Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

Key Encryption in Wireless

Sensor Network
Mohammed khalil Ibrahim
Mustansyria University
Computer center
Abstract
The information needed by smart environments is provided by Distributed
Wireless Sensor Networks, which are responsible for detecting the relevant
quantities, monitoring and collecting the data, assessing and evaluating the
information, formulating meaningful user displays, and performing decision-
making and alarm functions are enormous. The importance of sensor networks is
highlighted by the number of recent funding initiatives, including the DARPA
SENSIT program, military programs, and NSF Program Announcements. We
described the architecture of sensor networks and present the Important features
of security in sensor networks , some Types of Attacks on sensor networks and
the defense against them finally we propose a public key encryption system by
using an algorithm of ElGamal and present the algorithms of encryption ,
decryption and show the efficiency and security of the proposed system.
1. Sensor Network Architecture
Sensor networks is made up from numbers of nodes with constrains in
resources like energy, memory, and computational power and for interaction
purposes, the nodes are equipped with radio frequency communication
capabilities. However, this wireless communication provides only limited
bandwidth. These nodes could be considered as
points of centralized control called base stations. A base station is typically a
gateway to another network, a powerful data processing or storage center, or an
access point for human interface.
The sensor node has specific factors set also add several constraints for
the security architecture. Since only a fraction of the total memory may be used
by the cryptographic algorithms and key material, the security architecture
demands very lightweight cryptographic algorithms with relatively short key
sizes. Furthermore, cryptographic computations need to be executable in an
appropriate amount of time as the execution of cryptographic algorithms is not
the main task of the nodes. Due to the limited bandwidth and communication
being the most expensive operation in terms of energy, messages should not be
extended significantly in length when applying security services.

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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

The sensor nodes are equal devices in terms of the role they can play in
the network and should self-organize to accomplish their appointed task, without
any supervision. Thus, the sensor nodes gather information based on their
sensing capabilities and make decisions based upon the gathered data. Another
important point in sensor networks is the limited lifetime of sensor data. Sensor
data and accordingly events that are derived from it should be communicated in
real time.
The network characteristics, similar to the node characteristics, determine
important aspects of the desired security architecture. Considering the node
mobility, authentication and key exchanges must not depend on numerous extra
messages, since the topology is subject to frequent change. Additionally, all
necessary cryptographic functions and key material must reside and be
executable on the nodes. With respect to the real-time property of sensor
networks, cryptographic algorithms should also be as fast as possible. Finally,
the security architecture needs to be scalable to accommodate high numbers of
nodes.
In a typical WSN we see following network components
• Sensor motes (Field devices) – Field devices are mounted in the process and
must be capable of routing packets on behalf of other devices. In most cases
they characterize or control the process or process equipment. A router is a
special type of field device that does not have process sensor or control
equipment and as such does not interface with the process itself.
• Gateway or Access points – A Gateway enables communication between Host
application and field devices.
• Network manager – A Network Manager is responsible for configuration of
the network, scheduling communication between devices (i.e., configuring
super frames), management of the routing tables and monitoring and
reporting the health of the network.
• Security manager – The Security Manager is responsible for the generation,
storage, and management of keys.
2 Important features of security in sensor networks
Setting security features for sensor networks will depend on knowing
what it is that needs protecting. Sensor networks share some of the features of
mobile ad hoc networks . The four important security features for sensor
networks are determined as Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and
Availability (CIAA).
2.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the ability to blocking messages from a passive attacker
so that any message communicated via the sensor network remains confidential.

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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

