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Rigid Designators
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Stanford Encyclopedia A rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds in
which that object exists and never designates anything else. This technical
of Philosophy concept in the philosophy of language has critical consequences felt
throughout philosophy. In their fullest generality, the consequences are
metaphysical and epistemological. Whether a statement's designators are
rigid or non-rigid may determine whether it is necessarily true,
necessarily false, or contingent. This metaphysical status is sometimes out
of accord with what one would expect given a statement's apparent
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen John Perry
epistemological status as a posteriori or a priori. Statements affected
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include central ones under investigation in philosophical subdisciplines
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http://plato.stanford.edu/board.html from the philosophy of science to mind to ethics and aesthetics. Hence,
much of the discussion in various subdisciplines of philosophy is
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explicitly or implicitly framed around the distinction between rigid and
non-rigid designators.
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bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP 1. A Basic Characterization of Rigid Designators and their Interest
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized 1.1 Names, Ordinary Descriptions, and Identity Statements
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the 1.2 Standard Clarifications from Kripke
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, 1.3 Grammatical Categories and Rigid Expressions
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . 2. Relations Between Rigidity and Associated Theories and
Phenomena
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Copyright c 2011 by the publisher 2.1 Direct Reference
The Metaphysics Research Lab 2.2 Causal Grounding
Center for the Study of Language and Information
2.3 Descriptivism
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
2.3.1 Names as Wide-Scope Descriptions
Rigid Designators
Copyright c 2011 by the author 2.3.2 Assertoric Content and Ingredient Sense
Joseph LaPorte 2.3.3 Descriptivism, Anti-Descriptivism, and the
All rights reserved. Importance of Rigidity
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 Rigid Designators Joseph LaPorte

3. Philosophical Work for Rigidity. Kripke (1980) famously argues that because a rigid designator designates
3.1 The Necessary A Posteriori the same object in all possible worlds, an identity statement in which the
3.2 The Contingent A Priori identity sign is flanked by two rigid designators must be necessarily true
3.3 Essentialism if it is true at all, even if the statement is not a priori. His classic example
3.4 Mind is the identity statement ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’, which is true, but
3.5 Rigidity at Work in Arguments from Two-Dimensionalism which was discovered a posteriori to be true. ‘Hesperus’ is a name that
Supplementary Document: Two-Dimensionalism Against was given to a heavenly body seen in the evening, and ‘Phosphorus’ is a
Materialism name that was, unknown to the first users of the name, given to that same
4. Objections to Rigidity heavenly body seen in the morning. The heavenly body is Venus.
4.1 Objections to Rigidity in General
4.2 Objections to the Application of Rigidity to Terms for One might initially suppose that since the statement ‘Hesperus =
Kinds and Properties Phosphorus’ was only discovered empirically to be true, it must be
Bibliography contingently true. But, says Kripke, it is necessarily true. The only respect
Other Internet Resources in which it might have turned out false is not metaphysical but epistemic:
Related Entries thus, one could as well say of a geometrical theorem before it is proven
that it might or might not turn out to be true or that it might or might not
be provable without the parallels postulate. But if it is true and is provable
1. A Basic Characterization of Rigid Designators without the parallels postulate, that is a matter of metaphysical necessity.
and their Interest In the same way, if the statement ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is true, that is
a matter of metaphysical necessity.
1.1 Names, Ordinary Descriptions, and Identity Statements
‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true if true at all because
Philosophical work performed by rigidity is discussed in §3 below, after a ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are proper names for the same object. Like
more thorough characterization of the notion of rigidity is provided. other names, Kripke maintains, they are rigid: each designates just the
However, a modicum of understanding about that work is needed for any object it actually designates in all possible worlds in which that object
understanding of what is interesting about rigid designators. Hence, exists, and it designates nothing else in any possible world. The object
before moving on to refinements in characterizing the notion of rigidity, I that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ name in all possible worlds is Venus.
rehearse here a famous application made by Saul Kripke, who coined the Since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ both name Venus in all possible
word ‘rigid designator’. Kripke is not the first philosopher to discuss the worlds, and since Venus = Venus in all possible worlds, ‘Hesperus =
idea behind the term he coined, but his illuminating discussions have Phosphorus’ is true in all possible worlds.
made the importance of rigidity widely appreciated.
A description like ‘the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’ is,

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 Rigid Designators Joseph LaPorte

on the other hand, not rigid. That explains why the identity statement fact the brightest in the evening sky, Venus (Hesperus), is necessarily
identical to Hesperus.
(H) ‘Hesperus = the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’
Third and finally, ‘Hesperus’ is rigid because it picks out Hesperus in all
is true but not necessarily true. While Hesperus is in fact the brightest worlds that contain Hesperus. In worlds not containing Hesperus, the
object in the evening sky apart from the moon, Hesperus might have been designator fails to name anything other than Hesperus. There is more than
dimmer: had, say, Hesperus been obscured by cosmic dust, Mars might one account of a rigid designator that conforms to that requirement. On
have been the object designated by ‘the brightest non-lunar object in the one such account, a rigid designator designates its designatum in every
evening sky’ rather than Hesperus. In that case, the above identity possible world containing the designatum and in other possible worlds the
statement (H) would have been false. So the reason that (H) could have designator fails to designate. In places, Kripke suggests that this is his
been false is that ‘the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’ does idea:
not designate Hesperus rigidly. It designates Hesperus in this world,
which explains why (H) is true, but this description designates Mars in when I use the notion of a rigid designator, I do not imply that the
some other worlds, which explains why (H) could have been false: (H) object referred to necessarily exists. All I mean is that in any
would have been false had some other such world been actual. possible world where the object in question does exist, in any
situation where the object would exist, we use the designator in
1.2 Standard Clarifications from Kripke question to designate that object. In a situation where the object
does not exist, then we should say that the designator has no
Some potential misunderstandings are well known.
referent and that the object in question so designated does not exist
First, a rigid designator designates the same object in all possible worlds (Kripke 1971, p. 146; a disclaimer is reported in Kaplan 1989b, p.
as it is used in the actual world, not as it is used in other possible worlds 570 note 8).
in which the object gets picked out: for although we identify objects in
In other places, Kripke seems to have in mind another account of rigidity:
other worlds by our own names, natives of some of these worlds use
one according to which a rigid designator designates its object in every
other names (Kripke 1980, p. 77). A few philosophers resist this
possible world, whether or not the designatum exists in that world.
clarification. They find the idea of differentiating between the reference
Hence, he says, “If you say, ‘suppose Hitler had never been born’ then
of terms in our world with respect to other worlds, on the one hand, and
‘Hitler’ refers here, still rigidly, to something that would not exist in the
the reference of terms as used in other worlds, on the other hand, fatally
counterfactual situation described” (Kripke 1980, p. 78).
confused (for critical discussion, see Fitch 2004, pp. 103–4). But such
objections are not popular. It may be that no substantive issues ride on which conception of rigidity is
adopted (Stanley 1997a, pp. 557, 566ff.; see also Brock 2004, p. 285 note
Second, although the statement (H) is not necessarily true, it is
13). On the other hand, some philosophers have held that true statements
nevertheless Kripke's view and the standard view that the object that is in
using a proper name to express that so and so might not have existed are

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 Rigid Designators Joseph LaPorte

unintelligible unless the relevant name refers to the object in all worlds, would seem to be rigid. So if I say, pleasantly surprised, “You made good
period. That might provide a substantive reason for favoring the latter time,” we could discuss reasons for this and conditions under which this
type of rigidity, obstinate rigidity, as Salmon calls it (1981, p. 34). might not have been the case, but in all of our considerations the same
Obstinate rigidity has sometimes been favored on grounds like these (see, individual, and not anyone else who might have been at my door in good
e.g., Plantinga 1985, p. 84: particularities of Plantinga's characteristically time or not, is the one in question. The individual in question is the one
interesting account are discussed in the section on individual essences in who is in fact identical to you (as any account could put it).
the entry on actualism) Kripke's quote above hints that obstinate rigidity
might afford this kind of advantage. But Kripke never argues for one There is some controversy over the relationship between rigidity and
position or another. Despite occasional slips in favor of one or another indexicals. According to some writers, ‘you’ means, in some contexts at
refined version of rigidity, he deliberately sidesteps these “delicate issues” least, something like the person at the door, so it is not used rigidly
when he gives them his full attention (1980, p. 21, n. 21). (Nunberg 1993; Smith 1989 §5). Often, but not always, such views are
motivated by considerations about propositional attitudes (see, for further
There are stronger and weaker brands of necessity corresponding to the discussion, see the entry on indexicals, the section on indexicals in the
possible notions of rigidity. Kripke argues that a sentence like ‘Hesperus entry on reference, and the section connecting possible worlds and
= Phosphorus’ is at least “weakly” necessary (1971, p. 137): true in all structured propositions in the entry on structured propositions).
those possible worlds in which Hesperus exists and Phosphorus exists.
The statement may enjoy a stronger necessity, too, which would render it Another category of singular terms is definite descriptions. Some definite
true in all worlds, period. [1] In this entry, “necessity” is to be understood descriptions, like ‘the successor of 2’, are counted as rigid by nearly
as weak necessity (at least). everyone: see §2.1. No one supposes that all definite descriptions are rigid
(on all uses: see §2.3.1); as we have seen, ‘the brightest non-lunar object
1.3 Grammatical Categories and Rigid Expressions in the evening sky’ is not rigid.

Rigidity is most straightforwardly applied to proper names of concrete Terms for natural kinds like ‘gold’ and ‘water’ are widely supposed to
objects. There is general agreement that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘George W. function as singular terms some of the time. They are frequently counted
Bush’ refer rigidly. as rigid. Other singular terms for properties that are sometimes counted
rigid include ‘redness’ and ‘loudness’. More controversial are singular
Rigidity is also applied commonly to indexicals, like ‘now’ or ‘you’. If, terms for properties that are more artificial: ‘bachelorhood’, or ‘soda
when I use ‘you’ in a context, my utterance means something like the pop’.
person at the door, then presumably it is not rigid. You may be at the
door, but in another possible world it is another philosopher who comes Not just singular terms but also general terms, like ‘tiger’, ‘hot’, and ‘red’
visiting. On the other hand, if (as Kaplan proposes: 1989a) ‘you’ refers are often recognized as rigid (following Kripke's suggestion: 1980, p.
directly to an individual, without amounting to a disguised description 134). These terms raise complications not present for singular terms.
meaning the same as a description like ‘the person at the door’, then it

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Objections to counting terms for kinds and properties rigid, whether they see 1989b, p. 571). As the theory is usually understood, it is the position
are singular or general, are discussed below (§4.2). that the semantic content of a name or other directly referring expression
is nothing more than the referent: the referent is all that the name
Terms from other grammatical categories, as well, might admit a contributes to a proposition expressed by a sentence containing it. So
rigid/non-rigid distinction. Philosophers have not attended much to the there is no descriptive information semantically conveyed by a directly
status of verbs and adverbs, in this connection. Compare ‘to begin referring expression. If we think of propositions as “structured entities
writing’, ‘to commence writing’, and ‘to do what the teacher commanded looking something like the sentences which express them,” as Kaplan
at time t’ (where the command was, “Begin writing”). Evidently, the invites us to do, we can think of directly referring terms as terms whose
necessity of ‘One is about to begin writing if and only if one is about to contribution to a proposition lacks the structure that characterizes the
commence writing’ is not enjoyed by ‘One is about to begin writing if contribution of definite descriptions. In the case of a definite description,
and only if one is about to do what the teacher commanded at time t’. “the constituent of the proposition will be some sort of complex,
Arguably, the reason for the modal differences has to do with the rigidity constructed from various attributes by logical composition. But in the case
or non-rigidity, in some appropriately extended sense, of the contained of a singular term which is directly referential, the constituent of the
verbs. Something similar applies to adverbs. Compare ‘She ran quickly’, proposition is just the object itself” (Kaplan 1989a, p. 494; see also the
‘She ran fast’, and ‘She ran in the manner signaled by her coach’ (where section relating possible worlds and structured propositions in the entry
the signal means: Run quickly!). There is room for contributions to the on structured propositions).
literature in this area of extension.
Direct reference theorists (e.g., Soames 2002, pp. 240, 243), also called
2. Relations Between Rigidity and Associated “Millians” after J. S. Mill, insist that ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ and
Theories and Phenomena ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ express the same proposition or share the same
content. At first glance, these statements appear to say different things,
Rigidity is generally discussed in the literature in connection with several but if ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ contribute no descriptive information
theories about reference that were introduced or reintroduced or discussed (like is a morning star or is an evening star) to the proposition expressed
feverishly about the time Kripke called attention to rigid designation. The by either sentence, but only the referent, which is the same for each term,
relationship between rigidity and these other theories, which is often then the sentences have to say the same thing despite first appearances.
blurred in the literature, can be brought into focus in a way that is fairly
uncontroversial, in many instances. It is generally acknowledged that rigidity cannot be identified with direct
reference. That is because some expressions designate rigidly by means
2.1 Direct Reference of describing the designatum: e.g., ‘The successor of 2’, which rigidly
designates 3. Kripke calls designators like ‘The successor of 2’ rigid de
About the time Kripke named rigidity, Kaplan named the theory of facto, rather than rigid de jure: the description happens to be satisfied by
“direct reference” (in “Demonstratives,” eventually published as 1989a: the same object in every possible world and never anything else. Compare

