ENDURING

LIES
The Rwandan Genocide
in the Propaganda System,
20 Years Later

The Real News Books

Edward S. Herman and David Peterson

The Real News Books

Copyright © 2014 The Real News Books

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced
in any medium without the prior written permission of The
Real News Books.

ISBN-13: 978-1500751111
ISBN-10: 1500751111
Layout/Design: Alphabet Soup
Evergreen Park, IL 60805
Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS
Copyright

Preface

Introduction

1. Rwanda: Background and context

2. The RPF invasion and low-level aggressive war that
never was a “civil war”

3. “Hutu Power extremists” did not shoot-down

Habyarimana’s Falcon 50 jet

4. The “Rwandan genocide” by the numbers

5. The West’s alleged “failure to intervene”

6. The ICTR delivers victor’s justice

7. The alleged Hutu “conspiracy to commit genocide”

that never was

8. Did Paul Kagame’s RPF really “stop the genocide”?

9. “Africa’s World War”: Kagame’s alleged pursuit of

“génocidaires” in Zaire—the Democratic Republic of
Congo—and the deaths of millions
 10. The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”

11. The New York Times and other “Genocide Fax”

disinformants

12. Role of UN, human rights groups, media, and

intellectuals in promulgating the standard model

Concluding Note: Genocidist misallocation (Rwanda) and

the real genocide denial (DRC)

Appendix I: More on the alleged Hutu “conspiracy to

commit genocide” that never was

Appendix II: The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”—another

look

Notes

Index
Maps:

Africa

Rwanda 1994
Zaire-The Democratic Republic of Congo

Table 1. Ranges and ethnic compositions of deaths in the

“Rwandan genocide”

Table 2. Bylined-articles on Rwanda in the world’s media,

April 1, 2004 - April 30, 2014

Illustrations: Three versions of the apocryphal “Genocide

Fax”

Preface
According to the widely accepted history of the 1994
“Rwandan genocide,” there existed a plan or conspiracy
among members of Rwanda’s Hutu majority to exterminate
the country’s minority Tutsi population. This plan, the story
goes, was hatched some time prior to the April 6, 1994
assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana,
who died when his Falcon 50 jet was shot-down as it
approached the airport of the capital city of Kigali. The killers
allegedly responsible for this crime were “Hutu Power”
extremists in positions of authority at the time. Although
Habyarimana was Hutu, the story continues, he was also
more moderate and accommodative toward the Tutsi than
“Hutu Power” extremists could tolerate; they were therefore
forced to physically eliminate him in order to carry out their
plan to exterminate the Tutsi. The mass killings of Tutsi and
“moderate Hutu” swiftly followed over the next 100 days,
with perhaps 800,000 or as many as 1.1 million deaths. The
“Rwandan genocide” came to an end only when the armed
forces of Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front drove the
“génocidaires” from power, and liberated the country.
We refer to the above-version of the events that
transpired in Rwanda 1994 as the standard model of the
“Rwandan genocide.” And we note, up front, that we believe
that this model is a complex of interwoven lies which, when
examined closely, unravels in toto.
Nevertheless, its Truth has been entered into the
establishment history books and promulgated within the field
of genocide studies, in documentaries, in the official history
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and even
proclaimed from on-high by the UN Security Council in April
2014.
The institutionalization of the “Rwandan genocide” has
been the remarkable achievement of a propaganda system
sustained by both public and private power, with the crucial
assistance of a related cadre of intellectual enforcers. The
favorite weapons of these enforcers are reciting the
institutionalized untruths as gospel while portraying critics of
the standard model as “genocide deniers,” dark figures who
lurk at the same moral level as child molesters, to be
condemned and even outlawed. But we will show that this is
not only crude name-calling, it also deflects attention away
from those figures who bear the greatest responsibility for
the bulk of the killings in Rwanda 1994, and for the even
larger-scale killings in Zaire and the Democratic Republic of
Congo thereafter.
Our book draws upon the work of a number of critics of
the standard model, as well as the steadily growing stock of
revelations that have entered the public realm over the past
20 years. But we also cite the publications of many of this
model’s defenders who, though failing to question and free
themselves from the early deluge of propaganda about the
“genocide,” have still produced important studies on Rwanda
or central Africa more broadly, and we cite them in their
areas of strength. (The Belgian scholar Filip Reyntjens
stands-out in this respect.) In other cases, however, we deal
with writers who advocate so zealously on behalf of the
standard model that they and their work are notable for
entirely different reasons—as willful conveyers of
misinformation on Rwanda 1994, and, ultimately, as
propagandists for Kagame Power. (The Canadian writer
Gerald Caplan and the British writer Linda Melvern are
featured here, but they are far from alone.) In the research,
acquisition of documents, and writing of the present book,
our greatest debts are to the Canadian attorney Christopher
Black and the U.S. attorney Peter Erlinder, both of whom
have represented Hutu defendants before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in two of its major trials, the
Military II and Military I trials, respectively. We’ve also been
guided by the work of the Canadian analyst of Rwanda,
Robin Philpot. Leopold Nsengiyumva (Rwanda) and Lauren
Tipton (United States), both of whom served as legal
assistants on Christopher Black’s team before the ICTR,
among others, also provided us with assistance. As has the
U.S. reference librarian Dale Wertz (indeed, over many
years).
Map of Africa, derived from EZILON MAPS
 Map of Rwanda 1994, derived from EZILON MAPS

Introduction
This year in April marked the twentieth anniversary of
the 1994 mass killings in Rwanda. Once again, the “Rwandan
genocide” became a hot topic.1 Its anniversary was officially
commemorated in Kigali by the government of Paul Kagame
and by governments around the world; by the United
Nations, which since 2004 had named April 7 the Day of
Remembrance of the Victims of the Rwanda Genocide; by
genocide and holocaust scholars and by the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington; and by an
International Forum on Genocide held in Kigali. It was also
commemorated by countless local groups on and off
university campuses formed on an ad hoc basis; by the
establishment media globally; and by left- and liberal-
interventionist intellectuals and political figures, always
eager to cite the “necessity to intervene” and lament the
“consequences of non-intervention.”2
As a way of kicking-off the year, the New York Times on
January 10 published a column by Michael Dobbs titled
“Rwanda’s Shrouded Nightmare.”3 “It is now commonly
recognized that the international community failed miserably
in its efforts to protect the people of Rwanda,” Dobbs
observed. “Whether the genocide was planned, and was thus
foreseeable, has been hotly debated by scholars, politicians
and lawyers.”
In conjunction with his column, this emissary from the
Holocaust Memorial Museum, where Dobbs runs the Rwanda
Documentation and Oral History project, posted something
called “The Rwanda ‘Genocide Fax’” to the websites of both
the Museum4 and the National Security Archive5 at George
Washington University, the first installment in what was
intended to be a joint, year-long project between the Archive
and the Museum’s Center for the Prevention of Genocide.
Drawing on a collection of 26 documents, and accompanied
by a lengthy analysis by Dobbs, Dobbs wrote that a fax (an
encrypted or coded cable) was sent by Canadian Lieut.-
General and force commander of the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) Roméo Dallaire on
January 11, 1994, from Kigali to the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations in New York
City. This fax allegedly warned the UN of an “anti-Tutsi
extermination” plot that had been hatched by extremist Hutu
figures. (We discuss the authenticity of this fax in Section 10,
below.)
The Museum also sponsored a series of events on
“Rwanda 20 Years Later.”6 Among these was a program with
Philip Gourevitch, one of the earliest disseminators of the
“Genocide Fax” in the English-language media,7 as well as
the United Nation’s Office on Genocide Prevention and the
Responsibility to Protect, devoted to what the Museum
described as the “leaders who instigated violence, the
individuals who participated willingly in mass murder, and
the international community that looked away.”8 Some
weeks later, on April 30, at the Museum’s National Tribute
Dinner and “in conjunction with Holocaust Days of
Remembrance events in Washington,” Dallaire himself
received the 2014 Elie Wiesel Award for his “valiant attempts
to warn the world of and prevent the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda, despite enormous apathy and opposition from the
UN, the United States, and the rest of the international
community.”9
Since 1994, the alleged “failure” on the part of the
United States and its allies to react decisively to the
“Rwandan genocide” (likewise with the “Bosnian
10
genocide” ), even though these powers had allegedly been
warned about the grave threats facing the country’s Tutsi
minority, and allegedly learned within the first few days of
the event that the Hutu had launched their planned genocide
against the Tutsi, has served an important role in justifying
U.S. and Western allies’ power-projection in Africa and
elsewhere.
This is one of the most frequently recurring and widely
accepted truths in the standard model of what happened in
Rwanda in 1994 (and in earlier and later years as well).
Within the Western propaganda system, these truths have
long been institutionalized and insulated from challenge—
and anybody who tries to challenge them, no matter how
seriously, and with how much evidence to the contrary, is
dismissed as a “genocide denier.” But, to a remarkable
degree, the truths embodied in this model are untrue and
often the inverse of the truth, attributing villainy to the
victims of the events of 1994, and making the real villains
into heroes and saviors and, now, elder statesmen.
 The extent to which the Western propaganda system
bends in favor of anyone whose actions serve Western—
especially U.S.—geopolitical interests is captured in this set
of facts: That Paul Kagame twice has won elections in
Rwanda, with 95 percent of the reported vote in 2003, and
93 percent in 2010, although the Tutsi population of Rwanda
which he Rwanda: Background and context allegedly saved
from Hutu killers is only some 10 percent of the total, and
the Hutu population which he at the same time conquered
comprise close to 90 percent (with Twa making up the rest).
Disappearances, assassinations, and extended prison
sentences for opposition political figures and journalists, and
the banning of opposition political parties, have been regular
features of a 20-year-long Kagame-Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF11) “regime consolidation” and the ascendency of
Kagame Power.12 Were U.S. targets such as Russia’s
President Vladimir Putin or Venezuela’s late President Hugo
Chavez or any number of successive Iranian presidents ever
to have been awarded 93 or 95 percent of the reported votes
in an election, the establishment U.S. media would have
devoted huge, angry, and sarcastic denunciations to such a
display of electoral corruption, and rejected and
delegitimized the outcomes. But Kagame’s flagrantly corrupt
victories and the brutal means his RPF has employed to
guarantee them have hardly caused a dent in his recognition
as a respectable and legitimate leader. He has been
described as the “Abraham Lincoln” of a new and
emancipated Africa,13 and a “model for the rest of Africa and
the World.”14 Western celebrities flock to visit with him and
like to appear with him in public. And he is regularly feted at
public events as a cosmopolitan man of great wisdom and a
defender of human rights, as when in late September 2013,
he appeared on stage with Elie Wiesel at Cooper Union in
New York City,15 or when in late April 2014, he appeared at
the Milken Institute Global Conference in Los Angeles, and
shared the stage with Tony Blair.16
Let us first briefly review some relevant events in
Rwandan history prior to the 1990s, and then turn a critical
eye towards the major lies that have underpinned and
sustained the twentieth anniversary memorial circus of the
“Rwandan genocide.”

1. Rwanda: Background and

context
“The 1990s began with a great surge of hope,” the
Human Development Report for 1991 opened. “Democracy
swept across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The
Berlin Wall came down. Germany was reunited. One-party
systems were on the retreat in Africa. A new era of human
rights seemed to be dawning.”17
Leaving aside this report’s blindly optimistic and even
millenarian tone, for the tiny (slightly smaller than
Massachusetts) central African country of Rwanda, the 1990s
began on October 1, 1990, when an armed group of between
2,000 and 4,000 Tutsi members of the Ugandan People’s
Defense Force, calling themselves the Rwandan Patriotic
Front, invaded northern Rwanda, launching what would
become a 46 month war against the government in Kigali,
and culminating in the massive bloodshed and losses of lives
of the April - July, 1994 period.
The RPF was founded in Kampala, Uganda, in late 1987,
when the leaders of an earlier organization of Tutsi exiles
from Rwanda, called the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity,
decided to rename and reorient the organization’s public
profile in an attempt to appeal to a larger base of supporters.
Gone was the earlier Marxist revolutionary edge. Instead,
they issued a practical Eight Point Plan, and reiterated the
right of return of all Tutsi refugees whose families had been
fleeing Rwanda since the 1960s, after the Hutu revolution of
1959-1961 overthrew the last Tutsi king,18 abolished the
monarchy, and, most important, established majority Hutu
rule.
Rwanda had been a kingdom since the 14th century, and
remained one even during the period of first German (1890-
1916) and then Belgian (1916-1962) colonial rule. The
territory in central Africa east of Lake Kivu that would
become the Kingdom of Rwanda was settled sometime prior
to the 1300s by groups of Bantu language-speakers later
known as Kinyarwanda. Of these Kinyarwanda speakers, two
groups emerged: A small group of aboriginal pigmies known
as Twa, and a large group of Banyarwandans. Throughout the
nearly 600 year history of the Kingdom, a class structure
developed such that if a Banyarwandan person was
privileged within the society, this person came to be
identified as “Tutsi;” conversely, if a Banyarwandan person
was non-privileged and socially subordinated to the “Tutsi,”
this person came to be identified as a “Hutu.” The “ethnic”
patina on this fundamental division of social identities
became increasingly polarized from the second-half of the
19th Century on;19 with the layers of many generations now
built-up upon it, it survives till this day, more rigid than ever.
And because the Kingdom was highly stratified—indeed, this
feature of the Kingdom was exacerbated and exploited under
both German and Belgian colonial rule—it was the Belgian
authorities, after all, that in the 1930s created the notorious
practice of issuing “ethnic” identity cards—there were fewer
persons at the top who enjoyed political and economic
power, and many more non-privileged persons below them
who did not. Mahmood Mamdani sums-up the meaning of
“Tutsi” and “Hutu” quite nicely: “To be a Tutsi was thus to be
in power, near power, or simply to be identified with power—
just as to be a Hutu was more and more to be a subject.”20
Hence, the conflicts and struggles between the “Tutsi”
minority and the “Hutu” majority that remain absolutely
central to Rwandan history, as well as to the histories of
neighboring Burundi, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Tanzania.
After the Second World War, the Kingdom of Rwanda was
not only a Belgian colony, it also became a Trust Territory of
the United Nations. (Just as the Kingdom had been a
mandate of the League of Nations up till this time.) In the
postwar period, this meant one thing above all else: Sooner
or later, independence from colonial rule would come to the
Kingdom. But in the 1950s, this meant something else as
well: Social organizing on the part of the Hutu majority, the
creation of the first political parties in the country’s history,
and pressures for democratization and open political
competition. In 1957, nine Hutu intellectuals published the
Hutu Manifesto. “The problem is above all a problem of
political monopoly which is held by one race, the Tutsi,” the
Manifesto stated, strangely treating a longstanding class
conflict within the Kingdom’s social order (“Tutsi” v. “Hutu”)
not only as an “ethnic” conflict, but as a “racial” one.
“[G]iven the totality of current structures, [this political
monopoly] becomes an economic and social monopoly….
[And] given the de facto discrimination in education, [it]
ends up being a cultural monopoly. To the great despair of
the Hutu who see themselves condemned to remain forever
manual laborers or worse…..”21
By late 1959, a major Hutu liberation movement was
underway, fueled by the proliferation of the new, alternative
Hutu-run media and new Hutu political parties that had
formed, most notably Grégoire Kayibanda’s Party of the
Movement and of Hutu Emancipation (PARMEHUTU).
“Rwanda was a simmering cauldron,” Catharine Newbury
writes.22 In Rwanda then as much as today, with 83 percent
of the population identifying themselves as “Hutu,” and 16.5
percent as “Tutsi,” democratization in turn meant that the
“explosive potential of ethnic voting blocks in direct popular
elections could not be ignored.”23 When acts of Tutsi-on-Hutu
and Hutu-on-Tutsi political violence began in late 1959, the
Belgian authorities responded in a way that they had never
done before: Now, the Belgians sided with the Hutu. Gérard
Prunier quotes the Belgian Colonel Guy Logiest, who had
been sent to Rwanda to oversee the eventual transition of
power: “Some among my assistants thought I was wrong in
being so partial against the Tutsi,” Logiest wrote in his
memoir. “Today, twenty-five years later, I ask myself what
was it that made me act with such resolution. It was without
doubt the will to give the people back their dignity.”24
By “people,” Logiest meant “Hutu people.” Acts of
interethnic violence escalated rapidly, in particular, Hutu
attacks on Tutsi settlements. Decades- and sometimes
centuries-old Tutsi privileges were suddenly being
overturned and taken away. The Tutsi exodus from Rwanda
began in 1960. Communal elections were held in June and
July. Out of 229 communes, Hutu candidates won 211 of
them.25 Then in January 1961, at a large meeting of Hutu
burgomasters in Gitarama city, at which both Logiest and
Kayibanda were also present, the Kingdom of Rwanda was
dissolved (the so-called “Coup d’État de Gitarama”), and the
Republic of Rwanda proclaimed in its place. In September,
amid ongoing political violence, elections were held for the
national legislature. The PARMEHUTU received 78 percent of
the vote, while a Tutsi party, the Rwandese National Union,
received 17 percent, the outcome more or less reflecting the
ethnic composition of Rwanda at the time. (Recall that in our
day, Tutsi leader Paul Kagame twice has won presidential
elections with more than 90 percent of the reported vote.)
The national legislature belonged to the Hutu majority. There
followed Grégoire Kayibanda’s election to the presidency in
October—another major Hutu victory. (Kayibanda would be
overthrown by the Hutu General Juvénal Habyarimana in the
so-called bloodless coup of July 5, 1973; later, he and his
wife were literally starved to death by the Habyarimana
regime.26) Rwanda’s independence from Belgian rule was
finally declared on July 1, 1962.27 A Hutu-dominated Rwanda
had been born, with Belgium acting as the midwife to this
newly independent country.

The Tutsi exodus from Rwanda continued throughout the

1960s, largely to Burundi, but also in lesser numbers to
Uganda, Zaire, and Tanzania, and to Belgium, France,
Canada, and the United States. So did armed Tutsi guerrilla
attacks on Rwanda from southern Uganda by fighters who
called themselves Inyenzi (“cockroaches”) because they
were active at night but disappeared with the daylight. Such
attacks provoked additional backlashes against the Tutsi who
still remained in Rwanda, causing more to flee the country.
By 1967, around 70,000 Tutsi exiles had settled in Uganda,
and some 118,000 by 1985.28 Among these exile-refugees
were the families of many of the Tutsi who, from October 1,
1990 on, took-up arms in Uganda and invaded Rwanda,
precipitating the devastating war of 1990-1994.
One year after the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin was
overthrown in 1979, Milton Obote, whose first presidency
had been overthrown by Amin in 1971, won a new election
and assumed the presidency for a second time. Within weeks
of Obote’s December 1980 victory, Uganda’s former defense
minister, Yoweri Museveni, along with 26 others, launched a
guerrilla war against the Obote regime. Eventually calling
themselves the National Resistance Army (NRA), two of
Museveni’s closest comrades in this campaign had been very
young boys when their families fled Rwanda in the early
1960s, and had first fought under Museveni in 1978-1979, as
part of the effort to drive Amin from power: Fred Rwigyema
and Paul Kagame. “Persecution drove many young
Banyarwanda into the NRA, the insurgent force led by
Museveni,” Catharine Watson has written. “By 1984,
Banyarwanda were probably the third largest group in the
NRA….More joined, many of them refugees, when the NRA
occupied western Uganda in November 1984….When the
NRA captured Kampala on January 26, 1986, it had 14,000
men, an estimated 2,000 – 3,000 of whom were
Banyarwanda.”29
Rwigyema, a highly respected military leader who at one
point had risen to the rank of army chief of staff under
Museveni, before an anti-Tutsi backlash in Uganda impelled
Museveni to demote him in 1989, led the RPF’s October 1990
invasion of Rwanda, where he died of a gunshot wound to
the head on only the second day.
But Kagame’s fortunes have followed the opposite
trajectory. Like Rwigyema, Kagame flourished under
Museveni, eventually becoming Uganda’s director of military
intelligence until he, too, was demoted in 1989. When the
RPF invaded Rwanda, Kagame was taking a one-year military
science course at the United States Army Command and
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and when he
learned of Rwigyema’s death several days after the event,
he withdrew from the course and made his way back to the
RPF in the field, where he assumed command of a badly
beaten guerrilla campaign on the verge of collapsing.30
What is more, the Tutsi members of the NRA who later
became members of the RPF even while, remarkably, they
had remained within the Ugandan People’s Defense Force,
and retained Museveni’s full support,31 always understood
that their years of service under Museveni were training and
preparation for their real mission: The recapture of Rwanda
from its Hutu majority, to whom their Tutsi elders had lost
control of the country during the 1959-1961 revolution. As
the onetime RPF Secretary-General and Kagame loyalist Tito
Rutaremara explained: “All during the 1960s and 70s, there
was this vague idea to go back, but no strategy, no
leaders….We decided [from 1987 on] we’d have to fight the
dictatorship. Fighting to go back was the only way. If you
negotiated with the dictatorship and then go back, they
would put you in prison or worse. No, we have to remove the
dictatorship in Rwanda. Only through that can we have
peace.”32
By “we,” Rutaremara meant “Tutsi.” From then on, this
has been both the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s and Paul
Kagame’s conscious reason-for-being. And though in their
official statements, the RPF was always careful to prioritize
the right of return of the Tutsi refugees, and not to mention
the overthrowing of the Hutu majority regime, which they
believe stole the country from its rightful owners back in
1959-1961, when the Habyarimana government in Kigali
began to take steps to address the Tutsi refugee problem
from 1988 on,33 for the RPF, this was the final straw: The RPF
had to attack now and pre-emptively to recapture the
country, before Habyarimana could remove from the RPF’s
propaganda arsenal the right-of-return objection to his
regime.
A critical feature of the years 1990 through the large-
scale killing in Rwanda in 1994 was the U.S. and allied
support of Kagame. This extended from training him and
implicitly sanctioning the RPF’s 1990 invasion and
subsequent guerilla war in Rwanda, to protecting him from
any UN sanctions and later, in 1994, sponsoring a Tribunal
that would serve his plans for anti-Hutu vengeance and pro-
RPF dictatorship propaganda. In addition, the United States
and its allies worked hard in the early 1990s to weaken the
Habyarimana government, forcing the abandonment of
many of the economic and social gains from the 1959
revolution, undermining Habyarimana’s popularity and
helping to reinforce the Tutsi minority’s economic power.
Eventually, the RPF was able to achieve a legal military
presence inside Rwanda thanks to a series of ceasefires and
other agreements that led to the final Peace Agreement
signed by the Rwandan government and the RPF in Arusha,
Tanzania, on August 4, 1993.34
 Pressed upon the Rwandan government by the United
States and Britain, the Arusha Accords called for the creation
of a power-sharing, Broad-Based Transitional Government
until national elections could be held in 1995 (i.e., within 22
months of the signing of the final Peace Agreement), the
repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally
displaced persons, the “integration” of the armed forces of
Rwanda and the RPF, and the introduction of a Neutral
International Force to provide security during the transition
period, among other terms. Under the “Integration of the
Armed Forces” agreement reached on the final day of
negotiations, the new Rwandan military’s chain of command
was to be divided evenly (fifty-fifty) between government
forces and the RPF, with alternation between the two at
specific dates; for lower ranking forces, the government
would supply 60 percent of the personnel, and the RPF 40
percent.35 As the Canadian Rwanda analyst Robin Philpot
notes, with terms such as these, the Accords gave the
invading RPF “much more power than the people would ever
give it in free elections,” with the result that that country’s
entire civil service disintegrated between September 1993
and April 1994.36 In short, the Arusha Accords positioned the
RPF for its imminent and bloody overthrow of a relatively
democratic coalition government and the takeover of the
Rwandan state by an unelected Tutsi minority dictatorship.
It is also of relevance to developments in Rwanda that on
October 21, 1993, in Burundi, Rwanda’s southern neighbor
and a country with roughly the same ethnic composition as
Rwanda (90 percent Hutu, 10 percent Tutsi), Burundi’s
almost exclusively Tutsi military leadership assassinated
President Melchior Ndadaye, and retook control of the state.
Burundi’s first-ever Hutu president, Ndadaye had been
democratically elected less than five months before, on June
1, with some 65 percent of the reported vote. In the
parliamentary elections that followed on June 29, his party,
Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), had gone
on to receive 71.4 percent of the votes, and captured 65 out
of 81 total seats.37 In Burundi, free elections in 1993 had
enabled the country’s Hutu majority to assert itself and win
majority representation.
The news of Ndadaye’s death triggered a massive
bloodbath over the next several weeks in which perhaps as
many as 50,000 people perished, with both Hutu on Tutsi
massacres and the Tutsi military’s massacres of Hutu.
Perhaps as many as 580,000 Burundians fled the country
during the first few weeks, with another 1,000,000 people
internally displaced by the conflict; by March 1994, 260,000
of these mostly Hutu refugees remained in Rwanda.38 At the
time of this coup, in late 1993, there already were some
350,000 people still internally displaced in Rwanda as a
result of the RPF’s major military offensive of January and
February that year;39 the new inflow of refugees from
Burundi further destabilized conditions there. In the words of
a cable sent out widely from the U.S. Embassy in Kigali,
everyone had gained a greater “understanding of the
intimate link between what happens in Burundi and the
security situation in Rwanda.”40
The full impact of the Burundian coup was felt not only
materially, but psychologically as well. And not just inside
Burundi. René Lemarchand, a French-American expert on
Africa’s Great Lakes region, traces the links between Burundi
and Rwanda even further back, to the massacre (though
Lemarchand prefers the term ‘genocide’) of perhaps 200,000
Hutu in Burundi by the country’s ruling Tutsi party in 1972.
Lemarchand quotes a Rwandan Hutu clergyman, who in late
1993, told him: “When we told [Rwanda’s Hutu youth] not to
spill blood [in the aftermath of the assassination of Ndadaye
on October 21], they said, ‘Look, since 1972 it is our blood
that’s being spilled! Now we hear that President Ndadaye
has been killed. If they did that, that means that we are
next!’”41
 By “they,” Rwanda’s Hutu youth meant the “Tutsi”
minority of both Burundi—and, of course, the RPF. In his
memoir of the year that he spent as the force commander of
UNAMIR, Roméo Dallaire notes the “contrast” that he himself
experienced “between the almost sunny optimism of Kigali in
August and the somber capital I returned to on October
22,”42 the day after the coup. Although the coup was
reversed and several of its principals fled to Kampala, where
they stayed “as well-received guests of RPF circles between
late October 1993 and early February 1994,”43 a confidential
State Department assessment of the situation warned that
the “violence could spread….The failed coup heightens
ethnic enmity in Rwanda….Rwandan Hutu, who fear a Tutsi
takeover, and Tutsi, who fear being victims of a bloodbath by
the majority, are riveted on events in Burundi.” The
assessment added that “The failed coup….makes
implementation of the peace settlement in neighboring
Rwanda more questionable….”44
In fact, for reasons we discuss in the sections that follow,
implementation of the Arusha Accords largely never
occurred, but one exception does stand out. In Article 72 of
the Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the
Two Parties, we read that “In order to participate in catering
for the security of its personalities, the RPF shall bring to
Kigali a security unit whose size is equivalent of one (1)
Infantry Battalion of six hundred people.”45 With these terms
in mind, Dallaire’s description of operation “Clean Corridor,”
UNAMIR’s securing a “safe spot” for the RPF’s military and
political personnel to live when they arrived in Kigali in late
December 1993, is very revealing. Out of the four possible
locations that Dallaire recommended, the “worst” option was
chosen: The National Council for Development (CND). The
CND is a complex of buildings in Kigali that includes the
Rwandan National Assembly building, a hotel complex
(where the RPF would set up its base), and a convention
center. “Imagine,” Dallaire writes, “a rebel organization
being given control of the East and West blocks on
Parliament Hill, or a portion of the Capitol complex in
Washington. The appearance was all wrong.” Later, Dallaire
continues: “Once the RPF began digging in, they never
stopped for the next four months….By the time the war
resumed in April, they had built an underground complex
under the CND. It was clear that while the peace process was
progressing, they were also prepared for the alternative.”46
As usual, Dallaire either misses or deliberately
suppresses the real lesson of the information he conveys.
The RPF was never interested in the “peace process”—it
was, however, wholly committed to the “alternative.” And it
would permit nothing to stand in the way of completing its
mission.

2. The RPF invasion and low-

level aggressive war that
never was a “civil war”
When Roméo Dallaire was sent to Rwanda in August
1993 on a reconnaissance mission to learn what a UN
peacekeeping force would need to help implement the
Arusha Accords, his team assessed the capabilities of both
the FAR [Forces Armées Rwandaises, Rwanda’s national
army] and the RPF. Dallaire’s report back to the UN was
striking. “The RPF victory, in its last offensive [February
1993], has adversely affected the morale of the [FAR],” he
wrote. “The general standard of [FAR] training…is low…
Soldiers possess only basic military skills of varying
standards… A large number of weapons were stolen or lost
during the war… The organization must be rebuilt.”47
But whereas Dallaire concluded that FAR’s overall
capability was “medium to low,” not so the RPF’s. The RPF
had “approximately 20,000 armed soldiers,” he wrote. (By
April 1994, their numbers would be greater.) The RPF had a
“very high morale and discipline. They are a young army
(average age estimated at 16 years with most field
commanders under 30). Their leadership is respected by
their men….[A] very effective training system.” The RPF is a
“well led, effective, disciplined force,” Dallaire summed-up
his assessment. Most strikingly, he concluded that “They
displayed the potential to easily defeat the [FAR].”48
The rapid victory of Kagame’s RPF after the
assassination of Habyarimana marked the final offensive in
their 46-month-war to take over Rwanda.49 But the RPF’s
aggression was never condemned by the United States or
addressed as such by the Security Council. Moreover, it was
followed by a series of U.S. and British moves that helped
the aggressor penetrate the Rwandan government and
military (the essence of the Arusha Accords), infiltrate armed
cells into Kigali and elsewhere,50 and eventually place an
oversized and well-equipped security battalion on the
grounds of the National Council for Development complex in
Kigali, with between 4,000 and 6,000 armed fighters in Kigali
alone—all in preparation for ongoing guerrilla strikes and, of
course, the final assault.
In fact, following the April 6, 1994 shooting down of
Habyiramana’s jet, the RPF was able to expand the territory
it controlled at a prodigious pace, doubling its size within 24
hours.51 Within two weeks, the RPF controlled the
northeastern-third of Rwanda. “[T]he [FAR] troops were
running for their lives,” is how Dallaire describes the FAR’s
response to the RPF’s offensive.52 By May 25, the RPF
controlled one-half of Rwanda, and had Kigali encircled from
without and subverted from within. By early July, the RPF
controlled two-thirds of Rwanda, including Kigali. And by July
18—the date on which the RPF declared victory—it controlled
all of Rwanda (with the exception of the far southwest, which
the French forces of Operation Turquoise had occupied and
would control until their departure in late August).
Meanwhile, back in Kigali, the Rwandan government and
its various forces were in complete disarray at the time of
Habyarimana’s death. In a state of crisis and chaos, an
interim government was formed on April 9, after the killings
had already begun; the interim government would flee Kigali
within a week for the city of Gitarama, never to return. On
the military side, Dallaire’s summary of his intelligence
officer Amadou Deme’s mid-April assessment of the FAR’s
own chaotic state is revealing. FAR “troops were receiving
very little tactical information or direction at the front;
soldiers were deserting….Some troops wanted peace….[A]
rift was starting between some military units and the
Interahamwe. As anticipated, the [FAR] front-line troops and
recruits, undisciplined and disorganized, would not put up
much of a fight.”53 Throughout the months of April, May, and
June, the interim government’s representative at the United
Nations pled for UNAMIR to be strengthened, and the FAR
made one ceasefire offer after another to the RPF. But clearly
winning the military struggle, the RPF consistently rejected
both options.
That is to say, this armed conflict was never a “civil
war,” never an indigenous Tutsi rebellion against the
repression and discrimination of Rwanda’s ethnic minority by
its post-1959-1961 Revolution’s Hutu majority. On the
contrary, it was a foreign invasion of Rwanda, led by young
Rwandan and Ugandan Tutsi members of the Ugandan
People’s Defense Force (formerly the Ugandan National
Resistance Army), which by 1987, had reconfigured
themselves as the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
It is, therefore, quite revealing to find how the two ad
hoc tribunals created by the Security Council in 1993 and
1994—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia(ICTY)54 and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR)55—interpret the nature of the armed conflicts
with which they have dealt. In the first indictment ever
issued by the ICTR, drafted by Richard Goldstone against
eight Hutu in 1995, Goldstone stated matter-of-factly: “At all
times relevant to this indictment, there was an internal
armed conflict occurring within Rwanda.”56 The same line
has been repeated in one form or another ever since. For
example, in the October 1997 indictment of Jean Kambanda,
the acting prime minister of Rwanda’s interim government
from April 9, 1994 until he fled the country in July: “During
the said events, there was a non-international armed conflict
in the territory of Rwanda.”57 And in the December 1999
amended indictment of Col. Théoneste Bagosora: “During
the events referred to in this indictment, a state of non-
international conflict existed in Rwanda.”58 In short, although
the 46 month armed conflict within Rwanda resulted from
the Ugandan People’s Defense Force-Rwandan Patriotic Front
(UPDF-RPF) cross-border invasion and occupation of the
country, official history via the ICTR and the advocates for
the standard model systematically define the conflict as a
civil war, rather than as an international war, and most
certainly not as an act of naked aggression (in contrast,
recall U.S. President George H.W. Bush’s condemnation of
Iraq’s “naked aggression” against Kuwait only two months
earlier59).—Why not?
We believe that the ICTR here is showing the kind of
political imperatives under which it operates. Since the
invasion of another country is a violation of the UN Charter
as well as illegal under customary international law, for the
ICTR to define the Rwandan conflict as an international one
would have placed one party to the conflict, the UPDF-RPF,
on the wrong side of international law, and not only during
1994, but from the October 1, 1990 date of the invasion.
However, since the ICTR was established on the “victor’s
justice” model both to immunize the U.S. client-UPDF-RPF
and to prosecute their Hutu victims exclusively, defining the
conflict as an international one could never be permitted:
Unlike Iraq’s “naked aggression” against Kuwait, the UPDF-
RPF’s aggression against Rwanda must remain non-
international—a civil war or simply a military operation to
stop the “genocide.” The United States and Britain couldn’t
publicly support an illegal war, even if they supported it
wholeheartedly and covertly; but they could support one
side in a civil war that is alleged to be fighting to prevent the
other side from committing genocide against its ethnic
brethren. And as the revisionists-before-the-fact who made
up the International Fact-Finding Commission (Alison Des
Forges, William Schabas, et al.) had as early as March 1993
already begun to frame Rwanda’s “head of state and…his
immediate entourage, including members of his family” with
accusations of “genocide,”60 there was no doubting who
were the good guys in this armed conflict, and who the
bad.61
In the case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY), on the other hand, there was a civil war in 1991, with
the ethnic groups in the SFRY’s six republics in conflict over
whether to remain within the SFRY or to break-away from it.
Then, by the historical engineering of the European
Commission, a ruling was announced on November 20, 1991
to the effect that the “Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia [was] in the process of dissolution,”62 thus
prejudging the outcome of this civil war in favor of the ethnic
majorities in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Macedonia to withdraw these four republics from the SFRY.
This was exactly what the Western powers wanted, and
recognition of the newly independent states soon followed.
But as the republics of Serbia and Montenegro as well as the
vast majority of ethnic Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina opposed this outcome, Serbs became the bad
guys. In this way, an ongoing civil war that had not been
resolved (and would not be resolved until the Dayton
Accords in late 1995) was legalistically transformed into an
international armed conflict, framed as the “result of a plan
conceived in Belgrade,” with Serbs aggressing (or
committing “naked aggression”) against Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.63 Indeed, in the first trial ever conducted at the
ICTY, that of a Bosnian Serb named Dusko Tadić, who was
accused of murder and rape at a detention facility in
Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the prosecution devoted
months to arguing the international nature of the Yugoslav
wars.64
In both cases, U.S. and U.K. foreign policy objectives
were advanced. (And in the case of the SFRY, European and
NATO objectives were as well). When the Great Powers
define a conflict as international (the SFRY), it is not only an
“international” conflict, but an “aggressive” war, and they
can take actions about it, and try to use Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and the Security Council to put the UN’s stamp of
approval on their actions. (At the time, and in contrast to the
crises in Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq today, Boris Yeltsin’s Russia
was a nonfactor in the Security Council, and a rubber-stamp
for the United States.) Conversely, when the Great Powers
define a conflict as non-international (Rwanda), it is a “civil
war,” and they can shield this conflict from sanction under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, though they may interfere
with and promote one side of it as they please. Thus does
revisionism-before-the-fact serve the Great Powers.
Kagame’s RPF has been on a tear across the Great Lakes
region of central Africa ever since.

