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No. 23-2200

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK RIDLEY-THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DISTRICT COURT NO. CR 21-485-DSF-1

GOVERNMENT’S ANSWERING BRIEF

E. MARTIN ESTRADA LINDSEY GREER DOTSON

United States Attorney ELANA SHAVIT ARTSON
THOMAS F. RYBARCZYK
BRAM M. ALDEN MICHAEL J. MORSE
Assistant United States Attorney Assistant United States Attorneys
Chief, Criminal Appeals Section
1500 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-4443
Email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

I INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 1

II ISSUES PRESENTED ..................................................................... 4

III STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................... 5

A. Jurisdiction, Timeliness, and Bail Status .............................. 5

B. Statement of Facts and Procedural History ........................... 5

1. The USC admission, scholarship, and

professorship .................................................................. 9

a. Defendant solicits benefits for his son by

dangling the carrot of County contracts ............... 9

b. Flynn memorializes the quid pro quo deal

in a hand-delivered letter to defendant .............. 10

c. Flynn works to deliver on her side of the

bargain ................................................................ 12

d. Defendant votes for the Vermont Reentry

Center and Probation University ....................... 13

e. The Assembly’s sexual harassment

investigation prompts Sebastian’s sudden
resignation under the guise of “health” .............. 14

f. Defendant’s demands to Flynn escalate

after it becomes clear that his son must
resign ................................................................... 16

g. After securing the admission, scholarship,

and professorship, defendant tells Flynn
regarding the Telehealth contract: “Your
wish is my command” ......................................... 20

ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

2. The $100,000 payment from USC to Sebastian’s

nonprofit ....................................................................... 22

a. Defendant attempts to donate $100,000 in

campaign funds to support his son’s new
job, but it fails due to concerns about
nepotism .............................................................. 23

b. In exchange for the Telehealth contract,

defendant solicits a $100,000 payment from
USC to his son’s nonprofit .................................. 25

c. After Flynn orchestrates the $100,000

payment, defendant delivers the Telehealth
contract................................................................ 32

d. Flynn admits a “side deal” with defendant

and his son to secure the Telehealth
contract................................................................ 33

3. USC makes a criminal referral after a

whistleblower exposes defendant’s bribery
scheme with Flynn ....................................................... 34

4. Indictment .................................................................... 35

5. Defendant’s trial theory ............................................... 35

6. Trial and convictions .................................................... 37

7. Post-trial litigation ....................................................... 38

8. Sentencing .................................................................... 38

IV SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................ 39

V ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 44

iii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

A. The Honest Services Fraud Convictions Are Legally

Valid and Supported by Sufficient Evidence ........................ 44

1. Standard of review ....................................................... 44

2. Defendant’s claim that “reputational benefit” was

the quid is contrary to the record and court’s
instructions .................................................................. 46

a. “Reputational benefit” was the motive, not

the quid ............................................................... 46

b. Skilling and related cases are irrelevant ........... 55

c. The government’s paradigmatic bribery

theory will not chill legitimate policymaking..... 59

3. Amply sufficient evidence demonstrates

materiality .................................................................... 63

a. Defendant’s acts were capable of influencing

the County, its employees, and the public ......... 63

b. The theory of materiality here was not novel .... 72

4. The court properly instructed the jury regarding

the mens rea for honest services fraud ........................ 74

5. The government’s references to defendant

“monetizing” his public office were not legal error...... 78

a. The government did not argue a gratuity

theory .................................................................. 78

b. Any error cannot support reversal because

the jury instructions required a quid pro
quo ....................................................................... 82

iv
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

B. Defendant’s Federal Program Bribery Conviction

Should Be Affirmed ............................................................... 86

1. Standard of review ....................................................... 86

2. Reputational benefit was a motive, not the

charged thing of value.................................................. 86

3. The court properly instructed the jury ........................ 89

a. Binding precedent does not require a quid

pro quo for section 666 bribery ........................... 89

b. The court did not abuse its discretion in

declining to give defendant’s proposed
instruction 37(d) .................................................. 91

i. Gratuity ......................................................... 92

ii. Ingratiation ................................................... 94

c. Any error was harmless ...................................... 98

C. Defendant’s Conspiracy Conviction Is Valid ........................ 98

D. The District Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Batson

Challenges ............................................................................. 99

1. Facts ............................................................................. 99

a. Initial voir dire .................................................... 99

b. Juror 13 Batson challenge ................................ 101

c. Further challenges ............................................ 106

d. Juror 1 Batson challenge .................................. 107

v
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

e. The final jury..................................................... 110

2. Batson’s framework .................................................... 112

3. Standard of review ..................................................... 114

4. Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case

of purposeful discrimination as to Juror 13 .............. 115

5. The strike of Juror 1 was not pretextual ................... 122

VI CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 128

vi
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

Cases

Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) ........................................................................ passim

Burton v. United States,

196 U.S. 283 (1905) .............................................................................. 52

Ciminelli v. United States,

598 U.S. 306 (2023) .............................................................................. 89

City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc.,

499 U.S. 365 (1991) .............................................................................. 81

Davis v. Ayala,
576 U.S. 257 (2015) ............................................................................ 123

Griffin v. United States,

502 U.S. 46 (1991) ................................................................................ 98

Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352 (1991) ............................................................................ 112

Hoyos v. Davis,
51 F.4th 297 (9th Cir. 2022) ...................................................... 119, 121

Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979) .............................................................................. 46

Johnson v. California,
545 U.S. 162 (2005) ............................................................................ 115

Kelly v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020) .......................................................................... 89

vii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

McDermott v. Johnson,
85 F.4th 898 (9th Cir. 2023) .............................................................. 116

McDonnell v. United States,

579 U.S. 550 (2016) ............................................................ 49, 61, 62, 79

McNally v. United States,

483 U.S. 350 (1987) .............................................................................. 57

Miller v. Gammie,
335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................ 90

Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U.S. 231 (2005) ............................................................................ 117

Neder v. United States,

527 U.S. 1 (1999) ................................................................ 63, 71, 83, 91

Nguyen v. Frauenheim,
45 F.4th 1094 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................................ 113, 115, 121

Percoco v. United States,

598 U.S. 319 (2023) .............................................................................. 61

Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765 (1995) .................................................................... 122, 125

Rice v. Collins,
546 U.S. 333 (2006) ............................................................ 114, 123, 124

Rowell v. Ferreira,
830 F. App’x 698 (2d Cir. 2020) ......................................................... 123

viii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

Sifuentes v. Brazelton,
825 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2016) .............................................................. 123

Skilling v. United States,

561 U.S. 358 (2010) ............................................................ 40, 55, 57, 82

Snyder v. Louisiana,
552 U.S. 472 (2008) ............................................................................ 118

Snyder v. United States,

144 S. Ct. 536 (2023) ............................................................................ 90

Thaler v. Haynes,
559 U.S. 43 (2010) .............................................................................. 124

Tolbert v. Gomez,
190 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1999) .............................................................. 113

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,

426 U.S. 438 (1976) .............................................................................. 45

United States v. Abdelaziz,

68 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023) ................................................... 49, 56, 57, 87

United States v. Alanis,

335 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................. 125

United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa,

784 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 120

United States v. Blagojevich,

794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015) ................................................................ 58

United States v. Bohonus,

628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1980) .................................................. 65, 72, 76

ix
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

United States v. Bonanno,

852 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................................................ 84

United States v. Cervantes,

542 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1976) ................................................................ 92

United States v. Chen,

754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1985) .......................................................... 93, 94

United States v. Collins,

551 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................... 114, 115, 122, 127

United States v. Crozier,

987 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1993) ........................................................... 53, 88

United States v. Cruz-Escoto,

476 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................... 113, 126

United States v. Edouard,

485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) .......................................................... 125

United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez,

422 F.3d 897 (2005) ................................................................... 122, 127

United States v. Foxworth,

334 F. App’x 363 (2d Cir. 2009) ........................................................... 65

United States v. Frega,

179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) .................................................... 51, 60, 70

United States v. Galecki,

89 F.4th 713 (9th Cir. 2023) ................................................................ 83

x
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

United States v. Garrido,

713 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2013) ........................................................ passim

United States v. George,

420 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................................ 95

United States v. Gillam,

167 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1999) ............................................................ 126

United States v. Gonzalez,

906 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2018) ................................................................ 99

United States v. Gorman,

807 F.2d 1299 (6th Cir. 1986) .................................................. 53, 87, 88

United States v. Guerrero,

595 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2010) .................................................... 120, 121

United States v. Hernandez,

2021 WL 3579386 (9th Cir. 2021) ............................................... 76, 121

United States v. Hernandez-Garcia,

44 F.4th 1157 (9th Cir. 2022) .................................... 112, 120, 125, 127

United States v. Hernandez-Quintania,

874 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2017) ............................................................ 121

United States v. Herrera-Rivera,

832 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................ 119

United States v. Hinkson,

585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................ 114

xi
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

United States v. Hong,

938 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 44, 45

United States v. Inzunza,

638 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2011) ........................................................ 50, 96

United States v. Jacobs,

506 F. App’x 558 (9th Cir. 2013)........................................ 64, 65, 66, 67

United States v. Jannotti,

673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982) ................................................................. 82

United States v. Kaplan,

836 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2016) ........................................................ 75, 95

United States v. Kimbrew,

944 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2019) .......................................................... 66, 95

United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey,

556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009) .................................................... 76, 77, 97

United States v. Koziol,

993 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2021) .................................................. 46, 86, 98

United States v. Langford,

647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) ............................................................ 72

United States v. Lew,

875 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................................................ 63

United States v. Lonich,

23 F.4th 881 (9th Cir. 2022) ................................................................ 77

xii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

United States v. Lopez-Lukis,

102 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 1997) ............................................................ 66

United States v. Lovett,

811 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1987) .......................................................... 51, 60

United States v. Mandel,

591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979) ........................................................ 51, 60

United States v. Marguet-Pillado,

648 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................. 96

United States v. McNair,

605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) ...................................................... 51, 60

United States v. Mende,

43 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................ 54

United States v. Mikhel,

889 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................ 113, 124, 126

United States v. Miller,

953 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................. 75

United States v. Milovanovic,

678 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................................... 63, 70, 71

United States v. Munoz,

233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) .............................................................. 70

United States v. Nagin,

810 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 81

xiii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

United States v. Nevils,

598 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) ........................................................ 46, 71

United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725 (1993) .............................................................................. 45

United States v. Oreto,

37 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1994) .................................................................. 92

United States v. Quinn,

359 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2004) ................................................................ 81

United States v. Renzi,

769 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2014) ........................................................ passim

United States v. Reyes,

660 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................ 54

United States v. Rubio-Villareal,

967 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1992) ................................................................ 45

United States v. Rybicki,

354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) ................................................................. 73

United States v. Schwartz,

785 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................................................ 88

United States v. Siegelman,

640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011) ...................................................... 51, 60

United States v. Silver,

948 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2020) ................................................................. 81

xiv
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

United States v. Spano,

421 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2005) .......................................................... 50, 60

United States v. Stinson,

647 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................ 114

United States v. Sullivan,

797 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................... 44, 78, 86

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California,

526 U.S. 398 (1999) ........................................................................ 84, 92

United States v. Swinney,

870 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1992) .............................................................. 125

United States v. Thompson,

484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007) .......................................................... 57, 58

United States v. Wilkes,

662 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................... 90, 91, 98

United States v. Woods,

335 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................ 70

United States v. Yijun Zhou,

838 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................. 44, 78, 86

Wade v. Terhune,
202 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................ 115, 120, 121

Yates v. United States,

354 U.S. 298 (1957) .............................................................................. 78

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 201 ............................................................................ 51, 90, 93

18 U.S.C. § 371 ........................................................................................ 35

18 U.S.C. § 666 ................................................................................ passim

18 U.S.C. § 1341 ...................................................................................... 35

18 U.S.C. § 1343 ...................................................................................... 35

18 U.S.C. § 1346 .................................................................... 35, 49, 57, 70

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ........................................................................................ 5

28 U.S.C. § 3231 ........................................................................................ 5

Other Authorities

Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction No. 15.34

(Mail Fraud—Scheme to Defraud—Deprivation of
Intangible Right of Honest Services—18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346) ........ 75

Rules

Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) .............................................................................. 46

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ........................................................................ 46, 78

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No. 23-2200

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARK RIDLEY-THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DISTRICT COURT NO. CR 21-485-DSF-1

GOVERNMENT’S ANSWERING BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

While an elected Los Angeles County Supervisor, defendant-

appellant Mark Ridley-Thomas abused the power of his public office for

private gain. He engaged in a shakedown of a university dean in dire

need of defendant’s votes and support to secure lucrative County

contracts for the dean’s graduate school. But as defendant made

abundantly clear, his help came with strings attached.

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Those strings came in the form of landing spots for defendant’s

son, who was the target of a not-yet-public sexual harassment

investigation and needed to resign his post as a California State

Assemblymember to avoid a scandal during the MeToo movement. To

help his son and preserve his own political ambitions, defendant

engineered his son’s abrupt resignation under the guise of “health”

concerns and tapped the dean (among others) to deliver prestigious

post-Assembly jobs, degrees, and titles for his son.

In this classic quid pro quo exchange, the quids and the quos were

well-defined—indeed, memorialized in multiple emails and a

confidential letter the dean had hand-delivered to defendant.

Defendant demanded from the dean four benefits for his son:

(1) admission to the university for a dual master’s degree; (2) a full-

tuition scholarship; (3) a paid professorship; and (4) a $100,000

payment from the university to his son’s nonprofit. In exchange,

defendant pledged his votes and political support for three matters the

dean desperately needed to remedy her school’s multimillion-dollar

budget deficit: (1) a County contract to train employees of the

Department of Children and Family Services; (2) the university’s

2
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involvement in a neighborhood parole office and County contract with

the Probation Department; and (3) the renewal and expansion of an

existing County contract whereby the university provided online mental

health services to at-risk youth through its Telehealth Clinic.

Both sides delivered. The dean lavished defendant’s son with

preferential treatment unlike anything in school history and in

violation of university policy. Defendant, in return, co-sponsored and

voted favorably on motions to support the dean’s desired County

business and directed his staff and high-level County department heads

to move the contracts forward.

Ultimately, after a university whistleblower and subsequent

investigation exposed the scheme, the school made a criminal referral to

the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Attorney’s

Office. Following almost two weeks of witness testimony and the

admission of nearly 500 government exhibits, a jury convicted

defendant of conspiracy, the single charged count of federal program

bribery, and five counts of honest services mail and wire fraud. This

Court should affirm.

3
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II

ISSUES PRESENTED

A. Regarding honest services fraud, whether (1) the

government’s theory was plainly erroneous where the evidence proved a

classic quid pro quo and defendant mischaracterizes the record to claim

otherwise, (2) sufficient evidence proved materiality, (3) the jury was

correctly instructed regarding mens rea, or (4) the government’s

references to defendant’s monetization of his public office advanced a

plainly impermissible gratuity theory.

B. Regarding federal program bribery, whether (1) the

government’s theory was plainly erroneous where reputational benefit

was defendant’s motive, not the “thing of value” he derived from his

scheme, or (2) the district court erred or abused its discretion in

instructing the jury.

C. Whether defendant’s conspiracy conviction is valid where its

objects are all legally sound.

D. Whether the district court clearly erred in rejecting

defendant’s Batson challenges.

4
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III

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Jurisdiction, Timeliness, and Bail Status

The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The court entered judgment on September 1, 2023. (CR-417.)1

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 11, 2023. (CR-

419.) Defendant is not in custody. (6-ER-1003-04.)

B. Statement of Facts and Procedural History

For over 30 years, defendant wielded influence as a prominent

politician in Los Angeles and the State of California. (15-ER-2878-80,

2882-87.) From 2008 to 2020, defendant served on the Los Angeles

County Board of Supervisors, where he and four other Supervisors—

known as the “Five Kings and Queens of Los Angeles”—controlled the

purse strings to the County’s $30 billion budget. (7-ER-1294; 15-ER-

2878, 2882-87; 21-ER-4018; 4-SER-940.) In 2017, defendant’s power

1“CR” refers to the district court docket sheet. “AOB” refers to

defendant’s opening brief.

5
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swelled when he became the chairman of that influential body. (15-ER-

2887-88.)

Defendant’s son Sebastian Ridley-Thomas followed in his father’s

political footsteps, becoming a member of the California State Assembly

in 2013. (4-SER-1137.) But by 2017, a crisis was unfolding. Sebastian 2

was the target of a not-yet-public sexual harassment investigation—a

toxic political threat for politicians during the MeToo movement. (15-

ER-2895-98 (all trial exhibits marked 201 through 367 are from

defendant’s personal email account); 7-ER-1225; 2-SER-516-19, 529,

532, 536, 539, 550; 3-SER-583-93, 631, 688-89, 693 (defendant bcc’d),

710-16, 729, 731, 739, 741, 744; 4-SER-952-57, 1137.) Beyond rendering

Sebastian potentially unemployable, a sexual harassment scandal

risked tainting defendant by association and hurting his political

ambitions, which included a possible run for mayor of Los Angeles. (15-

ER-2928-29; 4-SER-961.)3 To help his son and preserve his own

2 Because defendant and his son share a last name, this brief
refers to Sebastian Ridley-Thomas by his first name.
3 Eight days after Sebastian received a federal subpoena for
records related to USC’s $100,000 payment to his nonprofit, defendant
announced he would not run for mayor. (15-ER-2928-29; 4-SER-961.)

6
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political brand, defendant facilitated Sebastian’s quiet exit from state

politics. Citing “health issues” as the purported reason for his abrupt

resignation, a coordinated legal and public relations team aimed to end

the Assembly’s internal investigation and avoid a scandal. (7-ER-1189-

91, 1291; 15-ER-2931; 2-SER-521-22, 544-45, 560-62; 3-SER-564-65,

568-78, 583-93, 612 (“Named Accusers/Publicized Accusations” listed as

task for attorney to address), 620 (same), 622, 631, 693 (defendant

bcc’d), 704-60; 4-SER-1137, 1140.) Meanwhile, defendant worked to

secure landing spots for his son—advanced degrees, prestigious titles,

and paying jobs—to deflect suspicion from Sebastian’s sudden

resignation and to help him tackle mounting personal debt. (7-ER-

1187-88; 15-ER-2931-35; 2-SER-520, 523-28, 530, 537-38, 542-49, 555-

58; 3-SER-578-82, 594-625, 629-30, 632-34, 640-46; 4-SER-958.) One of

the people defendant leaned on to secure those landing spots was

someone he knew needed his help—Marilyn Flynn.

