EN BANC

[G.R. No. 97105. October 15, 1991.]

ROSETTE YNIGUEZ LERIAS, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ROGER G.
MERCADO, respondents.

Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for private
respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. Â CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVE; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE TRIBUNAL (HRET); SOLE
JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS ON ELECTION RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
ALL ITS MEMBERS. — The independence of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, (HRET, for brevity) as a constitutional body has time and
again been upheld by this Court in many cases. (Lazatin v. House Electoral
Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391; Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780). The power of the HRET, as the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of its members is
beyond dispute. (Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution)
2. Â ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO REVIEW DECISIONS OR FINAL
RESOLUTIONS OF HRET, GROUNDS. — Judicial review of decisions or final
resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-
called "extra-ordinary jurisdiction" — upon a determination that the
tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. (Morrero v . Bocar, 66 Phil.
429, 431; Lazatin v. House of Electoral Tribunal, supra; Robles v. HRET,
supra) Then only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown that
the Court interferes with the HRET's judgment or decision.
3. Â REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BEST EVIDENCE IN ELECTION
CONTESTS. — In an election contest where what is involved is the
correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most
conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot
be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best
evidence. Where it has been duly determined that actual voting and election
by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting
centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the
resulting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima
facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting.
4. Â ID.; ID.; BEST EVIDENCE RULE; ORIGINAL COPY PREFERRED
OVER XEROX COPY; CASE AT BAR. — The evidence before the HRET is the
original copy of the election returns while the Comelec's copy of the
certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy , the original thereof had not
been produced. Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a
writing, the contents of which are the subject of inquiry, other than the
original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec.
2 of the Rules of Court. The exceptions are not present here.
5. Â ID.; ID.; SECONDARY EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTIFICATE
OF CANVASS DISOWNED BY SIGNATORIES; CASE AT BAR. — The xerox copy
of the certificate of canvass is inadmissible as secondary evidence because
the requirements of Sec. 4 of the same Rule have not been met. Besides this
certificate of canvass had been disowned by the chairman and members of
the municipal board of canvassers, claiming that the same was falsified
since their signatures and thumbmarks appearing thereon are not theirs and
the number of votes credited to Lerias in the municipality of Libagon had
been reduced from 1,811 to 1,411.
6. Â ID.; ID.; FINDING OF COMELEC IN PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTEST
THAT COPY OF CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS GENUINE, NOT BINDING AND
CONCLUSIVE ON APPEAL. — The finding of the Comelec in the pre-
proclamation proceedings that its copy of the certificate of canvass is
"genuine and authentic" and which finding was sustained by this Court (G.R.
No. 78833; 79882-83) is not binding and conclusive.
7. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — This Court sustained the use of the
Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass instead of the copy of the
provincial board of canvassers only to establish prima facie (but not actually)
the winner (as called for by the summary nature of pre-proclamation
proceedings), without prejudice to a more judicious and unhurried
determination in an election protest. Acceptance of a certificate of canvass
as genuine and authentic for purposes of canvass simply means that said
certificate of canvass is genuine and authentic for the purpose of
determining the prima facie winner in the election.
8. Â POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTION CONTEST,
PURPOSE. — The very purpose of an election contest is to establish who is
the actual winner in the election.
9. Â REMEDIAL LAW; ESTOPPEL. WILL NOT APPLY IF IT WOULD
CONTRAVENE PUBLIC POLICY; CASE AT BAR. — Anent the pronouncement of
the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the Comelec's
copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it,
suffice it to state that Lerias agreed to the use of said copy because she was
not aware then that the figures therein had been altered. It is a matter of
record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy.
At any rate, she cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the
voters' will because such estoppel would contravene public policy. Moreover,
as indicated in the discussion hereinabove, under the circumstances relating
to pre-proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot apply.
10. Â POLITICAL LAW; OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; "NEIGHBORHOOD
RULE," EXPLAINED. — "Neighborhood rule" under Subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of
the Omnibus Election Code, a ballot where only the first name of a candidate
or his surname is written is considered a vote for such candidate as there is
no other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same office.
11. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL TO COUNT BALLOT CAST WHERE ONLY
FIRST NAME OF CANDIDATE WAS WRITTEN, A VIOLATION THEREOF; CASE AT
BAR. — The majority opinion, therefore, which did not count the ballots cast
where only the first name of Lerias was written "Rosette," "rosit" or "roset" is
contrary to said subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code. In her
certificate of candidacy, Lerias gave her full name as "Rosette Yniguez
Lerias." It is for this reason that the Tribunal during the appreciation of the
ballots in its executive sessions admitted as votes for Lerias ballots
containing, "Yniguez R," "Yniguez L," Yniguez Roset," "R. Yniguez" or "L.
Yniguez" written on the first line of senators for it is very clear that said
ballots were intended to be cast for Lerias. Under Subsec. 3 of Section 211
of the Omnibus Election Code, said ballots should be counted as votes for
Lerias inasmuch as there is no other candidate for the same position of
Representative who is an incumbent.
12. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHERE NAME OF CANDIDATE FOR HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVE WAS WRITTEN ON LINE INTENDED FOR SENATORS OR
IN SHADED BOX IMMEDIATELY ABOVE THE LINE FOR REPRESENTATIVE. —
What is settled is the guideline adopted in the case of Nograles v. Dureza
(HRET Case No. 34, June 16, 1990), and on the basis of which the Tribunal
admitted the ballots in question. Thus: '2. Ballots where the name of a
candidate was written on line 1 for Senators or in the shaded box
immediately above the line for Representative, were counted in favor of that
candidate, provided, that (1) the line for Representative had been left blank,
and (2) no other name of a candidate for Representative was written on
other lines for Senators, in the same ballot (Mandac v. Samaoante, 54 Phil.
706 [1903]) "This rule does not distinguish between ballots written by the
voter himself or assisted by another."
13. Â ID.; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTION PROTEST; CANDIDATE WHOSE
VOTES WAS FRAUDULENTLY TAKEN AWAY, MUST BE DECLARED WINNER. —
Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently
taken away from Lerias should be returned to her. So that in the entire
municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the original 35,539
votes, Lerias should be credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793
votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the results of
the review of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts would be,
wherein Mercado won by 67 votes according to the majority, or as found by
the dissenting members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or by
20 votes (dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the winner.

PADILLA, J., dissenting opinion:

 1. Â CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL; SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION,
RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR MEMBERS. — The framers of the
1987 Constitution, in no uncertain terms, provided in Sec. 17 of Article VI
thereof that: the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their respective member.
2. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SOLE JUDGE," CONSTRUED. — The use of the
word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred
on the House Electoral Tribunal such that judicial review of final decisions or
resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is possible only in the exercise of
the Supreme Court's extra-ordinary jurisdiction, i.e., upon a determination
that the electoral tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power
as constitutes a clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave
abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
3. Â ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; DECISIONS GENERALLY
NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTIONS. — The
House Electoral Tribunal, being the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court may not review its decisions except
when the Tribunal is clearly shown to have issued them with grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is fundamental
that for grave abuse of discretion to exist, there must be a "capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or
that the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law."
4. Â REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HOUSE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. —
The records of this case, disclose that the petitioner anchors her arguments
on alleged election abnormalities. And yet, all her allegations are based on
questions of fact the appreciation of which vests solely within the jurisdiction
and competence of the House Electoral Tribunal. Nowhere in the records of
this case is it disclosed that the House Electoral Tribunal resorted to arbitrary
or improvident use of its power as to constitute a denial of due process nor is
there any evidence of a clear unmitigated error manifestly constituting such
a grave abuse of discretion for which the Court should afford a remedy. The
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts, is
demonstrated by the fact that the Tribunal was so closely divided, which
means that the facts were susceptible of appreciation one way or the other.
It is precisely because of such situations that the Constitution has
constituted the House Electoral Tribunal — not this Court — as the sole judge
of all election contests involving members of the House of Representatives.
5. Â ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT A TRIER OF FACTS. — The Supreme
Court, moreover, is not a trier of facts and can do no more than to abide by
the House Electoral Tribunal's appreciation of the facts in cases within its
unquestioned exclusive jurisdiction.