3. “Hutu Power extremists”

did not shoot-down
Habyarimana’s Falcon 50 jet
The assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal
Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira
by the shooting-down of the former’s Falcon 50 jet as it
approached Kanombe International Airport on April 6, 1994 is
widely regarded as the “triggering event” for the mass
killings that followed. Michael Dobbs in his New York Times
op-ed noted that the shoot-down was the “immediate
trigger,”65 but, strangely enough, he failed to say who pulled
the trigger. In the standard model of the “Rwandan
genocide”—the model accepted in Western capitals, by the
Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTR, and in the field of
Genocide Studies—the assassination was carried out by
high-level “Hutu Power extremists,” “desperate members” of
Habyarimana’s “own akazu circle,” as Gérard Prunier put it
back in 1995, “who had decided to gamble on their all-or-
nothing ‘final solution’ scheme when they began to fear (or
perhaps to know) that the President was finally going to
comply with the provisions of the Arusha agreement.”66 (As
if compliance with the terms of Arusha would not be far more
threatening to RPF power!) When it was created by UN
Security Council Resolution 955 in late 1994, the ICTR was
charged with (among other things) “prosecuting persons
responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and…neighboring States, between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994…”67
Since the shooting-down of the presidential jet was a
serious crime, and one with grave consequences far
exceeding the event itself, it clearly falls within the ICTR’s
mandate. The late Australian lawyer Michael Hourigan, who
led the “National Team” of roughly 20 investigators for the
Office of the Prosecutor in 1996 and 1997, stated in a 2007
affidavit that the tribunal’s original Chief Prosecutor Richard
Goldstone had instructed his Team to “Identify the person(s)
responsible for the fatal rocket attack on 6 April 1994 killing
President Habyarimana and all others on board.”68 This was
sometime in the spring of 1996.
 The Canadian jurist Louise Arbour succeeded Goldstone
as chief prosecutor at the ICTR (as well as at the Yugoslavia
Tribunal) in October 1996. By early 1997, Hourigan’s Team
had been able to find three members of Kagame’s RPF who
volunteered information they deemed credible that it was
Kagame who ordered the shoot-down of the jet. Hourigan
communicated this to Arbour. “At no time did she suggest
that our investigation was improper,” his affidavit states.
Ordered to fly to The Hague and meet with Arbour, Hourigan
presented her with his evidence, a memo titled “Secret
National Team Inquiry—Internal Memorandum.” To his shock
and surprise, Arbour became “aggressive” and skeptical
toward his findings. She then instructed him that he was to
terminate the investigation, and told him that the ICTR’s
“mandate only extended to events within the genocide,
which in her view began ‘after’ the plane crash.” “I was
astounded at this statement,” Hourigan’s affidavit recounts.
Thus was the “triggering event” ruled outside the ICTR’s
mandate, not by a decision of the court itself, but by the fiat
of its chief prosecutor, who both here and in her work at the
ICTY showed great responsiveness to U.S. policy interests.
Hourigan’s memo was confiscated—and has remained buried
ever since. He returned to Kigali and resigned. Never again
has the ICTR investigated the “triggering event.”69
There is other evidence of Kagame-RPF responsibility for
the shoot-down—and for U.S., British, Belgian, and Canadian
roles in the event, and in the longstanding cover-up. French
anti-terrorism Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière’s detailed
investigation on behalf of family members of the jet’s crew
came to the same conclusion as Hourigan, and led to his
issuance of arrest warrants in November 2006 for nine
members of the RPF, figures he accused of engaging in a
“plot to physically eliminate the incumbent Rwandan
President.”70 The “consistent line of testimony” was that the
political situation was “not favorable to the hegemonic plans
of Paul Kagame,” so that his only solution was to assassinate
Habyarimana and resume the war—exactly what did happen
in Rwanda, April-July, 1994. As the Bruguière report puts it:
“[D]ue to the numerical inferiority of the Tutsi electorate, the
political balance of power did not allow [Kagame] to win
elections on the basis of the political process set forth by the
Arusha Agreements without the support of the opposition
parties….[I]n Paul Kagame’s mind, the physical elimination of
President Habyarimana became imperative as early as
October 1993 as the sole way of achieving his political
aims.”71
Like Hourigan’s, Bruguière’s findings were built out of
evidence provided by multiple defectors from the RPF, whose
legions keep growing in number every year.72 Many of these
exiles from Kagame Power once held very high positions and
were close to Kagame. With his penchant for political
assassinations, particularly anyone with knowledge of his
role in ordering the shoot-down of the Habyarimana jet, they
live in constant fear for their lives.
One of them, the late Lieut. Abdul Ruzibiza, testified
before Bruguière that “in February 1994 he formed part of
the unit which was infiltrated in Kigali and which had the
mission of carrying out reconnaissance of the Masaka-
Kanombe sector,”73 the area around the airport, in order to
determine the best site from which to target the
Habyarimana jet. Another, Sergeant Aloys Ruyenzi, testified
that “as a member of the personal guard of Paul Kagame, he
was in the meeting room at Mulindi headquarters on 31
March 1994, during a meeting between Paul Kagame and
officers James Karabebe, Jacob Tumwine, Charles Karamba,
Kayumba Nyamwasa and Théoneste Lizinde. According to his
version of events, the meeting was held to plan the
operational details of President Habyarimana’s
assassination.”
This section of the Bruguière report continues:
 [Ruyenzi] added that Paul Kagame stated “as soon as
President Habyarimana leaves the Arusha meeting and his
aircraft is approaching, fire on him. This war will not end until
President Habyarimana is dead;”
Aloys Ruyenzi also claimed to have witnessed the
delivery of two missiles to four soldiers who loaded them into
a vehicle forming part of a convoy escorted by the UNAMIR
which was destined for the C.N.D. in Kigali [i.e., site of the
RPF headquarters in Kigali];
He added that Deputy-Lieutenant Frank Nziza and
Corporal Eric Hakizamana were inside the vehicle and
confided to him at the end of the war that they had
participated in the attack. Eric Hakizamana fired the first
missile which missed its target, Frank Nziza however
succeeded in hitting and destroying the aircraft….74

According to former FBI counter-terrorism agent James

Lyons, who was Commander of Investigations at the ICTR at
the time of the Hourigan investigation, the National Team
obtained information that both UNAMIR as well as FAR
soldiers had intercepted a radio message over an RPF
channel on the evening of April 6 stating that “the target has
been hit.”75
Of the seven RPF figures named by Ruyenzi (excluding
Kagame), Col. Théoneste Lizinde fled Rwanda as early as
1995 and was assassinated in Nairobi in 1996;76 Kayumba
Nyamwasa, once the army’s chief of staff, fled to South
Africa in 2010, and has survived multiple assassination
attempts, one while he was recovering in a hospital from
wounds suffered in the previous attempt.77
That Kagame organized the assassination of
Habyarimana is entirely plausible strategically, as he could
never have won the free election that was scheduled to be
held within 22 months after the Arusha Accords and the
formation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, a
move that Habyarimana was ready to implement. The
immediacy with which RPF forces mobilized when news of
the shoot-down reached their headquarters in Mulindi, and
the complete disorder affecting the FAR at the same time,
also contradict the standard model. As Theogene
Rudasingwa, Kagame’s one-time chief of staff, now living in
exile, recalls a briefing he received from Kagame after the
shoot-down: “[The] RPF was to explain to the international
community how the Hutu extremists opposed to the Arusha
peace Agreement were responsible for the shooting down of
the plane, and had already started killing Tutsi and Hutu
opposition politicians. According to this narrative, the
government side had broken the ceasefire, and the RPF was
resuming hostilities 1) to stop the killings and 2) to restore
law and order.”78 In the words of another notorious liar: “If
you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will
eventually come to believe it.”
It is amusing to watch the leading proponents of the
standard model struggle on this issue, regularly pretending
that the ICTR-Hourigan investigation and subsequent ICTR
avoidance of this key issue never happened. Gerald Caplan,
a veteran Canadian advocate for the Hutu “conspiracy to
commit genocide” model as well as for Paul Kagame’s and
the RPF’s positive image around the world, was the principal
author of the Organization of African Unity’s 2000 report
Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide.79 Although the OAU
instructed the panel in charge of this inquiry to investigate
“The killing of President Habyarimana of Rwanda on 6 April
1994,”80 the panel punted: Never once in its report does the
panel name who it believed was responsible for the
assassination, although it mentions the event numerous
times. “[W]ildly conflicting stories and accusations about the
possible perpetrators have swirled ever since,” the report
states. “The truth is that to this day, this historic event is
shrouded in conflicting rumors and accusations but no hard
evidence. Mysteriously enough, a formal investigation of the
crash has never been carried out, and this Panel has had no
capacity to launch one.”81 In the end, the OAU inquiry
recommended that the “OAU should ask the International
Commission of Jurists to initiate an independent
investigation” into the matter.82
Yet, when acting in his personal capacity as apologist for
Kagame and the RPF, Caplan is less reticent: The findings of
the RPF’s own Committee of Experts’ inquiry into the shoot-
down “documents the logic most of us have accepted since
the start. They pin the blame directly and fully on a group of
Hutu extremists who were simply not prepared to accept the
power-sharing provisions of the Arusha Accords.”83 Not
surprisingly, the RPF’s inquiry into the shoot-down
exonerated the RPF and blamed “Hutu extremists.”84 So the
conclusion is “logical” to Caplan.85 As Filip Reyntjens, a
Belgian academic and onetime investigator for the ICTR,
noted in his powerful demolition of the RPF’s self-
exoneration, Caplan is an “RPF supporter” whose
assessment was a “painfully biased and uncritical
endorsement.”86
Linda Melvern, like Caplan, a long-standing advocate for
the standard model who has also written about the shoot-
down, never mentions the ICTR-Hourigan inquiry and its
suppressed findings. Instead, she ponders over the
“continuing secrecy of western nations, the withholding of
evidence and the failure to conduct an international inquiry,”
all of which she calls “shocking.”87 That this could be a result
of specific Western regimes—most notably the United States
and Britain—protecting their own interests as well as that of
their client Paul Kagame, never occurs to her. She searches
for and finds people who say what she wants said—that the
shoot-down was pure Hutu villainy. She even alleges an early
call by Hutu Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)
for action at the time of the assassination, but never
mentions the readiness of the RPF and the extreme
effectiveness of its forces, in contrast with FAR confusion and
ineptitude.
“The international court established by the UN Security
Council to try those responsible for genocide is silent on the
assassination of Habyarimana,” Melvern notes elsewhere, in
an article titled “The Perfect Crime.”88 But as we’ve just
seen, the ICTR did investigate this question, and having
found the evidence disagreeable, its chief prosecutor, after
having consulted the U.S. Embassy, closed it down. “The
event is ruled outside the court’s mandate on the grounds
that the trial judges, in all their rulings, have confirmed the
existence of a planned and systematically organised
conspiracy to commit genocide,” Melvern added, telling one
Big Lie after another. “The court has determined that the
mass killings could not be considered ‘a spontaneous
reaction’ to the assassination of Habyarimana.”
In contrast with Melvern’s oft-repeated lie that all of the
ICTR’s judgments “have confirmed the existence of a
planned and systematically organized conspiracy to commit
genocide” (in fact, the opposite is the case, as we show in
detail below), what makes the shoot-down a “perfect crime”
is that it was carried out in service to the United States by
one of its clients, Paul Kagame’s RPF. Moreover, it is the
Prosecution that refuses to touch the question of
responsibility for the assassination, not because it lies
outside the ICTR’s mandate, but because the Prosecution
knows what the answer would be, and it doesn’t dare run the
risk of permitting this.

4. The “Rwandan genocide”

by the numbers
A universal refrain of the spokespersons for the standard
model states that “Between April and July 1994, hundreds of
thousands of persons, mostly Tutsi and moderate Hutus,
were killed throughout Rwanda.”89
Many conflicting estimates exist as to the number and
ethnic composition of the Rwandans who perished during the
months of April through July, 1994, during which the
“genocide” took place. Also, many factors complicate
reaching a definitive total, not the least of which is that RPF
killings of Hutu continued unabated after the RPF seized
power in July, and we have always suspected that these
post-“genocide” deaths have been pulled backwards in time,
and counted for the April-July period, rather than when they
occurred.
The December 1999 UN Carlsson report for the
Secretary-General stated that “Approximately 800,000
persons were killed during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.”90
In 2004, the Rwandan Ministry of Local Government,
Community Development and Social Affairs estimated
1,074,017 persons had died at the time.91 In 2008, the
Genocide Survivors Students Association of Rwanda
estimated 1,952,08792—and even this total has been
superseded by higher (i.e., even more outlandish) estimates.
A very serious ongoing research project named
GenoDynamics, led by Christian Davenport and Allan Stam of
the University of Michigan’s Political Science Department,
more conservatively estimates that “around 500,000”
persons perished during the April – July 1994 period.93 But
more disturbing to the advocates for the standard model,
these researchers also draw the important conclusion that a
much greater number of Hutu died in Rwanda in 1994 than
Tutsi. To this they add the important point, equally disturbing
to advocates for the standard model, that the higher the
total number of deaths in Rwanda, the greater the disparity
between the relative (greater) number of Hutu and Tutsi
deaths will also turn out to be. Finally, they have been
arguing for at least the past ten years that that spikes in
civilian casualties correlated with surges in RPF advances
during the April – July, 1994 period.94
GenoDynamics estimates that the pre-April 1994 Tutsi
component of the Rwandan population was approximately
500,000 persons. (There are higher estimates in circulation,
of course, including one that we’ve used in the past—
596,387—drawn from Rwanda’s 1991 Census.95)
GenoDynamics then takes an estimate of post-“genocide”
Tutsi survivors of the April – July period from IBUKA
(“Remember”), a Rwanda-based Tutsi survivors umbrella
organization that includes 15 organizations in all. At one time
IBUKA used to claim that the number of Tutsi survivors in
1994 was 300,000 persons; currently, IBUKA claims the
number of Tutsi survivors was “nearer to 400,000.”96 Based
on an estimated range of 500,000 to 600,000 Tutsi members
of Rwanda’s pre-April 1994 population (respectively, the
estimate of GenoDynamics and of the 1991 Census), the
range of Tutsi who perished in 1994 must have fallen
somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000. Virtually every
other Rwandan who perished at the time was Hutu.97
Table 1, column 4, “Hutu Deaths,” depicts the likely
ranges of Hutu deaths in the Rwandan genocide, based on a
range of IBUKA estimates of Tutsi survivors of the April – July
period, and assuming one of four estimates for the total
deaths in Rwanda during the relevant period, introduced
above.

Table 1. Ranges and ethnic compositions of deaths in

the “Rwandan genocide” [1]

Total Deaths Tutsi Tutsi Deaths Hutu Deaths

Survivors
Between Between Between
300,000 and 100,000 and 300,000 and
500,000 400,000 200,000 400,000

Between Between Between

800,000 300,000 and 100,000 and 600,000 and
400,000 200,000 700,000
Between Between Between
1,100,000 300,000 and 100,000 and 900,000 and
400,000 200,000 1,000,000
Between Between Between 1.8
2,000,000 300,000 and 100,000 and and 1.9 million
400,000 200,000

[1] With rounding, based on a Tutsi population in Rwanda of

between approximately 500,000 and 600,000 at the start of
April 1994, and based on a range for Tutsi survivors between
300,000 and 400,000 as of August 1994.

What we see here is that the smaller the total number of

deaths, the greater the percentage comprised of Tutsi.
Conversely, the greater the total number of deaths, the
greater the number of Hutu deaths overall, and the greater
the percentage comprised of Hutu. Based on an estimated
range between 300,000 and 400,000 Tutsi survivors, if
500,000 Rwandans perished during April – July, then
between 100,000 and 200,000 of them were Tutsi, and
between 300,000 and 400,000 were Hutu. (See the second
row.) Similarly, based on outlandish estimates such as that
attributed to the Genocide Survivors Students Association of
Rwanda, if 2 million Rwandans perished during April – July,
then between 100,000 and 200,000 were Tutsi, and between
1.8 and 1.9 million were Hutu. (See the fifth row.) Small
wonder, then, that the most devout advocates for the
standard model denounce Davenport and Stam as “genocide
deniers” at every opportunity, and have named them
persona non grata in Rwanda. As the standard model holds
that it was “mostly Tutsi” who perished in 1994, their work
helps both to debunk and overturn the standard model.
Given that a larger—apparently substantially larger—
death toll was suffered by Hutu, the “Rwandan genocide”
commemorated in April 2014, based on the standard model,
clearly had the most fundamental facts upside-down. But
this, of course, points us to an alternative model for
explaining Rwanda 1994—an alternative centered on a much
different set of facts: That it was the RPF that stood to lose
the most in the national elections called for in the Arusha
Accords, and that the RPF resorted to military conquest of
the country as the only way of guaranteeing that this would
never happen. That it was the RPF that carried out the
assassination of President Habyarimana, the event that
triggered the mass killings. That at that moment, April 6,
1994, shortly before 8:30 PM local time, the RPF alone had
prepared and mobilized its forces, and methodically swept
across the country. That the RPF carried out major organized
killings during the period (as distinct from “wilding”-type kill-
or-be-killed murders and massacres at local levels, which
were rampant and involved Hutu on Tutsi, Tutsi on Hutu,
Hutu on Hutu, and Tutsi on Tutsi killings), a point attested to
by the numbers above. And most telling of all, that in only
104 days, the RPF conquered Rwanda, where it still holds
power today.
If the word genocide is to be applied to Rwanda 1994,
should it not be applied to the principal organized
perpetrators of the events of April-July—Paul Kagame and his
Rwandan Patriotic Front? Should it not be recognized that the
primary victims of his triumph were Hutu, whose earlier
social revolution once led to the flight of many Tutsi, now
triumphantly returned to minority power by the RPF and its
U.S. and U.K. sponsors?
5. The West’s alleged “failure
to intervene”
During the month of April, 2014, permutations of the
theme that the “international community looked away” while
the “Rwandan genocide” took place was as best we can tell
universal among both the political figures who spoke about it
and the reporters and commentators who wrote about it for
the establishment U.S. media. When the Security Council
met on April 16 to discuss “Prevention and fight against
genocide,” Rwanda 1994 took center stage, virtually to the
exclusion of any other mass killing. “As President Clinton has
said many times, the failure of the United States to act
during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is his greatest regret,”
U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power said.98 Speaking on the
same occasion, Rwanda’s Ambassador Eugène-Richard
Gasana thanked UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson
for having “rallied the United Nations system to learn from
its failure in Rwanda in 1994….”99 In one form or another,
speakers at this session of the Security Council made this
point 19 different times.
This widely held belief has also been expressed by the
White House’s National Security Adviser Susan Rice, who
claimed to be so “haunted” by the failure of the Clinton
administration (at which time she was a staff member on its
National Security Council) to intervene to stop the genocide,
she “swore to herself that if [she] ever faced such a crisis
again, [she] would come down on the side of dramatic
action, going down in flames if that was required.”100
Similarly, Samantha Power, back during her days at
Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights, wrote that “The
Rwandan genocide proved to be the fastest, most efficient
killing spree of the twentieth century. In 100 days, some
800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu were murdered.
The United States did almost nothing to try to stop it….[T]he
United States again stood on the sidelines.”101 In its massive
1999 study of these events, Human Rights Watch even used
the phrase “culpable passivity of 1994” to characterize the
response of the “international community.”102
But these are convenient falsehoods, even if repeated
robotically now for 20 years. The fact of the matter is that
the United States supported the RPF in its invasion of
Rwanda from Uganda at least from October 1, 1990 onward;
it trained Kagame, helped cover-up his and the RPF’s serial
crimes, including not only the initial invasion,103 but also
their killings of large numbers of Rwanda civilians over the
next four years, and their shooting-down of Habyarimana’s
jet, the event which triggered the killings of the months that
followed.
Knowing that Kagame’s RPF had acquired military
superiority over the FAR by 1993 if not earlier, the United
States ran diplomatic interference for the RPF throughout
1993-1994, and has done so ever since. This included the
support it gave the RPF as the latter used stalling tactics
during the months leading up to the Habyarimana
assassination, when the Arusha Accords called for power-
sharing and the formation of the so-called Broad Based
Transitional Government, plans that were terminated by the
assassination and the RPF’s military offensive. It also
included support for the RPF’s repeated rejections of
ceasefires with the FAR from the second week after the
assassination onward, when a strictly enforced ceasefire
could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives;104 and
active backing of the RPF’s final declaration that it is
“categorically opposed to the proposed U.N. intervention
force and will not under any circumstances cooperate in its
setting up and operation,”105 the actual policy position
shared by the United States.
As Roméo Dallaire wrote in his memoir:
[T]he Americans put obstacle after obstacle in our way, with
the British playing a coy supportive role. The French backed
UNAMIR 2 but with conditions; the non-aligned countries
were furious at the delays; and the RPF published a
statement to the Security Council that looked very much like
a manifesto against us, arguing that UNAMIR 2 was too late
to stop the killing and could potentially destabilize the RPF’s
struggle for power. In fact, it was not too late; the massacres
would continue for weeks. If I had been a suspicious soul, I
could have drawn a link between the obstructive American
position and the RPF’s refusal to accept a sizeable UNAMIR
2.106

But UNAMIR 1’s force commander didn’t need to be a

“suspicious soul” to draw these links—all that he or anyone
needed is common sense and, crucially, not to be trapped
inside the limited kind of group-think permitted by the
standard model of the “Rwandan genocide.” After all, as
Dallaire acknowledged in his very next sentence: “In the pre-
war period, the U.S. military attaché from the American
embassy was observed going to [RPF headquarters in]
Mulindi on a regular basis.”107 In short, the RPF and the
United States had been reading from the same script from
the very beginning. And though the end was now in sight—
the United States would force Rwanda’s interim government
out of the United Nations by mid-July, and recognize the RPF
as the legitimate government of Rwanda in late July 1994,
within ten days of its declaration of victory over the FAR108—
many innocent Rwandans would die before it was reached.
A State Department memo from September 1994 noted
that the RPF “has engaged in a pattern of systematic killing
of Hutu civilians…,” and that the “purpose of the killing was
a campaign of ethnic cleansing intended to clear certain
areas in the south of Rwanda for Tutsi habitation.” The “[RPF]
and Tutsi civilian surrogates,” the memo added, “had killed
10,000 or more Hutu civilian per month, with the [RPF]
accounting for 95% of the killing.”109 Understandably,
knowledge such as this has been suppressed from 1994
onward. Most important, it has not interfered at all with the
ongoing U.S. support of the Kagame regime, and it has not
haunted Susan Rice or Samantha Power. We believe that all
of the belated regrets and apologies circulating widely
around the date of the twentieth anniversary for an alleged
U.S. or Western or UN “failure” to intervene in 1994 to stop
the “Rwandan genocide” must be recognized for what they
really were: Self-serving, hypocritical lies. The fact of the
matter is that there was not just intervention from1990
onward, but sponsorship and diplomatic and political
protection of the RPF. And this real intervention was in
support of the armed forces driving the real genocide—Paul
Kagame and his RPF as they conquered the country and
advanced perceived U.S. interests.

6. The ICTR delivers victor’s

justice
The ICTR was created by the UN Security Council in
November 1994, only four months after the RPF had won its
victory in Rwanda. It has served several strictly political
objectives since then. But most important to understanding
its operations, the ICTR was established to deliver “victor’s
justice” in relation to the events of 1994, by exclusively
prosecuting the vanquished Hutu and finding them (largely)
guilty of genocide and other major crimes, while shielding
the RPF from prosecution. In so doing, the ICTR has helped
Kagame to consolidate his dictatorial rule in Rwanda.
Moreover, it has helped to justify Kagame’s and his patrons’
invasions and exploitation of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), where the army of the new Rwanda has
allegedly been hunting down the Hutu “génocidaires” of the
old Rwanda, as his forces killed vast numbers from 1995 to
the present.
Proof of the overwhelming political nature of the ICTR
from its inception is provided, first, by the language of the
Security Council Resolution that created this “international
tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons
responsible for genocide….”110 Although the ICTY’s trial and
appeals chambers had to perform legal gymnastics to find
Serbs guilty of genocide in the former Yugoslavia,111 before
the ICTR had even hired a chief prosecutor or a registrar, the
factual truth of the Hutu genocide against Tutsi had been
pronounced as given, negating any presumption of
innocence. Indeed, in a decision handed down in June 2006,
an ICTR appeals chamber ruled that the occurrence of
genocide in Rwanda between April 6 and July 17, 1994 was a
“fact of common knowledge” and therefore beyond
challenge in court; thus the Hutu genocide against the Tutsi
became an “adjudicated fact,” one that could never be
argued before the ICTR again.112 With this decision, the ICTR
placed its seal on the official narrative of victimhood and
villainy in the events of 1990-1994. As one critic responded
sharply: This decision was “designed to prevent the defense
from presenting the overwhelming evidence now developed
that there were many complex reasons for the events in
Rwanda, but genocide is not one of them. The political
purpose is stated outright in the press release when the
Tribunal state[d] that this decision by the Appeals Chamber
should ‘silence the rejectionist camp’.”113
The ICTR’s political nature is also seen in the fact that
100 percent of its 80 or so indictees have been Hutu, even
though its Security Council mandate includes “serious
violations of international and humanitarian law” committed
between January 1 and December 31, 1994.114 In fact, when
the Security Council created the ICTR, the new RPF-led
Rwandan government, which had inherited a seat on the
Council from the interim government it had overthrown, was
the only Council member to vote against the resolution
(China abstained). Among the reasons that Manzi
Bakuramutsa, the new RPF-led Rwanda’s UN ambassador,
gave after the no-vote, the one he stressed was the dates
set for the jurisdiction of the ICTR. “My delegation,”
Bakuramutsa said, “proposed that account be taken of the
period from 1 October 1990, the beginning of the war, to 17
July 1994, the end of the war.”115 Thus the new RPF-led
Rwandan government wanted a tribunal that focused
exclusively on the alleged Hutu genocide against Tutsi as far
back as October 1990, but that cut-off its temporal
jurisdiction in July 1994, immunizing the RPF for its
slaughters of Hutu after it took power. Clearly, his
government’s fears were badly misplaced.
This culture of Tutsi and RPF impunity has remained an
unbreakable rule at the ICTR. Filip Reyntjens, a Belgian
academic and former investigator for the ICTR, recalls a
conversation that he had with the ICTR’s first chief
prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, in July 1996. Reyntjens
“asked Goldstone whether he intended to prosecute RPF
suspects.” Goldstone “answered with irritation that he did
not see the need.” Then Reyntjens “told him that there was
compelling prima facie evidence that the RPF committed
crimes within the Tribunal’s mandate.” Goldstone “replied
that there was no such evidence.”116 The chief prosecutor’s
understanding that RPF crimes do not fall within the ICTR’s
mandate, even though they clearly do, and compelling
evidence of RPF crimes exists, appears to have been
operational from the beginning. And when the possibility of
such prosecutions has been raised—as with Michael
Hourigan’s report to Louise Arbour on RPF responsibility for
shooting-down Habyarimana’s jet—such efforts were
silenced and their authors quickly shown the door.
Another stunning example of the ICTR’s political nature
can be found in its most egregious case of extracting guilty
pleas at a time early in its history when the defendants were
poorly represented and essentially defenseless. Jean
Kambanda had served as prime minister in the interim
government from April 9, 1994, until the interim government
fled the country in July. He was arrested in Nairobi in July
1997, then held for an extended period of time in Dodoma,
Tanzania, rather than at the tribunal’s official detention
facility in Arusha, where the prosecution kept him under
guard, without access to a defense counsel, and visited only
by prosecutors and interrogators. Kambanda claims that
during this period, he was tortured; most certainly he lived a
vulnerable existence under great duress. “The transcript of
Kambanda’s interrogation, based on sixty hours of
interviews, is an extraordinary document,” Linda Melvern
writes, suppressing what really made it extraordinary. “It
gives unprecedented insight into how the genocide was
perpetrated.”117 On the contrary, it gives unprecedented
insight into a prosecution that wanted one of its “Big Fish”
defendants to cop a plea of genocide, no matter what
measures were required to extract it.
Although Kambanda was convicted of “conspiracy to
commit genocide,”118 nowhere in his actual guilty plea of
April 28, 1998 did he admit to a conspiracy at any time, and
notably not one organized before the killings started on April
7, 1994, and hence relevant to proving a planned genocide.
At most, “Jean Kambanda admits there was in Rwanda in
1994 a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian
population of Tutsi, the purpose of which was to exterminate
them,” the plea asserts, but it asserts nothing to the effect
that he himself was engaged in such activities. The plea also
asserts that Kambanda was the prime minister of the interim
government, exercising de jure authority.119
Before his guilty plea was filed, Kambanda had
requested representation by his lawyer, the Belgian Johan
Scheers. The prosecution denied his request. Instead,
Kambanda was held in isolation until the end of April 1998,
when “he was brought to enter a guilty plea after being
convinced by his [prosecution-imposed] lawyer Michael
Oliver Inglis, acting in league with his personal friend and
former partner in a law practice, Deputy Prosecutor
[Bernard] Muna, that he would get away with a light
sentence.”120 It is not difficult to understand the
machinations that went into extracting Kambanda’s plea. In
September 1998, the trial chamber accepted his plea,
convicted him on multiple counts including “conspiracy to
commit genocide,” and sentenced him to life in prison.121
This, an approving Linda Melvern writes, was how “Jean
Kambanda entered the history books, the first person ever to
plead guilty to the crime of genocide at an international
court hearing.”122
Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour issued a statement: “The
sentencing of Jean Kambanda and the conviction of Jean-Paul
Akayesu [two days earlier] are the most significant steps to
date in the eradication of the culture of impunity in Rwanda
and elsewhere in the world.”123 But Kambanda renounced
his guilty plea immediately after his conviction, citing
numerous dirty tricks by the prosecutor and his attorney. As
John Laughland observed: “So the landmark conviction of a
former head of government for genocide by an international
tribunal—a conviction which was itself used to obtain guilty
verdicts in subsequent trials—was in fact made on a rather
confused man who immediately rescinded his guilty plea, on
the basis that it had been made under duress, out of concern
for his family’s safety, and following bad advice from a
lawyer who was an old friend of the prosecutor and whom he
had not instructed.”124
Meanwhile, the real culture of RPF impunity (which
Arbour helped to preserve during her tenure as chief
prosecutor at the ICTR) remains perfectly intact. When Carla
Del Ponte, Arbour’s successor as chief prosecutor, attempted
to bring indictments against some RPF members, she not
only failed, she was ousted from the ICTR for her effort.125
Del Ponte announced in April 2002 that her office had
“opened investigations into three massacres.” She also
“showed [Kagame] a list of massacres we will be
investigating.”126 Kagame promised her his cooperation. But
instead the flow of Tutsi witnesses on which the prosecution
relied to conduct its cases was turned off in Kigali, forcing
the postponement of trials;127 in perfect character, RPF
officials started denouncing Del Ponte for “genocide denial,”
“divisionism,” “revisionism,” and the like. In the summer of
2002, Del Ponte informed the Security Council that the ICTR
had ceased functioning.128 By the spring of 2003, the United
States and Britain were pressuring Kofi Annan to remove Del
Ponte as chief prosecutor when her mandate expired that
September. On May 15, Del Ponte met twice with Pierre
Joseph Prosper, the Bush administration’s ambassador-at-
large for war crimes. During their second encounter, at the
Washington residence of the Swiss ambassador to the United
States, Prosper informed her that “some states think that the
[ICTR] should have its own prosecutor. You will not be
reappointed.”129
In a July 29 letter that Annan sent to the President of the
Security Council, Annan stated that he had “consulted with
the members of the Security Council regarding the
appointment of the Prosecutor. In the light of those
consultations, I have formed the view that it is now time to
split the positions of Prosecutor of the [ICTY] and the
Prosecutor of the [ICTR], so that they are occupied by
different people.”130 In a perfunctory session of the Security
Council on August 28, a U.S.-sponsored resolution was
adopted that for the first time in the histories of the ICTR and
ICTY, split their common chief prosecutor into two different
chief prosecutors.131 Del Ponte’s willingness to investigate
RPF crimes had gotten her fired.132
 Annan replaced Del Ponte with the Gambian jurist,
Hassan B. Jallow, a committed agent of the United States
and Britain and, by the same token, acceptable to Kagame.
Now, 11 years later, Jallow has maintained the ICTR’s perfect
record of never indicting a member of the RPF. Responding to
years of criticisms of the prosecution’s selective and
discriminatory practice of indicting Hutus but never
members of the RPF,133 Jallow wrote in 2005:

The issue of judicial control of the prosecutorial discretion

has arisen in the context of allegations of ‘selective’
prosecution by the [prosecution]. It will be recalled that the
Rwandan genocide was directed at the elimination of the
Tutsi minority and the moderate Hutus by the majority Hutu
in government. Opposing the Hutu government of the day
was the Rwandan Patriotic Front…, which waged a war of
liberation and defeated the Hutu government of the day,
putting an end to the genocide. There are allegations that in
the course of the war, fought alongside the genocide, the
RPF had itself committed atrocities.134

But no matter: The ICTR is by its “very nature” an “ad

hoc Tribunal,” Jallow explained, and it was “meant to deal
with one situation….The Statute of the Tribunal itself does
not require the prosecution of all offenders.”135 Sure enough,
in its stream of indictments of official Hutu enemy targets,
and in its incapacity or refusal to indict a single member of
the RPF, even when one of its chief prosecutors tried to bring
indictments, the ICTR has achieved true “victor’s justice,”
and perfected the culture of RPF impunity. In recounting how,
at the so-called ad hoc tribunals, “[U.S.] foreign policy
trumps international justice,” Robin Philpot points out that
David Scheffer, the “first United States Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crime issues,” confessed as regards the Yugoslavia
Tribunal: “By [1999], the tribunal was a potent judicial tool,
and I had enough support…in Washington to wield it like a
battering ram in the execution of U.S. and NATO policy.”136
Had Hassan Jallow been honest about his tenure at the ICTR,
he would have dropped the disguise of “prosecutorial
discretion,” and made the same confession.

7. The alleged Hutu

“conspiracy to commit
genocide” that never
was137
In stating matter-of-factly that the “Rwandan genocide
was directed at the elimination of the Tutsi minority and the
moderate Hutus by the majority Hutu in government,”
Hassan Jallow was repeating what is, unquestionably, the
core belief concerning events in Rwanda 1994.
“Overwhelming evidence indicates that the
extermination of Tutsis by Hutus had been planned months
in advance of its actual execution,” the Final Report of the
UN Commission of Experts stated in late 1994.138 Indeed,
Hutu-based genocidal planning has also been a premise of
every indictment that has ever been brought by the
prosecution at the ICTR. Thus, the indictment of Army Col.
Théoneste Bagosora and three other Hutu military figures
stated that “From late July 1990 until July 1994, [they]
conspired among themselves and with others to work out a
plan with the intent to exterminate the civilian Tutsi
population….”139 In Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s words, “[T]he
assassination of Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana (likely
perpetrated by Hutu members of his own movement) was
the spectacular event blamed on the Tutsi, and the pretext
for the exterminationist leadership of the governing National
Republican Movement for Democracy to put into action plans
long germinating for the ‘final solution’ to their Tutsi
problem.”140
We regard this belief in the existence of a Hutu
“conspiracy to commit genocide” against the Tutsi to be the
foundational lie in the standard model’s claim of a “Rwandan
genocide,”141 the truth of which has been institutionalized
and disseminated by the United Nations, by “Friends of the
New Rwanda” (governments and private sector supporters of
Rwanda under RPF rule142), by legions of academics, Rwanda
specialists, Kagame-Power enthusiasts, human rights
organizations, the establishment news media, a famous
Hollywood film, the prosecution at the ICTR, and, at least in
the early years, by the ICTR’s trial and appeals chambers as
well.
In Sections 2 - 6, we have shown that this core belief is
incompatible with massive and compelling evidence on the
issue. Most important, the evidence shows that Kagame’s
RPF was responsible for the event that “triggered” the
killings (the Habyarimama assassination); that it was ready
for action on April 6 and was the only effective military force
in Rwanda before and during the surge of mass killings, as
the RPF quickly conquered the country. And we have shown
that the numbers and ethnic composition of Rwanda’s dead
do not support standard model claims; on the contrary, the
evidence shows that Hutu deaths far exceeded deaths of
Tutsi.
Each of these counter-points provides powerful and
compelling reasons to believe that the standard model of the
“Rwandan genocide” is completely false, reversing the locus
of the primary killers and victims in the foundational lie.
But yet another compelling reason to reject the Hutu
plan-lie derives from an unexpected source: namely, the
ICTR itself. This is because, whether in the trial or the
appeals chambers, the ICTR’s judges have consistently
acquitted on this charge, or reversed convictions on appeal.
We find this to be a remarkable turn of events, because as
we have seen, the ICTR is a politicized body that never
prosecutes anybody but Hutu, and that regularly finds Hutu
guilty of participating in a genocide—the preordained
premise of the ICTR—but not of a conspiracy to commit one.
As we noted, in the indictment of Bagosora et al. (i.e.,
“From late July 1990 until July 1994…”), a Hutu “conspiracy
to commit genocide” refers to one that existed some time
prior to April 6, 1994, so that once the assassination of
Habyarimana had been carried out, the Hutu conspirators
could also carry out their plan to exterminate the Tutsi.
But it is precisely this notion of a Hutu “conspiracy to
commit genocide” that the ICTR’s own judges have
consistently rejected. We reviewed the trial judgments as
well as the judgments on appeal of what to date have been
the 15 most important cases argued before the ICTR.143 In all
15 of these judgments (the sixteenth defendant, Joseph
Nzirorera, died in custody prior to the end of his trial), the
defendants were either acquitted of the charge in the trial
judgment, or previous convictions were reversed on appeal.
Especially given the pro-Kagame and anti-Hutu political role
and bias of the ICTR, this alone is a compelling refutation of
the Hutu “conspiracy to commit genocide.” (See “Appendix
I” for a discussion of specific ICTR cases and judgments on
this charge.) But then how could a lie as big as the Hutu
“conspiracy to commit genocide” have ever been
institutionalized in the first place, given the wide array of
incompatible facts of the kind that we have outlined? One
crucial factor is that the United States and Britain, with their
great economic, political and communications power, and
influence over the UN, were the co-conspirators with the RPF
and Kagame, first in invading and conquering Rwanda, and
then invading the Democratic Republic of Congo. This Great
Power support, combined with the public’s and the media’s
distance from and unfamiliarity with central African affairs,
made the construction and dissemination of false
propaganda on Rwanda very easy. And it has been almost
miraculous in turning the truth on its head.
Also important in institutionalizing this foundational lie is
the fact that organizations such as African Rights and Human
Rights Watch, advocates for the Hutu “conspiracy to commit
genocide” claim since 1994, published extensive dossiers of
killings carried out by the FAR and Hutu individuals and
groups. African Rights amassed 750 pages of gory detail
(eventually expanded to over 1200), setting the scene for
everything that followed.144 Human Rights Watch’s focus on
Hutu actions in one prefecture, Butare, in the country’s
south, runs 163 pages and reads like a brief drafted at the
behest of the ICTR’s chief prosecutor.145 Such riches of
dramatic detail convey the impression that each violent
event must be taken as an instance of something far more
encompassing—“The Genocide.”
But given the considerably greater number of Hutu than
Tutsi victims in 1994, it surely would have been possible for
these and other chroniclers to assemble comparable or even
greater detail suggesting an RPF genocidal plan and the
bloody consequences that followed from it. Instead, the
human rights activists and journalists who were covering
Rwanda followed the political line that flowed from their
government’s interest in the outcome, which seems to have
been mentally pre-programmed in them to interpret and
report about events in only one Kagame-friendly framework.
The UN also followed this party-line, and when its
researchers like Robert Gersony came up with detailed
evidence of RPF mass killings, it quashed the evidence.146
These institutionalized biases led the UN, human rights
groups and journalists to one conclusion only, just as the
same biases continue to lead them to the same erroneous
conclusion, 20 years later.147
Over many years ICTR jurisprudence on this issue has
come around to a position that, in rejecting the “conspiracy
to commit genocide” charge based on the lack of supportive
evidence, is closer to that of so-called “genocide deniers”
and “revisionists” than its advocates are willing to admit. As
the French journalist Thierry Cruvellier wrote in 2011, after
the appeals chamber in the Military I cases had demolished
the conspiracy model even further than had the trial
chamber in 2008: “In 300 pages, it slashed the trial
judgment so deeply that, 17 years after the court was
created, it seems almost impossible to understand what’s
the narrative that has come out of the most important trial
at the ICTR.”148 His suggestion, which we do not accept, is
that “There was a genocide…but it was brainless.” On the
contrary, we believe that there was in fact a genocide in
Rwanda in 1994—but its brain was the RPF, Paul Kagame,
and their supportive U.S. and U.K. officials.

8. Did Paul Kagame’s RPF

really “stop the genocide”?
It is widely believed, and a core component of the
standard model, that the “Rwandan genocide” came to an
end only when the RPF drove the “Hutu Power extremists,”
the Rwandan Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie, the
Presidential Guard, the Para-Commando unit, and the
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi from the country into
exile. “The organizers [of the genocide] used the slaughter of
Tutsi to draw the RPF into renewed combat,” we read in
Human Rights Watch’s version of the events. In response,
“The RPF resumed the war in part to stop the
massacres….”149 “The mass killing in Rwanda was brought
to an end in July, and earlier in the eastern part of the
country,” African Rights reported as early as September
1994. “The credit for this lies with the RPF, whose military
advance was the chief reason the killings were halted. The
RPF was not responsible for the genocide; moreover it was
largely responsible for halting the genocide.”150 Asked by the
French newspaper Libération whether he was “still at war, 20
years after the genocide?” Kagame’s reply could have been
drawn from either the Human Rights Watch or the African
Rights reports: “We waged war back in 1994, when we
stopped the genocide.”151
But this view is completely incompatible with the serious
evidence we have already discussed. The driving force for
the mass killings that began on April 7, 1994, and rapidly
escalated, was the RPF brain-trust, led by Kagame, whose
one and only road to power was by violence that was long
planned, highly efficient, and eminently successful. That is,
Kagame-RPF violence was proactive, not reactive. Kagame-
RPF rejections of FAR ceasefire offers were strategic, not
poor diplomacy.
The same is true for the Kagame-RPF’s rejection of the
FAR’s unconditional surrender offer. Dallaire recounts
delivering this offer to the RPF. They “dismissed it outright,”
he writes. “Once more they were going for the extremists’
[sic] jugular. The [FAR] insisted on a ceasefire so they could
redeploy forces to stop the killings. The RPF insisted that the
killings had to stop before they would agree to a
ceasefire.”152 Similarly, Kagame-RPF warnings both to
Dallaire in Rwanda and at the United Nations in New York
City that if the UN placed additional UNAMIR troops on the
ground, they would regard these troops as enemy
combatants and fight them as well as the FAR, weren’t
empty threats—they were deadly serious threats.153
In all of this, the Kagame-RPF were aided and abetted by
U.S., British, and UN officials, who manifestly were not
standing idly-by and doing nothing in 1994, but were actively
engaged in supporting the Kagame-RPF conquest of Rwanda.
And since conquering Rwanda was the Kagame-RPF’s
desideratum from 1990 onward, the Kagame-RPF neither
“stopped the genocide” nor permitted any other force to try
and stop the mass killings of Hutu and Tutsi until they had
completed their conquest—after which date, the Kagame-
RPF went right on killing Hutu, first within Rwanda itself, later
within the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly
Zaire).
That Kagame and the RPF were the principal organized
killers in Rwanda 1994, as shown by their rejection of the
Arusha terms, by the number and composition of deaths,
and by their refusal to negotiate before and during the peak
killing period. Indeed, it would be more accurate to state that
the Kagame-RPF have never stopped their genocide against
Hutu, even if at times, they have put it on hold.
As Filip Reyntjens has written, the “RPF behaves similarly
to an occupying force, and it is seen as such by many
Rwandans, who resist in a way reminiscent of the situation in
occupied France during World War II.”154 With the conquest
of Rwanda and the establishment of a genuine dictatorship
by his ethnic minority group, and even more specifically, by
his military elite, Kagame Power flourishes.

9. “Africa’s World War”:

Kagame’s alleged pursuit of
“génocidaires” in Zaire—the
Democratic Republic of
Congo—and the deaths of
millions155
The Kagame-RPF conquest of Rwanda was followed two
years later by an invasion of the very large central African
country now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo
(the DRC, which had been known as the Democratic Republic
of Zaire through May 1997).156 Launched in September 1996
under several layers of pretext, this war has continued in
fits-and-starts up to the present day, with the collaboration
of Uganda, Burundi, and the United States and its close
allies, notably Canada and the United Kingdom.

Map of Zaire-The Democratic Republic of Congo, derived

from EZILON MAPS
The large number of armed combatants, the
monumental bloodshed, death toll, and human catastrophe
suffered by the native population and mass of Hutu refugees
in the DRC is on a scale so great that it has been referred to
as “Africa’s first World War,” 157 the “greatest humanitarian
crisis in the world today [ca. 2005],”158 and as the “world’s
deadliest crisis since World War II.”159
The numbers of victims of the continuing Kagame-led
assault have been immense. A UN report of October 2002
cited an estimate that “more than 3.5 million excess deaths”
had occurred in the DRC between August 1998 and
September 2002; the report concluded that “These deaths
are a direct result of the occupation by Rwanda and
Uganda.”160 A mortality study published in January 2009
estimated the “excess death toll in DR Congo since 1998 to
be 5.4 million, of which 4.6 million occurred in the five
insecure eastern provinces”161—North Kivu and South Kivu in
particular, exactly where Kagame’s footprint had made its
deepest impression. Perhaps most important, the October
2010 UN “Mapping Exercise” of the “most serious” crimes in
the DRC claimed that the RPF and its proxy forces had
carried out “systematic and widespread attacks…which
targeted very large numbers of Rwanda Hutu refugees and
members of the Hutu civilian population, resulting in their
death.” These attacks, the report continues, “reveal a
number of damning elements that, if they were proven
before a competent court, could be classified crimes of
genocide.”162 Undeniably, we are dealing here with mass
killing on a scale far exceeding that of Rwanda 1994, and
reaching levels not seen since the World War II era.
The October 1993 coup carried out by the Tutsi-
dominated military in Burundi and the interethnic conflicts
that followed led to as many as 50,000 deaths. The military
had accused the FRODEBU party of the assassinated Hutu
President Melchior Ndadaye of having planned to commit
genocide against Burundi’s Tutsi minority—hence its need to
pre-empt FRODEBU’s alleged plans. By March 1994, some
260,000 Burundian Hutu refugees remained in camps in
neighboring Rwanda, and as many as 55,000 in Zaire.163 By
the completion of the RPF’s final offensive in Rwanda in
1994, and the RPF’s pogroms and ethnic cleansing
operations in the months that followed, an estimated
2,257,000 Rwandans had fled their country, with perhaps as
many as 1.5 million Hutu refugees having fled west to Zaire,
another 626,000 east to Tanzania, 278,000 south to Burundi,
and 97,000 north to Uganda.164 Included within this massive
refugee flow were no doubt members of the Rwandan armed
forces that had been overthrown by Kagame’s RPF, but there
were far larger numbers of Hutu civilians. As a consequence
of these recurring armed conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda,
the situation in the eastern Zairean provinces of North Kivu,
South Kivu, and Orientale Province was economically,
politically, and socially unstable; and given the fact that the
government of Mobutu Sese Seko was in Kinshasa, at the
opposite end of the country, the Zairean government was
largely absent from these eastern provinces.
According to the standard model of the “Rwandan
genocide” and its aftermath, it was the threat posed to the
new RPF-controlled Rwanda and to the stability of the Great
Lakes Region in central Africa by the presence of these Hutu
“génocidaires” in eastern Zaire that left the armed forces of
Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi no choice but to invade Zaire
to clean them out. Adam Jones, a “genocide” studies
professor at the University of British Columbia, quotes
approvingly from Michela Wrong’s 2001 book, In the
Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz, where she writes that “Like a
monstrous cancer, the [Hutu refugee] camps coalesced,
solidified and implanted themselves in the flesh of east
Zaire.”165 Jones himself writes that “Hutu extremists inflicted
genocidal atrocities against Tutsi living in eastern Zaire and
staged cross-border raids into Rwanda, prompting the newly
installed RPF regime in Rwanda to launch operations in the
region that themselves led to the deaths of thousands of
civilians, together with hardcore génocidaires.”166 And Jones
goes on to quote approvingly Christian Scherrer, a professor
of Peace Studies at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, who has
written: “The export of genocide from Rwanda is the main
cause in the spread of conflict to the whole of the Central
African region, and the chief reason for the unprecedented
violence, intensity, and destructiveness of that conflict.”167
In Jones’s, Scherrer’s, and Wrong’s view, the Hutu
refugees carried “The Genocide” with them into eastern
Zaire in 1994 (because it was inside of them, a part of them),
where it then metastasized and spread to the whole of
central Africa, eventually leading to the wars and mass
killings that followed.
But, in fact, the truth is quite the opposite: It was
Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA, the new name of
the national army of Rwanda after the RPF took power) that
literally exported their 1990 invasion of Rwanda and their 46
month war against Rwanda’s Hutu from Rwanda to eastern
Zaire in 1996, and then beyond.168
By the spring and summer of 1996, Kagame-friendly
media in Rwanda had already begun to publish threats
against the Mobutu regime, accusing Mobutu of threatening
Rwanda, and even framing the situation in eastern Zaire as a
“genocide under incubation” against the region’s Tutsi
population.169 Just as the RPF’s advances and slaughters in
Rwanda 1994 had allegedly been in response to the Hutu
“genocide” against that country’s Tutsi population, so the
long-planned invasion, occupation, mass killings, and
resource exploitation in eastern Zaire were to be justified as
a preemptive war to prevent the next alleged “genocide”
against the Tutsi from occurring. Filip Reyntjens writes that
Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s long-time dictator, is on record
stating that “as early as 1995, Kagame had recruited 2000
Zairean Tutsi…into the RPA with a view of carrying out
military action against the refugee camps;” more recruits
were added later.170 Having infiltrated South Kivu province
along the border with Rwanda and Burundi, and then
become operational at the start of September 1996, this
Tutsi “rebellion” was in reality the “spearhead of a fifth
column,” as Roland Pourtier put it. “The strategic choice [of
Kigali] to attack the camps clearly shows the fundamental
objectives of a ‘rebellion’ that was no longer [a rebellion],
because what really happened was the extension of the
Rwandan civil war [sic] into Zairean territory.”171
Over the next nine months in eastern Zaire, one Hutu
refugee camp after another came under attack. Rwandan,
Ugandan, and Burundian armed forces participated in these
attacks, as did multiple proxy forces, most notably the
Alliance des forces Démocratiques pour la libération du
Congo-Zaire (AFDL), the lead “rebel” faction, but one that did
not even exist until the month of October, after the attacks
on eastern Zaire had begun. The United States also
participated in these cross-border assaults. Both the
invading armies and their proxies received steady U.S.
supplies, reconnaissance, communications, and
transportation support, as well as diplomatic cover, no
matter how many people were killed.172 Gérard Prunier
describes how “Washington operated a multi-purpose anti-
Mobutu machine which ranged from the half-humanitarian,
half-military support given by the International Rescue
Committee, long rumored to have been an NGO close to
sensitive segments of the U.S. administration, to the
soothing testimony given on the question of the missing
[Hutu] refugees by Assistance Secretary of State…Phyllis
Oakley in December 1996.”173 Reyntjens concludes that the
“United States was aware of the intentions of Kagame to
attack the refugee camps and probably assisted him in doing
so. In addition, they deliberately lied about the number and
fate of the refugees remaining in Zaire, in order to avoid the
deployment of an international humanitarian force, which
could have saved tens of thousands of human lives, but
which was resented by Kigali and the AFDL.”174 This pattern
is perfectly familiar, as we’ve observed in several sections
above.
On May 16, 1997, Mobutu fled Kinshasa for his
hometown of Gbadolite, at the far northern end of Zaire, and
then to France; he died four months later, an exile in
Morocco. On May 17, Kinshasa was officially in the
possession of the RPA and the AFDL, whose latecomer
leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was sworn-in as president on
May 29. As Kagame told the Washington Post in a July 1997
interview, “As long as the people at the forefront were
Zairean, the rebellion [sic] was going to be easy.”175
During this first phase of the Rwandan-Ugandan wars on
Zaire-DRC, an estimated 200,000 to 246,000 Rwandan Hutu
refugees are believed to have died.176 And the 1996-1997
phase was minor in comparison with the major war that
Rwanda and Uganda restarted in August 1998, the effects
from which central Africa is still reeling today (as reflected in
the death tolls reported above).177
This terrible, criminal treatment of the Hutu refugees
was based on both local and foreign interests. The RPF
conquerors of Rwanda were not happy at the prospect of a
return to Rwanda of large numbers of Hutu refugees, who
would not be friendly to the new Tutsi regime, and very well
might have tried to re-occupy land and properties often
taken over by Tutsi. Honoré N’Gbanda, a former security
adviser to Mobutu, was quite categorical about this:
“Kagame did not want the Hutu back in Rwanda.”178 Leon
Kengo, a former prime minister of Zaire, gave one reason
why: “[Kagame] wanted them to return to Rwanda as
stragglers, one by one, at his mercy. The international
community just let him do as he liked.”179
Rwandan and allied interest in exploiting the resources
of the DRC also demanded an excuse for invasion and
occupation, and a primary and apparently saleable one has
been the alleged need to clean-out the Hutu “génocidaires.”
As long as the Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALIR)
and later the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
(FDLR), the two main Hutu-based anti-Kagame fighting
forces in the eastern Zaire-DRC, remained armed, the RPA
would always have a pretext to invade.

U.S. and U.K. interest in the treatment of the refugees

was closely related to the basis of their support for Kagame
and the RPA: The latter were tacit agents of a program to
enlarge U.S. power in central Africa, displacing the French,
replacing Habyarimana with Kagame, Mobutu with the AFDL-
Kabila front, and thereby allowing a more unobstructed
exploitation of this resource-rich area of the planet.180 Just as
the mass killings in Rwanda were acceptable “collateral
damage” of the earlier drive for power, so were the
slaughters of large numbers in the eastern Zaire-DRC.
It must be stressed that the prime killer here was Paul
Kagame, whose toll of victims, first in Rwanda and then in
Zaire-DRC, runs into the millions, and surely exceeds that of
Idi Amin by a factor of at least five.181 And yet, in one of the
miracles of modern propaganda, Kagame became a savior-
modernizer-moral giant for the U.S., U.K., and Canadian
establishment to admire (and exploit). But surely this
favorable portrayal of Kagame flows from the fact that he
served U.S. and other powerful interests in clearing out
adversarial regimes that were under strong French influence
(Habyarimana’s and Mobutu’s), assuring U.S. dominance in
the Great Lakes region, and easier access to its resources.
U.S., British, and Canadian support of Kagame’s mass killings
has been steady throughout, even if sometimes
embarrassing. This extended naturally to the UN, which was
unable to provide effective aid to the very large numbers of
refugees under relentless attack by Kagame and his allies,
who shelled them, bombed them, assaulted them on the
ground, and starved them and drove their members,
including large numbers of women and children, into the
jungles of Zaire-DRC.
On November 9, 1996, with the Hutu refugees in eastern
Zaire in serious trouble, and following a wave of publicity and
strong pressure on the Security Council to act, the Council
did pass the Canadian-sponsored Resolution 1078, calling for
an “immediate ceasefire,” the “voluntary repatriation of
refugees to their country of origin,” the creation of a
“multinational force…for humanitarian purposes in eastern
Zaire,” and the establishment of “humanitarian corridors” for
the delivery of assistance.182 This in turn was followed on
November 15 by Resolution 1080, which explicitly authorized
the “establishment for humanitarian purposes of a
temporary multinational force” under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.183
But the very day the Council adopted this second
resolution, Kagame’s forces attacked the Mugunga refugee
camp, west of Goma, a large city in North Kivu, along Zaire’s
border with Rwanda. As this RPA attack was launched from
west-to-east, toward Rwanda, its purpose clearly was to
force the involuntary repatriation of as many Hutu refugees
back to Rwanda as quickly as possible, and then to claim
that the refugee crisis had been resolved.
Immediately, as if on-cue, U.S., British, and Canadian
political and military figures began expressing doubts about
whether the multinational force called for by the two
resolutions was still necessary. The Canadian General
Maurice Baril, who had been designated the force
commander for the still unmanned force, agreed that the
repatriation was well underway and that the multinational
force was not needed. Subsequently, the Canadian Raymond
Chrétien, the Secretary-General’s special envoy on the crisis,
briefed the UN in New York City on December 13, at which
time he stated that the “usefulness” of the “multinational
force will decrease,” even though, as Reyntjens notes, a
week earlier Chrétien had stated that the “humanitarian
force is indispensible.” In short, although a propaganda
campaign had been undertaken to make it seem like a
multinational force would be deployed to eastern Zaire, one
was “never seriously considered”184 and the U.S., Britain,
and Canada never would have permitted it.
In 2002, Robin Philpot interviewed Chrétien at the
Canadian Embassy in Paris. Asked about the multinational
force for Zaire that never was, Chrétien admitted that “there
was no political will to deploy the multinational force,” and
that the failure to create one had left “A million people
dead!”185
But this was what the Abe Lincoln of the New Africa and
Bill Clinton of the old United States wanted back in 1996. It
also repeats the pattern of the withdrawal of UN troops from
Rwanda in the spring of 1994, when Kagame and Clinton
wanted to clear the path for the RPF’s final offensive—at the
cost of facilitating the earlier “genocide.”

