Nature

September 11, 2023

India’s first Sun mission will investigate the origins of
space weather
Aditya-L1 will join other spacecraft from Europe and the United States in an attempt to understand
our stormy star.

Aditya-L1 sits aboard its launch vehicle at the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota, India.
On 2 September, India launched its first spacecraft to study the Sun, marking another aerospace
engineering success for the nation, hot on the heels of landing a spacecraft on the Moon last month.
After a journey lasting 1.5 million kilometres and 4 months, the solar mission, named Aditya-L1,
will join four other spacecraft circling a point in space known as Lagrange point 1 (L1).
Following the launch, Aditya-L1’s project director at the Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO) in Bengaluru, Nigar Shaji, said that the mission “will be an asset to heliophysicists of the
country and even the global scientific fraternity”.
But with L1 already busy with solar missions and other solar observatories orbiting Earth, what
makes the Indian mission different?

Solar flares and storms

Aditya-L1 is “a unique observatory”, according to solar physicist Dibyendu Nandi at the Indian
Institute of Science Education and Research Kolkata. He says it combines instruments that address
three outstanding problems in solar physics, namely how stars such as the Sun sustain their super-
hot outer layer; how variations in the Sun’s magnetic field affect Earth’s atmosphere; and how the
Sun’s magnetic fields create violent solar storms.
Aditya-L1 is equipped with seven instruments to observe the Sun’s layers. Using electromagnetic
and particle detectors it will, from a safe distance of 148.5 million kilometres, examine the outer
atmosphere, or corona, of the Sun. The mission is expected to throw light on the properties of the
corona and what prompts coronal mass ejections (CMEs) — large expulsions of electrons, ions and
magnetic fields. Knowing how CMEs vary with latitude and longitude on the Sun and over time
will help researchers to understand the physics of these events.
The mission will also examine the Sun’s lower atmosphere, called the chromosphere, and the
boundary between the Sun’s atmosphere and its interior, called the photosphere.
India will be taking some new technology to the craft’s vantage point. Annapurni Subramaniam,
director of the Indian Institute of Astrophysics in Bengaluru and her team have developed the
Visible Emission Line Coronagraph (VELC) for Aditya-L1 to monitor the inner corona. “The
uniqueness of the VELC is its simultaneous observations in multiple wavelength bands closer to the
solar limb,” she says, referring to the darker edges of the Sun.
“Data from VELC will help to understand the initial acceleration of coronal mass ejections that are
the most dangerous space-weather events,” she adds.
Scientists are also looking forward to data from Aditya-L1’s Solar Ultraviolet Imaging Telescope
(SUIT), which will help them to study coronal heating and solar-wind acceleration. SUIT could, for
the first time, provide images of the Sun’s disk — the outer visible layer of gas and dust — in the
near-ultraviolet (light with wavelengths of 200–400 nanometres). “Such images have never been
obtained and they will help us understand the crucial coupling or connections among the different
layers of the solar atmosphere,” says Durgesh Tripathi, an astrophysicist at the Inter-University
Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics in Pune, India.
Lagrange 1
Aditya-L1 will enter orbit around L1, one of five Lagrange points in space where the gravity
between two bodies — in this case, the Sun and Earth — cancel each other out, such that a
spacecraft there can remain in position with minimal use of fuel. L1 offers a good view of the Sun.
Aditya-L1 will join four other craft also orbiting L1: the 1995 European Space Agency Solar and
Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO); NASA’s 1997 Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE); NASA’s
2009 Wide-Field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE); and 2015’s Deep Space Climate Observatory
(DSCOVR), a mission involving NASA, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
and the US Air Force.

Missions such as Aditya-L1 are providing more-accurate measurements than before thanks to
advances in remote-sensing instrument design, says Juha-Pekka Luntama, who heads the space-
weather office at the European Space Operations Centre in Germany. “All these missions
complement each other, and it is a great scientific opportunity to have missions operating around
the same time.”
Space weather
Aditya-L1 will also help scientists to understand how connections between, and the dynamics
within, the corona and chromosphere drive space weather, says Subramaniam.
The Sun has a large and complex magnetic field which waxes and wanes, reaching a peak every 11
years, whereupon the field’s north and south poles flip. The current solar cycle is predicted to reach
its maximum in 2024–2025. With scientists expecting solar activity to keep rising over the next two
years, “this is a good time to collect data”, says Luntama.
Electrical and electronic infrastructure on Earth can be vulnerable to the fluctuating magnetic fields
of space weather, with data corruption or equipment failure possible. “As our dependence on space
technology, and technology in general, is increasing in leaps and bounds, it has become a necessity
to protect our technological assets from space weather and solar activity,” says Subramaniam.
Timely and accurate space-weather forecasts will help to protect crucial infrastructure and to ensure
astronauts’ safety during future missions to the Moon and Mars, adds Luntama.
In addition to gathering data on the Sun, Aditya-L1 will monitor the solar wind at L1. Nandi says
this will “help characterize the space weather just before it impacts the Earth, and of which we
would like to have advance knowledge”.
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Source:https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02811-2?utm_source=pocket-newtab-en-intl
Jagran
September 12, 2023
Chandrayaan Missions Provide 'Unmatched Data' To
World: Key Achievements Of India's Three Moon
Expeditions
According to ISRO scientists, the three Chandrayaan missions have highlighted the presence of
water ice, previously undiscovered minerals and elements, and temperature changes on the moon.

chandrayaan-missions-provide-unmatched-data-to-world-key-achievements-of-india-isro-three-
moon-expeditions
ISRO's Moon mission key achievements
The three Chandrayaan missions by the Indian Space Research Organisation, ISRO have provided
'unmatched data' to the international scientific community and has paved the way for moon
exploration from different dimensions, a top Scientist of the Indian Space Agency Debiprosad Duari
said. India's three lunar mission has also paved the way for setting up human habitation in the
future, news agency PTI reported citing the scientist.

According to ISRO scientist, the three Chandrayaan missions have highlighted the presence of
water ice, previously undiscovered minerals and elements, and temperature changes on the moon.
They have unmatched data quality for not only India but the entire world.

Check Key Achievements Of India's Three Chandrayaan Missions:

- Chandrayaan-1 in 2019 used the moon mineralogy mapper (collaborative instrument between
NASA and ISRO), and for the first time observed and indicated the presence of 60,000 crore litres
of water ice near the polar region. According to ISRO, this information its application in rocket fuel
and other areas created a synthetic biosphere where human beings can stay, was identified.
- In the Chandrayaan-2 mission, the lander failed to make a soft landing, it orbited the moon for
four years, yet provided a wealth of knowledge, information, data, and images.

Chandrayaan-3's Vikram lander and Pragyan rover on moon

- Chandrayaan-3 within days of its soft landing, has already relayed data about the presence of
sulphur near the south pole of the moon. The mission indicated a number of possibilities about other
minerals and elements that have been hitherto undiscovered on the moon... It has also supplied
interesting data on the temperature on the moon, which is just near the surface, The temperature is
around 10 degrees Celsius, but merely 8 cm below the ground, it dropped to minus 60 degrees C.
The drastic change tells us that the surface can act as a fantastic insulator from outside elements.

Chandrayaan-3's data shows that human habitation can be considered below the moon's surface.

Meanwhile, ISRO's next ambitious Gaganyaan mission will be a game-changer in terms of India's
capability in technology and cutting-edge infrastructure, he said.

The project can demonstrate human spaceflight capability by launching a crew of three members in
an orbit of 400 km above the Earth's surface for a three-day mission and bringing them back safely
to Earth, according to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).

"ISRO is likely to launch Gaganyaan by the end of this year or the beginning of 2024. What is most
interesting is that a humanoid robot will be the sole occupant for the first two flights. This female-
looking robot has tremendous capability and potential in understanding human interaction and
response," the ISRO scientist added.

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Source: https://english.jagran.com/india/chandrayaan-missions-provide-unmatched-data-to-world-
key-achievements-of-india-isro-three-moon-expeditions-10099972
Hindustan Times
September 12, 2023
Chandrayaan-3: Vikram Lander sleeping on Moon,
here is when ISRO will wake it
Vikram Lander and Pragyan rover are in sleep mode due to the lunar night. ISRO expects the
Chandrayaan-3 mission to continue and that both be able to function as soon as the sunrise comes to
this part of the Moon.

ISRO hopes that the Vikram lander will wake up from its sleep mode on September 22, 2023.
(ISRO)
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) achieved unimaginable success through the
Chandryaan-3 Moon mission by landing Vikram Lander and Pragyan Rover on the lunar surface.
Vikram lander touched the Moon's surface on August 23, 2023, making it a proud milestone for
India and ISRO scientists. The lander and Pragyan rover made some groundbreaking discoveries
over the course of one lunar day (14 days on Earth). Now, the lander and the rover both have been
put to sleep mode due to the absence of sunlight as their batteries will not be able to charge.

