EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY:

(a) Bill:

As the speeches made by the member of the constituent assembly in the course of
debates on the constitution cannot be admitted as an external aid to the construction of the
constitution. in the same way, the debates on a bill in parliament are not admissible for
construction of the Act which is ultimately enacted.

In Chiranjit lal Choudhry v. Union of India (AIR 1951 SC pp 45,46) FAZAL ALI J.
admitted parliamenatary history including the speech of minister introducing the Bill as evidence
of the circumstances which necessitated the passing of the act, acourse apparently approved
in later decisions.

In indira sawhany v. union of india, the supreme court referred the Dr. Ambedkar‘s
speech in the constituent assembly and observe in interpreting Art 16(4) that the debates in the
constituent assembly could be relied upon as an aid to interpretation of the constitutional
provision is borne out by a series of decision of the court. Since the expression backward
classes of the citizens is not defined in constitution, reference to such debates is permissible to
ascertain at any rate the context, background and the object behind them. Particularly where the
court wants to ascertain the original intent such reference may be unavoidable.

(b) Statement of objects and reasons:

The statement of objects and reasons accompanying a legislative bill cannot be used to
ascertain the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the legislation, but it can
certainly be pressed into service for the limited purpose of understanding the background, the
antecedent state of affairs and the object that the legislation sought to achieve.
The statement of object and reasons is undoubtedly an aid to construction but that by
itself cannot be termed to be and by itself cannot be interpreted. It is a useful guide but the
interpretation and the intent shall have to be gathered from the entirety of the statute and when
the language of the sections providing an appeal to a forum is clear and categorical no external
aid is permissible in interpretation of the same.
(c) Commissions/Inquiry committees:
Report of commissions and enquiry committees preceding of introduction of a Bill have
also been referred to as evidence of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of
mischief or evil intended to be remedied and at times for interpreting the Act. Example can be
taken of SODRA DEVI’s case in which Income Tax Enquiry report was referred; in Express
newspaper case the press commission’s case was referred.

HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCE:

Lord ATKINSON said” in the construction of statutes, it is, of course at all times and
under all circumstances permissible to have regard to the state of things existing at the time of
the statutes was passed and evils, which, as appears from the provisions, it was designed to
remedy.

In the words of Lord Halsbury: “The subject-matter with which the legislature was
dealing, and the facts existing at the time with respect to which the legislature was legislating
are legitimate topics to consider in ascertaining what was the object and purpose of the
legislation in passing the Act. (Herron v. Rathmines and Rathgare Commissioners, (1892) AC
498, p. 502 (HL)

SUBSEQUENT SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND SCIENTIFIC

INVENTIONS:

Generally, statutes are of “always speaking variety” and the court is free to apply the
current meaning of the statute to present day conditions. Therefore, the reference to
circumstances existing at the time of the passing of the statute does not mean that the language
used, at any rate, in a modern statute should be held to be inapplicable to social, political and
economic developments or to scientific inventions not known at the time of passing of the
statute.

A statute may be interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were unknown

or did not exist at the time of the enactment of the statute. (Sr. Electric Inspector v.
Laxminarayan Chopra, AIR 1962 SC 159, p. 557 (HL)). Lord Bridge observed: “When a change
in social conditions produces a novel situation, which was not in contemplation at the time when
a statute is first enacted, there can be no a priori assumption that the enactment does not apply
to the new circumstances. If the language of the enactment is wide enough to extend to those
 circumstances, there is no reason why it should not apply.” (Comdel Commodities Ltd. V.
Siporex Trade, SA, (1990) 2 ALL ER 552, p.557 (HL).

In a case before it, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Indian Penal Code should
be construed, as far as its language permits, with reference to modern needs and not with
reference to notions of crimainal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the Code was enacted.
(Mobarik Ali Ahmad v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857, p. 871.)

In Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra, supra it is said that there is a

distinction between ancient statutes and comparatively modern statutes.