10. The apocryphal

“Genocide Fax”
As we have shown, evidence of a longstanding Hutu plan
to commit genocide against the Tutsi of Rwanda is non-
existent, although the “conspiracy” charge has been
trumpeted in establishment Western circles for at least the
past 21 years.186 Robin Philpot points out that in September
1994, shortly after Roméo Dallaire had left his post as
UNAMIR force commander and returned to Canada, Dallaire
“took part in an important French-language television
program in Montréal.” During the program, someone asked
Dallaire for his thoughts about the alleged plan to
“exterminate Tutsis.” Correcting the questioner, Dallaire
replied: “The plan was more political. The aim was to
eliminate the coalition of moderates….I think that the
excesses that we saw were beyond people’s ability to plan
and organize. There was a process to destroy the political
elements in the moderate camp. There was a breakdown and
hysteria absolutely….But nobody could have foreseen or
planned the magnitude of the destruction we saw.”187
For Philpot, the significance of Dallaire’s September,
1994 dismissal of the standard model of the “Rwandan
genocide” (i.e., “nobody could have foreseen or planned…”)
is that this early Dallaire, fresh out of UNAMIR, contradicts
how the Dallaire of later years would come to speak and
write about Rwanda 1994. Some more-or-less credible,
additional evidence of Hutu planning was therefore very
much needed—and lo-and-behold, in November 1995, it was
suddenly provided in the form of the “Genocide Fax.”
On November 26, 1995, The Observer (London)
published a report titled “UN Suppressed Warning of Rwanda
Genocide Plan.” Based on an investigation by the Belgium
newspaper De Morgen, The Observer reported that “A secret
cable reveals that senior officials at the United Nations were
warned three months before last year’s genocide that Hutu
extremists were planning to ‘exterminate’ the minority Tutsis
in Rwanda. The subsequent slaughter, spearheaded by the
Interahamwe, only stopped when RPF rebels overthrew the
former government forces three months later.”188
As best we can tell, this is the very first public record in
the English language of what has come to be known as the
“Genocide Fax.” If authentic, it would provide some
documentary evidence of early United Nations knowledge of
Hutu planning to “exterminate” Tutsi. Dated January 11,
1994, this two-page fax was allegedly sent over an
encrypted phone line by UNAMIR Force Commander Lieut.-
Gen. Roméo Dallaire from his headquarters in Kigali to the
Canadian Gen. Maurice Baril at the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York City. (For our
analysis of the “Genocide Fax” based on the different extant
copies of the document that have been in circulation since
November 27, 1995, see “Appendix II.”) Titled “Request for
Protection for Informant,”189 Dallaire reported that UNAMIR
had met with a “top level trainer in the cadres of
Interhamwe-[sic] armed militia of MRND….”190 Dallaire
added that the informant—who later was identified as Jean-
Pierre Turatsinze—told UNAMIR that he knew the location of
an MRND “weapons cache with at least 135 weapons,” and
that he would be willing to take UNAMIR to that cache
“tonight” if UNAMIR guaranteed “that he and his family…be
placed under [UNAMIR] protection.” “It is our intention to
take action within the next 36 hours,” Dallaire informed the
DPKO.
But what makes this the “Genocide Fax” are two
paragraphs numbered 6 and 7 in which it states that the
informant “has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He
suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was
that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis”
(para. 6). “Informant states he disagrees with anti-Tutsi
extermination,” we read in the next paragraph, and that the
“President does not have full control over all elements of his
old party/faction” (para. 7).
“I was silent,” Dallaire writes in his 2003 memoir, “hit by
the depth and reality of this information. It was as if the
informant Jean-Pierre had opened the floodgates on the
hidden world of the extremist third force, which until this
point had been a presence we could sense but couldn’t
grasp.” 191
Both Philip Gourevitch and Human Rights Watch’s Alison
Des Forges were early and eager promoters of the “Genocide
Fax.” The fax “reported in startling detail the preparations
that were underway to carry out…an extermination
program,” Gourevitch wrote in The New Yorker. “As it
happened, everything Dallaire’s informant told him came
true three months later.”192 In its massive “Leave None to
Tell the Story”, Human Rights Watch reported that Dallaire
had written: “Informant states that he disagrees with anti-
Tutsi extermination”193—as we have just seen, extermination
being the central theme of the “Genocide Fax.”
Fortunately, Michael Dobbs has posted a copy of the
DPKO’s response to Dallaire at the website of the National
Security Archive.194 Also dated January 11, 1994, it is striking
that nowhere does this response indicate any awareness of
the paragraphs 6 and 7’s “anti-Tutsi extermination ” theme.
Instead, the DPKO discussed the need for UNAMIR to
maintain Kigali as a “weapons-secure area” as provided for
in the Arusha Peace Agreement, as well as indicating what
additional steps Dallaire should take, if he is “convinced that
the information provided by the informant is absolutely
reliable….” But the DPKO response is silent on the imminent
genocide theme.
Why would the DPKO in New York City fail to take any
notice at all of the most grave allegations the “Genocide
Fax” supposedly made about Hutu plans to exterminate Tutsi
(“anti-Tutsi extermination”)?
We believe that there is a simple explanation for this
discrepancy: The so-called “Genocide Fax,” as it exists today
in the official records related to Rwanda 1994, is a
counterfeit.
So where did the counterfeit “Genocide Fax” come from?
In early November 1995, Kigali played host to an
international conference titled “Genocide, Impunity, and
Accountability: Dialogue for a National and International
Response.”195 One hundred sixty-five people participated in
the conference, some 58 of whom came from other
countries. A recurring theme at the conference was the
failure of certain states (e.g., Belgium and France), and of
the United Nations especially, to act on intelligence that they
allegedly possessed about Hutu plans to exterminate Tutsi. In
response, Shaharyar Khan, the Secretary-General’s Special
Representative for Rwanda since July 1994, initiated a review
of the UN’s files on Rwanda for the relevant period of the UN
mission: October 1993 through March 1994. Twelve days
later, the Khan review “confirm[ed] the view that there was
no information or indication of planned genocide. There
were, of course, warnings of armed clashes, violence and
killings on an ethnic basis.”196 A chronology of the
potentially most relevant UN documents that had been
reviewed listed the following summary for a document dated
January 11, 1994: “Informant provided information of plans
by Interhamwe [sic] to disrupt process and assassinate
moderates. FC [Force Commander Dallaire] instructed by us
to approach President [Habyarimana] and inform diplomatic
community.”197 Evidently, this summary was based on the
original, authentic fax that Dallaire sent to Gen. Baril at the
DPKO in New York City, dated January 11, 1994. But the
summary of this document made no mention of an informant
talking about an “anti-Tutsi extermination” plan or any of the
other assertions that appear in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
“Genocide Fax.”
Seven days after the Khan review, on November 27,
1995, another fax arrived at the DPKO in New York City, also
bearing the subject heading “Request for Protection for
Informant.” This fax reproduced a copy of the two-page
document that is now known as the “Genocide Fax,”
including paragraphs 6 and 7, and reporting about an
informant who talked about “anti-Tutsi extermination” (etc.).
But the fax that arrived at the DPKO on November 27
also contained other peculiar features that are missing from
the copy of the “Genocide Fax” that Dobbs has posted
online. At the top left-hand corner of the November 27 fax, a
UN employee named Lamin J. Sise has typed: “This cable
was not found in DPKO files. The present copy was placed in
the files on 28 November 1995. Lamin J. Sise. 28 Nov. 1995.”
Additionally, the sender’s date-stamp that runs across the
very top of both pages of the fax reads: “From :
Connaughton – Camberley, Surrey Phone No. : 01276 25210
Nov. 27, 1995 8:11PM F04.”
 Richard M. Connaughton was then a colonel in the British
military and is a historian of military affairs. “Camberley,
Surrey” suggests a connection with the British Royal Military
Academy at Sandhurst in southern England, where the
British Army trains its officers. So the copy of the “Genocide
Fax” as it exists today actually dates from November 27,
1995, not January 11, 1994. Moreover, it came from
(presumably) a colonel serving at the RMAS.
As Christopher Black, a Canadian defense attorney and
the attorney for Gen. Augustin Ndindiliyimana in the Military
II trial before the ICTR, explains these peculiarities:

[T]he copy of this document presented by the Prosecutor at

the ICTR…has had the name and fax number of the sender,
Sise’s note and other notes removed. It is this doctored
version of the cable that the Prosecutor tried to present as
an exhibit in the Military II in October, 2005…. General
Dallaire does not mention such a fax before November
1995…. There was no response from New York to such a fax.
There exist only responses to a fax concerning weapons
caches, but this original fax is nowhere to be found. It is
clear that Dallaire sent a fax that night [January 11, 1994]
and that it concerned only weapons caches and seeking
advice from New York regarding the protection of the
informant. In fact, the subject heading of the “genocide” fax
is not “genocide” or “killing” but an innocuous “Request For
Protection of Informant.” The present fax was fabricated
using the original fax which dealt with weapons caches only
by cutting out some of the paragraphs of that fax and
pasting in new paragraphs about killing Tutsis and
Belgians.198

We concur. Apparently, the original fax sent by Dallaire

on January 11, 1994 to the DPKO in New York City made no
mention of an “anti-Tutsi extermination” plan. But this fax
has “disappeared”—expunged from the DPKO’s archive.
Then from November 27-28, 1995 onward, the counterfeit
so-called “Genocide Fax” was put in its place. The
significance of the “Genocide Fax,” of course, is that it can
be used as a documentary record of early UN knowledge of
Hutu planning to “exterminate” Tutsi. The counterfeit fax
thus reinforces the common and indeed regnant belief about
a Hutu “conspiracy” to commit genocide, just as it reinforces
the regnant belief about the UN’s “failure” to act on this
knowledge.
There is other evidence that the fax introduced on
November 27-28, 1995 is a doctored version of the original.
One is that Dallaire’s superior at UNAMIR at the time, the
Secretary-General’s Special Representative Jacques-Roger
Booh-Booh, categorically denies that he ever read a fax that
mentioned anything other than an informant who warned of
Hutu weapons caches, or that he and Dallaire ever discussed
anything other than these weapons caches. 199 Another is
that if Dallaire ever possessed credible evidence of genocidal
intent against the Tutsi, he assuredly would have warned his
own UNAMIR troops and the supposedly threatened Belgians.
But there is no record of his ever having done so.
We believe that it is important to recognize the extent to
which Dallaire in his role as UNAMIR force commander
served as a tool of Western powers supporting the RPF (the
United States, Britain, and Canada), and is therefore
unreliable not only with respect to the “Genocide Fax,” but
as regards Rwanda 1994 more generally. Dallaire was
blatantly hostile to the French, opposing their attempt to
establish and maintain a civilian refuge area during the mass
killing (Operation Turquoise), rejecting their offer to look into
the shoot-down as they had on-the-spot personnel in Kigali
(Dallaire preferred to wait for the import of U.S. experts from
Germany). While concerned with FAR weapons caches and
threats he ignored the massive RPF buildup of arms and
cadres that were quickly put into action on and after April 6.
And he supported the reduction of UN forces in Rwanda,
paralleling the U.S.-U.K.- Kagame position. He was an utter
failure insofar as UNAMIR was supposedly in place to prevent
war and mass slaughter.
Dallaire never publicized the existence of the fax until
November 1995, at which time it was first reported in
Belgian and British newspapers, and only after which time it
conveniently showed up at the DPKO in New York City. Booh-
Booh notes how “bizarre” he found it that even though
UNAMIR received numerous reports that the RPF was
receiving arms shipments from Uganda, Dallaire never acted
on this information to interdict the shipments, but remained
focused on FAR weapons caches instead.200 Amadou Deme,
a Senegalese officer who served in UNAMIR’s intelligence
section, recounted the many steps that UNAMIR knew the
RPF had taken in “preparation for hostilities” leading up to
April 6: The “build up [of] forces, logistics, stocks, etc.,” the
“bringing of troops, the information of massive weapons and
ammunition from Uganda,…likely from the Ugandan
[People’s Defense Force],” the lack of access by “our
observers in the RPF zone,” and the like.201 All of this reflects
UNAMIR knowledge of the RPF’s buildup towards its final
offensive, not Hutu preparations for genocide. And we’ve
already noted Dallaire’s August 1993 assessment that “[the
RPF] displayed the potential to easily defeat the [FAR].”
A remarkable feature of the importance given the
“Genocide Fax” is its source, Jean-Pierre Turatsinze, a
supposed informant on high-level Hutu plans, who allegedly
told UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire that Hutu leaders
intended to exterminate the Tutsi (to paraphrase the extant
fax’s “anti-Tutsi extermination” theme). Actually, the fax
doesn’t even state that Jean-Pierre knew of such a plan—
merely that he was allegedly “ordered to register all Tutsi in
Kagali” and that “He suspects it is for their extermination…”
(emphasis added). So the plan is only a figment of Jean-
Pierre’s imagination, whether or not he really believed it.
 But who was he? Alison Des Forges greatly exaggerated
the significance of Jean-Pierre, claiming that he “reported
directly to the chief of staff of the Rwandan army and to the
president of the MRND,”202 but she gives no evidence for
this. For Faustin Twagirimungu, at the time the prime
minister-designate and the head of the Mouvement
Démocratrique Républicain, one of the Hutu opposition
parties, the man who called the existence of this informant
to UNAMIR’s attention, and who would become the first
prime minister of the successor government after the RPF
seized power later that year, Jean-Pierre was nothing more
than an “office boy for MRND, but an office boy who was also
kind of [an] insurgent guide for RPF. Because, finally, he left
the country, and he joined RPF.”203 Amadou Deme, one of
four UNAMIR officers to meet with Jean-Pierre on January 10
and thereafter (the others were the Belgian Col. Luc Marchal,
the Belgian Col. Henry Kesteloot, and the Belgian Capt. Frank
Claeys—Dallaire himself never met Jean-Pierre), writes that
the only evidence of Hutu violations that Jean-Pierre ever
produced were roughly three dozen AK-47s, ammunition
clips, and grenades—and “that was all regarding the famous
reconnaissance of the MRND weapons cache.”204
So why would the Western establishment latch on to
some words from a figure such as Jean-Pierre,
uncorroborated by documentary or other evidence? And why
have his vague claims, which did not even encompass claims
of a known plan, have been taken seriously ever since? The
contrast with the establishment’s treatment of the findings
of Michael Hourigan’s National Team, of compelling witness
evidence of grave wrongdoing by the RPF, buried by the
ICTR’s chief prosecutor, is dramatic, but fits well the fact that
politics readily overrides truth in the propaganda system.
Jean-Pierre’s unverified claims fit Western propaganda needs;
Hourigan’s far more solid findings did not. Therefore,
whereas Jean-Pierre and the “Genocide Fax” can resurface
during the twentieth anniversary of the “Rwandan
genocide,” Hourigan’s National Team findings cannot. The
only surprise is that in the trial at the ICTR known as Military
I, when finding all four defendants not guilty of the
“conspiracy to commit genocide” charge, the trial chamber
also dismissed the evidence provided by “informant Jean-
Pierre” due to “lingering questions concerning [his]
reliability….”205
If all of this is true, we would suggest that Dallaire should
be regarded as a war criminal for positively facilitating the
actual mass killings of April-July, rather than taken as a hero
for giving allegedly disregarded warnings that might have
stopped them.

11. The New York Times and

other “Genocide Fax”
disinformants
As we have seen throughout, bodies of fact incompatible
with the standard model—on the April 6, 1994 shoot-
down/assassination, the RPF’s responsibility for and
readiness to move after the shoot-down, the relative
numbers of Hutu and Tutsi dead, the active engagement of
the United States and its closest allies in support of RPF
objectives, the alleged Hutu “conspiracy to commit
genocide”—are simply blacked out in the establishment
media, and advocates for the accepted view can spew out
falsehoods or play dumb without contestation.
Thus Michael Dobbs can play dumb on the shoot-down
and active U.S. and allied participation in the ongoing
Rwanda events, and continue the falsification of the
“Genocide Fax” tale without correction (in his “Rwanda’s
Shrouded Nightmare”206). Although the Times did publish
three letters in response to Dobbs’s commentary,207 none
challenged the authenticity of the “Genocide Fax,” and none
challenged the standard model’s Hutu “conspiracy to commit
genocide.” In fact, one letter signed by Linda Melvern, Larry
Stanton, and co-signed by 9 other “academics, authors, and
international lawyers,” heaped falsehood upon falsehood,
claiming that the discredited “informant,” Jean-Pierre, was
credible, that “there was ample evidence for a genocide
conspiracy that did not rely on Jean-Pierre,” and that Dobbs
had failed to mention the “overwhelming evidence of
planning that persuaded the judges of the tribunal to convict
defendants of conspiracy to commit genocide.”208
But as we pointed out in Section 7 above, and show
again in Appendix I, of the 15 defendants in the four major
trials at the ICTR, all 15 were acquitted of the “conspiracy to
commit genocide” charge—indicating that even the NATO-
power vetted ICTR’s judges have not been persuaded to
“convict defendants of conspiracy to commit genocide.”
Given this fact, it would have been more honest had the 11
co-signers written instead that the ICTR’s stunning record of
acquittals and reversals on appeal on the conspiracy charge
has only been broken following some early machinations by
the Prosecution to seek guilty plea agreements through
malpractice and coercion, as in the case of Jean Kambanda.
But now we are talking about the role of integrity in the
prospering field of “Genocide Studies,” one that is
remarkably politicized.
Gerald Caplan was also among the 11 co-signers of the
letter to the New York Times. In the Organization of African
Unity’s 2000 report Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide,
Caplan et al. addressed the “Genocide Fax.” Echoing both
Philip Gourevitch’s (1998) and Human Rights Watch’s (1999)
earlier conflation of the Connaughton version of the fax with
the now missing original version of it, the OAU report treats
Jean-Pierre as a credible source as well as repeating the
“anti-Tutsi extermination” theme. Although this report
accurately summarizes the response that the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations in New York City sent back to
Dallaire, “denying him permission to seize the arms caches
revealed by Jean-Pierre,” it fails to notice the discrepancy
between the DPKO’s response about arms caches and the
alleged extermination theme of the fax.209 Well before 2000,
the apocryphal “Genocide Fax” had successfully supplanted
the original within the establishment histories of Rwanda
1994.
In a personal attack on Michael Dobbs that Caplan
posted to the Rabble.ca website, Caplan took issue with the
“central proposition” of Dobb’s New York Times commentary:
“Whether,” in Dobbs’s words, “the genocide was planned,
and was thus foreseeable, has been hotly debated by
scholars, politicians and lawyers.”210 Caplan also let it slip
that he and the other co-signers had sent “another letter in
confidence to the head of the [Holocaust Memorial]
Museum,” and that “several members of our group
contacted senior Museum officials. We demanded the
obvious: that Dobbs’ piece be immediately removed from the
Museum website.”211
Aside from the fact that Caplan and his associates here
show themselves to be “Rwandan genocide-” enforcers
ready to engage in academic repression whenever someone
challenges the standard model, Caplan is onto something
important. As regards Dobbs, Caplan writes that “If [the
genocide] were unplanned, that meant the killings were
spontaneous. If so, perhaps there was no intent to
exterminate all Tutsi. If so, according to the 1948 UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, there was no genocide at all.”
This logical—indeed dangerous—conclusion is what so
infuriated Caplan et al., and mobilized them to attack Dobbs
at both the New York Times and Holocaust Memorial
Museum. If no plan existed among Rwanda’s Hutu population
prior to the assassination of Habyarimana to exterminate the
country’s Tutsi population, then, as Caplan concedes, the
Hutu-side of the killings that began late that night and the
next day must have been “spontaneous,” a response to the
crisis that engulfed the country.212 For Caplan, however, this
conclusion is unacceptable. Either there was a Hutu plan to
exterminate the Tutsi, or “there was no genocide at all.” But
this either-or is both historically false as well as illogical; an
alternative explanation comes to mind (ours), but they
cannot conceive of the possibility that the mass killings of
1994 stemmed mainly from RPF plans and actions. Nor can
they allow this thought to have a public hearing. And if and
when it does, they must attack and slander whoever gives it
a hearing; as we have seen, such people are guilty of
“genocide denial,” “revisionism,” and the like.213 Surely,
Kagame-Power’s attack and slander apparatus is grateful for
all of the assistance they provide it.214
Both Christopher Black and one of the present authors
(Peterson) also submitted letters to the editor of the New
York Times challenging Dobbs’s treatment of the “Genocide
Fax,” though of course from different angles than did
Melvern and associates. Black engaged in a number of email
exchanges with Times editors as well as with Dobbs himself
in an effort to show them the error of their ways, and
Peterson engaged with Times editors over the co-signed
letter’s patent falsehoods. But neither Black nor Peterson
were able to persuade the Times to publish any version of
their rebuttals. Today, the truth of the Hutu-based “Rwandan
genocide” remains so deeply ingrained in the collective
mindset of much of the world that obvious facts cannot
penetrate, and falsehoods are institutionalized and defended
by power and by the emotional attachments to the party-
line.
12. Role of UN, human rights
groups, media, and
intellectuals in promulgating
the standard model
As an organization, the United Nations is heavily
dependent on the policies and actions of its Member States.
Generally speaking, the more powerful a Member State
outside the UN, the more powerful it will be in the UN,
particularly in its relations to the Security Council and the
Executive Office of the Secretary-General. On many issues,
the UN can be managed by determined Great Powers.
The United States and its close allies, the U.K. and
Canada, have guided the UN on Rwanda-related issues since
the early 1990s. They arranged for the establishment of the
ICTR and greatly influenced its work, their muscle appearing
most dramatically in their ability to quash the Hourigan
investigation and otherwise prevent the ICTR from
investigating the assassination of Habyarimana; in their
ability to get the Gersony report that featured RPF civilian
massacres kept out of public view;215 and in their ability to
use the ICTR to prosecute their Hutu enemies from 1994,
and to sustain the culture of RPF impunity through the
present day.
In a stunning event, they were also able to get the
Security Council to make official the standard model’s
foundational lie that there was a “1994 Genocide against the
Tutsi in Rwanda,” to quote from Resolution 2150,216 which
the Council adopted on April 16, 2014, during a session
devoted to the “Prevention and fight against genocide.”217
That day, ambassadors mentioned Rwanda 140 times during
the session, a staggering total. Resolution 2150 recalls the
decision by the ICTR appeals chamber in June 2006 that “it
was a ‘fact of common knowledge’ that ‘between 6 April and
17 July 1994, there was a genocide in Rwanda against the
Tutsi ethnic group’,” and that the appeals chamber had taken
“judicial notice” of this. Moreover, the Resolution “Condemns
without reservation any denial of this Genocide, and urges
Member states to develop educational programs that will
inculcate future generations with the lessons of the Genocide
in order to prevent future genocides….”218 This was a
“landmark decision,” the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
reported.219 We do not believe that the Security Council has
ever been used in this manner previously (i.e., to issue a
proclamation about the truth of an historical event), not even
as regards the Nazi-managed holocaust. In 2014, Kagame
Power had reached its pinnacle.
Human rights groups played an ugly role in the mass
killings in Rwanda. Major organizations like Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International as a matter of policy ignore
the crime of aggression and focus on war crimes carried out
in the wake of aggressions, as they did in the cases of the
U.S. attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Iraq.
This is very convenient for the United States, given its
prolific record of aggression in recent decades.220 In the case
of Rwanda, this exclusion allowed human rights groups to
ignore the RPF’s aggression from Uganda in 1990 and later,
and to ignore the RPF’s illegal occupation of parts of three
prefectures in the north, while focusing on the Habyarimana
government’s responsive crackdown on the invaders and
their suspected local allies.
We noted in Section 2 that as early as March 1993, the
International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights
Abuses in Rwanda had begun to frame Habyarimana and his
close associates with accusations of “genocide.”221 Some
months later, in August 1993, the UN’s first Special
Rapporteur on Rwanda concluded that certain massacres
and acts of intercommunal violence “could fall within” the
Genocide Convention.222 Thus as early as 1993, these two
baseless and politicized findings for Rwanda served to
establish the dominant interpretive framework for much of
the reporting on Rwanda that followed. Neither of these
reports had much to say about the RPF invasion and ethnic
cleansing which pushed out and turned into refugees several
hundred thousand Hutu farmers. Alison Des Forges, a co-
chair of the International Commission, claimed later that its
report “put Rwanda human rights abuses squarely before the
international community.”223 The RPF used this report as
justification for a new killing spree. We believe that this and
other reports and claims of supposed human rights groups
contributed substantially to the demonization of the
Habyarimana government and Rwanda’s Hutu population
more generally, to wide support for the RPF, and thus to the
serial genocides carried out by the RPF in Rwanda and then
Zaire-DRC.
Alison Des Forges was an important figure both in
tearing down the Habyarimana and subsequent interim
government and in building support for the RPF, with a
stream of human rights documents, articles, public
advocacy, and eventual witness-for-the-prosecution
testimony at the ICTR, all based on the standard model and
delivered by her as an expert on Rwanda and a human rights
advocate. In global media citations in relation to Rwanda
after October 1, 1990, Des Forges received 939 mentions,
even though she has been dead since February 12, 2009.224
Des Forges also played a more direct political role, with her
Human Rights Watch colleagues lobbying at the United
Nations in New York City in May 1994 to get the relevant
delegations to recognize RPF representatives and to discredit
those of the Rwandan interim government.225 Less well
known and less publicized was the fact that she had been a
consultant with the U.S. State Department in the early
1990s, and for many years had engaged in what her own
Curriculum Vitae described as “advocacy and information
meetings” with the Pentagon and U.S. National Security
Council, members of Congress, delegations to the United
Nations (the United States, France, Belgium, and Britain are
named), members of the UN Secretariat, and the editorial
boards of the New York Times and Washington Post, among
other venues.226 This is of course unmentioned by the
establishment media, and probably would not influence
views of her independence and objectivity.
In “Propaganda and Practice,” one section of her “Leave
None To Tell the Story”, Des Forges manages to take what
has now been the RPF’s actual practices for the past 24
years and attribute 100 percent of them to “Hutu Power.”227
In this upside-down section, she writes about a
“mimeographed document entitled ‘Note Relative à la
Propagande d’-Expansion et de Recrutement’,” allegedly
discovered by accident somewhere in Butare prefecture,
sometime after the RPF’s victory. In this document, “one
propagandist tells others how to sway the public most
effectively,” she writes. For “propagandist,” read Hutu
propagandist. Indeed, Des Forges uses the word
“propagandist(s)” 49 times in the section alone, and
“propaganda” another 12 times, always in reference to Hutu
propagandists.

Des Forges’s Hutu propagandist draws ideas and

inspiration from Roger Mucchielli’s 1970 book, Psychologie
de la publicité et de la propaganda, as well as Lenin and
Goebbels. This Hutu propagandist “proposes two techniques
that were to become often used in Rwanda” by the Hutu.
“The first is to ‘create’ events to lend credence to
propaganda.” Her example was the RPF’s “ ‘attack’ on Kigali
on October 4-5, 1990”—an attack that actually did occur,
based on clandestine RPF cells already present in Kigali.228
Her Hutu propagandist “calls his second proposal
‘Accusation in a mirror’, meaning his colleagues should
impute to his enemies exactly what they and their own party
are planning to do.” Unable to detect the irony in attributing
ideas such as these to a Hutu propagandist, Des Forges adds
that “with such a tactic, propagandists can persuade
listeners and ‘honest people’ that they are being attacked
and are justified in taking whatever measures are necessary
‘for legitimate [self-] defense’.”229 As we’ve seen throughout,
these passages are perfectly accurate descriptions not only
of the RPF’s propaganda (e.g., its repeated warnings of a
planned Hutu genocide against the Tutsi to justify its war on
the Habyarimana government and, later, against Zaire-DRC
as well)—but also of Alison Des Forges’s. In a subsection
titled “Restoring the Old Regime,” Des Forges writes: “From
the first days of the war, officials and [Hutu] propagandists
alike warned that the RPF had come to re-establish their total
Tutsi control over the Hutu.”230 But Des Forges treats this as
nothing more than Hutu propaganda, even though total RPF
control over Rwanda’s Hutu population has been a fact on
the ground for most of the past 20 years!
Conflicts of interest among the standard model experts
are commonplace. One of the most influential commentators
on Rwanda has been Philip Gourevitch, a feature writer for
The New Yorker, whose 1998 book We wish to inform you
that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from
Rwanda was a rare popular essay on Rwanda 1994. Along
with Des Forges, Gourevitch has been perhaps the best-
known U.S. commentator on the subject. He was an
important disseminator of the “Genocide Fax,”231 the
authenticity of which he has never questioned. Not well
known was the fact that he was in the late 1990s the
brother-in-law of James Rubin, the Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs in the Clinton administration,232 and
likely source of the “Genocide Fax.” Gourevitch’s main
conflict of interest, though, is with himself: An ardent admirer
of Paul Kagame and an advocate for Kagame Power,
everything he writes reflects these facts. For Gourevitch,
Rwanda 1994 is a story of good guys and bad guys.233 He
likes to quote Kagame lavishly and uncritically, as when
Kagame told him, “Personally, I have no problem with telling
the truth;” Gourevitch used this insight into the great man’s
soul to conclude that “In a world where politicians were
presumed to be liars, Kagame had found that one could
often gain a surprise advantage by not being false.”234
Gourevitch has also been a vulgar apologist for RPF
attacks on Hutu refugees in Rwanda and later Zaire-DRC. He
makes the RPF’s April 1995 massacre of at least 4,000
internally displaced Hutu at the Kibeho camp in southern
Rwanda into a kind of national purification following the
“genocide”—after all, there were “génocidaires” at
Kibeho.235 He even accepts the far-fetched results of the so-
called Independent International Commission of Inquiry into
the events at Kibeho (“The tragedy of Kibeho neither
resulted from a planned action by Rwandan authorities to kill
a certain group of people, nor was it an accident that could
have been prevented.”236) as genuine and fair—exactly as
the RPF did.237 As for the much larger Hutu refugee camps in
Zaire-DRC, Gourevitch descends to the outrageous. Many of
the refugees did not deserve refugee status—they were
“fugitives fleeing criminal prosecution” in Kagame’s newly
liberated Rwanda, and “all of us who paid taxes in countries
that paid the UNHCR…were feeding [them].” Worse, he
complains that “breeding more Hutus was Hutu Power
policy” at these camps, so we were paying for that, too. The
“Hutu Power patronage network” really had it nice in the
camps. Free food, water, sanitation, medical care, well-
stocked pharmacies, two-story video bars, libraries,
churches, brothels, photo studios—the camps were a
veritable land of “refugee entitlements” and “rump genocidal
state” all in one.238 This is possibly the sickest performance
of the many apologists for a real genocide.
 Looking at media bias on Rwanda more broadly, Table 2
represents relative access to the world’s media according to
two broad categories: Does the potential contributor toe the
party-line on the “Rwandan genocide” (as exemplified by
figures such as Paul Kagame, his foreign minister Louise
Mushikiwabo, Roméo Dallaire, Gerald Caplan, and Linda
Melvern)? Or does the potential contributor dissent from one
or more key components of the party-line (as exemplified by
figures such as the former Kagame allies Faustin
Twagiramungu and Theogene Rudasingwa, and by Robin
Philpot, Christopher Black, Peter Erlinder, Christian
Davenport, and Allan Stam)?
The first numbers that jump out at us are the totals:
Over the ten year period through April 30, 2014, individuals
with a history of advocacy for the standard model of the
“Rwandan genocide” were published ten-and-one-half times
as frequently as persons whose work dissents from the
standard model (181 to 17). During this period, Paul
Kagame’s byline alone appeared as many times as the group
of 20 dissenters (17).239 Serious dissent from the standard
model means exclusion from (and often ridicule by) virtually
all media discussion that turns on the events in Rwanda
1994.

Table 2. Bylined-articles on Rwanda in the world’s

media, April 1, 2004 - April 30, 2014240

20 Advocates for the 20 Dissenters from the

Standard Model of the Standard Model of the
“Rwandan Genocide” “Rwandan Genocide”

Gerald Caplan: Pierre Péan:

30 9
Linda Melvern: 27 Robin Philpot: 2
Roméo Dallaire: Theogene Rudasingwa:
25 2
Paul Kagame: Keith Harmon Snow:
17 2
Colette Braeckman: Jacques-Roger Booh-
13 Booh: 1
Louise Mushikiwabo: Peter Erlinder:
12 1
Gary J.Bass: Luc Marchal:
8 0
Mahmood Mamdani: Christopher Black:
7 0
Samantha Power: Barrie Collins:
6 0
Philip Gourevitch: Thierry Cruvellier:
6 0
Fergal Keane: Christian Davenport:
6 0
Ben Kiernan: Amadou Deme:
 4 0
Deborah Lipstadt: Tiphaine Dickson:
4 0
Tony Blair: Charles Kambanda:
3 0
Daniel Jonah Bernard Lugan:
Goldhagen: 3 0
Samuel Totten: Charles Onana:
3 0
Michael Barnett: Peter Robinson:
2 0
Bill Clinton: Allan Stam:
2 0
Herman J. Cohen: Helmut Strizek:
2 0
Rakiya Omaar: Faustin Twagiramungu:
1 0
_____ _____
TOTAL TOTAL
181 17
 But beyond the number totals a further lesson lies in the
media venues of standard model spokespersons and the
dissenters. The fact that Kagame has been provided with
space to “talk his book” twice in the Wall Street Journal
(including one on April 7, 2014241) and twice in The Times of
London we believe to be very significant, as is the fact that
his colleague Louise Mushikiwabo has also enjoyed
substantial access, including two commentaries in The
Independent (London). This has been the pattern throughout.
Advocates for the standard model enjoy not just access—
they enjoy access to major media outlets. Whereas ardent
Kagame-apologist Gerald Caplan’s byline on Rwanda has
dominated the establishment Canadian media and been a
mainstay at the prestigious Toronto Globe and Mail, Linda
Melvern’s byline a mainstay at The Guardian (7
commentaries in all, while none of our 20 dissenters had
any), and Roméo Dallaire appears to be able to publish on
this topic anywhere he chooses around Canada as well as at
the New York Times, our 20 dissenters (with the exception of
the French writer Pierre Péan) have been limited to politically
marginal media venues such as the online Global Research
(3) and Dissident Voice (1) websites, the allAfrica aggregator
website (2), the Montreal-based French-language newspaper,
Le Devoir (1), and France’s Le Figaro (1). However, the
number of dissenters is inflated by the fact that one of them,
Pierre Péan, published 9 of the 17 items, all in French
publications, none of the first rank in circulation.242 These
results underscore the fact that like his cohorts, Péan, a
distinguished French journalist, has had zero access to
establishment English-language media venues, which
systematically operate in a universe where the ultimate
criterion for inclusion is service to power.
This modest list exhausts the dissenters’ access. Over
the ten-year period our survey covers, no less than 14 out of
the 20 dissenters had zero byline access to express their
perspectives. But this is clearly not because they have had
nothing to say on the topic of the “Rwandan genocide.” The
party line makes them genocide deniers, hence properly
ignored, although as we have contended here they are
actually opposing the misallocation of responsibility for
genocide (in Rwanda) and apologetics for a second and
larger genocide (DRC).