DECISION

PARAS, J :p

Politicians who are members of electoral tribunals, must think and act
like judges. Accordingly, they must resolve election controversies with
judicial, not political, integrity.
The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
(HRET for brevity) as a constitutional body has time and again been upheld
by this Court in many cases. (Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal , 168 SCRA
391; Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , 181 SCRA 780).
The power of the HRET, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election returns and qualifications of its members is beyond dispute. (Art. VI,
Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution) Thus, judicial review of decisions or final
resolutions of the HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-
called "extraordinary jurisdiction" — upon a determination that the tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion that there has to be
a remedy for such abuse. (Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil. 429, 431; Lazatin v.
House Electoral Tribunal , supra; Robles v. HRET , supra) Then only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown that the Court interferes with
the HRET's judgment or decision.
Accordingly, it is in this light that We shall proceed to examine the
contentions of the parties in this case.
prLL

Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the

official of the UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district
of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of
candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette Yniguez Lerias". Her maiden
name is Rosette Yniguez. Respondent Roger G. Mercado was the
administration candidate for the same position.
During the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it appeared that,
excluding the certificate of canvass from the Municipality of Libagon which
had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been
tampered with, the candidates who received the two (2) highest number of
votes were Roger G. Mercado with 34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with
34,128 votes, respectively.
In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the
municipality of Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while Mercado received
1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the canvass,
Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes,
giving Lerias a winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of
canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained
erasures, alterations and super imposition's and therefore, cannot be used
as basis of the canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the
explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon
that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which
did not affect the integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made
in the presence of the watchers of all the nine (9) candidates for the position,
including those of Mercado who offered no objection.
Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the
Comelec praying that the Commission order the provincial board of
canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon.
At the scheduled hearing on June 5, 1987, Atty. Valeriano Tumol, then
counsel for Lerias, agreed to use the Comelec copy of the certificate of
canvass provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar
reservation was made by counsel for Mercado.
The Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was produced and when
opened it showed that Lerias received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because
in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 she received in each of the said precincts 100
votes less than what she received as shown in the provincial board of
canvasser's copy of the certificate of canvass. The alleged discrepancy is as
follows:
  Provincial Board of Comelec Copy
  Canvasser's Copy  Â
     Â
Precinct 6 162 votes 62 votes
" 10 123 " 23 "
" 18 132 " 32 "
" 19 156 " 56 "
Nevertheless, the Comelec, (Second Division) in its Resolution dated
June 6, 1987, directed the provincial board of canvassers to complete the
canvass by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the votes
received by them, respectively, as shown in the Comelec copy of the
certificate of canvass. So, on June 7, 1987, the provincial board of
canvassers reconvened, resumed the canvass and proclaimed Mercado, as
the winning candidate, having received the highest number of votes —
35,793. Lerias, his closest rival, received 35,539 votes or a difference of 254
votes. On June 7, 1987, Lerias filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the
reconsideration of the June 6, 1987 resolution. She prayed that the members
of the municipal board of canvassers be summoned to testify on the
authenticity and veracity of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass
and statement of votes submitted to the Comelec and that the election
returns for precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 be produced. cdrep

On June 15, 1987 Lerias filed with the Comelec a petition (SPC No. 87-
488) for the annulment of the canvass and proclamation of Mercado, praying
that the ballot boxes of precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon be ordered
opened and the votes therein recounted. On June 21, 1987, she filed a
motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation of Mercado.
There being no action taken by the Comelec on the said motion and
since the term of office of the members of the House of Representatives
would commence on June 30, 1987, Lerias filed on June 30, 1987 before this
Court a petition (G.R. No. 78833) for the annulment of the Comelec
resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado.
Meanwhile, in SPC-87-488, the Comelec en banc required Mercado to
file an answer. Instead of filing an answer, however, Mercado filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds that (a) the resolution dated June 6, 1987 had
already become final because the motion for reconsideration filed by Lerias
was ex-parte and did not stop the running of the period to appeal therefrom
and (b) since Lerias filed with the Supreme Court a petition for the
annulment of the Comelec's June 6, 1987 resolution and the subsequent
proclamation of Mercado, she had abandoned her previous petition with the
Comelec.
At the scheduled hearing on June 16, 1987 of SPC-87-488, the
members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon and the school
teachers who served as inspectors of Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 were
present and manifested that they were ready to testify and affirm that the
Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was not authentic for it did not
correctly state the number of votes received by the parties since Lerias
actually obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon, not 1,411 votes. The Comelec did
not want to hear the case on the merits opting instead to merely hear
Mercado's motion to dismiss. The said witnesses were not given the chance
to testify.
On June 17, 1987, the Comelec resolved to dismiss SPC-87-488
because the petitioner had filed a case with the Supreme Court and had,
therefore, abandoned her case with the Comelec.
On July 22, 1987 Lerias filed with this Court a second petition to set
aside not only the Comelec's resolution of July 6, 1987 but also the
resolution of July 17, 1987.
The petition was heard on oral argument and on September 10, 1987,
this Court dismissed the petition because (a) the Comelec resolution of June
6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado had already become executory
inasmuch as five days had elapsed from receipt of a copy of said resolution
by petitioner and no restraining order had been issued by the Court citing
Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, and (b) Lerias thru counsel had
agreed before the Comelec (Second Division) during the hearing therein on
June 5, 1987 to use the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass.
Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed an election protest with respondent
HRET.
 In her protest, Lerias contested the results of the election in Precincts
Nos. 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon asserting that the total votes credited to her
in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less than or short by 400 votes
from that actually obtained by her (1,811 votes) and if the provincial board
of canvasser's copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon were to be used
as basis of the canvass instead of the Comelec copy, she would have
garnered 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes or a winning
margin of 146 votes. Thus, Lerias prayed that (a) precautionary measures be
undertaken for the safekeeping and custody of the ballot boxes and election
documents used in the protested precincts and that they be brought to the
Tribunal to prevent tampering and to protect their integrity; (b) a recount of
the votes cast in said precincts be immediately ordered; and (c) the
proclamation of Mercado be set aside and that she be declared the duly
elected Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte. She further
prayed that Mercado be ordered to pay damages, attorney's fees and costs.
LibLex

Mercado filed his Answer with Counter-Protest, denying the material

allegations of the protest and counter-protesting the results of the elections
in 377 precincts. He alleged that the votes cast for him were (a) intentionally
misread in favor of Lerias; (b) not counted or tallied, and/or counted or
tallied in favor of Lerias; (c) considered marked or were intentionally marked
and; (d) tampered and changed. The counter-protest also charged that blank
spaces in the ballots were filled with Lerias' name; that various ballots for
Lerias, pasted with stickers, were considered valid and counted for Lerias,
that votes in the election returns were tampered with and altered in favor of
Lerias, and that terrorism and massive vote-buying were employed by her.
The initial hearing was scheduled for August 22, 1988, but on March 7,
1988 unidentified uniformed armed men raided the municipal building of
Libagon and stole the ballot boxes for the 20 precincts of Libagon stored in
the office of the municipal treasurer. Fortunately, these armed men
overlooked the ballot box which was kept in the office of the election
registrar at the second floor of said municipal building. Said ballot box
contained all the copies of the election returns of Libagon which were used
in the municipal canvass. It is in the said office that said ballot box remained
until a representative of the HRET went to Libagon on March 23 and 24,
1988 to take possession of the contents of the same particularly the election
returns kept in said ballot box.
On December 6, 1990, the Tribunal (by a vote of 5-4) promulgated its
now assailed Decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"On the basis of all of the foregoing, and the supporting details
as contained in ANNEXES A, B and C and in order to determine the
final results of the elections for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, representing the lone district of Southern Leyte, a
full and final RECAPITULATION is hereunder provided:
FINAL TABULATION
Â
 Mercado Lerias
 Â Â Â
Votes per tally of the  Â
Provincial Board of  Â
Canvassers, used to  Â
PROCLAIM protestee  Â
Mercado 35,793 35,539
deduct: Votes per  Â
election Returns — Â Â
from 81 protested precincts 2,154 6,885
 ——— ———
UNCONTESTED VOTES 33,639 23,654
Add: Votes per  Â
REVISION (physical count) 2,28 6,867
 ——— ———
Totals 35,926 35,521
Revision Results: Â Â
deduct: Rejected  Â
Ballots (objected) 362 252
 ——— ———
Totals 35,564 35,269
add: Claimed and  Â
ADMITTED Ballots 26 273
Â
 ———
———
 35,590 35,542
add: Restored Votes 0 2
 ——— ———
FINAL RESULTS 35,590 35,544
 ====== ======
  Â
(Protestee Mercado wins by a plurality of 46 votes). Â
"ACCORDINGLY, THE PROTEST of protestant Lerias is dismissed;
and by virtue of the results of revision of the eighty one (81) counter-
protested precincts, the Tribunal declares that protestee Mercado is
the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of the Province of
Southern Leyte, by a plurality of FORTY SIX (46) votes ; having
garnered a total of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED NINETY
(35,590) votes as against the THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR (35,544) votes of protestant Lerias. No pronouncement
as to costs.
LLphil

