Richard M. Gula, S. S.

REASON INFORMED
BY FAITH
Foundations
of
Catholic
Morality

New York PAULIST PRESS Mahwah

 ,I'
15 :l he Natural Law in
Tradition

The natural law is central to Roman Catholic moral theology. It is

the kind of "reasoning" which "faith" informs. Perhaps the single most charac-
teristic feature of traditional Catholic morality is that the church can teach a
morality which is applicable always, everywhere, and for everyone because it
relies on the natural law as the basis for its teaching. In fact, the claim of the
Roman Catholic natural law tradition is that moral knowledge is accessible
not ju.~t t believers but ro anyone wbo is willing to reflect critically on
human e 'peri ncc. The advantage of using natural law is that the church
shows great respecr for human g odness and trusts the human capacity to
k110w and choose whal is right. Also, by means of appealing to natural law,
the church can address its discussion and claims for the rightness or wrong-
ness of particular actions to all persons of go d will, not just to those who
share its religiou onvictions. One of tbe greaL disadvantages of such an
approach is that it can easily lead to handing hristian morality over to moral
philosophy wherein religious beliefs do nor really make a difference for moral
claims.
The magisterium has app al d to the natural law as th basis for its
teachi ngs pertaining to a just society sexual behavior medical practice, hu-
mnn life, religious freedom, and the relationship between morality and 'ivil
law. J3ut tbe appeal to natW'allaw to support both tb uoj er al and absolute
prohibitions of very specific behaviors, such as in sexual matters, as well a
the openness and respect for ambiguity, such as in social matters, has occa-
sioned consider,lble clu'iosity and confusion ovcr the notion of "natural law"
and its use.
Natural law is a highly ambiguous notion. In a sense, natural law is
neither "natural" nor is it "law." It is not "natural" in the sense that the natural
moral law cannot be identified with physical, chemical, or biological laws of

220
Natural Law in Tradition 221

nature which try to express the way the natural world works. It is not "law" in
the sense that is not a written code of precepts which carry public sanctions
from the legislator. Furthermore, historical surveys of the meaning and use of
natural law quickly put to rest any notion that natural law is a single philosophi-
cal system which yields a clear and consistent code of conduct. I
In order to understand the church's moral teaching, we will need to
examine the natural law tradition in its origins and its status today. The
traditional Catholic point of reference has been the scholastic conception of
natural law synthesized by Thomas Aquinas.

Roots of Natural Law in Antiquity

The Bible
The Bible offers some basis for appealing to human nature as a source of
moral enlightenm nt. For example, the Wisdom literature of the O ld Testa-
ment draws upon collective human eX'Pcr ience to discover moral value. In the
New Testament, the parab les of Jesus use rdinary human experiences to
lighl up basic hWllan va lues. Paul , in pa.rticu!a r, was explicit in his reference
t " nature" a. a SOliTce of mora l knowledge for those who did not have access
to the revelation of the God of Israel. Critical reflection on experience is
sufficient for moral enligbten ment (Rom 1:20).
L1 hi s major work, Natural Law: A Tbeologjca/ Tf1vcstigatioll ,2 Jo efFuchs
develops this Line of thinking. He maintain that creation is intrinsically
connected with redemptive incarnation so that revelation nuJs nothi ng fie;
to what we can discover of the mJlterial content of morality through reason.
Natural law itself is graced; therefore, the rational requirements of morality
are the commandments of the creator. As a source of moral knowledge,
scripture offers a new motivation for living the moral life. Bruno Schuller h as
explored the 1'01 of scripture in morality t a greater extent and maintains
that, even though na mal law i. au horized by scripture, natural law is
necessary in the first place if we are ever to hear and understand revea led
morality. The revealed moral la w in scripture is an eXI res ion of na ural law;
it does not establish a different morality. 3
In any case, the development of a natural law tradition among Christian
thinkers is due not so much to the scriptures as to the influence of Greek
philosophy and Roman law.

The Greek Influence

Among the Greeks, the Stoics were the earliest ones to develop a notion
of natural law to a significant degree. They contributed to the natural law
tradition by emphasizing "nature" and the moral requirement to "conform"
222 Reason Informed By Faith

to what is given in nature. For the Stoics the goal of philosophy was to
achieve right moral conduct. As thorough-going materialists they believed
that the world was an inter-connected series of events and that right moral
living came with conforming to the given world order. "Don't fool with
Mother Nature" may be taken as their basic moral imperative. Abiding by
this maxim demands accepting what is given in nature as it is, cooperating
with the inter-connected rhythms of life, and not attempting to control or
shape nature to fit a personal goa\. Any talk of self-direction would make no
sense to the Stoics. Since the given order of events will ultimately assert
themselves according to their own design anyway, the human task is simply
to capitulate to what is given.
Aristotle influenced the natural law tradition, especially in St. Thomas,
even though Aristotle did not develop a natural law theory as such. From
within the framework of his hylomorphic theory of matter (a passive princi-
ple), he also emphasized "nature" but understood it as the cause or source of
activity in a being. The "law" of nature is the orientation of all beings toward
their perfection. Since the specific nature of humans is rationality, morally
good actions would be those which are rationally directed toward the full
actualization of human potential.

The Roman Influence

Whereas the Greeks emphasize I "uatlLre," the Romans cmphasizell Lhe
"law" of the natural order. The Romans w re interested in establishing politi-
cal order not only within the Roman state itself but throughout rhe w dd by
expanding the Roman emplre. Cicero (d. 43 B.C.) spok f n:ltural law as the
innate power of reason to direct action. To live according to the law given in
nature is to live according to what reason commands. For Cicero, then, we
ought to use prudential and thoughtful judgments in directing human behav-
ior and establishing social order.
Another Roman, Gaius (d. 180 A.D.) distinguishes two kinds of law for
regulating political order: jus civile regulates the civil rights within a legally
autonomous society such as the Roman state itself; jus gentium regulates the
relationships between legally autonomous territories. This kind of law is the
work of reason and gets its name from the fact that all peoples could observe it
since it is based on the common needs and concerns of all people. As such it is
not distinguishable from the natural law , or that which is reasonable.
By the third century, however, the natural law becomes clearly distin-
guished from jus gentium. This is due to the influential work of the Roman
jurist, Ulpian (d. 228 A.D.). To the two types of law distinguished by Gaius,
Ulpian adds a third, jus naturale, what nature has taught all animals. This law
is not peculiar to humans, but is the generic rule of action common to humans
Natural Law in Tradition 223

and to animals. In this sense, natural law comes close to the idea of animal
instinct. Ulpian's understanding of "nature" leads to identifying the human
with animal structures, tendencies, and behaviors. In this way, Ulpian was
making humans more like animals than unlike them.
By adding this kind of law, Ulpian isolated natural law from the law
proper to humans. In doing so, Ulpian opened up implications which have
had unfortunate effects on much of the subsequent moral reflection based on
natural law. For example, Ulpian's threefold division of law distinguished
what is proper to humans (reflected in jus civile and jus gentium) and what is
common to humans and animals (the domain of jus naturale). Unfortunately,
each aspect gets treated as a separate layer retaining its own purpose without
having any influence on the other. Natural law now takes on a physicalist cast
whereby the natural moral order becomes identified with the properties,
operations, and goals of the "natural" or given structures of physical, animal
life. According to such a view, the moral act becomes identified with the
physical act which corresponds to animal processes. Moral obligations arise
from what is already prescribed in the physical structures of being human
apart from their relation to the totality of the person, which includes such
aspects as reason, freedom, affections, and relationships. Moral evaluations,
as a result, become based on the integrity and purpose of physical actions
taken apart from the totality of the person.
Ulpian's definition has had a lasting effect on subsequent developments
of natural law theory. The influence of Ulpian on the natural law tradition
has been long-lived due to his definition being adopted by the most influen-
tial and authoritative source of Roman law, the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justin-
ian. Ulpian's definition passed on to St. Thomas through Roman law itself as
well as through those who commented on it. By the time St. Thomas under-
took his great synthesis, Ulpian's definition had been so firmly established in
the tradition of law that St. Thomas could not ignore it. He had to deal with
it.4

Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas

By the high Middle Ages, two strains of interpretation dominated the
natural law tradition. One, the "order of nature," identified with the Stoics
and Ulpian, focused on the physical and biological structures given in nature
as the source of morality. The other, the "order of reason," identified with
Aristotle, Cicero, and Gaius, focused on the human capacity to discover in
experience what befits human well-being. St. Thomas accepted both. Since
his teaching is the seminal influence on the traditional Catholic use of natural
law, subsequent Catholic theology has been influenced by both interpreta-
tions as well. 5
224 Reason Informed By Faith

The vacillation between the "order of nature" and the "order of reason"
as the basis of moral teaching has caused great confusion in Catholic moral
thought. We may better appreciate the confusion and vacillation ofthe use of
natural law in present Catholic teaching if we understand the ways St.
Thomas interpreted and used it.
In the Summa, natural law (I-II, q. 94) is set in the theological context of
the exitus et reditus principle: all things come from God and return to God. The
natural law is situated in the treatise on law (I-II, qq. 90-97) as a means of
returning to God. It is linked with the notion oflaw in general as an ordinance
of practical reason (q. 90) and with eternal law , which is the way of saying that
God is the ultimate source of moral value and moral obligation (q. 93).
Everything created participates in the eternal law according to its nature.
Insensible beings participate passively by following the direction of physical,
chemical, and biological forces. The animal world participates by instinct.
Humans participate in eternal law by reason. In this context we find the
classic expression of the most fundamental understanding of natural law in
St. Thomas: the human person's participation in eternal law through the use
of reason (cf. I-II, q. 91, a. 2; and q. 93).
This definition of natural law has wide-ranging implications for moral-
ity. With eternal law as the primary point of reference, what God requires
and enables becomes the ultimate norm of morality, the basis of objective
morality, and the source of moral obligation. The proximate norm of moral-
ity is authentic human existence. The natural law is the human way of
knowing the ultimate norm of morality---eternallaw, or what God requires
and enables. It knows this by reflecting critically on the proximate norm of
morality-what it means to live a fully human life in community with others
striving for human wholeness. 6
An accurate appeal to this classic understanding of natural law, then,
depends on discovering what being "human" really means. This is the work
of reason reflecting on the totality of human experience and not only one
aspect of it, such as the physical or biological. "Reason" is not to be construed
here in the narrow sense of logic or analysis. "Reason," in the Thomistic
sense of recta ratio, entails the totality of the human tendency to want to know
the whole of reality and come to truth. This sense of "reason" includes
observation and research, intuition, affection, common sense, and an aes-
thetic sense in an effort to know human reality in all its aspects. In short,
whatever resources we can use to understand the meaning of being human
will be appropriate for a natural law approach to morality.
This fundamental understanding of natural law shows St. Thomas' pref-
erence for the rational aspects of natural law , a view hardly reconcilable with
the biological natural law of Ulpian's definition. If St. Thomas were consis-
tent, the case against Ulpian's definition would then be closed and the Catho-
Natural Law in Tradition 225

lic tradition of natural law might well have followed the "order of reason"
interpretation throughout its moral teaching.
But St. Thomas is not consistent. According to the historical analysis of
Michael B. Crowe, St. Thomas was ready to welcome conceptions of natural
law from his predecessors which had little in common with each other and
which did not even fit the demands of his own basic thought. 7 As Crowe
further observes, "Aquinas does appear to feel a need, not altogether ex-
plained by his habit of deference to authorities, to make provision for
Ulpian."8 Crowe concludes that St. Thomas' retention of Ulpian's definition
remains "slightly puzzling."9
The influence of Ulpian's definition makes an unmistakable appearance
in his key discussion of natural law in I-II, q. 94, a. 2. The question is
whether the natural law has several precepts or only one. St. Thomas an-
swers this question by first identifying the one fundamental norm of natural
law: do good and avoid evil. In the Thomistic perspective, doing good is
following reason's lead to actualize human potential. Evil is whatever frus-
trates or prohibits that full realization. This fundamental norm does not give
content for action, but it does indicate a basic disposition we ought to have.
As such, this basic norm pertains more to the ethics of being than to the
ethics of doing. It encourages us to become who we are by acting in a way
that would actualize our potential. This first principle of natural law under-
scores the dynamic character of the natural law as a tendency rather than a
code ordering human persons toward being authentic persons. 10
Aquinas then moves on to the specific norms of natural law based on the
natural inclinations. The origin of our specific moral obligations lies in these
natural inclinations which give content to the fundamental requirement to do
good and avoid evil. The practical reason perceives the natural inclinations in
human persons in the form of moral imperatives which become the concrete
conclusions of natural law .
The first inclination to the good is common to all created reality. It is the
tendency to persevere in being. Preserving and protecting life as a basic value
belongs to the natural law on the basis of this inclination. St. Thomas appeals
to this inclination in his argument against suicide (II-II, q. 64, a. 5) and in his
argument for killing in self-defense (II-II, q. 64, a. 7).
The second inclination to the good is generic to animals. Insofar as
humans are animals, what nature has taught all animals belongs to natural
law. Included here is the tendency toward the procreation and education of
offspring. This is the "order of nature" strain of interpretation of natural law
in St. Thomas. The influence of Ulpian is quite evident here even though St.
Thomas does not mention him by name. St. Thomas appeals to the order of
nature of "generic natural law" in his discussion of sexual matters (cf. II-II,
q. 154, aa. 11, 12).
226 Reason Informed By Faith

The third inclination to the good is specific to humans. Insofar as hu-

mans are rational, whatever pertains to reason belongs to the natural law.
This includes the tendency toward truth and cooperating with one another in
a social existence. This is the "order of reason" strain of interpretation of
natural law, which is consistent with St. Thomas' fundamental definition of
natural law as the human participation in eternal law through the use of
reason. He appeals to the order of reason of "specific natural law" when
dealing with matters of justice (cf. II-II, q. 64).
The interpretation of natural law which corresponds to the "order of
nature," or generic natural law, in St. Thomas is influenced by Ulpian's
definition of jus naturale: what nature has taught all animals. This way of
understanding natural law emphasizes human physical and biological nature
in determining morality. It suggests a "blueprint" or "maker's instructions"
theory of natural law which supports physicalism over personalism. "Per-
sonalism" is hard to define with precision. It is characterized by placing
emphasis on dimensions of the human person and human actions which
extend beyond the physical and biological to include the social, spiritual, and
psychological dimensions as well. "Physicalism," on the other hand, refers to
the tendency in moral analysis to emphasize, or even to absolutize, the physi-
cal and biological aspects of the human person and human actions indepen-
dently of the function of reason and freedom.
N aturallaw physicalism is the guiding principle in the following analogy
provided by Gerald A. Kelly, one of the leading Catholic moralists immedi-
ately prior to Vatican II, in his major medical-moral manual.