Flynn was the dean of the Suzanne Dworak-Peck School of Social

Work (“Social Work School”) at the University of Southern California

(“USC”), which sat within defendant’s district. (7-ER-1295.) In 2017,

following her two decades of leadership, a multimillion-dollar budget

7
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deficit threatened the graduate school’s viability and, in turn, Flynn’s

deanship, six-figure salary, and legacy. (9-ER-1887-93; 2-SER-513.) To

resurrect the school’s finances, Flynn needed defendant—a powerful

County official and USC alumnus—to help secure lucrative County

contracts, which she saw as the school’s fiscal lifeline. (9-ER-1892-95;

10-ER-2086; 14-ER-2768, 2776-77; 21-ER-3991.) But defendant’s help

came at a price.

Over the course of a year, defendant repeatedly turned to Flynn,

demanding and soliciting the following benefits for his son: (1) USC

admission for a dual master’s degree; (2) a full-tuition scholarship; (3) a

paid professorship to teach at USC while simultaneously a student; and

(4) a $100,000 payment from USC to the Policy, Research & Practice

Initiative (“PRPI”), a nonprofit Sebastian spearheaded. The total value

of these benefits exceeded $250,000. 4 In exchange, defendant offered

Flynn his votes and other acts to move forward lucrative contracts

between the County and USC.

4 The scholarship was worth at least $100,000 (14-ER-2684), and

the half-time professorship salary was $50,000 (14-ER-2763; 2-SER-
401).

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1. The USC admission, scholarship, and professorship

a. Defendant solicits benefits for his son by

dangling the carrot of County contracts

In May 2017, defendant contacted Flynn with an ask—his son

wanted a master’s degree from USC. (7-ER-1146-48; 2-SER-345-46.) At

first, Flynn thought Sebastian could “audit” a class, but admission and

a “free ride” seemed off the table. (2-SER-347; 15-ER-2991-92.)

Defendant persisted. He emailed Flynn an article about his son and

suggested a meeting, telling Flynn, “Lots to catch up on.” (2-SER-348.)

This simple email carried heft and subtext. Defendant and Flynn were

not friends and did not speak regularly, as their emails and toll records

confirmed. (15-ER-2962-64, 2992-93.) Their infrequent

communications pertained to County business alone and increased

exponentially in 2017 and 2018 at times when defendant needed things

for his son. (See id.) From defendant’s email, Flynn understood he was

seeking assistance with his son’s ask and reminding her that he was

positioned to help her with County business. She immediately

responded, accepting the meeting invitation and offering a “joint

degree” for Sebastian. (2-SER-348.) She then emailed Sebastian too,

promising him admission to USC to pursue a joint degree, a

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scholarship, and the ability to attend classes online, despite the fact

that no online program existed. (7-ER-1149; 11-ER-2268-70; 15-ER-

2995.)

Over the coming months, Flynn worked tirelessly to ensure that

Sebastian received almost anything he or defendant wanted, and she

tasked employees with fulfilling their requests. (See e.g., 7-ER-1161; 2-

SER-350-51, 367, 372-73, 375-83, 389-94, 397, 401-11.) Irrespective of

Sebastian’s academic qualifications and potentially poor grades, Flynn

sought to “open every door” for “the son of Supervisor Mark Ridley

Thomas.” (7-ER-1147-48.) Flynn characterized her intended exchange

as a “full scholarship for our funds”—that is, a full-tuition scholarship

in exchange for County funds to benefit the Social Work School. (7-ER-

1150; 15-ER-2997-99.)

b. Flynn memorializes the quid pro quo deal

in a hand-delivered letter to defendant

On June 23, 2017, defendant met with Flynn privately in her

office. (2-SER-349, 505; 15-ER-2999.) During this meeting, the two

discussed Sebastian’s future at USC and County contracts. (7-ER-1155-

59.) Flynn then went on a lengthy vacation. (15-ER-3000.)

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Upon her return, Flynn directed a Social Work School employee to

hand-deliver a letter to defendant’s office containing “confidential

information.” (7-ER-1155-59; 2-SER-352.) The employee testified that

this request was unusual and that Flynn had never before or

subsequently tasked her with this kind of sensitive assignment. (9-ER-

1819, 1825; see 9-ER-1897.)

The July 23 letter memorialized defendant’s quid pro quo

arrangement with Flynn from their June meeting. Flynn wrote, “I am

prepared to follow up on our discussion in my office.” (7-ER-1155-59.)

“I look forward to working with Sebastian,” she said, and will “take

steps with him to plan the road ahead.” (Id.) In the very next sentence,

Flynn confirmed the “matters” with which defendant had agreed to

assist: (1) “Blocked movement of USC’s Title IVe contract with DCFS”;

(2) “USC role involvement in [a] refurbished neighborhood parole office

[the “Vermont Reentry Center”] and current negotiations for possible

IVe contract with Department of Probation [“Probation University”]”;

and (3) “Stalled movement of USC Telehealth contract with Mental

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Health.” (Id.) 5 The first two “matters” involved new or amended

contracts with the County whereby the Social Work School would train

County employees from the Department of Children and Family

Services (“DCFS”), the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”), and the

Probation Department (“Probation”) in return for taxpayer dollars. (7-

ER-1155-59; 9-ER-1896-1907, 1948-49; 14-ER-2698-2710, 2731-32,

2737-38.) Regarding the third item, Social Work School students were

already providing online mental health services through the USC

Telehealth Clinic (“Telehealth”) to patients referred by the County;

Flynn sought to expand the scope of clients able to be treated, which

could substantially increase the number of clients served and thereby

boost the school’s revenue. (7-ER-1155-59; 9-ER-1901-07.)

c. Flynn works to deliver on her side of the bargain

Flynn began carrying out her part of the bargain but encountered

numerous obstacles. For instance, arranging the joint master’s degree

from the Social Work School and the USC Sol Price School of Public

5 As she told defendant, Flynn believed Title IV-E of the Social

Security Act would allow federal funds to flow through the County to
USC for these training services. (7-ER-1155-59; 9-ER-1899, 1901-02.)

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Policy (“Public Policy School”) proved difficult due to the “specific and

very rigid sequence of courses” at the two schools and Sebastian’s desire

to attend online. (2-SER-350.) Three days after Flynn sent defendant

the confidential, hand-delivered letter, she emailed an associate dean to

make an “exception” for Sebastian and to “tackle this enigma” so that

he could take classes online and out of the required order. (Id.)

d. Defendant votes for the Vermont Reentry Center

and Probation University

On August 1, 2017, just a week after the July 23 hand-delivered

letter, defendant took official action with respect to Flynn’s request for

“USC role involvement in [a] refurbished neighborhood parole office.”

(7-ER-1155-59.) Defendant co-sponsored and voted in favor of an item

on the Board of Supervisors’ agenda announcing “Recommendations on

a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a partnership with the

University of Southern California’s School of Social Work to enhance

services, particularly around health, homelessness and case

management,” which related to the Vermont Reentry Center in USC’s

neighborhood. (7-ER-1283, 1285-86.) Upon seeing this agenda item,

Flynn emailed a colleague: “Yes, I talked with Mark [defendant] about

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this, and I am very happy to see that he was as good as his word.” (2-

SER-354 (emphasis added).)

Following that vote, defendant took official action to facilitate an

eventual partnership between the Social Work School and Probation.

Defendant co-sponsored an item on the Board of Supervisors’ agenda to

advance “Probation University.” (7-ER-1287-90; 9-ER-1909-12; 4-SER-

867-70.) The motion instructed high-level County officials to prepare a

report about the feasibility of Probation University and to identify

“funding streams” to pay for it. (7-ER-1287-90.) Upon learning that

this motion was on the Board’s agenda, Flynn emailed a colleague: “I

am holding my breath... MRT [defendant] is really trying to deliver

here.” (2-SER-358 (emphasis added).) On October 17, 2017, defendant

publicly spoke in support of Probation University and voted in favor of

it. (7-ER-1287-90; 4-SER-867-70.)

e. The Assembly’s sexual harassment investigation

prompts Sebastian’s sudden resignation under
the guise of “health”

Meanwhile, Sebastian was the subject of two non-public sexual

harassment allegations in the Assembly for conduct in 2016 and early

2017. (4-SER-1137.) On November 28, 2017, Sebastian received a

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letter formally notifying him that the Assembly’s investigation had

significantly progressed and his interview was imminent. (4-SER-955-

57; see 4-SER-1032 (calls between defendant and Sebastian that day),

1133.)

In response, dozens of emails show defendant carefully

orchestrating his son’s resignation and cover story with lawyers, a

public relations team, consultants, and Sebastian himself. (See, e.g., 7-

ER-1189-91, 1225, 1291; 15-ER-2918 (public relations and legal team

assembled to “address the sexual harassment allegations”); 19-ER-3608

(same); 2-SER-521-22, 529, 532, 536, 539, 544-45, 550, 558, 560-62; 3-

SER-564-65, 568-78, 583-93, 611-12 (“Named Accusers/Publicized

Accusations” listed as a task for attorney to address), 620 (same), 622,

631, 693 (defendant bcc’d), 704-60; 4-SER-1137, 1140.) As rumors

began percolating in December 2017 that Sebastian could be the “Next

#MeToo to Go” (2-SER-539; 3-SER-714-16; see also 2-SER-529; 3-SER-

704-05), exaggerated claims about Sebastian’s health became the

“plausible alternate narrative” to explain away his abrupt resignation

(see, e.g., 3-SER-584). The “health issues” pretext served to assuage the

public that nothing scandalous prompted the resignation and gave

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lawyers a means to undermine the investigation. (See, e.g., 3-SER-693

(defendant bcc’d), 750-51; 15-ER-2942-45.)

While Sebastian certainly had health issues in prior years, he took

leave as needed, kept his elected post, and maintained his six-figure

salary and health benefits. (15-ER-2951-52; 17-ER-3207; 20-ER-3901-

02; see 3-SER-585.) Prior to the November 28 Assembly letter, there

were no emails discussing plans for resignation, nor any suggesting that

Sebastian had a health issue so serious that he would need to resign, let

alone within weeks. There was also no planned surgery. (15-ER-2941;

20-ER-3905.) Sebastian elected to have a surgical procedure after

receiving the November 28 Assembly letter and scheduled the one-day

procedure for December 18, 2017 (the same day the Assembly

investigator sought to interview him). (3-SER-693 (defendant bcc’d); 4-

SER-952; 15-ER-2941, 2948; 20-ER-3879-80, 3904-05, 3908; see also 15-

ER-2936, 2940-48.) Sebastian resigned from the Assembly on December

31, 2017. (15-ER-2930-31.)

f. Defendant’s demands to Flynn escalate after

it becomes clear that his son must resign

Within days of learning about the Assembly investigation’s

progress, defendant and his son began working to secure multiple

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landing spots (despite public claims that Sebastian was too ill to work).

(See, e.g., 7-ER-1187-88; 2-SER-520, 526-28, 530, 537-38, 542, 546-47,

555-58; 3-SER-600-04, 611-12, 619-22, 629-30.) Chief among their

efforts were demands to Flynn to expedite the USC admission,

scholarship, and professorship. (7-ER-1160, 1161, 1166; 16-ER-3064-65,

3067-72, 3077-79, 3080-81, 3083-86, 3096-3100, 3104-07, 3118-19; 2-

SER-360-409, 530, 537-38, 542, 549, 551-56, 559; 3-SER-616-18, 634-39,

641-42; 4-SER-1032-1044 (see defendant’s calls with Sebastian, Flynn,

and DMH Director Jonathan Sherin from November 29, 2017 through

December 26, 2017).)

On December 5, 2017, Sebastian emailed Public Policy School

Dean Jack Knott and bcc’d defendant. (2-SER-530.) Sebastian said he

wanted a “Practitioner-In-Residence” title for his professorship, a salary

in the range of $25,000 for his “beginning compensation,” and to “launch

in January.” (Id.) Knott was caught off guard by the demands and

urgency. On December 9, 2017, he responded that he did not believe a

January start date was feasible and that he would have to “create a

part-time position with a salary,” which Knott had not been

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anticipating. (2-SER-537-38.) Sebastian immediately forwarded

Knott’s disappointing email to defendant. (Id.)

Upon learning that the professorship was stalled, in order to turn

the screws on Flynn, defendant contacted key department heads to

secure their support for the two remaining contracts itemized in Flynn’s

confidential, hand-delivered letter. On December 10, 2017, defendant

called Flynn multiple times. (4-SER-1037-38.) Two days later, he

emailed Flynn with the subject line “Your Innovative Proposal” and

wrote: “I spoke with Bobby Cagle today. Are you available to chat for a

moment?” (2-SER-549.) Cagle, the director of DCFS, was responsible

for the first contract referenced in Flynn’s confidential letter. (7-ER-

1155-59.) Flynn responded that she was eager to get defendant’s

update (2-SER-364) and spoke with him shortly thereafter (4-SER-

1038).

After speaking with Flynn, defendant twice called DMH Director

Sherin (4-SER-1039), whose support was critical for the amended

Telehealth contract (7-ER-1155-59). Defendant then emailed Flynn

with the subject line “John Sherin” and wrote, “He’s ready to go,”

followed by a winking emoji. (2-SER-551-52.) Defendant attached

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Sherin’s personal cell phone number to the email, signaling that he had

greased the wheels for Flynn to follow up with Sherin on the details

directly. (Id.)

Within minutes of seeing that Sherin was “ready to go,” Flynn

accelerated efforts to finalize Sebastian’s scholarship and professorship.

She instructed her staff to give Sebastian’s admission and scholarship

the “highest priority.” (2-SER-367; 9-ER-1913-29.) In an exceedingly

unusual move, she instructed her staff to “tap our endowed funds”—a

“protected fund” not to be accessed—to award the full-tuition

scholarship at a time of great financial hardship for the school. (2-SER-

367; 14-ER-2772-73.) She made sure to include Sebastian on that email

to show him (and defendant, by extension) that she was working hard to

deliver on her end of their bargain.

Within hours of Flynn’s email, defendant’s deputy (a County

employee) emailed Flynn to connect her with Cagle (the DCFS director)

to “facilitate a meeting to discuss a partnership among USC, DCFS,

DMH, and the Probation Department.” (2-SER-374.) Flynn responded

by urging Knott (the Public Policy School dean) to “get the offer letter

out before the holidays” for Sebastian’s professorship “in the interests of

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showing MRT [defendant] that we can deliver.” (7-ER-1161 (emphasis

added).)

The unprecedented exigency to “deliver” for defendant and

Sebastian during USC’s holiday break, when key faculty and staff were

traveling, baffled Flynn’s colleagues. (See, e.g., 14-ER-2748-50; 11-ER-

2205-11.) Nevertheless, at Flynn’s direction, staff worked tirelessly to

get the scholarship and professorship approved—despite Sebastian’s

failure to complete an application or send his transcripts, the non-

existence of an online dual degree program, and the fact that his

simultaneous student-faculty status would violate USC policy. (See,

e.g., 7-ER-1161-65; 9-ER-1912-30, 1947; 10-ER-2068-71; 11-ER-2209-17,

2251-53, 2265-71; 14-ER-2743, 2759-61, 2771-73; 2-SER-369-70, 372-73,

375-83, 386-90, 392, 397-98, 401-09, 489, 503-04, 555-56; 3-SER-594-

98.)

g. After securing the admission, scholarship, and

professorship, defendant tells Flynn regarding
the Telehealth contract: “Your wish is my
command”

After Sebastian was admitted with a full scholarship (2-SER-386-

90; 3-SER-594-98, 613-14), he received word on February 13, 2018 that

USC had agreed to waive its usual hiring process for his professorship,

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which he promptly reported to defendant (3-SER-634). Within hours,

defendant delivered on his end of their bargain, emailing Flynn about

County business. He sent her a “Probation Reform motion” and said he

wanted to talk. (3-SER-635-37.) He also sent her a “Probation

Department overhaul proposal” and said, “Lots to discuss.” (3-SER-

638.) Defendant bcc’d Sebastian on the latter email, despite his son

having no connection to County business other than reaping the

benefits of the quid pro quo scheme. In response to the former email,

Flynn wrote that she had “an excellent meeting last night with John

Sherin and Bobby Cagle,” the two high-ranking public officials in a

position to help Flynn obtain a lucrative amendment to the Telehealth

contract (Sherin) and secure the DCFS contract (Cagle), and thanked

defendant for facilitating the opportunity. (3-SER-639.)

Several days later, Flynn emailed defendant about “an extremely

important request” regarding an amendment to the Telehealth contract

that was scheduled for the Board of Supervisors’ agenda the following

week. (7-ER-1192-93.) Flynn told defendant that the contract needed

“to expand billable services and to increase the flat rate for services to a

level comparable to other county contract agencies.” (Id.) Her email

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outlined five specific amendments necessary for the Social Work School

to receive more money from the County under the contract. (Id.) In

response, defendant once again bcc’d his son (despite his lack of

connection to County business or this contract) and promised Flynn

that he would deliver on his end of their agreed-upon exchange: “Your

wish is my command.” (7-ER-1194-95.) (Count 15 wiring.)

Defendant then enlisted the help of two other public officials to

move the contract forward. He forwarded the email exchange with

Flynn to his deputy for follow up. (7-ER-1196-98.) The deputy reported

back to defendant that the amendment would not be on the Board’s

calendar until sometime around August but that she would stay on top

of the issue given the “importance of this contract” and would “take the

temperature of the other [B]oard offices” to suss out any opposition to

the contract. (Id.) In addition, over the next few days, defendant

repeatedly called Sherin, a critical stakeholder needed to move the

Telehealth contract forward. (16-ER-3122-23; 4-SER-1059-60.)

