R v Richardson.

(1999)

Facts.

The complainant, the appellants and others, who were all university students and had been
drinking, were indulging in horseplay during the course of which the complainant was lifted over
the edge of a balcony, allegedly by the appellants, and dropped. He fell about 10 or 12 feet and
was injured. The prosecution case was that the appellants had together acted both unlawfully and
maliciously, in the sense that they each actually foresaw that dropping the complainant would or
might cause harm and that they nevertheless took the risk of doing so. The appellant's case was
that the complainant had consented to the horseplay and that his fall was an accident. The
Recorder directed the jury that they had to consider each appellant's intention on the basis of a
reasonable ( i.e. not under the influence of drink) man and not (as they were) under the influence
of drink.

HELD.
The appellants were convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm. They appealed against
conviction on the grounds that the Recorder misdirected the jury. CA upheld their appeal on the
grounds that they ought to have been convicted if they themselves, when sober, would have
foreseen the risk and therefore the convictions were quashed. Even though the trial judge
misdirected on objective/subjective foresight, this surely ought not to have changed the outcome,
unless the court saw something that implied that whereas a reasonable man might have foreseen
some harm, these particular men would not.

DPP V MORGAN. (1976)

Facts
The defendant was a Royal Air Force Pilot and he had invited his friends over to have sexual
intercourse with his wife. He told them that any signs of struggle were not to be seen as a lack of
consent and that she enjoyed it. The men were convicted of rape, while Morgan was convicted of
aiding and abetting his wife. The men had argued that they had the honest belief that the
complainant had consented to sexual intercourse.

Issues
The issue in this case was concerning whether there could be a conviction for rape if the
defendant honestly believed that the woman consented to sexual intercourse, if his belief was not
based on reasonable grounds.

Decision / Outcome
It was held that as long as a belief was genuine and honest pertaining to consent, it did not have
to be a reasonable belief for a defence to rape. The focus was on the mens rea of rape; there had
to be an intention to commit the crime, as well as a lack of consent. There was a requirement to
know the woman had not consented or reckless to whether she did. Despite this decision, the
conviction was upheld, as no reasonable jury would have found them not guilty, even if directed
correctly by the judge. The complainant had clearly communicated her lack of consent for sexual
activity in this case.

Dr. Jacob Mathew vs State of Punjab and Anr (2005).

Facts:

Dr. Jacob Mathew (accused and appellant in this SLP); Ashok Sharma (complainant and
respondent 2; respondent 1–Punjab State). Jiwanlal (father of respondent 2) admitted to CMC
Hospital Ludhiana. One night, Jiwanlal was having difficulty in breathing. Respondent’s brother
called the nurse, no doctor for 25 mins. Dr. Jacob Mathew & Dr. Allen Joseph came. The oxygen
cylinder used was empty. No arrangements to make the oxygen cylinder functional. They wasted
5 to 7 mins in between and the patient died. Complainant filed FIR u/n S304A+34IPC for
offence of criminal negligence by the accused. JM First Class in trial Court convicted the
accused of 304A IPC. Further, the revision petition by the accused was also dismissed by the
Sessions Court à Further, High Court also dismissed the revision petition. Therefore, this appeal
by Special Leave. The question was whether the accused committed negligence? If so, whether it
is a civil liability or criminal liability, and how will it be determined? It was held that Simply
because a patient has not favorably responded to a treatment given by a physician or a surgery
has failed, the doctor cannot be held liable per se by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.
R V G ( 2004)

FACTS.
The two appellants were boys aged 11 and 12 respectively. They went camping at night
unsupervised (and in fact without parental permission). In the early hours of the night they
entered the back yard of a Co-Op shop and found old newspapers. They set fire to these
newspapers and threw them under a wheelie bin, then proceeded to leave without putting out the
fire as they believed it would naturally die out. The fire spread from that wheelie bin to another,
and then to the nearby Co-Op shop (specifically the roof) and from there to adjoining buildings.
All told, this lead to approximately £1 million of damage. It was accepted by all sides that the
appellants did not appreciate that there was any risk at all that the fire would spread in this way.
At trial they were convicted under s.1 Criminal Damage Act 1971.

