Japan's Foreign Policy

Author(s): Roger W. Bowen

Source: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 57-73
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 Japan's Foreign Policy

allocation through a controlled bank At $20 per year academic subscription rate,
system to implement industrial policy. this is the best bargain around for anyone About the Author
Background for instructor. interested in Japan. For further informa-
Ellis S. Krauss
tion, contact Japan Economic Institute,
Further Sources of Basic Information 1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washing- Ellis S. Krauss is
ton, D.C. 20036; tel: (202) 296-5633. Professor of Political
Japan Economic Institute. JEI Report. Keizai Koho Center. 1991. Japan, 1991: An Science at the Univer-
Washington: Japan Economic Institute. International Comparison. Tokyo: Keizai sity of Pittsburgh. He
This ten-page plus newsletter offers updates Koho Center. P. A handy compendium of has conducted re-
on Japan-U.S. relations, and current events statistics, many comparative, concerning search in Japan at
and economic and political developments in Japan's economy, society, and government. Tokyo, Kyoto, and
Japan, as well as periodic background English. Annual. Useful for background Keio universities.
reports and analyses of political economy for class lecture. To receive the publication Professor Krauss has
subjects. Despite the basically favorable write to Keizai Koho Center (Japan Insti- published Japanese
approach to Japan of the institute, the tute for Social and Economic Affairs) 6-1, Radicals Revisited (University of California
analysts do a credible job of providing Otemachi, 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo Press, 1974) as well as three co-edited books
good information and a point of view on 100, Japan. on Japan, Political Opposition and Local
Japan. A basic source both for those who Also handy is a booklet put out by the Politics in Japan (Princeton University Press,
do not read Japanese or get a daily news- same organization: Japan Information 1980; with Kurt Steiner and Scott Flanagan),
paper about Japan, and for those who do. Resources in the United States, 1990. Conflict in Japan (University of Hawaii
Press, 1984; with Thomas Rohlen and
Patricia Steinhoff), and Democracy in Japan
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989; with
Takeshi Ishida).

Japan's Foreign Policy

Roger Bowen, Colby College

Central Points always been successful in separating June 1990).

economic relations from political and If Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is cor-
Japan serves as an excellent case strategic considerations in its rela- rect and foreign policy is "the face a
of the anomaly of the economic tions with the United States and with nation wears to the world" (1983, 1),
giant-political pygmy whose ability to Asian neighbors. then the image being projected by
influence international events is Kaifu's declaration is of a nation
severely limited despite a manifest self-confident, willing to assist
Introduction
desire to play a larger role. Japan's others, bold and ready to take deci-
attempts to achieve political standing sive action when the need arises.
On June 25, 1990, just two days
commensurate with its economic after Japan renewed its thirty-year Indeed, the world should not be
clout internationally have enjoyed surprised by such heady rhetoric; the
only minimal success. world well knows by now that
Historical factors, especially its Japan's enormous wealth makes it
defeat in World War II and the
Japanese dependence on eminently capable of playing a lead-
Occupation of Japan by the United American defense ing political role in the international
States, continue to influence Japan's arena. Japan produces 15% of the
postwar foreign policy. So too does guarantees sometimes world's GNP, second only to the
the so-called "peace clause" of the United States; Japan leads the entire
conflicts with Japan's
U.S.-imposed Constitution and the world in providing other nations with
pacifist public consensus that has attempts to strike a more development assistance; and Japan is
grown around it. the world's largest creditor and
Since the war Japan's defense alli- independent foreign exporter of capital. Militarily Japan
ance with the United States has had
policy. ranks behind only the United States
an enormous impact on foreign and the Soviet Union in defense
policy, both inhibiting and aiding spending; its military-related tech-
Japan's relations with other states. old treaty of Mutual Security with nology is reputed to be among the
Japanese dependence on American the United States, Prime Minister most sophisticated in the world. In
defense guarantees sometimes con- Toshiki Kaifu told a Japanese sym- brief, Japan seems to possess all the
flicts with Japan's attempts to strike posium in Tokyo, "From now on ingredients of a world-class power.
a more independent foreign policy. Japan will go out into the world and Yet Japan does not behave like one.
Much of Japan's foreign policy if there is a need, if there is a request Only six weeks after Prime
can be properly termed "economic from another party, we should not Minister Kaifu issued his bold
diplomacy," yet Japan has not hesitate in meeting it" (FBIS, 25 declaration, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

March 1992 57

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

Such international political powers as The Prime Minister also initiated dis- refrain from insisting that the funds
the United States, Great Britain, and cussions within the government about be used for nonmilitary purposes.
other E.C. member-states reacted legislation that would create a Washington eventually relented on
quickly by imposing an embargo on "United Nations Peace Cooperation the latter issue, and two days after
Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil and by freezing Corps," a noncombat operations the war ended in the Gulf, the Clean
the assets of both Middle Eastern group of some 2,000 members who Government Party and the Demo-
nations. Japan, on the other hand, would play a support and relief role cratic Socialist Party in the Upper
which depends on these two nations for U.N. forces. A special session of House voted with the LDP in passing
for 12% of its oil imports, waited Japan's Diet debated the proposal in legislation for financing the $9 billion
three days before following suit. October. Predictably the ruling Lib- contribution. Debate continued
Compared with past reactions to eral Democratic Party met with stiff around the issue of sending a peace-
international crises, Japan acted resistance from the opposition par- keeping contingent to the Gulf, how-
quickly in this instance, at least ties, and outside parliament from ever. In March 1991, the United
initially. But then in the weeks that peace groups as well as from spokes- States pressed Japan to follow the
followed Iraq's invasion, Japan persons of Asian nations which in example of Germany, another nation
dragged its feet while the West, led WWII had fallen victim to Japanese whose Constitution restricts overseas
by the United States, mobilized mili- imperialism. Lacking majority con- deployment of its military, and send
tary forces in the Gulf. Not until the trol in the upper house, plagued by minesweepers to the Gulf. One
end of August did Japan settle on a factional divisions within the LDP, month later the Japanese government
policy "package" designed to con- and facing public opinion polls finally announced that it would con-
tribute to the multinational effort to tribute to the minesweeping effort.
punish Iraqi aggression. Surprisingly, just six weeks after the
But the world was not impressed . . . Japan seems to April 26 dispatch of the minesweep-
with Japan's "package," amounting ers, one opinion poll revealed that
to $1 billion of non-military aid to possess all the ingredients 65% of the public supported this
the multinational force and economic first post-war overseas venture. But
assistance to Middle Eastern nations of a world-class power.
in December 1991, 50 years after the
adversely affected by the sanctions Yet Japan does not attack on Pearl Harbor, an appre-
against Iraq. "The Scrooge of Asia," hensive public and an opposition-
said The Economist, referring to behave like one.
controlled Upper House combined to
Japan's package (September 1, 1990). force the new LDP government of
Japan's principal ally since World Kiichi Miyazawa to abandon a
War II, the United States, likewise showing strong opposition to the renewed attempt to legalize the par-
portrayed Japan's policy as one proposed law, Kaifu conceded defeat. ticipation of Japanese troops in
befitting a miserly wealthy weakling. When war began in mid January United Nations peacekeeping opera-
"A mere bagatelle," one U.S. 1991, Japan responded with new tions abroad.
senator called the package; anony- pledges of financial assistance in Japan's reaction to the Gulf Crisis
mous "high-ranking" American offi- hopes of preempting the sort of criti- serves as an object lesson to the
cials scornfully dismissed Japan's cism leveled at its policy the previous problems, limits, and perils of
"checkbook diplomacy" and warned fall. Following a week of internal Japan's foreign policy. The "Schles-
that Washington's "global partner- LDP squabbling, the Prime Minister ingerian" face of Japan's Gulf Crisis
ship" with Tokyo was in danger. finally pledged $9 billion in addi- policy reveals what Kent Calder has
"Japan Should Do More," read the tional funds, and further announced described as "the reactive state
title of a New York Times editorial that Japanese military transport (1988)," one which is more likely to
(September 1, 1990). planes would be sent to the Gulf to change policy because of outside
Japan's Foreign Ministry reacted ferry refugees away from the con- pressure than due to strategic con-
to American derision in kind, insist- flict. Kaifu warned that failure to cerns. More grossly put, Japan's
ing that "one billion dollars is not contribute more to the Allied effort behavior in the Gulf Crisis shows the
peanuts," but nevertheless reevalu- could result in "international isola- face of a wealthy weakling, uncer-
ated its package in light of American tion." Nevertheless, opposition tain, timid, slow-responding, con-
criticisms. After two weeks of in- forces inside and outside the Party flicted, and vulnerable to outside
fighting between leaders of the dif- grumbled about the proposed in- pressure, especially American. Obvi-
ferent ministries-Foreign, Inter- crease in taxes that would be needed ously, this is not the "face" pro-
national Trade and Industry (MITI), to pay for the added contribution jected by Prime Minister Kaifu in the
the Defense Agency, the Finance and further warned that the use of quotation opening this chapter.
Ministry (MOF), and the Transporta- military craft abroad would violate Kaifu is not the first prime min-
tion Ministry-Tokyo announced an the Constitution. Kaifu came under ister who has tried to project the
upgraded package worth $4 billion to intense criticism, moreover, once image of a Japan whose international
be divided equally between the multi- reports circulated in Tokyo that the political role should be commen-
national U.N.-sponsored military amount of the additional contribu- surate with its economic strength.
forces and the frontline Arab states tion had been dictated by Washing- Nor is the present Gulf Crisis the
economically damaged by sanctions. ton which also insisted that Tokyo only instance when Japan's foreign