2. The $100,000 payment from USC to Sebastian’s

nonprofit

While dealing with Flynn to secure Sebastian’s admission,

scholarship, and professorship, defendant was also working on another

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landing spot for his son—director of a nonprofit. Defendant sought to

use his campaign funds to support that endeavor, which initially did not

involve USC or Flynn at all. But after defendant had difficulty

donating campaign funds to his son because the involved organization

(Community Partners) felt uncomfortable with the optics, defendant

turned to Flynn, notably at a time when one critical County contract

still hung in the balance—Telehealth.

a. Defendant attempts to donate $100,000 in

campaign funds to support his son’s new job,
but it fails due to concerns about nepotism

Three days after the November 28 Assembly letter arrived,

defendant commenced an urgent action plan to donate $100,000 from

his campaign funds to the African American Civic Engagement Project

(“AACEP”) and then have his son quickly step in as its director. (See,

e.g., 7-ER-1185-88, 1278-79; 15-ER-2931-32; 2-SER-520, 523-28, 533-

535 (Sebastian planning to take over AACEP and hire a deputy

director), 540-41 (same), 546-48, 558; 3-SER-566-67; 4-SER-862-64, 941,

1034-50 (calls between defendant and the chief executive officer (“CEO”)

of Community Partners, Paul Vandeventer, from December 1, 2017 to

January 25, 2018).) Community Partners served as AACEP’s fiscal

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sponsor. (12-ER-2432, 2435.) As a fiscal sponsor, Community Partners

provided administrative support and allowed AACEP to operate under

its tax-exempt status, but it did not provide funding. (12-ER-2425-27;

13-ER-2541-42.) To take a salary, obtain healthcare, and hire staff,

Sebastian needed to fundraise for AACEP. (12-ER-2437-38, 2528-29;

13-ER-2542-43; 16-ER-3112-15; 3-SER-623-24 (list of potential donors).)

To support his son, defendant donated $100,000 from his

campaign committee, the Mark Ridley-Thomas Committee for a Better

L.A., to Community Partners for the benefit of AACEP. (7-ER-1185-86,

1279; 2-SER-546-48; 3-SER-794.) However, when defendant tried to

install his son as the new director soon thereafter, staff at Community

Partners questioned the donation’s legality and worried about

“nepotism” and the poor “optics” of “dad’s campaign funds” being used

“to hire his son.” (12-ER-2444, 2450-52, 2457-62, 2465-68, 2479-80; 13-

ER-2536-37, 2576, 2597-98.) Community Partners ultimately rejected

defendant’s proposal and refunded the $100,000. (4-SER-865-66, 942;

13-ER-2582-85, 2597-98.)

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b. In exchange for the Telehealth contract,

defendant solicits a $100,000 payment from
USC to his son’s nonprofit

Following the roadblocks with Community Partners and AACEP,

defendant and his son started a new nonprofit, PRPI, in late January

2018. (7-ER-1204-05; 20-ER-3721-31; 3-SER-625-30, 632-33.)

Sebastian was its director, and United Ways of California (“United

Ways”) soon became its fiscal sponsor. (Id.) To donate to PRPI,

defendant needed to do so in a more covert way to conceal his

connection to the funds and thereby ensure the donation’s success.

With the Telehealth contract still outstanding, defendant approached

Flynn, and the two expanded their quid pro quo scheme.

Despite defendant’s earlier promises in February when he told

Flynn “Your wish is my command” (7-ER-1194-95), the amended

Telehealth contract—which was critical to ensure Telehealth’s

“survival”—had not yet materialized (7-ER-1167-80, 1192-98; 9-ER-

1952-65, 2041; 10-ER-2138-39; 16-ER-3128-34; 2-SER-412-17). Flynn

and her colleagues were worried. (Id.) Flynn stated in early April that

the Social Work School was approaching a “very critical point” and

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needed a “better strategy” to secure the amended contract. (2-SER-

412.)

That better strategy presented itself on April 20, 2018 when

defendant repeatedly contacted Flynn. (3-SER-647-48; 4-SER-1073.)

Two days later, defendant spoke with Sherin, the County department

head responsible for the Telehealth contract. (4-SER-1074.) After his

call with Sherin, defendant immediately called Flynn, and the two

spoke for over 46 minutes. (Id.) The following morning, Sherin left

Flynn a voicemail.6 (4-SER-1138.)

On April 26, 2018, defendant and Flynn met in person. (2-SER-

498, 510, 514; 4-SER-1139.) Flynn’s USC lobbying report listed a

meeting with defendant “to influence official action” during which they

“discuss[ed] a gift agreement.” (2-SER-493, 510.) Shortly after that

private meeting, Flynn reported “[g]ood news” to Executive Vice Dean

John Clapp: “We’re going to get the Telehealth contract,” she said, “But

I had to do a little favor to get it.” (9-ER-1965-68; 10-ER-2041.)

Although the court excluded the contents of the voicemail, the

6

fact that Sherin left a voicemail for Flynn on April 23, 2018 was in
evidence. (4-SER-1138; 16-ER-3136-38.)

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Flynn’s “favor” soon became clear. In exchange for defendant’s

vote and prodding of other public officials (like Sherin) to finally bring

the amended Telehealth contract to fruition after many delays, Flynn

promised to secure a $100,000 payment from USC to United Ways for

the benefit of PRPI and Sebastian. (See, e.g., 7-ER-1181-82, 1199-1201,

1214-15, 1219-24; 10-ER-2040-60; 10-ER-2056-57 (Flynn admits she

had a “side deal” with defendant and Sebastian in connection with the

Telehealth contract); 2-SER-418-81, 486-87 (Flynn touts “working with

[Sherin]” with the “assistance of [defendant]” to obtain a “[m]aster

[c]ontract” from DMH), 493 (descriptions of meetings with defendant

and Sherin), 495, 502, 510, 514-15; 3-SER-647-87, 694, 703; 4-SER-

1073-84 (defendant’s calls with Flynn and Sherin from April 20, 2018 to

May 12, 2018), 1138-39; Exhibit 432 (voicemail from defendant to

United Ways CEO Peter Manzo); Exhibits 440 and 441 (voicemails from

Flynn to Manzo).)7 Defendant agreed to direct a $100,000 “gift” from

his campaign account to the Social Work School, and Flynn would then

facilitate a $100,000 payment from USC to United Ways. (Id.) This

7The government has filed a Motion to File Digital Exhibits for

Exhibits 432, 440, and 441.

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circuitous transaction was designed to avoid a repeat of the Community

Partners debacle—defendant could publicly report on his Form 460s (as

he did) that his campaign funds went to USC, without any mention of

the money’s ultimate destination, PRPI and his son. (3-SER-853.)

On May 2, 2018, just six days after their April 26 meeting,

defendant “donated” $100,000 to the Social Work School with a letter to

Flynn stating that the check represented “tangible acknowledgement of

the important work” of the Social Work School and that “these funds

can be used at your discretion in order to best facilitate the impressive

policy and practical work of the School and its impact in the

community.” (7-ER-1181-82.) But the donation letter was a sham. In

reality, the funds had been earmarked for PRPI and Sebastian—a fact

which defendant, now forced to confront the obvious nature of the

exposed transaction, acknowledges (AOB 20) but which he concealed

from everyone except Flynn and his son at the time (see, e.g., 3-ER-495-

97; 17-ER-3236-37; 20-ER-3719, 3747, 3774-76). Unaware of the deal

between defendant and Flynn, USC deposited defendant’s check,

believing it to be a genuine contribution. (7-ER-1181-82; 2-SER-502; 4-

SER-943-44, 1136.) (Count 19 wiring.)

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The day after defendant sent the sham donation letter and

$100,000 check, he instructed Flynn in a private email (with a bcc to

Sebastian) to “act with dispatch” to donate $100,000 to United Ways no

later than May 15 so that PRPI could hire an employee, Zaneta Smith.

(7-ER-1199-1201.) (Count 16 wiring.) Defendant also provided United

Ways’ IRS exemption letter and United Ways’ donor form—information

Flynn had “requested” to facilitate their agreed-upon $100,000

payment. (Id.) Defendant and his son had obtained that information

from United Ways under the guise that USC had awarded Sebastian

and PRPI a “grant.” (Id.) While a significant portion of this $100,000

would be used to hire Smith and thus help PRPI become operational, a

portion would also be available to pay Sebastian. 8

At defendant’s insistence, Flynn moved heaven and earth to meet

his May 15 deadline. She tasked subordinates and contacted United

Ways to quickly expedite the $100,000 payment. (7-ER-1214-15; 16-ER-

8 Smith’s total compensation was less than $100,000, which meant

that part of USC’s $100,000 payment would be available to compensate
Sebastian. (3-SER-632-33; 4-SER 958; 15-ER-2926-27.) Sebastian
planned to take a half-time salary of either $67,200 or $75,000, plus a
benefits package worth up to $18,750. (Id.)

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3148; 2-SER-419-73; Exhibits 440, 441.) Flynn urged Adriana

Gonzalez, an administrative assistant at the Social Work School, to get

the $100,000 payment issued quickly, confiding in Gonzalez that she

feared getting “in trouble” with someone (who could have only been

defendant) if USC did not issue the check to United Ways. (15-ER-

2849-50.) To conceal the quid pro quo deal with defendant and ensure

that USC would issue the check in violation of university policy, Flynn

made numerous misrepresentations to USC—she falsely represented to

USC that United Ways was a “vendor” providing services to the

university, that United Ways planned to use the $100,000 payment for

a “survey,” and that United Ways would expend the entire $100,000

payment by June 30, 2018, which was the end of USC’s fiscal year. (3-

ER-605-07; 10-ER-2050; 14-ER-2781-87; 15-ER-2853-66; 17-ER-3222-

23, 3254; 19-ER-3646-51, 3659-60; 20-ER-3755-56, 3770; 21-ER-4330-

31.) Flynn concealed that the funds were to pay a third party’s salary,

which USC policy prohibited. (14-ER-2786-87.)

Meanwhile, as the guiding hand orchestrating the transaction,

defendant acted with dispatch, too. He instructed Flynn to call Manzo,

the United Ways CEO, to “assure him of the School’s commitment and

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that you have begun the funds transfer process” and directed Flynn to

keep him updated on her progress (3-SER-662), which she did almost

daily (see, e.g., 2-SER-423-24; 3-SER-652-53, 668-69, 676, 678). At the

same time, defendant lobbied Manzo to allow PRPI to hire Smith,

assuring him that “Dean Marilyn Flynn of USC will follow up with you

on the financial details” and that “USC financial support comes in at

$100k” so that Manzo would approve the hire. (3-SER-657-61, 666-67;

Exhibit 432.)

On May 9, 2018, just seven days after defendant directed his

$100,000 payment to the Social Work School, USC issued a $100,000

check to United Ways. (7-ER-1214-15.) USC mailed the check to

United Ways the following day. (2-SER-477-79; 3-SER-860; 4-SER-

1135.) (Count 5 mailing.) United Ways then deposited the check. (7-

ER-1216; 4-SER-950-51, 1136.) (Count 20 wiring.) Flynn followed with

a sham letter thanking defendant for his “generous support” of the

Social Work School. (2-SER-481; 17-ER-3239-41.)

After Flynn told defendant that “[e]verything has been cleared”

and the $100,000 check would arrive at United Ways by his May 15

deadline, defendant praised Flynn and told her he looked forward to

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seeing her at an upcoming meeting on County business. (3-SER-679.)

Flynn responded: “This one was easy. Sort of.” (3-SER-680.) (While

the USC admission, scholarship, and professorship had taken months,

Flynn had secured this payment within just one week.) Two days later,

upon learning that United Ways had finally agreed to hire Smith for

PRPI, defendant emailed his son, “My piece is done,” followed by a fist

bump emoji. (3-SER-681.)

c. After Flynn orchestrates the $100,000 payment,

defendant delivers the Telehealth contract

After Flynn delivered on the $100,000 payment, defendant

delivered on his end of their bargain. On May 10, 2018, the day after

USC issued its $100,000 check to United Ways, Flynn met with Sherin,

DMH’s director, to discuss “the timing of renegotiation for our

Telehealth contract.” (2-SER-493, 510, 515; 17-ER-3230-31.) After the

meeting, defendant emailed Flynn regarding “Today’s Meeting” to

“debrief” “confidentially.” (3-SER-685.) He again bcc’d Sebastian,

despite his son having no connection to County business or the

Telehealth contract. (Id.; 3-ER-505-06.) The following day, defendant

emailed Flynn to discuss “master contract stuff and somehow use

yesterday’s ‘discussion’ to advance it,” a reference to the Telehealth

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contract and Flynn’s efforts to expand it. (3-SER-687; 3-ER-508.) Three

days later, on May 14, 2018, Flynn made a big announcement to her

colleagues—the Social Work School would, in fact, get the amended,

“multimillion dollar” Telehealth contract. (3-ER-508-09.)

On July 31, 2018, defendant voted in favor of the amended

Telehealth contract, which (1) renewed USC’s Telehealth contract with

the County and (2) did so on every expanded, more beneficial term

Flynn had requested from defendant. (7-ER-1167-80, 1192-98; 17-ER-

3256-66; 2-SER-412-17; 4-SER-871-939.) The motion passed. (4-SER-

939.)

d. Flynn admits a “side deal” with defendant

and his son to secure the Telehealth contract

In early June 2018, prior to any public reporting about the

$100,000 transaction, Social Work School faculty voted to remove Flynn

as dean for her perceived poor performance. (10-ER-2052-53; see also 9-

ER-1886-87.) In a transition meeting with Clapp to help prepare him to

serve as interim dean, Flynn emphasized the importance of the

amended Telehealth contract for the Social Work School and said that,

at some point, she would need to tell him about her “side deal” with

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defendant and Sebastian in connection with the Telehealth contract.

(10-ER-2055-57.)

3. USC makes a criminal referral after a whistleblower

exposes defendant’s bribery scheme with Flynn

After a whistleblower came forward with concerns about the

$100,000 payment to United Ways (3-ER-511-13), USC began

investigating. When USC initially inquired about the unusual

arrangement with the dual degree and professorship, Flynn pushed

back, noting that “Mark Ridley-Thomas…understand[s] this as a

commitment” from USC. (2-SER-488-92.) As the seriousness of the

investigation became more apparent, she later revised her internal

lobbying reports to scrub descriptions about the content of her

communications with defendant and Sherin, including deleting the

reference to the “gift agreement” she discussed with defendant on April

26, 2018 and the details of her discussion with Sherin on May 10, 2018

concerning the Telehealth contract. (17-ER-3247-51; 2-SER-493-98, 507

(revised), 510 (original).)

Ultimately, the investigation revealed that the benefits afforded to

Sebastian—at times when defendant was providing critical assistance

with County business—were unlike anything even so-called VIPs had

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ever received from USC. (10-ER-2083-86.) Upon discovering the

unprecedented arrangement, USC returned the $100,000 donation to

defendant, asked for its money back from PRPI, terminated Sebastian’s

scholarship and professorship, and made a criminal referral to the

United States Attorney’s Office and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(7-ER-1183-84; 10-ER-2078, 2127-30; 17-ER-3237-38; 20-ER-3762-64; 2-

SER-500-01; 3-SER-690-92, 695-701.)

4. Indictment

A grand jury returned an indictment against defendant and Flynn

for conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1), federal program

bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (Count 2 against defendant and

Count 3 against Flynn), and honest services mail and wire fraud, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (Counts 4-20). (6-ER-1110-

44.) Flynn pled guilty to federal program bribery (Count 3). (6-ER-

1005.)

5. Defendant’s trial theory

Defendant advanced three primary defenses at trial.

First, defendant argued that his preexisting support for the

County business at issue meant that no one would think they needed to

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bribe him. (1-ER-224.) Relatedly, defendant contended that he never

“changed his position” or “sold his vote” on account of any alleged bribe.

(23-ER-4383, 4440; see 23-ER-4382-87.)

Second, defendant asserted that USC treated Sebastian like a

“VIP” not because of any bribe, but because he was “accomplished” and

USC was “interested in admitting him.” (23-ER-4393, 4398; see 11-ER-

2273-74.) Defendant elicited testimony that USC thought it “critically

important to have a faculty that is diverse” and Sebastian “brought

some of that diversity” to USC. (11-ER-2284.)

Finally, defendant focused on the otherwise “legal” nature of the

$100,000 transaction and benefits USC provided to his son. Defendant

called a campaign finance expert to opine that the $100,000 transaction

was “legal under California’s Political Reform Act” and that defendant

could have donated $100,000 directly to United Ways. (2-ER-304, 333;

23-ER-4410-12, 4432.) Defendant similarly argued that the four quids

were legal. (23-ER-4438 (“And what happened at USC was legal. It

was the scholarship. It was the admission. It was the professor of

practice. It was the $100,000 donation to PRPI.”).) He ignored that the

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exchange of otherwise legal quids for otherwise legal quos was what

rendered the arrangement illegal.

6. Trial and convictions

During the 16-day trial, the court admitted nearly 500

government exhibits, including hundreds of emails from defendant’s

personal email account and USC, phone records, bank documents,

County records, documents from the public relations and legal team

defendant organized for Sebastian, campaign records, medical files for

Sebastian, and summary charts, among other exhibits. (1-SER-3-82.)

The jury convicted defendant of conspiracy (Count 1), federal program

bribery (Count 2), honest services mail fraud (Count 5), and honest

services wire fraud (Counts 15, 16, 19, and 20). (1-ER-24-43.) The jury

acquitted on the remaining honest services fraud counts. (Counts 4, 6-

14, 17-18). (Id.)

Defendant asserts that the counts of conviction pertain only to the

$100,000 payment from USC to United Ways and that the jury

acquitted him of conduct related to the USC admission, scholarship,

and professorship. (AOB 3.) He is mistaken. While the honest services

fraud verdicts pertained only to the Telehealth contract, the benefits

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defendant solicited in exchange were not limited to USC’s $100,000

donation to United Ways. The honest services wire fraud conviction for

Count 15 rested on the February 13, 2018 “Your wish is my command”

email that defendant sent Flynn (with a bcc to his son) in which he

promised to deliver the amended Telehealth contract (per their prior

agreement) immediately after Flynn delivered Sebastian’s USC

admission, scholarship, and professorship. (6-ER-1143; 7-ER-1194-95.)

Any discussion of the $100,000 payment from USC to United Ways did

not occur until months later in late April 2018. The only quids tied to

the “Your wish is my command” email are the USC admission,

scholarship, and professorship.