Decision / Outcome

The appropriate test for recklessness is subjective, which means that in order for the defendant to
be culpable and to be said to have been reckless as to a given risk, he must first be aware of it. In
the present case this was not met and so the appeal was allowed.

R V MILLER (1983)

Facts
The defendant was a vagrant who had spent the evening drinking before returning to the property
where he was squatting. He fell asleep with a lit cigarette in his hand, which started a fire. The
defendant woke and, seeing the fire, took no steps to extinguish it but simply moved to sleep in a
different room. Eventually the whole house caught fire, causing over £800 worth of damage. The
defendant was charged with arson.

Issues
Because the prosecution relied on the ground that the defendant had failed to take any action to
extinguish the fire in addition to the fact that he had been reckless in starting the fire by falling
asleep with a lit cigarette, the question arose whether the defendant could be liable for an
omission. If it was not, then the actus reus of arson was not present and no conviction for arson
would be possible.

Decision/Outcome
The court concluded that as he was responsible for having created the dangerous situation, the
defendant was under a duty to take action to resolve it once he became aware of the fire. It was
not necessary that the defendant was subjectively aware of the risk of damage posed by the fire,
provided that this would be obvious to a reasonable person who was troubled to turn his mind to
the matter. The defendant was therefore liable for his omission to take any steps to put out the
fire or seek help, and was accordingly convicted of arson.

R v Woollin (1999)

Facts.

The appellant threw his 3 month old baby son on to a hard surface. The baby suffered a fractured
skull and died. The trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied the defendant "must
have realised and appreciated when he threw that child that there was a substantial risk that he
would cause serious injury to it, then it would be open to you to find that he intended to cause
injury to the child and you should convict him of murder." The jury convicted of murder and also
rejected the defence of provocation. The defendant appealed on the grounds that in referring to
'substantial risk' the judge had widen the definition of murder and should have referred to virtual
certainty in accordance with Nedrick guidance. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal holding
that there was no absolute obligation to refer to virtual certainty.

Decision/ Outcome.

Murder conviction was substituted with manslaughter conviction. There was a material
misdirection which expanded the mens rea of murder and therefore the murder conviction was
unsafe. The House of Lords substantially agreed with the Nedrick guidelines with a minor
modification.

R v Prince (1875).

Facts
Henry Prince (H) was convicted under section 55 of the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 of
taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out of the possession of her father without the
father’s consent. The girl, Annie Phillips (A), was in fact 14 years old, however A had told H
that she was 18, and H reasonably believed that that was her age. The appellant appealed against
his conviction.

Issues
Section 55 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is silent as to the mens rea required for
the offence. The issue in question was whether the court is required to read a mens rea
requirement into a statute which is silent as to the mens rea for an offence, and therefore if H’s
reasonable belief was a defence to the offence under Section 55.

Decision/Outcome
Where a statute is silent as to the mens rea for an offence, the court is not bound to read a mens
rea requirement into the statute. The offence was one of strict liability as to age, therefore a mens
rea of knowledge of the girl’s actual age was not required to establish the offence. H’s reasonable
belief was therefore no defence, and the conviction was upheld.

S Varadarajan v State of Maharashtra (1963)

Facts.
In 1960, S Natrajan and his family were living in Nungabakkam. Savitri aged 17.5 years, was his
youngest daughter and was studying B.Sc.in Ethiraj College. Savitri became close with neighbor
Varadarajan. On 30th September, Rama, oldest daughter, saw Savitri and Varadarajan talking to
each other. Rama asked why she was talking to him, and Savitri said she wanted to marry
Varadarajan. On the same day, Rama told their father, and he took Savitri to his relative’s place,
which is far from Varadarajan’s home. On 1st October 1960, Savitri left her relative’s house to
meet Varadarajan on some particular road. Varadarajan came in a car and Savitri got in his car.
They both planned to marry at the registrar’s office, for which they picked a friend to make him
witness. They got married and stayed for 10 to 12 days in Coimbatore and then moved to
Tanjore.They both got to find out by police who were investigating them for S. Natrajan’s
kidnapping case complaint. The case went to Madras High Court, and the court convicted
Varadarajan guilty for kidnapping and awarded one year of rigorous punishment to him. Later,
Varadarajan appealed against High Court judgment by special leave in Supreme Court.