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 Rigid Designators Joseph LaPorte

the intuitively distinct case of de jure rigidity in a name, like ‘George W. be rigid de jure without directly referring to its designatum. Suppose that
Bush’. Here the intent is to refer to this person in all possible worlds, ‘Petrarch’ is, contrary to direct reference theorists, a disguised description,
whatever descriptions may designate him. shorthand for ‘The famous humanist most closely associated, in α, with
the Italian Renaissance’, where ‘α’ is a name for the actual world. This is
Even though there are rigid designators that are not directly referential, it one simple, though perhaps not highly plausible, account available to
is plausible to suppose that all directly referential expressions are rigid opponents of the theory of direct reference: it will do for illustration of
designators (as Kaplan suggests: 1989b, p. 571). Rigid directly referential this point. [2] If this descriptive account is correct, then ‘Petrarch’ is rigid:
expressions would evidently be rigid de jure. According to some in any other possible world w, ‘Petrarch’ designates the entity that, in α
philosophers (Salmon 1981, p. 33 note 35), it would be metaphysically (not w), is the famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian
possible to coin non-rigid directly referential expressions, by devising Renaissance. That person is Petrarch. ‘Petrarch’ refers to the same
some means of assuring that they change their designatum from world to individual in all possible worlds and never to any other individual, so it is
world; even this claim may be controversial (cf. Soames 2002, pp. 264–5; rigid. Plausibly, in this circumstance ‘Petrarch’ is also rigid de jure and
King 2001, p. 311), modest as it is, as a claim about possible languages not de facto: after all, it is by stipulation or design that the term refers, in
rather than English, French, etc. all possible worlds, to the same item. This term is assigned the task of
picking out in any world the item that meets certain world-indexed
Let me take stock briefly. Not all rigid expressions are directly referential;
descriptive requirements (for discussion of world-indexed properties, see
there are descriptions that are rigid de facto. But it is plausible that all
Plantinga 1974, pp. 62–5). The designatum must first be picked out in α
directly referential expressions, assuming there are any, are rigid and rigid
by whether it meets the descriptive requirements (with or without the
de jure. There remain the questions of whether all terms that are rigid de
indexing) there in α: but the purpose of the indexing is to keep the term
jure would have to be, and whether they are, directly referential.
referring, with respect to other worlds, to that same item picked out
The theory of direct reference for names is so intimately associated with originally in α by virtue of meeting the right requirements there.
the theory that names are rigid de jure that some philosophers have
If the above considerations are sound, then there could be rigid de jure
supposed that names cannot be rigid in this way, because names are not
terms that fail to be directly referential. Whether there in fact are any
directly referential (see Fitch's 2004 discussion, p. 54). But there are
rigid de jure terms in natural language that fail to be directly referential
reasons for supposing that an expression could be rigid de jure without
depends on whether the theory of direct reference is correct or not. Direct
being directly referential (as some direct reference theorists agree: e.g.,
reference theorists hold that widely recognized examples of terms that are
Kaplan 1989b, p. 577 note 25; cf. Salmon 2003, p. 486–7; see also
rigid de jure, like ordinary proper names (‘George W. Bush’, ‘Petrarch’,
Stanley's 1997a discussion: 570–1). If expressions could be rigid de jure
‘Italy’), are directly referential, and many seem to think that all terms that
without being directly referential, then even if names are not directly
are rigid de jure are directly referential. “Descriptivists,” who oppose
referential, they might be rigid de jure.
direct reference, hold that ordinary proper names and the like are not
Here are some considerations in favor of saying that an expression could directly referential: they may hold that no terms are directly referential,

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 Rigid Designators Joseph LaPorte

doubting the coherence of direct reference. Depending on which camp is description, which is used to “fix the reference” (Kripke 1980, pp. 54–6,
right, names and other rigid de jure terms may or may not be directly 135), and not as a synonym: the term is to apply to the designatum even
referential. with respect worlds in which it does not satisfy the description. In all of
these examples, whether the relevant term designates in a given instance
So, while opponents of the theory of direct reference are free to deny that depends on the properties of the object used to ground reference in the
names are rigid or rigid de jure (as, e.g., Rosenberg does: 1994), it is baptismal ceremony. The relevant properties may not be known to the
hardly clear that this is a general requirement for accounts opposed to term's coiner.
direct reference. Many opponents of the theory of direct reference
maintain that names are rigid or rigid de jure (Plantinga 1985, pp. 82–7; Some philosophers seem to think that rigid terms are just those coined in
Sidelle 1992; 1995; Justice 2003). Kripke remains uncommitted one way accordance with a baptism like the above.[3] But causal grounding is not
or the other about the theory of direct reference (1979; 1980, pp. 20–21), closely tied to rigidity. Since many philosophers deny that rigidity applies
but of course he is the first to come to mind among those committed to to designators for kinds (see §4.2), designators for other entities serve
the position that proper names are rigid de jure (1980, p. 21, n. 21). better to illustrate. First, designators that are rigid can fail to be causally
grounded. ‘The successor of 2’, which is rigid de facto, may be a case in
2.2 Causal Grounding point. ‘3’ might be an example of a rigid de jure term that is not causally
grounded. And there can evidently be terms for concrete objects that are
Another theory of reference that was named about the time ‘rigid
rigid but not causally grounded. You coin ‘Joy’ in the following way:
designator’ was coined, and that is widely associated with rigid
“‘Joy’ is to be used for the most joy-filled individual.” Here you use the
designation, is the causal theory of reference. All that is relevant here is
description to fix the reference, not as a synonym: whatever individual is
one method of term dubbing associated with that theory. According to a
most filled with joy is the designatum, even when we are discussing
typical causal theorist, many terms are coined in a “baptismal ceremony,”
worlds in which that same individual is glum. Reference is not secured by
during which the dubber points at an object in her perceptual field (hence,
way of causal grounding; you never point to anything in a baptismal
the object's causal role), and establishes reference by appeal to this object.
ceremony.[4] Yet the designator is rigid.
The baptismal object might become the referent, if the term's coiner says
something to this effect: “Term t is to be used for that object.” The So designators that are rigid might fail to be causally grounded.
baptismal object might also be a sample of a substance that becomes the Designators that are causally grounded might also fail to be rigid. You
referent, if the term's coiner says something to this effect: “Term t is to be find an old painting. After engaging in some convoluted discussion about
used for the substance instantiated by that object.” Or the object might legal ownership, you decide to clarify your terms: “Let the expression
have some other connection to the referent, as might happen if the term's ‘Originalowner’ designate, for any possible world w, the original owner in
coiner says something to this effect: “Term t is to be used for the w of that painting” (you point at the painting). You have causally
ceremonial function of that ancient artifact,” or “Term t is to be used for grounded ‘Originalowner’ by means of a baptismal ceremony; but the
the leader of that wolf pack.” Most of these examples involve a definite referent varies from world to world, depending on who first owned the

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painting. The term is not rigid. fails to mean the same as ‘the famous humanist most closely associated
with the Italian Renaissance’. The other reading is the relevant one.
2.3 Descriptivism According to that reading, the name takes wide scope, and the truth
conditions are the same as those for a sentence like, ‘For some x, x is the
I have suggested that names might be disguised descriptions that are
famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian Renaissance and
world-indexed. Of course, they might not be disguised descriptions that
it might have been the case that: x has never been famous’, which is true.
are world-indexed, too (a popular objection is discussed below in §2.3.2;
for more objections, see Soames 2002, pp. 39ff.); but the point here is Kripke (1980 pp. 11–15) points out that there are problems with this
that so far as the thesis that names are rigid designators is concerned, the attempt to accommodate rigidity. Some sentences have no modal
matter could go either way. In sections (2.3.1) and (2.3.2), I discuss operators. When we evaluate these sentences with respect to other worlds,
strategies for maintaining descriptivism according to which a name like we do not seem to admit that the designatum changes, as it would if
‘Petrarch’ has the same content as a traditional, non-world-indexed names were non-rigid descriptions taking the proper scope in modal
description like ‘The famous humanist most closely associated with the contexts. Thus, we can describe a possible world in which Petrarch dies as
Italian Renaissance’. an infant. With respect to such a world, would ‘Petrarch is never famous’
be true? It seems so. But on the proposal in question, the sentence would
2.3.1 Names as Wide-Scope Descriptions say the same as ‘The famous humanist most closely associated with the
Italian Renaissance is never famous’, which is false with respect to any
One proposal to defend traditional, non-world-indexed descriptivism has
world. Also, it seems that we can make names appear inside the scope of
taken the label “widescopism.” According to this proposal, the rigidity of
a modal operator: “It might have been the case that: Petrarch never
names is or may be treated as a matter of scope. ‘Petrarch’, on this view,
became famous.” This would apparently be impossible to do on the view
may be a disguised ordinary description meaning the same as ‘The
in question, but we seem to be able to do it. On the basis of such
famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian Renaissance’. It
considerations, Kripke rejects this proposal for accommodating rigidity
is natural to think that ‘Petrarch’ cannot have this semantic content, since
within descriptivism.
‘Petrarch might not have been famous’ seems unambiguously true, but
‘The famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian Kripke's arguments seem to have persuaded most of his audience, and his
Renaissance might not have been famous’ has a false reading. It can have principal target, Michael Dummett, has responded by making some
the same truth conditions as a scoped sentence something like, ‘It might modifications (1981, pp. xvii-xix). But the issue is not dead; more
have been the case that: for some x, x is the famous humanist most closely sophisticated versions of this basic Dummettian position continue to be
associated with the Italian Renaissance and x has never been famous’, defended by able philosophers (see, e.g., Sosa 2001; Hunter 2005; cf.
which is false. But according to the proposal in question, the false reading Caplan 2005; Everett 2005).
for ‘The famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian
Renaissance might not have been famous’ does not show that ‘Petrarch’ 2.3.2 Assertoric Content and Ingredient Sense

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 Rigid Designators Joseph LaPorte