Concluding Note: Genocidist

misallocation (Rwanda) and
the real genocide denial
(DRC)
We have stressed that when examined closely, all of the
major themes incorporated in the establishment story of the
“Rwandan genocide” unravel before our eyes. “Rwandan
Hutus in 1994 could freely, joyfully, and systematically
slaughter 8,000 Tutsi a day for 100 days without any foreign
interference,” Samantha Power has written,243 condensing
three key misleading elements into a single sentence: That
foreign powers stood idly by while massive killing took place,
that 800,000 Tutsi were slaughtered, and that as an invading
force from Uganda, the RPF doesn’t count among the foreign
powers, but must have been one of the indigenous forces
engaged in a civil war.
We have seen that the notion of a Hutu “conspiracy to
commit genocide”—the most fundamental claim of all—has
completely unraveled, and in the most interesting of venues:
The trial and appeals chambers of the ICTR itself. We have
also seen that as of the second-half of 1993, the RPF had
already achieved military superiority over the Armed Forces
of Rwanda, and that this was the assessment of Dallaire’s
Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda in August of that year,
which he duly reported to the UN Secretary-General the
following month. And we have seen how the RPF, having
fought for power in Rwanda for three-and-a-half years,
ultimately stood to lose their war under the Arusha Accords,
as the national elections called for by them could only end in
a landslide defeat for their ethnic Tutsi, who comprised some
10 percent of the population at most. The result: The RPF
leadership’s decision to assassinate Habyarimana, to launch
the final offensive the very same evening, and to seize state
power through extreme violence over the next 100 days.244
“More than 800,000 people were systematically killed—
overwhelmingly the Tutsi, and also moderate Hutu, Twa and
others,” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said during the
twentieth anniversary ceremony in Kigali.245 We have shown
that this, too, is a major lie, and that the evidence is clear
that Hutu were the primary victims, which is entirely
plausible given the RPF’s military superiority and rapid
victory. It also explains why the United States and its allies
and the UN did not intervene to stop the bloodshed: They
supported Paul Kagame at all times. And as he was on the
road to victory and wanted no outside interference, the
United States and the rest of the “international community”
obliged him, viewing the huge bloodbath as acceptable
“collateral damage,” with hypocritical apologies to follow.
But this policy went beyond non-intervention—Kagame was
supported logistically and diplomatically, and the United
States and its allies deliberately forced the reduction of UN
troops as the mass killings escalated. Thus when Bill Clinton
said in a 2013 interview that “If we’d gone in sooner, I
believe we could have saved at least a third of the lives that
were lost…it had an enduring impact on me,”246 he managed
to combine an implicit lie with rank hypocrisy.
We have also stressed that the U.S., U.K., and allied
support of the Kagame-RPF invasion, subversion, mass killing
and conquest of Rwanda was followed up within two years by
the U.S.-U.K.-supported Kagame-Museveni invasion and
mass killings in Zaire-DRC. Through the present day, this
involved the eventual deaths of several million local civilians
and Hutu refugees, greatly exceeding the numbers that
perished in the “Rwandan genocide.” Still ongoing, this was
done under the guise of pursuing Hutu “génocidaires” in
Zaire-DRC, a serviceable cover for the pursuit of material
and geopolitical aims on the part of both the local killer-
managers (Kagame et al) and their major supporters (the
United States et al). The “génocidaire” excuse was
swallowed in the West and contributed, along with the quiet
support of Kagame and Museveni, to very modest publicity in
the United States and the usual failure of the UN to take any
action against the true mass killers.
This kind of purposeful inaction has also extended to the
International Criminal Court. First, we should note that in
contrast to the situation in Rwanda 1994 (or in the former
Yugoslavia during the 1990s), no ad hoc tribunal has ever
been created by the Security Council for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Zaire-DRC from 1996 onward
(to paraphrase Resolution 955, which created the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). Although the
killing fields of Zaire-DRC dwarf those of Rwanda and even
more so the former Yugoslavia, no new ad hoc tribunal is
likely to materialize, either. As long as Kagame and Museveni
remain useful tools of U.S. power in central Africa, they will
remain beyond prosecution.

Second, and equally revealing, since its inception in July

2002, the ICC has only managed to bring indictments against
six individuals operating in the eastern DRC, either in the
Ituri district of Orientale Province or in North and South Kivu
provinces. But none of these figures was a “Big Fish,” to
recall the language favored by the ICTR’s Prosecution;
instead, all six were local or regional militia leaders, some
with ties to the Hutu refugees, some not, but all involved in
one form or another with local resource exploitation and its
protection racket.247
Of course, the ICC has never brought or even threatened
to bring an indictment against the Biggest Fish in the Great
Lakes pond: Paul Kagame, a man who remains eminently
indictable for the actions of his forces in the DRC during the
now 12-year period over which the ICC’s temporal
jurisdiction extends. Here we have yet another confirmation
of the real culture of RPF impunity. To recall ICTR Chief
Prosecutor Hassan Jallow’s words (applicable to the
supposedly more independent ICC): The Statute of the ICC
itself does not require the prosecution of all offenders—a
maxim that we might inscribe on the tombstone of
“international justice” as the Great Powers bury it in the first
decades of the 21st century. As with common usage of the
term “genocide,” the bringing of indictments for the crime of
genocide is always political, and follows a simple rule: Only
the enemies of the Great White Northern Powers commit
“genocide” for which they may be charged and prosecuted
by a tribunal, whether ad hoc or permanent, but never these
powers, and never their allies and clients.248 In Mrs.
Sheldon’s famous response to the question, “Why should
King Leopold be afraid of submitting his case to the Hague
tribunal?” as recounted by the British journalist William
Thomas Stead in 1905, she explained: “Men do not go to the
gallows and put their heads in a noose if they can avoid
it.”249 But this is precisely what the standard model of the
“Rwandan genocide” has enabled for the past 20 years, as it
has played its insidious Orwellian role, camouflaging the
RPF’s real genocides against millions of people first in
Rwanda and then Zaire-DRC, while awarding these real
génocidaires with a “victims’” license to go right on
killing.250
“Historical clarity is a duty of memory that we cannot
escape,” Paul Kagame said at the twentieth anniversary
ceremony in Kigali. “Behind the words ‘Never Again’, there is
a story whose truth must be told in full, no matter how
uncomfortable.”251
At this stage it should be unnecessary to note that these
words were spoken by a man who is quite possibly the
greatest mass murderer alive today. However, the fact that
Paul Kagame—as King Leopold II of Belgium once did (1865-
1909)—continues to live and work freely in the world,
unthreatened by “international justice,” celebrated as the
Abe Lincoln of his war-torn domain in central Africa, and
highly regarded and honored in the United States, Britain,
and Canada, shows us unambiguously that when the events
in Rwanda 1994 are the issue, things as fragile as truth and
historical clarity are only able to survive as exiles from these
powers. From today on, it is time to start calling the exiles
home.

Appendix I: More on the

alleged Hutu “conspiracy to
commit genocide” that never
was
As noted in Section 7, the ICTR’s trial and appeals
chambers have been doing something that we find quite
remarkable, given the ICTR’s overall pro-RPF and anti-Hutu
political role and biases: In their judgments, they have been
either acquitting Hutu defendants on the “conspiracy to
commit genocide” charge, or reversing on appeal previous
convictions on this charge.
Here we’d like to briefly summarize the judgments in the
major cases as regards the “conspiracy to commit genocide”
charge, reiterating what we stated in Section 7: That a Hutu
“conspiracy to commit genocide” refers to a conspiracy that
existed some time prior to April 6, 1994, so that once the
assassination of Habyarimana had been carried out, the Hutu
conspirators could also carry out their plan to exterminate
the Tutsi.
In the Government I trial of Édouard Karemera, a leading
figure in the Mouvement Républicain National pour la
Démocratie et le Développement, and who later served as
the Minister of the Interior for the interim government, and
Matthieu Ngirumpatse, president of the MRND, the oral
summary of the verdict read out in court in December 2011
was stunning. “The Prosecution has not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that Karemera and Ngirumpatse, or other
leaders, planned the massacre of Tutsis in advance of the
assassination of President Habyarimana,” Judge Dennis
Byron said. “The Chamber acknowledges that the genocide
may have started as a spontaneous reaction to the
assassination of President Habyarimana, which was fuelled
by the belief that the Tutsi-led RPF was responsible, and prior
anti-Tutsi propaganda.”252
Comparable acquittals or reversals on appeal were also
handed down in the other 12 major cases known as
Government II, Military I, and Military II. Taking them in the
order in which the relevant judgments were delivered, with
the four acquittals on the conspiracy charge in the Military I
trial preceding the rest (including the aforementioned
Government I acquittals), and doubtless establishing a
precedent on this charge for all of the judgments that
followed:

Military I Trial

Théoneste Bagosora : “NOT GUILTY of Conspiracy to

Commit Genocide.” (Judge Erik Møse et al., Judgment,
Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-
41-T, December 18, 2008, para. 2258, p. 568, <
http://tinyurl.com/ncarqtd >.)

Gratien Kabiligi : “NOT GUILTY of Conspiracy to

Commit Genocide.” (Ibid., para. 2258, p. 568, <
http://tinyurl.com/ncarqtd >.)

Aloys Ntabakuze : “NOT GUILTY of Conspiracy to

Commit Genocide.” (Ibid., para. 2258, p. 569, <
http://tinyurl.com/ncarqtd >.)

Anatole Nsengiyumva : “NOT GUILTY of Conspiracy to

Commit Genocide.” (Ibid., para. 2258, p. 569, <
http://tinyurl.com/ncarqtd >.)

Military II Trial

Augustin Ndindiliyimana : “Not Guilty of Conspiracy to

Commit Genocide.” (Judge Asoka de Silva et al., Judgment,
Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-
00-56-T, May 17, 2011, para. 262, p. 486, <
http://tinyurl.com/mh3vzop >.)

Augustin Bizimungu : “Not Guilty of Conspiracy to

Commit Genocide.” (Ibid., para. 262, p. 486, <
http://tinyurl.com/mh3vzop >.)

François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye : “Not Guilty of

Conspiracy to Commit Genocide.” (Ibid., para. 262, p. 486, <
http://tinyurl.com/mh3vzop >.)

Innocent Sagahutu : “Not Guilty of Conspiracy to

Commit Genocide.” (Ibid., para. 262, p. 487, <
http://tinyurl.com/mh3vzop >.)

Government II Trial
 Casimir Bizimungu : “NOT GUILTY of Conspiracy to
Commit Genocide.” (Judge Khalida Rachid Khan et al.,
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Case No.
ICTR-99-50-T, September 30, 2011, para. 1988, p. 538, <
http://tinyurl.com/mc985pr >.)

Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka : “NOT GUILTY of

Conspiracy to Commit Genocide.” (Ibid., para. 1988, p. 539,
< http://tinyurl.com/mc985pr >.)

Justin Mugenzi : “The Appeals Chamber reverses,

Judge Liu dissenting, Mugenzi’s and Mugiraneza’s convictions
for conspiracy to commit genocide and enters a verdict of
acquittal under Count 1 of the Indictment.” (Judge Theodor
Meron et al., Judgment on Appeal, Justin Mugenzi and
Prosper Mugiraneza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-50-
A, February 4, 2014, para. 94, p. 34, <
http://tinyurl.com/mljl4un >.)

Prosper Mugiraneza : “The Appeals Chamber reverses,

Judge Liu dissenting, Mugenzi’s and Mugiraneza’s convictions
for conspiracy to commit genocide and enters a verdict of
acquittal under Count 1 of the Indictment.” (Ibid., para. 94,
p. 34, < http://tinyurl.com/mljl4un >.)

We also reviewed some of the other high-profile cases:

Those of the three defendants in the “Role of the Media”
trial, and the six defendants in the “Butare” trial. In eight out
of nine of these cases, we found the same results:
Straightforward acquittals or reversals on appeal.
Thus in the “Role of the Media” cases, allegedly based on
broadcasts by Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)
in association with its founder and Steering Committee
member, Ferdinand Nahimana, and fellow Steering
Committee member Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, along with
material published by Kangura magazine’s Editor-in-Chief,
Hassan Nzeze, the convictions of all three on the conspiracy
charge were reversed on appeal. “The Appeals Chamber
finds that a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude
beyond reasonable doubt…that the only reasonable possible
inference was that the Appellants had personally
collaborated and organized institutional coordination
between RTLM, the CDR253 and Kangura with the specific
purpose of committing genocide.”254
Turning to the “Butare” cases: The Butare prefecture was
the scene of massive amounts of violence in 1994 (including
RPF killings of Hutu, as Robert Gersony’s mission to Rwanda
found255), and the six Hutu defendants were all accused of
organizing the violence against Tutsi locally. Nevertheless,
the trial chamber found five of these defendants “NOT
GUILTY of Conspiracy to Commit Genocide”—only Pauline
Nyiramasuhuko, the Minister for Family Welfare and
Advancement of Women, was found “GUILTY of Conspiracy to
Commit Genocide.” 256 But even this verdict is self-
contradictory, as none of Nyiramasuhuko’s co-defendants
(alleged co-conspirators) was found guilty on the conspiracy
charge. Are we to believe that Nyiramasuhuko conspired with
her co-conspirators, but her co-conspirators never conspired
with her? Moreover, her alleged conspiracy began on or after
April 9, 1994, so that by its timing alone, it falls outside what
is understood as the Hutu “conspiracy to commit genocide.”
Nyiramasuhuko has appealed her conviction on the
conspiracy charge, and we fully expect it to be reversed, like
the others.
In the “Conspiracy to Commit Genocide” section in the
Judgment rendered in the Military I trial—Col. Bagosora
among the four defendants, a man often represented as the
epitome of “Hutu Power” and the “mastermind of the
genocide”—the trial chamber determined that:

[I]n the context of the ongoing war with the RPF, [the]
evidence does not invariably show that the purpose of
arming and training these civilians or the preparation of lists
was to kill Tutsi civilians. After the death of President
Habyarimana, these tools were clearly put to use to facilitate
killings. When viewed against the backdrop of the targeted
killings and massive slaughter perpetrated by civilian and
military assailants between April and July 1994 as well as
earlier cycles of violence, it is understandable why for many
this evidence takes on new meaning and shows a prior
conspiracy to commit genocide. Indeed, these preparations
are completely consistent with a plan to commit genocide.
However, they are also consistent with preparations for a
political or military power struggle…. Accordingly, the
Chamber is not satisfied that the Prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the four Accused conspired
amongst themselves or with others to commit genocide
before it unfolded on 7 April 1994.257

Adopting the logic of the Military I trial chamber—based

in no small part on the logic of the argument laid out in the
May 2007 final trial brief filed by the U.S. defense attorney
Peter Erlinder on behalf of his client, the former Para-
Commando Battalion Commander, Major Aloys Ntabakuze258
—one could just as plausibly argue that when viewed against
the backdrop of its 46 month assault on the Rwandan
government and people, it is understandable why for critics
of the standard model, the evidence of RPF killings and
displacements leads to wholly different conclusions. For what
it strongly suggests is that from some date prior to October
1, 1990, until July 1994, the RPF’s military and political
leadership had conspired among themselves and with others
to wage an aggressive war and to seize state power in
Rwanda, with whatever suffering the Tutsi might endure
written-off as “collateral damage”—as “part of the sacrifice,”
in Kagame’s own words.259 Indeed, according to Military I
logic, the RPF’s execution of its 46 month war was
completely consistent with a plan to commit genocide
against the Hutu, and to ethnically cleanse Rwandan national
territory of its Hutu and Tutsi collaborators.

Appendix II: The apocryphal

“Genocide Fax”—another
look
 On this and the preceding two pages, we’ve reproduced
the topmost sections of the first page of three different
copies of the so-called “Genocide Fax”—the name that The
New Yorker’s Philip Gourevitch gave in 1998260 to the copy
he possessed of an outgoing code cable from UNAMIR Force
Commander Roméo Dallaire in Kigali, to the Canadian
General Maurice Baril at the UN’s Department of Peace-
Keeping Operations in New York City, dated January 11,
1994.
As can be plainly seen in the address box of each of the
three copies, the “Subject” that Dallaire et al. chose for this
cable was “Request For Protection For Informant.” This
informant (though disinformant would more accurately
describe him) was Jean-Pierre Turatsinze, a man who would
shortly thereafter join the Rwandan Patriotic Front, if he
wasn’t already covertly working for the RPF.261

We will not deal with the contents of the “Genocide Fax”

here; we’ve already dealt with its contents in Section 10
(above). In all three copies, however, the contents of the
message are identical, word-for-word. Each copy has 12
numbered paragraphs; each copy skips paragraph 12 (i.e.,
contains paragraphs numbered 1 through 11 and 13, but not
one numbered 12); and each copy is two pages in length.
But we do want to use the information provided by the
three different copies of the “Genocide Fax”—particularly
Copy C—to challenge its authenticity.
Copy A is the copy that Philip Gourevitch first wrote
about in 1998, and it is the copy that Michael Dobbs
reproduced in a commentary he published jointly at the
websites of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
and the National Security Archive in January 2014.262 Notice
that above the phrase “OUTGOING CODE CABLE” in Copy A,
minimal information is provided.
Copy B is the copy that the Prosecution at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda entered as
exhibits during multiple trials of Hutu defendants. On this
copy (B, but not Copy A), above and to the left of
“OUTGOING CODE CABLE,” is written that the Prosecutor in
the trial of the Hutu former general in charge of Rwanda’s
Gendarmerie, Augustin Ndindiliyimana (Case No. ICTR-00-56-
T), entered this document as an exhibit during the testimony
of the Belgian Captain and former UNAMIR member Frank
Claeys on October 11, 2005. But beyond the little bit of
handwriting in the upper right-hand corner of this document,
we find no other new information.
Not so with Copy C, which provides us with three clusters
of new information that are absent from the other two
copies.
 First, unlike Copy A and Copy B, we see that on October
11, 2005, Copy C was entered as an exhibit in the trial of
Augustin Ndindiliyimana, not by the Prosecutor, but by the
general’s defense attorney, the Canadian Christopher Black.
(Of course, Black’s name does not appear. But we know that
Black served as the lead counsel in Ndindiliyimana’s
defense.) This fact is significant, as we will explain below.
Second, as we discussed in Section 10, we can see from
the date-stamp that runs across the top of Copy C that it
originated as a fax sent out on November 27, 1995 by
“Connaughton” (i.e., Richard M. Connaughton, who was at
that time a colonel in the British military and is today a
historian of military affairs). The phrase “Camberley, Surrey”
suggests that Connaughton has a connection with the British
Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in southern England,
where the British Army trains its officers.263
Third, as we also discussed in Section 10, in the upper
left-hand corner of Copy C, we read that “This cable was not
found in DPKO files”—files that the UN’s Department of
Peace-Keeping Operations had searched in the weeks before.
In early November 1995, Shaharyar Khan, the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative for Rwanda since July 1994,
had ordered a review of the UN’s files on Rwanda for the
period October 1993 through March 1994. The Khan review
of the UN files “confirm[ed] the view that there was no
information or indication of planned genocide. There were, of
course, warnings of armed clashes, violence and killings on
an ethnic basis.”264 Thus, two-and-a-half years before
Gourevitch published on the “Genocide Fax” in The New
Yorker, the Khan review had found no record of any such
document in the DPKO’s Rwanda files. The information in the
upper left-hand corner continues: “The present copy was
placed in the files on 28 November 1995,” and this fact is
signed and attested to by Lamin J. Sise at the United Nations’
headquarters in New York City.
 So we learn from these three clusters of new information
that there are serious problems with the authenticity of the
“Genocide Fax.” Since the oldest extant copy of a code cable
dated January 11, 1994 from Dallaire in Kigali to Baril at the
DPKO in New York City could not be found in the DPKO’s
Rwanda files when they were searched in early November
1995, and since it turns out that the oldest extant copy was
only placed in the DPKO’s files on November 28, 1995, after
having been faxed to the DPKO by Colonel Richard
Connaughton the prior day from the town of Camberley in
the English county of Surrey, something is rotten with the
“Genocide Fax.”
Moreover, an important question demands to be
answered: Since the oldest extant copy of this document
(Copy C) includes the three clusters of information we’ve just
reviewed (i.e., that Connaughton faxed it to the DPKO on
November 27, 1995, that Sise placed it in the DPKO’s
Rwanda files on November 28, 1995, and that this vital
information is missing from the other two copies of the fax),
why do both the Gourevitch-Dobbs copy of the document
(Copy A) and the ICTR-Prosecution copy of the document
(Copy B) leave out this vital information?
Christopher Black, the attorney who represented General
Ndindiliyimana at his trial before the ICTR, wrote to the
United Nations in New York City on July 8, 2004 to learn
whether the UN possessed a copy of the “alleged fax or
cable of January 10/11, 1994 supposedly sent from General
Dallaire to Kofi Annan and others at UN HQ in New York…?”
As Ralph Zacklin, the acting legal counsel in the UN’s Office
of Legal Counsel, replied to Black on August 11: “[W]e are
providing you with a copy of a fax dated 11 January 1994
from General Dallaire to General Baril of DPKO that seems to
match the description of the document provided in your
letter. The United Nations has not been able to locate the
original of this document.”265
 That is to say, the copy of the document that the United
Nations was able to locate and the copy of it that Zacklin’s
Office of Legal Counsel faxed to Christopher Black is the one
we’re calling Copy C: The November 27, 1995 Connaughton
Fax. It is only when stripped of the three clusters of
information we have reviewed above that the Connaughton
Fax becomes the “Genocide Fax” (Copy A and Copy B). So
why strip the Connaughton Fax of these three clusters of
information?
The reason is simple: The need to pretend that the
Connaughton Fax isn’t the Connaughton Fax, but rather the
original January 11, 1994 code cable that Dallaire allegedly
sent to Baril at the DPKO in New York City. Otherwise, there is
no “Genocide Fax,” only a fax that features protecting an
informant who claimed knowledge of weapons caches
belonging to the MRND (Mouvement Républicain National
pour la Démocratie et le Développement, the political party
of Rwanda’s then President Juvénal Habyarimana). Exactly as
the Khan-initiated search of the DPKO’s files had determined
as far back as early November 1995 (“there was no
information or indication of planned genocide”), reiterated
by Zacklin in his fax to Black on August 11, 2004 (“The
United Nations has not been able to locate the original of this
document”). Enter the Connaughton Fax, but with the vital
information identifying its November 27, 1995 origin in
Camberley, Surrey, and the November 28, 1995 annotation
by Lamin J. Sise, both removed from it, so as to disguise its
true origin and to pretend that it is the original Dallaire code
cable dated January 11, 1994.
In conclusion, the document that is referred to as the
“Genocide Fax,” which claims that on January 11, 1994,
UNAMIR Force Commander Roméo Dallaire “reported in
startling detail the preparations that were underway to carry
out precisely such an extermination campaign,” as Philip
Gourevitch described it back in 1998,266 ought to be
renamed the Connaughton Fax, accorded zero credibility on
the question of an alleged Hutu plot to exterminate the
country’s Tutsi, and be permanently withdrawn from all
documentary histories related to Rwanda 1994.

Notes
Introduction

1 We carried out three Factiva database searches under

the combined “Wires,” “Newspapers: All,” and
“Transcripts” categories on May 2, 2014, for the periods
April 6 – 8, April 1 – 14, and January 1 - April 30, 2014.
Our search parameters were: rst=(twir or tnwp or ttpt)
and rwanda* w/10 genocid*. The results were as follows:
April 6 – 8: 1,380 items; April 1 – 14: 2,638 items; and
January 1 – April 30, 2014: 6,444 items.

2 Nicholas Watt, “Syria crisis: failure to intervene will

have terrible consequences, says Blair,” The Guardian,
April 8, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/qjy3nqq >

3 Michael Dobbs, “Rwanda’s Shrouded Nightmare,” New

York Times, January 10, 2014.—For the record, although
it is clear that Dobbs believes that genocide was
planned, he was savagely attacked for writing that the
issue “has been hotly debated by scholars, politicians
and lawyers.” See Sections 10 and 11, below. <
http://tinyurl.com/k2ze336 >

4 Michael Dobbs, “Genocide Fax,” Parts I – VI, United

States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014. <
http://tinyurl.com/pgdgnrk >.
5 Michael Dobbs, “The Rwanda ‘Genocide Fax’: What We
Know Now,” Electronic Briefing Book No. 452, The
National Security Archive, January 9, 2014. <
http://tinyurl.com/l7p3yl6 >.

6 See “Rwanda 20 Years Later,” United States Holocaust

Memorial Museum, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/pf2ge7j >.

7 See Philip Gourevitch, “The Genocide Fax,” The New

Yorker, May 11, 1998. < http://tinyurl.com/lxbff7t >

8 “Reflections on the Genocide in Rwanda 20 Years

Later,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
March 18, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/kfo3qrf >

9 See “2014 Elie Wiesel Award,” United States Holocaust

Memorial Museum, April 30, 2014. <
http://tinyurl.com/kvf9sp2 >

10 See, e.g., David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the

Failure of the West (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1995).

11 Although the Rwanda Patriotic Front is a political

organization, and its armed wing from 1990 through July
1994 was known as the Rwandan Patriotic Army, to
simplify matters, throughout our analysis, we will use the
phrase Rwandan Patriotic Front (or RPF) to refer to both
entities. However, after the RPF took power in July 1994,
the Rwandan Patriotic Army became the name of the
national armed forces of Rwanda. Then in 2002, the
Rwandan Patriotic Army was renamed the Rwanda
Defense Force. For more on this, see the website of
Rwanda’s Ministry of Defense. <
http://tinyurl.com/oxxbgbk >

12 See Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-

Genocide Rwanda (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2013), especially Ch. 1-3, pp. 1-97.

13 See Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that

tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from
Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1998), pp. 225-226.

14 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide

Rwanda, p. xiii, quoting a prepared statement by the
Clinton Foundation as Paul Kagame received its 2009
Global Citizens Award, September 23, 2009.

15 “Elie Wiesel and President Paul Kagame in the Great

Hall,” Cooper Union, New York City, September 30, 2013.
< http://tinyurl.com/mjlf2jw >.

16 “President Kagame attends Milken Institute Global

Conference,” Los Angeles, Office of the President of
Rwanda, April 28, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/mfny9sx >
1. Rwanda: Background and context

17 William H. Draper III, Human Development Report

1991 (New York: United Nations Development Program,
1991), p. iii. The 1991 report covered the calendar year
1990. Its interpretation of current history was at best
embarrassingly quaint. < http://tinyurl.com/osayf3y >

18 On July 25, 1959, Rwanda’s long-serving Tutsi King

Mutara Rudahigwa died. His successor, the young Tutsi
King Kigeri Ndahindurwa, was deposed in early 1960. All
of Rwanda’s kings had been Tutsi. Ndahindurwa was
Rwanda’s last king. (See Arial Sabar, “A King With No
Country,” The Washingtonian, March 27, 2013.) <
http://tinyurl.com/cr2qg22 >

19 See Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression:

Citizenship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860 – 1960 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), especially Ch. 3,
“State and Society under Rwabugiri,” pp. 38-52. Also see
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers:
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001),
especially Ch. 2, “The Origins of Hutu and Tutsi,” pp. 41-
75.

20 Ibid., p. 75.—As Catharine Newbury explains the

genesis of the modern political identities of “Hutu” and
“Tutsi” within Rwanda: “The state-building efforts of
[King] Rwabugiri [1860-1895] heightened awareness of
ethnic differences….[L]ines of distinction were altered
and sharpened, as the categories of Hutu and Tuutsi [her
spelling] assumed new hierarchical overtones associated
with proximity to the central court—proximity to power.
Later, when the political arena widened and the intensity
of political activity increased, these classifications
became increasingly stratified and rigidified. More than
simply conveying the connotation of cultural difference
from Tuutsi, Hutu identity came to be associated with
and eventually defined by inferior status….[T]he political
salience of membership in one ethnic category or
another came to depend on power….Under Rwabugiri,
Tuutsi and Hutu became political labels; ‘ethnicity’, such
as it was, came to assume a political importance,
determining a person’s life chances and relations with
the authorities. With the establishment of European
colonial rule in the country, ethnic categories came to be
even more rigidly defined, while the disadvantages of
being Hutu and the advantages of being Tuutsi increased
significantly. Passing from one ethnic category to another
was not impossible, but over time it became exceedingly
difficult and, consequently, very rare.” (Newbury, The
Cohesion of Oppression, pp. 51-52.)

21 Ibid., especially Ch. 9, “Pre-Independence Politics and

Protests,” pp. 180-206; here p. 191. As Gérard Prunier
observes: “[T]he reality [the Manifesto] referred to,
namely the humiliation and socio-economic inferiority of
the Hutu community, could not be doubted.” (The
Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 45.)
22 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, p. 193.

23 Ibid., p. 187.

24 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 49.

25 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, p. 198.

26 According to Prunier: “The reason for letting

Kayibanda starve rather than killing him seems to have
been President Habyarimana’s superstitious fear that his
blood oath of fidelity to the former head of state would
cause him harm if he actually shed the blood of the ex-
President.” (Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, n. 72, p. 82.)

27 Ibid., pp. 51-54.

28 See Ogenga Otunnu, “Rwandese Refugees and

Immigrants in Uganda,” in Howard Adelman and Astri
Suhrke, Eds., The Path of Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis
from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1999), Table 1.1, p. 9; and Table 1.4, p. 20.
29 Catharine Watson, Exile from Rwanda: Background to
an Invasion (Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee for
Refugees, February, 1991), p. 11. <
http://tinyurl.com/mb3qqtt >

30 See Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s

Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It (Hoboken, NJ: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), pp. 62-68. For the record, we
regard Kinzer’s book as a hagiography of Kagame Power,
and Kinzer as a stenographer for the same. When we
quote from his book, we do so with these caveats in
mind.

31 In the overwhelming majority of the accounts of the

RPF’s October 1, 1990 invasion of Rwanda, the RPF’s
soldiers are treated as “deserters” or “defectors” from
the Ugandan People’s Defense Force, with the UPDF
playing no role in the RPF’s war. But this is false, and has
always served as a cover story to hide the truth. In fact,
the RPF was built-up within the UPDF with the full
knowledge of President Museveni, and under UPDF Major
General Fred Rwigyema, the RPF simply detached from
the UPDF to carry out the invasion of Rwanda. When this
initial invasion was badly defeated by the Armed Forces
of Rwanda (with the crucial assistance of French,
Belgian, and Zairean troops), and nearly destroyed in
late 1990, the RPF retreated to Uganda, where they
reassembled, gathered new UPDF recruits, and were
resupplied by the UPDF, as well as by the United States
and Britain. The RPF re-launched its invasion of Rwanda
under Paul Kagame’s command on January 23, 1991. As
Ogenga Otunnu has written, “The existing evidence…
indicates that [Museveni’s] regime trained, provided
sanctuary, arms, logistical support, political, and
diplomatic assistance to the [RPF] throughout the period
of military engagement in Rwanda.” (“An Historical
Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Army
(RPA),” in Adelman and Suhrke, Eds., The Path of
Genocide, pp. 31-49; here p. 48. (Also see Ssemujju
Ibrahim Nganda, “Open Secrets: Museveni’s untold role
in RPF war,” The Observer [Kampala], July 8, 2009.) <
http://tinyurl.com/pj7nkxk >

32 Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, p. 49.

33 Catharine Watson observes that, “Before the invasion,

it was generally believed by close observers that most
refugees, if offered a free choice to repatriate to Rwanda
or remain (and someday naturalize) in Uganda, would
actually chose the latter….” For Watson, this suggests
that the “‘refugee problem’ could [have been] resolved
with minimal actual repatriation.” (Watson, Exile from
Rwanda, p. 13.) Alas, the RPF never permitted this to
happen. < http://tinyurl.com/mb3qqtt >

34 See the Peace Agreement between the Government

of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front, signed at Arusha on August 4 1993, UN General
Assembly (A/48/824-S/26915), December 23, 1993. A
total of seven documents were gathered together as the
“Arusha Accords,” most notably the two Protocols of
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-
Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based
Transitional Government, October 30, 1992 and January
9, 1993, pp. 22-58; the Protocol of Agreement between
the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of
Rwandese Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced
Persons, June 9, 1993, pp. 59-73; and the Protocol of
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the
Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties,
August 3, 1993, pp. 74-173. < http://tinyurl.com/qcew5fa
>

35 Protocol…on the Integration of the Armed Forces of

the Two Parties, Article 74, pp. 117-119. <
http://tinyurl.com/qcew5fa >

36 Robin Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for

Africa: From Tragedy to Useful Imperial Fiction (Montréal:
Baraka Books, 2013), pp. 58-60.

37 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 199.

38 “Burundi Refugees and Displaced Persons: Fact

Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, March 14, 1994, p. 1.
< http://tinyurl.com/q3n76ju > Also see Kristin Scalzo,
Ed., “The Rwandan Refugee Crisis: Before the Genocide,”
Electronic Briefing Book No. 464, The National Security
Archive, March 31, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/kfd2jol >
39 According to UNAMIR Force Commander Roméo
Dallaire, as of September 1993, “It [was] estimated that,
out of the original 900,000 [internally displaced people in
Rwanda], 350,000 [had] not yet returned home.” In Peter
Erlinder, Ed., Report of the UN Reconnaissance Mission to
Rwanda—August 1993 (Saint Paul, MN: International
Humanitarian Law Institute, 2011), p. 16.

40 U.S. Ambassador Robert A. Flaten, Kigali, Cable No.

1993Kigali 03970, November 4, 1993, para. 8, p. 5 (as
posted by to the website of the National Security
Archive). < http://tinyurl.com/k48awhn >

41 René Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and

Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2nd
Ed., 1996), p. xiv. Also see Ch. 5, “The 1972 watershed,”
pp. 76-105; especially pp. 96-105.

42 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The

Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Vintage Canada,
2004), p. 98.

43 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, n. 15, p. 202.

44 N.A., “Burundi: Implications of the Coup,” U.S.

Department of State, October 29, 1993, reproduced in
Peter Erlinder, The Accidental … Genocide (Saint Paul,
MN: International Humanitarian Law Institute, 2013), p.
112. As Erlinder himself adds: “[T]he Burundian example,
itself, demonstrated that the Tutsi military violently
rejected majority-rule elections and engaged in mass
killings of the Hutu majority, which must certainly have
reinforced the deep-seated fear of Tutsi domination…”
(Ibid., pp. 108-109). < http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat >

45 Protocol…on the Integration of the Armed Forces of

the Two Parties, Article 72, p 116. <
http://tinyurl.com/qcew5fa >

46 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, pp. 126-127; pp.

130-131.

2. The RPF invasion and low-level aggressive war

that never was a “civil war”

47 In Erlinder, Ed., Report of the UN Reconnaissance

Mission to Rwanda—August 1993, pp. 35-38.