Suppose that an inventor-mechanic would construct a new type of

machine, e.g., a special type of automobile; and suppose that he
would then sell it to me and would present me with a book of
instructions concerning its correct and incorrect use. Granted that
the mechanic acted reasonably, these instructions would not be a
merely arbitrary afterthought without any reference to the nature of
the machine. Rather, they would be a written formulation of "dos
and don'ts" based upon his own intimate knowledge of the machine.
He planned it for a certain purpose; he chose the materials and
arranged them according to a certain design; he knows what is in it;
and his instructions express this knowledge in a practical way.
Another talented mechanic might examine this same machine and,
by perceiving its materials, its arrangement, and its purpose, he
could reach substantially the same conclusions as the inventor had
expressed in his book of instructions. In other words, both the
inventor and the examining mechanic would know that the very
Natural Law in Tradition 227

nature of the machine requires that it be operated in a certain way,

or in certain ways, in order to accomplish its purpose. II

This analogy illustrates the "blueprint" or "maker's instructions" theory

of natural law physicalism in bold terms. It understands nature as the viceroy
of God. This turns the natural law theory into a kind of natural fundamental-
ism whereby the rule of God and the rule of nature are practically one. In
nature, God speaks. The structures and functions found in nature are the
expressions of God's actions on humankind. The human task is to examine
the givens in nature in order to understand their arrangement and purpose.
Moral obligation can be read off what nature requires in order to fulfill its
inherent design.
Such an understanding of natural law has significant implications for
morality. Physicalism discovers criteria for moral judgment by studying hu-
man structures and their functions in their natural (read: "God-given") state
before any intervention by the human person. Moral norms, for example, are
"written in nature." They can be "read off" the physical properties, opera-
tions, and goals of the human faculties (e.g., the faculty of speech is for truth-
telling, the reproductive faculty is for producing life). Moral obligations are
fulfilled by conforming human action to the detailed patterns found in na-
ture. An action is immoral, or "intrinsically morally evil," because it is
contrary to nature, i.e., it frustrates the finality of a natural (read: "God-
given") faculty. For example, speaking falsely frustrates the faculty of speech
which is oriented to telling the truth, and contraception or sterilization frus-
trates the reproductive faculty which is oriented to the giving of life.
The physicalist interpretation of natural law has dominated much of the
Catholic moral tradition in sexual and medical matters pertaining to reproduc-
tion. It allows moral positions to be taken without ambiguity in every in-
stance where the same kind of physical action occurs. 12 The Catholic tradi-
tion has regarded any violation of the natural order as a serious offense since
violating the natural order is an affront against God, its author. This helps
explain in part why our traditional morality maintained no "light matter" in
the area of sexual morality.
Since the order of nature comes directly from God as its author, it
assumes a priority and superiority over the order of reason which comes more
immediately from the human person. St. Thomas maintained this position in
the Summa when dealing with the morality of sexual matters:

Reason presupposes things as determined by-nature ... so in mat-

ters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as
determined by nature (II-II, q. 154, a. 12).
228 Reason Informed By Faith

This position establishes the superiority of the order of nature as coming

from God (cf. II-II, q. 154, a. 12, ad. 1) and makes reason subject to it in a
subordinate and passive way (ad. 2).
St. Thomas goes on to say in II-II, q. 154, a. 12 that in matters of
chastity, the most serious offenses are those against the order of nature, i. e.,
those actions which do not fulfill the finality written by God into biological
nature. Louis Janssens has studied this section of St. Thomas carefully to
show where such a position leads.

Sexual activities excluding procreation (Thomas classifies them in

an order of ascendent gravity: masturbation, marital contraceptive
intercourse, homosexuality, bestiality) are sins against biological
nature (contra naturam omnis animalis). They are graver than the sins
which do not exclude procreation (in ascendent degree of gravity:
fornication, adultery, incest), because they go directly against God,
the Creator who expresses his will in the biological nature. There-
fore, in a certain sense they are even graver than sacrilege. lJ

Following St. Thomas' principle that the most serious actions are those
which go against nature, we would have to conclude that masturbation is a
more serious violation of chastity than incest, adultery, rape, or fornication
(II-II, q. 154, aa. 11, 12). Janssens shows that contemporary moralists would
not draw such conclusions. A different understanding of "nature" and "natu-
rallaw" explains the different conclusions.
The modern worldview of contemporary morality does not look on
nature as a finished product prescribing God's moral will and commanding a
fixed moral response. Rather, it looks on nature as evolving. For example, the
laws and properties of the given world can and do combine with unexpected
circumstances to give us something new. Within the limits set by necessary
physical laws which already determine reality somewhat, human reason and
freedom can intervene to bring about something new. In this view, "nature"
provides the material with which we have to deal in a human way to promote
the well-being of human life. We are not subjected in a fated way to the inner
finality of nature. We discover what natural law requires by reason reflecting
on what is given in human experience to lead to authentic human life and the
full actualization of human potential. 14
With this brief overview of the understanding of natural law in tradition,
we are in a better position to appreciate the use of natural law in ecclesiastical
documents and to identify the characteristic features of the status of natural
law today. Such will be the focus of the next chapter.
Natural Law in Tradition 229

Notes
1. Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law (St. Louis: B. Herder,
1947); Yves R. Simon, The Tradition of Natural Law (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1965), pp. 16-40
2. Fuchs, Natural Law: A Theological Investigation, translated by Hel-
mut Reckter and John A. Dowling (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965). See
also his "Is There a Specifically Christian Morality?" in Charles E. Curran
and Richard A. McCormick, eds., The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics: Read-
ings in Moral Theology No.2 (Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1980), pp. 3-19.
3. "Zur theologischen Diskussion tiber die lex naturalis," Theologie und
Philosophie 41 (1966): 481-503. See also his "The Debate on the Specific
Character of Christian Ethics: Some .Remarks," in Curran and McCormick,
eds., The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics, pp. 207-233.
4. For the legal and theological uses of natural law and its influence on
St. Thomas, see Michael B. Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's Natural
Law," St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, ed. Armand A.
Maurer, 2 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974),
Vol. 1, pp. 261-282; see especially 267-272.
5. Even brief historical sketches of the natural law help to identify
these two strains. See, for example, Charles E. Curran, "Natural Law,"
Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1985), pp. 119-172; Timothy O'Connell, Principles for a Catholic
Morality (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), pp. 134-144; Columba Ryan,
"The Traditional Concept of Natural Law: An Interpretation," Light on the
Natural Law, An Interpretation, ed. I. Evans (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965),
pp. 13-37.
6. I am following here the insights of Columba Ryan, "The Tradi-
tional Concept of Natural Law: An Interpretation," in Illtud Evans, ed.,
Light on the Natural Law (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), pp. 22-24, 32.
7. See especially the thorough analysis of natural law in St. Thomas
by Michael B. Crowe, The Changing Profile of Natural Law (The Hague:
Martinus Nihoff, 1977); see especially Chapter VI, "Aquinas Faces the
Natural Law Tradition," pp. 136-165, and Chapter VII, "Aquinas Makes
Up His Mind," pp. 166-191. See also Crowe's study, "St. Thomas and
Ulpian's Natural Law," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative
Studies, pp. 261-282.
8. Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's Natural Law,-" in St. Thomas
Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, p. 278.
9. Ibid., p. 282.
10. I am following here the insights of Louis Monden, Sin, Liberty and
230 Reason Informed By Faith

