A.

DECLARATION OF PRESUMTIVE DEATH

G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner

vs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

A rule creating a presumption of death is merely one of the evidence.

It cannot be the lone subject of an independent action of proceeding.

FACTS:

On 2012, Petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the RTC a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo). She
alleged that her husband Wilfredo was a member of Philippine Constabulary which
never came back on his tour of duty (NPA infested) since 1979 wherein no
communication or made contact with him. The petition was being filed by the petitioner
for the sole purpose to claim the benefits under PD No. 1638 as amended.

The RTC granted the petition in a Special Proceeding which was based under Article 41
of the Family Code.

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via petition for certiorari on the
grounds that Article 41 of the FC does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.

In addition, the republic contends that the RTC is without authority to take cognizance
of a petition whose sole purpose is to have a person declared presumptively dead under
either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. The latter provisions merely express
rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead,
which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the
subject of an independent action or proceeding.

ISSUE: WON, the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under
the Civil Code is a viable suit?

RULING:

NO. The petition filed by the petitioner for the declaration of presumptive death
of Wilfredo under the Civil Code is not a viable suit.

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 A petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead
under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to
take cognizance of the same.

It has been held that a rule creating a presumption of death is merely one of the
evidence; that while may be invoked in any action or proceeding; it cannot be the lone
subject of an independent action or proceeding.

Hence, the petition filed by the petitioner for the declaration of presumptive
death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code is not a viable suit.

2
G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.

Article 247 Family Code - all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory".

FACTS:

On 1987, Gloria, herein respondent, married Francisco. Due to the latter being a
habitual drinker and violent, in addition to an unproductive husband and father; Gloria
decided to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her
three (3) children. Gloria was compelled to work abroad in order to support their
children. It was year 1991 when Gloria was physically separated from her husband
which the former have not heard from the latter, nor communicated.

After 9 years, Gloria filed with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings
in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code for declaring her husband Francisco
judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage.

The RTC granted the petition of Gloria declaring the presumptive death/absence of
Francisco.

The OSG filed a Notice of Appeal, despite the judgment being immediately final and
executory under the provisions of Article 247 of the Family Code. However, the CA
denied the appeal of the OSG.

ISSUE: WON, the CA duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed by the OSG?

RULING:

NO. The CA acquires no jurisdiction over the appeal filed by the OSG.

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no

reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments
rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, all judgments
rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and
executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court
of Appeals.

3
 An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory.

Therefore, the CA acquires no jurisdiction over the appeal filed by the OSG.

4
B. APPLICABILITY OF RULES IN ORDINARY CIVIL CASES

G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA
Administratrix, Respondent.

In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be,
as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

PRACTICABLE – possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice,

done or accomplished; and NOT merely suppletory to special proceedings.

FACTS:

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. The
petitioner filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due to him in the event of the
sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and likewise, the reimbursement
for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating
the sale of said realties.

However, the respondent moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the
estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written
explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

The RTC ruled against the petitioner which dismissed the petition for money claims.

The petitioner filed an appeal on the grounds that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only
in a suppletory manner.

ISSUE: WON, the rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings?

RULING:

YES. The rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings.

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 Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of
the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as
far as practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules
in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and
where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules
of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or
merely suppletory to special proceedings.

Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for

complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service
and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not
in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present
case.

Therefore, the rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings.

6
C. VENUE

G.R. No. 192048 December 13, 2017

DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner,

vs.
CITIBANK, N.A. (formerly First National City Bank), Respondent.

JURISDICTION – conferred by law / jurisdictional

VENUE – procedural, may be changed by consent of the parties , may be waived by a

timely objection by the opposing party

RTC has the exclusive jurisdiction for a petition for revival of judgment

FACTS:

Petitioner Douglas F. Anama (Anama) executed a promissory note in the amount of

₱418,000.00 in favor of Citibank. Anama also executed in favor of Citibank a chattel
mortgage over various industrial machineries and equipment located on his property at
Quezon City.

Due to Anama’s failure to pay the monthly installments due on the promissory note,
Citibank filed a complaint for sum of money and replevin with CFI of Manila. Anama
contends that the said bank refused to receive the checks and the chattel mortgage was
defective and void.

However, the RTC issued an order for replevin over the machineries and equipment
covered by the chattel mortgage; and eventually seized the said mortgaged property.

The CA nullifies the decision of the RTC and ordered the said bank to return the
machineries and equipment seized.