"WHEREFORE, as soon as this Decision becomes final, notice

and copies of the Decision shall be sent to the President of the
Philippines, the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and
the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to the Rules
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Section 28.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 136-137)
The Chairperson of the Tribunal, the Honorable Justice Ameurfina M.
Herrera dissented, in this wise:
"It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of
numbers; by overturning, at the post-appreciation stage, the rulings
earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for
 Protestant Lerias; by departing from the interpretation of the
neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the Tribunal;
by injecting 'strange jurisprudence,' particularly on the intent rule;
the majority has succeeded in altering the figures that reflect the final
outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the
true will of the electorate in the lone district of Southern Leyte.
"Premises Considered, I vote to declare Protestant Rosette Y.
Lerias the winner in this election protest. To the plurality of 20 votes
obtained by her in the counter-protested precincts according to the
outcome of the appreciation of ballots, must be added the 400 votes
that should have been counted in her favor in the municipality of
Libagon. All told, Protestant Lerias should, therefore, be credited with
a total of thirty six thousand eight (36,008) votes as against thirty five
thousand five hundred eighty eight (35,588) votes for Protestee
Mercado, or a margin of four hundred twenty (420) votes." (pp. 169-
170 Rollo)
Likewise, the Honorable, Justice Isagani Cruz, concurring with the
dissent of Justice Herrera stated:
"I cannot help noting that, as in several earlier cases, all the
five members representing the majority party are again voting
together in favor of the Protestee, who also happens to belong to
their party. Whatever this coincidence may import, I repeat my
observation in the Ong cases (HRET Nos. 13 and 15, Nov. 6, 1989)
that 'although the composition of the Tribunal is predominantly
legislative, the function of this body is purely judicial, to be
discharged on the basis solely of legal considerations, without regard
to political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions." (pp. 258-259,
Rollo)
The Honorable, Justice Emilio Gancayco (now retired) concurred with
the dissent of Justices Herrera and Cruz.
Another member of the Tribunal, Representative Antonio H. Cerilles,
also in his dissent, stated:
"Going over all the foregoing facts and circumstances, I
honestly fear that the majority decision will open the Tribunal to a
charge of grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the protest and
disallowing the admission of the results of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 and
19 of the Municipality of Libagon, Southern Leyte, as reflected in the
election returns, and the overwhelming documentary and testimonial
evidences introduced, supported by well-settled jurisprudence. The
same grave abuse of discretion may be said of the replacement of the
results of the Screening Committee where protestant Lerias was
originally a winner by twenty (20) votes over Mercado on the counter-
protest alone, but which tabulation was considered and ultimately
replaced with a revised tabulation which altered the result, this time
with protestee Mercado winning by forty-two (42) votes over Lerias,
without any identification and ocular review of the ballots of the
protestant thus rejected and no proper showing of the grounds for
such rejection.LexLib

"All these considered, I feel compelled to register my dissent to

this shameful and blatant disregard of the evidence, the law, and the
 rudiments of fairness. I regret that the majority decision will lend truth
to the suspicion that a protestant from an opposition party cannot
secure substantial justice from this Tribunal. It is the perception of
many that the odds are stacked against such party mainly because of
the composition of the Tribunal, and no evidence, no law, no
jurisprudence, not even elementary principles of fair play, equity or
morality can outweigh a determined demonstration of party stand,
partiality and bias. I will not be party to such travesty of justice.
"This is not the first time — and it certainly will not be the last
— when I as the lone opposition member of this Tribunal joined the
three Justices of the Supreme Court in dissent. But I do so guided no
less by the pronouncement of Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a member of
this Tribunal, when he said: 'Whatever this division may imply, it is
worth stressing that although the composition of the Tribunal is
predominantly legislative, the function of this body is purely judicial,
to be discharged, on the basis solely of legal considerations without
regard to political, personal and other irrelevant persuasions. ' 1
(Emphasis supplied).
"I now indicate that I favor the admission of the results of the
election returns of Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18, and 19 of the Municipality
of Libagon, Southern Leyte, and to return to protestant Lerias the 400
votes which was fraudulently taken away from her. Likewise, the
original revision results of the screening of the ballots of the counter-
protested precincts, as submitted to and previously approved by the
Tribunal, which reflected that Lerias was ahead of Mercado by 20
votes, should be upheld. Protestant Lerias should thus be credited
with a totality of 36,008 votes as against 35,588 votes of protestee
Mercado, in a final untarnished count.
"Protestant, should, therefore, be declared the winner in the
May 11, 1987 election for the Lone District of Southern Leyte, having
obtained a majority of the valid votes cast in the said election, with a
plurality of four hundred twenty (420) votes over the protestee, and
thus, further declare protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Southern Leyte." (Rollo, pp.
287-189).
Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado also filed a partial
motion for reconsideration.
Acting on the said motions, the Tribunal, on January 31, 1991
promulgated its assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Tribunal Resolved to DENY protestant's
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Protestee's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration, is hereby GRANTED. The Tribunal also DIRECTS
motu proprio the appropriate correction of the 'Votes per Revision' of
the Protestant, pursuant to the verified errors committed, so as to
reflect the true and correct votes actually garnered by the protestant
and the protestee.
"ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Tribunal promulgated on
December 6, 1990 is hereby amended and modified, by declaring
protestee Mercado as the duly elected Representative of the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Southern Leyte, by a plurality of
 SIXTY SEVEN (67) VOTES, having garnered a total of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (36,528) VOTES of
protestant Lerias." (pp. 344, Rollo)
In her revised Dissenting opinion, (pp. 346-353 Rollo) the Honorable
Justice Herrera made the following clarifications: LLphil