When will the Vikram lander wake up?

As per ISRO, the expected date for the lander to function is September 22, 2023, which is now just
10 days away. The Vikram lander was put in sleep mode on September 4, 2023, so it could survive
Moon's extreme conditions, which can reach temperatures as low as -200 degrees Celsius. Now,
scientists are hoping that the lander will wake up after the lunar sunrise arrives in this region. Also
read: Chandrayaan-2 takes a photograph of Chandrayaan-3

If the lander starts to function after sunrise, ISRO will be able to continue the Chandrayaan-3
mission on the Moon's south pole and it will be able to unfold various other mysteries about the
Moon. Right now, scientists are waiting and expecting for another miracle to happen so they can
contribute to further study the Moon.
Vikram lander discoveries
The lander is equipped with Instrument for Lunar Seismic Activity (ILSA) and Micro Electro
Mechanical Systems (MEMS) technology, which recorded seismic activity on the lunar surface.
However, ISRO quoted it as a natural occurrence. Additionally, the lander also contains a small
dog-sized Pragyan rover which can roam near the lander and collect various data. The rover was
successfully able to measure the temperature of the Moon's surface which was as high as 60-70
degree Celsius. Additionally, it found the presence of sulphur and other elements.

Now, we have to wait until the lunar sunrise for the Vikram Lander wake up from its much deserved
sleep and to continue its work. It will be a big achievement if it can be used for a long period of
time.

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Source:https://tech.hindustantimes.com/tech/news/chandrayaan3-vikram-lander-sleeping-on-moon-
here-is-when-isro-will-wake-it-71694502433406.html
Space
September 12, 2023
India, NASA to cooperate on human spaceflight and
planetary defense

NASA and its Indian counterpart 'are continuing efforts to finalize a strategic framework for human
spaceflight cooperation by the end of 2023.'

a lander on the lunar surface

India's Chandrayaan-3 lunar lander, named Vikram, as photographed on the moon by the mission's
Pragyan rover.

India plans to build off its recent space successes and become an even bigger player in the final
frontier.

The nation recently landed on the moon for the first time, acing the first-ever touchdown near the
lunar south pole with its Chandrayaan-3 mission. And India now has a solar probe aloft — Aditya-
L1, which launched on Sept. 2 to investigate some of the sun's biggest mysteries.

U.S. President Joe Biden congratulated Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the scientists at
the engineers at the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), for these achievements during a
meeting in India on Friday (Sept. 8).

And, during that meeting, the two leaders pledged to cooperate on several ambitious space projects
going forward.

"Determined to deepen our partnership in outer space exploration, ISRO and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have commenced discussions on modalities,
capacity building and training for mounting a joint effort to the International Space Station in 2024,
and are continuing efforts to finalize a strategic framework for human spaceflight cooperation by
the end of 2023," reads a joint India-U.S. statement that the White House published on Friday.
India has not yet sent anyone to space, but the nation is working to change that: It's developing and
testing hardware for its own human spaceflight program, called Gaganyaan, which could launch
astronauts for the first time as soon as late 2024.

The statement also notes that both Biden and Modi "welcomed efforts" toward the establishment of
a "working group for commercial space collaboration." That potential collaboration would slot into
an existing structure, the India-U.S. Civil Space Joint Working Group.

The U.S. and India also want to work together to help save the world from potential death from
above.

The two nations "intend to increase coordination on planetary defense to protect planet Earth and
space assets from the impact of asteroids and near-Earth objects, including U.S. support for India's
participation in asteroid detection and tracking via the Minor Planet Center," the statement reads.
(The Minor Planet Center, based at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory in Massachusetts, is
the official repository for asteroid and comet observations.)

NASA already has considerable expertise in this regard. For example, the agency's Double Asteroid
Redirection Test mission, or DART, slammed into an asteroid moonlet last year in a successful trial
of the "kinetic impactor" method of space rock deflection.

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Source:https://www.space.com/india-nasa-space-cooperation-planetary-defense
China Daily
September 12, 2023
Cargo spacecraft burns up as planned on Earth reentry
China's Tianzhou 5 cargo spacecraft burned up as it reentered Earth's atmosphere as planned on
Tuesday morning, according to the China Manned Space Agency.

The agency said in a news release that, under ground control guidance, the robotic craft flew back
into the atmosphere at 9:13 am. After that, most of the spaceship burned up, and a small amount of
debris fell into secure areas in the South Pacific Ocean.

The Tianzhou 5 detached from the Tiangong space station on Monday afternoon and then started the
process of atmospheric reentry guided by ground control.

The vessel launched on Nov 12 from the Wenchang Space Launch Center in Hainan province, and
docked with Tiangong later the same day. It was tasked with delivering supplies such as fuel and
items for the astronauts' daily needs.

It was the fourth cargo ship to have linked with Tiangong, which is manned by three astronauts
from the Shenzhou XVI mission.

On May 5, the vessel was undocked from Tiangong to carry out an experimental solo flight that
lasted 33 days. It reconnected with the space station in June.

In addition to resupply and refueling tasks, the ship carried several cutting-edge experimental
payloads to the space station, and they have been installed and are working well, according to the
agency.

It noted the space hydrogenoxygen fuel cell system has been successfully demonstrated in orbit and
the test results will be used for the research and development of new spacecraft fuel cells to be used
in China's planned manned missions to the moon.

Another piece of advanced equipment, the broad-energy-spectrum, high-energy particle detector,

has obtained a lot of scientific data in terms of charged particles, neutrons and particle radiation
effects.

In late December, the Tianzhou 5 deployed the Macao Student Science Satellite 1, a 12-kilogram
mini satellite, into orbit. The satellite has been used to help students in Macao learn about Earth
imaging, radio communication and other spaceflight activities.

Pang Zhihao, an expert on space exploration technology and a renowned writer on spaceflight, said
that after years of service, the Tianzhou series has proved to be a reliable, efficient transport vehicle
for the Tiangong station.

"As the model has been fully used and engineers have been very sure about its reliability and
capability, the next Tianzhou ships will likely carry more payloads and conduct more tasks," he
said.
The safe disposal of Tianzhou 5 indicates China's technologies and experience in spacecraft reentry
are trustworthy, he said.

Designed to function for more than a year, each Tianzhou cargo spaceship has two parts — a cargo
cabin and a propulsion section. The vehicles are 10.6 meters long and 3.35 meters wide.

The cargo vehicle model has a lift-off weight of 13.5 metric tons and can transport up to 6.9 tons of
supplies to the space station.

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Source:https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202309/13/WS65010913a310d2dce4bb573c.html
The Space Review
September 12, 2023
China, Article V, Starlink, and hybrid warfare: An
assessment of a lawfare operation

How China responded to alleged close approaches of Starlink satellites to the Tiangong space
station may be more telling that the incident itself.
“To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists
in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”[1]

An odd event occurred on December 6, 2021 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) filed a
notification with UN Secretary General under Article V of the Outer Space Treaty. Specifically, the
PRC complained on two occasions Starlink satellites, belonging to the non-geostationary satellite
orbit system being deployed by SpaceX, allegedly nearly collided with the PRC’s space station. The
notification was unprecedented in that such a notification had never been previously invoked and
curious given the PRC used Article V to address its concern to the Secretary General directly
instead of engaging with the authorizing state directly.

The use of Article V to address the PRC’s concern is not only unorthodox but appears to be a means
not to address a valid concern regarding its taikonauts but rather an implement in a lawfare action as
part of great power competition. This essay will discuss and analyze the PRC’s action in the UN,
elaborate on why the Article V notification was not consistent with the OST and misused to create a
lawfare action, and how this action furthers takes aim at the Starlink NGSO and the US to further its
own interests.
The PRC’s “Article V” Communiqué

The PRC filed its notification with the UN Secretary General on December 6, 2021. The filing is
prefaced with the assertion of the PRC’s legal standing to file the notification citing Article V of the
Outer Space Treaty stating:
 “The Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations (Vienna) presents its compliments to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to article V of the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1 (the Outer Space Treaty), which provides that “States Parties
to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts”. In
accordance with the above-mentioned article, China hereby informs the Secretary-General of the
following phenomena which constituted dangers to the life or health of astronauts aboard the China
Space Station.” [2]

The PRC filing alleges during the period of its space station’s orbit “of around 390 km on an orbital
inclination of about 41.5 degrees” Starlink satellites launched by SpaceX:

“…have had two close encounters with the China Space Station. For safety reasons, the China
Space Station implemented preventive collision avoidance control on 1 July and 21 October 2021,
respectively.”[3]

The PRC filing outlines the two alleged conjunctions as follows:

The use of Article V to address the PRC’s concern is not only unorthodox but appears to be a means
not to address a valid concern regarding its taikonauts but rather an implement in a lawfare action as
part of great power competition.

