Villarama vs.

Guno

Case Digest (G.R. No. 197514)

Facts:

● Ramon R. Villarama filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to challenge the

nullification of a Regional Trial Court's order denying a Special Appearance with Motion
to Vacate Judgment.
● The case originated from a dispute over the sale of a house and lot and the subsequent
foreclosure of a mortgage.
● The Sps. Marcial and Rita Reyes sold a house and lot to Crisantomas and Carmelita
Yadao Guno.
● The sale was documented through a deed of absolute sale and eighteen promissory notes
were issued by the Sps. Guno in favor of the Sps. Reyes.
● The Sps. Reyes also executed a Trust Agreement with Prudential Bank and Trust
Company, naming their children as beneficiaries.
● Later, they executed an Amended Trust Agreement naming Ramon Villarama as an
irrevocable beneficiary.
● The Sps. Guno obtained loans from Prudential and used the property as security.
● They defaulted on their payments, leading Prudential to foreclose the mortgage and
acquire ownership of the property.
● The Sps. Guno filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale and title, which was
granted by the RTC. The decision was affirmed by the CA and SC.
● Villarama filed a complaint for rescission of promissory notes, deed of sale of real
property, and cancellation of title against the Sps. Guno.
● The RTC granted Villarama's complaint for rescission. Carmelita filed an answer, while
Crisantomas was declared in default.
● Crisantomas filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Vacate Judgment, claiming that
the decision was void due to improper service of summons.
● The RTC denied the motion, ruling that the service of summons on Carmelita was
binding on Crisantomas.
● The CA ruled in favor of Crisantomas, stating that there was no valid service of
summons.

Issue:

● Whether the service of summons on Carmelita was valid and binding on Crisantomas.

Ruling:

● The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision and upheld the RTC's ruling.
● The Court held that the service of summons on Carmelita was sufficient to acquire
jurisdiction over Crisantomas.
 ● Crisantomas failed to substantiate his claims of not receiving the summons or being
unaware of the proceedings.
● Carmelita actively participated in the proceedings and litigated their shared interests.
● The core of the service of summons is to protect the right to due process, which was not
transgressed in this case.
● Ruling in favor of Crisantomas would only serve to delay the resolution of the case.

Ratio:

● The service of summons on Carmelita was valid and binding on Crisantomas.

● Crisantomas failed to prove that he did not receive the summons or was unaware of the
proceedings.
● Carmelita actively participated in the proceedings and litigated their shared interests.
● The right to due process was protected in this case.
● Ruling in favor of Crisantomas would only cause further delay in the case.
 Green Star Express, Inc. vs. Nissin-Universal Robina Corp.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 181517)

Facts:

The case of Green Star Express, Inc. v. Nissin-Universal Robina Corp. involves a dispute over the
proper service of summons on the defendant, Nissin-Universal Robina Corporation (NURC).
The incident began when a Mitsubishi L-300 van owned by NURC was involved in a vehicular
accident with a passenger bus owned by Green Star Express, resulting in the death of the van's
driver. The bus driver, Fruto Sayson Jr., was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.

After the accident, Green Star sent a demand letter to NURC for the repair of its passenger bus,
but NURC denied any liability, arguing that the criminal case would determine the parties'
ultimate liabilities. The criminal case against Sayson was eventually dismissed due to
insufficient evidence.

Following the dismissal of the criminal case, Sayson and Green Star filed a complaint for
damages against NURC before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna. NURC
received the summons through one of its employees, Francis Tinio, who was a cost accountant.
NURC filed a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of
summons.

Issue:

The main issue in the case was whether the summons was properly served on NURC, thereby
vesting the trial court with jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the rules on service of summons on a domestic private juridical
entity must be strictly complied with for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, summons may be served on a domestic
corporation like NURC only through its officers, such as the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

In this case, the summons was received by NURC's cost accountant, Francis Tinio, who was not
one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14. Although NURC may have actually
received the summons, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC because the
service of summons was not made on one of the designated persons. The Supreme Court
emphasized that strict compliance with the rules on service of summons is necessary to ensure
due process and the right to present a defense.

Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision,
which nullified the RTC's resolution and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
 NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 175799)

Facts:

This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia)
Limited (petitioner) against Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (respondent).

The respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner, seeking a judgment declaring the loan
and hedging contracts between the parties void and for damages.

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner due to defective and improper service of summons.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that there was proper service of summons
through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) since the petitioner had not applied for a
license to do business in the Philippines.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The petitioner then
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the
trial court.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, stating that the denial of a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order and can only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the
judgment after trial.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The petitioner then
filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issues raised in the case are whether the petitioner is a real party in interest, whether
the resort to a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper, whether the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss, and whether the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is a real party in interest, as it presented evidence of
its change of corporate name. The Court also ruled that the resort to a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals was not proper, as the denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory
order. The Court further ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss, as the issues raised by the petitioner are more properly
ventilated during the trial. Finally, the Court ruled that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner, as the petitioner voluntarily appeared before the court by seeking
affirmative reliefs.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is a real party in interest because it presented
evidence of its change of corporate name. This means that the petitioner has a direct and
substantial interest in the outcome of the case.

The Court also ruled that the resort to a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was not
proper. The denial of a motion to dismiss is considered an interlocutory order, which means that
it is not a final judgment that can be appealed. The proper course of action for the petitioner
would have been to wait for the trial court to render a final judgment and then appeal from that
judgment.

Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss. The issues raised by the petitioner, such as lack of jurisdiction
and defective service of summons, are more appropriately addressed during the trial proper. The
trial court should be given the opportunity to fully hear and evaluate the evidence before making
a final determination on these issues.

Lastly, the Court ruled that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Even though the petitioner argued that there was defective and improper service of summons,
the Court found that the petitioner voluntarily appeared before the court by seeking affirmative
reliefs. By doing so, the petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

In conclusion, the petition for review on certiorari was denied, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed.
 Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals

Case Digest (G.R. No. 130974)

Facts:

The case of Manotoc v. Court of Appeals involves a dispute between Agapita Trajano, on behalf
of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano, and Imelda Marcos-Manotoc. Trajano sought the
enforcement of a foreign court's judgment against Manotoc.

The trial court issued a summons to Manotoc at her alleged residence in Alexandra Homes, but
the summons was served on a caretaker named Macky de la Cruz. Manotoc filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that there was no valid service of summons. The trial court rejected the motion,
relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

Manotoc appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's ruling. Manotoc then
filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issue in the case was whether there was a valid substituted service of summons on
Manotoc for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the substituted service was invalid because it did not comply with
the requirements set forth in Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court. The Court
emphasized that substituted service is an extraordinary mode of service and must strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements. The Court noted that the Sheriff's Return did not
provide specific details on the efforts made to serve the summons on Manotoc in person, such as
the number of attempts, dates, and times of the attempts. The Return also did not specify the
residence, age, and discretion of Macky de la Cruz, the person who received the summons. The
Court ruled that these deficiencies rendered the substituted service invalid.

Ratio:

The Court explained that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty does
not apply when the Sheriff's Return is defective. The Court emphasized the importance of strict
compliance with the requirements of substituted service to protect the defendant's right to due
process. The Court also noted that even American case law stresses the principle of strict
compliance with the statute or rule on substituted service.

As a result of the invalid substituted service, the Court annulled the proceedings held before the
trial court. The Court concluded that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Manotoc,
and any judgment rendered by the trial court without jurisdiction is null and void.
 De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corp.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 194751)

Facts:

The case involves a petition for annulment of a court decision nullifying the petitioner's
certificate of title. The respondent, Romasan Development Corporation, filed separate
complaints against several defendants, including the petitioner, Aurora De Pedro.

The complaints sought the nullification of free patents and original certificates of title issued to
the defendants. Romasan alleged that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in
Antipolo City, which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 236044.