58 PS: Political Science & Politics

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 Japan's Foreign Policy

policy has seemed hesitant, contra- selves to rapid economic, political, Philippines, all of French Indochina,
dictory, inconsistent, or, as specialist and military development. "Enrich- British Malaya, and Indonesia
Donald Hellman puts it, "schizo- ing the nation, strengthening the (Dutch East Indies). Prosperous it
phrenic" (1988, 369). For antece- military" (fukoku kyohei) and was not, great it was, indeed, one of
dents and, more importantly, ex- "civilization and enlightenment" the largest (geographically) but
planations, it is necessary to review (bummei kaika) were the two most shortest-lived empires in world
the whole of Japan's postwar foreign important of several slogans adopted history.
policy. The review will reveal that by Meiji oligarchs to symbolize their But native resistance and the
international and domestic con- policy of catching up with the West American military proved too power-
straints have had, and continue to and regaining sovereignty by negoti- ful. By early 1945 the Americans
have, an enduring braking effect on ating an end to the unequal treaties. began bombing Japanese cities, utter-
the development of an independent, Military victories over China in the ly devastating Tokyo with fire
principled, and active foreign policy, 1890s and over imperial Russia in bombs, and, of course, destroying
and, hence, on the making of a "Pax 1905, a military alliance with Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early
Nipponica" whereby Japan can England in 1902, the annexation of August with atomic bombs. By war's
become a preeminent political actor Korea in 1910, and entry into World end, the Japanese reckoned that
in the international arena. War I on the side of the Allies some three million citizens had lost
together represented Japan's entry their lives during the war. The econ-
Japan's Foreign Policy into the international society of omy was in shambles, unemployment
in the Pre-War Period "civilized," i.e., imperialist, nations. was high, food production was
The unequal treaties were gradually dangerously low, factory production
Every nation can point to certain removed and by 1911 Japan had had been crippled, the wartime gov-
moments in its past that constitute regained sovereign control over its ernment and its expansionist policies
genuine "turning points," events that external relations. This did not pre- had been discredited, and aggressive
result in fundamental structural and vent Western nations, however, from nationalism had been exposed as a
policy changes that forever alter the disallowing a racial equality clause to failed doctrine. The Japanese people
nation's character. Two such turning be included into the treaty ending who had sacrificed so much for
points in Japan's modern history World War I, nor did it deter the national greatness now stood at the
happened because of the United United States from passing the edge wondering exactly who they
States; both had lasting impact on Oriental Exclusion laws in 1924. were and fearing equally what the
Japan's foreign policy. Japan had gained its legal equality future would bring.
The first happened in 1853, when with the West by the end of Meiji, Conditions were perfect for a
Commodore Matthew C. Perry's only to suffer the pains of discrim- second "turning point." Lacking a
fleet of warships steamed into Tokyo ination during the Taisho Era government they could trust and a
Bay for the purpose of forcing Japan (1912-25). national raison d'etre they could
to abandon its almost 250-year-old When Depression struck Japan believe in, the people of Japan, their
policy of sakoku, or "closed and the rest of the capitalist world spirit utterly broken, were ready and
nation," and open its borders to in the late twenties, western forms willing to obey their conquerors.
western trade. Perry's demand, of protectionism were aimed in many Thus begins Japan's American Inter-
backed by a war-making capability instances at Japanese exports. Seek- lude, 1945-52, fashioned by Supeme
unimaginable to the Japanese, effec- ing to secure safe overseas markets Commander for the Allied Powers
tively burst open the bubble of island for its exports, lebensraum for its (SCAP), General Douglas Mac-
consciousness that had long nurtured quickly expanding population, and Arthur. During those seven years
provincial feelings of national great- security for its investments in China, SCAP policy laid the basis for
ness. Perry's arrival also had the the Japanese government condoned Japan's foreign policy up until
effect of engendering factionalism aggression by its military in Man- the present day. In a few words,
amongst the ruling samurai who split churia, leading to its annexation America's foreign policy became
into coalitions around the issue of in 1932. Censure by the League of Japan's; the Occupation made Japan
opening Japan to the foreign bar- Nations led to Japan's decision to into a "junior partner" in an
barians. Civil war ensued with vic- quit the League and adopt a policy American-led alliance.
tory going to the so-called "realists" of international outlawry. By 1937 Throughout the nearly forty years
who understood that Japan had to Japan was at war with China, had that have passed since the Occupa-
defer to western military superiority. allied itself with Nazi Germany and tion, Japanese foreign policy elites,
The civil war, waged coincidentally Fascist Italy in 1940, and with the the opposition parties, as well as the
at roughly the same time as Ameri- bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, public at large, have split over the
cans fought theirs, concluded with set for itself an irrevocable policy of issue of how subordinate Japan's
the "restoration" of the emperor and war and conquest under the rhetoric foreign policy should be to the
the beginning of the Meiji Era (1868- of creating a "Greater East Asia Co- United States. Generally the opposi-
1912). Humbled and humiliated by Prosperity Sphere." At its height, the tion Socialists and the revisionist
"unequal treaties" imposed by the Japanese sphere of conquest encom- conservatives, such as prime min-
stronger Western governments, passed much of the eastern half of isters Kishi Nobusuke and Nakasone
Japan's new leaders dedicated them- China, all of Korea, Taiwan, the Yasuhiro, have sought, but for dif-

March 1992 59

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

ferent reasons and with different The two metaphors are not incom- The two general goals of the Occu-
aims, to make Japan's foreign policy patible: Okita's "under America's pation were demilitarization and
more independent of America's. ... wing" and Scalapino's and democratization. Demilitarization
Most specialists agree that both Frost's "marriage" analogy bespeak was accomplished rather quickly and
groups have failed, yet it is equally a crucial truth about this relation- easily with the destruction of Japan's
evident that as Japan's economy had ship, and hence about Japan's armaments industry, the purging of
progressed from dependency to inter- foreign policy. During most of the wartime leaders, and the prosecution
dependency with the United States, post-WWII period, Japan has pretty of war criminals. In order to ensure
in at least some areas, notably much behaved as a submissive "sig- that demilitarization would last
defense, economic diplomacy, and nificant other" to American hus- beyond the Occupation, the famous
policies toward the Middle East, bandly dictates, and indeed, even Article 9 was inserted into the
Southeast Asia, and South Africa, today betrays old habits of obedi- American-drafted constitution.
Japan has devised foreign policies ence, even loyalty, to United States Article 9, commonly known as the
independent of and even occasionally foreign policy wishes, requests, and "peace clause," obliges Japan to
at odds with American policy demands. "forever renounce war ... and the
stances. Perhaps the most important In the aftermath of the war Mac- threat or use of force as a means of
question confronting foreign policy Arthur's rule was paternalistic, per- settling international disputes" and
makers as Japan approaches the mitting little or no domestic opposi- commits it not to maintain military
twenty-first century is whither goeth tion from the Japanese. In the 1950s, forces. This unusual feature,
the U.S.-Japan alliance. America encouraged Japan to do especially because of foreign author-
more, especially for its self-defense, ship, has resulted in frequent calls by
but as Ito Kan puts it, "One of the LDP conservatives to revise the Con-

Changing U.S.-Japan fundamental aspects of postwar U.S. stitution, even as it has helped make
Relations policy toward Japan was to keep pacifism the ideology of most
Japan weak and underarmed" (1990, Japanese.
The cornerstone of Japan's post- 148). Keep the little woman at home, The other crucial effect of Article
war foreign policy has been its and make certain she remembers to 9 has been to shift the sovereign
bilateral relationship with the United lock the doors. In the 1960s, Japan responsibility for defense to Japan's
States. The relationship was became self-absorbed with making military protector, the United States.
grounded in Japan's defeat in World money, which America encouraged, Demilitarized Japan had to depend
War II, its terms largely defined yet by the time America returned on militarized America for defense.
during the American Occupation of from its failed war in Vietnam, a war Over the years the arrangement has
Japan (1945-52), and cemented in the supported by Japan, it discovered nurtured a deep sense of dependency,
1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, that the trade relationship with Japan even to the extent of legitimizing
amended somewhat in 1960 and just had gone bad. In the early seventies "freeridership" under the American
recently renewed in June of 1990. America punished Japan in response. hegemonic umbrella. For the first
The importance of the U.S.-Japan Then when both marriage partners twenty years of the U.S.-Japan alli-
tie was recently underscored by Okita fell victim to oil extortionists, Japan ance, during which America enjoyed
Saburo, former Foreign Minister of went its own way and cut its own a healthy balance of trade surplus
Japan (1979-81), "Japan's relations deal. Its purse quickly refattened with a Japan still rebuilding, "free-
with the entire world have been while America's wallet thinned. In ridership" was not a contentious
shaped by being under America's the eighties Japan made much more issue for either party. Only in the
economic, social, and political wing money than America, much of it at 1970s when Japan turned the trading
for more than forty years" (1989, America's expense, but also due to relationship to its advantage did the
131). American profligacy. And now as United States begin faulting Japan
Another metaphor, especially the nineties begin, talk of divorce, for taking a free ride on defense.
favored by Americans for reasons however "unthinkable," is in the Nevertheless, Article 9, and the
that should be obvious, used to air. An economically emasculated U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, formed
describe the U.S.-Japan relationship America wants more concessions; an the basis of Japan's foreign policy
is "marriage." Robert Scalapino, for economically empowered Japan is in the immediate postwar period.
example, recently wrote, "The less inclined to give them. Japan's security needs were met by
Japanese stake in the economic The facts of this changing relation- the United States, which built over
health of the United States is steadily ship give meaning to both meta- one hundred military bases in Japan
gaining. Thus, a divorce is unthink- phors. In the American military accommodating yet today some
able even if the marriage remains occupation of Japan, SCAP sought 50,000 American servicemen. At
troubled" (1990, 105). Ellen Frost, nothing less than to remake Japan's American urging, which became
whose recent book is titled For political and economic systems in quite strong once the Korean War
Richer, For Poorer in order to the American image, and, with the (1950) began, Japan did create a Self
emphasize the intimacy of the U.S.- beginning of the Cold War, to use Defense Force (SDF) but only slowly
Japan relationship, bluntly states, Japan as the critical link in built it from a 120,000-man military
". .. the two countries are so closely America's are of containment around into today's 240,000-man army, navy
intertwined that 'divorce' is virtually the Soviet Union and the People's and airforce. Government reluctance
impossible" (1987, ix). Republic of China (PRC). to comply with U.S. demands to
60 PS: Political Science & Politics