The first alleged conjunction occurred when Starlink-1095 (COSPAR ID: 2020-001BK), which the
PRC alleges was maneuvering in a 555-kilometer (345-mile) orbit starting on April 19, 2020, but
between May 16, 2020, and June 24, 2021, maneuvered in an orbit of about 382 kilometers (237
miles) and continued in that orbit when it allegedly made a close encounter with the PRC space
station on July 1, 2021. The second alleged conjunction occurred with Starlink-2305 (COSPAR ID:
2021-024N) on October 21, 2021.

Interestingly, the PRC does not offer specifics on the second alleged conjunction and only goes to
say:

“…the satellite was continuously manoeuvring, the manoeuvre strategy was unknown and orbital
errors were hard to be assessed, there was thus a collision risk between the Starlink-2305 satellite
and the China Space Station.”[4]

In both cases, the PRC alleges it performed maneuvers to avoid a conjunction:

“[t]o ensure the safety and lives of in-orbit astronauts…”

The last paragraph of the filing asserts moral authority and points to Article VI by indirectly noting
the responsibility of the US for the non-governmental activities of Space X:

“In view of the foregoing, China wishes to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
circulate the above-mentioned information to all States parties to the Outer Space Treaty and bring
to their attention that, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, ‘States Parties to the Treaty shall
bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the
provisions set forth in the present Treaty.’”[5]

The PRC’s communiqué citing Article V of the Outer Space Treaty is curious not because it is the
first time the mandatory reporting obligation has been invoked, but rather because it applied Article
V in a manner inconsistent with its intent.
The US Response

The US responded to the PRC’s notification on January 28, 2022.[6] The US prefaced its response
with its commitment to the Outer Space Treaty and the sustainable use of outer space, including the
21 Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Outer Space. Substantively, the US response refutes the
PRC’s claims as follows:

In cases where a potential collision hazard is calculated, the United States Space Command –
through the United States Space Force’s 18th Space Control Squadron – provides relevant analysis
to all affected spacecraft operators, including to China, to support their decisions on collision-
avoidance manoeuvres.

Since November 2014, the United States has provided spaceflight safety information to the
Government of China, including emergency notifications of high-risk collision hazards between
crewed and robotic Chinese spacecraft and other space objects.

In the specific instances cited in the note verbale from China to the Secretary-General, the United
States Space Command did not estimate a significant probability of collision between the China
Space Station and the referenced United States spacecraft: Starlink-1095 (2020-001BK) on 1 July
2021.Starlink-2305 (2021-024N) on 21 October 2021.

Because the activities did not meet the threshold of established emergency collision criteria,
emergency notifications were not warranted in either case.

If there had been a significant probability of collision involving the China Space Station, the
United States would have provided a close approach notification directly to the designated Chinese
point of contact.

The United States is unaware of any contact or attempted contact by China with the United States
Space Command, the operators of Starlink-1095 and Starlink-2305 or any other United States entity
to share information or concerns about the stated incidents prior to the note verbale from China to
the Secretary General.[7]

Markedly, the US response did not challenge the PRC’s curious use of Article V. This is significant
to the extent that while the response substantively refutes the PRC’s allegations, it did not address
the PRC’s legal standing to invoke Article V to bring this matter before the Secretary General. The
significance of this will be discussed later in this article.
The Starlink NGSO satellite system
The Starlink NGSO satellite system has and continues to generate much controversy. Most of the
debate surrounds the sheer magnitude of the system and its effect on the outer space environment.
The FCC-licensed system has come under scrutiny from both non-governmental space operators
and environmental NGOs, including an action in the US Federal Court of Appeals challenging the
FCC’s decision to modify SpaceX’s license for Starlink by asserting the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) required the FCC to perform an environmental assessment before granting the
license. The US Court of Appeals rejected the challenge finding the non-governmental space
operator and the environmental NGO did not have legal standing to challenge the FCC decision.[8]

While the FCC decision was being litigated, the Russian Federation invaded the Republic of
Ukraine. It is during this period where Starlink’s utility for Ukraine’s military operations became
evident, providing broadband access for command and control. The national security utility of
Starlink was not lost on the Russian Federation or the US, especially its ability to work around
jamming efforts by the Russian Federation.[9]
A precept of treaty interpretation in customary international law is that the terms of a treaty are to be
interpreted in good faith applying the ordinary mean given to the treaty in the context of the purpose
of the treaty.

Starlink’s national security value did not go unnoticed by the PRC either. Military researchers for
the People’s Liberation Army submitted a paper in April 2022 vis-à-vis Starlink. The paper
examined the development and deployment of Starlink and advised the PRC must be able to destroy
or disable the NGSO through a combination of hard-kill and soft-kill anti-satellite capabilities if it
becomes a threat to the PRC’s national security. The PRC’s concern no doubt revolves around the
utility of Starlink to US forces if and when the PRC mounts a military campaign to annex Taiwan or
operations against a geopolitical ally.[10] The PRC is also cognizant the NGSO would provide a
valuable capability for command and control to Taiwanese forces should they acquire ground
systems and access to Starlink.[11] Consequently, the PRC appears not to be waiting for an
impending action against Taiwan to cripple Starlink and has already began its offensive against the
NGSO via the Article V action it filed in the UN.
The PRC, lawfare, and the Three Warfares

Five years ago this author advanced in this publication the role of lawfare in outer space (see “The
art of lawfare and the real war in space”, The Space Review, September 17, 2018.) In that essay, this
author used the definition of lawfare created by Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF (retired) in
2001 as “…a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”[12]

General Dunlap’s definition of lawfare emphasizes the purpose of legal warfare as military object
and not a political object as remarked by Clausewitz.[13] This author submits a more precise
definition of lawfare consistent with the nature of hybrid warfare and Clausewitz’s observations of
war:

“Employing the rule of law and its instruments and institutions as force to augment or replace
physical force to serve a national interest or achieve a political/geopolitical end.”

By this definition, lawfare replaces or supplements violence as force and uses institutions and
mechanisms of law as the means to achieve political objects. This definition of lawfare is consistent
with hybrid warfare as espoused by Communist Chinese Party (CCP) doctrine in the Three
Warfares.
A heavily redacted report commissioned in 2013 by the late Andrew Marshall, Director of the
Office of Net Assessment, remarks in part on the Three Warfares as follows:

“The Three Warfares is a dynamic three-dimensional war-fighting process that constitutes war by
other means. Flexible and nuanced, it reflects innovation and is informed by CCP control and
direction.[14]”

“The Three Warfares envisions results in longer time frames and its impacts are measured by
different criteria; its goals seek to alter the strategic environment in a way that renders kinetic
engagement irrational.”[15]

The facets of the Three Warfares include psychological, media and legal.[16] These three facets are
utilized individually and in combinations by the CCP and its various organs, including the PLA. It
is the last facet of the Three Warfares, legal warfare, this essay will focus its analysis.
The PRC’s lawfare objectives vis-à-vis its “Article V notification”

The objectives of the PRC’s lawfare operation in this instance is three-fold: 1) To engineer Article V
into a lawfare implement to be used in the UN and facilitate the media and psychological aspects of
the Three Warfares; 2) to use that lawfare implement to discredit and sequester the utility of Starlink
and non-governmental space activities in general to erode their advantage for national security and
defense; 3) to use that lawfare implement to discredit the standing and credibility of the US to
create standards of behavior and norms for outer space activities; and 4) test the US response to a
lawfare operation using Article V.
1. Engineer Article V into an implement of lawfare

The PRC engineered Article V into a lawfare instrument to assert standing under Article V. On its
face, the petition under Article V is inappropriate. Consider Article V, paragraph 3:

“States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of
astronauts.” [17]

Perplexing in the PRC’s usage of Article V is its treatment of the term “phenomena.” The term, like
others in the OST, is not defined; however, it is couched in terms of natural events and consistent
with the scientific context of the OST. Yet, the PRC implies the term is synonymous with non-
natural events or activities, including non-governmental space activities like Starlink.

A precept of treaty interpretation in customary international law is that the terms of a treaty are to be
interpreted in good faith applying the ordinary mean given to the treaty in the context of the purpose
of the treaty.[18] Take into consideration in the preamble to the OST as support for its scientific
context:

“Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal
aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”[19]

The OST’s scientific setting is also supported in Article I:

 “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use
by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.”

“There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such
investigation.[20]”

Why did the PRC go through this maneuvering rather than invoke its standing under the Article IX
right to consultation?