Law, translated by Joseph Donceel (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp.
88-89.
11. Gerald A. Kelly, Medico-Moral Problems (St. Louis: Catholic Hospi-
tal Association, 1958), pp. 28-29.
12. An excellent book which traces the physicalist interpretation of natu-
rallaw through Catholic medical ethics in North America is David F. Kelly,
The Emergence of Roman Catholic Medical Ethics in North America (New York:
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1979).
13. "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics," Louvain Studies 4 (Spring
1977): 234-235. References to St. Thomas in this quotation are II-II, q. 154,
aa. 11, 12 ad. 4; De Malo q. 15, a. 1, ad. 7; II-II, q. 154, a. 12 and 12 ad. 2.
14. Ibid., p. 236.
 16 Natural Law Today

Since the tension between the "order of nature" and the "order of
reason" approaches to natural law has been so paramount in subsequent
Catholic theology, we need to give more attention to the meaning and implica-
tions of each and show examples of their use in official Catholic teaching. l

Natural Law in Magisterial Documents

The manner of deriving a moral position on the basis of the "order of
nature" over the "order of reason" and pronouncing specific moral judgments
on acts in themselves has found its way into the documents of the ma-
gisterium on sexual and medical moral matters pertaining to reproduction.
For example, Pius XI in Casti Connubii (1930) says this:

But no reason, however grave, may be put forward by which any-

thing intrinsically against nature may become conformable to na-
ture and morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined
primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in
exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin
against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsi-
cally vicious. Z

This same understanding of natural law appears again in Pius XII's Address to
Midwives in 1951:

Nature places at man's disposal the whole chain of the causes which
give rise to new human life; it is man's part to release the living
force, and to nature pertains the development of that force, leading
to its completion .... Thus the part played by nature and the part
played by man are precisely determined. 3

231
232 Reason Informed By Faith

Paul VI carried this understanding of natural law forward in Humanae

Vitae in 1968 by maintaining:

Nonetheless the Church, calling men back to the observance of the

norms of the natural law, as interpreted by the constant doctrine,
teaches that each and every marriage act (quilibet matrimonii usus)
must remain open to the transmission of life ....

To make use of the gift of conjugal love while respecting the laws of
the generative process means to acknowledge oneself not to be the
arbiter of the sources of human life, but rather the minister of the
design established by the Creator. In fact, just as man does not have
unlimited dominion over his body in general, so also, with particu-
lar reason, he has no such dominion over his generative faculties as
such, because of their intrinsic ordination toward raising up life, of
which God is the principle. 4

Paul VI also reflects St. Thomas in making the order of nature superior to the
order of reason in sexual matters by claiming:

The church is the first to praise and recommend the intervention of

intelligence in a function which so closely associates the rational
creature with his Creator; but she affirms that this must be done
with respect for the order established by God. 5

In 1975 the Sacred Congregation issued Persona Humana, the Declaration

on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, which repeats the perspec-
tive of Humanae Vitae, as can be seen from this excerpt:

The main reason [that masturbation is an intrinsically and seriously

disordered act] is that, whatever the motive for acting in this way,
the deliberate use of the sexual faculty outside normal conjugal
relations essentially contradicts the finality of the faculty. 6

The same understanding of natural law is used again by the Congregation in

its 1986 letter to bishops, "The Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons." It
points out that homosexual acts are deprived of their essential finality and are
intrinsically disordered (n. 3). While this letter does appeal to personalism by
claiming to base its teaching on the reality of the human person in one's
spiritual and physical dimensions (n. 2), the personalist perspective is not
carried through consistently. The method of the document is ultimately
Natural Law Today 233

based on the essential nature of the sexual faculty which is taken to be the
same as the whole personality.
Similarly, the 1987 document on bioethics, "Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation," of the same
Congregation is mixed in its natuTaJ law perspective. ' ven though it u 'es
more personalistic terms and admits in tb Introduction to a prd r nc lor
(he rational and not the biological emphasis of natw'RI law, it falls back on
natural law physicalism in treating , orne specific issues. For example, in the
Introduction we read:

Therefore this law [the natural moral law] cannot be thought of as

simply a set of norms on the biological level; rather it must be
defined as the rational order whereby man is called by the Creator
to direct and regulate his life and actions and in particular to make
use of his own body ....

[Artificial interventions regarding procreation and the origin of life]

must be given a moral evaluation in reference to the dignity of the
human person, who is called to realize his vocation from God to the
gift of love and the gift of life. 7

Yet behind these personalistic terms and openness to the rational order lie the
framework and conclusions of physicalism regarding the morality of repro-
ductive interventions. For example,

Homologous artificial insemination within marriage cannot be ad-

mitted except for those cases in which the technical means is not a
substitute for the conjugal act but serves to facilitate and to help so
that the act attains its natural purpose. 8

Physicalism, however, does light up some tfilth. Part of being Illlman is

to have a body whose srructur and fuoctions cannot be arb itrarily treated .
So the trength of the physicalist approacb to nanlral law i that it dearly
recognizes the 19i en ness" of buman nature. Human effort must indeed
cooperare with the fixed chancter of human existence in promoting the well-
being f human life. The weakness of this approach however, is to mjstake
the "givens" of human nature as the ""hole of human natmc, or to take the
fixed cha racter of human existence as being dosed and beyond tbe controJ of
human creative development. The danger of pn sicalism is to derive moral
imperatives from bodily structl,lre an I functions :wd to exclude the totality of
the person and his or her relational con ext in making a moral assessment.
234 Reason Informed By Faith

Karl Rahner has captured well the tension between the givenness of
nature and human creative capacities in this statement:

For contemporary man, nature is no longer the lofty viceroy of

God, one which lies beyond man's control, but instead has become
the material which he needs so as to experience himself in his own
role of free creator and so as to build his own world for himself
according to his own laws. Of course, it is true that this material of
human creativeness has laws proper to itself which will weigh heav-
ily on man. It is true that this human creativeness consequently
subjects itself, whether it likes it or not, to what is alien and given to
it; it is not pure creativeness as we acknowledge it of God; it does
not come completely from within and it is not simply a law unto
itself; it does not evoke matter and form out of nothing, and hence
this creativeness of man, which has to deal with the laws of matter,
is naturally also in every case a growth in obedience and "servitude"
in the face of an alien law ... but it is creation in knowing, willing
and mastering sense, a creativeness which forces nature into its own
service. 9

The physicalist approach to natural law has been criticized on many

counts. 10 Typical of the critical reactions to this approach to natural law and
the conclusions it yields is this one by the Georgetown philosopher, Louis
Dupre, made during the birth control debates of the 1960s:

Such a way of reasoning about nature contains, I feel, two basic

flaws. It confuses man's biological structure with his human nature.
And it takes human nature as a static, unchangeable thing, rather
than as a principle of development. Man's biological life and its
intrinsic laws are but one aspect of human existence. I I