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 Japan's Foreign Policy

rearm can be explained partly by the Japan into a peace-loving state. them and the nation profitably for so
clause in Article 9 which forbade Obviously, as well, as architects of many years.
"land, sea, and air forces, as well Japan's postwar constitutional order, Japan's foreign policy fits the elit-
as other war potential" from being American occupiers were disinclined ist democracy model since only in the
maintained. Too, Japanese leaders to create a political system that most indirect way has public opinion,
also realized that a military buildup would differ substantially from their or the media to the extent it reflects
would only antagonize its former own, if for no other reason than public opinion, influenced Japan's
wartime victim nations, the very nations tend to strike alliances with foreign policy. Through the electoral
countries whose resources Japan similarly constituted political systems. process the public's unbroken en-
needed for reconstruction. And like the American system, so far dorsement of the LDP in election
But the main reason why Japan as foreign policy making is con- after election (the 1989 House of
decided against large-scale remilitari- cerned, the Japanese system has all Councillors election is the sole excep-
zation was economic. Japanese lead- the earmarks of an elitist democracy. tion) strongly suggests solid public
ers, supported by a public disillu- Concretely, this means that foreign support for the conservatives'
sioned with militarism, recognized policy is generally made with as little policies, probably more so in the case
the enormous expense of rearming regard for public opinion as political- of their domestic than their foreign
would drain valuable resources from ly feasible. This does not mean that policies. In the rare instances when
a war-ravaged economy that could ill the public is quiescent on controver- the public does challenge the govern-
afford such an unproductive venture, sial issues, nor does it mean that ment's policy, it happens usually
especially at a time when the Ameri- elites always ignore public sentiment because the LDP appears to be
cans, for their own strategic reasons when making policy. However plur- modifying the Yoshida Doctrine. On
in the Cold War, were only too will- those occasions, public opinion can
ing to bear the burden of Japan's act as a constraint on policy
security. Instead of wasting scarce . . . the main reason why innovation.
resources on the military, therefore, One such instance happened dur-
Japan's leaders, principally Prime Japan decided against ing the Gulf Crisis. As late as August
Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-47, 7, 1990, when the Kaifu Government
large-scale remilitarization
1948-54), made the decision to was slowly and cautiously developing
muster the nation's energies into was economic. a policy toward the Crisis, one
producing economic growth. opinion poll showed an overwhelm-
The political decision to foster eco- ing 70%o approval rating for Kaifu's
nomic growth, to forego a military alistic Japan's political system is foreign policy and a 580% overall
build-up, and to rely on U.S. security becoming, foreign policy since the approval rating for his government.
guarantees constitutes the basic three war, but most especially in the 1950s, But in October, as Kaifu's cabinet
dimensions of the so-called "Yoshida 1960s, and 1970s, has been made by endorsed the sending of members of
Doctrine." This doctrine essentially the Prime Minister, his cabinet, a the SDF to the Gulf in non-combat
remains today as the pillar of few factional leaders within the rul- roles, public opinion quickly shifted
Japanese foreign policy. Pragmatic ing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to a two-to-one margin against
dependency on the U.S. alliance has and high-ranking bureaucrats of the breaking with the pacifist consensus
meant comparatively minimal invest- most powerful ministries, especially as represented by Article 9 and the
ments in defense and maximum International Trade and Industry Yoshida Doctrine. With such clear
investments in economic growth. (MITI) and Finance (MOF). The public opposition, politically mani-
This formula is another way of Foreign Ministry, and even farther fested in a bare victory for the LDP
describing Japan's postwar foreign removed from decision making candidate in an October by-election,
policy as "overwhelmingly eco- power, the Defense Agency, denied Kaifu backed away from the United
nomic" (Hellman 1988, 373) and as it is ministerial status, influence Nations Peace Cooperation Corps
also helps to explain why some critics foreign policy only secondarily. By legislation. Kaifu had to yield to
say it is "in lock-step synchroniza- the 1980s, policy-oriented rank and popular sentiment, perhaps best sum-
tion with U.S. strategic planning" file LDP politicians, aligned in so- marized by an unnamed woman cited
(Shindo 1989, 278). called zoku (tribes), as well as in an interview with a New York
Central to Japan's alliance with bureaucrats from other ministries, Times correspondent: "If Japan is
the United States has been the began playing more important, if less criticized, that's that. It might sound
second of the Occupation's two conspicuous, roles in the policy pro- selfish to you (American reporter),
goals, democratization. Its relevance cess. Interest groups such as big but I'm very afraid of becoming
for understanding Japan's foreign business and farmers have exercised involved in another war" (Inter-
policy should not be overlooked. influence in particular instances national Herald Tribune, November
Occupation leaders operated on the where foreign economic policy 5, 1990).
assumption that democracies tend affects their interests directly, but Again, however, this exception
not to be aggressors in international generally they defer to the governing helps prove the rule that foreign
politics, and therefore believed that elites whose record in promoting eco- policy is made with as little regard
democratization was as important as nomic nationalism, as embodied in for public opinion as possible. A
demilitarization in transforming the Yoshida Doctrine, have served commonly cited example of public

March 1992 61

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

powerlessness to influence foreign Kishi's resignation, but replaced him for the Tiananmen Square massacre,
policy is the 1960 Security Treaty with another strongman, Ikeda but later when it was learned that
Crisis. Then the LDP government Hayato (1960-64), who was just as President Bush had quietly given his
acted to uphold the Yoshida Doc- supportive of the Treaty but more in approval to the Japanese loan,
trine, despite massive popular the Yoshida mold of emphasizing Kaifu's boldness appeared as mere
opposition. economic growth over contentious bluster.
The 1960 Crisis concerned ratifica- foreign policy issues. There is no shortage of examples
tion of a modestly revised version of Preserving the pillar of Japan's of elites setting Japan's foreign
the original 1951 U.S.-Japan Secur- postwar foreign policy, the alliance policy agenda according to American
ity Treaty. For Japan important revi- with the United States, was deemed preferences, indeed, says one student
sions included the removal of a more important than following par- of Japan's policy, "the general prin-
clause permitting American troops in liamentary procedure or heeding ciple of Japanese foreign policy is
Japan to serve as police in emergency public opinion. Prime Minister Sato's cooperation with Washington"
situations; a clause calling for the government (1964-72) acted accord- (Shimizu 1988, 385). One concrete
reduction of American troop levels in ing to the same assumption in un- measurement of this principle is that
Japan while getting a more explicit obtrusively supporting the American for the first twenty-five years of the
promise to defend Japan from exter- war in Vietnam, despite strong and postwar U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan
nal aggression; and a "prior con- voted with the United States over
sultation" clause that, if nothing 90% of the time in the United
else, symbolized greater equality in Japan 's foreign policy fits Nations.
the alliance. Then Prime Minister Japan has been willing to play the
Kishi Nobusuke, a conservative revi- the elitist democracy role of "junior partner" to the
sionist who sought greater autonomy model since only in the United States because followership
from U.S. control, saw the revisions has been in its national self-interest.
as important steps toward restoration most indirect way has In exchange for serving as a forward
of full sovereignty for Japan. deployment base for the American
The Treaty itself, quite apart from
public opinion, or the military in the Pacific, Japan has
any revisions, was opposed by both media to the extent it received a cheap ride on defense and
the right and left wings. The right a lucrative trade and commercial
wing objected to the treaty as reflects public opinion, relationship from its number one
foreign-imposed, the left objected to trading partner.
any military relationship with the
influenced Japan 's foreign Japan's defense expenditures have
leading protagonist of the Cold War, policy. always been small as a proportion of
feeling that it would result in Japan its Gross National Product (GNP).
being targeted in some future nuclear The most expensive years were the
war. Kishi, however, was determined unceasing public protest. For the 1950s when first building the Self-
to see the treaty ratified by parlia- public the pacifist provision of the Defense Force; but even then, Japan
ment before President Eisenhower Constitution took precedence over never spent even as much as 3 % of
visited Japan, scheduled for June. the security ties with the United its GNP on defense in any year dur-
Debate in parliament got out of hand States; for Sato the opposite held ing that decade. After 1967, and for
when members of the Socialist Party true. the next twenty years, Japan kept
took the Speaker of the House cap- Yet another example of elite con- defense expenditures below 1% of
tive; police were called to remove the trol over foreign policy is Japan's GNP, while the United States was
Socialists physically. The JSP there- China policy. Despite left-wing and spending around 6 to 70% and most
after boycotted Diet sessions. Outside strong business support for establish- NATO nations around 4%. In 1976
the Diet building, hundreds of thou- ing diplomatic relations with China Prime Minister Miki's cabinet made
sands of students, workers, and ever since the 1950s, Japan did not official the 1 o limit on military
peace advocates demonstrated. Peti- open up relations until after the spending in the Government's
tions opposing the Treaty garnered United States first approached the National Defense Program Outline;
13 million signatures; and most every People's Republic of China in 1971. the limit was honored by his succes-
major newspaper scolded the Gov- One Japanese critic recently charac- sors until Prime Minister Nakasone
ernment for using authoritarian tac- terized Japan's dependence on the barely exceeded the limit in 1987. But
tics in parliament. Ignoring them all, U.S. lead in formulating a China that measure hardly proved to be the
Kishi used his LDP majority in the policy as "like an obedient dog led psychological breakthrough that
Diet to ramrod ratification of the by its master" (Shindo 1989, 278). In Nakasone expected. Opinion polls
Treaty when the Socialists were the Houston Summit meeting in July show that the Japanese public
absent. Eisenhower's visit was can- 1990, Kaifu seemed to deflate such remains wedded to the notion of a
celled-his personal security could criticism by boldly announcing that 1% o limit (the defense budget for FY
not be guaranteed so angry had the Japan was determined to release an 1990 is barely under 1% o of GNP), as
demonstrators become-and Kishi 810 billion Yen loan package to well as to the other now commonly
travelled to Washington instead. China, regardless of the views of accepted features of Japan's defense
Shortly thereafter LDP leaders got Western nations still punishing China profile. These are: (1) a ban on the

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 Japan's Foreign Policy

export of arms and military technol- billion in 1990). As a general rule, America really wants (and needs)
ogy, a commitment first made by the higher the American trade deficit redress.
Prime Minister Sato in 1968 and with Japan, the louder and more fre- The most recent round of Japanese
modified only in 1983 by Nakasone quent are American calls for Japan commercial concessions, the so-called
to make technology transfers to the to beef up its defense. Structural Impediments Initiative
United States the sole exception; (2) Japan has to acknowledge such (SII) of 1990, discussed below, is
the "three nonnuclear principles," calls even if it does not always sub- remarkably similar in substance to
also announced by Sato during the mit to them. The United States has Japan's 1972 "Seven Point Pro-
Vietnam War when the Japanese throughout the postwar period been gram" designed to address American
public became nervous about sup- Japan's number one trade partner; complaints about Japan's mounting
porting America. The principles say their two-way trade ranks second in trade surplus with the United States.
that Japan will not possess, produce, the world, after only U.S.-Canada Then, as in 1990, Japan agreed to
or introduce nuclear weapons into trade. Over the past several years spend more on public works and
Japan; and (3) the periodic re- some 35% of all Japanese exports capital outlays, to expand its imports
affirmations by a succession of have gone to the United States while of American goods, to make fairer
Prime Ministers to abide by Article 9 well over 200%7 of all Japanese im- its marketing and retailing system, to
of the Constitution. Even the so- ports came from the United States. export more capital, and to forge a
called "hawk" on defense, Nakasone Such trade figures clearly reveal the "self-reliant" defense in tune with
(1982-87), reaffirmed Japan's com- the so-called "Nixon Doctrine." In
mitment to a small military and an exchange President Nixon promised
"exclusively defensive defense" while American pressure on to support Japan's quest for a seat
promising that Japan would never as a permanent representative on the
become a great military power. Japan to assume greater United Nations Security Council, a
Not coincidentally, Nakasone status symbol still not attained and
responsibility for its
made that promise while calling on still used as a lure by the Americans,
the Prime Minister of Papua New defense has usually most recently in September 1990 in a
Guinea in the early eighties. But failed attempt to induce Japan to
coincided with a
every Japanese leader has issued send troops to Saudi Arabia.
similar promises, including Kaifu in comparative weakening of Although Japan increased its
May 1990, when visiting Southeast defense budget modestly in 1972-73,
Asian nations, or, for that matter, the American economy it still remained less than 1% of
East Asian nations with which Japan GNP. Concessions in the other areas
has significant commercial ties. This vis-a-vis Japan 's. were likewise modestly implemented.
aspect of Japanese foreign policy The point, however, is that Japan
constitutes a second reason for keep- interdependency of the two giant makes concessions in the economic
ing defense expenditures low: the economies. sphere in order to deflect American
need to reassure former victims of Japan's response to American urg- criticism away from the existing
Japanese military aggression that ings to increase defense spending is defense arrangement. The further
history will not repeat itself. patterned; Japan's peace constitution point is that in the U.S.-Japan
Meanwhile, the constant American and relations with former victims of defense relationship, political and
refrain has been for Japan to beef up Japanese imperialism are genuine economic issues had gotten inter-
its military, to share the burden for constraints making compliance diffi- twined, which remains the situation
its defense and the defense of Asia. cult. Nonetheless Japan increases its today. The penultimate point is that
American pressure on Japan to defense budget annually by as much all the U.S. talk about "burden shar-
assume greater responsibility for its as 5 to 6%, points to the absolute ing" and "equal partnership" actual-
defense has usually coincided with dollar amount (nearly $30 billion in ly reflects American economic decline
a comparative weakening of the 1990, up from $10 billion in 1982), and Japanese ascension as an eco-
American economy vis-A-vis Japan's. buys more American arms and mili- nomic power. And the final point is
The pattern first showed itself when tary technolgy thus reducing the that America can usually squeeze
America's "imperial overstretch" in American trade deficit, assumes concessions, such as they are, from
the Vietnam War coincided with greater responsibility for develop- Japan because Japanese leaders then
Japan's economic recovery and trade ment assistance to strategic U.S. as now perceive the Security Treaty
surpluses with the United States. allies (such as Pakistan and Turkey), and U.S.-Japan commercial relations
Since then the problem has only got- and even periodically increases its as central to Japan's survival.
ten worse. By 1972 Japan was run- financial support of American bases Periodically the United States acts
ning a $4 billion trade surplus with in Japan, but Japan does not aban- to remind Japan of its dependence.
the United States, by 1977 an $8 don the essence of the Yoshida Doc- A year before Japan conceded the
billion surplus, and by 1981, a $15 trine. Instead of altering the basic "Seven Points Program," the United
billion surplus; the figure peaked at defense arrangement, Japan offers States "shocked" the Japanese con-
over $52 billion in 1987 and has since concessions in commercial relations, sciousness with an awesome display
hovered around $45 to $50 billion which is, after all, exactly the area of of American leverage over Japan's
(although the estimate is "only" $40 the U.S.-Japan relationship where commercial and foreign policy. With