Subbarao O, J., explained this principle thus : “ It is perhaps difficult to attribute to

legislative body functioning in a static society that its intention was couched in terms of
considerable breadth so as to take within its sweep the future developments comprehended by
the phraseology used. It is more reasonable to confine its intention only to the circumstances
obtaining at the time the law was made. But in modern progressive society it would be
unreasonable to confine the intention of the legislature to the meaning attributable to the word
used at the time the law was made, for a modern legislature making laws to govern society
which is first moving must presumed to be aware of an enlarged meaning the same concept
might attract with the march of time and with the modern revolutionary changes brought about in
social, economic, political, and scientific and other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless a
contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new
facts and situation, if the words are capable of comprehending them.”

REFERENCE TO OTHER STATUTES:

The other statutes are only an external aid to the interpretation. Another statute can be
used in interpreting the statute under consideration only when it is shown that the two statues
are similar. (Harshad Mehta v. State of Maharashtra, 2001(8) scc 257)

1. Statutes in pari materia:

Statues in pari materia means statues dealing the same subject-matter or forming part of
the same system. The rule of context which says that the statute must be read as a whole as
words are to be understood in their context, permits reference to other statutes in pari materia.
((2004) 1 SCC 755)
In an American case, pari materia was explained as “statutes are in pari materia which
relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word pari
 must not be confounded with the similes. It is used in opposition to it intimating not likeness
merely but identity. It is phase applicable to public statutes or general laws made at different
times and in reference to the same subject.” (Craies; Statutes Law, 7th Edn., p. 134.)
Lord Mansfield emphasized that “where there are different statutes in pari materia though made
at different times, or even expired, and not reffering to each other, they shall be taken and
construted together, as one system and as explanatory of each other.” (R. v. Loxdale, (1758)97
ER 394, p. 395.)
The sense in which a term has been understood in several statutes does not necessarily
through any light on the manner in which term should be understood generally, especially when
the statutes in question are not in pari material and are not dealing with any cognate subject and
definition coined by legislature is an extended or artificial meaning so assigned to fulfil object of
that particular enactment. (Maheswari Fish Seed Farm v. T.N. Electricity Board,(2004) 4SCC
705:AIR 2004 SC 2341.)
The copyright Act, 1957 and the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957, are not statutes in
pari materia and therefore, it has been held that the definition contained in the former should not
applied in latter.( Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P.,(2005) 1SCC 308: (2004) 271 ITR
401: (2004) 137 STC 420.)

2. Help from earlier statutes:

According to Lord MacMillan, ”if an Act of Parliament uses the same language which
was used in a former Act of Parliament referring to the same subject, and passed with the same
purpose, and for the same object, the safe and well-known rule of construction is to assume that
the legislature when using well-known words upon which there have been well-known decisions
uses those words in the sense which the decisions have attached to them.

CODIFYING AND CONSOLIDATING STATUTES:

The purpose of a codifying statute is to present an orderly and authoritative statement of

the leading rules of law on a given subject, whether those rules are to be found in statues or
common law.

The essence of a codifying statute “is to be exhaustive on the matter in respect of which
it declares the law and it is not the province of a judge to disregard or go outside the letter of
enactment according to its true construction”.
 The purpose of a consolidating statute is to present whole body of statutory law on a
subject in complete form, repeating the former statutes.

A consolidating statute is not a mere compilation of earlier enactments. The object of the
consolidation is to make a useful code which should be applicable to the circumstances existing
at the time when the consolidating Act was passed. For this object, all the statutory law bearing
upon a particular subject is collected and is transformed into a useful code.

CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIOEST FORTISSIMA IN LEGE:

Contemporanea Expositioest , i.e. the effect of usage and the practice means that word
of a statutes will generally be understood in the sense which they bore when it was passed.
Maxwell has said:” it is said the best exposition of a statute or any other document is that which
it has received from contemporary authority….. where this has been given by enactment of
judicial decision it is of course to be accepted as conclusive,”

The principle of contemporanea exposition is not applicable to modern statutes. The

doctrine is confined to the construction of ambiguous language used in very old statutes where
indeed the language itself have a rather different meaning of these days.