Assuming that Kripke's arguments against widescopism are successful, it Africa

might appear that any statement S containing a proper name cannot have
(2ʹ′) It will always be the case that the famous humanist now most
the same content as a statement Sʹ′ that differs from S just in the respect
closely associated with the Italian Renaissance wrote the epic
that a proper name in S is replaced by a non-rigid designator in Sʹ′.
Africa.
Following Stanley (whose precise formulations differ slightly from this
and from each other: 1997a, pp. 568–9; 1997b, p. 135), we might call this (1ʹ′) is dubiously true, at best. It might well be that Lorenzo Valla will
the Rigidity Thesis. overtake Petrarch at some future time, being a famous humanist more
closely associated with the Italian Renaissance than Petrarch. And Valla
But Dummett has still another suggestion that, if successful, would refute
did not write the epic Africa. On the other hand, (2ʹ′) is true, at least
the Rigidity Thesis (or at least one understanding of it: see note 7).
assuming, for the sake of an illustration, that (1) and (2) are true. On that
Consider the similarity between (1)–(4):
assumption, it does not matter that Valla might overtake Petrarch later:
(1) The famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian that will be too late to affect their respective status as it is now.
Renaissance wrote the epic Africa
Given that (1)–(4) make different semantic contributions to complex
(2) The famous humanist now most closely associated with the sentences in which they are embedded, must we reject the earlier
Italian Renaissance wrote the epic Africa suggestion that they share the same content? Here we might use a tip
from Dummett to resist an affirmative answer. We might acknowledge
(3) The famous humanist here most closely associated with the that (1)–(4) share the same truth conditions, which amount to at least one
Italian Renaissance wrote the epic Africa bona fide use of ‘content’. Thus, for Dummett, a speaker who could
classify sufficiently detailed possible states of affairs [5] into those that
(4) The famous humanist in α most closely associated with the render any statement like these “correct and those that render it incorrect,
Italian Renaissance wrote the epic Africa. may be said to know the assertoric content of the sentence” (1991, p. 48).
And we might also acknowledge a distinct phenomenon that is
In some intuitive sense, it might seem that these statements share the
responsible for different contributions (1)–(4) make to larger sentences in
same content. Thus, for example, what one believes when one assents to
which they are embedded: Dummett calls this distinct phenomenon a
any of (2)–(4) might seem to be what one believes when one assents to
sentence's “ingredient sense.” “Ingredient sense is what semantic theories
(1). Even so, (1)–(4) contribute different semantic values to complex
are concerned to explain” (p. 48).
sentences in which they are embedded. What one believes when assenting
to (1ʹ′) is not what one believes in assenting, say, to (2ʹ′): Armed with the distinction between assertoric content and ingredient
sense, we might reject the Rigidity Thesis. We might maintain that (1)–
(1ʹ′) It will always be the case that the famous humanist most
(4) have the same assertoric content and hence that they say the same
closely associated with the Italian Renaissance wrote the epic
thing: anyone who asserts one of these (or believes it, rejects it, and so

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on), also asserts the others. Where they differ is in ingredient sense. same assertoric content even though they differ in ingredient sense starts
from general considerations about what kind of animal “content” is. For
There are a number of lines of thinking that converge on the conclusion Stanley, the content of a statement is closely tied to what it is used to
that (1)–(4) share the same assertoric content even though they differ in communicate in normal contexts, where “normal” has to do with the
ingredient sense. I have already suggested that some might find it natural competence of speakers, their intentions to use words as others do, and so
to take (1)–(4) as expressing the same “semantic content” in some on (1997b, 136; 2002). In such contexts, he says, (1)–(4) are used to
meaningful sense (perhaps the only meaningful sense: see note 7): if so, communicate the same thing. So they have the same content, the same
Dummett's distinction indicates how one might coherently maintain that meaning. Meaning, which facilitates communication in the right contexts,
position. Such a position might be especially natural in view of is constituted by presuppositions on the part of speakers. In contexts of
“descriptive names,” like Evans’ famous ‘Julius’, which is a rigid modal evaluation, two sentences asserting the same thing can diverge in
designator for whoever invented the zipper (Evans 1979). It might seem their contribution to larger sentences or diverge in truth value with respect
natural to say that ‘Julius is an inventor’ has the same content as to counterfactual worlds under consideration because “meaning-
‘Whoever invented the zipper is an inventor’, even though the former is constituting presuppositions are irrelevant for modal evaluation. It is the
contingent and the latter necessary. purpose of modal evaluation to suspend presuppositions,” on this way of
thinking about content (Stanley 2002, p. 338; see also 1997b, p. 155).
There are other related considerations in favor of saying that (1)–(4) share
the same assertoric content even though they differ in ingredient sense: If the distinction between assertoric and ingredient sense is tenable, and if
here I merely sketch a couple of considerations from Stanley, who (1)–(4) share the same assertoric content even though they differ in
develops Dummett's suggestion in admirable detail in a series of ingredient sense, so that the Rigidity Thesis is false, then this opens the
interesting papers (1997a, 1997b, 2002). First, one might maintain that door to holding that proper names share the same content as ordinary,
what one asserts, when one asserts (1), is simply true or false, and not non-indexed descriptions after all, even though names are rigid and
true now but false later, true here but false in some other community ordinary, non-indexed descriptions are not rigid. In that case, something
where Valla is more highly esteemed than Petrarch, true in α but false in along the lines of the venerable descriptivism associated with Frege and
other possible worlds. Yet what (1) contributes to the likes of (2)–(4) is Russell (see the subsection on description theories in the entry on
not simply true or false: it is rather something like a function from times, reference and the section on descriptive theories of proper names in the
places, or worlds, respectively, to truth values. That function generates a entry on descriptions), which Kripke is widely thought to have
different truth value depending on the argument (Stanley 1997a, p. 577; devastated, survives. One way to develop a descriptivism along these
see also King 2003 §1; for related claims, see Lewis 1998). Hence, the lines would be to say that a name like ‘Petrarch’ is something like a
line of thinking concludes, what is asserted, when one asserts (1), is disguised description that is shorthand for ‘the famous humanist most
assertoric content and not ingredient sense. closely associated in α with the Italian Renaissance’. Although this
description for which ‘Petrarch’ is shorthand is world-indexed, it shares
Another line of thinking by which one might argue that (1)–(4) share the
the descriptive content of the non-indexed ‘the famous humanist most

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closely associated with the Italian Renaissance’. On this suggestion, since line of thinking is sound, or whether any descriptivist line is sound, is less
‘Petrarch’ shares the content of the rigid description, it also shares the important here than the question of what rides on the answer for rigidity.
content of the nonrigid description.
If the Dummettian line of thinking from §2.3.2 is sound, does rigidity lose
Kripke's reservations about a position like that just described go deeper its interest? It would appear that the answer is No.[6] The fundamental
than arguments from rigidity or indeed arguments from any work for rigidity sketched already in §1.1 and discussed in greater detail
considerations pertaining to the metaphysics of modality: there are quite below in §3 seems largely independent of these issues.
distinct worries about whether speakers would have to be in possession of
the relevant descriptive information to use ‘Petrarch’, for example. Could The fundamental work in question concerns the metaphysics of modality,
not someone refer to Petrarch by ‘Petrarch’ if she supposed that Valla for the most part. But assertoric content does not have much to do with
were the famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian the metaphysics of modality, so observations about content are unlikely to
Renaissance and she associated with ‘Petrarch’ only the description ‘a undermine or to pertain to the significance of rigidity's work: “the
clergyman who criticized the Avignon papacy’? If so, a standard propositional content of a sentence in a context is not its modal content”
argument runs, the content of ‘Petrarch’ cannot be the same as that of ‘the (Stanley 2002, 338).[7]
famous humanist most closely associated with the Italian Renaissance’.
Some of the fundamental work discussed below concerns epistemology:
There may be a few descriptive names of the relevant variety in natural
e.g., the issue of whether a sentence like ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is a
language: Dummett adduces ‘St. Joachim’, which he takes to have been
posteriori as well as necessarily true. Would the above considerations
“introduced as denoting the father of the Blessed Virgin, whoever that
from the foregoing section (§2.3.2) undermine Kripke's ideas here, at
may have been” (1991, p. 48), and Kripke adduces ‘Jack the Ripper’,
least, even if the considerations do not undermine Kripke's ideas about
introduced for the murderer of so and so (1980, 79–80). But it is unlikely
modality? That seems unlikely. On the contrary, the claim that names,
that there are many such descriptive proper names in natural language.
though rigid, share the semantic content of descriptions seems likely to
Still, it may be that more sophisticated descriptivisms appealing to more
vindicate Kripke's claims about the epistemic status of statements like the
sophisticated descriptions could overcome worries like these further, non-
above, if anything. That is because one could say that ‘Hesperus’ and
metaphysical worries about typical names (see, e.g., Nelson 2002).
‘Phosphorus’ differ in assertoric content (in an extended sense, applied to
designators rather than statements) but they do not differ in ingredient
2.3.3 Descriptivism, Anti-Descriptivism, and the Importance of Rigidity
sense or modal content. Because they do not differ in ingredient sense or
None of the above considerations (from §2.3.2) in favor of the modal content, being rigid designators for the same thing, ‘Hesperus =
fruitfulness of distinguishing assertoric content and ingredient sense is Phosphorus’ is necessarily true. Because they do differ in assertoric
beyond controversy. One might resist (for a clear and interesting content, ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is a posteriori; ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’,
discussion that is critical, see Everett 2005, pp. 125–38; see also Shieh by contrast, is a priori since both occurrences of ‘Hesperus’ have one and
2001, pp. 379–80). But the question of whether the foregoing descriptivist the same assertoric content. So descriptivism of this sophisticated sort

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suggests one means to retain Kripke's epistemic claims. Anti- statement whose necessity and aposteriority cannot be explained in terms
descriptivism in the form of direct reference, by contrast, is incompatible of the nondescriptive nature of the designators flanking the ‘=’ sign.
with at least one interpretation of the claim that ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’
is “a posteriori” (but only one interpretation: see below §3.1), because on Suppose we limit our consideration to names. By ignoring non-names, we
the theory of direct reference, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ just share the can ignore descriptive designators that are rigid, provided that names are
same content, end of story: so ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ shares the same nondescriptive, directly referring designators: suppose again that they are.
content as ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’, which is a priori just in virtue of Suppose, further, that rigidity follows from anti-descriptivism. Even
content (again, on one interpretation of the claim that the statement is “a granted these assumptions, it might be wise to distinguish sharply the
priori”). significance of rigidity from that of the theory of direct reference. That is
because rigidity's importance does not hang on the outcome of
Rigidity's work is compatible with descriptivism. Although some controversies surrounding the theory of direct reference. For contexts in
philosophers seem to have the impression that the important work that which the theory of direct reference is taken for granted, rigidity and its
rigidity performs is to refute descriptivism, this seems to be a mistake. A consequences at least for names might be helpfully explained in terms of
related impression is that the important work that Kripke performs is to how they follow from direct reference: direct reference can take center
refute descriptivism: the rigidity of terms and more just falls out of anti- stage. But contexts abound in which the theory of direct reference cannot
descriptivism, so anti-descriptivism is what really matters at bottom (see be taken for granted, since it is a controversial theory (as proponents
below, §4.2). But there are strong reasons to resist this assessment of concede: Salmon 2003, p. 475; Soames 2005, p. 3). In such contexts, it is
rigidity's importance or lack thereof, too. unhelpful or misleading to explain rigidity's significance, which obtains
regardless of the fate of direct reference, in terms of direct reference.
First, it can be replied that even if names are non-descriptive, directly Along the same lines, there are contexts in which direct reference is called
referring terms, it does not follow that they are rigid: a directly referential into question; it should not be thought that rigidity is thereby called into
designator can be nonrigid, at least in principle (see §2.1). If this thought question. The fate of rigidity's significance is distinct from the fate of
is right, then the work that rigidity performs for names does not follow direct reference's significance.[8]
from anti-descriptivism. More is required.
Finally, even if direct reference is to be taken for granted and rigidity for
Further, even if rigidity does follow from anti-descriptivism, anti- names does follow from direct reference, one might not draw the
descriptivism does not follow from rigidity: so rigidity's work is not conclusion that rigidity loses interest. Here is an analogy. Few would say
limited to that of direct reference. We have seen that descriptive that if the theory of special relativity, with all of its claims about the
designators may be rigid: e.g., world-indexed designators. But rigidity relativity of space and time, follows from the theory of general relativity,
performs much of the same work on these as on arguably nondescriptive then special relativity loses interest because in that case, general relativity
expressions like names. For example, ‘The evening star in α = the is what really matters: special relativity and much more just follow from
morning star in α’ would seem to be a necessarily true, a posteriori it. There is evidently something wrong with this attempt to devalue the