DECISION
The Honorable Court held the appellant was not guilty of taking away Savitri as she voluntarily
accompanied Varadarajan. Savitri was on the verge of attaining majority and she was capable of
knowing what is good and bad for her. Therefore, the appeal is allowed.

Sweet v Parsley (1970)

Facts
The appellant, Stephanie Sweet (S), was a sub-tenant of a farmhouse, where cannabis resin was
found. S no longer lived in the house and had let out several rooms to tenants. She did retain a
room but only returned occasionally to collect letters and rent. The appellant was charged and
convicted under Section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965.

Decision / Outcome
The conviction was therefore quashed, as S, did not have the requisite mens rea for the offence
under Section 5(b) of the 1965 Act.

B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428 House of Lords

Facts.

A boy aged 14 was charged with an offence of inciting a child under 14 to commit an act of
gross indecency, contrary to section 1(1) of the Indecency with Children Act 1960. He had sat
next to a 13 year old girl on a bus and repeatedly asked her to perform oral sex with him. She
refused. The boy believed the girl was over 14. The question for the court was whether the
offence under s.1(1) was of strict liability in relation to the age of the victim.

Held:

The House of Lords held that R v Prince did not lay down a rule that all offences relating to age
of the victim were outside consideration of the general presumption in favour of mens rea.
Moreover, the law had moved on since this decision favouring an honest belief of the defendant
which was not dependent upon the belief being reasonable. Where a charge was a true crime of
gravity, the stronger the presumption of mens rea. The defendant's conviction was quashed.

Hyam v. DPP 1975

The defendant Hyam had been in a relationship with a man before the relationship ended. Hyam
then had become jealous of her ex-boyfriend’s new fiancée Ms Booth. She poured petrol
through Booth’s letter box and then ignited it using a rolled up newspaper. Hyam did not warn
anyone of the fire but simply drove home. The resulting fire killed two young children. Hyam
was tried for murder. At trial she claimed that she had only intended to frighten Booth and had
not intended to kill anyone as the mens rea of murder demanded. Hyam was convicted and
appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal to the House of Lords.

Decision / Outcome
The appeal was refused. A person had the requisite mens rea for murder if they knowingly
committed an act which was aimed at someone and which was committed with the intention of
causing death or serious injury. Lord Hailsham also held that intention could also exist where
the defendant ‘knew there was a serious risk that death or serious bodily harm will ensure from
his acts and he commits those acts deliberately and without lawful excuse with the intention to
expose a potential victim to that risk as the result of those acts. It does not matter in such
circumstances whether the defendant desires those consequences or not.’

Nathulal v. State of MP 1962

The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant was a dealer in a food grains at Dhar in
Madhya Pradesh prosecuted in the Court of Additional District Magistrate for possessing in
stock maunds and 21/4 seers of wheat for the purpose of sale without license. Subsequently
appellant was charged for committing an offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities
Act, 1955. Thereafter the appellant pleaded there was no intention to contravene any provisions
of the law and the grains were stored upon filing an application for license and upon believe that
it will be issued to him. The appellant further stated that he continued to submit returns on the
food grains stored and purchased to the respected authority.

Thus, the appellant was acquitted in the Court of Additional District Magistrate on the ground
that the appellant is not found to be of a guilty mind. On appeal a division bench of High Court
of Madhya Pradesh set aside the order of acquittal and convicted Nathulal on basis that in a case
arising under the act the idea of guilty mind was different from that arising in the case like theft;
and that he contravened the provision of the act and the order made thereunder.

PUCL v. Union of India 2002

The Supreme Court of India held that Indian voters have a right under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Indian Constitution to obtain information about political candidates. The People’s Union of Civil
Liberties (PUCL) challenged the validity of a 1951 law, which stated that political candidates
were not bound to disclose any information not required under the law. The Court reasoned that
the availability of basic information about the candidates enables voters to make an informed
decision and also paves the way for public debates on the merits and demerits of candidates.
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the Rules as they stood violated fundamental rights
and ruled that a ‘none of the above’ option in electronic voting machines should be provided.
R v. Gould 1968