Charles E. Curran has been consistent in his criticism of the physicalist

approach to natural law. His criticisms run along several lines. He finds
physicalism to reflect the naive realism of the classicist worldview. This
means that physicalism is based on an essentialist definition of human nature
which has no room for change; it views nature as a finished product so that
change and historical process are incidental; also, it depends on a moral order
that is fixed and undeveloping. Physicalism gives exaggerated importance to
the human physical and biological nature in determining morality and puts
these on a par with the whole personality. It also separates the action from the
totality of the person and the full moral context. Physicalism claims too many
negative moral absolutes based on the action taken in itself, and it does not
Natural Law Today 235

make room for historical development and the creative intervention of reason
to humanize the given patterns of nature. 12
Catholic theology today is trying to revise the physicalist approach to
natural law which dominated the manuals and the magisterial decrees on
sexual ethics and medical moral matters pertaining to reproduction. Many
theologians today are saying that natural law is not necessarily tied to physi-
calism and the classicist world view; it belongs also in a world view that takes
experience, history, change, and development seriously. Contemporary theol-
ogy's use of natural law is more historically conscious and taps into the
second strain of interpretation of natural law , the order of reason.
The trend in Roman Catholic moral theology today is to develop more
and more the rational aspect of the natural law tradition. In this use, reason,
and not the physical structure of human faculties or actions taken by them-
selves, becomes the standard of natural law. Building on Thomistic founda-
tions, this approach understands reason (recta ratio) in the broad sense of the
dynamic tendency in the human person to come to truth, to grasp the whole
of reality as it is. A morality that has reason as its basic standard, then, is a
morality based on reality. The work of reason is to discover moral value in
the experience of the reality of being human. This seems to be the fundamen-
tal direction which recent trends in interpreting the natural law are taking.
Much more attention is being given today to the total complexity of reality
experienced in its historically particular ways.ll
In a natural law approach which emphasizes the rational aspects, the
human person is not subject to the God-given order of nature in the same way
the animals are. The human person does not have to conform to natural
patterns as a matter of fate. Rather, nature provides the possibilities and
potentialities which the human person can use to make human life truly
human. The given physical and biological orders do not dictate moral obliga-
tions; rather, they provide the data and the possibilities for the human person
to use in order to achieve human goals.
The natural order remains an important factor to consider if the human
person is to base moral norms on reality. But the natural order is not to be taken
as the moral order. The human person can creatively intervene to direct the
natural order in a way that is properly proportionate to full human develop-
ment. The "nature" which reason explores is no longer separated from the total
complexity of personal, human life taken in all its relationships. 14
This understanding of natural law has important implications for moral-
ity. Natural law morality is objective morality insofar as it is based, not on
selfish interest, but on a critical effort to grasp the whole of human reality in
all its relationships. Insofar as reality continues to change, moral positions
must be open to revision. Inasmuch as we can grasp only a part of the whole
at anyone time, specific moral conclusions based on natural law will necessar-
236 Reason Informed By Faith

ily be limited and tentative. These conclusions are reliable insofar as they
reflect as accurate a grasp of human reality as is possible at one time. But such
conclusions must necessarily be open to revision since more of the meaning of
being human is yet to be discovered.
While right reason is the full exercise of our capacity to grasp the whole
of reality, the full exercise of reason is limited by individual capacities,
emotional involvements which bias the interpretation of data, and cultural
conditions which influence one's perspective on reality (cf. I-II, q. 94, a. 6).
All of these factors necessarily place limitations on moral judgments, contrib-
ute to moral differences, and lead to more modest claims of certitude than did
the order of nature approach to natural law.
The order of reason approach to natural law is used in magisterial docu-
ments on social ethics. 15 Even though the great social encyclicals Rerum
Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno, and Pacem in Terris reflect something of a static
social order, they do move away from the order of nature interpretation of
natural law evident in decrees on sexual and medical moral matters to an
interpretation of natural law which is based on the prudential use of reason.
Consider this brief excerpt from Pacem in Terris (1963) as a point of illustration
for this shift:

But the Creator of the world has imprinted in man's heart an order
which his conscience reveals to him and enjoins him to obey: This
shows that the obligations of the law are written in their hearts: their
conscience utters its own testimony. . . . But fickleness of opinion often
produces this error, that many think that the relationships between
men and states can be governed by the same laws as the forces and
irrational elements of the universe, whereas the laws governing
them are of quite a different kind and are to be sought elsewhere,
namely, where the Father of all things wrote them, that is, in the
nature of man. 16

In that encyclical John XXIII could address all persons of good will, not just
Catholics specifically or Christians in general, because he emphasized that
reason can discover the demands of human dignity placed in creatures by the
creator.
Paul VI reflects a dynamic view of natural law in his great social
encyclical Populorum Progressio (1967). He appeals to the creative interven-
tion of the human person and the community to direct natural processes
toward fulfillment:

In the design of God, every man is called upon to develop and fulfill
himself, for every life is a vocation. At birth, everyone is granted, in
Natural Law Today 237

germ, a set of aptitudes and qualities for him to bring to fruition.

Their coming to maturity, which will be the result of education
.received from the environment and personal efforts, will allow each
man to direct himself toward the destiny intended for him by his
Creator. Endowed with intelligence and freedom, he is responsible
for his fulfillment as he is for his salvation. He is aided, or some-
times impeded, by those who educate him and those with whom he
lives, but each one remains, whatever be these influences affecting
him, the principal agent of his own success or failure. By the un-
aided effort of his own intelligence and his will, each man can grow
in humanity, can enhance his personal worth, can become more a
person. 17

In his apostolic letter of 1971, Octogesima Adveniens (more popularly

known as "A Call to Action"), Paul VI also expressed a dynamic view of
natural law. It is based on the order of reason which grounds morality in
reality and yields tentative moral positions open to development.

In the face of such widely varying situations it is difficult for us to

utter a unified message and to put forward a solution which has
universal validity. Such is not our ambition, nor is it our mission. It
is up to the Christian communities to analyze with objectivity the
situation which is proper to their own country, to shed on it the
light of the Gospel's unalterable words, and to draw principles of
reflection, norms of judgment and directives for action from the
social teaching of the Church. IS

A comparison of documents representing the order of nature approach to

natural law with those representing the order of reason approach shows the
two different methods which have been operating in Catholic moral theology
side by side to give us our moral norms and moral positions.1 9 The clear
distinctions and definitions which were possible by using the order of nature
approach in sexual and medical moral matters are not present in the areas of
social ethics. On the basis of the order of nature criteria, Catholic sexual
ethics and medical ethics pertaining to reproduction have achieved a degree of
certainty, precision, and consistency of moral judgment which we do not find
in the documents on social ethics. The order of reason approach to under-
standing natural law does not yield the clear unambiguous positions which
the order of nature approach does.
The church's epistemological claims in regard to natural law in social
matters are more modest, more cautious, and more nuanced than those in
sexual ethics and medical moral reproductive matters. In social ethics, the
238 Reason Informed By Faith

church readily accepts the inevitability of conflict on the philosophical level

as well as in social life. The above excerpt from Octogesima Adveniens acknowl-
edges this and the American bishops openly acknowledge inevitable diversity
in their recent pastoral letters on war and peace and the economy. In The
Challenge of Peace (1983) we read:

When making applications of these principles we realize-and we

wish readers to recognize-that prudential judgments are involved
based on specific circumstances which can change or which can be
interpreted differently by people of good will .

. . .On complex social questions, the Church expects a certain

diversity of views even though all hold the same universal moral
principles. 20

From such a perspective, the church accepts conclusions of the application of

general principles which are limited, tentative, and open to revision-all of
which are characteristic of the order of reason strain in the tradition of natural
law.
A review of what we have seen thus far will prepare us for a synthetic
view of the profile of natural law in contemporary Catholic moral theology.
For this review, see the accompanying chart which contrasts the salient
features of both approaches to the natural law. The examples under the order
of nature approach actually show a mix in their use of natural law. However,
the order of nature interpretation of natural law does dominate to control the
moral method and conclusions of these documents.