Additional support for the scientific context of the OST and by extension “phenomena” relating to
natural events is found in the genesis of Article IX with Project West Ford. Article IX’s genesis was
driven largely by concerns about interference with science by non-natural events. The apprehension
with Project West Ford originated from the international scientific community. Specifically, it was
the potential effect on science, including radio and optical astronomy, that raised concern from the
International Astronomical Union. Moreover, it was the Committee on Space Research that was the
driving force behind the creation of Article IX.[21]

Outside of the OST, the definition of “phenomena” from the Merriam-Webster dictionary supports
its congruence to natural events:

1. “phenomena : an observable fact or event

2. plural phenomena
a. an object or aspect known through the senses rather than by thought or intuition;
b. a temporal or spatiotemporal object of sensory experience as distinguished from a noumenon;
c. a fact or event of scientific interest susceptible to scientific description and explanation
3.
a. a rare or significant fact or event
b. plural phenomenons : an exceptional, unusual, or abnormal person, thing, or occurrence.”

Additionally, the Cambridge Dictionary English to Chinese (traditional) translation of phenomena is

(层指不尋常的或有趣的 ) 現象, which means “something that exists and can be seen, felt, tasted, etc.,
especially something unusual or interesting.” Other examples of the usage of the term: 力是一種自然
現象. (Gravity is a natural phenomenon.) and 你相信超自然及其他通靈珳象嗎 ? (Do you believe in the
paranormal and other psychic phenomena?). In most cases, “phenomena” is used to explain
naturally occurring events.

The PRC’s ostentatious association of “phenomena” to non-natural events, including non-

governmental space activities, is unsupported. It is not a good faith interpretation based on accepted
practices of treaty interpretation nor does it conform to any known definition. This means the PRC’s
application of “phenomena” is an arbitrary action on its part designed to manipulate Article V to
create legal standing where it is not applicable for its own benefit.

The proper course for PRC would have been to assert standing in Article IX:
 “A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by
another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.”[22]

The PRC obliquely admits the relevance of Article IX in a statement from its Foreign Ministry’s
spokesperson at a Press Conference on February 10, 2023 commenting on the U.S. January 28th
response:

“Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty stipulates that in the exploration and use of outer space,
States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance
and shall conduct all their activities in outer space with due regard to the corresponding interests of
all other States Parties to the Treaty.”

The tone and nature of the allegations in the December 6th notification give the impression the PRC
did an end-run-around the right to consultation and appropriated the standard of care in “due
regard” and “potentially harmful interference” from Article IX. The PRC does so without triggering
the right to consultation and superimposes “due regard” and potentially harmful interference” on the
hijacked Article V.

Why did the PRC go through this maneuvering rather than invoke its standing under the Article IX
right to consultation? Surely the hair trigger of “potentially harmful into interference” would have
given the PRC sufficient reason to assert legal standing if not for the two alleged near-collisions
then to complain of future tranches of Starlink satellites to be launched. The answer is two-fold.

First, neither the duty to consult or the right to consultation have been invoked, which means there
is no state practice as to what constitutes “potentially harmful interference” and consequently “due
regard” for this aspect of Article IX.[23] The inherent danger of invoking its right could create a
state practice for these two terms is not lost on the PRC as is the potential geopolitical adversaries
might use the newly unleashed state practice for future lawfare actions against the PRC itself.[24]
Instead, the PRC arbitrarily conflates “phenomena” in Article V with non-governmental space
activities to concoct legal standing in Article V and implicitly draw in “potentially harmful
interference” and “due regard” to do an end-run-around Article IX without triggering the right to
consultation and the resulting state practice.
With the standard of care of due regard and potentially harmful interference engineered into Article
V through lawfare manipulation, the PRC opened the door to the psychological aspect of the Three
Warfares to play on concerns about Starlink’s effect on the orbital environment.

Second, if the PRC asserted standing through the right to consultation, it would not have been able
to file its complaint with the Secretary General. While the method of reporting under Article IX is
not spelled out in the OST, negotiations during the OST showed the preference by the parties to
bypass the Secretary General and directly communicate with the relevant state as the accepted
means for the duty to consult and the right to consultation.[25] Invoking the right to consultation
would have required the PRC to communicate directly with the US and not through a formal
notification with the UN, which would have limited its audience and ability to project the media and
psychological facets of the Three Warfares. Arbitrarily conflating “phenomena” with Starlink and
amalgamating the standard of care in Article IX to Article V allowed the PRC to create the chimera
of legal standing and usurp the mandatory reporting requirement to the Secretary General.[26] This
allowed the PRC to make a grandiose announcement that it would have otherwise been denied if it
invoked its right to consultation under Article IX.
2. Discredit and sequester the utility of Starlink and non-governmental space activities

The PRC’s second objective is to criticize and discredit Starlink and US non-governmental space
activities in general. As discussed previously, the PRC is aware of Starlink’s capabilities and its
threat to the PRC’s national security and strategic objectives. The PRC is also aware that kinetic or
soft-kill anti-satellite actions would be irrational and risk a premature hot war with the US and open
it to international criticism.

However, with the standard of care of due regard and potentially harmful interference engineered
into Article V through lawfare manipulation, the PRC opened the door to the psychological aspect
of the Three Warfares to play on concerns about Starlink’s effect on the orbital environment.
Specifically, the PRC’s public allegations of two near collisions with its space station plays and
builds upon narratives propagated by the media of the growing influence of Starlink and fears it has
become a de facto monopoly that threatens the safety of on-orbit operations.[27] The PRC’s public
allegations also tacitly intensifies that concern and furthers the narrative in the media of the wisdom
of placing trust in a non-governmental space actor to do the right thing.[28]

The result of the PRC’s lawfare engineering of Article V facilitates the PRC’s allegations against
Starlink to be implicitly messaged in three political narratives:

Starlink’s activities and the activities of non-governmentals cause potentially harmful

interference to the activities of other states in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
including the peaceful activities of the PRC space station;[29]
Because Starlink’s activities and the activities of non-governmentals cause potentially harmful
interference, both Starlink and non-governmentals perform their activities without due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty; and [30]
Because Starlink’s activities and the activities of non-governmentals are performed without due
regard, these activities including Starlink, constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts,
including the PRC’s taikonauts.[31]

3. Discredit the standing and authority of the U.S. to create standards of behavior and norms for
outer space activities

The PRC’s third objective is facilitated by its first lawfare objective through its engineered Article V
standing and cites a portion of Article VI in the last paragraph of its Article V filing as part of this
objective:

“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are
carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.”[32]

The third objective builds on the second objective and through subtext again employs Article IX
through its flimsy Article V standing to create a political narrative that attacks the credibility of the
U.S. through the Article V notification requirement. It does so through six messaging inferences:
 The non-governmental Starlink activities, which operate under the authorization and continuing
supervision of the US, cause potentially harmful interference to the activities of other states in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space;[33]
The U.S. authorizes and continually supervises the potentially harmful interference of the non-
governmental Starlink activity, and does so without due regard to the corresponding interests of all
other States Parties to the Treaty;[34]
The potentially harmful interference of the peaceful activities of the PRC space station by the
non-governmental Starlink activities and the lack of due regard by the U.S. constitute a danger to
the life or health of astronauts, including the PRC’s taikonauts;[35]
The US bears international responsibility for the potentially harmful interference with the
peaceful activities of the PRC space station by the non-governmental Starlink activities, and the
U.S. bears international responsibility for the resulting lack of due regard, which interferes with the
peaceful activities of the PRC space station and constitute a danger to the PRC’s taikonauts;[36]
The US does not to meet its legal obligations under international law and permitting the
continued activities of the non-governmental activities of Starlink and other non-governmental
activities demonstrates the lack of US commitment to the rule of law and international order; and
Because the US does not meet its obligations under international law it does not have the
integrity to propose standards of behavior and norms of customary international law.

4. Test the US response to the use of lawfare and Three Warfares tactics directed to the outer space
domain.

The final and perhaps overreaching objective of this lawfare operation is to test the US response to
hybrid warfare tactics. Indeed, the US response to the PRC’s misuse of Article V could be the
primary purpose of the operation with the allegations about Starlink being a secondary objective.
The timing of the PRC’s filing so close to the holidays lends credence to this.

The last alleged near-collision with the PRC space station occurred in October 2021, yet it took
over a month for the PRC to make the filing. This suggests the PRC concern about the incidents
was exaggerated. However, the timing of the response and the lack of an express US objection to
the use of Article V as a lawfare implement was surely noticed by the PRC and may have created
the impression the US either did not recognize the Article V communiqué as a lawfare operation, or
it didn’t consider it significant.

The lack of an objection to the PRC’s lawfare action may have encourage the PRC to take the
operation a step further and employ the media aspect of the Three Warfares. Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated in part at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ February 10, 2022,
Regular Press Conference:

“Now the US attempts to use the so-called threshold of emergency collision criteria to shift
responsibilities and deflect attention. It is not showing a responsible attitude as a space power.
Moreover, it is in no position to unilaterally set a threshold of emergency collision criteria.”