March 1992 63

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

no prior consultation, Nixon an- end the OPEC oil embargo against relationship involves fundamental
nounced in July 1971 that he would Japan. In so doing, however, Japan philosophical differences with
be visiting China in February, leaving broke ranks with the United States another nation's political system,
Japan, the last major power with- and western European nations which Japan's typical response has been to
holding diplomatic recognition from refused to give into blackmail. Oil "separate politics from economics"
China, out to dry. Nixon also issued dependency on the Middle East, then (seikei bunri). In its trading relations
Japan an ultimatum to restrict textile supplying 85% of Japan's oil needs, with, say, Khomeini's Iran or racist
imports to the United States, to forced Japan to deviate, in the words South Africa, Japan has clearly
which Japan yielded in part because of one observer, "from its traditional stated that the economic tie should
delivery on the 1969 American prom- 'follow America' diplomatic line" not be regarded as an endorsement
ise to return U.S.-occupied Okinawa (Shimizu 1988, 384). By distancing of either nation's repressive politics.
to Japanese control rested on itself from Israel and adopting a line Generally the official American reac-
Japanese compliance on textiles. The toward the Palestinian issue that was tion has been neither to condone nor
textiles conflict, accompanied by a acceptable to petroleum exporting condemn this practice, recognizing
10% surcharge on Japanese imports countries, Japan convinced OPEC to that resource dependency makes it
to the United States, was followed in reopen the spigots by December difficult for Japan to adhere consis-
August 1972 by Nixon's so-called 1973. tently to a democratically principled
"dollar shock." By floating the The Nixon shocks and the oil foreign policy. Nevertheless, in Con-
dollar and thereby inflating the value shocks were countered by Japan with gress and amongst the American
of the yen, U.S. policy caused slower economic or "resource diplomacy," public, Japan's practice of giving
economic growth, reduced exports, also more broadly known as "multi- primacy to economic relations over
and set off a record number of bank- lateral diplomacy," "omnidirectional political principles has slowly gen-
ruptcies in Japan. If that was not diplomacy," and "comprehensive erated such epithets as "Japan,
enough, in 1973 Nixon imposed a security," all terms used by Japanese Inc.," "economic animal," and
short-term embargo on soybean foreign policy analysts to refer to the "predatory" commercial and foreign
exports to Japan, conclusively prov- pragmatic and necessary steps (1) to aid practices.
ing Japanese vulnerability to the diversify various Japanese dependen- Not surprisingly, criticism of
exercise of American power. cies and trading relationships, (2) to Japan's economic practices worsens
The two "oil shocks" of the 1970s develop overseas' resources, (3) to in the United States during periods
only exacerbated Japan's sense of stockpile crucial commodities at when the American economy is weak
vulnerability and heightened its his- home, and (4) to curry favor with and the Japanese economy is strong,
toric sense of "victim conscious- primary producers by providing and especially when the bilateral
ness," succinctly described by Karl generous "development assistance" trading relationship accentuates
Van Wolferen, "Japanese popular in the form of grants and loans. Japan's strength and America's
imagery has long viewed the nation Concrete examples include the pur- weakness. During these periods-
as surrounded by an unreliable and chase of more oil from Mexico, 1968-72, 1976-78, and 1981 to the
capricious world, and as the potential Southeast Asia, and China so that present-the American predominant-
victim of uncontrollable external today 710% of its oil, rather than ly military notion of security and the
forces" (1990, 47). Such thinking is 85% as in 1973 or 80% at the time Japanese predominantly economic
understandable for an import-depen- of the second "oil shock" in 1979, notion of security have come into
dent nation like Japan which must comes from the Middle East. Also, conflict. But because the Japanese
buy 9907o of all its oil, 90% of its during the Iran-Iraq war of the tend to believe that their economic
wheat, soybeans, corn and feed 1980s, Japan cultivated friendly rela- security rests on American defense
grains, as well as most of its iron tions with both warring nations, security guarantees and the larger
ore, nonferrous metals, lumber, despite American displeasure, with economic benefits gained from the
uranium, coal, and natural gas. Most the effect that during the 1990 Gulf bilateral trading relationship, the
tellingly, Japan relies on imports to Crisis, increased oil imports from Americans invariably enjoy strong
meet a full 70% of its food needs. Iran nearly compensated for the loss leverage in negotiations over trade
Such resource dependency, quite of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil. and other disputes.
naturally, tends to result in "resource Since the Nixon shocks, and In the late seventies, for instance,
diplomacy" and a reactive foreign because of recurring trade disputes as America's trade deficit with Japan
policy that is constantly conjuring ad with the United States-textiles in the mounted to $8 billion and a be-
hoc solutions to externally induced 1960s, TV and steel in the 1970s, and leaguered post-Vietnam War America
shortfalls of necessary goods. automobiles and semiconductors in struggled to restore its economy and
Fresh on the heels of the Nixon the 1980s-Japanese policy makers national self-esteem, complaints
shocks, the first oil shock of 1973 have adopted a more comprehensive about Japan's "free ride" on defense
threw Japan's economy into a tail- notion of national security that grew in Congress. President Carter
spin; high inflation, panic and hoard- makes friendly relations with vir- sought to reduce defense expendi-
ing, and negative growth combined tually every resource-rich nation and tures in East Asia in part by paring
to send Japanese leaders rushing to not just those favored by the United back American troop levels stationed
the oil-producing nations to strike States, central to Japanese foreign in Korea. Carter also came under
whatever deal they could in order to policy. In instances where a trading pressure from the American steel

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 Japan's Foreign Policy

industry to levy fines on Japan for Such concessions, however modest, TABLE 1.
"dumping" steel products in the developed gradually enough so that Japan's Direct Overseas Investment
American market and from Ameri- when Prime Minister Suzuki in 1981 by Region and Country
can television manufacturers to referred publicly to the U.S.-Japan (as of March 31, 1990) (US$ million)
impose export restraints on Japan. relationship as an "alliance," despite
a public outcry, most commentators FY 1989 FY 1951-89
Already apprehensive about the relia-
Amount Total
bility of the American defense com- acknowledged the remark as an
mitment to Japan in the wake of the obvious truth. United States 32,540 104,400
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and Certainly one LDP leader who did Canada 1,362 4,593
regarding South Korea's security as was Nakasone Yasuhiro, chosen North America, Total 33,902 108,993

central to its own, Japan's leaders Prime Minister in 1982. Longtime United Kingdom 5,239 15,793
Luxembourg 654 5,383
reacted to Carter's new policies by nationalist on record as favoring con-
Netherlands 4,547 10,072
increasing financial support for stitutional revision, former head of Germany, F.R. 1,083 3,448
American troops stationed in Japan, the Defense Agency, and well known France 1,136 2,899
by purchasing more U.S. manufac- "hawk" on defense issues, Naka- Switzerland 397 1,829
tured military items, by accepting sone's ascension to power seemed to Spain 501 1,546
Europe, Total 14,808 44,972
"voluntary" export restraints, and signal a fundamental shift in Japan-
Indonesia 631 10,435
by promising another "package" of ese foreign policy away from the
Hong Kong 1,898 8,066
trade concessions that would result in passive Yoshida Doctrine and depen- Singapore 1,902 5,715
the purchase of more value-added dence on U.S. security promises but Korea, Republic of 606 3,854
manufactured goods from the United in ways that would nonetheless har- China 438 2,474
Malaysia 673 2,507
States. At the time only 41% of U.S. monize with President Reagan's
Taiwan 494 2,285
goods sold to Japan were manufac- hardline anticommunist views. Naka-
Thailand 1,276 2,088
tured items (in FY 1990 the figure is sone, many believed, would be the Philippines 202 1,322
closer to 50%). But Japan hedged its leader whose foreign policy reflected Asia, Total 8,238 40,465
bets by also signing a big trade deal Japan's emergent status as a great Australia 4,256 12,394
with Peking, as well as a Peace and power. Nakasone tried hard not to Oceania, Total 4,618 13,933
Friendship Treaty partly in order to disappoint them. Saudi Arabia/Kuwait 32 1,415
reduce the possibility of Chinese Early in his administration Naka- Middle East, Total 66 3,404
meddling in the Korean peninsula. sone engineered a partial reversal of Panama 2,044 14,902
Brazil 349 5,946
By cultivating such alternative Japan's long-standing policy pro-
Cayman 1,658 6,743
markets, Japan clearly signalled the hibiting the export of military tech- South America, Total 5,238 36,855
U.S. that interdependence would not nology by making the United States
Liberia 643 4,301
be permitted to degenerate into the exception to the rule. He also Africa, Total 671 5,275
dependence. broached the issue of revising the Total 67,540 253,896
Because the second oil shock in constitution in discussions with
1979 slowed Japanese economic Reagan; he went beyond Suzuki's Source: Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1991: An
expansion, Japan devoted greater declaration of an "alliance" with the International Comparison (Tokyo, 1991).
attention to economic problems, at United States by referring to Japan Note: Figures are the accumulated value of
as "a big aircraft carrier" in the approvals and notification. Source: Ministry
the insistence of the Ministry of
of Finance, Japan.
Finance, and less to renewed Ameri- Pacific. In 1985 he broke with tradi-
can pressure to spend more on tion again, this time by visiting the
defense. Japan palliated U.S. pres- Yasukuni Shrine where Japan's
sure, however, by supporting puni- World War II militarists are buried. placate the Americans in the area of
tive actions taken by the Americans The next year he agreed to cooperate defense precisely when the U.S.-
against the Soviets in the wake of the with Reagan's "Star Wars" (Stra- Japan economic relationship was
invasion of Afghanistan, and by sus- tegic Defense Initiative) program; deteriorating at quicksilver speed.
pending economic relations with and in 1987 his defense budget Japan's economy boomed during
Vietnam after it invaded Cambodia. exceeded, but only barely, the sacro- the eighties while America's floun-
Japanese leaders further yielded to sanct 1% o limit for the first time in dered in budget deficits, trade defi-
American pressure by enlarging the twenty years. Nakasone's list of cits, and unprecedented borrowing.
official definition of self-defense accomplishments is lengthy, yet as Further, as Japan's economy truly
to include protection of sea lanes Kenneth Pyle correctly asserts, his internationalized, especially after
extending as far as 1,000 miles from attempts to establish "a more activist 1985, its overseas investments, nearly
the Japanese islands. Joint military foreign policy were limited and often half of which went to the United
exercises with American forces and symbolic." Nakasone "modified the States, made its rising wealth in rela-
additional financial support for U.S. Yoshida Doctrine by making changes tion to America's growing indebted-
troops stationed in Japan, by 1981 around the edges" (Pyle, 1987, 268, ness all the more conspicuous to an
amounting to $1 billion, both sig- 269). American public straining to believe
nalled a growing willingness in the Yet that Nakasone went as far as Reagan's "feel good about America"
early eighties to share a greater he did bespeaks as much as anything rhetoric. Between 1987 and 1989,
responsibility for its own defense. else the perceived need for Japan to Japan's overseas investments were