Synthetic Description of Natural Law

In light of the tradition of natural law just considered, we can bring
together a synthetic description of natural law which highlights its salient
features.

The Meaning of "Natural"

As it is used in natural law theory, "natural" is not opposed to "artifi-
cial," nor does it refer to the well-defined given structures and functions of
the body or of any created reality. To equate "natural" with well-defined
patterns in creation leads to a natural fundamentalism and yields a "blue-
print" of "maker's instructions" theory of the natural moral law. Such an
approach has no room for the distinctively human, creative aspects of moral
knowledge and freedom. Moral knowledge would be simply the matter of
Natural Law Today 239

TWO STRAINS OF INTERPRETATION

OF NATURAL LAW
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL NORMS
"THE ORDER OF "THE ORDER OF
FEATURES NATURE" REASON"

1. Designation of "According to Nature" "According to (right) Rea-

Moral Norms son'J

2. Source of "Written in Nature" "Human Experience" taken

Moral Norms in all its complexity and in
its relationships
God is the author of na-
ture.
God-given structures take Norms express the prudent
priority over anything use of reason in the hu-
derived from human re- man, rational effort to
flection. grasp moral obligation
grounded in human experi-
ence.

3. Knowledge of Observe the way nature Rational grasp of human ex-

Moral Norms works. perience.
Reason is expressed through
whatever means would
help us grasp the meaning
of being human in all its
fullness.

4. Violation Any interference with the Acting against what you

order designed by God know to be a true expres-
is gravely serious. No sion of what most fulfills
"light matter" here. human potential as this
can be known through rea-
son's reflection on human
experience.
240 Reason Informed By Faith

"THE ORDER OF "THE ORDER OF

FEATURES NATURE" REASON"

5. Examples Casti Connubii (1930) Rerum Novarum (1891)

Pius XII's Address to Mid- Quadragesimo Anno (1931)
wives (1951)
Humanae Vitae (1968) Pacem in Terris (1963)
Persona Humana (1975) Gaudium et Spes (1965)
Letter on the Pastoral Care of Populorum Progressio (1967)
Homosexual Persons
(1986)
Instruction on Bioethics Octogesima Adveniens (1971)
(1987)
The Challenge of Peace (1983)
Economic Justice for All (1986)

discovering the given patterns in the world, and freedom would be reduced to
a matter of abiding by or violating what is given.
Rather, the notion "natural" in natural moral law theory is more accu-
rately construed as shorthand for the total complexity of human reality taken
in all its relationships and with all its potential. What pertains to "nature" is
accessible to all and provides the potential with which human creativity must
deal in order to achieve human wholeness. Since "nature" is constantly chang-
ing, it continues to make new demands on us. As a result, change, revision,
and development would be constitutive of the natural moral law.
The force of "natural," then, is not to oppose what is artificial or to point
to a fixed pattern in the world. Rather, it is to ground morality in reality lest
moral obligations become the product of self-interest groups or subjective
whim. "Natural" is what is in reality providing the potential which would
make it possible for each person to come to wholeness in community with
others seeking wholeness.

The Meaning of "Law"

The notion of "law" in natural moral law theory is "law" only in a
secondary sense. It is "law" in the sense of disclosing moral obligation. But it
does not have the meaning of a codified system of rights or regulations
prescribed by a legislator, such as the Bill of Rights or the Nuremberg Code.
Nor does it have the sense of a scientific law of uniform behavior, such as the
law of gravity or the law of thermodynamics. While uniformity is indeed an
important aspect of law in the regulation of elements and organisms, human
moral behavior is not regulated in the same way as animate or inanimate
Natural Law Today 241

objects are. Human moral behavior respects the creative human capacity for
knowledge and freedom.
The force of "law" in natural moral law theory is the force of reason in
the Thomistic sense of recta ratio--the inclination to grasp the whole of reality
and come to moral truth. "Law" then means that reason is the basic standard
by which we discern moral obligation in the total complex of human relation-
ships. As we discover more and more what contributes to human well-being
and personal wholeness in community, we can formulate with confidence
these discoveries of value into guiding norms, such as respect human life,
treat others as you would wish to be treated. Insofar as these norms reflect
truly human values, they can be invoked as guiding principles for all peoples.
From these understandings of "natural" and "law" we can put together a
synthetic definition which reflects the core of the Catholic natural law tradi-
tion: natural law is reason reflecting on human experience discovering moral
value.

The Function and Value of

Natural Law
Natural law functions in the Catholic moral tradition more as an ap-
proach to discovering moral value than as a body of established content. As
an approach to moral value, it yields three basic convictions which are hall-
marks of Catholic morality.21

1. Natural law claims the existence ojan objective moral order.

This claim follows from the conviction that morality is grounded in
reality. On this basis Catholic morality claims some actions as right and some
as wrong since moral obligation is not something which can be made up at
will, nor is it dependent on a single individual's or group's interest. This
conviction places natural law morality in strict opposition to the extreme
forms of situation ethics which emphasize the uniqueness of each moment of
moral choice and an unpredictably changing moral order. It also puts natural
law morality in strict opposition to voluntarism (or legal positivism) which
makes the will of the legislator the determiner of the morally right or wrong.

2. Natural law morality is accessible to anyone independently oj one's religious

commitment.
This conviction claims that our knowledge of moral value and moral
obligation is available to anyone who is able to do the critical work of reflect-
ing on human experience with an interest in discovering moral truth. It
enables the Catholic tradition to argue for the rightness of particular actions
without recourse to religious insight or motivation. As such, this puts Catho-
242 Reason Informed By Faith

lic natural law morality in strict opposition to a divine command theory of

ethics, such as that of Karl Barth, which requires access to divine revelation
to know what is morally required. It enables Catholic morality to engage in
ecumenical dialogue on moral issues not only with other Christian traditions,
but also with non-Christian religions as well as with non-religious persons.
The claim that the natural law is accessihle to everyone does not mean
that everyone actually knows what is morally required or is equally commit-
ted to it. This does not change the fact that morality has an objective ground.
It may, however, render a person less culpable of immorality. For example,
not every murder is committed by a morally culpable person, but that does
not lessen the immorality of murder. This conviction is the basis in natural
law for the requirement of a keen pastoral sensitivity when dealing with
others who may not be culpable in some moral matters. The traditional
Catholic distinction between the objectively immoral action and the subjec-
tively non-culpable person derives from this conviction.

3. The knowledge of moral value can be universalized.

The Catholic moral tradition has addressed its teaching to all people of
good will in the belief that it is teaching the truth about being human gener-
ally. To discover an objective moral value which renders some actions right
and some wrong is to discover something which would apply wherever that
value is at stake or those particular actions are done.
These are three hallmarks of Catholic morality rooted in its natural law
tradition and still viable today. From these we can move on to sketch the
characteristic features of a contemporary profile of natural law which repre-
sents the dominant tendency of a significant number of contemporary Catho-
lic theologians.

