELEC failed to recognize the true effect of the
executed decisions of dismissal because it strained its reading of the
OMB's Rules, and ignored the relevant law and jurisprudence in so
doing. Thus, it gravely erred.
 III.
Petitioner's dismissals resulted
in permanent vacancy
The COMELEC opined that the DILG's reliance on Section 44 of
the LGC in respect of the second OMB case was erroneous because
the order of succession therein applied pertained to a permanent
vacancy despite the lack of such permanent vacancy in view of the
OMB's dismissal of the petitioner being still not final; that Section 46
of the LGC, which provided for succession in cases of a temporary
vacancy, was applicable to the petitioner's case; and that the DILG
corrected itself by now citing Section 46 of the LGC when it
implemented the second dismissal decision issued in relation to the
third OMB case.
We find that contrary to the opinion of the COMELEC, the DILG
did not err in citing Section 44 of the LGC as its legal basis when it
implemented the dismissal of the petitioner under the second OMB
case.
To start with, the DILG executed against the petitioner two
decisions of dismissal handed down in two different and separate
cases. As such, the COMELEC had neither factual nor legal basis to
conflate the DILG's actions in the two OMB cases for the reason that
its action on the second OMB case could not be prejudiced by its
action on the third OMB case.
Secondly, the DILG's opinion on what provision of the LGC
properly applied was far from binding or controlling. It was even
irrelevant. We ought to observe that the DILG, as the mere
implementor of the decisions, had no legal competence to interpret or
to render its opinion on the succession ensuing from the dismissals.
As the implementing body, the DILG was acting in a ministerial
capacity, and, as such, was absolutely bereft of the discretion to
determine what provision of the LGC specifically governed. Instead,
the DILG was duty-bound to execute the directives of the OMB's
decisions exactly as they were written in the decisions. Otherwise, the
DILG could literally supplant the prerogative of the OMB itself to
decide the administrative cases of the petitioner.
Thirdly, inasmuch as Section 46 of the LGC textually applied to
succession where the local chief executive was "temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such
as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension
from office," the provision was certainly not the proper basis for the
COMELEC to characterize as temporary the vacancy in the office of
Governor ensuing from the petitioner's dismissal. As earlier
explained, the vacancy was not temporary because the petitioner was
fully divested of his title to the office of Governor in both instances of
his dismissal.
Under Section 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises
whenever an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, or
refuses to assume office, or fails to qualify, or dies, or is removed
from office, or voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. In contrast,
 Section 46 of the LGC enumerates as resulting in a temporary
vacancy in the office of the local chief executive leave of absence,
travel abroad, and suspension from office. Although Section 46 of the
LGC specifically states that the causes of a temporary vacancy are
not limited to such circumstances, what is evident is that the
enumeration therein share something in common, which is that there
is a definite term to be re-assumed. However, the petitioner's
dismissals, even if still not final, were not akin to the instances
enumerated in Section 46 of the LGC because the loss of his title to
the office denied to him the expectancy to re-assume his term.
Lastly, Section 44 of the LGC includes removal from office as
one of the instances triggering a permanent vacancy. Such
permanent vacancy was precisely the outcome that the OMB directed
in its decisions. Consequently, when the petitioner was ousted in the
period from November 8, 2016 to December 30, 2016, in the first
instance of dismissal, and in the period from March 14, 2018 to
September 26, 2018, in the second instance of dismissal, the
permanent vacancy in the office of Governor ensued." 5 (citations
omitted)
In Our September 10, 2019 Decision, this Court ruled that the dismissal
orders of the OMB against petitioner serves as permanent removal from
office and was not merely temporary. From his dismissal until the Court of
Appeals' modification of his penalty to suspension, petitioner neither had
title nor powers to wield as governor of Camarines Norte. As evidence of this
lack of title by petitioner, Camarines Vice Governor Jonah Pedro G. Pimentel
was sworn as Governor, and not as Acting Governor. The nomenclature
used here by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) is
important because it recognizes that the vacancy is not temporary but a
permanent one. To rule otherwise would result in the absurd situation where
a public office is occupied by two persons when basic in the law on public
officers is that in single constituency positions, like the Office of the
Provincial Governor, only one person can occupy a public office at a given
time. The fact that the DILG has now clarified its position that it should have
applied Section 46 of the Local Government Code, rather than Sec. 44, is
irrelevant. As stated earlier, it is not the position of the DILG to characterize
the nature of the dismissal of public officers being merely the implementor
of the law.
Further, the OMB Rules placing petitioner in preventive suspension
upon modification of his penalty cannot be applied, considering the
constitutional consequences of his prior authorized removal, as compared to