Subsequently, during the pendency of the case, the building where the documents were
stored was caught on fire.

After 10 years from the fire incident, Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment
with the CA.

The Citibank argued that the petition should be dismissed as an action for revival of
judgment is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.

The CA denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

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ISSUE: WON, the CA acquired jurisdiction over the petition for an action for revival of
judgment?

RULING:

NO. The CA acquired no jurisdiction over the petition for an action for revival of
judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the
rules on instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction.
Its jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the
petition does not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered
judgment.

As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right
to have the final and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced
and does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that jurisdiction over a
petition to revive judgment is properly with the RTCs. (incapable of pecuniary
estimation)

However, venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may
NOT be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed
by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the
plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the
defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid
judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the
parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration. Venue is procedural,
not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived.

Therefore, the CA acquired no jurisdiction over the petition for an action for
revival of judgment.

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G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

ACTUAL RESIDENCE RATHER THAN DOMICILE (LEGAL RESIDENCE)

“Residence” should be understood as its popular sense

FACTS:

Respondent Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate, which she filed before the RTC of Makati. She
alleged that at the time of her husband’s death, he was residing at Manila.

However, petitioner Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause
of action. He contends that the petition should have been filed in Laguna, Felicisimo’s
place of residence.

At first, the RTC denied their motion to dismiss. However, when the case was re-raffled
to a different branch, the presiding Judge dismissed the petition for letters of
administration which held that the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
and not in Makati City, since Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident
of the Province of Laguna upon his death.

However, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC which cited Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON, the venue was properly laid which is in the RTC of Makati City?

RULING:

YES. The venue was properly laid.

9
 Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."

The term "resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal

residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile
is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.

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D. EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT

G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.
SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.

INTERCLUTORY ORDER VS FINAL ORDER

RTC vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be
included in the inventory.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. (special and limited
jurisdiction)

FACTS:

Emigdio died intestate, survived by his second wife Teresita, and their five children,
and two (2) children by his first marriage. The decedent owned properties (real and
personal). During the decedents lifetime, he assigned his real properties in exchange of
stocks. Thelma, one of the children of his first marriage, filed before RTC a petition for
the appointment of Teresita (second wife) as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate
which the court granted.

Subsequently, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio to the RTC and
indicated in the said inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties". And thereafter, Teresita amended the
inventory which already includes the stocks. However, Thelma opposed the inventory
that was submitted by Teresita on the grounds that there are still properties that have
not been included in the said inventory.

After 8 years of trial, the RTC denies the list submitted by Teresita and ordered to re-do
the inventory of properties (including the land that was bought and transferred to
Mervir Realty).

Teresita contends that the parcel of land located at Badian Cebu, was already sold to
Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had
already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.

11
The CA partially reversed the decision of the RTC and excludes the parcel of land that
was bought by Mervir Realty. (via certiorari)

ISSUE: WON, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged
for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

RULING:

NO. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

The RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide
discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. The
general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will
and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and

convenience.

(1) The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action.
(2) If the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.

12
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.

Therefore, The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged
for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime.

13
RULES WHERE TWO (2) PROCEEDINGS, ONE INTESTATE, THE OTHER
TESTATE, WERE INSTITUTED FOR THE SAME ESTATE

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila;
MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA
GRIMM, respondents.

"no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed”

FACTS: (Probate of the WILL is MANDATORY)

Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died in the Makati Medical Center.
He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, and
another two children including herein petitioner Ethel, by his first marriage.

Edward executed two (2) Wills in California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate,
and one disposed his estate outside the Philippines.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E.
LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of
Tooele County, Utah.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel
at RTC Branch 20.

Subsequently, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on
the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's
will. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine
estate.

However, the counsel of Maxine withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss
pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement.

After a few years, with Maxine’s new counsel, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court
a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that
the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of
administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita
Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same
to Maxine.

14
ISSUE: WON, the court is correct in setting aside the partition and the letters of
administration be revoked?

RULING:

YES. The court is correct in setting aside the partition and the letters of
administration be revoked.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills
and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person
who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate
case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Therefore, the court is correct in setting aside the partition and the letters of
administration be revoked.

15
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial
District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN
URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

Negros Intestate court (Vicente) and Manila Testate Court (Juan and Higinio)

Settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate

proceedings for the same purpose.