2.2 Integrity
Data integrity in sensor networks is needed to ensure the reliability of the
data and refers to the ability to confirm that a message has not been tampered
with, altered or changed while on the network.
2.3 Authentication
Authentication ensures the reliability of the message by identifying its
origin. Attacks in sensor networks do not just involve the alteration of packets,
adversaries can also inject additional bogus packets. Therefore, the receiving
node needs to be able to confirm that a packet received does in fact stem from
the node claiming to have sent it. In other words, data authentication verifies the
identity of senders.
2.4 Availability
Availability determines whether a node has the ability to use the resources
and whether the network is available for the messages to communicate. Since
complex security measures entail a higher consumption of energy and
computation power, keeping resource starved sensor networks available is
challenging. However, failure of the base station or cluster leader’s availability
will eventually threaten the entire sensor network. Thus availability is of
primary importance for maintaining an operational network.
3. Types of Attacks on sensor networks
Sensor networks are particularly vulnerable to several key types of
attacks. Attacks can be performed in a variety of ways, most notably as denial of
service attacks, but also through traffic analysis, privacy violation, physical
attacks, and so on. we will focus first on of some common denial of service
attacks and then describe additional attacking, including an identity based attack
known as the Sybil attack which is concerned directly with key encryption over
networks and between nodes and finally show a review over Attacks Against
Privacy.
3.1 Types of Denial of Service attacks
A standard attack on wireless sensor networks is simply to jam a node or
set of nodes. Jamming, in this case, is simply the transmission of a radio signal
that interferes with the radio frequencies being used by the sensor network. The
jamming of a network can come in two forms: constant jamming, and
intermittent jamming. Constant jamming involves the complete jamming of the
entire network. No messages are able to be sent or received. If the jamming is
only intermittent, then nodes are able to exchange messages periodically, but not
consistently. This too can have a detrimental impact on the sensor network as
the messages being exchanged between nodes may be time sensitive .
Attacks can also be made on the link layer itself. One possibility is that an
attacker may simply intentionally violate the communication protocol, IEEE
801.11b (Wi-Fi) protocol, and continually transmit messages in an attempt to
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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

generate collisions. Such collisions would require the retransmission of any

packet affected by the collision. Using this technique it would be possible for an
attacker to simply deplete a sensor node’s power supply by forcing too many
retransmissions.
3.2 The Sybil attack
The Sybil attack is defined as a “malicious device illegitimately taking on
multiple identities”. It was originally described as an attack able to defeat the
redundancy mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer
networks . In addition to defeating distributed data storage systems, the Sybil
attack is also effective against routing algorithms, data aggregation, voting, fair
resource allocation and foiling misbehavior detection. Regardless of the target
(voting, routing, aggregation), the Sybil algorithm functions similarly. All of the
techniques involve utilizing multiple identities. For instance, in a sensor network
voting scheme, the Sybil attack might utilize multiple identities to generate
additional “votes.” Similarly, to attack the routing protocol, the Sybil attack
would rely on a malicious node taking on the identity of multiple nodes, and
thus routing multiple paths through a single malicious node.
3.3 Attacks Against Privacy
Sensor network technology promises a vast increase in automatic data
collection capabilities through efficient deployment of tiny sensor devices.
While these technologies offer great benefits to users, they also exhibit
significant potential for abuse. Particularly relevant concerns are privacy
problems, since sensor networks provide increased data collection capabilities.
Adversaries can use even seemingly innocuous data to derive sensitive
information if they know how to correlate multiple sensor inputs. For example,
in the famous “panda-hunter problem”, the hunter can imply the position of
pandas by monitoring the traffic.
The main privacy problem, however, is not that sensor networks enable
the collection of information. In fact, much information from sensor networks
could probably be collected through direct site surveillance. Rather, sensor
networks aggravate the privacy problem because they make large volumes of
information easily available through remote access. Hence, adversaries need not
be physically present to maintain surveillance. They can gather information in a
low-risk, anonymous manner. Remote access also allows a single adversary to
monitor multiple sites simultaneously . Some of the more common attacks
against sensor privacy are:
• Monitor and Eavesdropping : This is the most obvious attack to privacy. By
listening to the data, the adversary could easily discover the communication
contents. When the traffic conveys the control information about the sensor
network configuration, which contains potentially more detailed information