March 1992 65

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

larger than all its investments made the American reforms. Millions of space was one of the few remaining
abroad between 1951 and 1986. In small retailers and large industrial industries where the United States
FY 1989 (through March 31, 1990) groupings (keiretsu), however, whose retained a competitive edge with
alone, Japan sent $67.5 billion support the LDP relies on, oppose Japan, Americans were uncomforta-
abroad, half of that to the United aspects of SII-related legislation ble with the prospect of losing com-
States, and spent another $14 billion which may mean that implementa- mercial advantage.
in 174 mergers and acquisitions of tion of the reforms will prove prob- At roughly this juncture in the
American companies (see Table 1). lematic. Furthermore, since SII also squabbling, it was revealed that the
To read the financial pages of any resulted in American agreement to Toshiba Corporation illegally trans-
major American newspaper in the strengthen its economy by, among ferred American military technology
late 1980s was to learn that Japan other things, reducing the deficit and to the Soviets, thereby causing
seemed to be buying up America. increasing the savings rate, it's quite serious damage to U.S. security.
Well publicized purchases of Ameri- possible that American failure to ful- Relying on trade legislation, the
can landmarks, like Columbia Pic- fill its part of the bargain will serve United States slapped sanctions on
tures and Rockefeller Center, made as a convenient excuse for Japan to imports from Toshiba. At the same
the American pain all the worse. renege as well. time, the Reagan administration took
Then to learn that America was the However fully Japan implements retaliatory measures against Japanese
world's number one debtor nation, its SII promises, American insistence microchip producers by imposing
and Japan the number one creditor on a greater Japanese commitment to 100% tariffs on electronic imports.
nation; that Japan had taken first security arrangements is unlikely to To defuse the trade conflict and
place from the United States in dis- cease. Before the Gulf Crisis broke derail American protectionism, the
bursing "foreign aid" (Overseas out, Secretary of State Baker told the Japanese government agreed to co-
Development Assistance) was like Asia Society, "The time has arrived development of the fighter plane.
pouring the proverbial salt in the for Japan to translate its domestic At this stage, 1988, the FSX sym-
gaping wound of American pride, and regional successes more fully bolized a genuine partnership, with
Reagan rhetoric notwithstanding. into a broader international role with both nations sharing technologies
The result: Business Week's well- increased responsibilities" (New York with the other, hence its importance
known August 1989 poll: Americans Times, June 27, 1989). Recent went well beyond mere defense coop-
are less fearful of the Soviet's mili- Japanese leaders, including Kaifu, eration to reflect renewed attitudes of
tary power than of Japan's economic have been receptive to this message, mutual trust. But during the next
(August 7, 1989, 51). although they've been quick to add year pressure was applied by Ameri-
Washington's response today to that increased burden-sharing should can congessmen and trade specialists,
Japanese advances echoes that of be accompanied by increased power- who feared that American aircraft
earlier administrations: attack sharing in return. America, some technology would wind up being
Japan's commercial practices as Japanese critics observe, seems dis- used in the same way that computer
unfair, which is what the Structural inclined to trust Japan with greater memory chips, videocassette record-
Impediments Initiative (SII) does, power. Some observers point to the ers, and television sets had been used
insist on change, and intone once recent FSX (fighter plane) flap as by Japan in the past, i.e., Japan
more that Japan must assume greater evidence. would improve on these American
responsibilities for its and Asia's The FSX was initially conceived in inventions and take the industrial
security. the mid-eighties as an exclusively lead. As such worries mounted, the
SII essentially tells Japan to re- Japanese project to develop a next Bush administration effected a revi-
structure its economy and reorder its generation support fighter for the Air sion of the earlier memorandum of
economic priorities in ways that Self Defense Force. By 1987, how- understanding with Japan in order to
should theoretically benefit the ever, American military contractors, ensure that Mitsubishi Heavy Indus-
United States's position in the bi- congressmen and U.S. officials wor- tries, the prime contractor and sym-
lateral relationship. The aim of SII is ried that an independent Japanese bol of Japan's economic prowess,
to reorient the Japanese economy defense industry would cut into U.S. would not gain advantage in the
away from export reliance and hid- exports of aircraft to Japan in the aerospace industry by getting F-16C
den trade and investment barriers, future. They combined to press technology. The Japanese govern-
and toward greater market liberaliza- Japan either to purchase existing ment responded with a plea to sep-
tion and consumer spending; it calls American-made fighters or to enter arate trade from defense issues, but
for the diversion of some $3 trillion in with American manufacturers in Bush gave into domestic pressure and
in governmental funds to public co-development of the experimental insisted on revision of the original
works spending over the next ten aircraft. Japan's defense establish- agreement. Japan conceded just
years. Japanese consumers, who on ment, and the principal contractor when it appeared that the United
average pay some 42% more for the for the project, Mitsubishi Heavy States was about to take retaliatory
same goods as Americans, stand to Industries, preferred that Japan go it action once again, this time against
gain from lower prices and improved alone, not only because it would be Japan for failing to liberalize its tele-
road, sewerage and park systems, as more cost effective, but also to communications market. The issue of
they themselves are well aware. reduce Japan's dependency on U.S. free trade, the sine qua non of
Opinion polls show a majority favor aerospace technology. But as aero- Japan's economic survival, had to

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 Japan's Foreign Policy
take precedence over defense. And ing the war, but winning the peace." many Asians. Nevertheless Japan
for the United States, Washington's Military aggression proved ultimately perseveres to prove that not only
reneging on the original agreement ineffectual for securing Japan access does it not have hegemonic intentions
symbolized, as the New York Times to Asia's markets, raw materials, in Asia, but also that it wishes to
put it, a "new concern over the cheap labor, and investment oppor- lead the nations of Asia into an era
economic dimension of national tunities, but Japan's aggessive eco- of unprecedented economic growth,
security" (April 29, 1989). nomic policies since the war have cooperation, and mutual respect.
The meaning of the FSX affair for proven stunningly effective. Today A rough road to hoe. As recently
Japan was that Washington did not Japan is the number one trading as the fall of 1990, when Japan pro-
trust Tokyo enough to share power, partner with, leading investor in, and posed the creation of a small, non-
military technology in this case, and major donor of aid to most nations combat United Nations Peace Coop-
further denigrated Japanese sover- in Asia. eration Corps, former victims of
eignty by imposing what one critic Yet the "face" that Japan's for- Japanese aggression denounced this
called an "unequal treaty" on Japan eign policy projects to many Asian proposal as evidence of a revival of
(Ishihara 1989, 65). Making matters nations is of an untrustworthy, Japanese militarism. Aware of this
worse, less than a year later, in rapacious, aggrandizing economic prospect, the Japanese foreign
March 1990, the U.S. Marine com- machine that systematically exploits ministry attempted to allay such sus-
mander in Japan stated that Ameri- the human and material resources of picions by consulting broadly with its
can troops needed to stay in Japan Asia for its own profit while enjoy- Asian neighbors. China and South
as "a cap in the bottle," that is, to ing American protection, but forever Korea especially, however, demurred.
prevent Japan from becoming a mili- threatening to make itself into a At first glance, their demurral is
tary power once again. This at a time dominant military power in Asia. difficult to explain in rational terms
when Japan is paying for 40% of the Such harsh imagery bears the heavy (see Table 2). South Korea is Japan's
expense of maintaining U.S. troops imprint of historical aggression and second leading single country trading
in Japan (to be increased to 50%o by presentday strategic alliances that the partner, has had diplomatic relations
1995). The Japanese must wonder passing of forty-five years and with Japan since 1965, is the recipi-
about the contradictions in Washing- repeated signs of greater Japanese ent of billions of dollars of Japanese
ton's mixed messages: Spend more independence from the United States aid and investment, and has received
on defense but don't build your own seem unable to erase in the minds of a formal apology from Japan for
fighter planes, and pay for the
American troops who guard you
against yourselves. TABLE 2.
The contradictions may be catch- Japan's Leading Trading Partners (1987-1989)a
ing up with Washington. In Septem-
ber 1990, the House of Representa- Japan's Exports to-
tives passed a resolution, 370-53, that 1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
proposes withdrawing U.S. troops
(US$ millions) (percentages)
from Japan unless Japan agrees to
pay the full cost of maintaining United States 83,580 89,634 93,188 36.5 33.8 33.9
them. The resolution was answered ECb 37,693 46,873 47,908 16.4 17.7 17.4
by the Director-General of the Korea, Republic of 13,229 15,441 16,561 5.8 5.8 6.0
Germany, F.R. 12,833 15,793 15,920 5.6 6.0 5.8
Defense Agency with the remark: Taiwan 11,346 14,354 15,421 4.9 5.4 5.6
"Japan has never asked for the sta- China 8,250 9,476 8,516 3.6 3.6 3.1
tioning of troops. Let them (the Australia 5,146 6,680 7,805 2.2 2.5 2.8
Americans) go home" (FBIS, Octo- Canada 5,611 6,424 6,807 2.4 2.4 2.5
United Kingdom 8,400 10,632 10,741 3.7 4.0 3.9
ber 1, 1990). Yet just months before,
Indonesia 2,990 3,054 3,301 1.3 1.2 1.2
in July 1990, Prime Minister Kaifu Saudi Arabia 3,239 3,142 2,763 1.4 1.2 1.0
wrote, "Japan considers it important Hong Kong 8,872 11,706 11,526 3.9 4.4 4.2
Singapore 6,008 8,311 9,239 2.6 3.1 3.4
to contribute to regional stability--
and, by extension, to the peace and Malaysia 2,168 3,060 4,124 0.9 1.2 1.5
France 4,014 4,987 5,298 1.8 1.9 1.9
stability of the world-by cooperat- United Arab Emirates 1,118 1,286 1,296 0.5 0.5 0.5
ing with the United States under the Switzerland 2,266 2,775 2,664 1.0 1.0 1.0
security arrangements provided for U.S.S.R. 2,563 3,130 3,082 1.1 1.2 1.1
by the mutual security treaty" (1990, Netherlands 4,071 5,054 5,112 1.8 1.9 1.9
32). It seems as if the Americans do Thailand 2,953 5,162 6,838 1.3 1.9 2.5
Italy 2,103 2,787 2,783 0.9 1.1 1.0
not have a monopoly on contra- South Africa 1,863 2,047 1,717 0.8 0.8 0.6
dictions. Belgium 2,697 3,390 3,455 1.2 1.3 1.3
India 1,957 2,082 2,018 0.9 0.8 0.7
Mexico 1,389 1,772 1,908 0.6 0.7 0.7
East Asian Co-prosperity Brazil 879 998 1,310 0.4 0.4 0.5
Philippines 1,415 1,740 2,381 0.6 0.7 0.9
Sphere? Kuwait 857 730 671 0.4 0.3 0.2
Sweden 1,931 2,319 2,174 0.8 0.9 0.8
Japan's relations with Asia today World, Total 229,221 264,917 275,175 100.0 100.0 100.0
give meaning to the expression, "los-