Romasan discovered that De Pedro had put up fences on a portion of its property and
confronted her. De Pedro showed title and documents evidencing her ownership. Romasan later
discovered that free patents were issued to De Pedro and other defendants, covering portions of
its property. Based on these free patents, the Register of Deeds issued titles to the defendants.
Romasan filed the complaints to nullify these titles.

Attempts to personally serve summons on De Pedro failed, and the court allowed service of
summons by publication. De Pedro did not file an answer to the complaints, and the court
declared the titles and free patents issued to the defendants null and void.

De Pedro filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person due to improper service of summons. She also argued that there was a pending civil
case involving the same property when Romasan filed the complaints. The court denied her
motion for new trial, ruling that summons was validly served through publication.

De Pedro filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was also denied. She
then filed a petition for annulment of judgment, but the Court of Appeals denied the petition,
ruling that she can no longer file a petition for annulment of judgment after availing herself of
the remedy of new trial and petition for certiorari.

Issue:

The main issues in this case are: 1) whether the trial court decision was void for failure to
acquire jurisdiction over De Pedro's person; and 2) whether filing a motion for new trial and
petition for certiorari is a bar from filing a petition for annulment of judgment.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Pedro's person
due to improper service of summons. The sheriff's return did not contain the necessary details of
the efforts to personally serve summons on De Pedro, rendering the substituted service by
publication irregular. However, the filing of a motion for new trial and petition for certiorari
constituted voluntary appearance, which barred De Pedro from filing a petition for annulment of
judgment. The court also held that the requisites of litis pendentia were not satisfied, as there
was no identity of parties and relief prayed for in the two cases. Finally, the court clarified that a
certificate of title does not vest ownership and can be declared null and void if issued irregularly.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court based its ruling on the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over De Pedro's person due to improper service of summons. The sheriff's return did not provide
sufficient details of the efforts made to personally serve summons on De Pedro, making the
substituted service by publication irregular. As a result, the trial court decision nullifying De
Pedro's certificate of title was void.

However, the court also noted that De Pedro's filing of a motion for new trial and petition for
certiorari constituted voluntary appearance. By availing herself of these remedies, De Pedro
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, she was barred from filing a petition
for annulment of judgment.

The court also addressed the issue of litis pendentia, stating that the requisites were not satisfied
in this case. Litis pendentia requires the identity of parties and the relief prayed for in two cases.
In this case, there was no identity of parties and the relief sought in the petition for annulment
of judgment was different from the relief sought in the original complaints filed by Romasan.

Finally, the court clarified that a certificate of title does not automatically vest ownership. It can
be declared null and void if it was issued irregularly. In this case, the court found that the free
patents and original certificates of title issued to De Pedro and the other defendants were null
and void due to the irregularities in their issuance.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court denied the petition for annulment of judgment, ruling that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over De Pedro's person due to improper service of summons.
However, De Pedro's voluntary appearance through the filing of a motion for new trial and
petition for certiorari barred her from filing a petition for annulment of judgment. The court
also clarified the requirements for litis pendentia and reiterated that a certificate of title does not
automatically vest ownership.
 Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation vs. Spouses Villa

Case Digest (G.R. No. 184197)

Facts:

The case of Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation v. Spouses Villa involves a
complaint filed by Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation against several defendants,
including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa.

The complaint sought the declaration of nullity of subdivision plans, mandamus, and damages.
The case was filed at the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 04-7350.

The court process server attempted personal service of summons to the defendants but was
unsuccessful. As a result, the server resorted to substituted service by serving the summons to
the respondents' househelp.

However, the househelp did not acknowledge receipt of the summons and refused to provide
their names. Despite the substituted service, the respondents failed to file their Answer, leading
the petitioner to file a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default, which was granted by the trial
court.

The respondents later filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, claiming that they had officially
received all pertinent papers and denying the existence of the househelp who refused to sign and
acknowledge receipt of the summons.

The trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave the respondents five days to file their
Answer. However, the respondents still did not file an Answer, prompting the petitioner to file
another Motion to declare them in default, which was granted by the trial court.

The respondents then filed an Omnibus Motion to challenge the trial court's jurisdiction due to
invalid service of summons. The trial court denied the motion and proceeded to receive ex parte
evidence for the petitioner.

The respondents appealed the trial court's orders to the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
annulled the orders declaring the respondents in default.

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the respondents voluntarily
submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction by filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of
Default.

Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether the respondents voluntarily submitted themselves to the
court's jurisdiction by filing the Motion to Lift the Order of Default.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The court held that even in the absence of
valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant through voluntary appearance.

The court cited Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which states that the defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.

The court also referred to the case of Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses
Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al., which explained that a party who seeks affirmative
relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

The court further clarified that objections to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, and failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

In this case, the respondents did not allege in their Motion to Lift the Order of Default that their
filing thereof was a special appearance to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Therefore,
they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court's decision was based on the principle that voluntary appearance can confer
jurisdiction upon the court, even in the absence of valid service of summons.

The court relied on Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which recognizes that the
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.

The court also emphasized that a party who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court.

Furthermore, the court clarified that objections to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly raised, and failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

In this case, the respondents failed to explicitly state in their Motion to Lift the Order of Default
that their filing was a special appearance to question the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, they had
voluntarily submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled that the respondents voluntarily submitted themselves
to the court's jurisdiction by filing the Motion to Lift the Order of Default, despite claims of
invalid service of summons. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to the trial court.
 People's General Insurance Corp. vs. Guansing

Case Digest (G.R. No. 204759)

Facts:

The case of People's General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing involves a dispute over the
reimbursement of an insurance claim. On February 4, 2006, Edgardo Guansing's employee,
Eduardo Lizaso, was driving Guansing's truck when he hit another vehicle, causing extensive
damage.

The vehicle was insured with People's General Insurance Corporation, who paid the full amount
of the claim to the owner of the damaged vehicle. People's General Insurance Corporation then
sought reimbursement from Guansing for the amount paid, less the salvage value of the vehicle.
Despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse the amount claimed.

People's General Insurance Corporation filed a complaint against Guansing and Lizaso in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for a sum of money and damages.

The summons was served on Guansing's brother, Reynaldo Guansing, instead of Guansing
himself. Guansing filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his
person, arguing that he did not personally receive the summons.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the substituted service of summons was valid.
Guansing filed an answer and other subsequent pleadings, raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction over his person. The RTC eventually ruled in favor of People's General Insurance
Corporation and ordered Guansing to pay the reimbursement amount, attorney's fees, and costs
of the suit.

Guansing filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC. He then appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled in his favor. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over Guansing due to the defective service of summons.

The CA remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings, including the valid service of
summons. People's General Insurance Corporation filed a petition for review before the
Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issues before the Supreme Court were whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
Guansing through the service of summons and whether Guansing's filing of an answer and other
subsequent pleadings constituted voluntary appearance.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of People's General Insurance Corporation. It held that the
service of summons on Guansing's brother was defective because the sheriff's return did not
provide a detailed explanation for not personally serving the summons on Guansing. However,
the Supreme Court also held that Guansing's filing of an answer and other subsequent pleadings
amounted to voluntary appearance, which gave the court jurisdiction over him. The Supreme
Court reinstated the RTC's decision, ordering Guansing to pay the reimbursement amount,
attorney's fees, and costs of the suit.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court emphasized that technicalities should not be used to undermine substantial
justice and that courts may relax strict application of procedural rules if it serves the interests of
justice.

In this case, although the service of summons on Guansing's brother was defective, Guansing's
voluntary appearance through his filing of an answer and other subsequent pleadings cured the
defect and gave the court jurisdiction over him.

The Court held that Guansing's actions showed his intention to participate in the proceedings
and defend himself against the claims made by People's General Insurance Corporation.