other public officers subject to the OMB's administrative jurisdiction.
To start with, the administrative jurisdiction of the OMB is all-
encompassing. Rule III, Sec. 2 of Administrative Order No. 07 provides:
Section 2. Â Public officers covered; exceptions. — All
elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of
the Cabinet, local governments, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries are subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Office of the Ombudsman.
 Excepted from the foregoing are Members of Congress, the
Judiciary, and officials removable only by impeachment; provided,
however, that the Office of the Ombudsman may investigate any
serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials
removable only by impeachment for the purpose of filing a verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted. (emphases supplied)
Thus, when an appointive official is initially dismissed by the OMB and
his penalty eventually judicially modified and reduced, the rules of the OMB
declare his period of dismissal, by fiction of law, as a period of preventive
suspension with payment of backwages and other emoluments. This means
that for the appointive official, it is as if he was never removed and all the
vestiges of his removal were reversed. There is nothing wrong with this
conversion because his removal only affected his wages which are
eventually given to him. But this is not the same for elective local
government officials, like petitioner, because dismissal of an elective local
government official does not only affect receipt of salaries but also affects
his term, which would effectively be interrupted — an interruption which has
constitutional consequences.
When an elective local public officer is administratively dismissed by
the OMB and his penalty subsequently modified to another penalty, like
herein petitioner, the period of dismissal cannot just be nonchalantly
dismissed as a period for preventive suspension considering that, in fact, his
term is effectively interrupted. During said period, petitioner cannot claim to
be Governor as his title is stripped of him by the OMB despite the pendency
of his appeal. Neither does he exercise the power of the office. Said title and
power are already passed to the Vice Governor. He also cannot claim that
the exercise of his power is merely suspended since it is not. Hence, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye on the interruption of his term despite the ex
post facto redemption of his title following the OMB rule.
Considering the constitutional consequences of the application of OMB
Rules to local elective officials compared to other officials under the
administrative jurisdiction of the OMB, there is reason to excuse the former
from the preventive suspension rule.
The exception cannot be said to be in violation of the equal protection
clause. In the past, the Court has recognized the substantial distinction of
elective officials as compared to appointive officials. 6 As stated above, aside
from the distinctions stated in Quinto v. COMELEC, supra, the application of
the "preventive suspension proviso" to appointive officials does not affect a
constitutional provision while the application of the same rule to elective
officials, particularly local elective officials, has constitutional consequences.
Hence, there is a justification why said preventive suspension proviso cannot
be applied to local elective officials.
Lastly, respondents fear that the Court's construction would reward
corrupt politicians who will perpetuate their term by escaping the
constitutional term limits. This claim is not only unfair but also
discriminatory.
 To begin with, the Court's conclusion is but an application of
established jurisprudential concepts and was never intended to reward
corrupt politicians who escape dismissal. The OMB's dismissal order is
immediately executory and, once executed, the public officer ceases to have
title for the time being. Hence, it should be considered as an interruption of
his term. The fact that the public official is not an ideal one, considering his
administrative baggage, does not deprive him of the law's application.
Moreover, our laws never required our elective public officials to be
immaculately free from a troubled past. As a matter of fact, the mere
imposition of an administrative penalty does not automatically disqualify a
public officer from running for public office. Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code 7 does not disqualify a person from running even if he was previously
administratively sanctioned. The same observation can be made in Secs. 12
and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Lastly, the Court's construction cannot be construed as a reward for
corrupt politicians as it does not guarantee their prolonged grips on power. It
must be remembered that they are still subject to competitive and recurring
democratic elections wherein the people decide their political fate. It is
presumptuous to say that upon the Court's decision, public officials would
automatically claim their stakes in certain government positions for the
foreseeable future. With or without the application of the three-term limit
rule, their political futures are still uncertain. Thus, respondents' fears are
clearly unfounded.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsiderations are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M.V. Lopez,
Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario and J.Y. Lopez, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., dissent and maintain my vote in the
Court's Decision dated September 10, 2019.
Leonen, J., I maintain my dissent.
Carandang, J., I dissent.

Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
I maintain my dissent.
The ponencia states that "It would be unwarranted to differentiate the
dismissals enforced against him from the dismissal based on and pursuant to
a decision that was already final. Both dismissals would produce the same
effect — the ouster of the official from his title to the office."1
I beg to disagree. The second paragraph of Section 7, Rule III of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman 2 provides:
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In
case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins
such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
 suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. 3
The difference between a dismissal pending appeal and dismissal
based on a final and executory decision is clearly provided: that the
respondent is entitled to his or her salary and other emoluments in case
respondent wins the appeal. As elucidated by Justice Jardeleza in his dissent
in the September 10, 2019 Decision:
To my mind, what is decisive is Tallado's reinstatement to
office, which occurred not once, but twice. I am unable to subscribe
to the majority opinion because it attributes permanent effect to the
dismissals pending appeal, when such permanency is not
contemplated by the very Rules that sanction such dismissal. The
Ombudsman rules provide a remedy when the non-final but
executory dismissal is overturned, i.e., the respondent is considered
to have been under preventive suspension for which he shall be paid
the salary and other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
his removal. This is a glaring indication that no permanent
effect of the dismissal pending appeal is contemplated so
that none should attach. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The Commission on Elections' cancellation of petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy for the 2019 National and Local Elections was not a grave
violation of discretion. Petitioner had served three (3) consecutive terms as
Governor. Petitioner's various suspensions did not create any permanent
vacancy that can be considered as an involuntary interruption of his term.
In Section 44 of the Local Government Code: 5
a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. 6
"Temporary vacancy" is defined in Section 46 of the Local Government
Code. Section 46 also states that suspension from office is one of the
instances when a temporary vacancy is created. 7 Notably, Section 46 did
not differentiate between preventive suspension and suspension as a
penalty.
The reason for the elective official's incapacity to hold office must be
considered to determine whether the vacancy created is permanent or
temporary. Justice Jardeleza raised that "the nature of the vacancy is merely
a consequence of such incapacity." 8 The definitions of "permanent vacancy"
and "temporary vacancy" provided under Sections 44 and 46 of the Local
Government Code are clear; thus, "the law does not contemplate a situation
where a temporary incapacity would lead to a permanent vacancy, and vice
versa." 9
In petitioner's case, he was removed from office twice and in both
instances, the removals were based on Office of the Ombudsman decisions
that were immediately executory, but pending appeal. In both cases,
petitioner was reinstated. These instances happened during his term as
Governor from 2016 to 2019. To recall, he was removed on November 8,
2016, but was reinstated on April 12, 2016 when the Court of Appeals issued
a temporary restraining order. He was once again removed on January 10,
2018, but was reinstated on October 29, 2018, when the Court of Appeals
imposed a penalty of six (6) months suspension in lieu of dismissal. 10
Had any of his removals been permanent, then there would be no legal
basis to reinstate him as Governor. A permanent vacancy presupposes that
the decision removing the official has become final and executory. In this
case, the Office of the Ombudsman's decision included the "accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding any public office." 11
However, petitioner was allowed to hold office after his removal.
There can be no other conclusion then, but that petitioner was never
permanently removed from office. As pointed out by Justice Jardeleza:
First, there was no final judgment dismissing Tallado from the service.
Anything less than a final judgment of dismissal cannot create a
permanent void in the Governor's office. Second, by actions rendered
by the CA, Tallado was reinstated as Governor. Not much legal
calisthenics is required for one to recognize that the vacancy caused
by Tallado's dismissals were only temporary. Verily, Tallado was not
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office,
and the vacancy created in his absence was not permanent. 12
(Emphasis in the original)
T h e ponente writes that the period of preventive suspension is an
effective interruption of the term of an elective official, since no power can
be exercised by the elective official while on preventive suspension.
However, the exercise of power should not be the sole factor considered. An
official placed under preventive suspension is entitled to be paid "the salary
and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension of the removal." 13 If there is an effective interruption in the term
of an elective official that is equivalent to a permanent vacancy, then the
elective official should not be entitled to salary and other emoluments for
the period of interruption.
I vote to grant the Motion for Reconsideration.
Â
Footnotes

1. Rollo , Vol. III, p. 1416.

2. Id. at 1367.

3. Id. at 1330.

4. Id. at 1353-1364.

5. Id. at 1292-1297.

6. Quinto v. Commission on Elections, 627 Phil. 193, 228 (2010).

7. Section 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:
 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

LEONEN, J., dissenting:

1. Ponencia , pp. 5-6.

2. Administrative Order No. 07. Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(1990), as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 7,
2003.

3. Administrative Order No. 07. Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(1990), as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 7,
2003.

4. Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019,

<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65755> [Per C.J.
Bersamin, En Banc]. J. Jardeleza, dissenting.

5. Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).

6. Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).

7. Republic Act No. 7160 (1991) sec. 46 partly states:

(a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is

temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons
such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension
from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest
ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the
powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief executive
concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees
which can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds
thirty (30) working days.

8. Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019,

<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65755> [Per CJ
Bersamin, En Banc]. J. Jardeleza, dissenting.

9. Id.
10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id.

13. Sec. 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07. Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman (1990), as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated
September 7, 2003.