The full statement of the Ministry’s Spokesperson was picked up by several media sites, but one in
particular chose to focus on this aspect of the statement and sought commentary from two NGO’s
who appear to agree with the PRC’s stated position.[37]
The statement from the Press Conference continues:

“With a view to protecting the safety of Chinese astronauts and space station, the Chinese side
stands ready to establish a long-term communication mechanism with the US side and hopes that
the US will take concrete measures to prevent such incident from happening again. China also
hopes that all countries will respect the international system in outer space based on international
law and jointly safeguard the life and safety of astronauts and the safe and stable operation of space
facilities in orbit.”

Here the PRC continues to apply the media facet of the Three Warfares to bolster the objectives of
its lawfare operation in the UN to not only persist in discrediting the U.S. but to create political
optics with the strategic objective that it and not the U.S. is the responsible player in outer space and
the one who should be shaping the rule of law in outer space.[38]

These four objectives are consistent with the definition of lawfare advanced by the author and the
Three Warfares:

The PRC executed a lawfare operation in the UN when it side-stepped and avoided triggering its
right to consultation under Article IX.
The PRC arbitrarily ignored the meaning of the term “phenomena” in the context of the OST to
create a pseudo-legal standing to take advantage of the language and reporting requirement in
Article V.
The PRC appropriated the standard of care from Article IX to use as subtext with its Article V
lawfare instrument and direct language from Article VI towards the political end of discrediting
Starlink’s operational legitimacy, the legitimacy of non-governmental space activities in general and
attack the standing and credibility of the U.S. and its integrity to propose standards of behavior and
norms of customary international law and interject itself as the responsible player in outer space.
[39]

Closing thoughts

Western contemporary strategic and academic thought tends to discount or minimize the
significance of hybrid warfare, including lawfare. Western thought frames the geopolitical dynamic
in terms of war and peace where war is consigned to the application of hard power and info-centric
tactics and strategy that remove the fog of war. Conversely, as noted by the report from the Office
of Net Assessment, hybrid warfare, including lawfare, is an effective tool the PRC uses to operate in
the spectrum of gray zone operations in all domains between the interludes of peace and war when
the use of kinetic force is irrational.[40] Indeed, the existence of hybrid warfare and lawfare
operations affect the very concept of deterrence, including deterrence in outer space and by
extension the strategic goals of the US and its allies.
The question is whether the PRC’s use of Article V will remain unchallenged and gain the status of
customary international law and, by extension, alter the foundation of international space law to the
PRC’s advantage.

The effectiveness of the lawfare operation examined in this essay cannot be measured
conventionally or immediately as results of a lawfare and hybrid warfare operations are long term
and measured by different metrics than conventional military activities.[41] What is evident is the
PRC has created a lawfare instrument in the UN that has gone unchallenged and therefore remains a
tool for future lawfare operations against the US national interests in space, including non-
governmental space activities.

The question is whether the PRC’s use of Article V will remain unchallenged and gain the status of
customary international law and, by extension, alter the foundation of international space law to the
PRC’s advantage. Only time will tell, and until that becomes clear, the PRC will continue with
existing lawfare actions within and outside of the UN and, if it remains unchallenged, it will be
emboldened to initiate new operations to affect the strategic outlook of outer space to their
advantage and break the resistance and influence of the US and its allies to ensure it prevails in
outer space and great power competition.

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Source:https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4650/1
The Space Review
September 12, 2023
Key issues for the Japanese government regarding
exploration and development of space resources

LUPEX, a joint mission of India and Japan, will send a rover to the Moon to look for water ice
deposits.

In June 2021, Japan enacted the “Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration
and Development of Space Resources (Space Resources Act).” This act includes provisions on the
ownership of space resources. Japan is the fourth country to have a space resources act, following
the United States, Luxembourg, and the United Arab Emirates, which have similar acts.

While there are many types of space resources, one of the space resources currently receiving the
most attention is water ice on the Moon. It is believed that the Moon has accumulated water ice (or
hydrogen) that has been transported over a long period. Water ice can be converted to hydrogen and
oxygen, which can be used as propellant.
Even if sufficient water ice is confirmed on the Moon, several issues remain before water ice can be
used as water resources.

However, although many studies based on remote sensing observation data have been reported,
estimates of the amount of water ice present on the Moon vary widely due to differences in data
analysis methods and other factors. In addition, no clear conclusions have been reached regarding
its distribution and morphology. In other words, the extent to which water ice can be used as
propellant is currently unknown. Japan has stated in its “Basic Plan on Space Policy” that “resource
exploration will be conducted as part of scientific exploration activities beginning in the 2020s to
determine the presence of resources on the lunar surface, including water resources, and to identify
the potential for future use.”
Against this background, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is planning the Lunar
Polar Exploration Mission (LUPEX) in cooperation with the Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO). The mission aims to obtain data on lunar water ice’s quantity and quality (distribution,
state, morphology, etc.) to determine its availability for future exploration activities. Other countries
have also planned similar missions (e.g., ISRO’s Chandrayaan-3, China’s Chang’e-6, and NASA’s
Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) mission).

It is hoped that these missions will provide information on the quantity and quality of water ice on
the Moon. However, even if sufficient water ice is confirmed on the Moon, several issues remain
before water ice can be used as water resources.

To illustrate the issues, this article first summarizes the currently envisioned process for producing
propellant from water ice. One possible method of extracting water from regolith is to mine the
regolith and then extract the water in a plant. A technique called thermal mining, in which water is
extracted by applying heat directly to the regolith without mining the regolith, is also being
considered. After the water is extracted, hydrogen and oxygen are produced. The hydrogen and
oxygen are then liquefied, placed in storage tanks, and loaded into a transportation vehicle to and
from the Gateway and the lunar surface, or elsewhere.

In the case of regolith mining, dust could get into the machine’s working parts and cause it to
malfunction. Thermal mining requires heavier equipment than regolith mining. In addition, there
remain issues to be considered in other processes, such as the water extraction process.
Developing lunar water ice as a resource only makes sense if there is a benefit to using lunar water
ice over bringing propellant from the Earth.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, Japan has enacted the Space Resources Act, and there is a
growing demand to promote the development of space resources, including lunar water. Therefore,
based on the above background, this article examines what important issues the Japanese
government should consider in the future regarding the long-term exploration and development of
space resources.
The pros and cons of promoting the development of water resources

As mentioned above, in its “Basic Plan on Space Policy,” Japan has stated that “resource
exploration will be conducted as part of scientific exploration activities beginning in the 2020s to
determine the presence of resources on the lunar surface, including water resources, and to identify
the potential for future use” and plans to conduct LUPEX to obtain water ice data. Therefore, in the
future, it will be necessary to determine whether lunar water ice is sufficient as a resource, i.e.,
whether the development of water resources should proceed, based on the water ice data obtained
through LUPEX.

This article will present some studies that have provided water content benchmarks to determine
whether lunar water ice is sufficient as a resource.
(i) JAXA. “International Space Exploration Scenario (Draft) 2021” (2022)

It was assumed that a crewed exploration mission would be conducted once a year and that 75
tonnes of water for the mission would be generated and converted to propellant in one year. It was
also assumed that propellant generation would be carried out by extracting water and producing
propellant from the extracted water in a plant after mining and transporting the regolith. This study
then calculated how the total launch mass varies with the presence or absence of a propellant
generation plant, the number of crewed exploration missions, and the water content of the regolith.
The results showed that when the water content of the regolith is greater than 0.5% by weight, the
total launch mass with a propellant generation plant built on the Moon is lower than without it when
the number of crewed exploration missions is four or more. In other words, in such cases, building a
propellant generation plant is more efficient than not building one.
(ii) Julie E. Kleinhenz and Aaron Paz (NASA). “Case Studies for Lunar ISRU Systems Utilizing
Polar Water.” (2020)

It was assumed that the process of generating 10 tonnes of water and converting it to propellant
would be carried out during the period of continuous illumination in the polar regions, which is 225
days. It was also assumed that propellant production would be accomplished by mining the regolith,
extracting and transporting the water, and then producing propellant from the extracted water at a
plant. The study then calculated how the mass and power of the equipment involved in the above
process would change depending on the water content of the regolith. The results showed that the
transition in equipment mass and power between 1 and 2% by weight water content is more notable
than the transition between 2and 10% by weight water content. Based on this result, this study
concludes that 1% by weight is a threshold at which ISRU is unlikely. It should be noted that the
reason for this result was analyzed as the size per unit exceeds the scalability limit to treat the
amount of regolith required in the 1% by weight case, thus requiring multiple water extraction units,
resulting in higher mass and power.
(iii) George F. Sowers and Christopher B. Dreyer (the Colorado School of Mines). “Ice Mining in
Lunar Permanently Shadowed Region.” (2019)

United Launch Alliance (ULA) has indicated a willingness to make a commercial deal of $500 per
kilogram for 1,100 tonnes of propellant per year on the lunar surface. Based on this, it was assumed
that 1,600 tonnes of water equivalent to 1,100 tonnes of propellant would be generated and
converted to propellant during the year. It was also assumed that the propellant generation would be
carried out in the following manner. First, sunlight is directed into a dome-like tent to heat the lunar
surface directly, and the sublimated water is captured and refrozen by a cold trap connected to the
tent. The refrozen ice is then transported to the plant to produce propellant. The study then
calculated how the power of the equipment involved in the above process would vary depending on
the water content of the regolith. The results showed that the power required to sublimate a given
amount of ice increases exponentially as the water content decreases when the water content is less
than 2% by weight, but when the water content exceeds 5% by weight, the power is relatively
independent of the water content. Based on these data, the lower limit of acceptable water content
was then determined to be 4% by weight.