7. Post-trial litigation

Defendant filed post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial.

The court denied both motions. (1-ER-7-23.)

8. Sentencing

The court sentenced defendant to 42 months’ imprisonment,

followed by three years’ supervised release, and imposed a $30,000 fine.

(1-ER-2.) Having observed the “substantial detail” of the “documentary

evidence and testimony” presented at trial (2-SER-307), the court

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characterized defendant’s solicitation of Flynn as a “shakedown” (2-

SER-310-11). The court stated that defendant “used his position and

power” to demand “benefits for his son who was under scrutiny for

claims of sexual harassment while serving as a member of the

California State Assembly, a position he had resigned claiming health

concerns.” (2-SER-308.) Defendant’s “motive was purely to help his son

and himself,” and “he was willing to betray the trust placed in him by

this community to do so.” (2-SER-322.)

IV

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Defendant mounts a robust legal defense for a trial that never

happened. He distorts the government’s trial presentation, omits jury

instructions and critical facts fatal to his claims, and repeats his self-

serving narrative the jury heard—and rejected. He fails to appreciate

how his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed—

drawing all facts and inferences in favor of the government—and

instead presents his arguments and assertions as if he is entitled to an

appellate retrial. His claims uniformly lack merit.

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A. Defendant’s honest services fraud convictions are legally

valid and supported by sufficient evidence.

First, contrary to defendant’s strawman claim erected for the first

time on appeal, the government did not proceed on a theory that the

quid was “a perceived reputational benefit.” (AOB 33.) The indictment

and jury instructions identified the quids in the bribery scheme as the

USC admission, scholarship, professorship, and $100,000 payment from

USC to United Ways, and both parties argued to the jury based on

those quids alone. Reputational benefit was merely evidence of

defendant’s motive. The government’s bribery theory—soliciting

financial benefits for an official’s family member in exchange for a

government contract—falls comfortably within the honest services

fraud statute as interpreted by Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358

(2010).

Second, defendant’s attack on materiality is similarly divorced

from the record. Amply sufficient evidence demonstrated acts by

defendant capable of influencing the County, its employees, and the

public—the most obvious of which were his solicitation and concealment

of bribes, votes on Flynn’s coveted County business, and influence over

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other government officials to move Flynn’s sought-after contracts

forward.

Third, the district court properly instructed on the mens rea for

honest services fraud by telling the jury it must find that defendant

acted with the intent to deprive County residents of their right to his

honest services through quid pro quo bribery.

Finally, the government did not rely on a gratuity theory for the

honest services fraud charges. Arguments that defendant “monetized”

his public office—that is, traded official acts for private gain—were

plain references to quid pro quo bribery. It is no defense to bribery that

defendant may have, or even should have, performed an official act

without the bribe—and saying so did not invite the jury to convict based

on a gratuity. Moreover, by requiring a quid pro quo, the jury

instructions categorically foreclosed conviction on a gratuity theory.

B. Defendant’s attacks on his federal program bribery

conviction are equally flawed.

First, defendant repeats his newly-invented claim that the

government proceeded on a theory that reputational benefit was the

“thing of value.” As the district court expressly instructed the jury—in

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an instruction defendant approved yet omits from his opening brief and

excerpts of record—the only alleged things of value were the USC

admission, scholarship, professorship, and $100,000 payment from USC

to United Ways.

Second, defendant’s challenges to the jury instructions are

meritless. This Court’s binding precedent does not require a quid pro

quo for federal program bribery. Additionally, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to give defendant’s proposed instruction

regarding gratuities and currying favor. That instruction was

erroneous, confusing, and unnecessary given the other instructions

properly articulating the elements of federal program bribery.

Finally, any alleged error was harmless because the jury found a

quid pro quo with its five honest services fraud convictions.

C. The conspiracy conviction is valid because all its objects are

legally sound.

D. The district court did not clearly or otherwise err in denying

defendant’s Batson challenges to the strikes of two Black jurors.

Regarding Juror 13, defendant failed to establish a prima facie case.

The court applied the correct legal standard (totality of the relevant

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facts), the government’s case-specific questioning of numerous jurors

showed no pattern of purposeful discrimination, the government offered

race-neutral reasons for the strike (including her experience in local

government and defense-friendly pronouncements about the legality

and commonplace practice of legacy admissions), and the government

subsequently struck white jurors with similar advanced-degree

credentials. Regarding Juror 1, the court did not clearly err in crediting

the prosecutors’ explanations for the strike, including that the juror was

shaking her head during the reading of the charges, suggesting

potential anti-government bias. Significantly, the government did not

utilize all its peremptory strikes, and the final jury included two Black

men and one Black/Hispanic man, along with at least eight women:

three Hispanic, one Hispanic/white, two Asian-American, and two

white. A highly diverse jury delivered defendant’s convictions. Those

convictions should be affirmed.

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ARGUMENT

A. The Honest Services Fraud Convictions Are Legally Valid

and Supported by Sufficient Evidence

1. Standard of review

“[W]hen a Rule 29 motion is made on a specific ground, other

grounds not raised are waived,” United States v. Hong, 938 F.3d 1040,

1047 (9th Cir. 2019), and reviewed for plain error, United States v.

Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 632 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015). Contrary to his newly-

minted appellate claim, defendant never asserted below that the quid

was something other than the four things of value enumerated in the

indictment and jury instructions, nor did he argue that the alleged quid

was reputational benefit. Defendant cannot circumvent the plain error

standard by characterizing that claim as a challenge to the legal

validity of his convictions. Even if a pure question of law may be

reviewed de novo—a proposition to which the government objects—that

exception does not apply to mixed questions of law and fact. United

States v. Yijun Zhou, 838 F.3d 1007, 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2016).

Whether the government pursued a reputational benefit theory involves

a mixed question of law and fact, i.e., “the application of a legal

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standard to a particular set of facts.” Id. at 1012 (quoting TSC Indus.,

Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)) (mixed question of law

and fact requiring plain error review exists where this Court must

review, among other things, the indictment and transcripts).

Defendant’s assertion that the government “failed to prove an essential

element of the honest services fraud charges” (AOB 37) underscores

that his argument necessitates a review of the trial record, thus

presenting a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed for plain

error.

Accordingly, defendant must demonstrate that the government

“clearly” or “obviously” proceeded solely on a reputational benefit

theory. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (defendant

bears burden of establishing plain error). He also must establish that

the alleged error affects substantial rights and the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 732-36.

Defendant’s preserved challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

regarding materiality is reviewed de novo, Hong, 938 F.3d at 1047, but

in a manner that is “highly deferential” to the jury’s verdict, United

States v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

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His challenge fails if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United

States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Finally, this Court “review[s] the formulation of jury instructions

for abuse of discretion, but review[s] de novo whether those instructions

correctly state the elements of the offense and adequately cover the

defendant’s theory of the case.” United States v. Koziol, 993 F.3d 1160,

1179 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). The question is “whether the

instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s

deliberation.” Id. (quotations omitted). Unpreserved instructional

challenges are reviewed for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b).

2. Defendant’s claim that “reputational benefit” was the

quid is contrary to the record and court’s instructions

a. “Reputational benefit” was the motive, not the

quid

The alleged theory that the quid was “perceived reputational

benefit” (AOB 33) exists nowhere in the record. From indictment to

closing argument, the government’s theory was clear—the four things of

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value (or quids) defendant demanded and solicited were the USC

admission, scholarship, professorship, and $100,000 payment from USC

to United Ways. (6-ER-1116, 1136, 1138 (indictment); 9-ER-1752

(opening); 1-ER-123-24, 129, 134, 147, 167, 185, 202 (closing); 23-ER-

4494 (rebuttal).) Defendant repeatedly acknowledged in both his

closing argument and motion for judgment of acquittal that those four

benefits were the alleged quids. (1-ER-204; 23-ER-4438; 6-ER-1073,

1082.)

The court echoed the government’s theory. At the outset of the

case, the court told the jury that the “indictment [] alleges” four

“benefits” for defendant’s son traded in exchange for official acts—the

admission, scholarship, professorship, and $100,000 payment from USC

to United Ways. (4-ER-688.) During deliberations, in a supplemental

instruction defendant approved yet fails to acknowledge on appeal, the

court instructed the jury that the “thing of value in this case is alleged

to be one or more of the following: [1] Admission to the University of

Southern California (USC) for Sebastian Ridley-Thomas; [2] A

scholarship for Sebastian Ridley-Thomas to attend USC; [3] A paid

professorship for Sebastian Ridley-Thomas to teach at USC; or [4] A

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$100,000 payment from USC to the United Ways of California.” (1-

SER-2, 249.) While the instruction enumerated the alleged things of

value for the federal program bribery count (id.), it equally informed

what the quids were for the honest services fraud counts. With respect

to honest services fraud, the court instructed the jury that it must find

the exchange of “a thing of value” for official acts (1-ER-74, 75), and the

supplemental instruction contained the only definition of a thing of

value the jury received.

Defendant’s concerns about the reputation of the Ridley-Thomas

political brand simply explained his motive—that is, why he sought the

benefits for his son and why he sought to obtain those benefits in a

secretive manner. (See, e.g., 1-ER-121-22, 170-71, 180; 6-ER-1111-12; 9-

ER-1751; 23-ER-4519-20.) The government argued that the crisis

caused by the Assembly’s sexual harassment investigation and

Sebastian’s resignation was defendant’s “motive” for escalating his

demands on Flynn and that bad political optics were the “real reason”

defendant sought to secure the $100,000 payment from USC. (23-ER-

4519-20, 4549.) See United States v. Yates, 16 F.4th 256, 264 (9th Cir.

2021) (argument that bank officers desired to increase the value of their

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stock was offered as motive for some of defendants’ conduct, “not as an

independent theory of the object of the scheme”); United States v. Kemp,

500 F.3d 257, 284-85 (3d Cir. 2007) (approving a loan to the defendant,

done for purpose of making him “look good,” was a bribe). In denying

defendant’s motion for acquittal, the court agreed that a desire to

conceal the $100,000 payment was defendant’s “motive for entering into

the bribery agreement” but was not the basis of the charge. (1-ER-14

(emphasis in original).)

Bribery for purposes of the honest services fraud statute, 18

U.S.C. § 1346, involves seeking or accepting anything of value in

exchange for an official act. See McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S.

550, 562 (2016); United States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir.

2014). A “thing of value” has been “interpreted broadly to carry out the

congressional purpose of punishing the abuse of public office” and

includes “the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the

items received.” Renzi, 769 F.3d at 744 (quotations omitted). Money—

here, a $100,000 payment from USC to Sebastian’s nonprofit—is

“indisputably a thing of value.” United States v. Abdelaziz, 68 F.4th 1,

24 (1st Cir. 2023). Ignoring that obvious proposition, defendant argues

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that the payment did not enrich him personally and had only

reputational benefit to him. (See AOB 33, 35, 36, 41.) However, a

benefit to someone other than the public official, such as a relative, is a

legally cognizable—indeed, commonplace—quid. “[P]rivate gain is not

an element of honest services fraud.” United States v. Inzunza, 638

F.3d 1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). “A participant in a scheme to defraud

is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue

to other participants.” United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th

Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he public is deprived of its

servants’ honest services no matter who receives the proceeds.” Id.

Federal bribery statutes reject the notion that the public official

must have himself personally profited. Federal program bribery occurs

where a public official “corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of

any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any

person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any

business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization,

government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.”

18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Similarly, for bribery of

federal public officials, the thing of value need not be given, offered, or

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promised to the public official himself. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1). Rather,

the bribe can be directed to “any other person or entity.” Id.

Ample precedent confirms that benefits in bribery schemes can

flow to someone other than the public official. See, e.g., United States v.

Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1999) (bribe included over “$100,000

in payments and benefits—including automobiles, car repairs, money

orders, an apartment, health club memberships, and a queen-sized

bed—to the judges or members of their families”) (emphasis added);

United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1169-72 (11th Cir. 2011)

(donation to governor’s education lottery foundation); United States v.

McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1198 (11th Cir. 2010) (scholarship for official’s

son). Several cases defendant cites (AOB 35-36) also involved a benefit

for someone other than the public official directly. See, e.g., United

States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1356 (4th Cir.), aff’d on reh’g, 602 F.2d

653 (4th Cir. 1979) (diamond bracelet for public official’s wife); United

States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 1987) (interest in cable

company for public official’s close personal friend).

In passing, defendant suggests that arguments about defendant

seeking to funnel his campaign funds through USC signaled that

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reputational benefit was the quid. (AOB 33, 36.) He is wrong. The

reference to funneling the money through USC inherently involved the

ultimate $100,000 payment to Sebastian’s nonprofit (the quid, as

instructed by the court and alleged in the indictment for all counts) and

offered evidence of the corrupt nature of the exchange, defendant’s

intent, and his motive.

To the extent defendant suggests that there can be no bribe

because USC purportedly lost no money (AOB 37), that argument is

wrong both factually and legally. Factually, defendant donated

$100,000 to the Social Work School to “facilitate the impressive policy

and practical work of the School and its impact in the community” (7-

ER-1181)—a donation USC was entitled to keep. See Burton v. United

States, 196 U.S. 283, 297 (1905) (title of a check passes to its recipient

upon delivery of the check). But neither the Social Work School nor any

other program at USC ever saw a penny of defendant’s “donation”

because defendant directed Flynn to immediately send $100,000 from

USC to United Ways, and Flynn followed that instruction to obtain

defendant’s promised actions on the Telehealth contract.

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As a legal matter, the $100,000 payment from USC to United

Ways involved a thing of value, even if defendant arguably provided the

seed money for that payment and USC therefore did not suffer a “loss.”

A payment that has value to the defendant, including a loan that the

official must repay and thus results in no loss to the bribe-payor, is a

thing of value. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 284-85 (approval of a loan can be a

bribe, even if the loan needs to be repaid); United States v. Crozier, 987

F.2d 893, 901 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A]ny payment that the defendant

subjectively believes has value, including a loan, constitutes a thing ‘of

value’ within the meaning of § 666(c).”); United States v. Gorman, 807

F.2d 1299, 1304-05 (6th Cir. 1986) (“thing of value” in bribery case

“must be broadly construed” to include loan). In Renzi, this Court

rejected the argument that “an equal value exchange cannot constitute

‘something of value’ because there was no net loss to the victim.” 769

F.3d at 743-44. The defendant in Renzi demanded that a private

business purchase land owned by Renzi’s friend (who owed money to

Renzi) in exchange for Renzi’s promise to support favorable legislation.

Id. at 737. Even if the business paid a fair market price for the land

(and received an offer to resell it at a profit), this Court held that Renzi

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committed honest services fraud because, in exchange for utilizing his

influence to move a bill through Congress, he received money he was

not otherwise entitled to receive (early repayment of the friend’s debt)

that had subjective value to him. See id. at 744. Likewise, in exchange

for moving the Telehealth contract to fruition, defendant obtained a

$100,000 donation to United Ways for his son’s nonprofit that he was

not otherwise entitled to receive, and the money had subjective value to

defendant because it provided employment for his son and paid the

PRPI employee’s salary.

Accordingly, there is no error, plain or otherwise, related to the

fictitious quid of reputational benefit premised on a strawman record. 9

9 Moreover, even if the government had suggested inadvertently

that reputational benefit could be a quid (it did not), the court
instructed the jury that it must follow the court’s instructions. (1-ER-
45, 48-49.) Because the court expressly enumerated the four items of
value solicited as part of the bribery scheme—and reputational benefit
was not one of them (1-SER-2)—any error was harmless. “Jurors are
presumed to follow the court’s instructions.” United States v. Reyes, 660
F.3d 454, 468 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298,
1302 (9th Cir. 1995).

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b. Skilling and related cases are irrelevant

Because the government did not proceed on a reputational benefit

theory, defendant’s treatise on Skilling is immaterial. (AOB 34-38.)

There, the Supreme Court held that honest services fraud covers only

bribery and kickback schemes. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409. Other types

of schemes, such as those rooted in undisclosed self-dealing, do not fall

within the ambit of section 1346. Id. at 410-11. Because the court

instructed, the government argued, and the evidence supported that the

honest services fraud scheme must have involved a bribe, Skilling is

irrelevant.

Specifically, the court instructed the jury that defendant’s honest

services fraud scheme must have “consisted of a bribe in exchange for at

least one official act by defendant, with all of you agreeing as to which

act.” (1-ER-68, 70 (emphasis added).) The instructions elaborated:

Bribery involves the exchange of a thing or things of value

for official acts by a public official, in other words, a “quid
pro quo” (a Latin phrase meaning “this for that” or “these for
those”). Bribery also includes offers and solicitations of
things of value in exchange for official acts. That is, for the
payor, bribery includes the offer or agreement to provide a
thing of value to a public official in exchange for an official
act. For the public official, bribery includes the public
official’s solicitation or agreement to accept a thing of value
in exchange for an official act. It is not sufficient for the

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government to prove that defendant failed to disclose a

conflict of interest or violated a rule, policy, or contractual
obligation of his position; the government must prove a
scheme to deprive the public of defendant’s honest services
through bribery.

(1-ER-74-75 (emphasis added).) These instructions incorporated

defendant’s proposed language. (5-ER-941, 973.)

Defendant takes no issue with the instructions enumerating the

bribery requirement, nor does he claim the government incorrectly

articulated the law. Indeed, in its closing argument, the government

repeatedly emphasized that an honest services fraud scheme must

involve bribery. (See, e.g., 1-ER-131-32, 203.) Defendant’s extensive

discussion of Skilling is premised on his mistaken notion that the quid

was reputational benefit. Because that premise is belied by the record,

his Skilling discussion is a distraction.

Defendant’s other cited cases are equally irrelevant. (AOB 38-42.)