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theory of special relativity. It would be better to say that part of what is truth. Thus, rigid designation seems to play a crucial role in securing
interesting about general relativity concerns its implications for the necessity with surprising epistemological significance. Prior to discussion
relativity of space and time, as explained by the theory of special about rigid designation, the necessary a posteriori was generally thought
relativity: special relativity retains its interest as part of a larger, more to be an empty category. Rigid designation, along with other referential
fundamental theory. In the same way, rigidity might be said to lose no mechanisms discussed in connection with it, like reference fixing and
interest even if it is explained by something more fundamental. causal grounding, has changed all that. Thus, Putnam observes that
rigidity has “startling consequences for the theory of necessary truth”
It might be tempting, then, to think that if descriptivism survives, then (1975, p. 232).
rigidity is useless because its work, which is to refute descriptivism, is left
unperformed. It might also be tempting to think that if descriptivism is Since Kant there has been a big split between philosophers who
defeated but by considerations that are more fundamental than rigidity and thought that all necessary truths were analytic and philosophers
that give rise to rigidity, then rigidity is superfluous because its work is who thought that some necessary truths were synthetic a priori.
performed but by other phenomena. The foregoing paragraphs offer But none of these philosophers thought that a (metaphysically)
reasons for thinking that these tempting lines of thought are erroneous. If necessary truth could fail to be a priori (Putnam 1975, p. 233).
these reasons are sound, then unless there are other, quite unheralded ties
between rigidity and descriptivism or its opposition, rigidity's interest There is no question that a major reason for excitement about rigidity is
would seem to be largely independent of the fate of these rival theories that it underwrites the necessary a posteriori (Schwartz 2002, pp. 270ff.).
about semantic content. However, in light of the theory of direct reference, this apparent coup
may have been overstated or misunderstood. As I have observed (§2.1),
3. Philosophical Work for Rigidity. direct reference theorists insist that ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ and
‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ express the same proposition or share the same
As I have indicated, rigidity does interesting epistemological and content even though these statements have the appearance of saying
metaphysical work. In sections (3.1)–(3.5) below, I discuss various areas different things. For direct reference theorists, to say that Hesperus =
of work. Phosphorus is to say no more and no less than to say that Hesperus =
Hesperus. Since it is a priori that Hesperus = Hesperus, it is a priori that
3.1 The Necessary A Posteriori Hesperus = Phosphorus. For this reason, the claim that rigidity presents
propositions that are necessarily true and a posteriori might be disputed
Basic epistemological and metaphysical work performed by rigidity is
(Soames 2002, pp. 240, 243; Salmon 1986, 133–42; Fitch 1976; for
indicated in §1.1. Because of the rigid designation of the names it
further discussion, see Fitch 2004, pp. 110–13; Hughes 2004, pp. 84–
contains, ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true. Since empirical
108).[9]
work on the part of astronomers was required to determine that the
statement is true, we seem to have an illustration of necessary, a posteriori So it is controversial, though common, to say that rigidity assures that the

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proposition Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true and a posteriori.

According to Kripke, a proper understanding of rigidity also reveals that
On the other hand, it may be less problematic or less controversial to say
some contingent statements are a priori. Kripke considers the standard
that rigidity assures that the sentence or statement (interpreted sentence)
meter stick, which has been used to define the length of one meter.
‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true even though we can find this
Someone decreed that the expression ‘one meter’ is to be used for the unit
out only a posteriori (Fitch 2004, pp. 110–13; LaPorte forthcoming;
of length of that stick, perhaps at a certain time in the stick's existence.
Hughes 2004, pp. 106–7; cf. Kripke 1980, pp. 20–1). If it is tenable to say
The stick, S, might not have been the length that it was at the time ‘one
that rigidity assures that some sentences or statements like this are
meter’ was coined: had it been heated or cooled it might have been longer
necessarily true though a posteriori, further questions immediately impose
or shorter. As things are, it was not heated or cooled. So the sentence
themselves. Here is a salient question: Does the aposteriority that
‘One meter = the length of S (at time t0)’ is true in the actual world but it
characterizes the necessarily true statements retain its epistemological
is false in some possible worlds: it is contingently true. Yet S has been
significance and surprise, given that it is associated with statements rather
used to define ‘one meter’, in the sense that it fixes the reference (see
than propositions? The question carries some importance in view of the
§2.2), so the definers of ‘one meter’ know a priori the truth of the
popularity of Millianism, but it has not been discussed much in the
sentence ‘The length one meter is instantiated by S (at time t0)’. The
literature, despite all of the debate about the correctness of Millianism.
reason that the sentence is contingently true is that ‘one meter’ is a rigid
Here is one challenge to the proposal that the relevant statements are designator for the length one meter. ‘The length of S (at time t0)’ is, on
necessarily true and a posteriori in any interesting respect. The proposal the other hand, a non-rigid designator for one meter; in this world it
apparently amounts to this: the sentence ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is designates one meter but in other worlds, those in which S is heated or
necessarily true as it is used by English speakers and it is an a posteriori cooled, ‘the length of S (at time t0)’ designates other lengths.
matter to determine that it is. But if this is all that the a posteriori
The contingent a priori has not been as widely discussed as the necessary
necessity of ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ amounts to, then all necessary
a posteriori. The introduction of the contingent a priori is perhaps less
statements are a posteriori in the relevant way. So, the necessary a
surprising than the introduction of the necessary a posteriori, in view of
posteriori loses its interest. To find out how English speakers use any
the plausible contingency of a priori statements that philosophers all along
sentence at all, one needs an empirical look at the world. Even ‘The circle
recognized, like the plausible contingency of the statement, as uttered in a
cannot be squared’, which is generally regarded as a priori, seems to come
context, ‘I exist’. Further, Kripke's examples of the contingent a priori are
out a posteriori on the account. It is an a posteriori matter to determine
perhaps more controversial than his examples of the necessary a
that ‘The circle cannot be squared’ is necessarily true as used by English
posteriori. Many dispute that the examples really are examples of the
speakers. The reader might determine whether the intended position lacks
contingent a priori (Plantinga 1974, pp. 8–9n.; Donnellan 1977; Hughes
interest in this or other ways. There are niches to be filled hereabout in
2004, pp. 84–107). And if even if they are contingent and a priori, many
the literature.
feel they lack much significance. They are not “scary,” as Donnellan puts
it (also Fitch 2004, p. 121). On the other hand, confusions are like loose
3.2 The Contingent A Priori

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threads: they sometimes work their way to apparently remote material. organism descended from sperm s and egg e’ indeed expresses an essence
Confusion about the contingent a priori can and arguably does lead to of Cicero, it must designate just Cicero in all possible worlds, and hence
confusion and apparent paradox in unsuspected areas of philosophy (an rigidly: so, given that the statement at issue is necessarily true, ‘Cicero’
alleged example is discussed in LaPorte 2003). Kripke (1980, pp. 14–15) must be rigid, too. Alternatively, if ‘Cicero’ is rigid, as is widely
recalls that considerations about the contingent a priori led in his mind to acknowledged, then in order for the statement at issue to be necessarily
a number of clarifications concerning designation, which again is hardly true, ‘the organism descended from sperm s and egg e’ must be rigid and
surprising given the interconnectedness of different issues in a fabric. so express an essence of Cicero.

3.3 Essentialism I have discussed a line of reasoning according to which rigid designation
is needed for certain statements to come out necessarily true. Usually,
The statements of necessity associated with rigid designation are rigidity is discussed with a view not to its being necessary for the
interesting from an epistemological standpoint, as I have stressed. Of completion of a job but rather with a view to its being sufficient for the
course, they are also interesting from a metaphysical standpoint. completion of a job. The rigid designation of both designators flanking an
identity sign in a true theoretical identity statement is sufficient to
What first comes to mind in connection with rigid designation is
establish the necessity of the statement. If we acknowledge that ‘the
traditional essences. Intuitively, rigid designation is needed on the part of
organism descended from sperm s and egg e’ is rigid, and we
both designators if there are to be true “theoretical identity statements”:
acknowledge that ‘Cicero’ is rigid, then we are committed to the
statements in which a designator designates by way of expressing
necessity, in case of truth, of ‘Cicero = the organism descended from
explicitly in some manner one of the designatum's theoretically interesting
sperm s and egg e’. The reasoning is parallel to that given for the case of
essences. The argument is not often put explicitly. I outline explicitly the
‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ above.
line of reasoning in order to bring out more clearly what stands or falls
with rigidity. ‘Cicero = the organism descended from sperm s and egg e’ shows that
statements about individuals can, in effect, be theoretical identity
Not all identity statements widely accepted as necessary specify a
statements. The most commonly discussed theoretical identity statements
theoretically interesting essence in the relevant respect. ‘Hesperus =
concern kinds. They include ‘Gold = the element with atomic number 79’
Phosphorus’ or ‘Cicero = Tully’ do not; each sentence contains only
and ‘Water = H2O’ (Kripke 1980, pp. 138–40, 148). Similar reasoning
names for an object. But take, on the other hand, ‘Cicero = the organism
might apply. Here the reasoning is again nearly always left implicit; I am
descended from sperm s and egg e’, where ‘s’ and ‘e’ are names for the
filling in gaps to present a general line of thought that seems to accord
right sperm and egg. Many regard this sentence as necessarily true and
with a widely held, if not widely articulated, tradition. For that tradition,
revealing of a theoretical essence of Cicero: roughly, a theoretically
in order for it to be the case that ‘Water = H2O’ is necessarily true, both
interesting property possessed by Cicero in all possible worlds and never
designators must be rigid if either is. So if the statement is necessarily
possessed by anyone else. [10] In order for any identity statement to be
true and either ‘water’ is rigid by virtue of being a name for a substance
true of necessity, both designators must be rigid if either is. And if ‘the

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or else ‘H 2O’ is rigid by virtue of expressing an essence, both designators stubbing my toe, that pain you feel now in your forehead), is identical to a
need to be rigid. And again, the rigidity of designators in a true theoretical particular brain event, which might be this firing of c-fibers in my head,
identity statement is sufficient for the statement's necessity. If ‘H 2O’ is a that firing of c-fibers in yours.
rigid designator of a substance, and ‘water’ is a rigid designator of a
substance, and ‘Water = H2O’ is true, then that statement is necessarily Here I offer a standard Kripkean argument against token identity theories,
true. which are often thought to be more compelling than type identity
theories. Kripke is typically understood to put forward something like this
Theoretical identity statements are of interest across the gamut of argument.
philosophy. Various writers appeal to rigid designation to support views
about the essences not only of kinds from chemistry or biology but also The Argument Against Token Identity: Suppose that every
kinds from philosophical subdisciplines apparently far removed from particular mental event is identical to some particular brain event.
empirical science: ethics and aesthetics, for example (see, e.g., Carney Then we can take some pain and name it ‘P’, and we can do the
1982; Gampel 1997; Leddy 1987). The reader interested in pursuing any same for the corresponding brain event, calling it ‘C’ (for “c-fiber
of these traditions should beware that applied philosophers who make use firing,” assuming for the sake of argument that that is the
of rigidity in the various subdisciplines frequently confuse rigidity with corresponding brain event). According to the identity theory, P =
other phenomena recognized by popular theories of reference: see C. But in reality, P ≠ C. C could have existed without P: that very
clarifications above in §2. c-fiber firing could have obtained even while there was no
corresponding P. Your c-fibers could have been blasting away
By far, the most attention concerning theoretical identity statements has even as you felt nothing at all. In the same way, P could have
focused on the area of philosophy of mind. That is next on the agenda. existed without C. You could have felt that same dull, throbbing
sensation in your forehead without the corresponding c-fibers
3.4 Mind having ever acted up. Now, merely showing that C could have
existed without P and that P could have existed without C does
Kripke appeals to rigid designation in arguing against the identity theory
not yet belie ‘P = C’. For this statement might be true necessarily
of mind, which is really a constellation of theories. A broad division
or contingently. Since P and C could each exist without the other,
between identity theories can be drawn between type identity theories and
the statement cannot be necessarily true. But there is still the
token identity theories. Type identity would obtain if and only if every
possibility that the statement is contingently true. There are
mental event type were identical to some physical event type or other.
contingently true statements, as we have seen: e.g., ‘Hesperus =
According to some accounts, the type pain, which can be exemplified in
the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’. However, it
different bodies (I stub my toe, you feel a mild headache from stress), is
cannot be that ‘P = C’ is contingently true, as ‘Hesperus = the
identical to the type c-fiber firing, which is a type of brain event that can
brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’ is. ‘Hesperus = the
again be exemplified in different bodies. Token identity would obtain if
brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’ is contingently true
and only if every particular mental event (this pain I feel now after