Developing lunar water ice as a resource only makes sense if there is a benefit to using lunar water
ice over bringing propellant from the Earth. Therefore, it is desirable to derive a benchmark by
comparing the case where a propellant generation plant is constructed on the Moon with the case
where no propellant generation plant is built, as in the JAXA study. Here, to use a benchmark
obtained by JAXA’s method as a criterion for deciding whether or not to proceed with water
resources development, it is necessary to understand the extent to which missions will be conducted
in the future. However, it is difficult to predict how often missions will be conducted to which
Japan’s propellant generation plant can contribute. Hence, even if the benchmark obtained by
JAXA’s method can be used as a reference value, it will not be possible to judge the pros and cons
of promoting the development of water resources based on this benchmark alone.
The Japanese government should make a comprehensive decision on the pros and cons of
promoting water resource development in the future based on the results of LUPEX.

In addition, the assumptions regarding the production volume and details of the production process
may change in the future, depending on the results of currently planned exploration, technological
advances, and other factors. Furthermore, if sufficient information is obtained through exploration,
then distribution and morphology can be considered, and it may be possible then to calculate a more
appropriate benchmark. For this reason, this article will not discuss the details of the benchmark
calculation but will instead examine other perspectives on the pros and cons of promoting water
resources development. The perspective to be examined here is the perspective from which Japan
decided to participate in Artemis. Specifically, the perspective of further deep space exploration
such as Mars, the perspective of international competitiveness and presence, and the perspective of
expanding a wide range of industries, including non-space fields. This article discusses the merits of
lunar resource development from the above perspectives.
(i) Prospects for further deep space exploration, including Mars

Suppose the potential for water resources is confirmed. In this case, it is expected that the
development of technology to produce propellant by extracting lunar water to supply propellant to a
transportation vehicle to and from the Gateway and the lunar surface or a lunar mobile vehicle
would be promoted. If this technology is established for lunar exploration, it may be applied to
further deep space exploration, such as Mars.
(ii) Prospects for International Competitiveness and Presence

The technology to extract water from lunar regolith to produce propellant is important to ensure the
sustainability of lunar and deep space exploration. Therefore, international cooperation in these
exploration missions through this technology is expected to strengthen the international presence
and provide a voice.
(iii) Prospects for Broad Industrial Expansion, Including Non-space Sectors

As mentioned above, there are many issues in the development of space resources, and it must be
said that the extent to which the space resources development industry will expand is uncertain.
However, the technology that makes up the propellant generation plant is expected to be applied to
the hydrogen energy society on the ground. In other words, water resources development
technologies can contribute to expanding a wide range of industries, not just the space sector.

In light of the above, the author believes that the Japanese government should make a
comprehensive decision on the pros and cons of promoting water resource development in the
future based on the results of LUPEX, taking into consideration the merits of promoting water
resource development as described above, while calculating and referring to values related to water
content as benchmarks, if necessary.
Matters requiring special attention for exploration and development in the lunar polar regions

Next, this article examines the matters that need special attention when conducting future
exploration and development.
Because countries other than Japan are also interested in lunar water ice, and because lunar water
ice is unevenly distributed in the polar regions, if Japan conducts exploration or development, there
is a possibility that Japanese activities and those of other countries will be conducted in adjacent
locations. There is a risk of harmful interference when space activities are conducted nearby. In this
regard, Article IX of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)
contains the following provision: “A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an
activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request
consultation concerning the activity or experiment.”

Here, to hold consultations to avoid “harmful interference” as defined in Article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty, information must be disclosed to determine the likelihood of harmful interference.
Therefore, the author believes that the Japanese government should ensure that information about
the contents, place, and period of Japan’s space activities is made available to the public so that
other countries can determine whether there is a possibility of “harmful interference” between their
activities and those of Japan.

Next, specific measures for the implementation of the above suggestion are discussed. In Japan, in
addition to the Act on Launching of Spacecraft, etc. and Control of Spacecraft (Space Activities
Act), the Space Resources Act applies to the exploration and development of space resources,
except for those conducted exclusively as scientific research or for the purpose of scientific
research. And the Space Resources Act requires that the business activity plan (purpose, period,
place, methods, etc.) regarding the exploration and development of space resources be disclosed to
the public, except in cases where disclosure may unjustly harm the operator’s interests. Therefore,
the author believes other countries can determine the possibility of “harmful interference” by using
such public information.

On the other hand, only the Space Activities Act applies to activities not covered by the above-
mentioned Space Resources Act. Here, Article 34 of the Space Activities Act allows conditions to
be attached to permission to manage satellites. And the author believes that the conditions for
permission should include the reporting to the Japanese government of information related to the
above-mentioned business activity plan (excluding information that would unjustly harm the
interests of the operator if made public), on the assumption that such information will be made
available to the public. This will allow other countries to determine, as in the case above, the
possibility of “harmful interference.”
Other matters to consider

Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty also states that “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies
of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as
to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt
appropriate measures for this purpose.” It is expected that water resources development, even if in
the demonstration and research phase, will have some impact on the lunar surface. Therefore, it is
necessary to take measures to prevent “harmful contamination.” However, the specific content and
level of “harmful contamination” of outer space to be prohibited under the Outer Space Treaty are
not clarified in the Treaty.
If Japan conducts exploration or development, there is a possibility that Japanese activities and
those of other countries will be conducted in adjacent locations. There is a risk of harmful
interference when space activities are conducted nearby.

In this regard, the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) has recommended since 2002 that the
COSPAR Policy on Planetary Protection be widely disseminated to COPUOS and other
international communities to become international standards. Considering this, a practical measure
to prevent “harmful contamination” is to bring operators’ activities into compliance with the
COSPAR Policy on Planetary Protection through an examination based on the Space Activities Act
and the Space Resources Act.

COPUOS has also established a Working Group on the Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities
to develop recommended principles for space resource activities for the five years 2023–2027. The
topics for the 2024 meeting include “the role of information-sharing in supporting space resource
activities” and “environmental and socioeconomic aspects of space resource activities.” When these
principles are organized in the future, Japan should implement activities with full consideration of
the said recommended principles.

On the other hand, the content of the measures to be taken will vary depending on the nature of the
mission and the activities of other countries. Therefore, specific measures should be adjusted based
on these factors.
Conclusion

This article discussed how the pros and cons of promoting the use of water resources should be
determined and what specific actions the Japanese government should take in conducting
exploration and development. The author hopes that these activities will lead to a future of peaceful
use of water resources.

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Source:https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4648/1
The Space Review
September 12, 2023
Putting the private into private spaceflight

Virgin Galactic waited until after its VSS Unity spaceplane landed on the Galactic 03 mission to
annouce the three customers who had been on board.

After years of waiting, Virgin Galactic has finally gotten into a rhythm of suborbital spaceflights.
The company’s latest flight of its VSS Unity spaceplane, Galactic 03, took place September 8, and
was the third flight in a little more than two months, after the inaugural commercial flight, Galactic
01, June 29 (see “Regulating a maturing commercial spaceflight industry”, The Space Review, July
3, 2023) and Galactic 02 August 10. The company had vowed to conduct monthly flights of its
SpaceShipTwo vehicle and, so far, it is sticking to that cadence, with the next tentatively scheduled
for early October.
What was different about Galactic 03, though, was the publicity surrounding it—or, rather, lack
thereof.

As with the two previous flights, Unity carried six people: two pilots, an astronaut trainer, and three
customers. All three were among the first to sign up for Virgin Galactic flights, paying $200,000 for
tickets as far back as 2004. The company has about 800 people who have purchased tickets and, in
some cases, have been waiting more than 15 years for their opportunity to fly.