"Interpolating the necessary corrections, therefore, the final

tabulation of votes obtained by the parties in the counter-protested
precincts should be revised as follows:
Â
 Mercado Lerias
  Â
Votes per  Â
proclamation 35,793 35,539
Deduct: Â Â
Votes in 81 Â Â
counter-protested  Â
precincts 2,154 6,885
 —— ——
Votes-Uncontested  Â
precincts 33,639 28,654
Add: Â Â
Votes per  Â
revision  Â
(physical count, Â Â
as corred 2,292(formerly 6,851(formerly
 —————— ——————
 2,287 6,867
TOTAL 35,931(formerly 35,505(formerly
 35,926 35,521
Deduct: Â Â
Rejected ballots 363 249
TOTAL 35,568 (formerly 36,256 (formerly
 35,563) 35,272)
Add: Â Â
Claimed ballots  Â
admitted  Â
(as corrected) 25 347 (formerly
  334)
Add: votes restored 0 2
Â
 —
—
TOTAL VOTES 35,593 (formerly 35,605 (formerly
 35,588) 35,608)
  Â
Plurality of Protestant Lerias — 12 votes (instead of 20 in the original dissent)
"To this plurality of twelve (12) votes obtained by Protestant
Lerias in the counter-protested precincts must be added the 400
votes obtained by her in the four contested precincts in Libagon.
Protestant Lerias should, therefore, be credited with a total of thirty
six thousand five (36,005) votes as against thirty five thousand five
hundred ninety three (35,593) votes for Protestee Mercado, or a
 margin of four hundred twelve (412) votes, instead of the 420 votes
in the original dissent.
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, in so far as the undersigned's dissent
is concerned, Protestee Mercado's Partial Motion for Reconsideration
is denied, and I reiterate my vote to proclaim Protestant Rosette Y.
Lerias as the duly elected Representative for Southern Leyte." (pp.
351-353, Rollo)
Justice Cruz maintained his original dissent.
Representative Cerilles filed a "Dissenting Opinion on Denial of
Protestant's Motion for Reconsideration" (pp. 355-357 Rollo) stating that:
"In sum, Protestant should therefore be declared winner in the
May 11, 1987 election for the Lone District of Southern Leyte having
obtained a plurality of four hundred four (404) votes over the
Protestee, and thus further declare Protestant Rosette Y. Lerias as the
duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Southern Leyte."
(pp. 356-357, Rollo)
We have read and examined, with utmost interest and care, the
contentions of the parties, the majority opinion of the five members of the
Tribunal as well as the separate dissenting opinions of the chairperson and
some members of the electoral tribunal, and the Court arrived at the
conclusion, without any hesitation, reservation, or doubt, that the Tribunal
(the majority opinion) in rendering its questioned Decision and Resolution
had acted whimsically and arbitrarily and with very grave abuse of
discretion. It is for this reason that We cannot bring ourselves to agree with
their decision.
llcd

The Protest
Lerias contended that in the four (4) protested precincts of Libagon
where her votes were determined to be 1,411 only, the same were allegedly
reduced by 100 votes in each precinct, thus totalling 400, the details of
which reduction are as follows:
Precinct Lerias' Lerias'
Protested Credited Votes Claimed Votes
  Â
No. 6 62 162
No. 10 23 123
No. 18 32 132
No. 19 56 156
Should her claimed votes as aforestated be sustained, Lerias' total
votes from the municipality of Libagon shall be 1,811 votes. In such an
eventuality, Lerias shall have been able to recover 400 votes, more than
sufficient to overcome the winning margin of Mercado, thereby prevailing by
a plurality of 146 votes.
To prove her contention, Lerias submitted original copies of the
certificate of canvass of the municipal board of canvassers and the provincial
board of canvassers. She also invoked the original copy of the election
returns for the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon. These documents,
particularly the election returns showed that Lerias received 162 votes in
Prec. No. 6,123 votes in Prec. No. 10, 132 votes in Prec. No. 18 and 156
votes in Prec. No. 19 to give her a total of 1,811 votes in the entire
municipality of Libagon.
Upon the other hand, Mercado relied mainly on the xerox copy of the
certificate of canvass for the Comelec. This certificate showed that Lerias
received 62 votes in Prec. No. 6, 23 votes in Prec. No. 10, 32 votes in Prec.
No. 18 and 56 votes in Prec. No. 19.
The HRET majority opinion rejected the election returns and sustained
the certificate of canvass because (1) the Comelec found that the Comelec
copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and authentic on its
face" and said finding of the Comelec had been sustained by the Supreme
Court; (2) the protestant (meaning Lerias) had agreed during the pre-
proclamation proceedings to the use of the Comelec copy of the certificate of
canvass; and (3) the authenticity of the election returns from the four (4)
disputed precincts had not been established.
The reasons given by the majority for doubting the authenticity of the
election returns are: (a) the non-production of the election returns during the
entire pre-proclamation proceedings definitely creates much doubt as to
their authenticity especially so when they surfaced only almost a year later
after the ballots had been stolen; (b) during that time, the election returns
may have been tampered with and "doctored" to Lerias' advantage; (c) no
proof whatsoever was offered to show that the integrity of the ballot box in
which they were kept was not violated; and (d) the witnesses presented by
Lerias had shown their partisanship in her favor by executing affidavits to
support her protest. LibLex

The foregoing findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majority

opinion) are totally bereft of any support in law and settled jurisprudence.
In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the
number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence
are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or are
not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Where it has
been duly determined that actual voting and election by the registered voter
had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting centers, the election
returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting
disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status
a s bona fide reports of the results of the voting. Canvassing boards, the
Comelec and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns
and may do so only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are
obviously manufactured or fake. And, conformably to established rules, it is
the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered with, who
should submit proof of this allegation.
At this juncture, it is well to stress that the evidence before the HRET is
the original copy of the election returns while the Comelec's copy of the
certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy , the original thereof had not
been produced.
 Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing,
the contents of which are the subject of inquiry, other than the original
writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court. The exceptions are not present here. Moreover, the xerox
copy of the certificate of canvass is inadmissible as secondary evidence
because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the same Rule have not been met.
(Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 254) Besides, this certificate of canvass had been
disowned by the chairman and members of the municipal board of
canvassers, claiming that the same was falsified since their signatures and
thumbmarks appearing thereon are not theirs and the number of votes
credited to Lerias in the municipality of Libagon had been reduced from
1,811 to 1,411. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1988 AM, pp. 74-78; TSN, Sept. 13, 1988 PM,
pp. 41-46; Dissenting Opinion, Rep. A.H. Cerilles, p. 2)
The finding of the Comelec in the pre-proclamation proceedings that its
copy of the certificate of canvass is "genuine and authentic" and which
finding was sustained by this Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not
binding and conclusive. The HRET must be referring to the following portion
of the decision of this Court —
"Public interest demands that pre-proclamation contests should
be terminated with dispatch so as not to unduly deprive the people of
representation, as in this case, in the halls of Congress. As the Court
has stressed in Enrile v. Comelec, and other cases, the policy of the
election law is that pre-proclamation controversies should be
summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass
and proclamation should be delayed as little as possible. The powers
of the COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative in
nature and the question of fraud, terrorism and other irregularities in
the conduct of the election should be ventilated in a regular election
protest and the Commission on Elections is not the proper forum for
deciding such matters; neither the Constitution nor statute has
granted the COMELEC or the board of canvassers the power, in the
canvass of elections returns to look beyond the face thereof 'once
satisfied of their authenticity'. We believe that the matters brought up
by petitioner should be ventilated before the House Electoral
Tribunal. Unlike in the past, it is no longer the COMELEC but the
House Electoral Tribunal which is 'the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications' of the members of
the House of Representatives.
"In opting to go by the COMELEC copy which on its face did not
show any alteration, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, specially since both parties agreed to the COMELEC using
its own copy (Copy No. 3).
"Accordingly, the Court resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack
of merit. The temporary restraining order issued on July 23, 1987 is
hereby LIFTED effective immediately." (Rollo, pp. 264-265) llcd