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because ‘Hesperus’ is a rigid designator and ‘the brightest non- 3.5 Rigidity at Work in Arguments from Two-Dimensionalism
lunar object in the evening sky’ is non-rigid. Because ‘Hesperus’
and ‘the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’ designate High-profile two-dimensionalists often embrace the broad conclusions
the same object at the actual world, ‘Hesperus = the brightest non- associated with rigidity, so that those conclusions are now often discussed
lunar object in the evening sky’ is true; because ‘Hesperus’ and in connection with two-dimensionalism. The relevant arguments from
‘the brightest non-lunar object in the evening sky’ designate two-dimensionalists may concern the same identity statements as those at
different objects at some other worlds, ‘Hesperus = the brightest issue in simpler, familiar arguments from rigidity: when that is the case,
non-lunar object in the evening sky’ is false at those other worlds. rigidity can typically be seen to play a salient role similar to the one that it
That is why ‘Hesperus = the brightest non-lunar object in the plays in the simpler, familiar arguments. [11] I illustrate below, by appeal
evening sky’ is true but contingently so. ‘P = C’, on the other to garden-variety two-dimensionalist arguments for the necessary a
hand, contains two rigid designators. ‘P’ is a name for that very posteriori and the contingent a priori.
pain, and so rigidly designates it. ‘C’ is a name for that very brain
I discuss the contingent a priori first. According to the Kripkean argument
event, and so rigidly designates it. Because ‘P’ and ‘C’ are both
from section (3.2), ‘One meter = the length of S (at time t0)’ is contingent
rigid designators, ‘P = C’ has to be true of necessity if it is true at
but a priori. Recall that the length of S (at time t0) is determined by
all. Since it is not true of necessity, it is not true at all.
temperature, in part, and that in a hotter or colder world it would have
Some premises in this bare-bones argument are in obvious need of differed. ‘One meter = the length of S (at time t0)’ is true at our temperate
support, like the modal intuition that P and C could have existed each in world, but false in counterfactual worlds that are hotter and colder, since
the absence of the other. Support has been provided and rejected by ‘the length of S (at time t0)’ has a different value at those worlds but ‘one
different writers. Many philosophers who reject anti-materialist meter’ has the same value, being rigid for the length that, as it happens,
arguments along these lines nevertheless make use of rigid designation as the stick instantiates at time t0. The contingency of the statement can be
a resource in order to frame materialist views that recognize a parallel represented in a one-dimensional diagram like that below: three worlds
between ‘P = C’ and ‘Water = H2O’. differing in truth value are represented horizontally and below them are
the respective truth values (ignore the bottom two rows and the
Kripke's views concerning the philosophy of mind could hardly be called information at the far left).
popular. But, as the introduction to an edited volume covering the topic
says, “Even authors who disagree with Kripke's fundamental picture tend Table 1
to present their arguments against an implicitly or explicitly Kripkean
backdrop—including most of the authors in this volume” (Gendler and Considered as counterfactual → w1 w2 w3
Hawthorne 2002, p. 26), the contributions to which provide a good start Considered as actual ↓ (temperate) (hot) (cold)
on the literature. w1
T F F
(temperate)

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w2 time t0)’ is true at that world. Here I assume that the ceremony is still
T performed on the stick in similar fashion: suppose that dubbers would not
(hot)
have chosen another stick to serve as a standard because the difference of
w3 length is so subtle that it could be detected only with technology that
T
(cold) became available after the baptism. The final row indicates that should
the cold world turn out to be actual, the sentence ‘One meter = the length
But even if one is convinced by Kripke that the content of the sentence
of S (at time t0)’ is true at that world.
that Kripke discusses is contingent and a priori, one might have the sense
that something is necessary, too. This suggests that there might be more A little reflection indicates that the missing truth-value indicators in the
than one semantic value for ‘one meter’ and the above sentence diagram are all ‘F’s. For example, if the cold world turns out to be actual,
containing it. If there is more than one semantic value, then the diagram then the sentence ‘One meter = the length of S (at time t0)’ is true at that
could be filled out to capture another value (or, potentially, more). One world, as the diagram indicates. From the perspective of the cold world,
line of thinking according to which there are two values for an expression or on the assumption that that world is actual, the expression ‘one meter’
is the Dummettian line of reasoning from section (2.3.2). An enriched, rigidly designates some length l, which is the length of S at that world, but
two-dimensional diagram might capture this as well as any number of which is a little shorter than the length of S at the warmer worlds. Since at
other suggestions for differentiating apparently distinct semantic values. the warmer worlds, the length of S is longer than l, even though ‘one
meter’ is rigid for l, again from the perspective of the cold world, the
Here is a garden-variety way of developing the suggestion that the
sentence is false at the warmer worlds, considered from the perspective of
relevant sentence has more than one kind of semantic value. Take the
the cold world. So there should be a couple of ‘F’s to the left of the ‘T’
horizontal row at the top of the diagram to represent worlds as we
in the last row. Something similar can be said for the middle row.
consider them counterfactually (or, in the case of the actual world,
factually) from the actual world. Take the column on the far left to The sentence has more than one intension, or function from worlds to
represent worlds that could, in some sense, “turn out” to be actual: when truth values, given the two dimensions. There is not only the one-
we consider any of these worlds w, we consider the value of the sentence dimensional intension that Kripke recognizes (which corresponds to
at various counterfactual or factual worlds represented horizontally, given Chalmers’ secondary intension: 1996, p. 57; Jackson's C-intension: 1998,
that our world turns out to be w. Thus, should the temperate world turn pp. 48-52; and otherwise-labeled intensions for others, e.g., Davies and
out to be actual, as it has, then the sentence ‘One meter = the length of S Humberstone: 1980; see also Davies 2004, p. 87; Stalnaker 1978); there
(at time t0)’ would be true in the temperate world, but false at the are other intensions, including that depicted in the diagonal string of ‘T’s
counterfactual hot world and cold world, where the temperature alters the (Chalmers’ primary intension; Jackson's A-intension, and again
length of the stick: the top row of ‘T’s and ‘F’s indicates this. The next otherwise-labeled intensions for others). The diagonal string of ‘T’s
row, which is not completely filled out, indicates that should the hot indicates that something about the content of the relevant sentence is
world turn out to be actual, the sentence ‘One meter = the length of S (at necessarily true. We might say that the sentence is “deeply necessary,”

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to H2O.
adapting similar use by Evans (1979), as Evans is famously interpreted by applies to XYZ.
Davies and Humberstone (1980; for a more extended discussion that is
clear, see Soames 2005, chap. 6). Correspondingly, we might say that the
sentence is only “superficially contingent.” What is necessarily true might 1. ‘Water = H2O’
be the epistemic content, the thought, the “meaning” in some intuitive (F)
sense that differs from the semantic value captured by the horizontal 2. ‘Watery stuff =
dimension, or something else. wet, drinkable
w2
… stuff’ (T)
(the watery stuff
A similar diagram might make perspicuous the aposteriority of ‘Water = 3. ‘Water’ and
is XYZ)
H2O’. We may compare that sentence with ‘Watery stuff = wet, drinkable ‘watery stuff’
… stuff’, where ‘watery stuff’ just means stuff that is wet, drinkable …. apply to XYZ.
The relevant statements are assigned a truth value, which might be 4. ‘H 2O’ applies to
thought of as a statement's extension. The key designators are also H2O.
assigned an extension, which may be understood here as that to which
they apply, as ‘watery stuff’ applies to H2O in w 1.
The top horizontal row of ‘T’s indicates that ‘Water = H2O’ is necessary.
Table 2 The diagonal runs T–F for ‘Water = H2O’. According to a standard
version of two-dimensionalism, this indicates that the content of the
Considered as w1 w2 statement is not a priori.[12] Compare ‘Watery stuff = wet, drinkable …
counterfactual → (the watery stuff is (the watery stuff is stuff’. This is a priori, as well as necessary. ‘Watery stuff’ just is a
Considered as H2O) XYZ) designator for stuff that is wet, drinkable, and so on.
actual ↓
These two-dimensionalist arguments for the contingent a priori and the
1. ‘Water = H2O’ necessary a posteriori appear to make implicit use of rigidity. The
1. ‘Water = H2O’ horizontal intension of ‘water’, ‘one meter’, and the like plays a crucial
(T)
(T) role in the respective arguments for the status of sentences containing
2. ‘Watery stuff =
2. ‘Watery stuff = these terms as necessary a posteriori or contingent a priori. But the
wet, drinkable
w1 wet, drinkable horizontal intension plays this crucial role by way of indicating rigidity or
… stuff’ (T)
(the watery stuff … stuff’ (T) the lack thereof for the respective terms.[13] Thus, for example, every box
3. ‘Water’ and
is H2O) 3. ‘Water’, ‘watery along the relevant horizontal row in the diagram associates ‘water’ with
‘H 2O’ apply to
stuff’, and H2O, which seems (as Chalmers observes: 1996, p. 132) to be a kind or
H2O.
‘H 2O’ all apply property found at the different worlds. If, even so, ‘water’ fails to be a
4. ‘Watery stuff’
to H2O.

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rigid designator for H2O because it does not apply to matter that is H2O antimaterialist argument from section (3.4) addresses an identity
with respect to some metaphysically possible worlds that are missing statement, ‘P = C’, and accordingly uses rigidity to establish that
from the completed diagram, then the completed diagram can not be statement's falsity, the famous two-dimensionalist arguments against
trusted, in the way that it is supposed to be trusted, to indicate the materialism that have received so much attention since the publication of
metaphysical necessity of ‘Water = H2O’: so the diagram can not be Chalmers' powerful The Conscious Mind (1996) address statements
trusted, in the way that it is supposed to be trusted, to indicate that concerning supervenience or constitution, not identity. Accordingly, the
statement's status as necessary but a posteriori. work performed by rigidity is less clear. It would seem that rigidity is at
work in securing various claims about the modal status of statements
Further, two-dimensionalist arguments might make natural use of rigidity. about constitution, and not just claims about the modal status of
We might recognize a “horizontal rigidity” and a “diagonal rigidity,” statements about identity. Thus, we might argue for the necessity of the
corresponding to the relevant intensions. Thus, one might say that ‘water’ statement, ‘If David exists, then David is constituted by the clay Lumpl’
is a horizontally rigid but not a diagonally rigid designator for H2O; (see section 4.1): but if ‘David’ and ‘Lumpl’ are nonrigid shorthand for
‘H 2O’ is both a horizontally rigid and a diagonally rigid designator for descriptions like ‘the statue in the corner’ and ‘the clay that Kim bought
H2O. Kripke would say that if both designators in an identity statement last week’, then the alleged necessity cannot obtain, since ‘If the statue in
rigidly designate the same entity, then the statement is necessarily true, as the corner exists, then the statue in the corner is constituted by the clay
‘Water = H2O’ is. A two-dimensionalist naturally understands this claim that Kim bought last week’ is not true with respect to every possible
as one that concerns horizontal rigidity: for her, if both designators in an world. I leave to the reader the task of determining how much work
identity statement rigidly designate the same entity horizontally, then the rigidity plays in well-known two-dimensionalist antimaterialist arguments
statement is necessarily true, as ‘Water = H2O’ is. A two-dimensionalist concerning constitution. Two-dimensionalists frequently avoid making
adds that if both designators rigidly designate the same entity diagonally, salient appeals to rigidity (Chalmers 1996, p. 149, p. 374, note 26; cf., by
then the statement is a priori, as ‘Watery stuff = wet, drinkable … stuff’ contrast, the two-dimensionalist argument discussed by Gendler and
is, or as ‘H 2O = H2O’ is. However, if one designator in a true identity Hawthorne 2002, pp. 54–55), but of course rigidity may be doing work in
statement but not the other rigidly designates an entity like H2O the background. Because arguments in the style of Chalmers are so high
diagonally, then the statement is a posteriori, as ‘Water = H2O’ is. In this profile, I discuss their relationship to the Kripkean antimaterialist
way two-dimensionalist lines of thinking might be expressed naturally by argument from section (3.4) in the supplementary document
appeal to rigidity.[14]
Two-Dimensionalism Against Materialism.
These arguments, which address the necessary a posteriori status of
‘Water = H2O’ and the contingent a priori status of ‘One meter = the 4. Objections to Rigidity
length of S (at time t0)’, concern identity statements. Neither Kripke nor
anyone else discusses the importance of rigidity for other kinds of Various objections to the coherence or usefulness of rigidity have been
statements, which introduce complications. Although the Kripkean put forward by specialists in the philosophy of language; but criticisms