The defendant was subpoenaed at Inner London Sessions on 22nd March 1967 for the charge of
bigamy. His counsel arrived late at the court and in the meantime the defendant pleaded guilty
for the offence of bigamy. When the counsel arrived at the court , he asked the deputy chairman
to withdraw the plea for the offence as he wanted to defend the case on the ground that at the
time of the second marriage, defendant had honest and mistaken belief that the decree for
absolutely dissolving the second marriage had been granted. The deputy chairman held that even
it is proved that the defendant had honest belief that the decree for dissolving the first marriage
has been granted would not amount to defence and hence refused to withdraw the plea of guilty
and thus the defendant was convicted.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

Whether the honest belief on reasonable ground that the decree for dissolving the first marriage
has been granted at the time of second marriage is a good defense for a person booked for
bigamy?

According Sec-57 of offences against the person act,(OAPA)1861, "whosoever, being married ,
shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second
marriage shall have taken place in England or Ireland or elsewhere, shall be guilty of felony. "

JUDGEMENT
Mistake of belief is a good defence only when the belief is not only honest but also reasonable.
The reasonable and honest belief negates the element of Mens rea in sec-57 of OAPA ,1861.

R v. Moloney 1985
The defendant and his stepfather who had a friendly and loving relationship were engaged in a
drunken competition to see which of them could load a shotgun faster than the other. Moloney
won, and was then challenged by his stepfather to fire the gun. He did, killing his stepfather
instantly. Moloney was charged with murder and convicted. He appealed and the Court of
Appeal allowed appeal to the House of Lords.

Decision:
The House of Lords allowed Moloney’s appeal. He had not intended to kill his stepfather.
Knowledge of foresight of the consequences of an action were to be considered at best material
from which a crime of intent may be inferred. Where the defendant’s purpose was other than to
cause serious bodily harm or death to another then the jury may infer intent if the consequence of
the defendant’s act was a natural consequence, and the defendant foresaw that this was a natural
consequence of his act. The jury in such a circumstance should be directed that they may infer
intent, but were not bound to infer intent, if both these circumstances are satisfied. Foresight of
the natural consequences of an act is no more than evidence of the existence of intent.

R v. Taaffe 1984
Paul Desmond Taafe (T) was enlisted by a third party in Holland to import cannabis into
England, which was prohibited to import under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. T, however, had
mistakenly believed the substance to be currency, which T had believed was prohibited to import
but was in fact not. T was charged under section 170(2) of the Customs and Excise Management
Act 1979 (1979 Act) of having been knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the
prohibition on the importation of cannabis. T was convicted and appealed.

‘Knowingly concerned’ under section 170(2) of the 1979 Act had to be read as actual knowledge
that the substance in question was one the importation of which is prohibited. T was not
knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of cannabis
when he mistakenly believed that the substance he was importing was currency. For an offence
of which the ingredients are the defendant’s state of mind and knowledge, the defendant must be
judged on the facts as he believed them to be. T’s mens rea for the impossible offence of
smuggling currency could not be imported to the smuggling of drugs. The Court of Appeal
allowed T’s appeal and his conviction was quashed. The House of Lords dismissed the
prosecution’s appeal.

DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 House of Lords

The appellant had taken a substantial quantity of drugs over a 48 hour period. He then went to a
pub and had a drink. He got into a fight with two others. The landlord went to break up the fight
and the appellant attacked him. When the police arrived, he assaulted the arresting officer.
Another officer was struck by the appellant when he was being driven to the police station. The
next morning he attacked a police inspector in his cell. He was charged with four counts of
occasioning actual bodily harm and three counts of assaulting a police constable in the execution
of his duty. The appellant claimed he had no recollection of the events due to his intoxication. He
was found guilty on all counts and appealed contending that he could not be convicted when he
lacked the mens rea of the offences due to his intoxicated state.

Held:
Appeal dismissed. Conviction upheld. The crime was one of basic intent and therefore his
intoxication could not be relied on as a defence.