It would appear, therefore, that this Court sustained the use of the
Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass instead of the copy of the
provincial board of canvassers only to establish prima facie (but not actually)
the winner (as called for by the summary nature of pre-proclamation
proceedings), without prejudice to a more judicious and unhurried
determination in an election protest, and because Lerias thru counsel had
previously agreed conditionally and qualifiedly to its tentative use for pre-
proclamation proceedings. The decision of this court was merely an
affirmance of the action of the Comelec and it cannot be relied upon as a
final adjudication on the merits, on the issue of the genuiness and
authenticity of the said certificate of canvass. Besides, the use of said
Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass by the board of canvassers did
not foreclose the right of Lerias to prove that the votes attributed to have
been received by her as stated, in said certificate of canvass is not correct.
Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as genuine and authentic for purposes
of canvass simply means that said certificate of canvass is genuine and
authentic for the purpose of determining the prima facie winner in the
election. But the very purpose of an election contest is to establish who is
the actual winner in the election.
Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having
agreed to the use of the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias
is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state that Lerias agreed to the
use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein
had been altered. It is a matter of record that she immediately objected after
she discovered the discrepancy. At any rate, she cannot be estopped from
protesting a falsification of the voters' will because such estoppel would
contravene public policy. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 5) Moreover, as indicated in
the discussion hereinabove, under the circumstances relating to pre-
proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot apply.
As to the delay in presenting the election returns because these were
not presented during the whole pre-proclamation proceedings, it must be
noted that at that time, the four ballot boxes of Libagon with their
corresponding ballots were still intact and as these would have provided the
best evidence, resorting to the election returns was uncalled for. It is for this
reason that Lerias had asked for a recount of the ballots and this would have
obviated the need for the election returns. Under these circumstances the
failure of Lerias to ask for the production of the election returns during those
times that the ballots were still available cannot be considered as ground for
considering said election returns as of dubious character.
The "suspicion" of the HRET (majority opinion) regarding the possible
tampering of the election returns are at best merely speculative and
dispelled by the incontrovertible evidence in the case. On its face, these
election returns have no traces of tampering. Even the majority decision
admits that said election returns "appear to be originals and on their faces,
authentic." (Decision, p. 21)
The authenticity of said returns, particularly those of Precincts 6, 10,
18, and 19, the four disputed precincts, had been further established by the
testimonies of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors of said
precincts during the hearing before the Tribunal and before the hearing
officer designated to hear the case. More importantly, examination of said
returns conclusively established the identity of said returns as the very same
ones prepared by the respective Board of Election Inspectors during the
counting of the votes. The election returns for Precinct 6 was marked as
Exhibit "F"; that of Precinct 10, Exhibit "AA"; Precinct 18, Exhibit "U", and
Precinct 19, Exhibit "P".
LLphil

The election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial No. 0138; for Precinct
10, No. 0142; for Precinct 18, No. 0150; and for Precinct 19, No. 0151. The
minutes of voting for each of said precincts which were submitted to the
Comelec and later on presented in evidence before the Tribunal, indicated
the serial numbers of the election returns for said precincts and they
corresponded to the serial numbers of election returns for the four precincts.
The NAMFREL reports, (copy from the National Headquarters) which
were presented during the initial hearing before the HRET by a
representative of the national headquarters of NAMFREL, as well as the
copies of said reports of Bencouer Gado, the municipal coordinator of
NAMFREL in Libagon, also indicated that the election returns for Precinct 6
bears Serial No. 0138; Precinct 10, Serial No. 0142; Precinct 18, Serial No.
0150 and Precinct 19, Serial No. 0151. 2 The envelopes wherein said election
returns were originally placed by the Board of Election Inspectors from said
precincts, when they turned over said election returns to the election
registrar, were the very same envelopes which contained the election
returns from said precincts at the time that they were turned over to Luspo
(the Tribunal's representative) on March 24, 1988. The identity of said
envelopes had been conclusively proven by the fact that the serial numbers
that they bear and the Comelec paper seal sealing said envelopes are the
same. The serial numbers of said envelopes had been noted in the minutes
of each of said proceedings.
The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 6 bears Serial
No. 042366 and the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No. 017318.
The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 10 bears
Serial No. 042370 and the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No.
0173226.
The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 18 bears
Serial No. 04373 while the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No.
0173326.
The envelope containing the election returns for Precinct 19 bears
Serial No. 042379 while the Comelec paper seal thereof bears Serial No.
173332.
When the chairmen of each of said precincts testified before the
Hearing Officer designated by the Tribunal, they all identified their respective
signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the envelopes for said four
precincts. Ruego, the chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers and
acting election registrar during the election, also identified his signature on
the envelopes acknowledging the receipt of said envelopes containing the
election returns for said precincts.
The four chairmen of said precincts also positively identified that the
election returns shown to them for their respective precincts taken from the
custodian of the Tribunal and placed inside Envelopes A and B were the very
same election returns prepared by them. They identified their own
signatures and thumbmarks and those of the other members of the board of
election inspectors in their respective precincts.
On the basis of the election returns from the four disputed precincts,
the votes of Lerias and Mercado in said precincts were as follows:
Precinct No. Lerias Mercado
  Â
6 162 45
10 123 79
18 132 46
19 156 24
It would appear then that the votes of Lerias as indicated in the
Comelec copy of the Certificate of Canvass (Exh. 22) had been
systematically reduced by 100 votes in each of the four precincts. With the
correction of the votes of Lerias in said four precincts as reflected in the
election returns it would result that in the entire Municipality of Libagon
protestant received 1,811 votes while Mercado received only 1,361 votes.
Consequently, the total number of votes Lerias received in the entire
congressional district would be 35,939 votes (400 votes more than what was
credited to her in the Comelec copy of the Certificate of Canvass which was
the basis of the proclamation of Mercado) while Mercado received 35,793
votes giving a margin in favor of Lerias of 146 votes before the revision of
the ballots in the precincts involved in the counter-protest of protestee. LLpr

The number of votes received by protestant and protestee in the four

precincts of Libagon as shown in the election returns for said precincts is
substantiated by the following documentary evidence:
1. Â The NAMFREL Operation Quick Count (OQC) reports,
national headquarters' copies and copies of the municipal coordinator
of NAMFREL in Libagon (Exhs. EE, FF, GG, HH, H, CC, X);
2. Â The certificate of votes of the candidates (CE form 13)
issued to the representatives of the political parties (Exhs. D and E for
Precinct 6; Exhs. V and UU for Precinct 18; Exhs. Land M for Precinct
19);
3. Â The certified result of the canvassing prepared by
watchers of UPP-KBL (Exhs. G for Precinct 56; Exh. DD for Precinct 10,
Exh. Y for Precinct 18 and Exh. O for Precinct 19);
4. Â The Municipal Board of Canvassers' copy of the
certificate of votes and its supporting statement of votes (Exh. LL);
5. Â The Provincial Board of Canvassers' copy of the
Certificate of Canvass and its supporting statement of votes (Exh. LL)
6. Â The letter report to Comelec, Manila, dated May 18,
1987, of Manuel Paler, OIC Mayor of Maasin as municipal chairman of
Lakas ng Bansa (Exh. J);
7. Â The letter report to Comelec, Manila, dated May 18,
 1987 of Rito B. Go, PDP-Laban Chairman for Southern Leyte (Exh. I);
and
8. Â The tally board (photograph taken by photographer
Rodriguez (Exh. NN).
According to NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075576 for
Precinct 6, both the national headquarters' copy and the copy of the
NAMFREL municipal coordinator, Bencouer Gado (Exhs. H and CC),
protestant got 162 votes while protestee got only 45 votes.
NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075580 prepared by
NAMFREL representative Edna Pajo, duly certified by the members of the
Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10 after verifying its accuracy,
checking the same against the election returns and the tally sheet, both
national headquarters' copy and the copy of the municipal coordinator,
showed that in said Precinct 10 protestant received 123 votes while
protestee received 79 votes (Exh. CC and Exh. FF).
NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075590 for Precinct 18
prepared by NAMFREL watcher Rito Lopina, certified by the members of the
Board of Election Inspectors of said precinct after verifying if they tally with
the results as shown in their tally board showed, that in said precinct
protestant received 142 votes as against protestee's 46 votes (Exh. X).
NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075589, prepared by
NAMFREL watchers assigned to Precinct 19, duly certified to by the members
of the Board of Election Inspectors of said precinct, after checking whether
the votes of the candidates contained in said OQC report tally with the
election returns in the tally sheet showed, that protestant obtained in said
precinct 156 votes while protestee received 24 votes (Exh. N).
The certificate of votes (CE Form No. 13) issued to the watchers of the
political parties (Exhibits E, D. V. WW, L and M), as well as the reports
prepared by the watchers of UPP-KBL (Exhibits G, DD, Y and O) also showed
the same votes received by protestant and protestee in the four disputed
precincts as reflected in the election returns for said precincts.
prcd