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from this subdiscipline do not seem to have done much to damage the true. Consider this scenario: you mold one chunk of clay into the top half
widespread appeal of rigidity. Rigid designation and the accompanying of a statue, and another chunk of clay into the bottom half. You stick the
necessity, even with respect to terms for properties, which are the most halves together, thus bringing into existence both a statue, call it ‘David’,
controversial candidates for rigidity, are commonly taken for granted in and a large lump of clay, call it ‘Lumpl’. Suppose, next, that you explode
mainstream literature from various areas of philosophy (see above, §3). the statue: both David and Lumpl go out of existence. It is tempting to
say that ‘David = Lumpl’ is true, but not necessarily true. It could have
Whether philosophers are on the whole entitled to embrace rigidity is
been that: David exists and Lumpl exists but ‘David ≠ Lumpl’ is true.
another matter, even if the criticisms derail. There is a case for saying, in
This would have been the case had Lumpl survived David: e.g., had you
particular, that rigidity and the necessity accompanying it stand or fall
squeezed the clay statue into a ball, thereby changing the shape of the
with a robust version of the analytic-synthetic distinction (LaPorte 2004,
relevant lump of clay, instead of exploding it, thereby bringing an end to
chap. 6, §II). If that case is solid, then either popular Quinean antagonism
the lump of clay.
toward analyticity should prompt the rejection of rigidity or else the
appeal of rigidity should prompt the rejection of the familiar antagonism If both ‘David’ and ‘Lumpl’ are rigid designators, then ‘David = Lumpl’
toward analyticity. is necessarily true if it is true in any possible world at all. So, if it is even
possible that David ≠ Lumpl, then David ≠ Lumpl. David and Lumpl are
In what follows, I address resistance to rigidity. I save for its own
distinct, however intimately related, because they have different modal
subsection (§4.2) treatment of objections specifically directed at the
properties: Lumpl could instantiate ballhood, while David could not. The
application of rigidity to terms for properties, which are more contentious
rigidity of ‘David’ and ‘Lumpl’ evidently requires as much. In order to
candidates for rigidity than terms for concrete objects, like ‘Hesperus’.
say that ‘David = Lumpl’ is contingently true, Gibbard gives up the thesis
that ‘David’ and ‘Lumpl’ are rigid designators in the usual respect. He
4.1 Objections to Rigidity in General
maintains that designators are rigid only with respect to a sortal: ‘David’
There are various arguments against the coherence or applicability of is statue-rigid, always referring to the same statue, while ‘Lumpl’ is
rigidity with respect even to concrete object designators (for discussion, lump-rigid, always referring to the same lump. Accordingly, ‘Possibly,
see Fitch 2004, pp. 102–10), but there is relative calm. As Hughes says, David is no statue’ is false, while ‘Possibly, Lumpl is no statue’ is true.
the position “that proper names are rigid, and that identity statements What about the object that is, as a matter of fact, both a statue and a
involving only proper names are accordingly necessarily true or lump? For Gibbard, objects have no modal properties and it makes no
necessarily false,” is “as close to uncontroversial as any interesting views sense to say that an object in some other possible world is identical to an
in analytic philosophy” (2004, p. vii). Even so, one not altogether- object in the actual world. This is counterintuitive, but Gibbard does offer
sympathetic line of response to the usual understanding of rigidity, a non-standard semantics to accommodate modal talk.
sometimes spun as a modification rather than a rejection, deserves
David Lewis (1986, chap. 4) offers a similar strategy for maintaining that
discussion as a salient minority opinion. It appears to some (e.g., Gibbard
‘Possibly, David is no statue’ is false, while ‘Possibly, Lumpl is no
1975) that not all identity statements containing just names are necessarily

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statue’ is true. For Lewis, what makes a sentence like the above true or same place at the same time is not necessarily removed if we accept
false is whether counterparts in other possible worlds associated with contingent identity. Gibbard, for example, acknowledges that Lumpl and
‘David’ or ‘Lumpl’ are all statues. The use, in discourse, of different David are distinct objects in any world w in which David but not Lumpl
names like ‘David’ and ‘Lumpl’ can create different contexts, thus comes to an end by being squeezed into a ball; but despite the failure of
altering the counterparts that come into play in determining the truth of identity to hold between David and Lumpl in w, the two share one
sentences containing the names. The sentences ‘Possibly, David is no spatiotemporal location before David is destroyed because the material of
statue’ and ‘Possibly, Lumpl is no statue’ can vary in truth value because the clay lump that is Lumpl is precisely the material of David.
the counterparts relevant to the truth value of the former sentence are all
statues but the counterparts relevant to the truth value of the latter For further discussion of these issues, see papers in Rea (1997), including
sentence are not. a well-done “Introduction.”

Rigidity proponents who distinguish between the referents of ‘David’ and 4.2 Objections to the Application of Rigidity to Terms for Kinds
‘Lumpl’ say that there is more than one object at the same place and time and Properties
where the statue stands. The intimate relationship between David and
Both Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) famously extend the notion of
Lumpl is understood as one of constitution: David is constituted by
rigidity to terms for natural kinds. Here controversy has ensued. Let us
Lumpl. Constitution has been championed by various philosophers to
begin with a singular term as an example; general terms introduce
address a variety of related issues (see, e.g., Baker 2000 on personal
additional complications (for discussion, see Linsky 1984; Soames 2002;
identity).
Salmon 2003; 2005; see also note 14 of this entry). What is rigidly
Another possibility in conformity with maintaining the rigidity of names designated by a kind term like ‘Apis mellifera’? Apparently it can not
despite these kinds of considerations avoids commitment to constitution. rigidly designate particular honeybees, since those honeybees that
This is to maintain an eliminativism about statues or clay lumps. One presently go about their work might not have existed. Others that do not
might maintain that there is no real entity to name “David,” in the way exist might have existed instead. To be rigid, a term has to designate the
that the story above requires; there is only Lumpl in a statuesque form. same thing in all possible worlds.
Accordingly, the problem of accounting for the modal status of a sentence
Some philosophers have proposed that ‘Apis mellifera’ rigidly designates
to which ‘David’ contributes, like ‘David = Lumpl’, never arises. (For an
an abstract object, a kind or property. One might say that ‘Apis mellifera’
appeal to eliminativism to handle various candidates for constitution, see
designates the honeybee kind in every possible world: it never designates
Fitch 2001, pp. 382–3, 391 note 5; Hershenov 2005; Merricks 2001.) In
any other kind, like the bumblebee kind, say. That might be said to make
order to work as a general alternative approach, eliminativism would have
the term rigid. Something similar could be said for ‘water’, ‘heat’, and
to work for all of a wide variety of would-be cases of constitution.
‘redness’. But a number of objections have been issued.
Notice that the unintuitive idea that more than one object can exist in the
The most common objection to this proposal is that something similar can

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be said about singular terms for artificial kinds or properties: ‘soda pop’ Yet another kind of objection, if it should be called that, is that rigidity
or ‘bachelorhood’. These would seem to designate an abstract object does, in some respect, the work attributed to it; but rigidity is superfluous
rigidly if terms for natural kinds and natural properties do. It has even to the task of explaining that work because the work is the result of other,
been claimed that on the above proposal for the rigidity of kind and more fundamental phenomena (see Soames, e.g., pp. 310–11, for one
property terms, rigidity is so indiscriminate that the account must reflect a approach along these lines). This objection has been discussed in the
confusion between sameness of meaning across possible worlds, which context of a treatment of property designators, but it might be raised with
every meaningful expression enjoys, and sameness of designation, or respect to the rigidity of any term at all.[15]
rigid designation (Schwartz 2002, p. 272). The basic objection can be also
lodged against the view that general terms like ‘watery’, ‘honeybee’, In what might be viewed as a compromise, some philosophers of
‘hot’, and ‘red’ are rigid by virtue of designating the right property in language who abandon rigid designation for properties nevertheless hold
every possible world: again, the alleged problem is that something similar that general terms like ‘honeybee’ are rigid because they rigidly apply to
can be said for general terms like ‘bachelor’. For contrasting views, their extensions. What makes the application of a general term rigid is
compare Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002, pp. 250–1, 260–1) with that any item to which the term applies, in any possible world, is part of
LaPorte (forthcoming). the extension of that term in all worlds in which it exists (Cook 1980;
Devitt forthcoming; Devitt and Sterelny 1999, pp. 85–6). The notion of
A second group of objections centers around the idea that the proposal rigid application might hold some attraction for someone bothered by the
seems committed to substantive metaphysical positions about abstract objections just mentioned against the view that terms rigidly designate
objects like kinds or properties, concerning which a theory of language properties. It would appear that terms for natural kinds come out rigid:
ought to remain neutral (Devitt forthcoming; Haukioja forthcoming; Marti thus, ‘honeybee’ is rigid because any particular honeybee is essentially a
1998, p. 487). For example, the proposal seems committed to rejecting honeybee and could not have been something else like a dragonfly or a fir
nominalism. Some defenders of property terms' rigidity are happy so to tree instead. But ‘lawyer’ does not apply rigidly. And the position appears
commit (Linsky 1984). Other defenders of property terms' rigidity seek to be open to nominalism: along with defenders of rigid application and
ways of accommodating nominalism (Marti 1998). Even if we are happy everyone else, nominalists recognize the legitimate application of general
to commit to properties, problems remain. Some authors maintain that terms.
there are so many properties that allegedly non-rigid designators for
properties always end up rigidly designating some property or other in the However, even if rigid application evades the above difficulties, it has its
plenum: for example, ‘the element most discussed in philosophy’, a limitations. In particular, consider identity statements like ‘Water = H2O’,
candidate non-rigid designator for gold, may be said to designate rigidly or ‘Red light = light with wavelength 680 nm’. Rigidity is apparently
the property of being the element most discussed in philosophy. For supposed to guarantee the necessity, in case of truth, of identity
discussion, see Devitt (forthcoming); LaPorte (forthcoming); Linsky statements like these. Typically, fans of rigid application rewrite identity
(forthcoming); Schwartz (2002); Soames (2002, pp. 261–2). statements to have this form: ‘Anything is (a) P if and only if it is (a) Pʹ′’.
But many philosophers, including proponents of rigid application, have

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pointed out that it could be the case for two general terms P and Pʹ′ that, Dimensional Semantics,” in M. Garcia-Caprintero and J. Macia
(i) ‘necessarily, every P is essentially P and every Pʹ′ is essentially Pʹ′’, is (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications.
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and Philosophy, 28: 117–134. Other Internet Resources
Schwartz, Stephen P. (2002): “Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity:
A Reply to LaPorte,” Philosophical Studies, 109: 265–77. Book Symposium on Lynne Baker (2000)
Shieh, Sanford (2001): “Meaning, Rigidity, and Modality,” in J. Comments on Nathan Salmon "Are General Terms Rigid" [PDF], by
Floyd and S. Shieh (eds.), Future Pasts: the Analytic Tradition in Robert May (text of presentation at the Princeton Semantics
Twentieth Century Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, Workshop, May 2003.
pp. 369–92. Third Barcelona Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Reference,
Sidelle, Alan (1992): “Rigidity, Ontology and Semantic Structure,” Special topic: General Terms, has links to a number of relevant
Journal of Philosophy, 89: 410–30. papers.
Sidelle, Alan (1995): “A Semantic Account of Rigidity,”
Philosophical Studies, 80: 69–105. Related Entries

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sensations
actualism | a priori justification and knowledge | descriptions | essential fiber firing)
vs. accidental properties | God: and other necessary beings | identity |
identity theory of mind | indexicals | individuals | names | natural kinds |
physicalism | properties | propositions: structured | qualia | reference 1. ‘Pain occurs
w2 when c-fibers
Acknowledgments (c-fibers fire as in fire’ (F)
W1 but with no 2. ‘pain’ applies to
I am grateful to Jason Stanley for discerning comments on an earlier draft attending unpleasant
that brought about substantial changes for the better. sensations) sensations (≠ c-
fiber firing)
Supplement to Rigid Designators