In Abdelaziz, parents paid a college admissions consultant money to

help their children get accepted to universities as athletic recruits

under false pretenses, and the consultant, in turn, provided some of the

funds to university athletic programs. 68 F.4th at 15-17. The First

Circuit ruled that the parents’ payments to the universities, whose

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interests were betrayed by their agents (the coaches), did not constitute

bribes for purposes of section 1346. Abdelaziz reasoned that section

1346 was adopted to overrule McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350

(1987), which had rejected the honest services theory of fraud; that

Skilling held that Ҥ 1346 criminalizes only the bribery-and-kickback

core of the pre-McNally case law”; and that no pre-McNally case

involved a purported bribe paid to the victim of the bribery scheme. Id.

at 28-29 (quoting Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409). Abdelaziz further rejected

as a basis for bribery the fact that the university insiders stood to

benefit professionally, noting that an indirect professional benefit such

as a salary increase or “psychic” benefit such as approbation from one’s

superior is not the sort of private gain that makes an act criminal under

section 1346. Id. at 31 (citing United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877,

884 (7th Cir. 2007)).

No such concerns exist here. Unlike in Abdelaziz, the bribes in

this case were not paid to the defrauded entities (the County and the

public) or their agents, and defendant’s benefits were not limited to

professional or psychic benefits. The bribery scheme here—the

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exchange of official acts for monetary benefits for an official’s son—falls

squarely within the bribery-and-kickback core of pre-McNally case law.

Defendant’s other cases fare no better. In Thompson, unlike here,

neither the defendant nor any other public official was accused of taking

a bribe or receiving a kickback. 484 F.3d at 881. Yates, too, did not

involve bribery. That case involved a scheme by bank officials to

deceive the bank while continuing to draw their salaries, and this Court

held that salary maintenance (as opposed to a scheme whose object was

to obtain a new or higher salary) was not a property interest sufficient

to support bank fraud. 16 F.4th at 266-67. Finally, United States v.

Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015), involving the former governor

of Illinois, actually supports the government’s theory. There, the court

reversed counts where the instructions permitted conviction based on

logrolling (the trading of political votes and appointments among

politicians) but ruled that the defendant could be retried on the

government’s alternative theory of making a political appointment

(official act) in exchange for a private payment in the form of a large

donation to a social welfare organization that the defendant would

control. 794 F.3d at 733-38.

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Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the government, as defendant concedes this Court must (AOB 34), his

contention that the honest services fraud convictions were based on a

legally incognizable quid is meritless.

c. The government’s paradigmatic bribery theory

will not chill legitimate policymaking

Defendant—supported by amici Ninth Circuit Federal Public and

Community Defenders and Former California Officials, who parrot his

attacks on a fictional trial record—argues that recognizing reputational

benefit as a basis for honest services fraud would “grind policymaking

as we know it to a halt.” (AOB 33.) Because defendant’s prosecution

was not based on that newly-invented theory, defendant’s parade of

horribles in which ribbon-cutting ceremonies would subject elected

officials to federal prosecution is a myth. (AOB 33, 42-43.) The self-

serving narrative that defendant could not have known that his

otherwise legal acts transgressed into illegal territory is one the jury

heard—and properly rejected. Nothing about the quid pro quo scheme

here fails to provide “fair notice” to the average official about acceptable

political bounds. (AOB 42.) Schemes involving benefits for a public

official’s relative, close friend, or other third party traded for official

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acts are plainly illegal and have been for decades. See, e.g., Frega, 179

F.3d at 798; Siegelman, 640 F.3d at 1169-72; McNair, 605 F.3d at 1198;

Kemp, 500 F.3d at 268, 285-86; Spano, 421 F.3d at 603; Lovett, 811 F.2d

at 982; Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1356.

The cross-examination of defendant’s former deputy (and chief of

staff while he was on the Los Angeles City Council) most clearly dispels

this sky-is-falling fiction. (21-ER-4047-48.) Karly Katona testified that

she would recuse herself from an official decision or action having any

financial tie to a close family member because it is “the right thing to

do” and she is not “working for personal gain.” (21-ER-4039-40.) Had

anyone offered her a “bribe” or “something of value in exchange for [her]

taking an action or making a recommendation,” she would “report” it.

(21-ER-4040.) Even for defendant’s fiercely loyal former aide, the crux

of this case is simple: trading official acts for financial benefits to one’s

son is wrong and corrupt.

Amici Former California Officials argue that defendant’s donation

from his ballot measure committee to the Social Work School was legal

under California law, but they ignore that defendant was not

prosecuted for his sham donation. Rather, he was prosecuted for

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soliciting, demanding, accepting, and agreeing that—in exchange for

getting Flynn the amended Telehealth contract—Flynn use those funds

not for their stated purpose but rather to make an equivalent payment

of USC’s money to United Ways for PRPI. Percoco v. United States, 598

U.S. 319 (2023), is inapposite. Percoco rejected the Second Circuit’s

theory that a private citizen could deprive the public of its intangible

right of honest services if he or she had a “special relationship” with the

government and had “dominated and controlled” government business.

Id. at 322 (quotations omitted). That standard—suggesting a private

person has a fiduciary duty to the public when their “clout exceeds some

ill-defined threshold”—was too vague and did not define the right of

honest services “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can

understand what conduct is prohibited or in a manner that does not

encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 330-31

(quoting McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 576) (quotations omitted). Here,

defendant was a public official and his agreement to deliver a

government contract in exchange for USC’s $100,000 payment for the

benefit of PRPI is a long-recognized form of bribery that raises no such

danger.

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Amici Federal Defenders similarly rest their argument on the

false premise that the government relied on the theory that “perceived

reputational benefits…qualify as things of value.” (Brief (dkt. 23) at 3.)

Like amici Former California Officials, their brief makes no reference to

USC’s $100,000 payment to United Ways for PRPI or the Telehealth

contract that defendant promised in exchange. Nor do Federal

Defenders contend that university admission, a full-tuition scholarship,

or a paid professorship—the quids underlying Count 15, see supra

section III.B.6—do not qualify as things of value under the honest

services fraud statute.

In sum, the honest-services-fraud crimes of which defendant was

convicted were not based on a novel reputational benefit theory but

rather a well-worn bribery theory involving financial benefits in

exchange for a government contract. Nothing in this case “‘cast[s] a pall

of potential prosecution’ over everyday interactions” between elected

officials and their constituents. (AOB 42 (quoting McDonnell, 579 U.S.

at 575).) Even if defendant’s funneling of $100,000 to United Ways and

PRPI through USC would otherwise have been legal, soliciting Flynn to

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do so in return for the Telehealth contract was not. The quid pro quo

trade was paradigmatic bribery and honest services fraud.

3. Amply sufficient evidence demonstrates materiality

a. Defendant’s acts were capable of influencing

the County, its employees, and the public

Honest services fraud requires a showing of materiality. United

States v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 727 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). An

act is material if it has “a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable

of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was

addressed.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (quotations

omitted). For honest services fraud, materiality exists where

“misinformation” or an “omission” is “capable of leading a reasonable

[decisionmaker] to change its conduct.” Milovanovic, 678 F.3d at 727

(quotations omitted).

The government agrees that the fraudulent scheme must have

been materially deceptive with respect to the parties deprived of honest

services, not third parties—what defendant refers to as the convergence

doctrine. Cf. United States v. Lew, 875 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1989).

Ignoring plain evidence to the contrary, defendant asserts that the

government failed to prove materiality because it “adduced no evidence

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of deception material to the public, relying exclusively on

misrepresentations and omissions it alleged were material to USC and

third parties.” (AOB 51.) That is false. Ample evidence established

numerous material acts by defendant capable of influencing the County,

its employees, and the public.

Most fundamentally, defendant demanded and accepted a bribe in

exchange for supporting the amended and extended Telehealth

contract, and he concealed his demand for, and acceptance of, that

bribe. The concealed bribe was certainly material. Knowledge of its

existence was capable of influencing, for example, the decisions of

various County officials who advanced, formulated, and approved the

amended Telehealth contract.

Indeed, this Court and others have had no difficulty grasping the

obvious proposition that knowledge of a bribe can lead uncorrupted

decisionmakers to change their conduct. For instance, in United States

v. Jacobs, 506 F. App’x 558 (9th Cir. 2013), there was sufficient

evidence of materiality because an immigration officer’s scheme to take

bribes in exchange for immigration information and assistance had a

natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the

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defendant’s employing agency. Id. at 559-60. Likewise, in United

States v. Foxworth, 334 F. App’x 363 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit

found sufficient evidence of materiality because a state senator’s non-

disclosure of a bribe naturally tended to influence decisionmakers who

awarded lucrative contracts to the briber. Id. at 366. The same is true

of the public at large who elected defendant. Id. “When a public official

is bribed,” the deception lies in the fact that “he is paid for making a

decision while purporting to be exercising his independent discretion.”

United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1980).

Knowledge of such deception would be capable of, for example,

influencing citizens in choosing their elected representatives or seeking

government redress with respect to the contract at issue. As the

government told the jury during closing, honest services fraud is a

“scheme to deprive the public of its right to [defendant’s] honest

services” and “[t]aking a bribe is the most fundamental violation of

that.” (1-ER-131 (emphasis added).)

Additionally, defendant performed other material acts beyond his

demand, receipt, and concealment of bribes. It is axiomatic that a

public official “commits honest-services fraud when [he] sells [his] vote.”

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United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997). As

the government argued in closing, defendant’s “votes” were material

since they were capable of influencing County officials and the public (1-

ER-203), and the jury rationally could have so found. The district court

correctly agreed, concluding that defendant’s vote on Telehealth had a

natural tendency to influence the County’s actions regarding that

contract. (1-ER-12.) Indeed, defendant’s vote could certainly influence

the County in its decision to execute the amended Telehealth contract

and eventually pay USC under the amended terms. Defendant’s vote

was also capable of influencing the residents of Los Angeles in their

support for the initiatives the contract involved.10

10 Defendant correctly observes that the material act need not be

the same as the “official act” required by section 1346. (AOB 53 n.12.)
But defendant fails to cite any authority establishing that the same act
can never satisfy both requirements. While the scheme or plan must
consist of a bribe in exchange for at least one official act, defendant
need not perform the official act. United States v. Kimbrew, 944 F.3d
810, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2019). It is the promise of an official act traded for
some benefit that satisfies the second element of honest services fraud.
Id. But where an official goes further and actually performs the official
act, that execution constitutes a material act—indeed, one of the most
material there can be: a vote in favor of a measure obviously tends to
make the measure more likely to pass. See Jacobs, 506 F. App’x at 559-
60 (securing the promised immigration benefit satisfied materiality).

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Moreover, as the government also argued in closing, material acts

included defendant “advising [] other officials.” (1-ER-203.) For

example, defendant directed his deputy to move the amended

Telehealth contract forward on the terms Flynn sought. (7-ER-1196-

98.) Defendant also contacted Sherin, the DMH director and critical

gatekeeper to Telehealth’s advancement, to enlist his support for the

contract amendment. (4-SER-1074 (defendant’s call with Sherin on

April 22, 2018 and a 46-minute call with Flynn immediately afterward),

1138 (Sherin’s voicemail to Flynn on April 23, 2018).) While these

actions need only be capable of influencing County employees, here they

actually did. Defendant’s outreach to Sherin prompted him to contact

Flynn at a key moment when defendant was soliciting the $100,000

payment from her. (Id.) And the deputy’s reply email shows her taking

steps to move the contract forward, just as her boss (defendant) made

clear he wanted. (7-ER-1196-98.) See Jacobs, 506 F. App’x at 560

(sufficient evidence of materiality where “scheme did in fact influence”

subordinate to confer immigration benefits at defendant’s direction).

What defendant fails to appreciate in suggesting (incorrectly) that the

government needed to call a County employee to testify that they could

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have been influenced (see AOB 52) is that the government offered

evidence that County employees actually were influenced. The

government’s evidence exceeds even what defendant (or the law)

demands.

Defendant points to comments in the government’s closing

argument about lies Flynn told USC to facilitate the university’s

$100,000 payment for the benefit of PRPI and lies defendant told USC

(in his sham donation letter) and United Ways about the $100,000

payment. (AOB 47.) Those comments did not reference materiality—

defendant’s quoted phrase “material … lies” (AOB 47) appears nowhere

on the page he cites (1-ER-200)—and were instead made in the context

of arguing that defendant’s and Flynn’s lies and misrepresentations

proved that USC’s $100,000 payment to United Ways constituted a

bribe, not a legitimate payment (see 1-ER-201). With respect to

materiality, what the government actually argued was that “defendant’s

acts”—that is, his “votes” and “advising of other officials”—“were

material.” (1-ER-203 (emphasis added).)

At no time during its closing did the government argue that

Flynn’s acts satisfied materiality. Rather, in its opposition to

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defendant’s motion for acquittal, the government told the court that

defendant’s lies and acts with respect to Flynn and USC were among his

numerous material acts—and they were. (6-ER-1047-49.) Although not

necessary for the jury’s finding of materiality given the other evidence

of his concealed bribes and official acts, defendant’s acts with respect to

USC and United Ways were capable of influencing, not just those

parties, but the County and public as well. For instance, had the

County or public known that defendant lied to USC with his sham

donor letter or misled United Ways (which were acts to facilitate and

conceal the bribery scheme), those acts could have influenced the

County or public in its support of defendant or the Telehealth contract.

The jury would not have been irrational in concluding that defendant’s

acts to further the scheme, as the indictment alleged (6-ER-1116-17,

1139), were material in this regard.

Defendant’s challenge to the proof of materiality also rests on the

incorrect premise that convicting a public official of honest services

fraud requires proof of specific material false statements or omissions

beyond defendant’s solicitation, acceptance, and concealment of a thing

of value in exchange for a government contract. (AOB 50.) No such

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proof is required. Section 1346 provides that a scheme “to deprive

another of the intangible right of honest services” is a type of “scheme or

artifice to defraud,” and a scheme to defraud does not require proof of

specific false statements. United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 999

(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117, 1131 (9th Cir.

2000). Although Milovanovic stated that the defendant in an honest

services fraud case must “misrepresent or conceal a material fact,” 678

F.3d at 726, here, concealment of the bribe is sufficient. See Frega, 179

F.3d at 804 (“[B]ribery and concealing bribery are part and parcel of the

same scheme.”).

Contrary to defendant’s claim (AOB 47, 52-53), there is no

requirement that the government call a random member of the public or

a County official to testify that he or she would have wanted to know

the details of the bribery scheme or to explain how that knowledge

would have influenced him or her. Tasked with using their reason and

common sense in evaluating the evidence (which can be circumstantial)

and permitted to draw reasonable inferences from it (see 1-ER-47, 50),

the jurors could have soundly inferred that defendant’s various acts to

further and conceal the bribery scheme had a natural tendency to

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influence the behavior of elected officials and members of the public,

and this Court “must presume” that jurors drew that inference, see

Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164. And even if some paradoxical rule required a

witness to opine about how knowledge of a bribe could have influenced

him or her, Katona’s testimony suffices—she would have reported the

bribe. (See 21-ER-4039-40; see also 2-ER-271 (Supervisor Janice Hahn

believes it is important for a “public servant” to be “ethical,” and she

strives to be ethical).)

Finally, defendant incorrectly argues that the government was

required to prove that a person or entity was actually influenced, would

have acted differently had they known about the bribe, or relied on

defendant’s act to their detriment. (AOB 30, 52-53.) As defendant

acknowledged in his proposed instructions, the act need only be

“capable” of influencing a person or entity. (5-ER-941, 968.) Neder, 527

U.S. at 16. Milovanovic is not to the contrary—that case does not

require actual detrimental reliance, as defendant asserts (AOB 51), but

only misinformation or omissions that “would naturally tend to lead or

is capable of leading a reasonable [decisionmaker] to change its

conduct.” 678 F.3d at 727. The totality of the government’s evidence,

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including the timeline and context of defendant’s dealings with County

players, amply satisfied that standard.

b. The theory of materiality here was not novel

As demonstrated above, the government did not proceed on the

theory that materiality was established based on false statements that

deceived solely USC or United Ways. Contrary to defendant’s

contention, the government proved a scheme to “deceive his

constituents.” (AOB 51.) Defendant’s conduct fell within the core pre-

McNally bribery cases, and he was thus on notice that his conduct

violated the honest services fraud statute. E.g., United States v.

Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1321 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n honest

services cases, the scheme to defraud the public of honest services can

be proven when a public official accepts a bribe and fails to disclose it to

the public.”); Bohonus, 628 F.2d at 1171 (“The requisite ‘scheme or

artifice to defraud’ is found in the deprivation of the public’s right to

honest and faithful government. When a public official is bribed, he is

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paid for making a decision while purporting to be exercising his

independent discretion. The fraud element is therefore satisfied.”)11

Further, because the evidence established that defendant’s bribery

scheme and his conduct in carrying it out were material to County

decisionmakers and the citizenry, nothing about defendant’s conviction

“risks turning innocent conduct into a federal crime.” (AOB 49.)

Defendant’s demand that Flynn obtain, on short notice, a $100,000

payment from USC to United Ways for Sebastian’s nonprofit in

exchange for the Telehealth contract was not a “de minimis” bribe, such

as a free telephone call, luncheon invitation, or modest Christmas

present,” that would likely be immaterial. United States v. Rybicki, 354

F.3d 124, 146 (2d Cir. 2003).

11 Defendant claims he “violated no duty to disclose USC’s role in

his donation to PRPI.” (AOB 48.) But defendant did not make a
donation to PRPI. He made a donation to the Social Work School.
Subsequently, Flynn arranged for USC to make a donation to United
Ways for the benefit of PRPI in return for defendant finally delivering
the Telehealth contract—conduct the jury found to constitute a bribe.
Concealment of that bribe was material and violated section 1346, as
discussed supra.

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In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the government and

drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the jury’s verdict, there

was more than sufficient evidence of materiality.

4. The court properly instructed the jury regarding

the mens rea for honest services fraud

The court instructed the jury that honest services fraud requires

the government to prove:

1. Defendant devised or knowingly participated in a

scheme or plan to deprive the residents of the County
of Los Angeles of their right of honest services;

2. The scheme or plan consisted of a bribe in exchange for

at least one official act by defendant, with all of you
agreeing as to which act. The “exchange” may be
express or may be implied from all the surrounding
circumstances;

3. Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the residents of the

County;

4. Defendant acted with the intent to defraud by

depriving the residents of the County of their right of
honest services;

5. Defendant’s act was material; that is, it had a natural

tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, a
person or entity’s acts; and

6. Defendant used, or caused someone to use, [the

mails/an interstate wire communication] to carry out or
to attempt to carry out an essential part of the scheme
or plan.