48 Ibid., pp. 39-40.

49 The RPF’s military superiority over the FAR and other

government forces (e.g., the Gendarmerie, the Para-
Commando Battalion, and the Presidential Guard) is
argued at length in Erlinder, The Accidental… Genocide,
passim. < http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat >
50 According to William Cyrus Reed, “When the RPF
invaded Rwanda in 1990 it had 36 cells inside the
country, with nine in Kigali and others in Kigongi, Butare,
Gitarama, and Byumba, albeit so clandestine that out of
the 8,000-10,000 arrested that year only three were
members…. Two years later, however, following the
regime’s recognition of the RPF, cells emerged once
again, and by August 1993 the number in Kigali alone
had grown to 146….” (“Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front,” The Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1996), p. 496.)

51 Here we are drawing on the superb research of

Christian Davenport and Allan Stam et al., specifically
their videographic “Animation of Battle Fronts & Conflict
Zones,” GenoDynamics. < http://tinyurl.com/maoaak2 >

52 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, p. 288.

53 Ibid., p. 299.

54 See UN Security Council Resolution 827 (S/RES/827),

May 25, 1993. < http://tinyurl.com/o2l2cx5 >

55 See UN Security Council Resolution 955 (S/RES/955),

November 8, 1994. < http://tinyurl.com/lljyu9n >
56 Richard J. Goldstone, First Amended Indictment, The
Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Clement Kayishema et
al., Case No. ICTR-95-1-I, International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, April 19, 1995, para. 19, emphasis added. <
http://tinyurl.com/oktx76c >

57 Bernard Muna, Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Jean

Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-DP, October 16, 1997,
para. 3.4, emphasis added. < http://tinyurl.com/mgof26n
>

58 Bernard A. Muna, Amended Indictment, The

Prosecutor against Theoneste Bagosora, Case No.ICTR-
96-7-I, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
December 8, 1999, para. 2.5, emphasis added. <
http://tinyurl.com/lz9ct27 >

59 See R.W. Apple, Jr., “The Iraq Invasion,” New York

Times, August 3, 1990. Also see “Iraq’s Naked
Aggression,” Editorial, New York Times, August 3, 1990.

60 “The Commission finds itself obliged to conclude that

there have been acts of genocide, as contemplated by
international law. In this respect, the responsibility of the
head of state and of his immediate entourage, including
members of his family, is the inescapable conclusion.”
This quote derives from the “English Summary” of the
Rapportt de la Commission Internationale d’Enquete sur
les Violations des droits de l’Homme au Rwanda depuis
le 1er Octobre 1990 (7 – 21 janvier 1993), March, 1993,
p. 6. < http://tinyurl.com/khuxry3 >
61 The earliest use of the term ‘genocide’ in the English-
language media that we’ve ever been able to find to
describe the situation in Rwanda was in a March 24,
1992 Reuters report: “’The Tutsi are being systematically
massacred…This is genocide’, Andre Jadoul, a Belgian
lawyer who has been on two recent observer missions to
Rwanda, told a news conference in Paris.” (William
Emmanuel, “Rwandan Opposition Accuses Government
of Genocide,” Reuters, March 24, 1992.)

62 Allain Pellet, Ed., “The Opinions of the Badinter

Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-
Determination of Peoples,” European Journal of
International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1992, Opinion No. 1,
para. 3. < http://tinyurl.com/obz6zmv > Also see Danilo
Turk, Ed., “Opinions No. 4-10 of the Arbitration
Commission of the International Conference on
Yugoslavia…,” European Journal of International Law, Vol.
4, No. 1, 1993. < http://tinyurl.com/nt4q3sh >

63 In Marlise Simons, “War Crimes Trial Seeks to Define

the Balkan Conflict,” New York Times, May 12, 1996. <
http://tinyurl.com/ok4j5l5 >

64 See the file on Dusko Tadić, “Prijedor,” Case No. IT-94-

1, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. < http://tinyurl.com/kv3oyjx > Especially see
the testimony by defense witness Robert Hayden,
September 10, 1996. < http://tinyurl.com/n76lsve >, and
September 11, 1996. < http://tinyurl.com/m7ser4s >

3. “Hutu Power extremists” did not shoot-down

Habyarimana’s Falcon 50 jet

65 Dobbs, “Rwanda’s Shrouded Nightmare.” <

http://tinyurl.com/k2ze336 >

66 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p. 221. Prunier called this

the “most probable hypothesis” (p. 221). Prunier’s
account contains serious errors; today it reads more like
a fossil of the standard model than it did when first
published—and, we might add, that although Prunier is a
very fine historian of Africa’s Great Lakes region, the
moment that he takes-up the topic of the “Rwandan
genocide,” he reverts to a strict standard-modeler. For
example, Prunier asserted that “it was not in the political
interest of the RPF to kill President Habyarimana.” And
shortly thereafter, that “if the RPF had planned to kill
President Habyarimana, it would have been prepared to
leap forward militarily. This was not at all the case. The
Falcon 50 was shot down in the evening of April 6 and
there was no RPF reaction” (p. 220). But the RPF did leap
forward militarily as soon as Kagame received the report
of the successful shoot-down at his headquarters in
Mulindi. Moreover, the names of the actual RPF shooters
as well as those involved in the planning have been
divulged by RPF exiles and circulated in critical circles for
years.
67 Resolution 955 (S/RES/955), para. 1. <
http://tinyurl.com/lljyu9n >

68 Affidavit of Michael Andrew Hourigan, March 8, 2007

(as posted to the website of the Rwanda Documents
Project, No. DNT 365). < http://tinyurl.com/kzy97r2 >
Hourigan’s affidavit was entered into the evidentiary
record at the Military I trial of the Para-Commando
Battalion leader Major Aloys Ntabakuze by his lead
counsel, the American defense attorney Peter Erlinder.
The Hourigan affair has been so successfully redacted
from the standard model of the “Rwandan genocide”
that his name does not turn up even once in Human
Right Watch’s massive 800-page “Leave None To Tell the
Story”. (See n. 102, below.) When Hourigan died
suddenly in early December 2013 at his home in
Adelaide, Australia, his death went unmentioned by the
U.S., British, and Canadian media. Also see the interview
that ICTR defense attorney John Philpot conducted with
Hourigan at the Second International Criminal Defense
Conference, held in Brussels on May 21-23, 2010,
“Louise Arbour Was Wrong.” <
http://vimeo.com/12025909 >

69 See the “Prepared Statement of Mr. James R. Lyons,”

April 6, 2001, reproduced in Erlinder, The Accidental…
Genocide, pp. 49-51. < http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat > A
former FBI counter-terrorism agent, Lyons was
Commander of Investigations at the ICTR during the time
of the Hourigan investigation, and Lyons was present in
the room with Hourigan when Arbour ordered Hourigan
to shut-down his investigation of the assassination. Lyons
corroborates Hourigan’s account of their meeting. <
http://tinyurl.com/ndy7b56 >

70 Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, Request for the Issuance

of International Arrest Warrants, Tribunal de Grande
Instance, Paris, France, November 21, 2006, p. 11. The
nine RPF figures mentioned were: James Kabarebe,
Kayumba Nyamwasa, Charles Kayonga, Jack Nziza,
Samuel Kanyemere, Rose Kabuye, Jacob Tumwine, Frank
Nziza, Eric Hakizamana (pp. 46-48). Paul Kagame,
notably absent from this list of indictees, “enjoys the
immunity granted in France to incumbent Heads of State
and therefore cannot be prosecuted within the
framework of this proceeding” (p. 46). (English
Translation: < http://tinyurl.com/kas5n57 >.)

71 Ibid., p. 12.

72 According to ICTR defense attorney Peter Erlinder,

“The total number of former RPF officers who have
confessed in court proceedings or in public to RPF
involvement in the Habyarimana assassination plot now
exceeds eight (8), ranging from members of the missile
crew to generals and Kagame’s Chief of Staff [Theogene
Rudasingwa].” (Erlinder, The Accidental… Genocide, n.
49, p. 25.) We suspect that the number may even be
higher. < http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat >

73 Bruguière, Request for the Issuance of International

Arrest Warrants, p. 17.
74 Ibid., p. 19.

75 “Prepared Statement of Mr. James R. Lyons,” in

Erlinder, The Accidental… Genocide, p. 50. <
http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat > Also see Bruguière, Request
for the Issuance of International Arrest Warrants, p. 16. <
http://tinyurl.com/kas5n57 >

76 In Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide

Rwanda, p. 10.

77 See David Smith, “Exiled Rwandan general attacks

Paul Kagame as ‘dictator’,” The Guardian, July 30, 2012.
< http://tinyurl.com/pzguqbm > Also see Geoffrey York
and Judi Rever, “Rwanda’s hunted: Inside the plots to kill
Rwanda’s dissidents,” Toronto Globe and Mail, May 3,
2014. < http://tinyurl.com/ordt8o5 >

78 Theogene Rudasingwa, Healing A Nation: A Testimony

(North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent
Publishing Platform, 2013), p. 150.

79 See Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, International

Panel of Eminent Personalities. Gerald Caplan was a
member of the Secretariat, and is credited with having
been this report’s principal author. <
http://tinyurl.com/lvrotjb >

80 Ibid., p. 270.

81 Ibid., para. 9.14, p. 62.

82 Ibid., p. 267.

83 Gerald Caplan, “Who killed the president of Rwanda?”

Pambazuka News, January 21, 2010. <
http://tinyurl.com/mjqkqvz >

84 For the RPF’s self-inquiry into the shootdown of

Habyarimana’s presidential jet (i.e., the Independent
Committee of Experts or Mutsinzi Committee, named
after the titular head of the inquiry, Jean Mutsinzi), see
Report of the Investigation into the Causes and
Circumstances of and Responsibility for the Attack of
06/04/1994 against the Falcon 50 Presidential Aeroplane,
Registration Number 9XR-NN, Independent Committee of
Experts Charged with the Investigation into the Crash on
06/04/1994/…, Kigali, Republic of Rwanda, January,
2010. < http://tinyurl.com/mjgf8rn >
85 Similarly with The New Yorker’s Philip Gourevitch, who
found the RPF’s self-inquiry an “extraordinary historical
and political document,” providing “remarkably
convincing detail,” and showing the “thoroughness and
seriousness of the underlying investigation.”
Gourevitch’s exercise in Kagame-Power flattery
continued: The “report on Habyarimana’s plane is the
latest in a yearlong string of diplomatic and political
moves that show the new Rwandan government
achieving a level of sophistication, skill, and
effectiveness in commanding international respect that
has rarely, if ever, been seen before in Africa. A year
ago, Rwanda was being blamed for all the woes of the
war next door in the Democratic Republic of Congo—and
now those woes have come to be seen overwhelmingly
as the result of the continued presence of fugitive Hutu
génocidaires in Congo. Leaders of these Hutu Power
armies in exile, who had operated with impunity from
European capitals, are being rounded up. And this week,
on the day that the report first leaked in the French
press, France’s foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, was
in Kigali to announce the establishment of a special court
in France to prosecute refugees suspected of genocide.
Today’s issue of Rwanda’s official newspaper, New
Times, announces that Sarkozy will visit next month.”
(Philip Gourevitch, “The Mutsinzi Report on the Rwandan
Genocide,” The New Yorker, January 8, 2010.) <
http://tinyurl.com/y8mgs9z >

86 Filip Reyntjens, A Fake Inquiry of a Major Event.

Analysis of the Mutsinzi report on the 6th April 1994
attack on the Rwandan President’s aeroplane, Institute of
Development Policy and Management, Working Paper
2010.07, University of Antwerp, 2010, p. 27. <
http://tinyurl.com/llkq3tq > For an additional critique of
the Mutsinzi report, see Luc Marchal et al., “Analysis of
the Mutsinzi Report,” CirqueMinime, February 8, 2010. <
http://tinyurl.com/os9duo2 > A Belgian soldier, Marchal
served as the Belgian Contingent Commander in UNAMIR
until Belgium withdrew its troops in April 1994.

87 Linda Melvern, “Expert Refutes Bruguiere Claims,” All

Africa, November 27, 2006. < http://tinyurl.com/ppenvrh
>

88 Linda Melvern, “The Perfect Crime,” Prospect, January

31, 2008, emphasis added. < http://tinyurl.com/k2plolh
>

4. The “Rwandan genocide” by the numbers

89 Muna, Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda,

para. 3.20, p. 5. < http://tinyurl.com/mgof26n >

90 Ingvar Carlsson et al., Independent inquiry into the

actions of the United Nations during the 1999 genocide
in Rwanda (S/1999/1257), United Nations, December 16,
1999, p. 3. < http://tinyurl.com/kddoehn >
91 Christophe Bazivamo et al., Denombrement des
Victimes du Genocide: Rapport Final (Kigali: Ministere de
l’Administration Locale, du Developpement
Communautaire et des Affaires Sociales, April, 2004),
Section 2.1, “Effectifs déclarés et Effectifs dénombrés”
(“The numbers claimed and the actual numbers”), p. 21.
< http://tinyurl.com/p2k4gvw >

92 See Edwin Musoni, “Report claims 2 million killed in

1994 Genocide,” The New Times, October 4, 2008.
According to Musoni, the “President of the National
Commission against Genocide, Jean de Dieu Mucyo, said
that the figures in the [Genocide Survivors Students
Association] report are not yet official and that his
commission will have to verify the figures before
regarding them as real.” This observation was charitable
of Mucyo indeed. < http://tinyurl.com/n797mak >

93 See the website, Understanding Rwandan Political

Violence in 1994, GenoDynamics, <
http://tinyurl.com/l8mxguy >, specifically the section
titled “Data on Violence in 1994.” <
http://tinyurl.com/lfnvkff >

94 Christian Davenport and Allan Stam, Rwandan

Political Violence in Space and Time, unpublished
manuscript, 2004, especially pp. 27-33. <
http://tinyurl.com/ntdrgqs > Also see their videographic
display of RPF troop movements and violent deaths for
the period April 1 – July 31, 1994, “Animation of Violent
Deaths and Troop Overlays—Median Estimates,”
GenoDynamics. < http://tinyurl.com/kw6qpyu > As they
wrote in 2009, summing-up what this videographic
shows: “When the RPF advanced, large-scale killings
escalated. When the RPF stopped, large-scale killings
largely decrease.” (Davenport and Stam, “What Really
Happened in Rwanda?” Miller-McCune, October 6, 2009.
< http://tinyurl.com/lpjan8o >) As we have argued
elsewhere, we do not accept their conclusions
concerning the responsibility for the deaths they’ve
documented, i.e., FAR versus RPF. Nevertheless, theirs is
very important work. (See Edward S. Herman and David
Peterson, The Politics of Genocide (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 2nd Ed., 2011), “Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo,” pp. 51-68; here pp. 58-
59.)

95 See David Peterson, “Rwanda’s 1991 Census,”

ZBlogs, March 12, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/lytftt6 >

96 See the “Statistics” webpage at the website of the

U.K.-based Survivors Fund, n. 4. <
http://tinyurl.com/mqvp82q >

97 See “Data on Violence in 1994,” GenoDynamics. <

http://tinyurl.com/lfnvkff >

5. The West’s alleged “falure to intervene”

98 Statement by Samantha Power, Threats to
international peace and security: Prevention and fight
against genocide (S/PV.7155), UN Security Council, April
16, 2014, p. 12. < http://tinyurl.com/mo6mkco >.

99 Ibid., p. 6.

100 Massimo Calabresi, “Susan Rice: A Voice for

Intervention,” Time Magazine, March 24, 2011. <
http://tinyurl.com/q35m4jj >.

101 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and

the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp.
334-335.—In her Preface to the same book, Power writes
that “Washington led a successful effort to remove most
of the peacekeepers under [Gen. Dallaire’s] command
and then aggressively worked to block authorization of
UN reinforcements” (p. xx). The reasonable inference
from the fact that Washington removed peacekeepers
and then blocked their reinforcement, to the fact that
Washington wanted Kagame’s RFP to seize state power,
as it did, is inconceivable to Power. Her United States just
does not behave this way.

102 Alison Des Forges et al., “Leave None To Tell the

Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights
Watch, 1999), p. 27.
103 As Herman J. Cohen, at the time the U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State in charge of African Affairs, once
asked: “[Why] did [the United States] automatically
exclude the policy option of informing Ugandan President
Museveni that the invasion of Rwanda by uniformed
members of the Ugandan army was totally unacceptable,
and that the continuation of good relations between the
United States and Uganda would depend on his getting
the RPF back across the border?” The answer is of course
too obvious for Cohen to recognize it. (Herman J. Cohen,
Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a
Troubled Continent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000),
pp. 178-179.)

104 Erlinder, The Accidental Genocide, pp. 113-150. <

http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat >

105 See, e.g., Gerald Gahima and Claude Dusaidi,

Statement by the Political Bureau of the Rwandese
Patriotic Front on the Proposed Deployment of a U.N.
Intervention Force in Rwanda, New York City, April 30,
1994 (as archived at the Rwanda Documents Project), p.
4. < http://tinyurl.com/qdj7mhq >

106 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, p. 364.

107 Ibid., p. 364.

108 “Rwandan embassy closed, U.S. seeks to remove
Rwanda from UN Council,” Agence France Presse, July
15, 1994; “Clinton Orders Nonstop Aid Flights for
Rwandan Victims,” Associated Press, July 22, 1994; “U.S.
recognizes new government in Rwanda,” Reuters, July
29, 1994; “200 U.S. troops going into Kigali to open
airport,” Reuters, July 29, 1994.

109 George E. Moose, Memorandum drafted sometime

between September 17 and 20, 1994, U.S. Department
of State. In Erlinder, The Accidental… Genocide, pp. 311-
312. < http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat >

6. The ICTR delivers victor’s justice

110 Resolution 955 (S/RES/955), para. 1. <

http://tinyurl.com/nlnh7yx >

111 See Judge Almiro Rodrigues et al., Judgment,

Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
August 2, 2001, Section III G.2, “Mens rea,” para. 544-
599. “The Chamber concludes that the intent to kill all
the Bosnian Muslim men of military age in Srebrenica
constitutes an intent to destroy in part the Bosnian
Muslim group…and therefore must be qualified as
genocide” (para. 598). < http://tinyurl.com/lohd5hy >
Also see Judge Theodor Meron et al., Judgment on
Appeal, Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
April 19, 2004, Section II, “The Trial Chamber’s Finding
that Genocide Occurred in Srebrenica,” para. 1-38. <
http://tinyurl.com/lm7mpv2 >

112 See Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen et al., Decision

on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on
Judicial Notice, Prosecutor v. Edouard Karemera et al.,
Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C ), June 16, 2006. <
http://tinyurl.com/ka45avz >

113 John Laughland, “Destroying the rule of law,”

Sanders Research Associates (as posted to the
CirqueMinimie website), July 6, 2006. <
http://tinyurl.com/o9xdnaj >

114 Resolution 955 (S/RES/955), para. 1. <

http://tinyurl.com/nlnh7yx >

115 Statement by Manzi Bakuramutsa, The situation

concerning Rwanda, UN Security Council (S/PV.3453),
November 8, 1994, pp. 14-15. <
http://tinyurl.com/kfn7y3n >

116 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide

Rwanda, p. 244.
117 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan
Genocide (New York: Verso, Rev. Ed., 2006), p. 2.

118 Judge Laïty Kama et al., Judgment and Sentence,

The Prosecutor versus Jean Kambanda, Case No.: ICTR
97-23-S, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
September 4, 1998, para. 42(2). <
http://tinyurl.com/ojm8b77 >

119 Ibid., para. 39(i-ii).

120 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide

Rwanda, p. 242. Also see John Laughland, A History of
Political Trials from Charles I to Saddam Hussein (Oxford:
Peter Lang, 2008), Ch. 16, “Jean Kambanda, Convicted
without Trial,” pp. 207-220.

121 Kama et al., Judgment and Sentence, The Prosecutor

versus Jean Kambanda, para. 40(1).

122 Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder, p. 1. In contrast,

Reyntjens quotes the French journalist Thierry Cruvellier,
who wrote that by “avoiding a trial, thanks to the [plea]
agreement concluded between the defendant and the
prosecutor, the Tribunal thus nourished a judicial fiction.”
(Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide
Rwanda, p. 242.)
123 “War crimes prosecutor hails Rwandan judgments,”
Agence France Presse, September 4, 1998.

124 Laughland, A History of Political Trials, pp. 218-219.

—Laughland also quotes a September 2003 letter that
Kamdanda released from his prison cell at Bamako, Mali.
As Kambanda wrote: “In virtue of the fact that the
massacres had been going on for three days, it is
impossible that the government I led could have planned
them. Its members had nothing in common
ideologically…all planning between the parties was
impossible. At no point, during my time in office as prime
minister, did I have any knowledge of the conception or
any plan for these massacres, neither before nor after
the assassination of President Habyarimana. I would
have known about this since I had the Central
Intelligence Service under my supervision. Without the
assassination of President Habyarimana, interethnic
massacres on this scale would definitely not have taken
place. It is therefore essential to find those responsible
for that attack and he or they must be held responsible
for the consequences of their crime.” (Ibid., p. 219.)

125 See Carla Del Ponte, with Chuck Sudetic, Madame

Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst
Criminals and the Culture of Impunity: A Memoir (New
York: Other Press, 2009), Ch. 7, “Confronting Kigali 2000
to 2001,” pp. 177-192; and especially Ch. 9, “Confronting
Kigali 2002 and 2003,” pp. 223-241. Also see Peter
Erlinder, “The Rwanda War Crimes Coverup,” Global
Research, September 3, 2009. <
http://tinyurl.com/o7z5jk5 >

126 Chris McGreal, “Genocide tribunal ready to indict

first Tutsis,” The Guardian, April 5, 2002. <
http://tinyurl.com/ooga7sf >

127 Chris McGreal, “Witness boycott brings Rwandan

genocide trials to a halt,” The Guardian, July 29, 2002. <
http://tinyurl.com/kh36m5p >

128 Column Lynch, “U.N. Official Criticizes Rwanda,”

Washington Post, July 25, 2002. <
http://tinyurl.com/mdxntnk >

129 Del Ponte and Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor, p. 233.

130 Kofi Annan, Letter dated 28 July 2003 from the

Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/2003/766), July 28, 2003. <
http://tinyurl.com/mkc2hor >

131 UN Security Council Resolution 1503 (S/RES/1503),

August 28, 2003, para. 8 and Annex I. <
http://tinyurl.com/ky669wz >
132 After her termination as chief prosecutor at the ICTR,
Del Ponte was asked by an interviewer what she would
have done, had she been given the choice to remain the
chief prosecutor at either the ICTR or the ICTY? Del Ponte
replied: “I believe I would have opted for the ICTR
because I still remain with one challenge: the special
investigations.” (“Interview with Carla Del Ponte: ‘If I had
had the choice, I would have remained prosecutor of the
ICTR’,” The Arusha Times, September 20-26, 2003.) <
http://tinyurl.com/kq3xds8 >

133 See, e.g., “General Ndindiliyimana demands that

charges against him be dropped,” Hirondelle News
Agency, May 21, 2003. In the Military II trial chamber,
Ndindiliyimana’s defense attorney, the Canadian
Christopher Black, argued that since “only members of
the former Hutu majority regime in Rwanda are targeted
for prosecution while Tutsis, belonging to the Rwandan
Patriotic Front and its allies, who have committed similar
war crimes as those alleged against the Hutus, including
genocide, are granted effective immunity from
prosecution,” the prosecution’s policy “has no legitimate
criminal justice objective, only a political one.” <
http://tinyurl.com/o3s7qll > For the ICTR’s decision
rejecting this complaint, see Judge Arlette Ramaroson et
al., Decision on Urgent Oral Motion for a Stay of the
Indictment, or in the Alternative a Reference to the
Security Council, The Prosecutor v. Ndindilimana, Case
No. ICTR-2000-56-I, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, March 26, 2004. < http://tinyurl.com/l7b79bx >

134 Hassan B. Jallow, “Prosecutorial Discretion and

International Criminal Justice,” Journal of International
Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2005, p. 156.

135 Ibid., p. 150.

136 Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa,

Ch. 13, “International Criminal Justice as ‘Battering
Ram’,” pp. 175-193; here pp. 182-183.

7. The alleged Hutu “conspiracy to commit

genocide” that never was

137 The crime of “genocide” is defined by the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as “any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such,” followed by five specific qualifications: “(a)
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.” (Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, January,
2010, Article 2, “Genocide,” p. 59.) <
http://tinyurl.com/md4ftvg >

138 Atsu-Koffi Amega et al., Final Report of the

Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security
Council resolution 935 (1994), UN Security Council
(S/1994/1405), December 9, 1994, para. 58. <
http://tinyurl.com/qdqobn7 >

139 Muna, Amended Indictment, The Prosecutor against

Theoneste Bagosora, para. 5.1. This section of the
indictment is titled “Concise statement of the facts:
Preparation.” Continuing the same theme, Count 1 of
this indictment states that Bagosora et al. “conspired…
to kill and cause serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the Tutsi population with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a racial or ethnic group, and
thereby committed conspiracy to commit genocide…” (p.
54). < http://tinyurl.com/lz9ct27 >

140 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Worse Than War: Genocide,

Eliminationism, and the Onoing Assault on Humanity
(New York: Public Affairs, 2009), p. 288. Here we add the
revealing fact that neither the names Paul Kagame nor
Rwandan Patriotic Front appear even once in
Goldhagen’s 650-page tract. For Goldhagen, the events
of April-July 1994 were the monocausal result the Hutu
population’s anti-Tutsi eliminationist and exterminationist
beliefs.

141 According to the December 1999 Carlsson report, as

early as April 13, 1994, the “RPF representative at the
United Nations, Mr Claude Dusaidi, in his letter to the
President of the Security Council, said that ‘a crime of
genocide’ had been committed against the Rwandan
people….” (Carlsson et al., Independent inquiry into the
actions of the United Nations during the 1999 genocide
in Rwanda, p. 68.) < http://tinyurl.com/kddoehn >
142 See, e.g., the website of the Embassy of the United
States, Kigali, Rwanda. < http://tinyurl.com/n96nj2g >

143 Namely, the trials of some of the highest-profile

Hutu political and military command known as
Government I (Édouard Karemera, Matthieu
Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera (deceased), André
Rwamakuba); Government II (Casimir Bizimungu, Justin
Mugenzi, Jérôme-Clément Bicamumpaka, Prosper
Mugiraneza); Military I (Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien
Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze, Anatole Nsengiyumva); and
Military II (Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Augustin Bizimungu,
François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, Innocent Sagahutu).—
See our “Appendix I: More on the alleged Hutu
‘conspiracy to commit genocide’ that never was.”

144 To illustrate the dramatic use of gory detail by the

African Rights report, consider the following passage,
recounted by a young mother: “They ordered me to take
[my son] Déo to a pit latrine. When we got there, I saw
that it was already full of corpses. I was to kill him myself
but I refused. I pleaded with those who would kill him to
allow me to go away before they macheted him. After a
few minutes, I saw them looking for hoes to put the soil
on my son’s body. They were boasting that ‘The father
was the first in the pit. Now, let the son act as the lid’
[Jean-Paul] Birindabagabo then told me that he had not
wanted my son killed, telling me that my own fate was to
be decided soon.” (Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal,
Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London, African
Rights, 1994), p. 347.) In short, the scene is so frankly
gruesome, it must be taken as evidence of something far
more encompassing—“The Genocide.”

145 To better understand what we mean by the role of

“riches of dramatic detail” in conveying the impression
that everything is part of something far greater, namely,
“The Genocide,” consider the following paragraph from
Human Rights Watch’s treatment of events in the Butare
prefecture: “With the enormous instability introduced by
the genocide, political actors at all levels jostled for
power for themselves and their parties. At the
prefectural level, MRND stalwarts Nyiramasuhuko and
Kalimanzira struggled against the growth of MDR-Power
represented by men like Semwaga. This struggle
intensified towards the end of the genocide when
Shalom, as head of the MRND Interahamwe, prepared
attacks against the sector Gatobotobo of Mbazi, where
Semwaga and Prefect Nsabimana were protecting Tutsi.
The MRND group called RTLM to their assistance and the
radio station broadcast information about the continued
presence of Tutsi in that sector. Semwaga also previously
fought challenges from a CDR leader, the former
burgomaster of Mbazi, Kabuga, who [had] been one of
the most zealous organizers of the genocide in that
commune. According to local observers, Semwaga
apparently was behind the abduction and murder of
Kabuga and his associates like Masumbuko. Soldiers,
including Sergeant Gatwaza, reportedly arrived one day
in May to carry them off along with Emmanuel Sakindi, a
councilor who was said to be Tutsi. The supposed Tutsi
and the apparent killers of Tutsi were reportedly all killed
by the same people at the same time, but for different
reasons. Whether or not Sibomana, the burgomaster of
Mbazi, participated in instigating the murder, as is
sometimes charged, he benefited from the elimination of
Kabuga, who had challenged his authority.” (Des Forges
et al., “Leave None To Tell the Story”, p. 556.) As with the
previous note, the passage is so detailed, it must be
taken as evidence of something far more encompassing
—“The Genocide.”

146 See Robert Gersony, “Summary of UNHCR

Presentation Before Commission of Experts,” October 11,
1994 pp. 4-8. Gersony had been dispatched to Rwanda
on behalf of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’
Emergency Repatriation Team, and he reported to the UN
Commission of Experts in October, 1994. He told them
that in several of Rwanda’s prefectures he found an
“unmistakable pattern” of “systematic and sustained
killing and persecution of their civilian Hutu populations
by the RPF,” with between 5,000 and 10,000 Hutu killed
per month since April. < http://tinyurl.com/lkxq9ze >

147 See Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for

Africa, Part 2, Ch. 8-12, pp. 131-171. “Any body of
literature of this magnitude inevitably generates a set of
conventions, images, and metaphors,” Philpot writes.
“[W]hen an image is constantly repeated, it becomes the
substance itself. European ethnocentrism is the constant
and unifying theme of this literary convention.
‘Ethnocentrism created and preserved until today a
persistent fantasy: the civilized Briton in confrontation
with savage Africans in an Africa that never was’.” (pp.
131-133.) Also see Johan Pottier, Re-imaging Rwanda:
Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late
Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002). Here we’d add that since Rwanda’s Hutu
were as of 1994 official-enemy targets of the United
States, Britain, the RPF, and human rights NGOs, the
kind of literary conventions, images, and metaphors that
Philpot describes would have been marshaled against
the Hutu. And they still continue to be, 20 years later.

148 Thierry Cruvellier, “ICTR: Rwandan Genocide—no

master plan,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, December
19, 2011. < http://tinyurl.com/lyjr7e9 >

8. Did Paul Kagame’s RPF really “stop the

genocide”?

149 Des Forges et al., “Leave None to Tell the Story”, p.

20.

150 Omaar and de Waal, Rwanda, p. 628.

151 Maria Malagardis, “Paul Kagame : ‘Paris a été

impliqué avant, pendant et après le génocide’,”
Libération, April 6, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/lvduhzx >

152 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, pp. 294-295.

The event Dallaire describes here took place around mid-
April.
153 Quoting Kagame, Dallaire writes: “If an intervention
force is sent to Rwanda, we will fight it.” (Ibid., p. 342.)

154 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide

Rwanda, p. 184.

9. “Africa’s World War”: Kagame’s alleged pursuit

of “génocidaires” in Zaire—the Democratic
Republic of Congo—and the deaths of millions

155 In this section, we will largely limit ourselves to the

“first” war in Zaire-the Democratic Republic of Congo, ca.
September 1996 through May 1997, and not the
“second” war, which has lasted from August 1998
through the present day.

156 We adopt the convention of referring to Zaire for the

period through May 1997, by which date Mobutu Sese
Seko, Zaire’s long-time ruler, had been overthrown and
replaced by Laurent Désiré Kabila; and we will refer to
the Democratic Republic of Congo for the period from the
end of May 1997 on, at which time, Zaire was renamed
the Democratic Republic of Congo.

157 The origin of phrases such as “Africa’s first World

War” and “first African World War” is sometimes
attributed to Susan Rice, though we cannot confirm this.
See, e.g., Mark Turn, “Africa’s first world war,” Weekend
Financial Times, November 14, 1998. Also see Filip
Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional
Geopolitics, 1996-2006 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), p. 198.