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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

than accessible through the location server, the eavesdropping can act
effectively against the privacy protection.
• Traffic Analysis : Traffic analysis typically combines with monitoring and
eavesdropping. An increase in the number of transmitted packets between
certain nodes could signal that a specific sensor has registered activity.
Through the analysis on the traffic, some sensors with special roles or
activities can be effectively identified.
• Camouflage Adversaries can insert their node or compromise the nodes to hide
in the sensor network. After that these nodes can masquerade as a normal
node to attract the packets, then misroute the packets, e.g. forward the
packets to the nodes conducting the privacy analysis.
4 Protection Techniques
We will describe the techniques for satisfying security requirements, and
protecting the sensor network from attacks. We start with defending techniques
against Denial of Service attacks , Sybil attacks , and Sensor Privacy Attacks .In
the end we give a describe for key establishment in wireless sensor networks,
which lays the foundation for the security in a wireless sensor network and give
a proposal encryption system for secure keys used in wireless sensor network .
4.1 Defending Against Denial of Service attacks
The denial of service attacks are so common , effective defenses must be
available to combat them. One strategy in defending against the classic jamming
attack is to identify the jammed part of the sensor network and effectively route
around the unavailable portion. There are a two phase approach where the nodes
along the perimeter of the jammed region report their status to their neighbors
who then collaboratively define the jammed region and simply route around it.
To handle jamming at the MAC layer, nodes might utilize a MAC admission
control that is rate limiting. This would allow the network to ignore those
requests designed to exhaust the power reserves of a node. This, however, is not
fool-proof as the network must be able to handle any legitimately large traffic
volumes.
Overcoming rogue sensors that intentionally misroute messages can be
done at the cost of redundancy. In this case, a sending node can send the
message along multiple paths in an effort to increase the likelihood that the
message will ultimately arrive at its destination. This has the advantage of
effectively dealing with nodes that may not be malicious, but rather may have
simply failed as it does not rely on a single node to route its messages.
4.2 Defending Against the Sybil Attack
To defend against the Sybil attack , the network needs some mechanism
to validate that a particular identify is the only identity being held by a given
physical node .There are two methods to validate identities, direct validation and
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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

indirect validation. In direct validation a trusted node directly tests whether the
joining identity is valid. In indirect validation, another trusted node is allowed to
vouch for (or against) the validity of a joining node . Newsome et al. primarily
describe direct validation techniques, including a radio resource test. In the radio
test, a node assigns each of its neighbors a different channel on which to
communicate. The node then randomly chooses a channel and listens. If the
node detects a transmission on the channel it is assumed that the node
transmitting on the channel is a physical node. Similarly, if the node does not
detect a transmission on the specified channel, the node assumes that the identity
assigned to the channel is not a physical identity.
Another technique to defend against the Sybil attack is to use random key
pre-distribution techniques. The idea behind this technique is that with a limited
number of keys on a keyring, a node that randomly generates identities will not
possess enough keys to take on multiple identities and thus will be unable to
exchange messages on the network due to the fact that the invalid identity will
be unable to encrypt or decrypt messages.
4.3 Defending Against Attacks on Sensor Privacy
Regarding the attacks on privacy mentioned earlier, there exist effective
techniques to counter many of the attacks levied against a sensor. Here we
describe several common techniques .
4.3.1 Anonymity Mechanisms Location information that is too precise can
enable the identification of a user, or make the continued tracking of movements
feasible. This is a threat to privacy. Anonymity mechanisms depersonalize the
data before the data is released, which present an alternative to privacy policy-
based access control. Researchers have discussed several approaches using
anonymity mechanisms, for example, Gruteser and Grunwald analyze the
feasibility of anonymizing location information for location-based services in an
automotive telematics environment; Beresford and Stajano independently
evaluate anonymity techniques for an indoor location system based on the
Active Bat.
Total anonymity is a difficult problem given the lack of knowledge
concerning a node’s location. Therefore, a tradeoff is required between
anonymity and the need for public information when solving the privacy
problem. Three main approaches are proposed:
• Decentralize Sensitive Data The basic idea of this approach is to distribute the
sensed location data through a spanning tree, so that no single node holds a
complete view of the original data.
• Secure Communication Channel Using secure communication protocols, such
as SPINS , the eavesdropping and active attacks can be prevented.