R v. Reid 1992
Reid was charged with causing death by reckless driving. In Reid, the defendant had caused
death whilst driving in a manner which most people would consider carried a risk of harm but
had asserted that he had not been reckless because he had not been aware of the risk. The House
of Lords held that deliberately closing one’s mind to the risks that were obvious to other people
was equally blameworthy of taking a risk that had been recognised. This notion of objective
recklessness as a deliberate blindness to obvious risks could legitimately be described as wanton
indifference to the consequences of one’s actions. In a sense, it could be argued that objective
recklessness, failure to recognise an obvious risk, is a clearer encapsulation of wanton
indifference than subjective recklessness, which requires a degree of specificity in relation to the
foresight of harm. Objective recklessness is broader than this and includes situations in which the
accused was wilfully blind to the consequences of his actions as he closed his mind to any
contemplation of the ramifications of his behaviour.

State of maharashtra v. mayer hans george 1963

The respondent, Mayer Hans George, a German smuggler, left Zurich by plane on 27th
November 1962 with 34 kilos of gold concealed on his person to be delivered in Manila. The
plane arrived at Bombay on 28th of November. The Customs Authorities, as a part of their
duties, inspected to check if any gold was dispatched by any traveller and looked through
George, seized his gold and accused him of the offence under sec 8(10) and 23(1-A) of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.

The court further said that even though mens rea is an essential requirement to commit a crime
but regardless of that the statutory provision can exclude the mental element. The express words
of the statute can exclude the mens rea as an essential ingredient of the crime. This may be done
for various reasons, for instance, to promote public welfare and activities or to eradicate social
evils. The statute which complies strict liability helps the offender to assist the state in the
enforcement of the law.

When the provision of the act clearly and explicitly prohibits carrying a certain amount of gold
and then if a person chooses to carry gold more than the specified amount without disclosing it in
the manifest than he will be held liable.
The further said that it cannot interfere with the sentenced passed by the lower courts unless they
are in violation of the principle or are illegal. But since this case has some unusual characters
therefore George was convicted but his years of imprisonment was reduced.

As it has been inferred from M.H v. George’ case that phraseology of the statute can cover an
offense under strict liability and bar the mental element . Therefore the nature of the mischief at
which the arrangement is pointed in some cases albeit strict liability is deduced strictly on the
facts of the case where is depicted as a grave social malevolence.

DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290 House of Lords

A policeman tried to stop the defendant from driving off with stolen goods by jumping on to the
bonnet of the car. The defendant drove off at speed and zigzagged in order to get the police office
off the car. The defendant argued he did not intend to harm the policeman. The policeman was
knocked onto the path of an oncoming car and killed. The defendant was convicted of murder.
The trial judge directed the jury as follows:

‘If you are satisfied that ... he must as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily
harm was likely to result to that officer ... and that such harm did happen and the officer died in
consequence, then the accused is guilty of capital murder. ... On the other hand, if you are not
satisfied that he intended to inflict grievous bodily harm upon the officer - in other words, if you
think he could not as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm would
result to the officer in consequence of his actions - well, then, the verdict would be guilty of
manslaughter.’

The jury convicted of murder and the defendant appealed on the grounds that this was a
mis-direction and that a subjective test should apply. The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction
for murder and substituted a manslaughter conviction applying a subjective test. The prosecution
appealed to the House of Lords who re-instated the murder conviction and held that there was no
mis-direction thereby holding an objective test was applicable.

R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168

The appellant married in Sept 1880. In Dec 1881 her husband went missing. She was told that he
had been on a ship that was lost at sea. Six years later, believing her husband to be dead, she
married another. 11 months later her husband turned up. She was charged with the offence of
bigamy.
Held:
She was afforded the defence of mistake as it was reasonable in the circumstances to believe that
her husband was dead.

R v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206 Court of Appeal

The appellant smashed a bottle over a woman's head and then struck her with a video recorder
whilst she was asleep. The appellant had no recollection of the events and claimed he had been
sleepwalking. This claim was supported by medical evidence. He sought to rely on the defence
of automatism, however the trial judge ruled that on the evidence the only defence available was
insanity. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defendant appealed
contending that the trial judge should have allowed the defence of automatism to be put before
the jury.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed. The evidence demonstrated there was an abnormality or disorder,
albeit transitory, due to an internal factor, which had manifested itself in violence and which
might recur.

Lord Lane CJ
"We accept that sleep is a normal condition, but the evidence in the instant case indicates that
sleepwalking, and particularly violence in sleep, is not normal."