What was different about Galactic 03, though, was the publicity surrounding it—or, rather, lack
thereof. Virgin Galactic did not provide a live webcast of the flight, instead providing play-by-play
updates on social media. Moreover, it did not disclose the identity of the three customers—Ken
Baxter, Timothy Nash, and Adrian Reynard—until after the mission was over and the company
issued a press release confirming a successful flight.
That is a break in tradition in Western spaceflight, where crews of suborbital or orbital launches, by
governments or companies, have been announced to the public before launch, days to months
(sometimes years) in advance. Virgin Galactic did name the company personnel who would be on
Galactic 03 in advance, but in an August 28 statement only mentioned that the customers “would
become Virgin Galactic astronauts 014, 015 and 016.” The lack of information about those
customers puzzled many people following the flight.

Some see this as a normalization of spaceflight. Airlines don’t publicly disclose who is on each of
their flights, so it seems reasonable that spaceflight companies will follow the same practice as their
flights become more common. Perhaps, there may come a time when Virgin or another provider
does not disclose at all who was on a flight beyond a numeric designation.

Be we still have some ways to go before human spaceflight does become that routine. Virgin
Galactic is still flying only once a month, a pace unlikely to change until its new Delta class of
suborbital spaceplanes enters service around 2026, a schedule that assumes all goes well with the
development and testing of those vehicles, which is hardly guaranteed.

That low rate of operations also means limited revenue for the company. Executives acknowledged
in an earnings call in August that, with a monthly flight rate and only three customers on each flight,
many of whom bought tickets at the original price of $200,000 years ago, there will be much
revenue for the foreseeable future.

“When we look at the capacity of Unity and the ticket prices that we’re flying these days, you
would expect to see for the near term about $600,000 per flight,” Michael Colglazier, CEO of
Virgin Galactic, said in that earnings call. By next year, he said, the company expects to replace the
astronaut trainer with a fourth customer, allowing the company to generate more revenue. Research
flights like Galactic 01 will also produce more revenue—about $600,000 per seat, he estimated—
but those will be far less frequent than tourist flights.

Virgin Galactic is still losing significant amounts of money given its limited revenue and high costs
of developing the Delta-class vehicles: $134.4 million in the second quarter alone. It has been able
to sell stock to raise money, giving it cash reserves of nearly $1 billion, but will likely need to
continue that to be able to sell stock to complete development of the Delta vehicles and bridge the
gap to operations.
The industry is shifting, and that customers of private human spaceflight can and will have more
control over how their journeys into space are publicized as flights eventually do become more
routine.

Another sign human spaceflight isn’t that routine yet is the status of Virgin Galactic’s competitor.
The Galactic 03 flight took place almost exactly a year after Blue Origin’s latest New Shepard
launch, which suffered an engine anomaly on an uncrewed flight carrying only research payloads.
The capsule landed safely under parachutes, but the propulsion module was destroyed.

In March, the company announced it had completed the investigation into the mishap, concluding
that the nozzle of the rocket engine suffered a structural failure linked to thermal damage. Blue
Origin said then that flights would resume “soon” starting with another payload-only flight.
In early June, Bob Smith, CEO of Blue Origin, said at a Financial Times event that the company
was “dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s” on plans to return New Shepard to flight and getting FAA
approval to do so. “New Shepard, from that standpoint, should be ready to go fly within the next
few weeks,” he said then. The vehicle has yet to return to flight.

It's clear, though, that the industry is shifting, and that customers of private human spaceflight can
and will have more control over how their journeys into space are publicized as flights eventually
do become more routine. That was the case even on Galactic 03: Baxter had a website where he
documented his plans for the flight and even, before the flight, had a countdown to launch. (The Las
Vegas real estate developer describes himself as “America’s First Space Tourist”—an appellation
usually given to Dennis Tito, who went to the International Space Station in 2001—and “the first
everyday American to visit outer space.” How “everyday American” is defined is unclear.)

Many others are like Baxter in the sense that they will want to broadcast their experiences, either
through conventional or social media, for a range of motivations. Others, though, may see their
journeys into suborbital space as more personal affairs to be shared with smaller audiences rather
than webcast to the world. For them, the new era of private spaceflight will be as much about
private as it is about spaceflight.

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Source:https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4649/1Spacedaily
September 12, 2023
Galileo becomes faster for every user

Galileo second generation satellites.

ESA satnav receiver vans - driving between the busy heart of Rotterdam, quiet countryside, and the
Agency's ESTEC technical centre - have confirmed that Galileo signals now provide a first position
fix more rapidly, while also offering improved robustness in challenging environments and
streamlined access to time information.

The improvement comes from a new so-called improved 'I/NAV' navigation message, first
demonstrated on the latest two Galileo satellites launched in December 2021 and entered into
service last summer. ESA as Galileo's System Design Authority has been contributing to the
deployment of the improved 'I/NAV' navigation message starting from the design phase, the
implementation at satellite and ground segment, the qualification of the implementation and the in-
orbit testing.
Galileo's service provider, the European Union Agency for the Space Programme, EUSPA has now
upgraded all other Galileo FOC satellites in service so as to broadcast this enhanced navigation
message.
This upgraded navigation message does improve Galileo's time to first position fix by a factor of
two or three - depending on whether the receiver is in rural or more challenging urban
environments.
This is made possible by improving the message's capability to correct for decoding errors and to
recover lost data. At the same time receivers can gain also faster access to the ultra-precise Galileo
System Time without having to decode the entire navigation message.
ESA has been using its Galileo Time and Geodetic Validation Facility - an independent network of
monitoring stations around the globe - to check the correctness of the broadcast data and its related
performance. Their analysis has shown that all broadcast data are correct. Also, the as-measured
performance of the new data is fully aligned to the performance targeted in the design phase.
Meanwhile ESA's Navigation Laboratory, based at ESTEC in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, has
deployed its pair of Telecommunications and Navigation Testbed Vehicles in drives across the
Dutch countryside to the centre of Rotterdam to confirm the performance improvements available
to users in a variety of environments.
These testbed vehicles incorporate a variety of satnav receivers plus cameras and sensors to record
all details of their surrounding environment.
"The Galileo signals do provide the world's most precise accuracy, down to decimetre-scale
precision," explains Stefan Wallner, heading ESA's Galileo G1 Signal in Space Engineering Unit.
"In order to benefit from the excellent accuracy of the Galileo system, the user has also to retrieve
the corresponding navigation message from the Galileo signal even in challenging user
environments - so the faster the better. In the Galileo navigation message, there was sufficient spare
data capacity available to address this improvement."
At the same time, these new elements in the 'I/NAV' message have to be entirely backward
compatible with legacy receivers, so that the update has no impact on their functioning and
performance. Before the start of the deployment, ESA in cooperation with EUSPA and EC's Joint
Research Center (JRC) did intensive test campaigns covering an extensive number of commercial
Galileo receivers and successfully demonstrated that the new I/NAV message does indeed not have
any negative impact on them."
The I/NAV improvements are based on a trio of innovations.
The improved time to first position fix comes through reducing the amount of information needed
for the receiver to generate a first position fix, at the cost of a reduced initial accuracy in turn. This
leads to a first fix within a few seconds, with a ranging error of less than 4.5 m, decreasing further
in turn until reaching the accustomed submetre-level accuracy after the reception of the complete
Galileo navigation message.
I/NAV's improved robustness comes from a new coding method that introduces additional
redundancy into the navigation message, so any lost or corrupted data - perhaps blocked by high
buildings or reflected off polished artificial surfaces - can be recovered easily.
Finally, Galileo System Time is made available to receivers without the need to fully demodulate
the navigation message by introducing it as a 'secondary synchronisaton pattern' within the
message, accessible within a few seconds. This is of particular interest to receivers that retreive the
Galileo navigation message through the internet or parallel communication networks and therefore
are only missing the correct link to the Galileo System Time for the provision of a first fix.
The data gathered during this current monitoring campaign are being used to implement a set of
recommendations to chipset manufacturers to maximise their effectiveness use of I/NAV signals.
All information necessary to implement and benefit from I/NAV message improvement can be
found in the Galileo Open Service Signal in Space Interface Control Document. The next version of
the Galileo Open Service Definition Document will also provide a characterisation of the expected
performance to be obtained from the improved I/NAV message.

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Source:https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Galileo_becomes_faster_for_every_user_999.html
Space Daily
September 12, 2023
Phase Four's next generation Maxwell Propulsion
System Achieves Flight Heritage

Phase Four's Maxwell propulsion systems.

Phase Four has reported the successful flight heritage of its next-generation Maxwell propulsion
system. This marks a major step in deploying state-of-the-art propulsion technology for small
satellites.