March 1992 67
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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

TABLE 2 (continued). ly of the United States. Japan's con-

tinued support of an anti-Peking line
Japan's Imports from--
until the United States pulled the rug
out from under Japan in 1971, and
1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
Japan's domestically unpopular posi-
(US$ millions) (percentages) tion of lending economic support to
South Vietnam during the Vietnam
United States 31,490 42,037 48,246 21.1 22.4 22.9
ECb 17,670 24,071 28,146 11.8 12.8 13.3 War are both examples showing how
Korea, Republic of 8,075 11,811 12,994 5.4 6.3 6.2 the U.S. security relationship can
Germany, F.R. 6,150 8,101 8,995 4.1 4.3 4.3 damage Japan's credibility as an
Taiwan 7,128 8,743 8,979 4.8 4.7 4.3 independent and impartial actor with
China 7,401 9,859 11,146 5.0 5.3 5.3
Australia 7,869 10,285 11,605 5.3 5.5 5.5
other Asian nations. In short, the
Canada 6,073 8,308 8,645 4.1 4.4 4.1 Security Treaty cuts both ways.
United Kingdom 3,057 4,193 4,466 2.0 2.2 2.1 Nonetheless, the LDP ruling estab-
Indonesia 8,427 9,497 11,021 5.6 5.1 5.2 lishment has decided, as Kuriyama's
Saudi Arabia 7,311 6,348 7,048 4.9 3.4 3.3
remark attests, that the gains from
Hong Kong 1,561 2,109 2,219 1.0 1.1 1.1
Singapore 2,048 2,339 2,952 1.4 1.2 1.4 the dependency relationship with the
Malaysia 4,772 4,710 5,107 3.2 2.5 2.4 United States outweigh its liabilities.
France 2,871 4,315 5,546 1.9 2.3 2.6 The clearest evidence that the U.S.
United Arab Emirates 5,408 5,324 6,051 3.6 2.8 2.9 tie produces greater good than
Switzerland 3,101 3,565 3,863 2.1 1.9 1.8
U.S.S.R. 2,352 2,766 3,005 1.6 1.5 1.4
damage is Japan's thriving economic
Netherlands 757 996 1,122 0.5 0.5 0.5 relationship with most Asian nations,
Thailand 1,796 2,751 3,583 1.2 1.5 1.7 which underscores the fact that
Italy 2,135 2,895 3,806 1.4 1.5 1.8 Japan's foreign policy in Asia is pre-
South Africa 2,259 1,933 2,035 1.5 1.0 1.0
dominantly economic. This observa-
Belgium 859 1,125 1,430 0.6 0.6 0.7
India 1,530 1,804 1,978 1.0 1.0 0.9 tion applies to northeast Asia-the
Mexico 1,625 1,591 1,730 1.1 0.8 0.8 two Koreas, China, the USSR, Tai-
Brazil 2,032 2,950 2,999 1.4 1.6 1.4 wan, and Hong Kong-and southeast
Philippines 1,353 2,044 2,059 0.9 1.1 1.0 Asia-the Association of Southeast
Kuwait 1,796 1,590 2,339 1.2 0.8 1.1
Sweden 682 977 1,086 0.5 0.5 0.5
Asian Nations (ASEAN: Singapore,
World, Total 149,515 187,354 210,847 100.0 100.0 100.0 Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines and Brunei), Indochina
Source: Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1991: An International Comparison (Tokyo, 1991). (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos), and
aln order of total value of exports plus imports in 1987. New Zealand and Australia. With
b1985 ten countries, 1986-87 twelve countries. See p. 5. Source: Japan Tariff Association, The the exceptions of Soviet Asia, New
Summary Report: Trade of Japan. Zealand, and Australia, Japan's
WWII empire included all these
past aggression. In the case of China, and foremost of these policies is the nations.
Japan was one of the few industrial U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Vice In most cases, twenty or more
democracies to go easy on China in Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu years had to lapse before Japan
the wake of the Tiananmen massacre helped make this very point in an could normalize diplomatic relations
and the first to resume normal eco- article published in June of 1990. with these nations, by which time
nomic relations, including the releas- Arguing broadly about the impor- Japan passed the United States to
ing of low interest loans of some $6 tance of the Treaty, Kuriyama made become the leading trading nation in
billion for development projects. the special point that it "renders Asia. Prior to the mid-sixties,
At second glance, however, it international credibility to Japan's Japan's Asia policy generally fol-
becomes clear that China, South stance that it will not become a lowed American wishes which in-
Korea and other Asian nations are major military power, thus facilitat- cluded negotiations to settle the
not quite so obsessed with past ing the acceptance of a larger polit- terms of reparation payments for
Japanese wrongs as they are about a ical and economic role for Japan by harm inflicted by Japan during its
potential future Greater East Asia its neighbors" (Far Eastern Eco- military occupation of these nations.
Co-prosperity sphere, extending from nomic Review, July 5, 1990). Curi- Only with Taiwan, which became
Seoul to Sydney. They understand ously, Japan's foreign policy makers strategically important to American
that Japan's economic might and its feel that its acceptance by other Cold War strategy after the com-
technological and military prowess Asian nations rests on maintaining its munist victory in China in 1949, did
could very easily permit Japan to military-dependent relationship with Japan sign an early peace treaty, and
become the hegemon of Asia. the United States. only then because of American pres-
Knowing this, Japan has designed But if Japan's trustworthiness in sure. More typical examples include
policies toward its Asian neighbors the eyes of Asian nations rests on the South Korea with whom Japan nor-
largely in ways that will reassure American alliance, the U.S.-Japan malized relations in 1965, with China
them that it is content to remain treaty also harms Japan's credibility in 1972, and with the Philippines in
"merely" an economic giant. First as a nation that can act independent- 1974. Diplomatic relations with the

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 Japan's Foreign Policy

Soviet Union were reestablished in bered by Koreans and still strains the If Japan and North Korea do
1956, but Soviet refusal to return the relationship with Tokyo. As recently establish formal relations, it will in
four small islands north of Hok- as 1974 Koreans mounted attacks on large part be due to the ending of the
kaido, seized at the tailend of the Japan's embassy in Seoul, and today Cold War in northeast Asia, perhaps
war, to Japanese control resulted in Japan's arguably racist treatment of best typified by the Soviet Union's
Japan's refusal to sign a peace some 680,000 Koreans living in decision in September 1990 to nor-
treaty; this issue remains unresolved Japan continues to be a sore point. malize relations with Seoul. But for
in 1991. Despite growing commercial Not until 1984 did a South Korean Tokyo the real test of whether the
ties, Japan has yet to establish diplo- head of state visit Tokyo, and only post Cold War era indeed arrived
matic relations with communist in May 1990 did the Korean presi- was the visit to Japan by President
North Korea; relations with North dent get a formal apology from Gorbachev in April 1991. Then
Vietnam came only in 1973, follow- Tokyo pressed once more for the
ing the Paris Peace Accords between return of the so-called "Northern
the United States and North Viet- Territories," the four small islands
. . . the "face" that off the coast of Hokkaido
nam, but economic relations were
suspended after reunified Vietnam's Japan's foreign policy (Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri,
invasion of Cambodia in 1979. These Etorofu), which Japan has claimed
examples generally show that Japan's projects to many Asian since WWII but have been occupied
political relations with most Asian nations is of an untrust- by the Soviets. Japan's leadership
nations closely adhered to U.S. insisted that the islands be returned
policy during the Cold War. worthy, rapacious, to Japanese sovereignty as a condi-
Normalization of economic rela- tion to the signing of a peace teaty
tions, however, was another matter aggrandizing economic with the Soviets and thus as a pre-
altogether. Well before diplomatic machine that lude to greater Japanese trade,
relations were restored, Japan prac- investment, and aid. The Soviet
ticed a policy of separating eco- systematically exploits the refusal to exchange territory for
nomics from politics, that is, keeping human and material improved economic relations means
commercial relations unfettered by that future Japanese-Soviet relations
political or ideological differences. In resources of Asia for its will likely continue at the modest
the best-known case of Sino-Japanese level of the past. Two-way trade in
relations, Japan adhered to own profit while enjoying 1990 amounted to only about $6
America's Cold War policy of "two billion.
American protection, but Japan has long subscribed, and
Chinas," the good capitalist Taiwan
and the bad communist PRC, on forever threatening to played a role in, the American "con-
strictly political grounds, yet ex- tainment" of the former Soviet
panded trade with the PRC so that make itself into a Union, and its defense policy has tra-
by 1964 trade with Peking surpassed ditionally assumed the Soviets to be
dominant military power
trade with Taiwan. Today, ironically, the principal enemy of Japan. De-
although Japan no longer has formal in Asia. spite Soviet invitations for Japan to
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, invest, especially in exploiting
their two-way trade in 1987 and 1988 Siberia's natural resources, between
exceeded Tokyo's trade with Peking, Japan for its repressive behavior dur- 1968 and 1976 Japan separated eco-
even though Japanese direct foreign ing the colonial period. For the last nomics from politics only to the ex-
investment in China is some $200 decade Seoul has complained about tent of investing $1.5 billion in seven
million more than that in Taiwan. Japan's persistent trade surplus, just different development projects. Since
Japan's most important trading as Japan has complained about that time, the Soviet invasion of
partner in northeast Asia is, and has Korean trade barriers and protection- Afghanistan, the shooting down of a
been, South Korea. Historically re- ism against Japanese exports. A Korean airliner near Japanese air
garded as critical to Japan's security, possible future strain on the relation- space, and the Soviet military build-
Japan has a strong vested interest in ship is Japanese movement toward up in Asia soured the climate for
helping ensure political and economic normalizing relations with communist greater Japanese economic involve-
stability on the Korean peninsula. North Korea, accompanied by an ment in the USSR. Only about a
Between 1951 and 1988, direct unofficial promise of sizeable repara- dozen Japanese-financed develop-
Japanese investment in South Korea tion payments which could possibly ment projects were agreed upon since
reached $3.25 billion, and since 1965 undermine the South's attempt to use 1976, these dealing primarily with oil
Japan has poured in about 650 its economic leverage to push the and gas exploration. Since the late
billion yen in loans to the govern- North toward unification. Nonethe- eighties, however, the Soviets were
ment in Seoul; in 1988 their two-way less, Japan will be careful to avoid no longer described officially as a
trade amounted to over $25 billion. damaging its relations with Seoul for "threat" to the peace and stability of
Thirty-five years (1910-45) of a trading relationship with the North East Asia, yet because of its eco-
especially brutal colonial occupation that in 1989-90 was worth only one- nomic difficulties, exemplified by
by Japan continues to be remem- sixtieth of that with the South. $518 million in unpaid debts to