The tally board used in the canvass remained displayed in the session
hall of the municipal building of Libagon for several months after the
elections. Pictures of said tally board were taken by Rudy Rodriguez, a
professional photographer (Exh. NN, TSN Sept. 12, 1988, p. 48). According to
said tally board the votes of protestant and protestee were the same as
those shown in the election returns. If they were erroneous, Mayor Paitan of
Libagon who has his office on the same floor who saw said tally board every
day, would have complained about the entries particularly for Precincts 6,
10, 18 and 19, which were the subject of the raging election contest
between protestant and protestee.
The reports of Manuel Paler, OIC Mayor of Maasin and chairman of
Lakas ng Bansa to the chairman of the Commission on Elections dated May
18, 1987, received by the Law Department of Comelec on May 20, 1987, and
the report of Rito Go, chairman of PDP-Laban for Southern Leyte, to the
chairman of the Commission on Elections dated also May 18, 1987 and
received by the Law Department on May 20, 1987 (Exhibits J and I), similarly
reflected that Lerias received 1,811 votes in Libagon while Mercado obtained
1,351 votes.
In the entire congressional district Lerias obtained 35,937 votes while
Mercado obtained 35,795 votes. These are reports coming from Lakas ng
Bansa and PDP-Laban, political parties who had their own candidates. They
would not have filed said reports admitting that Lerias obtained more votes
than their own candidates unless the same were actually the votes obtained
by her as verified by their own representatives.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers' copy of the Certificate of Canvass
and supporting statement of votes as well as the Provincial Board of
Canvassers' copy of said reports showed that Lerias obtained 1,811 votes in
Libagon. True, that the Provincial Board of Canvassers rejected their copy of
said Certificate of Canvass because of certain erasures and alterations
therein. But the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers explained to
the Provincial Board of Canvassers that the corrections made by them were
merely to correct certain clerical errors. It should be pointed out here that
the corrections and erasures made did not refer to the votes of the
congressional candidates. The votes of Lerias and Mercado in Precincts 6,
10, 18 and 19 of Libagon bear no corrections or erasures. And in the canvass
for the senatorial candidates, the Provincial Board of Canvasser's copy which
the board rejected in the congressional canvass, was used as basis of the
canvass. The board would have rejected the same were it not authentic. The
fact that said copy of the Certificate of Canvass was used in the senatorial
canvass conducted after the congressional canvass would indicate that the
board considered the same authentic. (Dissenting Opinion of Rep. Cerilles,
pp. 13-19).
The fact that the members of the board of election inspectors in the
disputed precincts had executed affidavits in support of the claim of Lerias
cannot be considered as partisanship since it is the duty of said members of
the board to inform the Comelec, of the actual results of voting in their
respective precincts.
In any event, the test of whether or not the testimonies of said election
officials should not be believed because they are biased or prejudiced would
be the tenor of their respective testimonies or affidavits, whether the same
are credible and corroborated by other evidence. The testimonies of these
election inspectors that the election returns were the very same election
returns prepared by them were corroborated by the documentary evidence
which had not at all been disputed such as the NAMFREL reports, the
statement of votes given to the representatives of the other parties, the tally
sheets, the certificates of canvass, both the municipal board and provincial
board of canvassers' copies (not the Comelec copy which reflected a
different result).
In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. in G.
R. Nos. 78833, 79882-83 entitled "Lerias v. Comelec et al", is very pertinent:
LibLex
 "Another inexplicable act of the COMELEC is the refusal to even
hear the members of the Libagon municipal board of canvassers and
the election board of inspectors of the four disputed precincts who
expressed willingness to testify as to which certificates are genuine.
When the very persons whose signatures appear on the questioned
certificates attest that those are not their signatures because the
correct copies are the two copies carrying their corrections, it is the
height of incongruity to even refuse to hear them. They are the
persons in the best position to state what they did, what they entered
on the various election forms, etc., but they were unceremoniously
ignored. To say that these persons were either purchased or coerced
is not only unkind, to say the least, but irrational and without basis.
First, their testimonies could be rejected if perceived as not truthful.
But they should be heard. Second, these personnel manning the
election precincts and canvass boards are all government employees.
The head of the municipal canvass board is a COMELEC employee.
The rest of the canvassers are other government officials. The
precincts are manned totally by school teachers. Why should they be
summarily rejected as the most competent of all possible witnesses?
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
"The tactic of 'win the proclamation and delay the protest' is
even more rampant than when it first surfaced. The ruling in Espino v.
Zaldivar (21 SCRA 1204, 1213) that we should not wink at a brazen
form of wrongdoing to subvert the people's will and in mockery crown
the loser with victory; the genuine returns must be ascertained and
the obvious forgery disregarded remains as true now as it was then."
(Emphasis supplied) (pp. 279-280, Rollo).
But more importantly, another xerox copy of the Comelec copy of the
certificate of canvass exactly the same as the xerox copy of the Comelec
copy submitted to the HRET is attached to the joint affidavit of the Chairman
and members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon, to show that
their signatures and thumbmarks appearing in the Comelec copy before the
HRET are not their own signatures and thumbmarks. For purposes of
comparison, they affixed their respective signatures and thumbmarks on the
margin of said xerox copy of the supposed Comelec copy of the certificate of
canvass. Therefore, the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass used by
the Comelec and sustained by the Tribunal's majority opinion is not only a
xerox copy but is a xerox copy of a falsified and forged document. This being
the case, it should not be given any evidentiary value. It is incredible that
the majority opinion in the HRET decision would deliberately use forged
signatures and thumbmarks simply in their desire to produce an infamous
political decision. Surely this is pure anathema to all rules of fair play.
All told, the Court is of the considered opinion that the HRET (majority
opinion) had no basis at all in considering the election returns from Precincts
6, 10, 18 & 19 as not authentic. And considering the overwhelming and
indubitable evidence presented by Lerias in support of her protest, more
particularly the election returns which in the absence of the ballots would
constitute the best evidence, the actual number of votes received by Lerias
and Mercado in the four (4) contested precincts are as follows:
Â
Precinct No. Lerias Mercado
  Â
6 162 45
10 123 79
18 132 46
19 156 24
Â
and that in the entire municipality of Libagon, Lerias obtained 1,811 votes
while Mercado obtained 1,351 votes. Based solely on the protest, in the
whole congressional district, Lerias obtained 35,939 votes as against
Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving her a winning margin of 146 votes.
The Counter-Protest
After the Tribunal had screened and appreciated both the "objected to"
and "claimed" ballots from the 81 precincts subject of the counter-protest of
Mercado, the result was 363 ballots of Mercado and 249 ballots of Lerias
were rejected and 25 ballots claimed by Mercado and 334 ballots claimed by
Lerias were admitted. Two ballots were also restored to Lerias after it was
found out that her name written thereon was tampered with or erased by
another person and the name of Mercado written in its place. This gave
Lerias a winning margin of 20 votes over Mercado as shown in the following
tabulations:
 LERIAS MERCADO
  Â
Votes Per Proclamation 35,539 35,793
Votes-Counter-protested  Â
precincts 6,885 2,154
 ——— ———
Votes-Uncontested  Â
precincts 28,654 33,639
Votes-Per Revision + +
of ballots 6,867 2,287
 ——— ———
 35,521 35,926
Rejected Ballots 249 363
Claimed Ballots + +
Admitted 334 25
 ——— ———
 35,606 35,588
 + Â
Votes Restored to  Â
Lerias 2 Â
 ——— Â
 35,608 Â
Plurality of Lerias 20 Â
This was disregarded by the majority and in the revised tabulation
reflected in the majority decision, Mercado no longer lost by 20 votes.
Instead he already won by a plurality of 42 votes over Lerias. This came
about through the simple expedient of reducing the already admitted
claimed ballots of Lerias by 57 votes (from the original 334 to 277);
invalidating 3 more ballots of Lerias (from 249 to 252) and adding 1 more to
the claimed ballots of Mercado (from 25 to 26) at the same time rejecting 1
more ballot of Mercado (from 363 to 364).
The modification consisted in:
1. Â Where only the first name of the candidate is written on line 1
for senator, the neighborhood rule will not apply. According to the majority
the neighborhood rule itself is but an exception to that accepted rule on
appreciation that the candidate's name placed in another line not the proper
space for the position he is aspiring is a stray vote, and being already an
exception the same must be applied most rigidly and very strictly. (Decision,
p. 35)
Thus, according to the majority, ballots with "Rosette, or "roset" or
"rosit" written on line 1 for senators, even if the space for congressman is
blank and no other candidate for congress is written on the ballot, were
rejected and denied admission by the majority. prcd