Two-Dimensionalism Against Materialism The diagram immediately indicates that it is not metaphysically necessary
that pain occurs when c-fibers fire. This seems to indicate that pain is not
Consider the following materialism-unfriendly two-dimensional diagram constituted by c-fiber firing, even in w 1, the actual world. If pain were
(see the subsection Rigidity at Work in Arguments from Two- constituted by c-fiber firing in w 1, then it would seem to be impossible to
Dimensionalism (§3.5) of this entry for an indication of how to interpret have c-fiber firing carrying on just as it does in w 1 but without the pain;
it). yet that is just what happens in another possible world, w 2. Compare a
battle in w 1, which might be constituted by certain deadly firings of
Table 3
weapons even though the battle is not identical to those deadly firings
because the same battle would have occurred had one of the weapons run
Considered as w1 w2
out of ammunition faster. On these assumptions about constitution, it is
counterfactual → (c-fibers fire if and (c-fibers fire as in w 1
natural to suppose that there is no possible world w 2 in which deadly
Considered as only if there is an but with no attending
firings carry on just as in w 1 but with no attending battle.
actual ↓ unpleasant sensation) sensations)
Arguments like the above have been discussed feverishly since the
1. ‘Pain occurs publication of Chalmers' The Conscious Mind (1996). Because there is so
1. ‘Pain occurs
w1 when c-fibers much interest in arguments of this broad variety, it is worth sorting out
when c-fibers
(c-fibers fire if fire’ (F) some of the striking similarities and differences between them and
fire’ (T)
and only if there 2. ‘pain’ applies to Kripkean arguments from rigidity like that presented in the subsection on
2. ‘pain’ applies to
is an unpleasant unpleasant Mind (§3.4) of this entry. As I have said there, I leave to the reader the
unpleasant
sensation) sensations (≠ c- task of determining how much work rigidity performs in the well-known
sensations

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two-dimensionalist arguments. How does this style of argument compare to the Kripkean argument
presented above? Similarities are clear: in both cases, the argument turns
A perspicuous version of the two-dimensionalist case against materialism on the claim that what we would call a “pain” in any possible world is the
can be approached as a response to an initial materialist reaction to Table phenomenal sensation, not the underlying physical phenomenon that
3. The reaction is that there is no good reason to fill out the horizontal scientific information in the actual world allows us to associate with that
row of values at the top right under ‘w 2’ in the way that the above sensation. In this respect, ‘pain’ differs from ‘water’.
diagram does. In Chalmers' vocabulary, the “primary intensions” of ‘Pain
occurs when c-fibers fire’ and ‘pain’, are functions from possible worlds But there are important differences. The most salient difference is that the
to extensions that are captured on the diagonal. The diagonal concerns whole two-dimensional structure is superfluous for the Kripkean
content that is relevant to the epistemic status of the sentence as a priori or argument. Kripke does not appear to commit to any kind of content apart
a posteriori; the diagonal does not concern what is metaphysically from content relevant to the metaphysics of modality. Indeed, in places he
possible. The horizontal row of values at the top, which depicts the appears to reject the idea that there is any other content like epistemic
“secondary intension,” concerns what is metaphysically possible. Even content.[2] When Kripke talks about epistemically possible worlds, he
though we know about primary intensions just from a priori reflection, we rephrases. To say that water might have turned out not to be H2O for
do not know about secondary intensions in this way so we must find out a Kripke is actually “inaccurate” shorthand and “should be replaced” (p.
posteriori how to fill out the values in the top right box. We thus have no 143) by something better. The kind of accurate replacement that Kripke
reason to say that it is really metaphysically possible that there should be has in mind is something like this: in another possible world that, like
c-fiber firing without pain. Twin Earth, appears to denizens of that world just as ours appears to us,
the word ‘water’ fails to apply to H2O but it applies instead to some other
I will follow Chalmers' frequently cited and highly detailed response to chemical like XYZ (Kripke 1980, pp. 102-4; see also pp. 140-3). Notice
materialism on behalf of two-dimensionalism (Chalmers 1996, pp. 132-4; that this paraphrase distinguishes our term ‘water’, with its content, from
for very similar arguments, see Jackson's 1998 discussion leading to the the term ‘water’ that is employed by denizens of the relevant
anti-physicalist conclusion on p. 83). For Chalmers, as for Kripke, counterfactual worlds, which term looks and sounds like ours but has a
anything that feels like a pain is a pain, in any counterfactual world. different content. If this is all there is to epistemic possibilities then such
Something similar holds for any world considered as actual: were we in a possibilities do not make room for our term ‘water’ to enjoy any
world in which scientists find out that our unpleasant sensations are not epistemic semantic content that could allow ‘Water = H2O’ to take the
attended by c-fibers, we would still say that those sensations are “pains.” value F, as it does in the diagonal intension recognized by two-
For that reason, Chalmers says, the primary and secondary intensions for dimensionalists (see Table 2 from the subsection Rigidity at Work in
‘pain’ coincide. They fail to correspond to any physical phenomenon Arguments from Two-Dimensionalism (§3.5) of this entry).
along the diagonal so they fail to correspond to any physical phenomenon
along the horizontal. [1] Chalmers, by contrast, recognizes the diagonal intension as genuine
“epistemic content,” which he takes to be distinct from the “subjunctive

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content” represented on the horizontal line. “As for the content of S

The Kripkean argument is resistant, then, to some objections that
(unqualified), this is a complex content that subsumes both of these and
beleaguer standard two-dimensionalism like that of Chalmers. By failing
possibly more” (Chalmers 2002, p. 165; see also 1996, p. 62). Both are
to commit to any diagonal content for our expressions, the Kripkean
perfectly legitimate truth-bearing contents. Thus, to protest that ‘Water =
argument is committed to less. Another way the Kripkean argument is
H2O at w 2’ is really true since the subjunctive content is true is, for
committed to less is that it never endorses the kind of simplicity and
Chalmers, “arbitrary”: one could as well say that the statement is really
power that standard two-dimensionalism claims. A “core claim” of
false, since the epistemic content is false. Nor does he brook the
standard two-dimensionalism is that “A sentence token S is
suggestion that epistemic content is about the content of sentences as
metaphysically necessary if and only if the secondary intension of S is
speakers at other worlds use them, that epistemic content is about the
true at all worlds” (Chalmers forthcoming-b §3.1). As we have seen,
content that the sentences would have had had the world been different.
‘Pain occurs when c-fibers fire’ has a secondary intension that yields F
On that suggestion, the epistemic content of sentences is not the content
for some worlds: so the statement is not necessarily true, according to
that they do in fact have as we use them in our world, given the way the
Chalmers (1996, pp. 136-8). The statement also yields T for some worlds,
world has turned out. This suggestion is just a mistake, for Chalmers
so its negation is not necessary: accordingly, the statement is contingent.
(2002, p. 166; see also forthcoming-a, §5.7; forthcoming-b, §5).
But the Kripkean argument above never commits to saying that all
No doubt Kripke's alternative way of seeing things could be mapped onto statements with contingent secondary intensions are in fact
a two-dimensional diagram, with the horizontal bar representing the metaphysically contingent.[4] There is nothing so sweeping in the
content of our expressions as we use them and the diagonal representing argument, which does not address claims that are unlike the theoretical
the content of expressions that look and sound like ours but that have identities under consideration. Take a quite different claim: there is a
different content in different worlds: the content that they would have if tradition according to which ‘God exists’ is metaphysically necessary (see
they were to be used in the respective world, in which the language is God and Other Necessary Beings). We do have epistemic access to the
sufficiently like ours. Such a diagram would not depict two-dimensional truth of God's necessary existence by way of metaphysical principles
semantics for our expressions; rather, the two dimensions would represent about causation and contingency, according to many in the tradition
semantics for our expressions, on the one hand, and semantics for (Aquinas, Leibniz and others), so for simplicity let us consider a variant
expressions looking and sounding like ours, on the other. But such a tradition favored by agnostics who maintain that God's existence is
position would circumvent objections directed at the proposal that there necessary if it obtains at all but who maintain that whether God actually
are two kinds of content. For example, there are objections centering does exist (and so does exist necessarily) cannot be demonstrated true or
around whether the two intensions can and must be understood as giving false by us mere mortals. Chalmers appears to be committed to rejecting
rise to ambiguity (Marconi 2005, p. 345; Bealer 2002, pp. 83-4). There such necessity since for him the secondary intension of ‘God exists’ is
are also the expected objections from direct reference theorists.[3] false in worlds at which the primary intension is false, the secondary
(Chalmers resists these attractions, finding Kripke's surrogate two- intension representing truth values as we have access to them in ideal
dimensionalism objectionable: Chalmers forthcoming-a, §5.7.) epistemic circumstances that might obtain after, say, scientists have done

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their work (Chalmers 1999, pp. 484-5; forthcoming-b, §5). Kripke is Claims like this are crucial to the Kripkean argument, from the subsection
silent about such matters. on Mind (§3.4) of this entry, for the failure of token identity statements
like ‘P = Cʹ′. A champion of the two-dimensionalist argument would
A third respect in which the two-dimensionalist argument associated with reject token identity, presumably, since she concludes that pain (any pain,
Table 3 commits to more than the Kripkean argument from the subsection by a natural extension of the above argument) is something over and
on Mind (§3.4) in this entry is that the two-dimensionalist argument above c-fiber firing. Even so, she need not say that any particular pain
concludes that pain is not even constituted by c-fiber firing. According to could have existed without the corresponding c-fiber firing or that any
this argument, pain is something “over and above” any physical particular c-fiber firing could have existed without the corresponding
phenomenon (Chalmers 1996, p. 134). This is a stronger claim than the pain: therefore she need not accept Kripke's argument against token
mere claim that pain is not identical to c-fiber firing. For Kripke, a statue identity, [5] which relies on the intuition that the token pain P could have
is not identical to the clay that constitutes it (see the subsection existed without the token c-fiber firing C or that C could have existed
Objections to Rigidity in General (§4.1) of this entry): but clearly there is without P. The two-dimensionalist could restrict herself to saying that
an intimate relationship between the two. The Kripkean argument above there are worlds w in which a c-fiber firing Cʹ′, which is otherwise just like
merely establishes non-identity. Further work would be needed to draw the event C in the actual world, fails to be painful (even though Cʹ′ may be
conclusions about constitution, though Kripke suggests that arguments distinct from C, since should C have failed to generate pain, the “rump C”
against constitution are only a short step away (1980, p.145, note 74; remaining in the resulting world w is not C, but merely something just
there appears to be unresolved tension in Kripke's mind about the matter: like C: Cʹ′, whose failure to generate pain makes it distinct from C).
cf. p. 155, note 77).
The Kripkean argument against token identity is generally recognized to
The foregoing paragraphs show that the standard two-dimensionalist be of great significance, if it is successful. But it is controversial.
argument associated with Table 3 is more ambitious, in some respects, Standard two-dimensionalist arguments against materialism evade some
than the Kripkean argument from the subsection on Mind (§3.4) of this of the controversy, as I have indicated, by committing to less. In the same
entry. The Kripkean argument is committed to less. There are also way, the Kripkean argument avoids some of the commitments of standard
respects in which the relevant Kripkean argument against identity, as an two-dimensionalist arguments against materialism.
argument against token identity, is committed to more than the two-
dimensionalist argument. The two-dimensionalist argument mentions Return to Rigid Designators
nothing about whether a token pain could be that very pain in a
counterfactual world in which it (or what would otherwise be it) is not Notes to Rigid Designators
generated by the corresponding c-fiber firing. Similarly, the two-
dimensionalist argument mentions nothing about whether a token c-fiber 1. One might expect terms for rigid designators to correspond in the
firing could be that very c-fiber firing in a counterfactual world in which following way: a “strongly” rigid designator would be obstinately rigid,
it (or what would otherwise be it) fails to generate the corresponding pain. referring to its object in all possible worlds. A “weakly” rigid designator

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would be one that refers to its object in just those possible worlds in respect, anyway: by way of ostension to an object in something like a
which the object exists. It is plausible to suppose that the question over causal baptismal ceremony. It is a different question whether some terms
whether statements like ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’, or perhaps ‘If Hesperus in the reference-fixing description are causally grounded. It is hard to
exists then Hesperus = Phosphorus’, are strongly necessary or merely come up with descriptions free from such terms (Stanley 1997a, p. 564;
weakly necessary depends on whether ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are Devitt and Sterelny 1999, p. 60). If there are no such descriptions
“strongly” rigid (obstinate) or merely “weakly” rigid in this sense. available, then every rigid designator for a concrete object may be said to
However, as Kripke has defined ‘strongly rigid’, ‘Hesperus’ cannot be a be “broadly” causally grounded in the respect that it is either grounded in
“strongly rigid designator”; that distinction is reserved for designators that the primary way by means of ostension to an object in something like a
designate a necessarily existing object (1980, pp. 48-9). Thus, given the causal baptismal ceremony or it is hooked to a description some terms in
truth of a classical tradition according to which God and entities like which are causally grounded in the primary way. In that case, of course,
numbers exist and could not have failed to exist, ‘7’ or ‘God’ are broad causal grounding is ubiquitous and not specially tied to rigidity: all
“strongly rigid” in Kripke's sense: this is a special case of obstinate singular concrete object designators, including non-rigid definite
rigidity. descriptions, are broadly causally grounded.