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(1-ER-68, 70.) This instruction tracks both defendant’s proposed

language (5-ER-941, 968) and Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury

Instruction No. 15.34 (2023).

Relying on United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.

2020), defendant requested an additional instruction that “[a]n intent to

defraud is an intent to deceive and cheat.” (5-ER-956.) Miller, a

money-and-property fraud case, held that the jury charge misstated the

law by instructing that wire fraud requires an intent to “deceive or

cheat” rather than “deceive and cheat.” Miller, 953 F.3d 1098. Miller

explained that it is not enough for the defendant to deceive the victim;

the defendant must also intend “to deprive a victim of money or

property by means of those deceptions.” Id. at 1101. Here, defendant

makes the reverse argument—that the jury instructions erroneously

required only “cheating” (the intent to deprive another of honest

services), but not deception. (AOB 54.) He is wrong.

Other instructions already incorporated the requirement of

deceptive intent. See United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1215 (9th

Cir. 2016) (“A defendant is not entitled to any particular form of

instruction, nor is he entitled to an instruction that merely duplicates

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what the jury has already been told.” (quotations omitted)). In a case

involving bribery of a public official, the deceit is the fact that the

official “is paid for making a decision while purporting to be exercising

his independent discretion.” Bohonus, 628 F.2d at 1171. “The fraud

element is therefore satisfied.” Id. Thus, if defendant acted with the

intent to deprive County residents of their right to his honest services

through quid pro quo bribery, as the instructions required the jury to

find (1-ER-68, 70, 74-75), he acted with the necessary deceptive intent.

See United States v. Hernandez, 2021 WL 3579386, at *1 (9th Cir. 2021)

(unpublished) (no Miller error in honest services fraud case where

instructions made clear that “scheme or plan” must consist of a bribe or

kickback and the “deprivation” or “cheat” element was covered by the

separate instruction that “the defendant acted with the intent to

defraud by depriving Fannie Mae of its right of honest services”).

Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556

F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case actually supports the

government’s position. In Kincaid-Chauncey, this Court held that the

jury instructions “adequately stated the elements of honest services

fraud on a bribery theory,” including the intent to defraud, “[b]ecause

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the instructions, taken a whole, contained an implicit quid pro quo

requirement.” Id. at 946. Here, the jury was instructed on the requisite

intent to defraud more clearly than in Kincaid-Chauncey because the

jury was expressly told that it must find quid pro quo bribery—the jury

was instructed that the government was required to prove (1) a scheme

to deprive the public of defendant’s honest services through bribery,

(2) defendant’s intent to defraud by depriving the public of his honest

services, and (3) a quid pro quo, i.e., “the exchange of a thing or things

or value for official acts by a public official.” (1-ER-68, 70, 74-75.)

Meanwhile, United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996),

another pre-Skilling case, did not involve quid pro quo bribery and

therefore has little bearing on the issue here. No additional instruction

was necessary.

Even if there was error, it was harmless. “Jury instructions, even

if imperfect, are not a basis for overturning a conviction absent a

showing that they prejudiced the defendant.” United States v. Lonich,

23 F.4th 881, 898 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Based on the instructions given by the court, defendant was

fully able to pursue his defense—that he did not engage in any quid pro

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quo and thus had no intent to deceive the County and public or deprive

them of his honest services. The jury’s rejection of that defense given

the compelling evidence of a quid pro quo in relation to the Telehealth

contract does not establish prejudice.

5. The government’s references to defendant “monetizing”

his public office were not legal error

Defendant claims that the government secured his honest services

fraud convictions under a legally invalid gratuity theory by referring to

defendant “monetizing” the power of his public office for private gain.

(AOB 58-62.) He further argues that this purported error requires

reversal because a general verdict of guilt must be set aside “where the

verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is

impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.” Yates v. United

States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957). His argument, which was never raised

at trial, establishes no plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Sullivan, 797

F.3d at 632 n.5; Yijun Zhou, 838 F.3d at 1010, 1012.

a. The government did not argue a gratuity theory

Defendant mischaracterizes the government’s evidence and

argument as advancing a gratuity theory of honest services fraud.

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First, defendant distorts the agent’s testimony by failing to

recount his actual words. (See AOB 60.) The agent testified that an

official “monetizes” his position by “[t]rading official acts in their official

capacity as an elected official in exchange for benefits, benefits to

themselves or benefits to a third party.” (19-ER-3558 (emphasis

added).) That is the definition of quid pro quo bribery, not a gratuity.

McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 555 (bribery required proof that the defendant

“committed (or agreed to commit) an ‘official act’ in exchange for the

loans and gifts”). The agent further confirmed that even “where a

public official might already be planning to take certain action,” he

could monetize his position by “trying to extract benefits from people,

making others think that they need to provide those benefits to get help

with that government business.” (19-ER-3558.) That is true. As

discussed herein, extracting benefits by making others believe the

benefits are necessary to prompt official action is bribery; it is not the

same as accepting a gratuity or reward.

Second, defendant conflates the government’s arguments

regarding honest services fraud and federal program bribery. Federal

program bribery criminalizes a defendant’s corrupt solicitation of a

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benefit where he intends to be influenced or rewarded in connection

with government business. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). Unlike honest

services fraud, no quid pro quo is required under section 666 (although

the government argued throughout trial that defendant engaged in a

quid pro quo). United States v. Garrido, 713 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir.

2013). The government’s references to a “reward” in closing argument

were, in proper context, references to the elements of federal program

bribery, not honest services fraud. (1-ER-129-31; 23-ER-4491.)

Third, defendant takes aim at the government’s comments that as

long as a bribe was agreed on, it was not a defense to honest services

fraud that defendant would have performed a certain official act

without a bribe. (AOB 76 (citing 1-ER-133-34, 203; 23-ER-4551-52).)

That was a correct statement of law, as the jury was instructed. (1-ER-

67, 76.) Throughout trial, defendant leaned into a “defense” that he

purportedly always supported Telehealth and thus did not “need” to be

bribed. (1-ER-224.) But even if defendant always planned to support

the Telehealth contract—a fact very much in dispute given defendant’s

failure to move the contract forward until he extracted benefits for his

son—if he solicited and demanded benefits in exchange for official acts,

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it is not a valid defense to honest services fraud (or federal program

bribery) that defendant would have performed an official act absent the

bribe, nor is it a defense that such acts were good for the community.

An official “is guilty of accepting a bribe even if he would and should

have taken, in the public interest, the same action for which the bribe

was paid.” City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S.

365, 378 (1991). “That is frequently the defense asserted to a criminal

bribery charge—and though it is never valid in law, it is often plausible

in fact.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Courts have confirmed this proposition many times. See, e.g.,

United States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538, 562 n.14 (2d Cir. 2020) (“It is no

defense that an official would have taken certain actions regardless of

any alleged bribe.”); United States v. Nagin, 810 F.3d 348, 351-52 (5th

Cir. 2016) (finding no error in an honest services wire fraud prosecution

where the court instructed the jury that “[i]t is not a defense to claim

that a public official would have lawfully performed the official action in

question even without having accepted a thing of value”); United States

v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 675 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding no error with an

instruction stating: “It is not a defense that the official act sought to be

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influenced would have been done anyway regardless of the fact that the

bribe was received or accepted. That is to say, even if the defendant

acted as he or she normally would if the bribe had not been requested,

the crime of bribery has still been committed.”); United States v.

Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 601 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (“[I]t is neither

material nor a defense to bribery that ‘had there been no bribe, the

(public official) might, on the available data, lawfully and properly have

made the very recommendation that (the briber) wanted him to

make.’”).

In sum, the government argued that defendant acted corruptly by

engaging in a quid pro quo bribery scheme. (1-ER-131.) The comments

defendant cites did not improperly urge conviction on a gratuity theory.

b. Any error cannot support reversal because the

jury instructions required a quid pro quo

Even if the government made an isolated remark that could be

construed as asking the jury to convict based on a gratuity theory (it did

not), “errors of the Yates variety are subject to harmless-error analysis.”

Skilling, 561 U.S. at 414. “[A] Yates error is harmless if, after a

‘thorough examination of the record,’ we are able to ‘conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent

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the error.’” United States v. Galecki, 89 F.4th 713, 741 (9th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 19). That standard is met here because the

jury instructions required a quid pro quo bribery scheme for the honest

services fraud counts, prohibiting a conviction based on a gratuity. (1-

ER-68, 70, 74-75.) The indictment similarly alleged bribery and made

no reference to an illegal gratuity for the honest services fraud counts.

(6-ER-1138-39.) And the government repeatedly reminded the jury in

closing and rebuttal that the honest services fraud counts required quid

pro quo bribery. (1-ER-131-32, 203; 23-ER-4449.) See Garrido, 713

F.3d at 998 (evaluating harmlessness of invalid legal theory by

examining the indictment, jury instructions, and closing arguments).

Defendant’s reliance on this Court’s decision in a separate case

also titled Yates, 16 F.4th 256, is misplaced. (AOB 60.) There, “the jury

instructions, although correct so far as they went, did nothing

to…preclude conviction under the government’s invalid theories, despite

the defendants’ request for an instruction on that issue.” Yates, 16

F.4th at 269. Here, in contrast, the honest services fraud instructions

requiring a bribery scheme involving a quid pro quo precluded

conviction based on a gratuity. The requirement of a quid pro quo is

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one of the many “distinguishing feature[s]” that separates bribery from

gratuities. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526

U.S. 398, 404 (1999). In contrast to bribery, an illegal gratuity does not

require a quid pro quo, only a “reward for some future act that the

public official will take (and may already have determined to take), or

for a past act that he has already taken.” Id. at 404-05.

Defendant also complains that the court compounded the alleged

error by failing to instruct the jury that “[a] benefit made to reward a

politician for an act he has already taken or has already determined to

take is not a bribe.” (AOB 62 (citing defendant’s proposed instruction

37(d) at 5-ER-928).) While defendant requested this instruction for

federal program bribery (5-ER-928), he never—either in his proposed

instructions (5-ER-838-1002) or at the charging conference (2-ER-386-

437)—sought this instruction for honest services fraud. “The court’s

failure to give an instruction not requested is reviewed for plain error,”

United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1988), a standard

defendant does not even attempt to meet. Nor could he. Defendant

wrongly latches onto Sun-Diamond’s reference of a reward for some

future act the official already determined to take to argue that he

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cannot be guilty of any offense if he was already planning to vote for the

Telehealth contract. (AOB 62.) As discussed supra, that is inaccurate.

Provided the elements of honest services fraud, including the quid pro

quo bribe, were otherwise established, preexisting support for the

Telehealth contract did not insulate defendant from criminal liability.

See supra at section V.A.5.a.

Furthermore, any error was harmless because defendant’s theory

of the case was adequately covered by other instructions. The court

properly instructed that honest services fraud requires that the “scheme

or plan consisted of a bribe in exchange for at least one official act by

defendant, with all of you agreeing as to which act.” (1-ER-68, 70

(emphasis added).) The court stated that bribery requires a quid pro

quo exchange and, for a public official, “bribery includes the public

official’s solicitation or agreement to accept a thing of value in exchange

for an official act.” (1-ER-74-75 (emphasis added).) The government

embraced that burden, stating that it must “prove a quid pro quo for

the fraud counts in this case.” (1-ER-132 (emphasis added); see also 1-

ER-131, 203; 23-ER-4449.) These instructions permitted defendant to

argue his theory of the case—in essence, that because he purportedly

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always supported Telehealth, he did not need to be bribed, would not

have solicited a bribe, and never engaged in a quid pro quo scheme with

Flynn. (1-ER-224; 23-ER-4382-87.) That theory failed because the jury

disbelieved it, not because of any instructional error.

B. Defendant’s Federal Program Bribery Conviction Should

Be Affirmed

1. Standard of review

In the district court, defendant never claimed that the “thing of

value” was reputational benefit, nor did he assert that any alleged thing

of value was legally insufficient. Accordingly, review of that claim is for

plain error. Sullivan, 797 F.3d at 632 n.5; Yijun Zhou, 838 F.3d at

1010, 1012.

Defendant’s claim that the jury instructions incorrectly stated an

element of federal program bribery is reviewed de novo, while his

challenges to the formulation of the instructions is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Koziol, 993 F.3d at 1179.

2. Reputational benefit was a motive, not the charged

thing of value

Defendant duplicates his newly-invented “reputational benefit”

claim in attacking his federal program bribery conviction on Count 2.

(AOB 62-68.) That claim fails for the same reasons set forth supra in

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section V.A.2. In brief, the court gave a supplemental instruction with

respect to Count 2 expressly stating that the four alleged “thing[s] of

value in this case” were the USC admission, scholarship, professorship,

and $100,000 payment from USC to United Ways (1-SER-2), and the

government consistently argued that those four items were the things of

value at issue (6-ER-1116, 1136, 1138 (indictment); 9-ER-1752

(opening); 1-ER-123-24, 129, 134, 147, 167, 185, 202 (closing); 23-ER-

4494 (rebuttal)). Reputational benefit was merely one of defendant’s

motives in soliciting and demanding benefits for his son.

Because reputational benefit was not the thing of value, this

Court need not address defendant’s argument that the “thing of value”

must be construed coextensively in sections 1346 and 666(a)(1)(B) and

cannot be broader than traditional notions of property. (AOB 63-66.)

In any event, money—in the form of the $100,000 payment from USC to

United Ways for Sebastian’s nonprofit—is clearly a thing of value.

Abdelaziz, 68 F.4th at 24; Renzi, 769 F.3d at 744. Moreover, defendant

sought that $100,000 payment to provide future employment and

income for his son. That, too, is a thing of value. Gorman, 807 F.2d at

1305 (promised future employment was thing of value).

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It is immaterial that defendant made a sham donation to the

Social Work School to facilitate USC’s payment to United Ways and

PRPI. Just as a loan is a thing of value even if it must be repaid, the

payment from USC had value to defendant; no “loss” to USC was

required. Kemp, 500 F.3d at 284-85; Crozier, 987 F.2d at 901; Gorman,

807 F.2d at 1304-05.

Finally, even if this Court were to accept defendant’s

mischaracterization that Flynn merely provided assistance securing the

$100,000 payment from USC, that service constituted a “thing of value”

because defendant subjectively believed it had value. Renzi, 769 F.3d at

744 (“‘thing of value’ is defined broadly to include ‘the value which the

defendant subjectively attaches to the items received.’”). For example,

this Court has held that the term “thing of value” includes intangible

services, such as “providing assistance in arranging a merger.” United

States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1986). Here,

Flynn’s assistance in arranging the payment had value to defendant

because her services helped ensure that his son actually received the

money and that the payment was not rejected by United Ways (like

Community Partners had done months earlier). In addition, her

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services allowed defendant to avoid the unseemly appearance of using

his campaign funds to benefit his son directly.

The $100,000 bribe payment here is a far cry from a scheme to

reduce lanes on a bridge as political retribution, Kelly v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 1565, 1572 (2020), or to deprive a victim of “potentially

valuable economic information necessary to make discretionary

economic decisions,” Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306, 309-10

(2023) (cleaned up). Proscribing defendant’s “shakedown” of Flynn (2-

SER-310-11) in no way “risks criminalizing quotidian interactions

between constituents and their elected officials” (AOB 66).

3. The court properly instructed the jury

a. Binding precedent does not require a quid pro

quo for section 666 bribery

Defendant sought an instruction that section 666 requires quid

pro quo bribery (5-ER-932), while acknowledging that this Court has

held to the contrary (5-ER-933 (citing Garrido, 713 F.3d at 996-97)).

Garrido held that section 666 “does not require a jury to find a specific

quid pro quo.” Garrido, 713 F.3d at 996. As Garrido explained, “the

government must prove at least an implied quid pro quo to prove

bribery under § 1346, but the government does not need to prove a quid

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pro quo under § 666 bribery.” Id. at 997 n.10. Garrido is the law of this

Court, and absent intervening Supreme Court authority that is “clearly

irreconcilable” with this Court’s precedent, it would have been error for

the district court to instruct the jury in a manner inconsistent with this

Court’s binding precedent. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Although the question of whether section 666 is

limited to quid pro quo bribery is currently before the Supreme Court,

Snyder v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 536 (2023) (granting certiorari

petition), that grant alone does not establish any clearly irreconcilable

higher authority.

Moreover, even if the instructions incorrectly omitted a quid pro

quo requirement for federal program bribery, any error was harmless.

In United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2011), this Court held

that instructing the jury on the nondisclosure theory invalidated in

Skilling was harmless because the jury convicted the defendant of

federal bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201, which required a quid pro quo

and thus “confirm[ed] beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would

have convicted Wilkes of honest services fraud if the court’s definition

had been limited to the bribery basis that Skilling expressly approved.”

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Id. at 544. The same is true here. The jury convicted defendant of five

counts of honest services fraud that required quid pro quo bribery. (1-

ER-68, 70, 74-75.) It is thus “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a

rational jury would have found the defendant guilty [under section 666]

absent the [alleged] error.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.

b. The court did not abuse its discretion in declining

to give defendant’s proposed instruction 37(d)

Contrary to defendant’s claims (AOB 71-74), the court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to give defendant’s proposed instruction

37(d), which stated:

A benefit given to curry favor, to cultivate a friendship, or to

express gratitude is not a bribe. A benefit given to a
politician with the generalized hope or expectation of future
benefit likewise does not constitute a bribe. A benefit made
to reward a politician for an act he has already taken or has
already determined to take is not a bribe. Nor is a benefit a
bribe merely because there is some connection in time or
place between a benefit to a politician and action by the
politician that helps the one who made the benefit.

(5-ER-928.)

The instruction was erroneous, confusing, and unnecessary given

the court’s other instructions properly articulating the elements of

federal program bribery (which defendant does not challenge).

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i. Gratuity

Defendant’s assertion that the court was required to instruct the

jury that a gratuity is not a bribe rests on the faulty premise that

federal program bribery requires a quid pro quo and does not cover

gratuities. That premise is incorrect. Garrido, 713 F.3d at 996, 997

n.10. Thus, even if the statement “[a] benefit made to reward a

politician for an act he… has already determined to take” accurately

defines a gratuity, Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405, the remainder of the

sentence (“is not a bribe”) was legally incorrect with respect to

section 666. Where part of an instruction does not correctly state the

law, the court is entitled to reject the instruction in its entirety. United

States v. Cervantes, 542 F.2d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 1976); accord United

States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 749 (1st Cir. 1994) (“the district judge is

not required to edit a proposed instruction to delete the bad and

preserve the good”).