The advances in the Maxwell propulsion system underscores Phase Four's commitment to
excellence, innovation, and customer-focused solutions towards providing reliable, cost-effective
propulsion systems tailored towards proliferated Low Earth Orbit (LEO) small satellite missions. A
continued differentiator for Phase Four is its focus on providing a full suite of products and services
for in-space propulsion.
It is noteworthy that Phase Four's propellant fill operations were completed with its engineering
team using in-house developed Ground Support Equipment (GSE) for this critical component of
launch preparation for the Maxwell propulsion system. Phase Four takes pride in seamlessly
integrating propellant fill operations and on-site support, ensuring mission flexibility while adhering
to industry-standard safety protocols such as AFSPCMAN 91-710 and AIAA/ANSI S-080A.
Additionally, Phase Four performs a comprehensive telemetry check during on-site visits, covering
all system channels, ensuring optimal propulsion subsystem condition before launch. All Maxwell
propulsion units are delivered with an initial propellant load for optional end-to-end testing and hot
fires with each spacecraft, ensuring mission readiness.
Phase Four's 24-hour commissioning support services ensure optimal deployment of the Maxwell
propulsion system. As a mission partner seeking to continuously improve customer success, Phase
Four has already delivered Over-the-Air (OTA) software updates for the system's on-orbit
performance, ensuring adaptability and mission optimization post-deployment. Another innovation
worth noting is the Built-in Self-Test (BIST) feature of the latest Maxwell system, enabling thruster
function validation anytime, anywhere, enhancing system reliability.
Phase Four, a "one-stop-shop" propulsion provider, allows customers to focus on satellite
applications and mission objectives. The newest Maxwell system's flight heritage is a significant
milestone in Phase Four's quest to redefine small satellite propulsion, with its customer-centric
approach, dedication to innovation, and unwavering commitment to safety.

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Source:https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/
Phase_Fours_next_generation_Maxwell_Propulsion_System_Achieves_Flight_Heritage_999.html
Space Daily
September 12, 2023
OSIRIS-REx adjusts course to target sample capsule's
landing zone

This graphic shows the Earth return trajectory for the OSIRIS-REx spacecraft and for the sample
capsule, after the spacecraft releases it above Earth on Sept. 24. The yellow diamonds indicate the
dates of spacecraft maneuvers that slightly adjust its trajectory to get it closer, and then pointing at,
and then above Earth.

On Sept. 10, NASA's OSIRIS-REx spacecraft briefly fired its ACS (attitude control system)
thrusters to point itself toward Earth, putting it on course to release its sample capsule, carrying
rocks and dust from asteroid Bennu, from 63,000 miles (or 102,000 kilometers) above Earth's
surface on Sunday, Sept. 24.

Yesterday's trajectory-correction maneuver changed the spacecraft's velocity about a 0.5 mph (less
than 1 kph) relative to Earth. Without this tiny but critical shift, the spacecraft and its asteroid cargo
would have flown past Earth.
But now, the spacecraft is set up to release the capsule to enter the atmosphere just off the coast of
California at 8:42 a.m. MDT / 10:42 a.m. EDT.
Traveling at a precise speed and angle, it will land approximately 13 minutes after release in a 36-
mile by 8.5-mile (58-kilometer by 14-kilometer) predetermined area on the Department of
Defense's Utah Test and Training Range southwest of Salt Lake City.
Meanwhile, about 20 minutes after releasing the sample capsule, the spacecraft will fire its engines
to divert past Earth and onto its next mission to asteroid Apophis: OSIRIS-APEX (OSIRIS-Apophis
Explorer).
OSIRIS-REx may fire its thrusters again on Sept. 17 if engineers determine that one final
adjustment to its trajectory is necessary before it releases its capsule a week later.
The spacecraft is currently 4 million miles, or 7 million kilometers, away, traveling at about 14,000
mph (about 23,000 kph) toward Earth.

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Source:https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/
OSIRIS_REx_adjusts_course_to_target_sample_capsules_landing_zone_999.html
Space Daily
September 12, 2023
Tianzhou 5 spacecraft burns up on Earth reentry

File illustration of China's Tianzhou cargo spacecraft.

China's Tianzhou 5 cargo spacecraft was destroyed as scheduled on Tuesday morning as it reentered
Earth's atmosphere, according to the China Manned Space Agency.
The agency said in a news release that, under ground controllers' guidance, the robotic craft flew
back into Earth's atmosphere at 9:13 am. After that, most of the spaceship burned up, and a small
amount of debris fell into secure areas in the South Pacific Ocean.
The Tianzhou 5 departed from the Tiangong space station on Monday afternoon and then started the
atmospheric reentry process guided by ground controllers.
The vessel launched on Nov 12 from the Wenchang Space Launch Center in Hainan province, and
docked with the Tiangong later that same day. It was tasked with refueling the space station and
bringing astronauts' living and work necessities.
It was the fourth cargo ship to have linked with the Tiangong, which is now manned by three
astronauts of the Shenzhou XVI mission.
On May 5, the vessel undocked from the Tiangong station and started a solo flight for experimental
purposes that lasted 33 days. It reconnected with the space station in June.
In addition to resupply and refueling tasks, the cargo ship carried several cutting-edge experimental
payloads to the space station, which have been working well, according to the agency.
It noted the space hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell system has been successfully demonstrated in orbit.
The test results will be used for the research and development of new spacecraft fuel cells to be
used in China's planned manned missions to the moon.
Another piece of advanced equipment, the broad-energy-spectrum, high-energy particle detector,
has obtained a lot of scientific data in terms of charged particles, neutrons, and particle radiation
effects, the agency added.
In late December, the Tianzhou 5 deployed the Macao Student Science Satellite 1, a 12-kilogram
mini satellite, into orbit. The satellite has been used to help students in Macao learn about Earth
imaging, radio communication and other spaceflight activities.
The Tiangong station is currently linked with the Tianzhou 6, which arrived on May 11.

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Source:https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/
Tianzhou_5_spacecraft_burns_up_on_Earth_reentry_999.html
Space Daily
September 12, 2023
Kombucha: Ally for Moon and Mars

ESA is testing kombucha cultures, famous for their fermentative properties and potential health
benefits, to assess their resilience in space. These cultures hold great promise for supporting humans
on the Moon and Mars.
Multicellular biofilms found in kombucha, have shown promise in surviving harsh environments on
Earth, prompting scientists to investigate their potential to endure space's extreme conditions. The
microorganisms are even being considered as bio-factories for self-sustaining life support systems
for space settlements.
Kombucha in space
ESA's Expose facility held experiments on the International Space Station to investigate if and how
bacteria survive in space and in simulated martian conditions.
Samples flew on the outside of the Space Station. The results show that a microorganism,
cyanobacterium, was able to repair its DNA and resume cell division even after being exposed to
cosmic radiation, even resisting the destructive iron ions that cause extensive cell damage.
In many living beings, tissues regenerate like human skin or bacterial biofilms by consistently
multiplying through a process of cell division. The way these cells stop dividing until they've fixed
their DNA damage is still a mystery, but researchers suspect a specific gene - the sulA gene - could
play a part in it. The sulA gene acts like a traffic signal for cells. It stops cells from dividing until
they've repaired their DNA, like a red light stops cars from moving. It's a crucial part of a cell's
safety system, ensuring that any damages are fixed before the cells continue to multiply.
Another experiment revealed that cell clusters provided a microhabitat for smaller species, showing
that some cells can 'hitchhike' through space within larger groups of cells that protect the
hitchhikers.
Planetary protection is a set of protocols to prevent harmful biological and chemical contamination
from Earth reaching other planets, moons, or celestial bodies, and vice-versa. Experiments like
these can help understand how cell clusters and biofilms protect against the extremes of space,
preventing contamination and preventing the contamination of space missions. They could also be
used to shield organisms on longer journeys through space.
Microbes can also be a valuable 'radiation model'. By understanding how these microorganisms
respond, researchers can gain insights to comprehend and enhance human health and well-being.
This includes developing radiation-protection strategies for astronauts in space.
To Moon and Mars
Future Artemis missions to the lunar Gateway could involve cultivating microorganisms on the
Moon.
"The cultures show great potential in supporting long-term human presence on the Moon and on
Mars," says Petra Rettberg, Head of the German Aerospace Center's (DLR) astrobiology group.
"Due to their ability to produce oxygen and function as bio-factories, this biotechnology could
significantly enhance future space missions and human space exploration efforts," adds ESA deep
space exploration scientist Nicol Caplin.
"I hope to see our samples attached to the lunar Gateway in the future or perhaps utilised on the
surface of the Moon and beyond. Until then, we will continue to explore the possibilities our bio-
cultures offer."

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Source:https://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Kombucha_Ally_for_Moon_and_Mars_999.html