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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

• Change Data Traffic De-patterning the data transmissions can protect against
traffic analysis. For example, inserting some bogus data can intensively change
the traffic pattern when needed.
• Node Mobility Making the sensor movable can be effective in defending
privacy, especially the location. For example, the Cricket system is a location-
support system for in-building, mobile, location dependent applications. It
allows applications running on mobile and static nodes to learn their physical
location by using listeners that hear and analyze information from beacons
spread throughout the building. Thus the location sensors can be placed on the
mobile device as opposed to the building infrastructure, and the location
information is not disclosed during the position determination process and the
data subject can choose the parties to which the information should be
transmitted.
5. Key Establishment
One security aspect that receives a great deal of attention in wireless
sensor networks is the area of key management. Wireless sensor networks are
unique (among other embedded wireless networks) in this aspect due to their
size, mobility and computational/power constraints. Indeed, researchers envision
wireless sensor networks to be orders of magnitude larger than their traditional
embedded counterparts. This, coupled with the operational constraints described
previously, makes secure key management an absolute necessity in most
wireless sensor network designs. Because encryption and key
management/establishment are so important to the defense of a wireless sensor
network, with nearly all aspects of wireless sensor network defenses relying on
solid encryption, Now we give an overview of the public key encryption and our
proposal systems .
6 public key proposal system
Traditionally, key establishment is done using one of many public-key
protocols. One of the more common is the Diffie-Hellman public key protocol,
but there are many others.
We will propose an encryption system used one of techniques depend on
mathematical problems with one direction solutions like discrete logarithm
problem with Elgamal algoritham which can summarize as follows:
6.1 ElGamal public-key encryption
The ElGamal public-key encryption scheme can be viewed as Diffie-
Hellman key agreement in key transfer mode . Its security is based on the
intractability of the discrete logarithm problem and the Diffie-Hellman problem.
The basic ElGamal and generalized ElGamal encryption schemes are described
in this section.

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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

6.1.1 Definition The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is the following:

given a prime p,a generator  of Zp*, and an element   Z n* , find the integer x
, 0  x  p  2 , such that  x   (mod p)
6.1.2 Definition The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP) is the following: given a
prime p:
a generator  of Zp*, and an element  a mod p and  b mod p , find  ab mod p .
6.1.3 Basic ElGamal encryption
1. Algorithm Key generation for ElGamal public-key encryption
SUMMARY: each entity creates a public key and a corresponding private key.
Each entity A should do the following:
1. Generate a large random prime p and a generator of the multiplicative group
Zp* of the integers modulo p (using Algorithm 1.1).
2. Select a random integer a, 1  a  p  2 , and compute  a mod p (using
Algorithm 1.2).
3. A’s public key is (p;  ;  a )
1.1 Algorithm Selecting a k-bit prime p and a generator  of Zp*
INPUT: the required bit length k of the prime and a security parameter t.
OUTPUT: a k-bit prime p such that p − 1 has a prime factor  t, and a generator
 of Zp*
1. Repeat the following:
1.1 Select a random k-bit prime p
1.2 Factor p − 1.
Until p − 1 has a prime factor  t.
2. Use Algorithm 1.1.1 with G = Zp* and n = p − 1 to find a generator  of Zp*
3. Return(p,  ).
1.1.1 Algorithm Finding a generator of a cyclic group
INPUT: a cyclic group G of order n, and the prime factorization n  p1e1 p2e 2 ... pkek
OUTPUT: a generator  of G.
1. Choose a random element  in G.
2. For i from 1 to k do the following:
n
2.1 Compute b   pi
2.2 If b =1then go to step 1.
3. Return(  ).
1.2 Algorithm Repeated square-and-multiply algorithm for exponentiation in Z
INPUT: a ∈ Zn , and integer 0  k < n whose binary representation is
k  i 0 k i 2 i
t

OUTPUT: ak mod n.
1. Set b←1.If k =0 then return (b).
2. Set A← a.
3. If k0=1 then set b ← a.
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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