2. Â The same principle of strict application of the intent or

neighborhood rule was applied to votes placed on line 1 for senator, which
merely reflects the initials of the first name of a candidate but whose
surname or maiden surname happens to be the same surname of a
legitimate candidate for senator. Under this application of the neighborhood
rule, votes for protestant cast as "R. Yniguez" or "Yniguez R." or L. Yniguez"
or Yniguez L" were also rejected.
3. Â A ballot where the name Lerias is written on line 1 for senator is
rejected where it appears that it is written by an assistor.
4. Â Where the only entry in the space for Representative was
Yniguez, said ballot is considered as a misplaced vote for senatorial
candidate Yniguez since there was an Yniguez who was a candidate for
senator who is at the same time an official.
The aforementioned departures from the application of the
"neighborhood rule" laid down in "Nograles v. Dureza" (HRET Case No. 34,
June 16, 1990) are unwarranted and clearly designed by the majority to
reduce the claimed votes to be admitted for Lerias and make Mercado
eventually the winner.
Under Subsec. 1 of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, a ballot
where only the first name of a candidate or his surname is written is
considered a vote for such candidate as there is no other candidate with the
same first name or surname for the same office. The majority opinion,
therefore, which did not count the ballots cast where only the first name of
Lerias was written "Rosette", "rosit" or "roset" is contrary to said subsec. 1 of
Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In her certificate of candidacy, Lerias gave her full name as "Rosette
Yniguez Lerias." It is for this reason that the Tribunal during the appreciation
of the ballots in its executive sessions admitted as votes for Lerias ballots
containing, "Yniguez R", "Yniguez L", Yniguez Roset", "R. Yniguez" or "L.
Yniguez" written on the first line of senators for it is very clear that said
ballots were intended to be cast for Lerias. Under Subsec. 3 of Section 211
of the Omnibus Election Code, said ballots should be counted as votes for
Lerias inasmuch as there is no other candidate for the same position of
Representative who is an incumbent. Subsec. 3, Sec. 211 reads:
"3. Â In case the candidate is a woman who uses her maiden
or married surname or both and there is another candidate with the
same surname, a ballot bearing only such surname shall be counted
in favor of the candidate who is an incumbent." (p 315, Rollo)
In said particular ballots they cannot be considered as votes cast for
senatorial candidate Yniguez inasmuch as in the same ballot Yniguez had
also been voted for as senator in the proper space for senators.
Some of the ballots rejected by the majority also contain the name
"Lerias" on line 1 for Senator. These ballots were written by assistors, and
therefore, were admitted as valid. (Timbol v. Lazatin, HRET Case No. 46, 22
March 1990). The majority rejected these ballots by discounting the
applicability of the "neighborhood rule".
On this point, the Honorable Chairperson, J. Herrera in her dissent aptly
ruled:
"Strangely enough, according to the majority, the
'neighborhood rule' liberalizes the 'proper space' rule because the
voter may not be literate, 'but should find no applicability where the
ballots are filled by assistors who themselves appear illiterate' (p. 37,
Majority Opinion). This pronouncement has been plucked from thin air
and appears nowhere in electoral jurisprudence.
"What is settled is the guideline adopted in the case of Nograles
v. Dureza (HRET Case No. 34, June 16, 1990), and on the basis of
which the Tribunal admitted the ballots in question. Thus:

'2. Â Ballots where the name of a candidate was written

on line 1 for Senators or in the shaded box immediately above
the line for Representative, were counted in favor of that
candidate, provided, that (1) the line for Representative had
been left blank, and (2) no other name of a candidate for
Representative was written on other lines for Senators, in the
same ballot (Mandac v. Samaoante, 54 Phil. 706 [1903].'
(Decision, p. 17)

"This rule does not distinguish between ballots written by

the voter himself or assisted by another." (p. 168, Rollo)

Finally, there are 170 ballots of Lerias with stickers which had been
rejected. Again, the majority had committed an error in rejecting said ballots.
Justice Cruz, in his dissent stated:
"In addition to the above observations, I will also express my
objections to the rejection of the 170 ballots cast for the Protestant
which were considered marked with stickers by the majority.
 "As long as the stickers were pasted on a blank space on the
ballot, I agree that the ballot should be invalidated under Section
211, Rule 20, of the Omnibus Election Code. But I maintain that
where the stickers appeared to have been hastily and surreptitiously
stuck on other parts of the ballots (mostly diagonally and without any
uniform location), this was done by persons other than the voters
themselves, precisely to invalidate the ballots. It is illogical for a voter
to take the trouble of writing down the names of his candidates,
sometimes laboriously, only to nullify the ballot (and all his votes) by
pasting a sticker on it." (pp. 257-258, Rollo) llcd

But, what is more revealing are the following observations of Rep.

Cerilles in his dissent, as follows:
"Based on the evidence presented, I am thoroughly convinced
that Lerias was systematically cheated of one hundred (100) votes in
each of the four precincts of Libagon. The majority of the Tribunal
refuse to reinstate these 400 votes of Lerias inspite of the
overwhelming weight of evidence and the laws and jurisprudence in
point. And now that she won by twenty (20) votes in the original
tabulation on the counterprotest submitted before the Tribunal,
inspite of the dismissal of her protest, the majority simply decided to
change the results with Mercado coming out with a plurality of forty-
two (42) votes. All told, the results of this election have been
magically changed twice and, in both instances, always against the
protestant Lerias. This is definitely bad precedent. It may be that in
the future candidates will no longer believe in the counting of votes
for, after all, the results can easily be changed, or otherwise replaced,
substituted, modified or altered as in this case, by the sheer force of
the majority, no matter how erroneous, arbitrary and legally
unjustified that judgment may be. Although I recognize the reality of
the composition of this Tribunal, still I am tempted to ask whatever
happened to our conception and application of the Rule of Law?
"Having asked that question, I entertain serious doubt about
the legality of the action undertaken by the majority especially so
since the winner in the original tabulation suddenly became the loser.
Clearly, it was an afterthought on the part of the majority. This, to say
the least, is anomalous because the result of the screening of ballots
had already been approved previously by the Tribunal after a random
checking was made in accordance with established procedures.
"In effect, therefore, the majority re-opened what was already
approved and simply reconsidered their previous ruling thus rejecting
fifty-seven (57) ballots claimed by the protestant which were already
admitted in her favor, and invalidating three (3) more from her valid
ballots. This action is arbitrary because these already admitted
ballots were reconsidered and rejected without the benefit of an
ocular review by the members of the Tribunal. And it becomes all the
more irregular because these ballots were just deducted from the
total ballots claimed by the protestant and already admitted without
identifying which ballots these are.
"Absent such identification, it is downright unfair to have these
ballots rejected on the mere say-so of the majority without the benefit
of the examination. Might is not necessarily right." (pp. 283-284,
 Rollo)
This was the same observation made by the Honorable Justice Herrera,
when she stated in her dissent, thus:
"In the executive session of 15 November 1990, the re-
appreciation of some of the ballots was sought. Some members of the
Tribunal firmly opposed any re-opening of the case on the ground that
it would entail delay in its resolution, besides the fact that all
observations/objections should have been raised and ruled upon
during the appreciation state. Attention was also called to the fact
that rulings on the ballots appreciated were made by at least a
majority vote of the members present in meetings where there was a
required quorum, hence, the resolutions arrived at were valid and
official acts of the Tribunal. When the issue was subsequently put to a
vote, a majority of the members voted to overturn the previous
rulings of the Tribunal, even as the other members urged that the
rulings made by the Tribunal during the appreciation of ballots should
no longer be disturbed as the case had already been submitted for
decision.
"It becomes only too obvious then that by sheer force of
numbers; by overturning at the post-appreciation stage, the rulings
earlier made by the Tribunal admitting the claimed ballots for
Protestant Lerias; by departing from the interpretation of the
neighborhood rule heretofore consistently followed by the tribunal; by
injecting 'strange jurisprudence', particularly on the intent rule; the
majority has succeeded in altering the figures that reflect the final
outcome of this election protest and, in the process, thwarting the
true will of the electorate in the lone district of Southern Leyte.' (pp.
168-169, Rollo)
Conclusion
Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes
fraudulently taken away from Lerias should be returned to her. So that in the
entire municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the original
35,539 votes, Lerias should be credited with 35,939 votes as against the
35,793 votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the
results of the review of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts would
be, wherein Mercado won by 67 votes according to the majority, or as found
by the dissenting members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or
by 20 votes (dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the winner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET
Case No. 16 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court declares that petitioner
Rosette Yniguez Lerias is the duly elected representative of the Lone District
of the Province of Southern Leyte. llcd

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera and Cruz, J., took no part.
Feliciano, J., No part being a member of the HRET.
 Sarmiento, ** J., Did not take part in the deliberation.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:

In my dissenting opinion in G.R. Nos. 92191-92 entitled "Antonio Y. Co

vs. House Electoral Tribunal" and G.R. Nos. 92202-03 entitled "Sixto T.
Balanguit vs. House Electoral Tribunal", which involved the question of
whether or not therein respondent Jose Ong was a natural-born Filipino
citizen and, therefore qualified or not to be a member of the House of
Representatives, I stated the following, among others:
"The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more
than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional
election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may
be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision
of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by
constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to
such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less
than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in
the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have
been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the
performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to
allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as
a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because the House
Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the
tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this
Court of its power of judicial review."
In the present case, however, the questioned decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal revolves around questions of fact in connection with
alleged irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election. Regardless
of how far we may differ from the factual findings of the House Electoral
Tribunal and its resultant conclusions, I submit that this Court may not
review and alter such findings and conclusions because the House Electoral
Tribunal, under the Constitution, is the sole judge thereof. LLjur

The framers of the 1987 Constitution, in no uncertain terms, provided

that:
"SEC. 17. Â The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective member. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in
 the Electoral Tribunal shall be its chairman." 1 (emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the intent of the 1987 Constitution is to make the
Electoral Tribunals of both the Senate and the House of Representatives the
sole judge of all election contests concerning their respective Members. This
is vividly highlighted by the following discussion on the matter:

"MR. MAAMBONG.

 Thank you. Madam President.

One more question on this point. Could we make a general

statement that the jurisdiction of this electoral tribunal, either of
the Senate or of the House, is exclusive and unlimited and,
therefore, there will be no appeal to the Supreme Court?

MR. AZCUNA.

 It is the sole judge, I think that further implies that there is no

appeal elsewhere.

MR. MAAMBONG.

 In other words, its judgment is final and not appealable.

MR. AZCUNA.

 Insofar as the qualifications, returns and elections are

concerned." 2

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred on the House Electoral Tribunal such that judicial
review of final decisions or resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is
possible only in the exercise of the Supreme Court's 'extra-ordinary
jurisdiction', i.e., upon a determination that the electoral tribunal's decision
or resolution was rendered, without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion or, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such a grave abuse of discretion
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 3
The House Electoral Tribunal is not an ordinary agency established by
statute or executive fiat to better handle administrative concerns assumed
by line departments of the executive branch. It is a constitutional body
created precisely to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. 4
The House Electoral Tribunal, being the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, the Supreme Court may not review its decisions except
when the Tribunal is clearly shown to have issued them with grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 5 It is fundamental
that for grave abuse of discretion to exist, there must be a "capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or
that the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law." 6 cdll

The House Electoral Tribunal is a tribunal in the true and strict sense of
the term, with the limited but exclusive jurisdiction granted to it by the
fundamental law and its functions are properly judicial. This power granted
by the Constitution is not as abstract or empty as a carcass, but real and
positive, with all the attributes for effective manifestation in the external
world and, like all human powers, needs the tools and instruments linking
the cause and effect. 7
I submit that the Supreme Court cannot exercise the power of judicial
review over decisions and orders of the House Electoral Tribunal, except only
upon the strongest showing that a constitutional norm — like the mandate of
natural-born citizenship for members of the House of Representatives — has
been violated, or a patently manifest grave abuse of authority committed;
for "courts are mere creatures of the state and of its power, and while their
life as courts continues, they must obey the law of their creator." 8
The records of this case, disclose that the petitioner anchors her
arguments on alleged election abnormalities. And yet, all her allegations are
based on questions of fact the appreciation of which vests solely within the
jurisdiction and competence of the House Electoral Tribunal. Nowhere in the
records of this case is it disclosed that the House Electoral Tribunal resorted
to arbitrary or improvident use of its power as to constitute a denial of due
process nor is there any evidence of a clear unmitigated error manifestly
constituting such a grave abuse of discretion for which the Court should
afford a remedy. The absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of the facts, is demonstrated by the fact that the Tribunal was
so closely divided, which means that the facts were susceptible of
appreciation one way or the other. It is precisely because of such situations
that the Constitution has constituted the House Electoral Tribunal — not this
Court — as the sole judge of all election contests involving members of the
House of Representatives. The proper role for the Court to perform is to
apply the law based on the findings of fact of the electoral tribunal. This
inevitably leads to a dismissal of the petition in this case.
This Court cannot remedy, as the majority would have it, a situation
where the House Electoral Tribunal has arrived at a conclusion which, in the
perception of the majority in this Court, is gravely erroneous. The Supreme
Court is, in my opinion, powerless to review, much more, revise the decision
of the House Electoral Tribunal in this case; for otherwise it can be charged
with usurping power not granted to it by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court, moreover, is not a trier of facts and can do no more than to abide by
the House Electoral Tribunal's appreciation of the facts in cases within its
unquestioned exclusive jurisdiction. True, the circumstance that the
decisions of the House Electoral Tribunal are final and without appeal may
seem unreasonable, or better still, inequitable, but then the decisions of this
Court in matters within its jurisdiction are likewise final and without appeal.
"There must be a final tribunal somewhere for deciding every question in the
world. Injustice may take place in all tribunals for all human institutions are
imperfect — courts as well as commissions and legislatures . . . It may be
that our legislatures, (or, in this case, our electoral tribunals), are invested
with too much power, open as they are, to influences so dangerous to the
interests of individuals, corporations and society. But such is the Constitution
of our republican form of government and we are bound to abide by it until it
can be corrected in a legitimate way." 9 After all, "the courts are without
authority to repress evil save as the law has proscribed it and then only
according to law." 10 cdll

Believing, therefore, that what the Court seeks to do today in this case
carries unwarranted and even dangerous consequences for our state,
government and people, in that it blurs (if not demolishes) the constitutional
boundaries between the Court and the Electoral Tribunals in matters where
the latter are, by express constitutional design, and mandate, made sole
judges, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Â
Footnotes

1. Â Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, dissenting together with Tribunal Chairman

Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and
Congressman Antonio H. Cerilles, in Balanquit Jr. v. Ong Chuan, Jr. (HRET
Case No. 15), 86 D.G. No. 4, January 22, 1990, 720-721.

2. Â Exh. H, NAMFREL report, National Headquarters' copy for Precinct 6; Exh.

CC, NAMFREL report, National Headquarters' copy for Precinct 10; Exh. X,
NAMFREL report, National Headquarters' copy for Precinct 18; and Exh. N,
NAMFREL report, National Headquarters' copy for Precinct 19 and Exhs. EE,
FF, GG, HH, Godos copies of the NAMFREL reports for Precincts 6, 10, 18 &
19.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

** Â Retired on October 8, 1991.

1. Â Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Â Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Tuesday, July 22, 1986

found in volume two, page 113.

3. Â Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647,

February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 780.

4. Â Veloso vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 88372, July
18, 1989.

5. Â Aznar vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 65000, January 9, 1990.

6. Â People vs. Marave, G.R. No. L-19023, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 618.

7. Â Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948).

8. Â Cardozo, Growth of the Law, p. 49.

9. Â Justice Harlan F. Stone's dissent in United States vs. Butler, 297 US 1.

10. Â Viereck vs. United States, 318 US 236, 245.