Contemporary Profile of Natural Law

While no totally systematic treatment of a revised theory of natural law
has yet been made, at least certain key features which would make up the
profile of such a theory have emerged. Timothy E. O'Connell has outlined
them well as real, experiential, historical, and proportional. 22 I will summa-
rize his presentation here and add the component of "personal" which,
though implicit and running through all his other features, he does not
identify specifically.

Real
Natural law asserts that morality is based on reality. Realism stands, on
the one hand, in opposition to legal positivism which makes something right
merely because it is commanded. On the other hand, realism stands against a
Natural Law Today 243

morality based on personal whim whereby one can arbitrarily decide what is
right and wrong. The dimension of realism in a natural law theory means that
the moral life, ultimately, is not merely a matter of obedience to positive law,
nor is it a matter of doing whatever you want. The moral life is a matter of
doing the good. The moral person and the moral community must discover
what is morally good by critically reflecting on the total complexity of human
reality in all its relationships. The more we discover what it means to be
human the more we may have to revise our previously accepted conclusions
in morality. Our views of what is moral may change as our knowledge of
what it means to be authentically human develops. This is the fundamental
direction of a contemporary natural law approach to morality. A moral posi-
tion based on natural law, then, would be an expression of what the moral
community discovers in its experience to be most contributing to the full
actualization of human potential to attain human wholeness.2l

Experiential
If morality is based on realilty, we come to know morality through
experience. The experience of what helps or hinders human well-being pre-
cedes and directs the course of a moral argument. For example, we see what
lying does to people before we put together arguments about what makes
lying wrong. This suggests an inductive method for moral theology and an
appeal to empirical evidence in our process of deriving moral norms and
carrying on moral evaluations. 24 We discover moral value through our experi-
ence of living in relationship with self, others, God, and the world. A moral
position of the community ought to reflect its collective experience of what it
means to live this relational life. The inherited formulations of a moral posi-
tion are tested by continued experiences of what builds up and promotes the
dignity of human life. All this means that our moral theology must pay close
attention to human experience, past and present, in telling us what it means
to be human.

Consequential
Closely related to the experiential is the consequential. With the feature
of "consequential" we are entering an arena of much controversy, especially
because "consequences" are often intrepreted too narrowly to mean the short-
run, immediate consequences. 25 Consequences are an important part of moral
meaning, but consequences alone do not tell us what is right or wrong. The
totality of moral reality includes more than consequences. Yet consequences
are important if we are going to pay attention to the accumulation of human
experience. The moral community's ongoing experience of what helps and
hinders the well-being of human life gives rise to a moral position. These
244 Reason Informed By Faith

positions are retained within the community as a way of passing on to the

next generation the accumulated wisdom of the moral community's experi-
ence of moral value. 26

Historical
One of the most frequent criticisms made of traditional natural law
theory, especially of the order of nature strain of interpretation, is that it fails
to account for the possibility of change and development. Its static view of
the moral order produced universal and immutable positions. In contrast, the
historically conscious world view of contemporary theology has as a central
characteristic the reality of change and development. Contemporary theology
asks whether we can continue to presume that moral conclusions drawn on
the basis of historically conditioned experience and a limited perspective can
be equally valid for all times, places, and peoples. Whereas traditional moral
theology grounded natural law norms in the abstract, ahistorical, metaphysi-
cal nature of the human person which it held to be unchanging through the
ages, contemporary natural law theory grounds its position in the human
person concretely realized in various stages and situations of history. But
nothing is more damaging to natural law than to absolutize what is, in fact,
relative to history and to culture. Contemporary theology recognizes that it
cannot ignore the unfinished, evolutionary character of human nature and the
human world. Historical changes cannot be dismissed as accidental to what it
means to be human. The evidence of experience and the verification by data
of the historical sciences are too strong to support such a position.
The influence of historical consciousness on morality today is great.
Moral teaching today must be able to take into account our fundamental capac-
ity for change and development. What has built up human well-being in the
past may, or may not, continue to do so in the present or future.27 This
historical component of natural law leaves room for change and development.
A moral position developed from this approach will reflect the tentativeness of
historical consciousness and the provisional character of moral knowledge. 28

Proportional
O'Connell's last component is introduced to help us answer the practical
moral question, "What ought we to do?" At the most fundamental level, we
ought to do what is genuinely good, what is most loving, what truly contrib-
utes to the well-being of persons and community. Yet we know that we are
limited in so many ways-such as our personal capacities and skills, our time,
and our freedom. The good we do comes mixed with some bad. Our moral
efforts are directed toward trying to achieve the greatest proportion of good
to evil. The component of proportionality in natural law tells us that we are
Natural Law Today 245

doing the morally right thing when we achieve the greatest possible propor-
tion of good over evil. 29 This, in fact, gets to the heart of the Christian virtue
ofprud~nce as it comes to us through St. Thomas (I-II, q. 61, a. 2). It tells us
that moral persons must be able to guide us in our prudential judgments, i.e.,
in our judgments of proportionality.

Personal
Gaudium et Spes (1965) is a landmark document for the shift from "nature"
to "person" in an official Church document. 3D This historically conscious,
empirically oriented, personally focused document of the Second Vatican
Council introduced new considerations into natural law by the attention it
calls not to human nature as such, but to the human person. Part I of that
document lays the groundwork for this shift, and Part II addresses specific
problems in light of a personalistic perspective. We have already explored the
implications of the shift from nature to person under the analysis of Louis
Janssens' version of the personalistic criterion of "the human person ade-
quately considered." Again in brief summary, they are: (1) to be a moral
subject, i.e., to act with knowledge and in freedom; (2) to be an embodied
subject; (3) to be an historical subject with continuing new possibilities; (4) to
be an embodied subject who is part of the material world; (5) to be related to
others; (6) to be in a social group with structures and institutions worthy of
persons; (7) to be called to know and worship God; (8) to be unique yet
fundamentally equal (cf. Chapter 5).
A person-based morality avoids the fragmenting of human nature into
distinct faculties each having its own inherent purpose and morality indepen-
dently of other aspects of the person and of the totality of the person's
relationships. The shift from "nature" to "person" acknowledges not only
what all persons have in common, but also their differences as unique indi-
viduals with a distinct origin, history, cultural environment, and personal
vocation from God. The focus on the person in natural law theory can move
us closer to realizing that our vocation as persons is to image the divine
community of persons.
These in brief are the salient features of a contemporary profile of natu-
ral law. It is rooted in the order of reason strain of the natural law tradition,
and it is consistent with the historically conscious worldview of contempo-
rary theology. This approach to natural law calls for an inductive method of
moral argument which takes historical human experience seriously. It is
sensitive to the ambiguity of moral experience and to the limitations of formu-
lating absolute, universal, concrete moral norms. The use of natural law in
Catholic morality today is becoming more open to the great complexity and
ambiguity of human, personal reality. Its conclusions, while as accurate as
246 Reason Informed By Faith

the evidence will allow, are accurate enough to be reliable but must necessar-
ily be tentative and open to revision.
With this overview of the tradition and use of natural law in Catholic
moral theology, we are ready to explore in the following chapters the particu-
lar applications of natural law in the form of human, positive law, and moral
norms.