FACTS: (With prior knowledge)

On November 6, 1961 petitioner Vicente Uriarte (acknowledged natural son – sole heir)
filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don
Juan Uriarte y Goite. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the
Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961, however, the
Philippine National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, herein private respondent, opposed the petition
alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed
a Last Will and Testament in Spain”.

On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced
Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged
to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss.

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros
Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

The Negros Court (intestate court) dismissed the Special Proceeding pending before it.

ISSUE: WON, the Negros Court (intestate Court) is correct in dismissing the special
proceeding filed by the petitioner?

RULING:

YES. The Negros Court (Intestate Court) is correct in dismissing the special
proceeding filed by the petitioner.

16
 It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last
will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession
to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding
shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

However, in this case, the petitioner should have submitted said will for probate
to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion
for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344.

Therefore, the Negros Court (Intestate Court) is correct in dismissing the special
proceeding filed by the petitioner.

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G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO,
LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN
CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO
GONZALEZ, respondents.

CFI Cebu – Intestate Court (Lourdes) and CFI Quezon – Testate Court (Rosa)

FACTS:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors'
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two
(2) minor sons, all residing in Quezon City; and his children of the first marriage all
residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of

Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu, alleging that Mariano died
intestate, and he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death leaving properties in
Cebu and Quezon City.

On the other hand, on 12 March 1964, herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a
petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor,
as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an
Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator.

The Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's
motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted
on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament
of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco.

The respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss.
However, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal
reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondents on the grounds of venue and the CFI of Cebu
having filed first which take cognizance of the proceeding which has jurisdiction to the

18
exclusion of other courts. The CA ordered a writ of prohibition against the CFI of
Quezon City and its judge from proceeding and taking any action.

ISSUE: WON, the CA erred in issuing a writ of prohibition against the CFI of Quezon
City?

RULING:

YES. The CA erred in issuing a writ of prohibition against the CFI of Quezon
City.

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of
equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is
first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's
last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his
conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and
that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold
the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has
before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

In this case, this exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing
with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court,
awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu
court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City
court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition
which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its
act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question
between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of
the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the

19
latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the
decedent within its territory and venue.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu
court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule
73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Therefore, the CA erred in issuing a writ of prohibition against the CFI of Quezon City.

20
THE TWO YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD

G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES
VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.

FACTS:

A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters was left behind by the late
Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs partitioning and adjudicating
unto themselves the lot in question. However four (4) of the heirs have not signed it.
The said Extra Judicial Settlement was published in the newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks.

Nine (9) months later, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was executed
among heirs and the same four (4) of the heirs have not signed it. The portion of 55 sqm.
were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.

Subsequently, Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas, herein respondent, later
knew about the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale on May 1995. Gloria
tried to redeem the property, however, was refused. Gloria Vargas filed a case for
annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot.

The respondents contend that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal and
binding effect on them, on the grounds that no written notice was sent to them.

The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The RTC likewise affirmed the decision of the MTC. However, the CA reversed the
decision of the lower courts declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were void and without any
legal effect. The CA held that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents
considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to
the same.

ISSUE: WON, the respondents were deemed constructively notified and bound,
regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and
partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly
published?

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RULING:

NO.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of
creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without
their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

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Extra-judicial settlement vis-à-vis Summary Settlement of Estate

G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ,

SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F.
MARQUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez,
Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to the
property described in TCT which was eventually cancelled, and a new TCT was issued
in his name on 1982.

On 1983, Rafael executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos covering the subject parcel of
land to his three (3) children, herein private respondents, with the exclusion to his other
children, herein petitioners, in which a new TCT was issued under the name of the
private respondents.

When petitioners knew that a new TCT was issued to the private respondents, they
immediately demanded that they are entitled to the subject property, however, ignored
by private respondents.

On 1991, petitioners filed a complaint for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages"
before the trial court alleging that the documents ("Affidavit of Adjudication" and
"Deed of Donation Inter Vivos") were fraudulent.

Private respondents contended that petitioner’s action was already barred by statute
of limitations.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioners and held that the
documents did not produce any legal effect and did not confer any right
whatsoever. However, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court on the grounds
of prescription.

ISSUE: WON, the petitioner’s action for “reconveyance and partition” is barred by
prescription?

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RULING:

NO. The petitioner’s action for “reconveyance and partition” is not barred by
prescription.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust

prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

In this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was
issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for
reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is
evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

Therefore, the petitioner’s action for “reconveyance and partition” is not barred
by prescription.

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