Furthermore, taking a single-sentence definition of gratuity out of

context was misleading. Section 666 criminalizes instances in which a

defendant “corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person,

or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person,

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intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business,

transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government,

or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.” 18 U.S.C.

666(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The jury was instructed on the elements

of the offense consistent with the statutory language. (5-ER-66

(“Defendant acted corruptly, that is, intending to be influenced or

rewarded in connection with any business… of the County involving

anything of value of $5,000 or more” (emphasis added)).) Defendant’s

instruction was inaccurate and confusing because it wrongly suggested

that defendant’s preexisting support of the Telehealth contract

prohibited conviction even if all the elements of federal program bribery

were met. See supra at section V.A.5.a.

United States v. Chen, 754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1985), is

distinguishable. The defendant in Chen was prosecuted for bribing a

federal immigration official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), which

requires that the defendant act “corruptly.” See id. at 822. The

corresponding gratuity provision, however, does not contain a

requirement of corrupt intent and carries a lower penalty. 18 U.S.C.

§ 201(c). Thus, in Chen, an instruction distinguishing bribes from

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gratuities was necessary because “proof of a gratuity does not establish

the requisite corrupt intent for a bribery conviction.” 754 F.2d at 825.

Here, on the other hand, federal program bribery contains a single

provision, with a single penalty, requiring corrupt intent for both bribes

and gratuities. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (requiring that the defendant

“corruptly” solicit or demand anything of value “intending to be

influenced or rewarded” in connection with government business).

ii. Ingratiation

Defendant contends his instruction was necessary to distinguish

bribes from lawful ingratiation, but the proposed instruction was

incorrect and misleading.

The instruction inaccurately suggests that there was no bribe, and

defendant was entitled to acquittal, if the bribe-payor (Flynn) gave a

benefit to curry favor. However, Flynn’s intent for the substantive

charge of federal program bribery was irrelevant; what mattered was

defendant’s intent and whether defendant corruptly solicited or

demanded a thing of value intending to be influenced or rewarded in

connection with County business. As opposed to the conspiracy count,

where the intent of both coconspirators is at issue, the substantive

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charge of bribery requires only a finding related to the defendant’s mens

rea. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); see Kimbrew, 944 F.3d at 811-13 (public

official guilty of bribery where he demanded benefits from an

undercover agent who lacked corrupt intent). Defendant was “not

entitled to an instruction that misstates the law.” United States v.

George, 420 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005).

Moreover, “[a] defendant is not entitled to any particular form of

instruction, nor is he entitled to an instruction that merely duplicates

what the jury has already been told.” Kaplan, 836 F.3d at 1215

(quotation omitted). A judge also “need not include proposed

instructions that are not necessary to explain to the jury the legal effect

of the theory of the defense.” Id. (cleaned up). The court properly

instructed the jury on the elements of federal program bribery, which

permitted defendant to argue his theory of the case. (1-ER-66-67.) The

court specifically instructed that the government had to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant acted “corruptly, that is, intending to

be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction,

or series of transactions of the County involving anything of value of

$5,000 or more.” (1-ER-66.) At defendant’s request (5-ER-923), the

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court went further, instructing that an act is done corruptly “if it is

performed voluntarily, deliberately, and dishonestly, for the purpose of

either accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing

some otherwise lawful end or lawful result by an unlawful method or

means” (1-ER-24).

With these instructions, defendant was well positioned to argue

his theory of the case, namely, that he lacked corrupt intent, nothing he

solicited was in connection with any County business, and that he

purportedly always acted in “good faith.” (AOB 57.) A separate theory-

of-defense instruction is not required where “other instructions, in their

entirety, adequately cover that defense theory.” United States v.

Marguet-Pillado, 648 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011). For example,

“the failure to give an instruction on [a] good faith defense is not fatal so

long as the court clearly instructed the jury as to the necessity of

specific intent as an element of a crime.” Inzunza, 638 F.3d at 1020

(quotation marks omitted). Similarly, here, where the court clearly

instructed on the elements of federal program bribery, it was not

required to give defendant’s instruction as to what bribery is not.

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Defendant’s cases are inapposite. Kincaid-Chauncey did not hold

that an explanation of goodwill gifts is required in a section 666 case;

rather, there the district court did not explicitly instruct on the quid pro

quo bribery required for honest services fraud, so this Court pieced

together adequate guidance for the jury from the instructions as a

whole, including what bribery is not. 556 F.3d at 945-46 (jurors “could

not convict for mere influence or political friendships”). Here, no quid

pro quo was required for Count 2, and the instructions as a whole

adequately guided the jury. Sawyer involved hospitality—including

meals, rounds of golf, and other entertainment—the defendant lobbyist

lavished upon legislators. 85 F.3d at 721. He was charged under the

Travel Act with interstate travel with intent to promote unlawful

activity in the form of illegal gratuities. Id. at 734. In those particular

circumstances, the First Circuit held that “the jury needs to be told

specifically that the defendant has not violated the bribery component

of the Travel Act (or committed honest services fraud) if his intent was

limited to the cultivation of business or political friendship.” Id. at 741.

Because this case, by contrast, involved a charge of

“straightforward corruption,” Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 741, the instructions

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as a whole—requiring that defendant corruptly solicited or demanded a

thing of value intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with

County business, coupled with the additional instructions on “corrupt”

intent (1-ER-66)—adequately advised the jury that goodwill gifts

lacking such intent are insufficient to support conviction under

section 666. Koziol, 993 F.3d at 1179.

c. Any error was harmless

Even if there was instructional error, it was harmless. The jury

was instructed that it must find quid pro quo bribery to convict

defendant of honest services fraud (1-ER-68, 70, 74-75), and it convicted

defendant on five such counts. Therefore, it is clear beyond a

reasonable doubt that even with defendant’s proposed instructions, the

jury would have convicted him of the section 666 violation. Wilkes, 662

F.3d at 544.

C. Defendant’s Conspiracy Conviction Is Valid

A conspiracy conviction with multiple objects can only be

overturned where the legal theory of one of the objects is invalid, not

based on claims of factual insufficiency. Griffin v. United States, 502

U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991); United States v. Gonzalez, 906 F.3d 784, 790-91

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(9th Cir. 2018). For the reasons discussed supra, there is no legal

infirmity with the theory of conviction for either object of the

conspiracy. Defendant’s conspiracy conviction must stand.

D. The District Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Batson

Challenges

1. Facts

a. Initial voir dire

After placing the first 18 venirepersons in the box, the district

court read a set of questions that might form the basis of challenges for

cause and privately questioned each prospective juror who had a

positive response. (4-ER-706.) The government asked follow-up

questions of four prospective jurors:

• Juror 4 felt strongly that there is corruption among elected

officials. The government asked whether he could follow the

court’s instruction to listen to the facts and put aside his

personal opinions. The juror indicated that he would try, but

his opinion would be hard to change. (4-ER-708-10.)

• Juror 14 had served as a board member on her local

neighborhood council when it supported defendant’s re-election

and had a friend whom she believed had been wrongfully

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terminated from employment at USC. (4-ER-711-14.) When

the government asked whether she could set aside her prior

opinions about defendant and USC, the juror responded, “I’m

concerned.” (4-ER-715-17.) Later, the government again asked

if the juror could keep an open mind when hearing about

initiatives defendant supported. The juror hesitated and

ultimately replied, “I don’t know.” (4-ER-721.)

• Juror 16 had strong feelings about legacy admissions because

he paid his way through college and had significant student

debt. When the government asked whether he felt so strongly

on this point that he could not set aside his views, the juror

responded, “I don’t know that I could.” (4-ER-723-25.)

• Juror 18 had difficulty hearing, and the government inquired

about the juror’s ability to hear the prior proceedings. (4-ER-

730-31.)

The district court dismissed all four jurors for cause. (4-ER-736-37.)

Their race does not appear in the record.

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b. Juror 13 Batson challenge

The government exercised its first peremptory strike against

Juror 13, a Black female. (4-ER-782-84.) Juror 13 had a dual

bachelor’s degree in business and Mandarin, was enrolled in a master’s

program in East Asian Studies, worked for a bank as a relationship

manager and financial solutions advisor, was single, and had no prior

jury service. (4-ER-749, 757.) She had worked as a management

analyst for a state agency in Ohio (4-ER 754) and had experience in

budgeting and expense tracking (4-ER-757).

One of the case-specific voir dire questions defendant requested

was “Do you think it’s appropriate for universities to consider race or

legacy as a factor in determining admission?” (4-ER-768, 785.) When

the court asked this question to the group, Juror 13 responded: “[Y]es,

because affirmative action currently is the law and so a lot of

universities do consider race when it comes to college admissions and

legacy—a lot of institutions have legacy admissions so it’s a current

practice.” (4-ER-768.) One other juror (Juror 16) briefly responded too:

“I think legacy is OK when determining admission.” (Id.) The court

then reformulated the question, asking whether any juror felt race and

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legacy should not be considered in admissions. (4-ER-769.) Juror 10

responded that he opposed legacy admissions. (Id.)

Before the parties exercised peremptory challenges, the court

permitted attorney voir dire. After questioning another juror (Juror 15)

about her experience working for a government agency (4-ER-772-73),

the government asked Juror 13 to describe her work with the Ohio

government agency, whether she worked with government officials in

that job, and whether her education related to government

administration (4-ER-774-75). She described one of her roles as

reviewing hearing orders from a state agency to determine “whether

there were any discrepancies that would impact the legality of the

proceedings.” (4-ER-774.) The government also asked her to clarify her

response that it was appropriate to consider legacy in the admissions

process. (4-ER-775.) The juror stated: “Yes. Because they have a

percentage of legacy admissions and then they have a percentage of

race-based admissions. I know that that is the current way that

universities bring on students.” (Id.) She also stated she had

“experience with admissions.” (Id.) When pressed about whether she

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believed legacy admissions were fair, she responded that she did not

have enough information to formulate an opinion. (4-ER-776.)

Defendant also asked Juror 13 follow-up questions about her

education. (4-ER-779-80.)

Outside the presence of the court and jury, the government

informed defendant that it planned to strike Juror 13. (4-ER-782-84.)

Defendant said he intended to strike Juror 10, a white male who

opposed legacy admissions. (4-ER-769, 782-83, 791, 794.) When the

government asked the court on the record to excuse Juror 13, defendant

raised a Batson challenge. (4-ER-782.)

In support of a prima facie case, defendant argued—incorrectly—

that the government questioned only three jurors, all minorities, when

in fact the government had questioned seven jurors by that point. (4-

ER-783-85.) He contended that the government asked detailed

questions of two Black jurors “designed to give the basis to strike them.”

(4-ER-783.) He claimed there was “extensive questioning” about Juror

13’s “impressions of affirmative action” despite the fact that the

government asked about legacy, not race. (4-ER-775-76, 785.)

Defendant also claimed that affirmative action had “little to do with the

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substantive issues in this case” (even though defendant had himself

proposed the question about race and shortly thereafter told the court

that “race plays an obvious and important issue” in this case). (4-ER-

768, 785, 801.)

The prosecutor volunteered why he had questioned each juror.

Juror 15, an Asian-American woman, worked for the Department of

Public Social Services, which falls under the purview of the Board of

Supervisors. (4-ER-772-73, 787.) The government inquired about her

interactions with the Board of Supervisors or DCFS, which

administered one of the contracts involved in this case. (Id.) Juror 5

was a Black male who lived in defendant’s district or adjacent to it, so

the government asked whether he was involved in local politics. (4-ER-

745, 776, 787.) When the juror indicated that he worked for a homeless

shelter, the government followed up because Flynn wrote to defendant

about homelessness and the two had worked together on homelessness

initiatives. (4-ER-776-78, 787-88.) With respect to Juror 13, the

prosecutor clarified that the government never asked about race, only

legacy, because the case involved Sebastian’s admission to USC

potentially as a legacy admission. (4-ER-786, 788.) The prosecutor

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explained that Juror 13 said it was her understanding that the practice

occurred in universities and that the government was trying to

determine whether the juror believed legacy admissions were

appropriate because that was the question posed by the court, which

she had not answered. (4-ER-788.) The prosecutor inquired about her

experience with local government “because this is what the case is

about, local government.” (Id.)

The government explained that, in striking the juror, it considered

that Juror 13 “multiple times talked about what the law is and what is

legal” but stated that she had no opinion regarding whether legacy

admissions were appropriate. (4-ER-789.) She also worked in local

government, dealt with government hearings, and had a dual bachelor’s

degree—all of which were “issues in the case.” (Id.)

In response, defendant argued that Juror 13’s education was not a

reason to challenge “a Black juror” because there was a white juror in

the venire who had a high level of education. (4-ER-790.) Defendant

subsequently asserted that “the specific justification” allegedly

demonstrating a prima facie case was the absence of questioning of

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other jurors with advanced degrees and the lack of a nexus between the

juror’s education and the issues in the case. (4-ER-793.)

The court ruled that defendant failed to establish a prima facie

case. The court correctly stated that it was required “to consider the

total[ity] of the relevant facts.” (4-ER-792.) Those facts included that

defendant had submitted the question regarding race and legacy in

university admissions (4-ER-785), the government had questioned two

Black jurors and one Asian-American (4-ER-792), and defendant had

raised his claim in response to the government’s very first challenge (4-

ER-791). The venire panel, moreover, was “mostly nonwhite” (4-ER-

793); at that point, it appeared to be comprised of four Black jurors

(including Juror 13), five Hispanic jurors, five white jurors, two Asian-

American jurors, one juror who was Black/Hispanic, and one who was

Hispanic/white (4-ER-790-91). The court understood that a Batson

claim is cognizable “even on a first challenge” but found that defendant

had, at that point, failed to establish a prima facie case. (4-ER-793-94.)

c. Further challenges

The government exercised its next two peremptory challenges

against white males (4-ER-800)—Juror 8, who had a double bachelor’s

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degree and was a doctoral student at Caltech (4-ER-746-47), and Juror

11, a marketing and fund development manager with a bachelor’s

degree who had experience with budgeting and fundraising and some

familiarity with the role of a county board of supervisors (4-ER-748,

755-56, 764).

As noted, defendant exercised his first peremptory challenge

against Juror 10, a white male who opposed legacy admissions. (4-ER-

769, 791, 794, 800.) He also challenged Juror 18, a Hispanic male, and

Juror 6, a Hispanic female. (4-ER-800.)

d. Juror 1 Batson challenge

When the government exercised its fourth peremptory challenge

against Juror 1, a Black woman, defendant raised another Batson

challenge. (4-ER-798, 800.) Juror 1 lived in Los Angeles, had attended

some college, was single, was unemployed, had a daughter who was

almost 18, and had never been on a jury. (4-ER-743.) As the juror was

the first one to respond to the standard questions and seemed nervous

(“I’ve never done anything like this at all. This is my very, very first

time ever….”), the court assured her: “Well, you couldn’t tell it by me.

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You have done a fine job of showing everybody else how this should be

done.” (Id.)

Defendant, in addition to reiterating his previous claims about the

government’s questioning of jurors, stated that the government had now

challenged the second, and only remaining, Black female on the jury.

(4-ER-801.) The district court found that defendant had established a

prima facie case. (4-ER-807.)

The government gave three reasons for its strike: (1) two of the

prosecutors observed that, during the court’s reading of the summary of

charges, the juror was shaking her head and looking down; (2) the juror

wore sunglasses for most of the jury questioning and took them off only

when the court directly addressed her; and (3) the juror was

unemployed. (4-ER-802, 809.) The government also reviewed the case-

related reasons why it had previously questioned Jurors 5, 13, and 15,

including because the government expected defendant to argue that

Sebastian had been admitted to USC based on some level of diversity

and legacy, as defendant had specifically proposed a voir dire question

on that point. (4-ER-803-05.) The government noted that there were

still two Black men on the jury and the government had challenged two

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white jurors. (4-ER-802-03.) Finally, the government observed that

given the predominantly nonwhite composition of the panel, multiple

challenges to nonwhite individuals would be expected (4-ER-802), and

in fact, the defense had struck two Hispanic jurors by that point (4-ER-

800). The court found that the government’s reasons were race-neutral

and also agreed with the government’s statistical point about challenges

to nonwhite jurors considering the composition of the panel—in over 25

years on the bench, the court had never seen a venire panel with so few

white jurors. (4-ER-792, 807-09.)

Defense counsel argued that they had not observed Juror 1

shaking her head and that the better inference was that the strike was

racially motivated. (4-ER-806-07.) Regarding the composition of the

panel as a whole, defendant emphasized that he was focusing

specifically on “challenges to Black jurors,” as there were four Black

jurors on the jury panel and the government was striking the second

Black and only other Black woman on the panel. (4-ER-808.)

The court ruled that defendant failed to meet his burden to prove

intentional discrimination at Batson step three. (4-ER-810-11.)

Although the court had not personally observed this particular juror

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sitting in the audience, it found the reasons offered by the government

to be credible, not pretextual, and found no reason to discredit the two

prosecutors’ statements of what they had observed. (4-ER-811.) The

court further reasoned that the government’s explanations regarding its

follow-up questions were all case-specific and legitimate. (Id.) “[I]n

fact,” the court stated, “I agree with all of them.” (Id.)

e. The final jury

The government’s questioning of replacement jurors was

consistent with its earlier case-related questioning. For example, the

government extensively questioned Replacement Juror 13 about his

graduate degree from USC, his wife’s degree from the Social Work

School and any continuing connection to USC, his involvement in local

politics, and his knowledge of the operations of the Board of

Supervisors.12 (1-SER-132, 141-46, 154-55.) The government discussed

with Replacement Juror 16 his work in the California State Assembly,

including whether he worked on any initiatives involving nonprofit

organizations. (1-SER-149-50.) And the government asked

The court later excused Replacement Juror 13 for cause. (1-

12

SER-175.)

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Replacement Juror 1 whether his experience with contract bidding

related to any government entity. (1-SER-148-49.)

Defendant exercised three more peremptory challenges,

including against Replacement Juror 16, who stated that he did not

support affirmative action. (1-SER-134, 176.) The government passed

and accepted the jury with two Black males and one Black/Hispanic

male. (1-SER-177.)