158 See Robert Evans, “UN Sees East Congo as Worse

Crisis Than Darfur,” Reuters, March 16, 2005, wherein
Jan Egeland, then the head of the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, stated that “In
terms of the human lives lost…this is the greatest
humanitarian crisis in the world today.” <
http://tinyurl.com/kyaxymc >

159 Benjamin Coghlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic

Republic of Congo—An Ongoing Crisis (International
Rescue Committee and the Burnett Institute), January 22,
2008, p. ii. < http://tinyurl.com/nt8nr5f >

160 Mahmoud Kassem et al., Final report of the Panel of

Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (S/2002/1146), October 8, 2002, para. 96. <
http://tinyurl.com/lvl6xpk >

161 Coghlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic Republic

of Congo, p. ii; p. 16.
162 Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the
most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993
and June 2003, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
August 2010, para. 500-522; here para. 515. <
http://tinyurl.com/nk6tbm3 >

163 See “Burundi Refugees and Displaced Persons: Fact

Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, March 14, 1994, p. 1
(as posted to the website of the National Security
Archive). < http://tinyurl.com/q3n76ju >

164 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The

State of the World’s Refugees 1995: In search of
solutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995),
Annexes, Table 3: “Refugee populations by
country/territory of asylum and origin,” and Table 4:
“Largest refugee populations by country of origin,” 1995.
< http://www.unhcr.org/4a4c70859.html >

165 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive

Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1st Ed., 2006), p. 244.

166 Ibid., p. 244.

167 Ibid., p. 244.

168 The number of armed groups operating in Zaire-DRC
these past 20 or more years is vast and confusing, and in
the present account, we are going to keep the actors to
an absolute minimum. But if one wants to read a
catalogue of them, see Jason Stearns et al., The national
army and armed groups in the eastern Congo:
Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity (London: The
Rift Valley Institute, 2013). < http://tinyurl.com/oxb5zrd
>

169 Here we are drawing from Reyntjens, The Great

African War, especially his early chapters.

170 Ibid., p. 48.

171 Ibid., p. 51.—For the reasons why we reject that the

war in Rwanda ever was a civil war (i.e., non-
international), see Section 2, above. On the contrary, we
contend that what really happened in September 1996
was the expansion of the RPF’s October 1990 invasion of
Rwanda into a second-phase invasion of Zaire.

172 Ibid., “U.S. Involvement,” pp. 66-74.

173 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the

Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental
Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009),
p. 127.

174 Reyntjens, The Great African War, p. 78.

175 John Pomfret, “Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo,”

Washington Post, July 7, 1997. <
http://tinyurl.com/no6tmce >

176 Reyntjens, The Great African War, Ch. 3, “Massacre

of Rwandan Refugees,” pp. 80-101; here p. 93.

177 See Louis Charbonneau and Michelle Nichols,

“Exclusive—Congo’s army accused of abuse as rebels
regroup in Rwanda -U.N. experts,” Reuters, December
17, 2013. < http://tinyurl.com/m2x449p >

178 Reyntjens, The Great African War, p. 19.

179 Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa, p.

220, based on a December 5, 2002 interview that Philpot
conducted with Kengo.
180 See Mahmoud Kassem et al., Report of the Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (S/2001/357), UN Security Council, April 12,
2001, especially para. 195-212. <
http://tinyurl.com/q6xu2zg >

181 Conservative estimates of the number of Ugandans

killed under the Idi Amin dictatorship (1971-1979) are
100,000 victims, with high-end estimates at 300,000.
See Richard H. Ulmann, “Human Rights and Economic
Power: The United States Versus Idi Amin,” Foreign
Affairs, April, 1978. As Ulmann noted at the time, “In any
contemporary lexicon of horror, Uganda is synonymous
with state-become-slaughterhouse.” It is all the more
revealing, therefore, that given the vast body-counts we
can fairly attribute to Paul Kagame’s 24 year reign of
terror in central Africa, first in Rwanda, and later in Zaire-
DRC, his regime has never entered the contemporary
lexicon of horror.

182 UN Security Council Resolution 1078 (S/RES/1078),

November 9, 1996. < http://tinyurl.com/mzsg8rb >

183 UN Security Council Resolution 1080 (S/RES/1080),

November 15, 1996, para. 3. <
http://tinyurl.com/phkv8ys >

184 Reyntjens, The Great African War, pp. 86-87.

185 Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for Africa, p.
214, based on a November 22, 2002 interview that
Philpot conducted with Chrétien.

10. The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”

186 See n. 60, above.

187 Robin Philpot, “Rwanda, ‘Shake Hands with the

Devil’. General Dallaire’s film fails ‘Reality Check’,”
Global Research, November 22, 2007. <
http://tinyurl.com/omonvrr >

188 Lindsey Hilsum, “UN Suppressed Warning of Rwanda

Genocide Plan,” The Observer, November 26, 1995.

189 Roméo Dallaire, “Request for Protection for

Informant,” UNAMIR/Kigali, January 11, 1994 (as posted
to the website of the National Security Archive) <
http://tinyurl.com/kbuvlgr >

190 MRND, or Mouvement Républicain National pour la

Démocratie et le Développement, the party of Juvénal
Habyarimana. The late Joseph Nzirorera was from July
1993 on the Secretary General of the MRND. In effect,
this made Nzirorera Jean-Pierre Turatsinze’s boss at the
MRND secretariat. According to the U.S. attorney Peter
Robinson, who served as Nzirorera’s lead defense
counsel in the Government I trial until Nzirorea’s death in
July 2010, Nzirorea dismissed Turatsinze from his job with
the MRND secretariat in November 1993 “because he
found Turatsinze to be dishonest.” Although “Turatsinze
still played some role with the local Kigali MRND,” more
important, Robinson adds that Turatsinze was never a
“top level trainer in the cadre of Interhamwe- [sic] armed
militia of MRND.” This means that the opening paragraph
of the so-called “Genocide Fax” badly misidentified its
“informant,” and inflated his true importance. (Personal
communication between Peter Robinson and David
Peterson, July 22, 2014.)

191 See Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, pp. 141-
151; here pp. 142-143. In the same book, Dallaire
defined the “third force” as the “Name given by UNAMIR
to an extremist group that was out to derail the peace
process” (p. 542). But what he really means is an
extremist Hutu group. No consideration is given to an
extremist Tutsi group, namely the Kagame-led RPF.

192 Gourevitch, “The Genocide Fax.” <

http://tinyurl.com/lxbff7t >

193 Des Forges et al., “Leave None to Tell the Story”, pp.
150-153; here p. 151.
194 Kofi Annan, “Contacts with Informant,” United
Nations, New York, January 11, 1994 (as posted by to the
website of the National Security Archive). <
http://tinyurl.com/krdul4f >

195 See Recommendations of the Conference Held in

Kigali from November 1st to 5th, 1995, on: “Genocide,
Impunity, and Accountability: Dialogue for a National and
International Response,” Office of the President, Republic
of Rwanda, Kigali, December, 1995. <
http://tinyurl.com/konkl9d >

196 Shaharyar M. Khan, “Warnings of Genocide to

UNAMIR,” MIR 3961, United Nations, November 20, 1995,
para. 2.

197 N.A., “Rwanda Chronology,” N.D., emphasis in the

original By the presence of the handwritten name
“Rivero” on the third page of this document, the
“Chronology” may have been prepared by Isel Rivero,
who served on the review committee, and who worked
on Rwanda at the UN in New York City at the time.

198 Christopher Black, “The Dallaire Genocide Fax,”

Sanders Research Associates, December 7, 2005. <
http://tinyurl.com/nypctau >
199 In testimony before the ICTR as recently as February
2010, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh was asked by Prosecutor
Don Webster, “Sixteen years after the genocide—you as
the chief of mission of UNAMIR, a document that has
generated so much controversy and so much
commentary that it’s used to suggest that there was a
conspiracy to commit genocide—you are telling this
Chamber that you didn’t have the intellectual or
professional curiosity to find it and read it after it’s been
circulating freely in the public domain for the last 10
years?” To which Booh-Booh replied: “Maybe you are in
possession of that document. What I am telling you is
that I only became aware of this document through
rumor. What the United Nations asked me to do was to
look for weapons caches in the city. I and General
Dallaire went to see President Habyarimana to tell him
that there are weapons that are hidden in Kigali and that
the Secretary-General has asked us to tell him that he
will be responsible from—for any situation arising
because of those weapons caches and that he should
take action in respect of those caches and not distribute
the said weapons. That is what I was asked to do and
that is what I did. No one ever asked me whether Jean-
Pierre had killed somebody or whether Tutsis were being
killed every second or what have you.” (Prosecutor v.
Édouard Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse, Case No.
ICTR-98-44-T, February 17, 2010.)

200 See Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, “Paris n’est pas

responsable du genocide,” Le Figaro, April 11, 2005. The
passage in the original reads: “Ensuite, Hutus et Tutsis
ont tout fait pour accumuler des armes dans la capitale.
Le 3 mars 1994, le ministre rwandais de la Défense
(hutu) m’a demandé d’autoriser son gouvernement à
réceptionner du matériel de guerre en provenance
d’Egypte. Je lui ai opposé un refus catégorique. Du côté
des Tutsis du FPR, j’ai reçu de nombreuses informations
faisant état de cargaisons d’armes qu’ils recevaient de
l’Ouganda. Bizarrement, ces armes n’ont jamais été
saisies par le commandant en chef de la Minuar, le
général Dallaire.”

201 Amadou Deme, Rwanda 1994 and the failure of the

United Nations Mission: The whole truth (CreateSpace
Independent Publishing Platform, 2nd. Ed., 2012), p. 158.

202 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell the Story”, p. 151.

203 Phil Taylor, interview with Faustin Twagiramungu,

The Taylor Report, January 27, 2014, our transcription,
picking up the program around the 35:15 mark. Later in
this interview, Twagiramungu continues (from the 36:39
mark): “Let me tell you: If it was a case of planning to kill
Tutsis, why did not…General Dallaire, why did not he
inform the people who were in CND, I mean the RPF
soldiers who were there? Why? He should have informed
them….Why one has to keep this planning for genocide
[secret] from January to April? Why? Why? Why UN did
it? If you know that this planning was there, and kept this
information until the genocide took place? No no. There
is something wrong, I think. Fortunately, we are still alive
to tell the truth.” < http://tinyurl.com/ouwnm96 >
204 Deme, Rwanda 1994 and the failure of the United
Nations Mission, p. 56.

205 Judge Erik Møse et al., Judgment, Prosecutor v.

Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T,
December 18, 2008, para. 2103. <
http://tinyurl.com/ncarqtd >.

11. The New York Times and other “Genocide Fax”

disinformants

206 See n. 3, above.

207 See Rafael Medoff, “The Rwandan Genocide,” New

York Times, January 11, 2014, <
http://tinyurl.com/kyg4qvx >; Karel Kovanda, “Tracing
the Rwanda ‘Genocide Fax’,” New York Times, January
15, 2014, < http://tinyurl.com/mcqxrte >; and Linda
Melvern, Gregory Stanton, and nine others, “The
Rwandan Genocide,” New York Times, January 22, 2014.
< http://tinyurl.com/lne5lpl >

208 Melvern and Stanton et al. <

http://tinyurl.com/lne5lpl >

209 See Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, Ch. 9, “The

Eve of the Genocide: What the World Knew,” pp. 54-63,
here p. 59. It is interesting that two of the sources this
report cites when discussing the “Genocide Fax” are
Human Rights Watch’s Alison Des Forges and Philip
Gourevitch. < http://tinyurl.com/lvrotjb >

210 Dobbs, “Rwanda’s Shrouded Nightmare.” <

http://tinyurl.com/k2ze336 >

211 Gerald Caplan, “Inflammatory falsehood poor

homage to twentieth anniversary of Rwanda genocide,”
Rabble.ca, February 24, 2014. <
http://tinyurl.com/mdh2mp7 >. For Michael Dobbs’s
treatment of the “Genocide Fax” at the Holocaust
Memorial Museum’s website, see “Genocide Fax.” <
http://tinyurl.com/pgdgnrk >

212 See Section 7 as well as “Appendix I: More on the

‘conspiracy to commit genocide’ that never was.”

213 See Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “George

Monbiot and the Guardian on ‘Genocide Denial’ and
“Revisionism’,” MRZine, September 2, 2011. <
http://tinyurl.com/3t7tq4h >

214 See Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-

Genocide Rwanda, Ch. 5, “Dealing with the World and
the Region,” pp. 124-162.
12. Role of UN, human rights groups, media, and
intellectuals in promulating the standard model

215 See n. 146, above.

216 UN Security Council Resolution 2150 (S/RES/2150),

April 16, 2014, para. 1. < http://tinyurl.com/lty6s3a >

217 Threats to international peace and security:

Prevention and fight against genocide (S/PV.7155), UN
Security Council, April 16, 2014. <
http://tinyurl.com/mo6mkco >

218 Resolution 2150, quoting the introductory

paragraphs and para. 2.

219 “UN Security Council and US Senate Pass

Resolutions on the Prevention of Genocide,” United
States Holocaust Historical Museum website, April 21,
2014. < http://tinyurl.com/lcvgzlb >

220 This pattern is uniform.—When as recently as late

August 2013, the United States began threatening Syria
with a possible military attack after the still-unsolved
August 22 sarin gas incidents in the suburbs east of
Damascus, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International issued the following statements. “Human
Rights Watch does not take a position advocating or
opposing such intervention, but any armed intervention
should be judged by how well it protects all Syrian
civilians from further atrocities…. If there is a military
intervention, all warring parties must strictly adhere to
the laws of war.” (“Statement on Possible Intervention in
Syria,” Human Rights Watch, August 28, 2014. <
http://tinyurl.com/oxllbbg >) “Amnesty International
generally neither condemns nor condones the resort to
the use of force in international relations, nor does it
make any comments or pass judgment on the arguments
justifying the use of force… In the event of armed
international intervention, Amnesty International’s focus
will be on the conduct of such intervention in the light of
the rules of international humanitarian law and
applicable human rights law. (“Questions and Answers,”
Amnesty International, August 29, 2013, p. 3. <
http://tinyurl.com/pl3tn3w >)

221 See n. 60, above.

222 B.W. Ndiaye et al., Question of the Violation of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of
the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and
Other Dependent Countries and Territories
(E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1), Economic and Social Council,
August 11, 1993, Section 11, “The genocide question,”
para. 78-81. < http://tinyurl.com/pr2ksxs >
223 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell the Story”, p. 53.

224 Factiva database searches under the “Wires,”

“Newspapers: All,” and “Transcripts” categories carried
out on May 23, 2014 for the period October 1, 1990
through April 30, 2014. Our search parameters were:
rst=(twir or tnwp or ttpt) and rwanda* and alison des
forges.

225 See Philpot, Rwanda and the New Scramble for

Africa, Appendix II, pp. 265-269. Therein, Jérôme C.
Bicamumpaka, the Rwandan interim government’s
minister of foreign affairs from April 9 until mid-July
1994, recounts how in May 1994, when his delegation
traveled to the United Nations in New York City to lobby
it to help curb the violence then engulfing his country,
Alison Des Forges mobilized a counter-offensive to
prevent the UN and the relevant ambassadors from
meeting with him.

226 Ibid., p. 87, and n. 13, p. 243. This information is

drawn from Des Forges’s Curriculum Vitae, ca. late 1994,
which she submitted to Canada’s Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration when she served as an “expert witness”
before this body in its 1995 deportation hearings of the
Hutu exile Léon Mugesera, who had fled Rwanda for
Canada in late 1992. Of course, Des Forges testified
against Mugesera.
227 Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell the Story”, pp. 65-
95.

228 Ibid., pp. 65-66. On the presence of clandestine RPF

cells in Kigali and elsewhere, see n. 50, above.

229 Ibid., p. 66.

230 Ibid., p. 76.

231 See n. 7, above.

232 Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that…, p. 356,

were the name “Elizabeth Rubin” appears.

233 Gourevitch quotes with disapproval a line from Filip

Reyntjens, who had told an interviewer: “It’s not a story
of good guys and bad guys. It’s a story of bad guys.
Period.” (Ibid., pp. 185-186.)

234 Ibid., p. 274.

235 Ibid., Ch. 13, pp. 185-208

236 Ibid., p. 203.

237 See Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, pp. 156-170;

especially pp. 166-170. Pottier specifically criticizes
Gourevitch’s misrepresentations of the Kibeho massacre:
“His story is a chef d’oeuvre of obfuscation” (p. 169).

238 Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that…, pp. 266-

273.

239 Paul Kagame’s perspective was greatly enhanced by

a long, uncritical interview that the journal Foreign
Affairs published in 2014. See “Rebooting Rwanda: A
Conversation With Paul Kagame,” Foreign Affairs,
May/June, 2014. < http://tinyurl.com/nwtvhl9 >

240 Factiva database byline-searches of a selective list

of 40 potential contributors to any debate on the
“Rwandan genocide,” carried out on May 22, 2014 for
the period April 1, 2004 through April 30, 2014. Our
search parameters were: by=[soandso] and Rwanda*
and genocide*. The way we designed our byline-
searches, it would have been sufficient for any of the 40
potential contributors to have published something
either in print or online in which the words “Rwanda” or
“Rwandan” and “genocide” or “genocidal” appear in the
same item. We then checked each item to determine
 that the contributor had asserted something about the
“Rwandan genocide;” if the contributor did not, we
excluded the item from the reported total. We should
also add that some of the reported total includes items in
which the “Rwandan genocide” was mentioned merely in
passing, without being the focus of the contributor; these
items were included in the reported total.

241 See Paul Kagame, “Reflecting on Rwanda’s Past—

While Looking Ahead,” Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2014.
< http://tinyurl.com/qcg3l9b >

242 During our ten-year search period, Pierre Péan’s

byline on the “Rwandan genocide” has appeared nine
times in the French media: Libération (2), Le Point (1),
Marianne (1), Le Nouveau Marianne (3), and Marianne2
(2).

Concluding Note: Genocidist misallocation (Rwanda)

and the real genocide denial (DRC)

243 Power, “A Problem from Hell”, p. 503.

244 To be precise, 104 days: April 6 through July 18,

1994.
245 Ban Ki-moon, “Remarks at the commemoration of
the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide,” UN
Secretary-General, April 7, 2014. <
http://tinyurl.com/lzjus59 >

246 Kiran Moodley, “Bill Clinton: we could have saved

300,000 lives in Rwanda,” CNBC Meets, March 13, 2013.
< http://www.cnbc.com/id/100546207 >

247 See the entry for “Democratic Republic of Congo” at

the website of the International Criminal Court. At this
time of writing, the six DRC-related indictees have been:
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (convicted), Germain Katanga
(convicted), Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (acquitted), Bosco
Ntaganda (no trial yet), Callixte Mbarushimana (court
declined to confirm the charges against him), and
Sylvestre Mudacumura (still at large). <
http://tinyurl.com/o92shku >

248 See Herman and Peterson, The Politics of Genocide,

passim.—We should add that in a major study of the
International Criminal Court published in 2014, David
Hoile makes a point that we ourselves have made
before, namely, that “The ICC has charged thirty-two
people to date. They are all Africans.” (Justice Denied:
The Reality of the International Criminal Court (London:
The Africa Research Center, 2014), pp. 199-227; here p.
203.) But even more revealing about the reality of the
ICC than its “exclusive focus on Africa,” has been which
kind of African leaders the ICC has not focused on. The
fact that the ICC could indict Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, the
 Côte d’Ivoire’s Laurent Gbagbo, Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta,
and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, but not Rwanda’s Paul
Kagame, and not Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, shows us
that the ICC’s focus is not just on Africans, but on those
Africans who are not allies/clients of the United States.

249 Quoted in “Ought King Leopold To Be Hanged?” a

1905 interview with the Reverend John N. Harris by the
British journalist W.T. Stead, published as a Supplement
to Mark Twain’s sarcastic, anti-colonial pamphlet, King
Leopold’s Soliloquy: A Defense of His Congo Rule
(Boston: P.R. Warren Co., 2nd Ed., 1905), p. 56. <
http://tinyurl.com/nr97o6z >

250 What we here refer to as a “victims’” license to go

right on killing is often referred to as a “genocide credit,”
but we prefer our formulation.

251 Paul Kagame, “Speech by President Paul Kagame at

the 20th Commemoration of the Genocide Against the
Tutsi,” Kwibuka20, April 7, 2014. <
http://www.kwibuka.rw/speech >

Appendix I: More on the alleged Hutu “conspiracy to

commit genocide” that never was

252 The Prosecutor v. Edouard Karemera et al., Oral

Summary, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, December 21, 2011, para. 75. <
http://tinyurl.com/m7ox2od > For the remainder of
Government I, see Judge Dennis C.M. Byron et al.,
Judgment, Prosecutor v. André Rwamakuba, Case No.
ICTR-98-44C-I, September 20, 2006, p. 86. <
http://tinyurl.com/k5o94c2 >. In this Judgment, the Trial
Chamber acknowledged that it had been the Prosecution
itself, as early as 2004, that removed the initial
“conspiracy to commit genocide” charge from its
Indictment against Rwamakuba (para. 21-22).

253 CDR, or Coalition pour la Défense de la République,

a Hutu political party to the right of Habyarimana’s
MRND.

254 Judge Fausto Pocar et al., Judgment on Appeal,

Ferdinand Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-A, November 28, 2007, para. 912, p. 292. <
http://tinyurl.com/ljm5lyj >

255 See n. 146, above.

256 Judge William H. Sekule, Judgment, Prosecutor v.

Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-T,
June 24, 2011, para. 6186, pp. 1449-1451.—At this time
of writing, all six defendants’ cases were on appeal at
the ICTR. < http://tinyurl.com/n6k63xz >
257 Møse et al., Judgment, Prosecutor v. Théoneste
Bagosora et al., para. 2084-2113, pp. 531-540; here
para. 2109, 2110, and 2112, pp. 539-540. <
http://tinyurl.com/ncarqtd >

258 See Peter Erlinder et al., Major Aloys Ntabakuze

Amended Final Trial Brief, May 27, 2007, as archived at
the website of the Rwanda Documents Project. <
http://tinyurl.com/moam95e > In particular, see Part
Three, Section II, “Alternative Explanation of the Tragic
Events in Rwanda During the Four Year War,” pp. 138-
174. < http://tinyurl.com/ow3tedn > This argument is
reprised at greater length in Erlinder, The Accidental …
Genocide, passim. < http://tinyurl.com/k2opuat >
Separately, Erlinder has written: “The only way the ICTR
‘victors’ court’ could be forced to ‘give-up’ endorsement
of the ‘Hutu conspiracy to commit genocide’ charge was
by presenting the presiding Judge Møse with an
alternative explanation that was just as plausible, or
more so, so that ‘a reasonable fact-finder could not hold
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was only one
alternative….’. Because that is a universal legal principle
the Judges could not openly get around. That was the
strategy. A credible ‘non-conspiracy’ explanation
prevented conspiracy convictions as a matter of law,
even though ‘genocide’ had been judicially noticed.”
(Personal Communication between Peter Erlinder and
David Peterson, July 12, 2014.)

259 See Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, pp. 357-
358. Although the date is unclear, Dallaire recounts a
meeting with Kagame “in newly held territory” in the
Byumba prefecture, where “Kagame had set up a tactical
 headquarters that was much easier to reach than his
compound in Mulindi.” “I raised with the general my
worries about the fate of the Tutsis and the moderate
Hutus still marooned in the Mille Collines,” Dallaire
writes. Kagame replied: “There will be many sacrifices in
this war. If the refugees have to be killed for the cause,
they will be considered as having been part of the
sacrifice” (p. 358).

Appendix II: The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”—another

look

260 Gourevitch, “The Genocide Fax.” <

http://tinyurl.com/lxbff7t >

261 See n. 190 above. According to an affidavit filed by

Jean-Pierre Turatsinze’s widow, Genevieve, with
investigators for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, in early 1994, Jean-Pierre traveled to Tanzania,
where members of his family were then living, “some of
[whom] were RPF members. They are the ones who
convinced [Jean-Pierre] to join the RPF.” (Affidavit of
Genevieve Turatsinze, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, April 3, 2003. < http://tinyurl.com/kbsoasp >)
However, as noted above, we suspect that Jean-Pierre
had already been working covertly on behalf of the RPF
by the date of his first contact with UNAMIR staff, ca.
January 10, 1994.
 262 Dobbs, “The Rwanda ‘Genocide Fax’: What We Know
Now.” < http://tinyurl.com/l7p3yl6 >.

263 Note well that in the version of the “Genocide Fax”

that we reproduce here and refer to as Copy C or as the
Connaughton Fax, the date-stamp has been enhanced by
a professional graphic designer for the sake of its
legibility, but its original font (Bauhaus Medium) as well
as its actual content (discussed in this Appendix as well
as Section 10) remain exactly as they appeared across
the top of the original fax to the DPKO, dated November
27, 1995.

264 Khan, “Warnings of Genocide to UNAMIR,” para. 2.

265 Ralph Zacklin, Re: Prosecutor v. Augustin

Ndindiliyimana (ICTR-00-56-T), Office of Legal Counsel,
United Nations, New York, August 11, 2004, p. 1,
emphasis added. Also see Black, “The Dallaire Genocide
Fax.” < http://tinyurl.com/nypctau >

266 Gourevitch, “The Genocide Fax,” p. 42. <

http://tinyurl.com/lxbff7t >

INDEX
Note: Tables are indicated by a “t” after the page number.
“Accusation in a mirror” proposal, 69

AFDL (Alliance des forces Démocratiques pour la

libération du Congo-Zaire), 52, 53, 54

Africa

Burundi-Rwanda security interlinked in, 20–21

ethnocentric views of, 111n147

Great Lakes region of, 20, 26, 51, 54, 76, 98n66

ICC’s choice of leaders to indict, 122n248

map, 9

West’s power-projection in, 12, 54–55

“world war” of, 48–55, 112n157

African Rights (organization), 45–46, 47, 109n144

aggression. See armed conflicts

Akayesu, Jean-Paul, 41

ALIR (Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda), 53

allAfrica (website), 73

Alliance des forces Démocratiques pour la libération du

Congo-Zaire (AFDL), 52, 53, 54

Amin, Idi, 17, 54, 114n181

Amnesty International, 67, 119n220

Annan, Kofi, 42, 88

Arbour, Louise, 27, 40, 41, 99n69

armed conflicts

civil vs. international, 23–26

crimes of aggression vs. war crimes in, 67, 119n220

preemptive attacks, 52

armed forces

agreement to integrate, 19, 21–22

assessments of, 21–23, 61, 74

exile of most, 47, 50

RPF’s superiority among, 96n49

See also specific groups

Armed Forces of Rwanda. See FAR

Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALIR), 53

Arusha Accords (1993)

allegations concerning, 26, 30–31

Broad Based Transitional Government called for, 29–30,

36

documents noted, 94n34

implementation lacking, 21
Kagame-RPF’s problem with and rejection of, 19, 28, 29,
34, 48, 74, 95n44

peacekeeping force and, 22

weapons-secure-area provision of, 58

Bagosora, Théoneste

indictment of, 24, 43–44, 45, 108n139, 109n143

“not guilty” of conspiracy, 79, 81–82

Bakuramutsa, Manzi, 31

Banyarwandan people, 14, 17.

See also Hutu; Tutsi

Barayagwiza, Jean-Bosco, 80–81

Baril, Maurice

fax sent to, 57, 59, 85–89

multinational force rejected by, 55

Belgium

colonial rule of Rwanda, 14–15, 16, 76, 77

Hutu favored by, 16

See also West

Bicamumpaka, Jerôme-Clément, 80, 109n143, 120n225

Birindabagabo, Jean-Paul, 109n144

Bizimungu, Augustin, 79, 109n143

Bizimungu, Casimir, 80, 109n143

Black, Christopher

on “Genocide Fax,” 59–60, 65 126

media access limited for, 71

as Ndindiliyimana’s attorney, 86, 88, 107n133

Blair, Tony, 13

bloodless coup (1973), 16

Booh-Booh, Jacques-Roger, 60, 61, 116–117n199

Bosnian genocide, 12, 104–105n111

See also International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia

Britain. See United Kingdom

Bruguière, Jean-Louis, 27–29

Burundi

Hutu refugees in, 50

Kagame-RPF’s invasion of DRC supported by, 49, 51, 52

map, 49

Tutsi coup in and aftermath of, 19–21, 50–51

Tutsi exiles in, 17

Bush, George H. W., 24, 42

Butare prefecture

document “discovered” in, 68–69

ICTR cases concerning, 80, 81–82

killings in, 46, 109–110n145

Byron, Dennis, 78

Canada

deportation hearing for Hutu exile in, 120n226

Kagame-RPF’s invasion of DRC supported by, 49, 54–55

Rwanda in media of, 73

UN influenced by, 66–67

See also West

Caplan, Gerald

as “Genocide Fax” disinformant, 64–65

on Hutu extremists, 30–31

media access of, 70, 73

Rwanda report by, 30, 64, 100n79

standard model promoted by, 8, 70–71

Carlsson, Ingvar, 32, 109n141

CDR (Coalition pour la Défense de la République) and
Impuzamugambi, 47, 81, 109–110n145, 123n253

Center for the Prevention of Genocide (Holocaust

Memorial Museum), 11–12, 64–65, 67, 86

Chrétien, Raymond, 55

Chui, Mathieu Ngudjolo, 122n247

Claeys, Frank, 62, 86

“Clean Corridor” operation, 21

Clinton, Bill, 35, 55, 69, 75

CND (National Council for Development) building, 21, 22–

23, 29

Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) and

Impuzamugambi, 47, 81, 109–110n145, 123n253

cockroaches (Inyenzi), 17

Cohen, Herman J., 103–104n103

Connaughton, Richard M., 59, 64, 86–89, 125n263

“conspiracy to exterminate Tutsi” (belief in planned

genocide)

advocates for, 30, 31, 63–66, 70–73, 72t

alleged plans for, 7, 43–44, 45

alleged warning of, 11 (see also “Genocide Fax”)

authenticity refuted, 44–46, 56, 74–77

chief prosecutor’s view of, 42–43

evidence produced to bolster, 40, 56, 60–61

ICTR’s rejection of, 44–46, 63, 64, 74, 78–82, 123n252

“mastermind” of, 81–82

See also standard model of Rwandan genocide

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (UN), 65, 67–68

Cooper Union (New York City), 13

Coup d’État de Gitarama (1961), 16

Cruvellier, Thierry, 46, 105– 106n122

Dallaire, Roméo

armed forces assessed by, 21–22, 23, 74

bias and unreliability of, 61

on Burundian coup, 21

on “conspiracy to exterminate Tutsi,” 56

Elie Wiesel Award for, 12

on FAR’s unconditional surrender, 47–48

fax sent by, 11, 57–59, 60–61, 64, 85–89

media access of, 70, 73

on refugees, 95n39, 124n259

standard model promoted by, 70–71

on “third force,” 115–116n191

on U.S. and allied obstructionism, 36–37

as war criminal, 63

Davenport, Christian

labeled as “genocide denier,” 34

media access limited for, 71

research project described, 32–34

videographic display by, 96n51, 102–103n94

Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Rwanda

Genocide (April 7), 11–12

deaths

under Idi Amin, 54, 114n181

Butare prefecture, 46, 109– 110n145

in Kagame-RPF’s war in DRC, 76–77, 113n171

post-“genocide” period, 32, 48

statistics on, 32–35, 33t

Del Ponte, Carla, 41–42, 107n132

Deme, Amadou, 23, 61, 62

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire)

Hutu refugees in, 50–53

Kagame-RPF’s invasion and killings in, 8, 38, 45, 48–53,

54, 55, 70, 75, 76–77, 113n171

map, 49

minor leaders prosecuted for killings in, 76, 122nn247–

248

number of armed groups in, 113n168

terms for, 112n156

Tutsi exiles in, 17

West’s interests in resources of, 53

Des Forges, Alison

as disinformant on Rwanda, 67–69

“Genocide Fax” disseminated and promoted by, 57, 62

testimony for deporting Hutu exile, 120n226

UN lobbying by, 68, 120n225

Le Devoir (Canadian newspaper), 73

disinformants

human rights groups, 67–69

media and intellectuals, 63–66, 67–73

UN, 66–67

See also propaganda system; West

Dissident Voice (website), 73

Dobbs, Michael

“Genocide Fax” posted by, 11, 59, 86, 88

others’ attack on, 64–65, 90n3

response posted by, 58

standard model promoted by, 11, 26, 63–64

DPKO. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC. See Democratic Republic of Congo

Dusaidi, Claude, 109n141

Dyilo, Thomas Lubanga, 122n247

Egeland, Jan, 112n158

Eight Point Plan, 14

elections

communal and national legislature, 16

Kagame-RPF’s problem with, 19, 28, 29, 34, 74, 95n44

Eliasson, Jan, 35

Elie Wiesel Award, 12

Erlinder, Peter

on Burundian coup, 95n44

on confessions in Habyarima assassination, 99n72

media access limited for, 71, 124n258

as Ntabakuze’s attorney, 82, 98–99n68

ethnic cleansing, 37–38, 50, 67. See also genocide

ethnic identity cards and registration system, 15, 57, 62

ethnocentrism, 111n147

European Commission, Yugoslavia ruling by, 25. See also

West

Evans, Robert, 112n158

FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises, Armed Forces of

Rwanda)

assessment of strength, 22, 61, 74

as exiles, 47, 50

killings by, 45–46

message about plane shoot-down intercepted by, 29

RPF’s rejection of unconditional surrender by, 47–48

RPF’s superiority over, 23, 36, 37

victory of (1990), 93–94n31

FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda),

53

Le Figaro (French newspaper), 73

Forces Armées Rwandaises. See FAR

Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR),
53

Foreign Affairs (U.S. journal), 121n239

France

decline of power in Africa, 54

forces in Rwanda, 23, 61

role in round up and prosecution of suspected

génocidaires, 100–101n85

Rwanda in media of, 73, 121n242

UNAMIR 2 supported by, 36–37

“Friends of the New Rwanda” (group), 44

Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), 20, 50

Gasana, Eugène-Richard, 35

Gatwaza (sergeant), 109–110n145

“génocidaires”