Notes
1. For a comparison of the natural law approaches in sexual and social
ethical documents, see Christopher Mooney, "Natural Law: A Case Study,"
in Public Virtue: Law and the Social Character of Religion (Notre Dame: Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 140-150. See also Charles E. Curran,
"Catholic Social and Sexual Teaching: A Methodological Comparison, " Theol-
ogy Today 44 (January 1988): 425-440.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all excerpts from official ecclesiastical
documents in this section are taken from the handy resource book, Official
Catholic Teachings: Love and Sexuality, ed. Odile M. Liebard (Wilmington,
N.C.: McGrath Publishing Company, 1978). This quote is on p. 41.
3. Ibid.,p.102.
4. Ibid., pp. 336-337.
5. Ibid., p. 339.
6. Ibid., p. 436.
7. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Instruction on Respect
for Human Life in its Origins and on the Dignity of Procreation," St. Paul
Editions (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1987), pp. 8-9.
8. Ibid., p. 31.
9. "The Man of Today and Religion," Theological Investigations, Vol. 6,
translated by Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (New York: Seabury Press,
1974), p. 8.
10. See, for example, the excellent article by Edward A. Malloy, "Natu-
ral Law Theory and Catholic Moral Theology," American Ecclesiastical Review
169 (September 1975): 456-469, especially pp. 457-461.
11. Dupre, Contraception and Catholics: A New Appraisal (Baltimore: Heli-
con Press, 1964), pp. 43-44.
12. See Curran's "Absolute Norms in Moral Theology," Norm and Con-
text in Christian Ethics, edited by Gene Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 139-173; also "Absolute Norms and
Medical Ethics," in Curran's edited collection Absolutes in Moral Theology?
(Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), pp. 108-153; and his "Natural Law," in
Directions, pp. 119-172.
Natural Law Today 247

13 . Summaries of trends in natural law thinking can be found in Rich-

ard A. McCormick, "Moral Notes," Theological Studies 28 (December 1967):
760-769; also, George M. Regan, New Trends in Moral Theology (New York:
Newman Press, 1971) pp. 115-144. For a Protestant view of trends in Catho-
lic natural law thinking, see James M . Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catho-
lic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1978), pp. 80-94. For some creative articles on natural law, see those by
Curran in the note above; also Bernard Haring, "Dynamism and Continuity
in a Personalistic Approach to Natural Law," Norm and Context, Outka and
Ramsey, eds., pp. 199-218; Michael B. Crowe, "Natural Law Theory To-
day," The Future of Ethics and Moral Theology, Richard A. McCormick, et al.
(Chicago: Argus Communications Co., 1968), pp. 78-105.
14. This is a point clearly made by Josef Fuchs; see especially "Hu-
man, Humanist and Christian Morality," Human Values and Christian Mo-
rality (London: Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1970), pp. 140-147, especially at
p. 143.
15. For a study of natural law in the social encyclicals, see Charles E.
Curran, "Dialogue with Social Ethics: Roman Catholic Ethics-Past, Pres-
ent, Future," Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue (Notre Dame: Fides Publish-
ers, 1972), pp. 111-149.
16. Unless otherwise indicated, the excerpts from ecclesiastical docu-
ments on social ethics are taken from the convenient resource, Official Church
Teaching: Social Justice, ed. Vincent P. Mainelli (Wilmington, N .C.: McGrath
Publishing Co., 1978). For this first excerpt, see p. 64. For an interpretation
of "imprinted in man's heart" that follows the order of reason approach to
natural law, see Fuchs, "Human, Humanist and Christian Morality," Human
Values, pp. 144-147.
17. Mainelli, ed., SocialJustice, p. 210.
18. Ibid., p. 255. This excerpt also shows the elements of a moral
method for reflecting on a social issue: namely, situational analysis, religious
convictions, and moral norms. Not included is a consideration of the "agent,"
which is often hard to identify in a social issue.
19. Such a comparison is astutely made by Charles E. Curran in "Catho-
lic Social and Sexual Teaching: A Methodological Comparison," Theology
Today 44 (January 1988): 425-440.
20. The Challenge of Peace (Washington: USCC, 1983), paragraphs 10-
12, pp. 4-5. The bishops make a similar claim in their letter, Economic Justice
for All (1986), paragraphs 20-22.
21. What follows is a summary of the key themes of the section "Basic
Catholic Principles" concerning moral objectivity in Philip S. Keane, "The
Objective Moral Order: Reflections on Recent Research," Theological Studies
43 (June 1982): 260-262.
248 Reason Informed By Faith

22. O'Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality (New York: Seabury

Press, 1978), pp. 144-154.
23. Daniel C. Maguire confirms "realism" in his approach to morality.
See The Moral Choice (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1978), p. 220.
24. This has been a consistent theme of John G. Milhaven. See his
"Toward an Epistemology of Ethics," Theological Studies 27 (June 1966): 228-
241; also, "Objective Moral Evaluation of Consequences," Theological Studies
32 (September 1971): 407-430; and "The Voice of Lay Experience in Chris-
tian Ethics," CTSA Proceedings 33 (1978): 35-53. See also Maguire, The Moral
Choice, pp. 221-222. Robert H. Springer is another Catholic theologian who
has appealed to the empirical grounding for morality in his "Conscience,
Behavioral Science and Absolutes," in Charles E. Curran, ed., Absolutes in
Moral Theology? pp. 19-56. Charles E. Curran has written a valuable article
identifying some of the difficulties involved in moral theology'S efforts to
dialogue with empirical science. See his essay "Dialogue with Science: Scien-
tific Data, Scientific Possibilities and the Moral Judgment," Catholic Moral
Theology in Dialogue, pp. 65-110.
25. Richard A. McCormick, "Moral Notes," Theological Studies 36
(March 1975): 93-100, reviews pertinent literature on the interpretation of
"consequences. "
26. The issue of how to regard consequences is receiving a great deal of
attention in the moral literature. In addition to McCormick's "Notes" above,
see the balanced treatment of Maguire, The Moral Cboice, pp. 150-170. For
two essays negatively critical of consequences, see John R. Connery, "Moral-
ity of Consequences: A Critical Appraisal," Readings in Moral Tbeology No.1:
Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, edited by Charles E. Curran and Richard
A. McCormick (Ramsey: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 244-266. In the same
collection, see also Paul M. Quay, "Morality by Calculation of Values," pp.
267-293.
27. John Noonan's work, Contraception (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1965), shows how historical factors influence the weight given to
competing values in different historical periods. Natural law theory that is
historically conscious will be cautious about issuing single, unambiguous
answers for all times.
28. This has been a consistent theme of Charles E. Curran in his analy-
sis of natural law. See for example his "Natural Law" in Directions in Funda-
mental Moral Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985),
pp.119-172.
29. The idea of proportionality has been receiving a great deal of atten-
tion in recent years. For some seminal works on this notion in the collection
edited by Curran and McCormick, Readings in Moral Theology No.1, see Peter
Knauer, "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect," pp.
Natural Law Today 249

1-39; Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," pp. 40-93; Richard A.
McCormick, "Reflections on the Literature," pp. 294-340. Also see the col-
lection of essays responding to Richard A. McCormick's major contribution
to this discussion, Ambiguity in Moral Choice, which is the first chapter in the
collection, Doing Evil to Achieve Good, edited by Richard A. McCormick and
Paul Ramsey (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978).
30. David F. Kelly has traced the methodological development of Catho-
lic teaching on medical ethics in America from natural law physicalism
(1900-1940) to empirical personalism (1965 and beyond). "Empirical per-
sonalism" is a shorthand formula for the contemporary understanding of
natural law. Kelly shows it emerges with the impetus of the shift made at the
Second Vatican Council. See his The Emergence ofRoman Catholic Medical Ethics
in North America (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1979), pp. 416-436 and
449-454.