March 1992 69

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

Japanese trading companies, Japan's withdrawal of American military Japan's direct overseas investment,
foreign minister reacted to a 1991 forces from Vietnam in 1973, and and received nearly 50% of Japan's
West European proposal for eco- Vietnam's reunification in 1975, total foreign aid.
nomic aid to Moscow by saying it making Vietnam the most powerful Thereafter Japan-ASEAN links
would be "no more than money military power and primary threat to expanded and tightened as regular
down the drain." In more polite the stability of Southeast Asia, consultations, tariff reduction nego-
terms, the same views were expressed forced Japan to reconstruct its policy tiations, and development projects
jointly by the United States and toward the region. Spurred on by became standard fare. ASEAN has
Japan at the Houston Summit in American pressure to assume a since become the main beneficiary of
July 1990. stronger stabilizing role, Japanese Japanese Overseas Development
Japan's foreign policy toward Prime Minister Fukuda issued a Assistance (ODA), development
northeast Asia has generally adhered "doctrine" in 1977, with implemen- loans, and private investment (see
to American Cold War strategy, tation the following year, that was Figure 1). In the 1970s ASEAN
albeit the economic component of its intended to enhance the chances for received 45% of Japan's total ODA
policy, as opposed to the strategic peaceful development in the region. and in the 1980s between 30% and
(just the opposite of American priori- The "Fukuda Doctrine" emphasized 350%. Despite the high level of eco-
ties), has played a much larger role. that Japan rejected a military role in nomic support from Japan, some
But in the case of Japan's policy Southeast Asia, that it sought rela- ASEAN nations have complained
toward Southeast Asia, and most tions based on mutual trust, and fur- about tied aid, i.e., grants and loans
especially ASEAN, it is arguable that ther offered to play an overtly polit- to be used for the purchase of
Japan's "yen diplomacy" reflects ical mediator role of repairing rela- Japanese exports. Japan's ODA to
both a greater sensitivity to the tions between Vietnam and ASEAN. the Philippines, for instance, between
strategic angle and a greater aware- The latter represented a genuine 1968 and 1989, amounted to nearly
ness of the impossibility of separat- departure from Japan's typical reac- one trillion yen, but since 80% of
ing strategic concerns from econom- tive foreign policy, but alas, it came that amount was in yen-dominated
ics. Or otherwise put, Japan's south- to naught, in part because of loans, a full 70% of ODA was spent
east Asian policy demonstrates, ASEAN disinterest, especially follow- on orders for goods and services
especially after and in light of ing Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia from Japanese corporations. ASEAN
America's defeat in Vietnam, that and border skirmishes with Thai "beggars" can seldom afford to be
the wisest "strategic angle" is troops, and partly because ASEAN choosers, but tied aid of this sort
economic diplomacy. nations brashly argued for material nonetheless results in nationalistic
The attraction of southeast Asia is rather than political aid from Japan. hackles being raised.
obvious: low labor costs, under- Thus Fukuda's offer of $200 million Japanese ties to Thailand represent
developed pollution control laws, in development aid to each of the a different sort of relationship.
relatively open markets, easy access five ASEAN states (Brunei did not Direct Japanese investment in Thai-
to raw materials, and, for all these join ASEAN until 1984) was warmly land is second only to Japan's invest-
reasons, attractive investment oppor- welcomed. It was aid wisely invested; ment in the United States and repre-
tunities. Until the early seventies at the time ASEAN nations bought sents 53% of all foreign investment
Japan practiced fairly opportunistic 10% of Japan's exports, got 20% of in Thailand. Until 1987 Thailand was
neo-mercantilist policies of maximiz-
ing the export of its manufactured
goods and minimizing the import of FIGURE 1.
nonessential goods from Southeast Japan's Overseas Development Aid in Asia 1985-89
Asia. Japan bought low-cost raw
materials and sold high-cost con- US$ billion
3.5
sumer goods. Small and medium-
12.7 Asia Total = US$ 14.9 billion
sized Japanese firms, squeezed out 3 11.8 World Total = US$ 24.9 billion
by larger companies in the domestic Figures at top of bar = percent share of total ODA
Japanese market, or made unprofit-
2.5
able by stricter pollution control laws
8.0
passed in the early seventies, flocked
2 6.8
to Southeast Asia. The low wages
these Japanese companies paid, their 5.7

poor record on worker safety, the

3.9
pollution their factories caused, and
1 3.4 3.3
the profits they exported back to 2.4

Japan combined to cause a high level 0.5

1.6

of anti-Japanese sentiment, expressed

most forcefully in protest riots dur-
ing Prime Minister Tanaka's 1974 Indonesia China Philippines Thailand Bangladesh India Pakistan Burma Sri Lanka Malaysia
visit to the five ASEAN nations.
A combination of the riots, the Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 June 1991).

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 Japan's Foreign Policy

the second largest recipient of pledge of 3.2 billion yen made to to punish Vietnam for its invasion of
Japanese aid and is now ranked Indonesia in August 1990 for use in Cambodia by cutting commercial
fourth. For Bangkok, Japanese ODA domestic production of vaccines and relations. In 1984, however, Japan
amounts to nearly 70% of all bi- forestation projects. offered to assist peacekeepers in
lateral development assistance. Japan Japan has been moving toward Indochina, to extend humanitarian
is also Thailand's biggest trading dispensing more humanitarian and assistance to refugees in the region,
partner; two-way trade in 1988 less commercially tied aid, but it and promised to provide economic
amounted to almost $10 billion, with remains true that Japanese aid tends assistance to all of Indochina once
Japan enjoying a $3 billion trade sur- to follow trade. Thus Japan is the war ended. Now that Vietnam has
plus. Unfortunately for the Thais, largest single donor to Indonesia withdrawn its troops from Cam-
such trade imbalances favoring Japan where bilateral trade (1988) bodia, Japan is rewarding Vietnam.
have been a persistent problem since amounted to some $12 billion, but In the first five months of 1990,
the 1950s. And the problem is getting was less generous with Malaysia Japanese trade and investment in
worse; in 1989 the Thais suffered a where two-way trade amounted to Vietnam has doubled, and its exports
$4 billion trade deficit, the worst about $7.5 billion. Moreover in 1989 are 85% higher than a year earlier.
ever. Aggravating the deficit is the 60% of all Japanese aid to Indonesia Yet so long as civil war rages in
content of trade; less than 50% of went to servicing its debt to Japan; Cambodia between the Vietnamese-
what Japan buys from Thailand con- Malaysia, in order to limit its indebt- installed government and rebel
sists of manufactured goods, and forces, the restoration of stability to
much of that figure represents goods the larger region remains in jeopardy.
manufactured by Thai-based Japan- To help end the conflict Japan took
ese companies. Despite attempts by
Japan has been moving the initiative by hosting its first peace
the Thai government to negotiate toward dispensing more talks in an international dispute in
away the inequities and trade defi- June 1990. The two-day talks failed
cits, the Thais feel stuck in what they humanitarian and less because the most militant of the war-
acknowledge is a dependent relation- ring factions, the Khmer Rouge,
ship. The hundreds of thousands of
commercially tied aid, but
came to Tokyo but boycotted the
jobs that Japanese companies have it remains true that sessions. Nevertheless, by demon-
created and the estimated two per- strating its willingness to play a
cent boost to GDP growth resulting Japanese aid tends to larger role in the peace process,
from Japanese investment, aid, and Japan was rewarded with observer
follow trade.
trade forces Thai officials to suffer, status at the ongoing Paris peace
however gladly, the unequal rela- talks conducted by the five perma-
tionship. edness to Japan, had to refuse all nent members of the United Nations
The alternative seems less pleasant, Japanese loan offers in 1989. Security Council. In addition, Japan
as represented by Indonesia and As a predominantly trading nation has been using its strong ties with
Malaysia. Both those nations enjoy dependent on Southeast Asian China, the chief supporter of the
sizeable balance of trade surpluses resources, Japan's bilateral relations Khmer Rouge, to encourage quiet,
with Japan, but unlike Thailand with each of the ASEAN nations behind-the-scenes resolution of the
which is fast becoming an industrial- tends to be primarily economic, yet conflict.
ized nation due to Japanese invest- as a wise trader and investor, Japan Japan's ventures into more tradi-
ment, Indonesia and Malaysia re- also realizes that the key to sustain- tional diplomacy of this sort have
main stuck in a classic North-South ing lucrative commercial relations not succeeded. Despite its economic
dependency relationship with Japan. depends on political stability in the leverage in Southeast Asia, neither
Indonesia's trade surplus with Japan region. Generally Japanese involve- ASEAN nor the Indochinese states
is due largely to oil exports, ment has worked on the liberal yet regard Japan as a credible leader
Malaysia's because of oil and for- assumption that economic progress in in the region. In some respects Japan
estry products. A full 80% of Southeast Asia will help produce appears to them as a kind of "Asian
Indonesia's exports to Japan consists political stability and, of course, pre- Uncle Tom," Asian to be sure, but
of raw materials, a similar percentage serve free trade. Yet Japan has also in truth aligned with the Western
in the case of Malaysia; such exports undertaken initiatives more strictly camp of advanced industrialized
do not create many new jobs and, of political. The most recent instance is nations. After all, 65%7o of all
course, eventually the volume of Japan's attempt to play the role of Japanese aid may be going to Asian
exports will decline as resources are mediator in the Cambodian civil war. nations, lending credence to Japan's
depleted. Similarly, what Japanese Japan's economic relationship with claim to be an "aid great power,"
investment such resource rich nations Cambodia is miniscule, but its eco- but more than 68%7o of its direct
attract tends to be devoted to build- nomic ties with Cambodia's neighbor investment, the lion's share of the
ing an infrastructure that facilitates to the west, Thailand, are gargan- wealth Japan exports abroad, con-
greater raw material extraction. tuan. Its ties to Cambodia's eastern tinues to gravitate toward the ad-
Japan is not insensitive to complaints neighbor, Vietnam, the regional vanced nations of North America
stemming from this situation, as hegemon, have been slowly develop- and Western Europe. Finally, while
shown, for example, by a Japanese ing. In the late seventies Japan tried there is no question that Japanese

