ANYATHĀKHYĀTI:
A Critique by Appaya Dīkṣita
in the Parimala
Appaya Dīkṣita
Introduction
In Sanskrit, the word khyāti has two
different meanings, namely ‘‘fame’’ and
‘‘knowledge’’. In all evidence, in the context
of theories of illusion, the word is employed
only in the sense of ‘‘knowledge’’, or
‘‘apprehension’’. The five theories under
consideration are thus concerned with the
mechanism for the generation of knowledge
in illusory perception.
1. Asatkhyāti (Buddhist Mādhyamikas)
2. Ātmakhyāti (Yogācāra Buddhism)
3. Akhyāti (Prabhākara)
4. Anyathākhyāti (Naiyāyikas)
5. Anirvacanīyakhyāti (Advaita Vedānta)
1. Asatkhyāti (Buddhist Mādhyamikas) - In an
erroneous cognition, neither the object nor the
substrate is real. - E.g., In the shell-silver illusion,
both the cognized silver and the shell are non-existent.
2. Ātmakhyāti (Yogācāra Buddhism) - The object of
illusion is an existent mental image, projected
externally. The content is real, but cognition of it as
external is erroneous.
3. Akhyāti (Prabhākara) - No erroneous cognition;
failure to distinguish valid perceptions and
recollections. E.g., Shell perceived as 'this', followed
by memory of silver, leading to illusion.
4. Anyathākhyāti (Naiyāyikas) - 'This' is first
cognized, then 'silverness' is associated through
extraordinary perception. ‘Silverness' is real, but its
association is misconceived.
5. Anirvacanīyakhyāti (Advaita Vedānta) - The
perceived entity has a special reality (prātibhāsika),
neither existent nor non-existent. - It is indeterminate
(anirvācyam, anirvacanīyam) and unreal (mithyā).
Understanding Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti
To study the argument, firstly we have to learn
Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti.
Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti is a concept from the Naiyayika
school referring to an "extraordinary perception" arising
from superimposing prior knowledge onto a present
perception.
It literally means: Jñāna = Knowledge Lakṣaṇa =
Characteristic Pratyāsatti = Superimposition
So it is perceiving something by projecting prior
knowledge about it, rather than just from present
sensory inputs.
The Naiyayikas used it to explain cases like:
1. Perceiving "fragrant sandalwood" by superimposing
prior knowledge of fragrance.
2. Cognizing knowledge itself as a quality through
yogic perception.
3. Illusory perceptions like the "shell-silver" example.
Arguments between Naiyayikas and
Advaitians.
Three examples by Naiyayikas to support
Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti (extraordinary perception based
on prior knowledge):
1. Fragrant Sandalwood
Naiyayikas: We perceive "fragrant sandalwood"
through Jñānalakṣaṇapratyā satti.
Advaitins: We only visually perceive sandalwood. The
fragrance is inferred by recognizing the invariable
relation (vyapti) between sandalwood and fragrance.
2. Knowledge as a quality of self.
Naiyayikas use this example to support
Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti.
Advaitins: They don't consider knowledge as a
quality of self, nor accept anuvyavasāya as a means to
cognize knowledge.
So, this example doesn't require Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti
for Advaitins.
Arguments between Naiyayikas and
Advaitians.
Madhusudana Sarasvati argues that if we accept
'Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti' (extraordinary perception
based on prior knowledge), then inference becomes
redundant. In the example "There is fire on the mountain
because of smoke", we could say fire is perceived through
'Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti' from the prior knowledge of
fire-smoke relation, not inference. When factors for
perception and inference are present together, perception
overrides inference as it is more powerful. So
'Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti', being a means of extraordinary
perception, will always prevail over inference, making
inference redundant. Naiyayikas counter that only
ordinary perception overrides inference, not extraordinary
perception like 'Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti '.
Arguments between Naiyayikas and
Advaitians.
Advaitins give the example of falsely perceiving a pillar as
a human being to argue against Naiyayikas. First, there is
doubt whether it's a pillar or human. Apparent hand
movement makes us infer it's a human. But on
examination, there is no hand. So the perception of human
must be through 'jnanalaksanapratyasatti' (extraordinary
perception), overriding inference. Naiyayikas respond that
in inferences where the major term (e.g. 'different from
the rest') can't be known beforehand, extraordinary
perception can't occur to override inference. Advaitins
object that this example is not inference but 'arthapatti'
(postulation), another means of knowledge, as inference is
based on the relation between middle and major terms, not
their absence.
It is impossible to explain the appearance of
silverness through Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti
Even if Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti explains perception of fragrant
sandalwood or perception in anuvyavasāya, it cannot explain
perceiving silverness in the shell-silver illusion. Appaya Dikshita
cites two conditions for accepting Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti:
1. If something was previously known at a locus, and that same
locus is seen again, the prior knowledge is revived.
2. If something was previously known in a locus delimited by
"that", and something with the same "thatness" is seen, the
prior knowledge is revived.
These conditions are fulfilled for fragrant sandalwood, but not for
shell-silver illusion, as the shell was never previously known with
silver or as a delimiter of silverness. Without prior perception of
shell-silver connection, Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti cannot give rise
to cognition "this is silver".Thus, Advaitins reject using
Jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti to explain illusory perception.
Arguments between Naiyayikas and
Appaya Dīkṣita
Naiyayikas
There is no mechanism of causation justifying creation of
silver at shell's locus, as conceived by Advaitins.
Appaya Dikshita's response:
The causal mechanism proposed by Advaitins should
also be accepted by Naiyayikas.
In cases like dreams, misunderstandings with no
established causal mechanism, both schools resort to
'dosha' (error/defect) as the agent creating illusion.
Advaita's argument:
It is simpler to take 'dosha' for explaining all illusions,
rather than different mechanisms for different illusions.
This follows the 'principle of parsimony' (lāghava) -
preferring the simplest explanation.
Advaitins are not proposing a new theory, but
generalizing a principle both schools already accept in
certain cases.
By construing different models, Naiyayikas go against
the principle of parsimony.
Conclusion:
The Advaita argument is that it is simpler to use
'dosha' to explain all illusions, rather than different
mechanisms for each, following the 'principle of
parsimony'. Advaitins are generalizing an already
accepted principle, not proposing a new theory.
Whereas Naiyayikas, by constructing separate models
for various illusions, go against parsimony. In essence,
Advaitins reject jñāналакṣaṇapratyāsatti for the shell-
silver case and propose using the simpler 'dosha'
explanation accepted by both sides.
Appaya Dīkṣita