R v Jones [1987] Crim LR 123 Court of Appeal

The appellants were schoolboys. They were convicted of inflicting GBH on two fellow school
mates having thrown them into the air with the intention of catching them. Unfortunately they
had dropped them resulting in serious injury including a ruptured spleen. Evidence was produced
that the boys had engaged in the activity before without injury and that it was taken by all as a
joke with no intention to cause injury. The trial judge would not allow the defence of consent to
go to the jury.

Held:

Appeal allowed. The convictions were quashed. Consent to rough and undisciplined horseplay is
a defence and even if there was no actual consent, if the appellants had a genuine belief in
consent they should be allowed the defence. There was no requirement that the belief be
reasonably held, provided it was genuine.

R v Kingston [1994] 3 WLR 519 House of Lords

Kingston had a business dispute with a couple. They employed Penn to gain some damaging
information on Kingston in order to blackmail him. Kingston was homosexual with paedophiliac
predilections. Penn invited a 15 year old boy to his room and gave him a soporific drug in his
drink. The boy remembers nothing from the time of sitting drinking the drink on Penn's bed until
waking the next morning. Penn then invited Kingston to the room and drugged his drink without
his knowledge. Penn and Kingston then both engaged in gross sexual acts with the unconscious
boy. Penn recorded the events and took photographs. Kingston was charged with indecent assault
on a youth. At his trial the judge directed the jury:

"In deciding whether Kingston intended to commit this offence, you must take into account any
findings that you may make that he was affected by drugs. If you think that because he was so
affected by drugs he did not intend or may not have intended to commit an indecent assault upon
[D.C.], then you must acquit him; but if you are sure that despite the effect of any drugs that he
might have been slipped - and it is for you to find whether he was drugged or not - this part of
the case is proved, because a drugged intent is still an intent. So intention is crucial, intention at
the time; and, of course, members of the jury, you will bear in mind there is a distinction between
intention at the time and a lack of memory as to what happened after the time. "

The jury convicted him and he appealed to the Court of Appeal where his conviction was
quashed.

Lord Taylor CJ:

"However, the purpose of the criminal law is to inhibit, by proscription and by penal sanction,
anti-social acts which individuals may otherwise commit. Its unspoken premise is that people
may have tendencies and impulses to do those things which are considered sufficiently
objectionable to be forbidden. Having paedophiliac inclinations and desires is not proscribed;
putting them into practice is. If the sole reason why the threshold between the two has been
crossed is or may have been that the inhibition which the law requires has been removed by the
clandestine act of a third party, the purposes of the criminal law are not served by nevertheless
holding that the person performing the act is guilty of an offence. A man is not responsible for a
condition produced 'by stratagem, or the fraud of another."
The prosecution appealed to the Lords.

Held:

Appeal allowed. There is no principle of English law which allows a defence based on
involuntary intoxication where the defendant is found to have the necessary mens rea for the
crime. The prosecution had established the defendant had the necessary intent for the crime - a
drunken intent is still an intent

R VS SAFI 2003 1 Cr App Rep 12

Facts:
In 2000, the appellant and his codefendants hijacked a plane in Afghanistan and
arrived at Stansted Airport London. They sought to rely on the defence of duress,
contending that they were under the imminent threat of death and torture as the
opponents of Taliban regime.

At first instance court, the jury found them guilty of several offences, inter alia,
hijacking. The appellants appealed against these convictions arguing that the judge
had misdirected the jury. The judge told the jury that in order for the defendants to
rely on the defence of duress, there had to be evidence that they were under real
danger. However, in their appeals, the appellants contended that the threshold for
the defence of duress was whether the defendant at the time could reasonably
believe that fleeing the country and hijacking was the ultimate way to escape death
or torture.

Issues:
Did the judge misdirect the jury?

Held:
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The Court found that there was indeed
misdirection. In Safi [2003], the correct test to apply was the one set out in R. v
Graham [1982] 1 W.L.R. 294. The tests consisted of two limbs- subjective and
objective. The first question to ask was whether the appellant believed that if he
had not hijacked the plane, he would be killed. The second question inquired about
what a reasonable person would do in the same circumstances. Consequently, the
convictions were unsafe.