Earlier the supreme court refused to apply the principle of contemporanea expositio to
the telegraph act, 1885, and the evidence act, 1872, but it was referred to in the case of
R.S.Nayak v. A.R.Antuley in construing section 21 of Indian Penal Code ,1860 and it was held
that an M.L.A. is not a public servant, as this expression is defined therein.

OTHER EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION:

DICTIONARIES:

When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find
out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance or, in other words,
dictionary meaning or common parlance meaning has to be resorted to. (Municipal Board,
Saharanpur v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 566; AIR 1999 SC 264; 1999 ll LJ
202.) But in selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to
the context as it is a they fundamental rule that “the meanings of words and expressions used in
an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear” (Ram Narian v. State of
U.P., AIR 1957 SC 18, p. 23)
 Dictionary meaning of a word is not considered when a plain reading of the provision
brings out what was intended (State of Maharastra v. Praful B Desai, (2003) 4 SCC (Cri) 815:
AIR 2003 SC 2053: (2003).

The view of KRISHNA AIYAR, J. is pertinent here. He said: “Dictionaries are not
dictators of statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law, more emphatically, the
definition clause furnishes a different denotation.” (SBI v. N. Sundara Money, AIR 1976 SC
1111, p. 1114; 1976 SCC (Lab) 132.)

Where an expression in any act has been defined, the said expression will have the
same meaning and it is not necessary to find out what is the general meaning of the expression.
(United Bank of India v. Debts Recovery Tribunal,(1999) 4 SCC 69; AIR 1999 SC 1381;
(1999)96 Comp. Cas.602.)The definition given in the statue is the determinative factor. (S.
Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 4 SCC 596; 1996 SCC (Cri) 792; AIR 1996 SC 2184.) Too
much reliance on the dictionary meaning with regard to the context is not proper. ((2002) 3 SCC
118.).

Dictionary meaning cannot be relied upon when there is a express statutory provision in
regard to that matter.(Nagulapati Lakshmamma v. Mupparaju Subbaiah, (1998) 5 SCC 285.).
But sometimes when the word is not defined in the Act, dictionaries may be helpful, for eg, to
determine the meaning of ‘furniture’ dictionary meaning was relied on. (New Chelur
manufacturers (P.) Ltd.. v. CCE, (1997) 94 ELT 467.

FOREIGN DECISIONS:

Indian Courts have permitted in the interpretations of Indian statutes sobered use of
those foreign decisions of the countries which follow the same system of jurisprudence as the
Indian jurisprudence and which are rendered on statutes in pari materia.

Statutory construction must be home-spun even if hospitable to alien thinking.(

Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548, p. 599.) There
is one qualification attached to the, assistance of foreign decisions that prime importance is
always to be given to the language of the relevant Indian Statute, the circumstances and the
settings in which it is enacted in the conditions where it is to be applied and that it is not to be
forgetten that there is always an element of risk in taking ready and hasty assistance from
foreign decisions (Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiya lal Mukund Lal Saraf, Air 1959 SC
135, pp.139, 140.)
 The Supreme Court is not bound by foreign (American) court decisions; they have only a
persuasive value. But if they are in consonance with Indian Law the courts can borrow the
principles laid down in foreign decisions keeping in view the changing global scenario.(Liverpool
& London S.P.& I. (2004) 9 SCC 512.)

Following are the factors which oblige the Indian Courts in taking recourse to foreign precedents
of English speaking countries:

1. Link of the English Common Law and Jurisprudence;

2. Similarity of political thought; and
3. The use of English language as authoritative text of Indian Statutes.

TEXT BOOKS:

In arriving at the true meaning of an enactment of the courts may refer to the text books
also. But it is not necessary that the meaning given in the text books should correspond to the
view of the court. It is in the discretion of the court to accept or reject the views given in the text
book which was referred to by the court. There are many instances of both rejection and
acceptance of the views expressed in text books.