Parubrub, Cherry A.

Universidad de Manila | Constitutional Law II

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE

M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO
E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents

G.R. No. 88211 | September 15, 1989

CORTES, J.
FACTS:

The case involves petitioning former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family
to be allowed to return to the Philippines and to enjoin the implementation of the President’s
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
In February 1986, former president Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency
through a people power revolution and forced into exile. Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Philippines under a revolutionary government. The victory in people power
led to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges
to the government. There were several threats and attacks on the government amongst
militaries and diehard followers of Mr. Marcos. The economy likewise was devastated due to
accumulated foreign debt and the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
Marcos, on his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue
them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to
bar Marcos from returning to the Philippines. The Marcoses founded their assertion that their
right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions of the Bill of Rights. They
contended further that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law”. They
advanced the view that the right to travel may be impaired if there is legislation to that effect.
Furthermore, they have asserted that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his
family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Parubrub, Cherry A.
Universidad de Manila | Constitutional Law II

RULING:

YES.

The Court ruled that the President did have the power to deny the Marcoses' return. The
Court explained that the right to return to one's country is distinct from the right to travel and
is subject to limitations in the interest of national security and public safety. The Court stated
that the President's power to protect national security and public safety, as well as her duty
to preserve and defend the Constitution, allowed her to make the decision.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country,
a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right
to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate
and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence"
[Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which
rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public
order, public health or morals or enter its own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily
deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode
and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle
of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of
the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against
being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic
collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
Parubrub, Cherry A.
Universidad de Manila | Constitutional Law II

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

G.R. No. 94284 | April 8, 1991

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

The case of Silverio v. Court of Appeals involves a petitioner who was charged with
violation of the Revised Securities Act. The petitioner posted bail for his provisional liberty.
The respondent People of the Philippines filed a motion to cancel the petitioner's passport
and issue a hold-departure order against him. The motion was based on the petitioner's
unauthorized travels abroad without court approval, which resulted in the postponement of
arraignment and scheduled hearings.
On January 26, 1998, or more than 2 years after the filing of the Information,
respondent People of the Philippines filed an urgent ex-parte motion to cancel the passport
of and to issue a hold-departure order against the accused-petitioner on the ground that he
had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval, resulting in the
postponement of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

On April 4, 1988, RTC issued an order directing the DFA to cancel the petitioner’s
passport or to deny his application, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent the
petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the trial court’s finding
that since the filing of the Information on October 14, 1985, “the accused has not yet been
arraigned because he has never appeared in the Court on the dates scheduled for his
arraignment and there is evidence to show that the accused x x x has left the country and
has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of the Court.”

Petitioner contends that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there
was a pending motion to quash the information, and that the right to travel can be impaired
upon lawful order of the court, even on grounds other than the “interest of national security,
public safety or public health.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s right to travel has been violated.

RULING:

NO.

The Supreme Court finds no reversible error in the trial court’s order. It affirms the trial court's
order to cancel the petitioner’s passport and issue a hold-departure order. The court explains
that the condition imposed on an accused on bail to make himself available at all times
Parubrub, Cherry A.
Universidad de Manila | Constitutional Law II

whenever the court requires his presence is a valid restriction on the right to travel. Previous
jurisprudence supports the idea that a person facing criminal charges may be restrained from
leaving the country or compelled to return. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission from
the court.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without a Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the
1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on
international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party.

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the
effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available
at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the
right to travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature
and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or
the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of
that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions
thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been
issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be
allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country.
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.