Although the race of the replacement jurors is not reflected in the

record, the seated members of the jury included at least two Black men

(Jurors 5 and 9), one Black/Hispanic man (Juror 7), three Hispanic

women (Jurors 2, 6, and 10), one Hispanic/white woman (Juror 12), two

Asian-American women (Jurors 4 and 8), and two white women (Jurors

3 and 11). There were at least eight women (Jurors 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11,

and 12). (See 4-ER-790-91.)13

After the jury had been seated and prior to opening statements,

Juror 5 (a Black man) informed the court that his cousin had

13Following peremptory challenges, Juror 17 became Juror 6 (4-

ER-799), Juror 15 became Juror 8 (4-ER-795), and Juror 14 became
Juror 10 (4-ER-795).

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“mentioned a couple of things about [defendant]” and his “policies.” (9-

ER-1732.) After questioning from the court (9-ER-1732-36), Juror 5

stated that he could still give defendant a “perfectly fair trial” (9-ER-

1736). The government said it had “[n]o concerns,” did not question the

juror, and never asked the court to strike him. (Id.)

2. Batson’s framework

“Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), established a three-step

burden-shifting framework for evaluating a defendant’s claim that the

prosecution exercised peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory

manner.” United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157, 1166 (9th

Cir. 2022). “The defendant must first make a prima facie showing that

the prosecution exercised its strikes based on race.” Id. “Then, the

burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a ‘race-neutral explanation

for striking the jurors in question.’” Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New

York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991)). “If the prosecution provides race-

neutral reasons, the district court must determine based on the record

whether the ‘defendant has carried his burden in proving purposeful

discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359).

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This Court has established a separate three-part test for step one.

Nguyen v. Frauenheim, 45 F.4th 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2022). “[T]o show

a prima facie case: (1) the prospective juror must be a member of a

cognizable group, (2) the prosecutor must use a peremptory strike to

remove that juror, and (3) the totality of the circumstances must raise

an inference that race or gender motivated the prosecutor to strike.”14

Id. If the defendant fails to establish a prima facie case, the burden

14 In a footnote, defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that

this Court should recognize Black women as a cognizable group. (AOB
76 n.17.) But this case presents no vehicle to do so. There was no plain
error because no controlling authority recognizes combined race-gender
classes for Batson purposes. Nguyen, 45 F.4th at 1097; United States v.
Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1032 (9th Cir. 2018) (no plain error where no
controlling authority). Furthermore, defendant never claimed below
that the government struck Juror 13 on gender grounds, and although
defendant commented that Juror 1 was the second, and only remaining,
Black woman on the panel, defendant made no argument about her
gender and instead focused on “Black jurors” and “challenges to Black
jurors.” (4-ER-801, 808.) On that basis, the court found a prima facie
case as to Juror 1. (4-ER-807.) See Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985, 988
n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Whether the cross-section of gender and race
[Black males] constitutes a cognizable class” was “irrelevant” where
“[t]he district court properly found that the defendant was a member of
a cognizable racial group and the prosecution removed another member
of this cognizable group.”). Moreover, when the court reaches the third
step (as it did with Juror 1), the issue of the prima facie showing
becomes moot. United States v. Cruz-Escoto, 476 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th
Cir. 2007).

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never shifts, and the prosecutor is not required to explain the challenge.

Id.

3. Standard of review

This Court reviews for clear error a district court’s: (1) decision of

whether a prima facie showing of discrimination has been made, United

States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); (2) determination

of whether purposeful discrimination has been shown at the third step,

id.; and (3) “credibility findings,” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338

(2006). A finding is clearly erroneous only if it is illogical, implausible,

or without support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the

record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 (9th Cir.

2009) (en banc).

Defendant wrongly asserts that the court denied his Batson

challenge to Juror 13 on the legally erroneous ground that a pattern is

required. See United States v. Collins, 551 F.3d 914, 919-20 (9th Cir.

2009) (court applied improper standard by requiring pattern). On the

contrary, the court explicitly recognized that it could find a prima facie

case even on the first challenge. (4-ER-793.) And even if the court had

applied the wrong legal standard (it did not), that is not a basis for

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reversal. Collins, 551 F.3d at 920. This Court simply reviews the

Batson claim de novo. Id. Under either standard, defendant’s claim

fails.

4. Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case

of purposeful discrimination as to Juror 13

It is undisputed that Juror 13 was a member of a cognizable group

and the government used a peremptory strike to remove her. The only

issue at step one is whether defendant “produc[ed] evidence sufficient to

permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has

occurred.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005). The district

court did not clearly err in finding that defendant failed to do so.

Striking one or even two prospective jurors belonging to a

protected group, standing alone, is insufficient to raise an inference of

discrimination. Nguyen, 45 F.4th at 1101. “More is required.” Wade v.

Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000). In assessing whether the

defendant has established a prima facie case, the court should consider

“all relevant circumstances.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Comparing

challenged and unchallenged jurors is one available tool. Collins, 551

F.3d at 921-22. This Court “can look to the entire trial record, even

after defense counsel made the motion.” Nguyen, 45 F.4th at 1101.

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A “prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire

examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an

inference of discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (emphasis

added). Here, contrary to defendant’s claim, the questioning refutes an

inference of discrimination.

First, the topics the government probed were case-specific, and the

record does not reflect disparate questioning of Juror 13 (or other Black

or minority jurors) compared to other similar jurors. McDermott v.

Johnson, 85 F.4th 898, 918 (9th Cir. 2023) (no Batson violation where

prosecutor questioned non-Black jurors and stricken Black jurors on the

same issues and questions were relevant to circumstances of the case).

All four jurors the government questioned in the initial stage of voir

dire were excused for cause. And the government questioned in a

uniform manner others besides Juror 13 who indicated knowledge of, or

involvement in, local government: (1) Juror 14, a board member of her

local neighborhood council (4-ER-711-21); (2) Juror 15, an Asian-

American woman who worked for the Department of Public Social

Services (4-ER-772-73); (3) Juror 5, a Black man who lived in

defendant’s district or adjacent to it (4-ER-745, 776); (4) Replacement

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Juror 13, whose father had worked closely with the Board of

Supervisors (1-SER-145-46); and (5) Juror 16, who interned with the

California State Assembly (1-SER-149-51).

Second, defense counsel mischaracterized the government’s

inquiry of Juror 13, claiming that “[t]here was extensive questioning

about how she felt about affirmative action and whether it was

something she supported.” (4-ER-786.) In fact, the government never

asked Juror 13 about affirmative action and instead probed Juror 13

about her work in government and her views about legacy admissions—

issues related to the case. Typically, the government’s

mischaracterization of a juror’s answers may support an inference of

discrimination. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 244-46 (2005).

Conversely, defendant’s mischaracterization of the record undermines

any inference of discrimination here.

Third, contrary to defendant’s assertion that the government’s

inquiry of Black jurors was “designed to give a basis to strike them” (4-

ER-783), Juror 5 was seated on the jury (as was another Black juror

and a Black/Hispanic juror). In fact, when given a second opportunity

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to challenge Juror 5 after the jury had been sworn, the government did

not seek to strike him. (9-ER-1732-36.)

Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the government

did not question Juror 16, a white woman who thought “legacy is okay

when determining admission.” (4-ER-768-69.) 15 But the government

explained that its concern (among others) was that Juror 13 made

pronouncements about the practice being legal in the sense that it

regularly occurred at universities. (4-ER-768, 775-76, 788-89.) Unlike

Juror 16, Juror 13 did not offer her opinion about the propriety of legacy

admissions (4-ER-776); rather, Juror 13 discussed the commonplace

nature of the practice (4-ER-768, 775). Juror 13’s responses indicated

that she thought legacy admissions were routine and that she had

familiarity with the admissions process. (4-ER-768 (“a lot of

institutions have legacy admissions”); 4-ER-775 (discussing knowledge

of the “current way” universities admit students and that universities

15 “[A] retrospective comparison of jurors based on a cold appellate

record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not
raised at trial. In that situation, an appellate court must be mindful
that an exploration of the alleged similarities at the time of trial might
have shown that the jurors in question were not really comparable.”
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483 (2008).

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have a “percentage of legacy admissions”).) She also said she had

knowledge of the legacy process based on her “experiences with

admissions.” (4-ER-775.) In this regard (among multiple others), Juror

13 was unique. She was the only juror to express an opinion on the

legality and commonplace nature of legacy admissions, which played

into the defense narrative at trial that because the benefits afforded to

Sebastian (including admission to USC potentially as a legacy admit)

were routine and otherwise legal, nothing out of the ordinary occurred

in defendant’s dealings with Flynn. (2-ER-304, 333; 23-ER-4410-12,

4432, 4438.) No other juror expressed comparable views. Hoyos v.

Davis, 51 F.4th 297, 312 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding no prima facie case

where no seated juror had comparable views to challenged juror). No

inference of discrimination arose from striking a juror whose responses

suggested she would be sympathetic to the defense. See United States

v. Herrera-Rivera, 832 F.3d 1166, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2016) (no pretext in

striking only Black male where his background indicated he “might be

sympathetic to the defense”).

At step one, a court may also consider any reasons in the record

for the strike. See United States v. Guerrero, 595 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th

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Cir. 2010); Wade, 202 F.3d at 1198. The government’s remaining stated

reasons further undermine any inference of discrimination. The

government cited Juror 13’s education (4-ER-789), and the government

also struck two white males with advanced degrees (4-ER-800)—Juror

8, who had a double bachelor’s degree and was a doctoral student at

Caltech (4-ER-747), and Juror 11, who had a bachelor’s degree (4-ER-

748). As for Juror 13’s contacts with government agencies, her job,

unlike any other juror, dealt with government hearings and oversight of

their “legality.” (4-ER-774.) United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d

558, 566 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In general, the concern that jurors with legal

experience will bias or commandeer a jury is widespread among

lawyers, and other courts have accepted it as a persuasive justification

at step three of Batson.”). Additionally, Juror 13 had experience with

budgeting, as did Juror 11 whom the government also struck. (4-ER-

756-57.) Defendant points to no retained juror with a similar

combination of characteristics—indeed, there are none. See Hernandez-

Garcia, 44 F.4th at 1167-68 (noting that the decision to strike a juror

involves the interplay of various factors).

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Other relevant considerations also supported the court’s finding.

The prosecutor defended his questioning and conduct without being

asked. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369. The government did not

exercise all its peremptory challenges. See Hoyos, 51 F.4th at 312 (no

prima facie case where prosecutor did not exhaust all peremptory

challenges and Hispanic jurors remained); Nguyen, 45 F.4th at 1102

(same). And the final jury had at least two Black jurors and one

Black/Hispanic juror, as well as several Hispanic and Asian-American

women. See id.; United States v. Hernandez-Quintania, 874 F.3d 1123,

1129 (9th Cir. 2017) (no prima facie case where government struck two

minority jurors but jury contained six minority jurors); Wade, 202 F.3d

at 1198 (no prima facie case where Black juror was seated).

Batson issues turn largely on an “evaluation of credibility.”

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. “The district judge witnessed the

prosecutor’s behavior during voir dire and jury selection and was in a

far better position than [this Court] to evaluate whether the defendant

raised an inference of discrimination regarding the prosecutor’s strike.”

Guerrero, 595 F.3d at 1064. The totality of the circumstances supports

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the court’s finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie

case. 16

5. The strike of Juror 1 was not pretextual

At the third step, the district court evaluates “the persuasiveness

of the justification” offered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate burden

of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts

from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768

(1995). Here, the court found the government’s reasons for striking

Juror 1 to be “credible” (4-ER-810-11)—not merely “plausible” (AOB

81)—and the court’s decision to credit the prosecutors’ explanations was

logical, plausible, and supported by the record.

The primary reason the prosecutors gave for striking Juror 1 was

that she was shaking her head and looking down when the court read

16If the court erred (it did not), the remedy would be to remand for
the district court to complete the remaining two steps of the analysis.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (remanding for prosecutor to state neutral
explanation and court to decide whether facts establish purposeful
discrimination); Collins, 551 F.3d at 923 (after finding that district
court erred in concluding there was no prima facie case, remanding
“with instructions that the court require the government to provide its
reason for striking Juror No. 9” and “then determine, in the first
instance, whether the strike was discriminatory”); United States v.
Esparza-Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 2005) (same process).

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the case summary, thus signaling that she might disagree with the

charges and could be hostile to the government. (4-ER-802, 809.) That

was a race-neutral reason, a point defendant does not meaningfully

dispute. See Rice, 546 U.S. at 336 (juror rolling her eyes in response to

a question from the court was race-neutral); Rowell v. Ferreira, 830 F.

App’x 698, 699-700 (2d Cir. 2020) (juror “‘shaking his head’ while the

district court summarized the case” was a race-neutral explanation for

strike). “[R]ace-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke

a juror’s demeanor,” and even if demeanor-based explanations may

sometimes serve as a pretext for discrimination, it is “peculiarly within

a trial judge’s province” to make determinations about “the demeanor of

jurors who are peremptorily challenged, as well as the credibility of the

prosecutor who exercised those strikes.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257,

273-74 (2015); Sifuentes v. Brazelton, 825 F.3d 506, 515 (9th Cir. 2016).

The court was entitled to credit the government’s explanation that it

struck Juror 1 because she was shaking her head and looking down

during the reading of the case summary.

It is of no moment that the court did not observe the behavior; the

judge was reading from a document at the time, so it is perfectly

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sensible that she did not see the juror’s reactions. See Rice, 546 U.S. at

339 (court could credit prosecutor even though judge did not witness

juror’s eye rolling); see also Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 48 (2010) (per

curiam) (no Supreme Court rule that “a demeanor-based explanation

must be rejected if the judge did not observe or cannot recall the juror’s

demeanor”). Nor is it accurate to assert that the defense team was

“best positioned to observe Juror 1’s demeanor.” (AOB 81.) Although a

defense attorney claimed that “many of the prosecution had their back

to the jury” (4-ER-806), the prosecutors were positioned closer to the

jury box, they had good reason to observe the venire carefully during

jury selection, and one prosecutor specifically identified where Juror 1

was seated when she was shaking her head—“the far back left” (4-ER-

809). The court reasonably credited the government’s justification for

its strike, which falls far short of clear error.

The government’s remaining reasons also disproved that “race

was a substantial motivating factor” for the strike. Mikhel, 889 F.3d at

1029 (citation omitted).

Striking a juror for wearing sunglasses is race-neutral. United

States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2007); United

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States v. Swinney, 870 F.2d 494, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Purkett,

514 U.S. at 769 (striking juror for “long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and

a beard” was race-neutral). That is especially so given that defendant

failed to identify any other venireperson who wore sunglasses.

Compare Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th at 1168 (no Batson violation

where juror was challenged in part because he was dressed in a hoodie

and the defendant “failed to identify a single similarly dressed non-

Asian juror who went unchallenged”), with United States v. Alanis, 335

F.3d 965, 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding Batson violation in case

charging abusive sexual contact where prosecutor used all six

peremptory strikes against men, but did not strike female jurors who

possessed the same objective characteristics). “[R]eliance on instinct is

permissible,” and the prosecutor could reasonably conclude that the

sunglasses, which made it difficult to gauge the juror’s reactions during

voir dire, reinforced the government’s concern that Juror 1’s head-

shaking and looking downward reflected hostility to the government’s

case. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th at 1168 (casual dress rationale and

prosecutor’s other stated reason reinforced one another).

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Striking a juror based on employment status is also race-neutral.

Cruz-Escoto, 476 F.3d at 1089-90; United States v. Gillam, 167 F.3d

1273, 1278 (9th Cir. 1999). In Cruz-Escoto, for example, this Court

found that striking two Hispanic jurors because they or their sons were

unemployed did not violate Batson where the seated jury included two

Hispanic jurors whom the government did not strike and the

government’s other peremptory challenges did not suggest a general

pattern of discrimination against racial minorities. 476 F.3d at 1089-

90. That same logic applies here where at least two Black jurors were

selected to serve, and the government did not exhibit a pattern of

striking racial minorities.

Finally, as discussed supra, several other considerations undercut

defendant’s claim of pretext, including the government’s even-handed,

case-related questioning of jurors, its overall pattern of strikes, and the

fact that the government did not exercise all its peremptory challenges

although the final jury included at least two Black jurors, one

Black/Hispanic juror, and several other Hispanic and Asian-American

jurors. See Mikhel, 889 F.3d at 1028-31 (striking Black woman did not

violate Batson where juror could not give unequivocal answer to

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whether she could consider imposing the death penalty, final jury had

two Black jurors and two Black alternates, and government left several

peremptory challenges unexercised). The jury that convicted defendant

was highly diverse.

Defendant’s contrary arguments do not come close to surmounting

the clear error hurdle. Defendant points to cases considering the lack of

questioning of a juror before striking him or her as relevant at the

prima facie stage. But, as defendant acknowledges, the prosecutor “has

no obligation to question all potential jurors,” and here the government

already had the relevant information about the juror. Esparza-

Gonzalez, 422 F.3d at 905; cf. Collins, 551 F.3d at 922 (if the prosecutor

was interested in marital or parenthood status as basis for strike, he

should have inquired because the record did not show whether the juror

had a spouse or children). And this Court has held that “[t]here is no

requirement…that the prosecution’s reasons be directly relevant to the

crime charged.” Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th at 1167 n.7.

In sum, defendant has not shown purposeful discrimination. The

district court properly rejected defendant’s Batson challenge and did not

clearly or otherwise err in its findings.

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VI

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s convictions should be affirmed.

DATED: April 8, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

E. MARTIN ESTRADA
United States Attorney

BRAM M. ALDEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Appeals Section

/s/ Lindsey Greer Dotson

LINDSEY GREER DOTSON

Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Public Corruption
and Civil Rights Section

ELANA SHAVIT ARTSON

Assistant United States Attorney
Criminal Appeals Section

THOMAS F. RYBARCZYK
MICHAEL J. MORSE
Assistant United States Attorneys
Public Corruption and
Civil Rights Section

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

The government states, under Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6, that it is

unaware of any case related to this appeal that is not identified in the

appellant’s brief.
 Case: 23-2200, 04/08/2024, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 146 of 146

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

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