4. For i from 1 to t do the following:

4.1 Set A←A2 mod n.
4.2 If ki = 1then set b←A . b mod n.
5. Return(b).
2. Algorithm ElGamal public-key encryption
SUMMARY: B encrypts a message m for A, which A decrypts.
1. Encryption. B should do the following:
(a) Obtain A’s authentic public key (p;  ;  a ).
(b) Represent the message as an integer m in the range {0, 1, …,p− 1}.
(c) Select a random integer k, 1  k  p  2
(d) Compute =    k mod p and  m . ( a ) k mod p.
(e) Send the cipher text c = ( ,  ) to A.
2. Decryption. To recover plaintext m from c, A should do the following:
(a) Use the private key a to compute  p 1a mod p (note  p 1a =   a =   ak )
(b) Recover m by computing ( (  a )   mod p
6.2 efficiency of ElGamal encryption
(a) The encryption process requires two modular exponentiations, namely
 k mod p and ( a ) k mod p. These exponentiations can be sped up by selecting
random exponents k having some additional structure.
(b) ElGamal encryption is one of many encryption schemes which utilizes
randomization in the encryption process. The fundamental idea behind
randomized encryption techniques is to use randomization to increase the
cryptographic security of an encryption process through one or more of the
following methods:
(i) increasing the effective size of the plaintext message space;
(ii) precluding or decreasing the effectiveness of chosen-plaintext attacks by
virtue of a
one-to-many mapping of plaintext to ciphertext .
(iii) precluding or decreasing the effectiveness of statistical attacks by leveling
the a priori
probability distribution of inputs.
(c) A disadvantage of ElGamal encryption is that there is message expansion by
a factor of 2. That is, the ciphertext is twice as long as the corresponding
plaintext.
6.3 security of ElGamal encryption
(a) The problem of breaking the ElGamal encryption scheme, i.e., recovering m
given
p,  ,  a ,  and  is equivalent to solving the Diffie-Hellman problem . In fact, the
ElGamal encryption scheme can be viewed as simply comprising a
DiffieHellman key exchange to determine a session key  ak and then encrypting

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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

the message by multiplication with that session key. For this reason, the security
of the ElGamal encryption scheme is said to be based on the discrete logarithm
problem in Zp*, although such an equivalence has not been proven.
(b) It is critical that different random integers k be used to encrypt different
messages.
Suppose the same k is used to encrypt two messages m1 and m2 and the
resulting ciphertext pairs are ( 1 ,  1 ) and ( 2 ,  2 ) . Then  1   m1 m and m2 could
2 2

be easily computed if m1 were known.

6.4 Generalized ElGamal encryption
The ElGamal encryption scheme is typically described in the setting of the
multiplicative group Zp*, but can be easily generalized to work in any finite
cyclic group G. As with ElGamal encryption, the security of the generalized
ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the intractability of the discrete
logarithm problem in the group G. The group G should be carefully chosen to
satisfy the following two conditions:
1. for efficiency, the group operation in G should be relatively easy to apply; and
2. for security, the discrete logarithm problem in G should be computationally
infeasible. The following is a list of groups that appear to meet these two
criteria:
1. The multiplicative group Zp* of the integers modulo a prime p.
2. The multiplicative group F2m *
of the finite field F2 m of characteristic two.
3. The group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
7. Conclusion
After studying the wireless sensor networks Architecture and all security issue
and present some attacks on this networks and numbers of solutions. we propose
a key encryption systems based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm
problem and the Diffie-Hellman problem (i.e) The encryption process requires
two modular exponentiations, namely  k mod p and ( a ) k mod p. These
exponentiations can be sped up by selecting random exponents k having some
additional structure like increasing the effective size of the plaintext message
space and decreasing effectiveness of chosen-plaintext attacks and decreasing
effectiveness of statistical attacks which can increase the security of data
transferred within these networks.
The ElGamal encryption scheme which used in our proposed system is typically
described in the setting of the multiplicative group Zp* which must be chosen to
satisfy the following two conditions:
1. for efficiency, the group operation in Zp* should be relatively easy to apply;
and
2. for security, the discrete logarithm problem in Zp* should be computationally
infeasible.

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Key Encryption in Wireless Sensor Network …… Mohammed khalil Ibrahim

Our proposed system which based on ElGamal encryption scheme have some
disadvantage because of the message is expansion by a factor of 2. That is, the
ciphertext is twice as long as the corresponding plaintext. And the second
disadvantage is by using different random integers k to encrypt different
messages if two messages m1 and m2 encrypted with same key then if
computed m1 the m2 is also will be computed
References
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109‫ة‬ ‫ل ةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةة‬ ‫مجلةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةة‬
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‫ةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةة‬ ‫ةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةة‬
110‫ة‬ ‫ل ةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةة‬ ‫مجلةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةةة‬
2012 ‫ع و سبعون‬ ‫عدد‬