Therefore, the Supreme Court reinstated the RTC's decision, upholding the reimbursement
amount, attorney's fees, and costs of the suit.
 Sarol vs. Spouses Diao

Case Digest (G.R. No. 244129)

Facts:

The case of Sarol v. Spouses Diao involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land
located in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental.

The petitioner, Eleonor Sarol, purchased the land from Claire Chiu in 2007 and obtained a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in her name in 2012. Sarol left the Philippines to reside in
Germany and appointed her father and a caretaker to manage the property.

However, the adjacent property owners, Spouses George Gordon Diao and Marilyn Diao,
discovered that there was an overlap in the survey of the land, with 464 square meters of their
property included in Sarol's TCT.

They demanded the return of their portion of the property but Sarol refused. As a result,
Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, seeking
to cancel the contracts of sale, reconvey the 464-square-meter portion of the land, and hold
Sarol liable for damages.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Sarol, considering her
claim that she was not properly served with summons.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared the decision of the RTC null and void and granted Sarol's petition
for annulment of judgment.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court found that the service of summons was crucial to acquire jurisdiction over
Sarol. Sarol claimed that she was not properly served with summons and that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over her.

The RTC issued summons to Sarol at an address in Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros
Oriental, which was the location of the disputed property. However, Sarol argued that her actual
residence was in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental, and that she was not served with any
summons. The Court agreed with Sarol, finding that the summons and alias summons were
issued to an incorrect address, and there was no evidence of successful substituted service of
summons.
The Court also found that the service of summons by publication was defective, as the
requirements of Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court were not strictly complied with.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Sarol, rendering
its decision null and void.
 Go vs. Court of Appeals

Case Digest (G.R. No. 244681)

Facts:

The case of Go v. Court of Appeals involves a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by
petitioner Vicente C. Go against the Court of Appeals (CA).

The petitioner claimed lack of jurisdiction and priority of his encumbrances over a sale to
Spouses Colet.

The case originated from a Complaint filed by petitioner against Setcom, Inc. and other
defendants for recovery of a sum of money, breach of contract, and damages.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner,
ordering the defendants to pay him a certain amount. Subsequently, an execution sale was
conducted on a property in Quezon City, which was sold to the petitioner as the highest bidder.

However, Spouses Colet filed a complaint against the petitioner for cancellation of
encumbrance, quieting of title, and damages.

They claimed that they bought the property from the original owners prior to the execution sale.

The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Spouses Colet, ordering the cancellation of the
encumbrances in the petitioner's favor. Petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
with the CA, but it was dismissed for being procedurally and substantially defective.

The CA found that the petitioner failed to attach supporting documents and failed to prove
improper service of summons. The CA also noted discrepancies in the petitioner's addresses.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in dismissing the petition.

Issue:

The main issues raised in the case are as follows:

1. Whether there was valid service of summons by publication.

2. Whether Spouses Colet's interest in the property is superior to petitioner's
encumbrances.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents and denied the petitioner's Petition for
Annulment of Judgment. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals were affirmed.
Ratio:

Regarding the issue of valid service of summons by publication, the Supreme Court found that
the petitioner failed to prove improper service of summons. The Court noted that the petitioner
did not present any evidence to support his claim that he did not receive the summons. On the
other hand, the Court found that there was valid service of summons by publication as
evidenced by the affidavit of publication and the certification from the newspaper. The Court
held that the petitioner's failure to present evidence to the contrary leads to the presumption of
valid service.

With regard to the issue of the priority of encumbrances, the Supreme Court held that Spouses
Colet's interest in the property is superior to the petitioner's encumbrances. The Court found
that Spouses Colet bought the property from the original owners prior to the execution sale. The
Court emphasized that the execution sale only transferred the rights of the judgment debtor, and
not the rights of third parties. Since Spouses Colet acquired the property before the execution
sale, their interest in the property takes precedence over the petitioner's encumbrances.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, ruling that
there was valid service of summons by publication and that Spouses Colet's interest in the
property is superior to the petitioner's encumbrances. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment
was denied.