March 1992 71

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Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics

economic involvement in Southeast Political and economic cooperation cism about the likelihood of the
Asia has enriched the nations of the with its senior partner, the United Yoshida Doctrine going the way of
region, it is just as obvious that the States, remains sacrosanct. And the kimono.
terms of trade, investment, and aid despite rumblings by the Congress to The fact is, Japan has prospered
continue to favor Japan. The poor shut down American bases in Japan for 45 years by respecting the status
get richer, to be sure, but the rich get unless Tokyo pays the full bill, the quo, the most important elements of
even richer. past has shown that Japan has which are U.S. security guarantees
repeatedly responded to charges of a and a relatively nonprotectionist
"free ride" on defense by upping its capitalist world committed to free
contribution to the American mili- trade. And "if it works, why fix it?"
tary. Japan is, after all, a "great aid But what if those two sine qua
Future Directions of power." In short, the Cold War may nons of Japanese success no longer
Japan's Foreign Policy be over in Europe, but Japan's work? What if a declining hegemon
actions in the Gulf Crisis, in SII, and like the United States closes up its
A "truth by definition": in the its renewal of the Security Treaty this military bases in Japan, South
absence of what was earlier called a Korea, and the Philippines and goes
"turning point," present trends will home, as it were, retreating into
continue into the future. This really
means that predictive powers are
The fact is, Japan has isolationism? Or what if Europe after
1992 places even greater restrictions
bound by the adequacy of our prospered for 45 years by on Japanese trade and investment?
description of the present. In this What if the U.S.-Canada free trade
short chapter much about the intrica- respecting the status quo, agreement extends to Mexico, thus
cies of Japan's foreign policy has
the most important creating a new, larger, and more self-
been omitted or just barely touched sufficient trading bloc that likewise
upon, meaning that predictions about elements of which are places restrictions on Japanese trade?
the future direction of Japan's To the first substantive question-
foreign policy will be equally sketchy. U.S. security guarantees the end of the security relationship
But in the few pages remaining, it is and a relatively non- with the United States-future
possible to fill in a few blanks and Japanese foreign policy makers may
offer guarded guesses about the protectionist capitalist very well conclude that the military
future. alliance is an anachronism of the
In November 1990 the Charter of world committed to free Cold War that has outlived its use-
Paris officially signaled the end of trade. And "if it works, fulness in the post Cold War world,
the Cold War in Europe, thereby that the American "nuclear um-
putting onto paper what many why fix it? " brella" only invites "rain," and that
observers have been saying for U.S. bases in Japan only waste
several years. The immediate issue scarce land better used for golf
for our purposes is to ask whether year all suggest that "it's back to the courses, and that the defense rela-
the Cold War has also ended in Asia, future." tionship is no longer necessary once
and, if so, whether this might con- Yet it is imaginable that Japan all the major powers of northeast
stitute a "turning point" in Japanese would bid fond farewell to American Asia reach genuine accommodation.
foreign policy. troops stationed in Japan if its rela- To the second issue, protectionism,
Of first importance is noting the tions with the newly formed Com- Japan's foreign policy makers should
American and Japanese commitment monwealth improve to the point conclude that economic interdepen-
to continuing the Security Treaty, the where Moscow returns the Northern dency between Japan and Western
linchpin of Japan's postwar foreign Territories; if diplomatic relations trading blocs is an immutable fact
policy. Itself a product of the Cold with North Korea are established; if that is unlikely to be altered anytime
War, the Security Treaty is the core South Korea and North Korea follow in the future. Japanese manufactur-
of the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine," the example of Germany and reunite ers are now investing at an accel-
which, as we have seen, has been as a nonnuclear nation; if the recent erated rate in specific West European
reaffirmed by every postwar Japan- detente between Moscow and Beijing nations, establishing something more
ese Prime Minister, including Mr. results in a further demilitarization than a foothold, in anticipation of
Kaifu. Japan's inability or unwilling- of northeast Asia; if a peaceful and the 1992 economic union of Europe;
ness, Kaifu's efforts notwithstanding, permanent accommodation can be in FY 1990 Japanese direct invest-
to play a more active role in the Gulf reached between China and Taiwan; ment in Europe increased a whop-
Crisis stands as a reminder that the and if all these powers, plus Japan's ping 20%7 to $15 billion. And the
pacifist provision of the Yoshida many worldwide suppliers of re- walls of "fortress America" were
Doctrine has withstood yet another sources, agree to trust a neutral long ago breached by Japanese
test. Further evidence of the inviola- Japan, independent of the U.S. alli- financiers, investors and manufac-
bility of the Doctrine is the apparent ance, that goes no farther toward turers, evoking a predictable jingoism
Japanese capitulation to American remilitarization than it already has. among America-firsters, but also a
demands to restructure its economy A great many "ifs" that when added reasoned assessment by cooler heads
as dictated by the SII agreement. can only prompt profound skepti- that the American economy needs,
72 PS: Political Science & Politics

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 Japan's Foreign Policy

indeed, depends on a Japanese pres- hope, and contribute whenever possi- Japan's foreign policy.
ence. Cooler heads also remind us ble to making the world safe for Okita Saburo. 1989. "Japan's Quiet
that Japan owns much less of business. Strength." Foreign Policy (Summer):
128-45. An intelligent overview of Japan's
America than does Great Britain, foreign policy by a former foreign
prompting thinking Americans to minister.
wonder whether it isn't racism at the Suggested Discussion Topics Prestowitz, Clyde. 1988. Trading Places:
bottom of U.S. hostility toward How We Allowed Japan to Take the
Compare the relative importance Lead. New York: Basic Books. An argu-
Japanese investment in America.
of military and political power in the mentative but thoughtful lament about the
But even if, for Japan, the worst reversal in fortunes of the two nations by
foreign policies of Japan, Germany,
case scenario were to happen and the the United States, and the former a Japanese specialist, formerly with the
American and European trading Commerce Department.
Soviet Union. Explain why the Pyle, Kenneth B. 1987. "In Pursuit of a
blocs were to repair the breach and United States seems to be the only Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past
say "no more," Japan has repeatedly "superpower" in the Post Cold War and the Future." Journal of Japanese
demonstrated that its powers of period; and why Japan is not a Studies 13:2: 243-70. An in-depth study of
"resource-omnidirectional diplo- former Prime Minister Nakasone's mar-
superpower.
macy" have made it the ultimate sur- ginally successful attempt to overcome
If you were an influential policy Japan's typically reactive foreign policy.
vivor. While most Western nations
maker in the LDP, what would your
slapped economic sanctions on South position be regarding the benefits
Africa in the 1980s, for instance, and liabilities of the alliance with the
Japan increased its trade with the United States? Other Readings Cited
pariah state, becoming its top trading Gaullism refers to the French Calder, Kent. 1988. "Japanese Foreign
partner in 1987, falling to second policy in the postwar period of Economic Policy: Explaining the Reactive
place (after West Germany) in 1988 adopting a foreign and defense policy State." World Politics 40(4): 517-41.
while still increasing its exports to that is independent of the Atlantic Ito Kan. 1990. "Trans-Pacific Anger."
South Africa by 10%. Japan has Foreign Policy 78: 131-52.
Alliance of Western nations. Discuss
Scalapino, Robert A. 1990. "Asia and the
shown itself equally adept in meeting the merits of Japanese Gaullism. United States: The Challenges Ahead."
its energy needs by kowtowing to Foreign Affairs 69(1): 89-115.
Middle Eastern oil-producing states Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1983. "Foreign
when necessary, by adopting the Policy and the American Character."
industrial world's most fuel-efficient Additional Readings Foreign Affairs 62(1): 1-16.
Shimizu Manabu. 1988. "Japan's Middle
production methods, by conserving Frost, Ellen J. 1987. For Richer, For Poorer: East Policy." Japan Quarterly 35(4):
energy, by developing alternative The New U.S.-Japan Relationship. New 383-89.
energy sources, especially nuclear, York: The Council on Foreign Relations. Shindo Eiichi. 1989. "Frozen in the Cold
and by widely diversifying its oil A well-written overview of the problems War: Another Look at Japan-U.S. Fric-
and promises of the U.S.-Japan rela- tion." Japan Quarterly 36(1): 275-81.
dependencies. Finally, Japan's com- tionship. Von Wolferen, Karl. 1990. "The Japan
mercial relations with Southeast Asia Inoguchi Takashi and Daniel I. Okimoto. Problem Revisited." Foreign Affairs
and the lesser developed countries 1988. The Political Economy of Japan, 69(4): 42-55.
(LDCs) in general have settled into Vol. 2: The Changing International Con- Periodicals/Newspapers cited: Business
text. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Week, The Economist, Far Eastern Eco-
fairly secure trading and investment
A useful collection of essays dealing with nomic Review, Foreign Broadcasting In-
patterns not easily altered by the Japan's place in the international system formation Service (FBIS): East Asia,
LDCs. and aspects of foreign policy making. International Herald Tribune, New York
To take special notice of Japan's Two essays especially are pertinent: Times.

survival skills is really to reaffirm Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Politics

and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy
what the Japanese themselves have
Within the American Greenhouse"; and
long recognized as a "given": the Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan, the World, and About the Author
world is a dangerous place, unpre- the Twenty-first Century."
Ishihara Shintaro. 1989. "From Bad to Roger Bowen
dictable, whimsical, and fraught with
Worse in the FSX Project." Japan Echo Roger Bowen
uncertainty. The best Japan can do is
XVI(3): 59-65. An angry critique about teaches in the Depart-
plan ahead whenever possible, react U.S. interference in Japan's attempt to ment of Government,
whenever necessary, cultivate friendly build its own experimental fighter aircraft, Colby College. He is
commercial relations at all times, but written by LDP conservative and co- the author of Rebel-
author (with Sony Corp. head Akio lion and Democracy
accept its limitations in shaping the
Morita) of the controversial The Japan in Meiji Japan (Cali-
world "order." Leave that ungodly That Can Say No. fornia, 1980) and
burden to the superpower(s?) and the Kaifu Toshiki. 1990. "Japan's Vision." Innocence Is Not
United Nations; meanwhile, ally Foreign Policy 80: 28-39. The current Enough: The Life
itself with the leading hegemon, prime minister's platitudinous survey of and Death of Her-
bert Norman (M.E. Sharpe, 1988). He is cur-
rently writing on Japan's land use policies.

March 1992 73
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