RPF as, 50, 76–77

RPF’s hunt for, 38, 48–53, 70, 74

use of term, 100–101n85

genocide

Bosnian, 12, 104–105n111

conference discourse on, 58

first guilty plea to (later renounced), 41

ICTR’s definition of, 108n137

RPF’s killings in DRC as, 50, 76–77

UN Convention on, 65, 67–68

West’s deployment of term, 76

See also “conspiracy to exterminnate Tutsi”; ethnic

cleansing; Rwandan genocide

“Genocide, Impunity, and Accountability” (conference),

58

“The Genocide”

gory details enhancing idea, 109n144

Hutu refugees as carriers of, 51

naming specific people in, 109–110n145

genocide credit (“victims’” license), 76, 123n250

genocide deniers

deployment of term, 7, 12

prosecutor labeled as, 41–42

researchers labeled as, 34

UN resolution condemning, 66–67

“Genocide Fax”

analysis of, 58–61, 85–89, 125n263

authenticity refuted, 60–61, 86–89

Chronology of, 116n197

cover pages of, 83–85

dissemination of, 11, 12, 57–58, 62, 63–66, 69

first reported (1995), 56–57

ICTR’s dismissal of, 59–60, 63, 86

informant claimed as source of, 57, 61–62, 115n190

key paragraphs, 57

later testimony and interview concerning, 116–117n199,

117n203

Rubin as source of, 69

West’s interests in “resurfacing,” 62–63

Genocide Studies, 26, 51. See also standard model of

Rwandan genocide

Genocide Survivors Students Association of Rwanda, 32,

34, 102n92

GenoDynamics (University of Michigan research project),

32–34

George Washington University, National Security Archive

website, 11, 86

Germany, colonial rule of Rwanda, 14–15

Gersony, Robert, 46, 66, 81, 110–111n146

Global Research (website), 73

Globe and Mail (Toronto newspaper), 73

Goebbels, Joseph, 69

Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah, 44, 108–109n140

Goldstone, Richard J., 24, 27, 39

Gourevitch, Philip

conflict of interest of, 69–70

“Genocide Fax” disseminated and promoted by, 12, 57,

64, 69, 85, 86, 88, 89

on RPF’s self-exoneration, 100–101n85

tirade of, 70, 120n233, 121n237

government (Rwandan)

Broad Based Transitional, 19, 29–30, 36

civil service disintegration, 19

interim, 23, 40, 78, 106n124

RPF’s expansion into, 22–23

RPF’s regime consolidation, 13, 38, 39, 53

See also Habyarimana, Juvénal; Kagame, Paul

Government I and II trials

defendants listed, 109n143

defense counsel in, 115n190

summary of judgments, 78, 80

The Guardian (British newspaper), 73

Habyarimana, Juvénal

bloodless coup of, 16

Dallaire’s instructions to contact, 59

demonization of, 67–68

moderate views of, 7

right-of-return objection to, 18

superstition of, 93n26

West’s undermining of, 19, 54, 67

See also MRND

Habyarimana, assassination (plane shot down)

alleged conspiracy in place before, 7, 44 (see also

“conspiracy to exterminate Tutsi”)

call to find guilty parties, 106n124

confessions in, 99n72

evidence buried and investigation quashed, 27–32, 40,

62–63, 66, 99n69

genocide as spontaneous response to, 65, 78

Kagame-RPF’s responsibility for, 27–32, 44

RPF prepared to advance immediately after, 22–23, 29–
30, 31, 34–35, 61, 74, 98n66

Hakizamana, Eric, 29, 99n70

Holocaust, 67

Holocaust Memorial Museum (U.S.), 11–12, 64–65, 67, 86

Hourigan, Michael

shoot-down of plane investigated by, 27–28, 29, 30, 31,

40

voice redacted and silenced, 62–63, 66, 98–99n68

Human Development Report (1991), 13–14, 91n17

human rights activists

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 45–46, 67–69

detailed reports of, 109n144, 109–110n145, 110–

111n146

focus on war crimes instead of crime of aggression, 67,

119n220

hopes of, 13–14

on RPF’s role, 47

Human Rights Watch

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 45–46

focus on war crimes vs. crime of aggression, 67

“Genocide Fax” disseminated and promoted by, 57–58,
64

gory details reported by, 109– 110n145

on RPF’s role, 47

on Syria, 119n220

UN lobbying by, 68, 120n225

on West’s alleged “failure to intervene,” 36

Hutu

alleged conspiracy of (see “conspiracy to exterminate

Tutsi”)

alleged propaganda of, 68–69

deaths of, 7, 32–35, 33t, 44, 46

deaths post-“genocide,” 32, 48

extremists (see “Hutu Power”)

ICTR’s indictments of, 24, 39, 40–41, 42–44, 108n139

identification as, 16

images and rhetoric deployed against, 67–68, 111n147

killings by, 45–46

liberation movement of, 15–16

origins and meaning of, 14–15, 92n20

as percentage of Rwandan population, 13

See also Hutu refugees; Hutu-Tutsi conflicts

Hutu Manifesto (1957), 15, 92– 93n21

“Hutu Power”

allegations concerning, 7, 26, 30–31, 100–101n85

disinformation about, 68–69

exemplar of, 81

Gourevitch’s tirade on, 70, 121n237

RPF’s alleged role in stopping, 47–48, 51

See also “conspiracy to exterminate Tutsi”

Hutu refugees

from Burundi, 50–51

call for return of, 77

camps of, 51, 55, 70, 121n237

in Canada, 120n226

Kagame-RPF’s hunt for and killings of, 8, 38, 45, 48–53,

54, 55, 70, 75, 76–77, 113n171

Kagame’s attitude toward, 124n259

number of, 50

plans to round up and prosecute, 100–101n85

in Rwanda, 20, 50
Hutu-Tutsi conflicts

accepted explanation of, 7–8

escalation of, 16–17

mischaracterized as civil war, 23–26

social, political, and economic underpinnings, 14–16,

92n20

Tutsi coup in Burundi, 19–21, 50–51

See also Rwandan genocide; Rwandan-Ugandan wars on

DRC; and specific armed forces

IBUKA (“Remember,” Tutsi survivors’ organization), 33

ICC (International Criminal Court), 75–76, 122nn247–248

ICTR. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

ICTY. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia

identity cards and registration system, 15, 57, 62

Impuzamugambi and CDR, 47, 81, 109–110n145,

123n253

The Independent (London newspaper), 73

Independent International Commission of Inquiry (on

Kibeho massacre), 70

Inglis, Michael Oliver, 41

Integration of the Armed Forces

agreement (1993), 19, 21–22

wing; later a combatant), 23, 47, 57, 59, 109–110n145,

115n190.

See also MRND

International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights

Abuses in Rwanda, 67–68, 70

International Criminal Court (ICC), 75–76, 122nn247–248

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

“conspiracy to exterminate Tutsi” rejected by, 44–46, 63,

64, 74, 78–82, 123n252

creation and mandate, 26–27, 38–39

Des Forges’s role at, 68

“facts” established before trials, 38–39, 66

genocide defined by, 108n137

“Genocide Fax” presented and dismissed at, 59–60, 63,

86

indictments and convictions by, 24, 39, 40–41, 42–44,

108n139

investigation of shoot-down of plane terminated by, 27–

32, 99n69

judicial fiction of, 105–106n122

National Team findings (see Hourigan, Michael)

official history at, 7

political imperatives underlying, 24–25, 38–43

RPF, Tutsi, and Kagame impunity at, 39–40, 41–43, 66,

76, 107n133

summary of major judgments, 78–82, 123n252

U.S. and allied interests in, 19 41–43, 66–67

See also standard model of Rwandan genocide

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

(ICTY)

chief prosecutor of, 42

genocide defined by, 104– 105n111

ICTR compared with, 24

legal strategies in, 38

mandate for, 75

U.S. and NATO policy served by, 27, 43

International Fact-Finding Commission, 25, 97n60

International Forum on Genocide (2014), 11

international law

on civil vs. international war, 24–26

U.S. foreign policy vs., 43

International Rescue Committee, 52

In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz (Wrong), 51

Inyenzi (cockroaches), 17

Iraq, U.S. attacks on, 24, 67

Jadoul, Andre, 97n61

Jallow, Hassan B., 42–43, 76

Jones, Adam, 51

Kabarebe, James, 99n70

Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 53–54

Kabiligi, Gratien, 79, 109n143

Kabuga (burgomaster), 109– 110n145

Kabuye, Rose, 99n70

Kagame, Paul

as Abraham Lincoln, 13, 55, 77

Idi Amin compared with, 114n181

background, 17–18

corruption and power of, 12–13

DRC invasion and killings by, 8, 38, 45, 48–53, 54, 55,
70, 75, 76–77, 113n171

elections mandate as problem for, 19, 28, 29, 34, 74,

95n44

elections of, 12, 16

genocide perpetrated by, 27–28, 30–32, 34–35, 37–38,
44, 46, 47–48, 54, 66, 68

genocide’s twentieth anniversary commemorated by, 11

ICC’s failure to indict, 76, 122n248

impunity at ICTR, 39–40, 41–43, 76, 99n70

international celebrity of, 13

media access of, 70–73, 121n239

responsible for shooting-down of presidential plane, 27–

30, 44, 46

as RPF leader, 93–94n31

standard model promoted by, 70–71

on truth, 76–77

U.S. and allied support for, 18–19, 31–32, 35, 36–38, 48–
49, 52–55, 74–75

See also Rwandan Patriotic Front

Kagame Power

components of, 13

“conspiracy” lie disseminated in support of, 44, 74–75

exiles from, 28–29

hagiography of, 93n30

media flattery of, 100–101n85

pinnacle of, 67

pre-1994 conspiracy of, 82, 124n259

propagandists for, 8, 64–66, 70

regime consolidation of, 13, 38, 39, 53

See also Kagame, Paul; Rwandan Patriotic Front;

standard model of Rwandan genocide

Kalimanzira (MRND member), 109–110n145

Kambanda, Jean, 24, 40–41, 64, 106n124

Kangura (magazine), 80–81

Kanyemere, Samuel, 99n70

Karabebe, James, 28

Karamba, Charles, 28

Karemera, Édouard, 78, 109n143

Katanga, Germain, 122n247

Kayibanda, Grégoire, 15, 16, 93n26

Kayonga, Charles, 99n70

Kengo, Leon, 53

Kesteloot, Henry, 62

Khan, Shaharyar, 58, 59, 87, 88–89

Kibeho refugee camp, 70, 121n237

Kigali, safe sport for RPF in, 21, 22–23, 29

Ki-moon, Ban, 74

Kingdom of Rwanda, 14–15, 16

Kinyarwanda (language), 14

Kinzer, Stephen, 93n30

Kouchner, Bernard, 100–101n85

Laughland, John, 41, 106n124

“Leave None to Tell the Story” (Des Forges and Human

Rights Watch), 57–58, 68

Lemarchand, René, 20

Lenin, V. I., 69

Leopold II (king of Belgium), 76, 77

Libération (French newspaper), 47

Lizinde, Théoneste, 28, 29

Logiest, Guy, 16

Lyons, James, 29, 99n69

Mamdani, Mahmood, 15

maps

Africa, 9

DRC, 49
Rwanda, 10, 49

Marchal, Luc, 62

Mbarushimana, Callixte, 122n247

MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain), 62, 109–

110n145

media

advocates vs. dissenters of standard model in, 70–73,

72t

bias of, 12–13, 70–73

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 46

Des Forges’s influence in, 67–69

earliest use of “Rwandan genocide” by, 97n61

ICTR trial related to, 80–81

Kagame-Power flattery in, 100–101n85

number of articles on Rwanda, 71, 72t, 121n240

threats against Mobutu in, 51–52

See also disinformants; propaganda system; and specific

newspapers

Melvern, Linda

as “Genocide Fax” disinformant, 63–64

on Hutu extremists, 31
on Kambanda’s ICTR trial, 40, 41

media access of, 71, 73

standard model promoted by, 6, 71

Military I and II trials

conspiracy model demolished in, 46

defendants listed, 109n143

“Genocide Fax” presented and dismissed at, 59–60, 63

Hourigan’s memo in evidentiary record, 98–99n68

Ndindiliyimana’s attorney at, 59, 86, 88, 107n133

summary of judgments, 78–79

Milken Institute Global Conference (Los Angeles), 13

Mobutu Sese Seko, 51–52, 53, 54, 112n156

De Morgen (Belgian newspaper), 56

Møse (judge), 124n258

Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), 62, 109–

110n145

MRND (Mouvement Républicain National pour la

Démocratie et le Développement), 57, 62, 78, 88, 109–
110n145, 115n190. See also Interahamwe

Mucchielli, Roger, 69

Mucyo, Jean de Dieu, 102n92

Mudacumura, Sylvestre, 122n247

Mugenzi, Justin, 80, 109n143

Mugesera, Léon, 120n226

Mugiraneza, Prosper, 80, 109n143

Mugunga refugee camp (DRC), 55

Muna, Bernard, 41

Museveni, Yoweri

ICC’s failure to indict, 122n248

invasion of DRC (with RPF), 52, 75

Kagame’s training under, 17–18

RPF build up supported by, 93–94n31

U.S. support for, 75, 103– 104n103

Mushikiwabo, Louise, 70–71, 73

Musoni, Edwin, 102n92

Nahimana, Ferdinand, 80–81

National Commission against Genocide, 102n92

National Council for Development (CND) building, 21, 22–

23, 29

National Republican Movement for Democracy, 44

National Resistance Army (NRA), 17, 18

National Security Archive (George Washington
University), 11, 86

Ndadaye, Melchior, 20, 50

Ndahindurwa, Kigeri (king), 91– 92n18

Ndindiliyimana, Augustin, 59, 79, 86, 88, 107n133,

109n143

Neutral International Force, 19

Newbury, Catherine, 15, 71n20

New Times (Rwandan official newspaper), 100–101n85

The New Yorker (magazine), 57, 69–70, 85, 100–101n85.

See also Gourevitch, Philip

New York Times (newspaper)

Des Forges’s influence at, 68

disinformants’ access to, 73

as “Genocide Fax” disinformant, 63–66

on genocide’s twentieth anniversary, 11

on “triggering event,” 26

N’Gbanda, Honoré, 53

Ngirumpatse, Matthieu, 78, 109n143

North Kivu Province (DRC), 49

(map), 50–51, 55, 76

“Note Relative à la Propagande d’Expansion et de
Recrutement” (mimeographed document), 68–69

NRA (National Resistance Army), 17, 18

Nsabimana (prefect), 109–110n145

Nsengiyumva, Anatole, 79, 109n143

Ntabakuze, Aloys, 79, 82, 98–99n68, 109n143

Ntaganda, Bosco, 122n247

Ntaryamira, Cyprien, 26–27

Nyamwasa, Kayumba, 28, 29, 99n70

Nyiramasuhuko, Pauline, 81, 109– 110n145

Nzeze, Hassan, 80–81

Nzirorera, Joseph, 45, 109n143, 115n190

Nziza, Frank, 29, 99n70

Nziza, Jack, 99n70

Nzuwonemeye, François-Xavier, 79, 109n143

Oakley, Phyllis, 52

Obote, Milton, 17

The Observer (London newspaper), 56

Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to

Protect (UN), 12

Operation Turquoise (French forces), 23, 61

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 30, 64, 100n79

Orientale Province (DRC), 49 (map), 50–51, 76

Otunnu, Ogenga, 93–94n31

Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation

(PARMEHUTU), 15, 16

Peace Agreement. See Arusha Accords

peacekeeping. See UN Department of Peacekeeping

Operations

Peace Studies, 51

Péan, Pierre, 73, 121n242

Peterson, David, 65

Philpot, John, 98–99n68

Philpot, Robin

on Arusha Accords, 19

Chrétien interviewed by, 55

on “conspiracy to exterminate Tutsi,” 56

on images and ethnocentrism, 111n147

media access limited for, 71

on U.S. foreign policy, 43

political parties

emergence of, 15–16

Hutu and Tutsi distinctions in, 92n20

See also specific parties

Pottier, Johan, 121n237

Pourtier, Roland, 51

Power, Samantha, 35, 36, 37, 74, 103n101

propaganda system

challenges dismissed in, 7, 12, 65–66

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 44–46

on deployment of multinational force, 54–55

Des Forges’s role in, 67–69

disinformants of, 63–66

geopolitical interests served in, 12–13, 62–63

Kagame as savior in, 47, 54–55

repeated lies in, 30

tools of, 7–8

Prosper, Pierre Joseph, 42

Prunier, Gérard

on Belgians and Hutu, 16

errors of, 98n66

on Hutu extremists, 26, 92– 93n21

on Kayibanda’s death, 93n26

on U.S. opposition to Mobutu, 52

Psychologie de la publicité et de la propaganda

(Mucchielli), 69

Rabble.ca, 64

Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), 31, 80–

81, 109–110n145

Reed, William Cyrus, 96n50

refugees

publicity about plight, 54–55

UN mission for, 110–111n146

whereabouts of internally displaced, 95n39

See also Hutu refugees; Tutsi refugees

repatriation, 14, 18–19, 54–55, 77, 94n33, 110–111n146

“Request for Protection for Informant” (faxes), 57, 59, 60

Reyntjens, Filip, views

context noted, 8

judicial fiction, 105–106n122

RPF as occupying force, 48

RPF’s impunity, 39–40

RPF’s self-exoneration, 31
Rwanda’s story, 120n233

UN resolutions, 55

U.S. support for RPF, 52–53

RFP. See Rwandan Patriotic Front

Rice, Susan, 35–36, 37, 112n157

Rivero, Isel, 116n197

Robinson, Peter, 115n190

Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS), 59, 87

RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army), 91n11. See also Rwandan

Patriotic Front

RTLM (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines), 31, 80–

81, 109– 110n145

Rubin, James, 69

Rudahigwa, Mutara (king), 91– 92n18

Rudasingwa, Theogene, 29–30, 71, 99n72

Rutaremara, Tito, 18

Ruyenzi, Aloys, 28–29

Ruzibiza, Abdul, 28

Rwaburgiri (king), 92n20

Rwamakuba, André, 109n143, 123n252

Rwanda
alleged threats to, 51–52

Census of (1991), 33

foreign invasion of, 14, 17–18, 23–26, 45, 67, 74, 93–
94n31, 113n171

history (pre-1990), 13–18, 92n20

Hutu and Tutsi as percentage of population, 12–13

independence and democratization of, 15–16

maps, 10, 49

regime consolidation in, 13, 38, 39, 53

security of Burundi linked to that of, 20–21

UN troops withdrawn (1994), 55

See also government

Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (Caplan et al.), 30,

64, 100n79

Rwanda Alliance for National Unity, 14

Rwanda Documentation and Oral History project, 11

Rwandan genocide (April–July 1994)

anniversary commemorated, 11–12

documents later resurfacing (or not), 62–63

earliest use of term in context, 97n61

end of, 7, 47–48

as excuse for RPF’s mass killings, 48–53

as “fact of common knowledge,” 38–39, 66

foundational lie in claim of, 43–46 (see also “conspiracy

to exterminate Tutsi”)

Kagame-RPF’s responsibility for, 27–28, 30–32, 34–35,

37–38, 44, 46, 47–48, 54, 66, 68

statistics on, 32–35, 33t

summary of actual events, 74–76

victor’s justice in, 38–43

West’s alleged “failure to intervene” in, 11, 12, 35–38

West’s rhetoric on stopping, 24–25

See also Arusha Accords;

“Genocide Fax”; standard model of Rwandan genocide

Rwandan Ministry of Local Government, Community

Development and Social Affairs, 32

Rwandan National Assembly, 16, 21

Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), 91n11. See also Rwandan

Patriotic Front

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF; later, Rwandan Patriotic

Army, RPA)

agreement to integrate, 19, 21–22

apologists for, 67–69, 70

assessment of strength, 21–22, 23, 74

Burundian coup and, 20–21

ceasefires rejected by, 36

cross-border invasion mischaracterized as civil war, 23–

26

defectors from, 28–29

DRC invasion and killings by, 8, 38, 45, 48–53, 54, 55,
70, 75, 76–77, 113n171

elections mandate as problem for, 19, 28, 29, 34, 74,

95n44

end of genocide and, 7, 47–48

as foreign invaders in Rwanda, 14, 17–18, 23–26, 45, 67,

74, 93–94n31, 113n171

genocide perpetrated by, 27–28, 30–32, 34–35, 37–38,

44, 46, 47–48, 54, 66, 68

goal of, 18

impunity at ICTR, 39–40, 41–43, 66, 76, 107n133

in-country (Rwanda) cells of, 69, 96n50

informant on “Genocide Fax” linked to, 62, 85, 124–

125n261

Kigali staging ground of, 21, 22–23

killings by, 32, 33, 46, 48, 93n26, 102–103n94

Museveni’s support for, 93– 94n31

origins of, 14

prepared to advance after Habyarimana’s death, 22–23,

29–30, 31, 34–35, 61, 74, 98n66

presidential plane shot down by, 27–32, 44

propaganda system of, 68–69

regime consolidation and, 13, 38, 39, 53

self-exoneration for plane shoot-down, 30–31, 100–

101n85

superiority of, 22, 96n49

U.S. and allied support for, 18–19, 31–32, 35, 36–38, 48–
49, 52–55, 74–75

See also Kagame Power

Rwandan-Ugandan wars on DRC

call for ceasefire in, 54–55

first phase (1994–1997), 48–53

second phase (1998– ), 53, 112n155

“Rwanda’s Shrouded Nightmare” (Dobbs), 11, 63

“Rwanda 20 Years Later” (Holocaust Memorial Museum),

12

Rwandese National Union, 16

Rwigyema, Fred, 17–18, 93–94n31

Sagahutu, Innocent, 79, 109n143

Sakindi, Emmanuel, 109–110n145

Sarkozy, Nicolas, 100–101n85

Scheers, Johan, 40–41

Scheffer, David, 43

Scherrer, Christian, 51

Security Council. See UN Security Council

Semwaga (MRND member), 109– 110n145

SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), 12, 25–

26, 67. See also International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia

Shalom (MRND member), 109– 110n145

Sheldon, Mrs., 76

Sibomana (burgomaster), 109– 110n145

Sise, Lamin J., 59–60, 87, 88

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), 12, 25–

26, 67. See also International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia

South Kivu Province (DRC), 49

(map), 50–51, 52, 76

Stam, Allan

labeled as “genocide denier,” 34

media access limited for, 71

research project described, 32–34

videographic display by, 96n51, 102–103n94

standard model of Rwandan genocide

advocates of, 6–8, 11, 63–73

civil war emphasized in, 23–25

conflicts of interest among experts of, 69–70

foundational lie in, 43–46 (see also “conspiracy to

exterminate Tutsi”)

institutionalization of, 7–8

key points, 12–13, 43

limited group-think in, 37

media access of advocates vs. dissenters on, 70–73, 72t

refutation of, 44–46, 56, 74–77

RPF’s invasion of DRC explained in, 51

RPF’s role in stopping genocide touted in, 47–48

statistics disproving, 32–35, 33t

treatment of shoot-down of presidential plane in, 26–32,

98n66

victor’s justice in, 38–43

West’s alleged “failure to intervene,” 11, 12, 35–38

See also “Genocide Fax”; International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda; propaganda system

Stanton, Larry, 63–64

Stead, William Thomas, 76

Syria, crises in, 26, 119n220

Tadić, Dusko, 25

Tanzania

Hutu refugees in, 40, 50

Tutsi exiles in, 17

“third force,” 115–116n191

The Times (London newspaper), 72–73

torture, of Hutu detainees, 40

Tumwine, Jacob, 28, 99n70

Turatsinze, Genevieve, 124–125n261

Turatsinze, Jean-Pierre

boss of, 115n190

defense of, 63, 64

as informant on “Genocide Fax,” 57, 61–62

protection requested for, 57, 59

as RPF member, 62, 85, 124– 125n261

Tutsi

coup in Burundi, 19–21

deaths of, 7, 32–35, 33t, 44, 45–46

exodus from Rwanda, 16–17

hopes to retake Rwanda, 18

identification as, 16

impunity at ICTR, 39–40, 41–43, 66, 107n133

Kingdom ruled by, 14–15, 16, 91–92n18

origins and meaning of, 14–15, 92n20

as percentage of Rwandan population, 12–13, 74

See also Hutu-Tutsi conflicts; Tutsi refugees

Tutsi refugees

Arusha Accords on, 19

Kagame’s attitude toward, 124n259

preferences of, 94n33

right-of-return issue for, 14, 18

in RPF, 17

Twagirimungu, Faustin, 62, 71, 117n203

Twa people, 13, 14, 74

Uganda
coups in, 17

Hutu refugees in, 50

Kagame-RPF’s invasion of DRC supported by, 48–49, 50,

51, 52–53

number killed under Idi Amin, 54, 114n181

RPF weapons and support from, 14, 61, 67, 93–94n31

Tutsi exiles and guerillas in, 17

Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF, formerly

Ugandan National Resistance Army), 14, 18, 23–24, 61,
93–94n31. See also Rwandan Patriotic Front

Ulmann, Richard H., 114n181

UNAMIR. See UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda

United Kingdom (U.K.)

Arusha Accords and, 19

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 45

“Genocide Fax” linked to military facility in, 59, 87

ICTR prosecutor removed at behest of, 42–43

Kagame-RPF support from, 18–19, 31–32, 35, 36–38, 48–

49, 52–55

political support for “civil war,” 24–25

responsible for genocide, 44, 46

UN influenced by, 66–67

See also West

United Nations

allegedly warned about genocide (see “Genocide Fax”)

Carlsson report for, 32, 109n141

Charter of, on invasion of country, 24, 26

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 44, 46, 66–67

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide, 65, 67–68

documents reviewed, 58, 59, 87, 88–89

failure of, 75

genocide’s twentieth anniversary commemorated by, 11

Human Development Report of, 13–14, 91n17

human rights activists’ lobbying at, 68, 120n225

RPF recognized by, 68

Rwanda as Trust Territory of, 15

Rwandan representative’s review of documents at, 58,

59, 87, 88–89

Special Rapporteur on Rwanda of, 67

states’ power and influence in, 66

See also International Criminal Court; International

Criminaltional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR and UNAMIR
2)

appeal for help from, 23

armed forces assessed by, 21–23, 74

commander of, 11

failure to respond to RPF’s military build up, 61

fax sent by, 11, 57–59, 60–61, 64, 85–89

message about plane shoot-down intercepted by, 29

RPF “safe spot” provided by, 21, 22–23, 29

RPF’s rejection of troops from, 47–48

U.S. and allied obstruction of, 36–37, 103n101

See also Dallaire, Roméo

UN Commission of Experts, 43, 110–111n146

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

ceasefires called for, 36

fax sent to, 11, 57–59, 60–61, 64, 85–89

UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 70, 110–111n146

UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility

to Protect, 12

UN Security Council

changing power balance in, 26

chief prosecutors appointed by, 41–43

genocide discussed by, 35–36, 109n141

publicity about Hutu refugees’ plight and, 54–55

RPF’s aggression ignored by, 22

Rwandan seat on, 39

specific resolutions 827, 96n54 955, 26–27, 38, 39, 75

1078, 54 1080, 54–55 2150, 66–67

standard model promoted by, 7, 66–67

United States

anti-Mobutu policy of, 52–53

Arusha Accords and, 19

attacks on other countries by, 67, 119n220

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 45

Des Forges’s connections to security agencies of, 68

geopolitical power of, 12–13

ICTR prosecutor removed at behest of, 42–43

Kagame-RPF support from, 18–19, 31–32, 35, 36–38, 48–

49, 52–55, 74–75

political support for “civil war,” 24–25

RPF’s aggression ignored by, 22–23

UN influenced by, 66–67

war crimes ambassador of, 42, 43

See also West

U.S. Army Command and Staff College (Fort

Leavenworth), 18

U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 11–12, 64–65, 67, 86

U.S. State Department, 37

University of Michigan, GenoDynamics research project,

32–34

UPDF (Ugandan People’s Defense Force, formerly

Ugandan National Resistance Army), 14, 18, 23–24, 61,
93–94n31. See also Rwandan Patriotic Front

“victims’” license (genocide credit), 76, 123n250

victor’s justice, 38–43, 124n258

Wall Street Journal, 72

war. See armed conflicts; and specific forces

Washington Post, 53, 68

Watson, Catharine, 17, 94n33

Webster, Don, 116–117n199

West (U.S. and allies)

African leaders protected by, 122n248

alleged failure to protect Rwandan people, 11, 12, 35–38

“conspiracy” lie disseminated by, 44–46, 63–73

DRC resources eyed by, 53

ethnocentrism of, 111n147

evidence of Kagame-RPF’s responsibility for

assassinations buried by, 27–28, 30–32

Kagame and RPF support from, 18–19, 31–32, 35, 36–38,

48–49, 52–55, 74–75

political support for “civil war,” 24–25

prosecution for killings in DRC and interests of, 75–76

responsible for genocide, 22–23, 44, 46

revisionism-before-the-fact tactic of, 25–26

Tutsi exiles to, 17

UN influenced by, 66–67

Yugoslavia’s dissolution fostered by, 25–26

See also Arusha Accords; “conspiracy to exterminate

Tutsi”; propaganda system; standard model of Rwandan
genocide; United States

We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed

with our families (Gourevitch), 69

Wiesel, Elie, 12, 13

Wrong, Michela, 51

Yeltsin, Boris, 26

Yugoslavia (former), 12, 25–26, 67.

See also International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia

Zacklin, Ralph, 88

Zaire. See Democratic Republic of Congo 142

 Table of Contents
index
Copyright
Preface
Introduction
1. Rwanda: Background and context
2. The RPF invasion and low-level aggressive war that never
was a “civil war”
3. “Hutu Power extremists” did not shoot-down
Habyarimana’s Falcon 50 jet
4. The “Rwandan genocide” by the numbers
5. The West’s alleged “failure to intervene”
6. The ICTR delivers victor’s justice
7. The alleged Hutu “conspiracy to commit genocide” that
never was
8. Did Paul Kagame’s RPF really “stop the genocide”?
9. “Africa’s World War”: Kagame’s alleged pursuit of
“génocidaires” in Zaire—the Democratic Republic of Congo
—and the deaths of millions
10. The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”
11. The New York Times and other “Genocide Fax”
disinformants
12. Role of UN, human rights groups, media, and intellectuals
in promulgating the standard model
Concluding Note: Genocidist misallocation (Rwanda) and the
real genocide denial (DRC)
Appendix I: More on the alleged Hutu “conspiracy to commit
genocide” that never was
Appendix II: The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”—another look
Notes
Index
Africa
Rwanda 1994
Zaire-The Democratic Republic of Congo
Table 1. Ranges and ethnic compositions of deaths in the
“Rwandan genocide”
Table 2. Bylined-articles on Rwanda in the world’s media,
April 1, 2004 - April 30, 2014
Illustrations: Three versions of the apocryphal “Genocide
Fax”
Preface
Introduction
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1. Rwanda: Background and context
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
2. The RPF invasion and low-level aggressive war that never
was a “civil war”
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
Chapter VII
Chapter VII
3. “Hutu Power extremists” did not shoot-down
Habyarimana’s Falcon 50 jet
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
4. The “Rwandan genocide” by the numbers
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
Table 1
Table 1
5. The West’s alleged “failure to intervene”
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
6. The ICTR delivers victor’s justice
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
7. The alleged Hutu “conspiracy to commit genocide” that
never was
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
Appendix I
144
145
146
147
148
8. Did Paul Kagame’s RPF really “stop the genocide”?
149
150
151
152
153
154
9. “Africa’s World War”: Kagame’s alleged pursuit of
“génocidaires” in Zaire—the Democratic Republic of Congo
 —and the deaths of millions
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
Chapter VII
183
184
185
10. The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”
186
187
188
Appendix II
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
11. The New York Times and other “Genocide Fax”
disinformants
206
207
208
Appendix I
209
210
211
212
213
214
12. Role of UN, human rights groups, media, and intellectuals
in promulgating the standard model
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
Table 2
239
Table 2
240
241
242
Concluding Note: Genocidist misallocation (Rwanda) and the
real genocide denial (DRC)
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
Appendix I: More on the alleged Hutu “conspiracy to commit
genocide” that never was
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
Appendix II: The apocryphal “Genocide Fax”—another look
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
Appendix I
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
Appendix I
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
Appendix II
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
INDEX
69
52
53
54
20
21
111
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