2. At least it is an account available to opponents of typical direct 5. Presumably, the relevant possibilities could not include all
reference accounts. Questions might be raised about whether a modest metaphysically possible states of affairs: otherwise, it is hard to see how
version of the theory of direct reference remains tenable in virtue of the (1) and (4) could share the same content, at least without help from a
reference of ‘α’, say. sophisticated widescopism (Sosa shows how this could help even though
there are no modal operators: 2001, pp. 34-5, note 7), which is supposed
3. Often an association between causal grounding and rigidity is to be a distinct suggestion.
complicated by a further association between causal grounding and
indexicality. Thus, Putnam, for example, calls causally grounded terms 6. Stanley agrees, though he withholds his reasons: 1997b, p. 156.
“indexical,” because they designate whatever has the underlying essence
of samples around the speaker. ‘Water’ and ‘whale’ are supposed to be 7. As I have suggested above, one might maintain a related line that the
indexical; ‘hunter’ and ‘bachelor’ are not, since they have analytic notion of semantic content, assertion, proposition, and so on must be
definitions. According to Putnam “Kripke's doctrine that natural-kind reevaluated in light of the distinction between assertoric content and
words are rigid designators and our doctrine that they are indexical are ingredient sense: one might say therefore that Kripke is onto one
but two ways of making the same point” (1975, p. 234). But these do not explication and that assertoric content is yet another explication of the
really seem to be two ways of making the same point. For further unrefined notion semantic content, assertion, proposition, and so on.
citations and discussion, see LaPorte 2000, §2; 2004, pp. 42-3. Something like this position is adopted by Chalmers, who is a pluralist
about content (Chalmers forthcoming-a, §1.4; what most interests
4. Reference is not secured by way of causal grounding in the relevant Chalmers is the division between what is epistemic in Fregean sense and

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the modal phenomenon of rigidity: 2002, pp. 157-9; see the 10. Talk about an essence is not as common as talk about the essence, but
supplementary document: Two-Dimensionalism Against Materialism). it is preferable since many properties apply to Cicero and only Cicero in
Even Dummett might tolerate the above proposal that Kripke is onto one all possible worlds: see Plantinga 1985, pp. 85-7; 1977, pp. 254-6.
explication of semantic content, assertion, proposition, and so on: he Plantinga's definition of an essence is given in the section on Individual
resists a simple yes or no answer to the question whether ‘St. Joachim had Essences in the entry actualism.
a daughter’ expresses the same proposition as ‘the father of Mary had a
daughter’: “The word ‘proposition’ is treacherous,” he cautions (p. 48). 11. The debt may be mutual: those who put rigidity to work in certain
Stanley (1997b, 132, 140, 155), by contrast, is much less favorably areas may find themselves committed to two-dimensionalism (for a
disposed to say that Dummett's distinction could be said to bring to light discussion of Kripke's possible commitment to two-dimensionalism, see
more than one notion of semantic content, assertion, proposition, and the the supplementary document, Two-Dimensionalism Against Materialism,
like. especially note 2 and the corresponding text).

8. Further, we might hold that the theory of direct reference is merely an 12. Thus, for Chalmers (forthcoming-b, §3.1) it is one of just a few “core
empirical theory about natural language, and that even if it is true, there claims of two-dimensionalism,” as recent authors understand it, that
are other possible languages in which a name spelled and pronounced like apriority obtains if and only if the primary intension (indicated on the
‘Petrarch’ is a disguised description meaning the same as ‘the famous diagonal) is true at all scenarios.
humanist most closely associated in α with the Italian Renaissance’. For
13. There are complications here: if the horizontal intension is a
such a language, rigidity does the work one would expect. So the work,
“secondary intension” as Chalmers, for one, understands it, then it is
even with respect to names, is independent from the theory of direct
debatable whether the intension is an infallible guide to whether a term is
reference not only epistemically (for all many philosophers know
rigid. According to a venerable tradition, there is an omniscient agent x,
languages do not conform to the theory of direct reference and rigidity
and it is impossible that either x should have failed to be an omniscient
performs its work anyway) but metaphysically (it is metaphysically
agent or that any being y such that y ≠ x should have been an omniscient
possible that languages do not conform to the theory of direct reference
agent. Something similar can be said for ‘the simplest agent’. This makes
and rigidity performs its work anyway).
‘the omniscient agent’ and ‘the simplest agent’ rigid designators.
9. Other examples of the necessary a posteriori made famous by Kripke However, neither ‘the omniscient agent’ nor ‘the simplest agent’ appears
may be accepted by direct reference theorists. Whether these examples to designate the same thing in all worlds along Chalmers' secondary
owe anything to rigidity may be contested (e.g., when the examples intension. It would appear that ‘the omniscient agent = the simplest agent’
concern kinds: see §4.2). Here I leave complications to the reader to has a contingently true or false secondary intension, even if tradition is
pursue, having pointed out the vicinity and general nature of the right and the relevant designators are actually rigid. But if tradition is
complications. right and these designators are actually rigid, then ‘the omniscient agent
= the simplest agent’ is not contingently true or false. So the range and

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power of two-dimensionalism may be limited by this sort of case (a the possible worlds considered do not present certain complications in
similar case is discussed, with some qualifying details that might apply far-off places, as we may assume (Chalmers 1996, p. 60).
here, in the supplementary document: Two-Dimensionalism Against
Materialism). Even so, where two-dimensionalism successfully captures 2. In addition to what follows in the text corresponding to this note, see
the status of an identity statement as necessary or contingent, it would Kripke (1980, p. 59, note 22), where Kripke characterizes the meaning of
appear to owe this to rigidity: the horizontal intension successfully a designator as a function from worlds (considered counterfactually) to
mirrors rigidity or lack thereof in these cases. values. In other places, when he is less interested in distinguishing modal
matters from epistemic ones and more interested in accounting for
14. Does ‘watery stuff’ nonrigidly designate the property or kind H2O, apparently non-modal contributions that words can make to a statement,
whether horizontally or diagonally, by virtue of applying to stuff that is Kripke seems more open to the possibility of non-modal content (cf.
H2O with respect to some worlds and not others? Or does ‘watery stuff’ Kripke 1979, p. 273, note 10). And, as section (2.3.3) of the main entry
rather fail to designate the property H2O at all, though the expression Rigid Designators indicates, there are considerations in favor of two-
applies to stuff that is H2O, since it fails to apply to stuff that is H2O with dimensionalism that could perhaps move Kripke. As we have seen,
respect to some worlds? There is no need here to answer these questions, Kripke holds ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ to be a priori and ‘Hesperus =
which gesture toward some of the complications with treating property Phosphorus’ to be a posteriori. If sentences like this are to have such
terms as rigid (see §4.2). differing epistemic status, and if the claim that they have such differing
status is to be interpreted as a claim about semantic content (as it might
15. Possible replies to a general version of this objection are discussed in
not: see §3.1 of the main entry Rigid Designators), then Kripke will have
§2.3.3. Of course, any or all of those replies might undermine a general
to embrace a form of content that is distinct from the content relevant to
statement of the objection while failing to apply to this or that specific
the metaphysics of modality. With respect to content relevant to the
version, e.g., Soames', with its particular context or nuances.
metaphysics of modality, the two sentences share the same status (they
are true or false at just the same worlds) because ‘Hesperus’ and
Notes to Supplement: Two-Dimensionalism Against
‘Phosphorus’ are rigid designators for the same thing.
Materialism
The argument about mind in consideration here does not require two-
1. Chalmers offers a further argument that is supposed to make use only
dimensionalism, though: it is about an identity statement's modal status as
of the diagonal intension, ignoring the horizontal intension: there is no
necessarily false. Epistemic matters are not even mentioned in its
need to elaborate here. Further, I ignore here complications concerning
formulation in section (3.4) of the main entry Rigid Designators. To the
intensions for expressions for physical phenomena, like ‘c-fiber firing’,
extent that epistemic matters could enter in answering objections (“But
and in particular the possibility that primary and secondary intensions for
couldn't ‘P = C’ be true a posteriori just as ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’
these expressions diverge in accordance with what Chalmers calls “type F
is?”), various responses are possible that dispense with epistemic or other
monism” (1996, pp. 134-6; cf. §11 of Chalmers 2003). Throughout, I
non-modal content in accordance with the strategy discussed in the
have also ignored world-centering, which may be overlooked so long as

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paragraph corresponding to this note. One response is to rule out Genuine, familiar ambiguity poses no trouble for direct reference
aposteriority for both ‘P = C’ and ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’. Another is to theorists: for them, the semantic value of ‘Phosphorus’, when that term is
recognize aposteriority for the latter statement and not the former but to used for the planet, is just Venus. But Chalmers' epistemic and
treat the aposteriority as applicable to the statements rather than their subjunctive intensions do spell trouble for direct reference theorists (and
content (again, see §3.1 of the main entry Rigid Designators). are accordingly rejected: see, e.g., Soames 2005. Much the same can be
said about Jackson's A-intensions and C-intensions: see, e.g., Jackson
3. Direct reference theorists are unsurprisingly unsympathetic to a two-
1998, pp. 85-6). Both intensions for ‘Phosphorus’ perform genuine
dimensionalism that appeals to epistemic content in order to recognize a
semantic work when the term is used for the planet, since not only the
difference in truth value between ‘It is a priori that Hesperus = Hesperus’
subjunctive intension but also the epistemic intension, whose value is
and ‘It is a priori that Phosphorus = Hesperus’.
something other than Venus at some worlds, performs work that is
As for complications surrounding ambiguity and its alternatives, responsible for determining the truth value of sentences (Chalmers
Chalmers for the most part denies that the two kinds of intension give rise forthcoming-a, §3.10): so the term's semantic value is not simply Venus,
to ambiguity (2002, p. 166; a stronger denial is in forthcoming-a, §3.10). contrary to direct reference theorists.
But two-dimensionalism does occasionally drive Chalmers to appeal to
4. At least Kripke does not say anything that would commit to this
ambiguity. For example, he would claim that ‘With respect to w 2, Water
position about “secondary intensions” as they are understood here. If
= H2O’ is not straightforwardly true, since on one reading it is false: the
secondary intensions are understood to be functions from worlds to
statement “is ambiguous between readings that invoke epistemic and
genuine extensions, rather than, as they are understood here (see also note
subjunctive intensions” (Chalmers 2002, p. 165; see Marconi 2005 for a
13 in the main entry Rigid Designators), something that will fall short of
detailed and critical examination of this territory; w 2 is a world discussed
this in the event that our epistemic access to necessity in some sort of
in Table 2 from §3.5 of the main entry Rigid Designators). In any event, it
ideal circumstances (e.g., after the scientists have discovered the relevant
seems clear that these two kinds of intension do not give rise to any
microstructural compositions of our substances, so that we are free to
ordinary ambiguity. ‘Phosphorus’ is ambiguous (or used to be, when
associate our vernacular terms like ‘water’ with theoretical essences like
chemical terms were capitalized). It could designate the planet or the
H2O) is wanting, then Kripke and everyone else is committed to saying
chemical. But on each of these readings the ambiguous term would have
that all statements with contingent secondary intensions are in fact
both kinds of intension, for two-dimensionalists. Thus, ‘Phosphorus’,
metaphysically contingent. But this alternative understanding of
when used as a planet term, takes Venus as its value for all possible
“secondary intensions” would add complications that Chalmers' clean
worlds according to the subjunctive intension even though ‘Phosphorus’,
two-dimensional framework avoids.
when used as a planet term, takes other planets like Mars as its value for
some other possible worlds according to the epistemic intension. 5. Chalmers rejects the Kripkean argument for token non-identity: 1996,
Something similar would hold for ‘Phosphorus’ when it is used as a pp. 147-8. Two-dimensionalists like Chalmers would seem to be
chemical term instead of a planet term. committed to Kripkean arguments against type identity, like ‘Pain (the

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kind) = c-fiber firing (the kind)’. But their focus is on the failure of
constitution; the importance of type-identity failure may accordingly be
downplayed (Chalmers 1996, pp. 131, 148).

Copyright © 2011 by the author

Joseph LaPorte

68 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy