Understanding the Roots of War
Understanding the Roots of War
“Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?
“It is common knowledge that, with the advance of modern
science, this issue has come to mean a matter of life and death for
civilization as we know it; nevertheless, for all the zeal displayed,
every attempt at its solution has ended in a lamentable breakdown.
“I believe, moreover, that those whose duty it is to tackle the
problem professionally and practically are growing only too aware
of their impotence to deal with it, and have now a very lively desire
to learn the views of men who, absorbed in the pursuit of science,
can see world-problems in the perspective distance lends. As for
me, the normal objective of my thought affords no insight into the
dark places of human will and feeling. Thus, in the enquiry now
proposed, I can do little more than seek to clarify the question
at issue and, clearing the ground of the more obvious solutions,
enable you to bring the light of your far-reaching knowledge of
man’s instinctive life to bear upon the problem...
“As one immune from nationalist bias, I personally see a simple
way of dealing with the superficial (i.e. administrative) aspect of
the problem: the setting up, by international consent, of a leg-
1
This book makes use of my previously published book chapters, but a considerable
amount of new material has also been added.
1
islative and judicial body to settle every conflict arising between
nations. Each nation would undertake to abide by the orders issued
by this legislative body, to invoke its decision in every dispute, to
accept its judgments unreservedly and to carry out every measure
the tribunal deems necessary for the execution of its decrees. But
here, at the outset, I come up against a difficulty; a tribunal is a
human institution which, in proportion as the power at its disposal
is inadequate to enforce its verdicts, is all the more prone to suffer
these to be deflected by extrajudicial pressure... ”
Freud replied with a long and thoughtful letter in which he said that a
tendency towards conflict is an intrinsic part of human emotional nature, but
that emotions can be overridden by rationality, and that rational behavior is
the only hope for humankind.
2
a pond, surrounded by an adoring group of goslings who believe him to be
their mother. Lorenz also studied bonding behavior in waterfowl.
It is, however, for his controversial book On Aggression that Konrad
Lorenz is best known. In this book, Lorenz makes a distinction between
intergroup aggression and intragroup aggression. Among animals, he points
out, rank-determining fights are seldom fatal. Thus, for example, the fights
that determine leadership within a wolf pack end when the loser makes a
gesture of submission. By contrast, fights between groups of animals are
often fights to the death, examples being wars between ant colonies, or of
bees against intruders, or the defense of a rat pack against strange rats.
Many animals, humans included, seem willing to kill or be killed in de-
fense of the communities to which they belong. Lorenz calls this behavioral
tendency a “communal defense response”. He points out that the “holy
shiver” - the tingling of the spine that humans experience when performing a
heroic act in defense of their communities - is related to the prehuman reflex
for raising the hair on the back of an animal as it confronts an enemy - a
reflex that makes the animal seem larger than it really is.
In an essay entitled The Urge to Self-Destruction 2 , Arthur Koestler says:
3
defense mechanism (“militant enthusiasm”) described in biological terms by
Lorenz.
Population genetics
Human emotions evolved during the long period when our ancestors lived in
small, genetically homogeneous tribes, competing for territory on the grass-
lands of Africa.
To explain from an evolutionary point of view the communal defense
mechanism discussed by Lorenz - the willingness of humans to kill and be
killed in defense of their communities - we have only to imagine that our an-
cestors lived in small tribes and that marriage was likely to take place within
a tribe rather than across tribal boundaries. Under these circumstances, each
tribe would tend to consist of genetically similar individuals. The tribe it-
self, rather than the individual, would be the unit on which the evolutionary
forces of natural selection would act. The idea of group selection in evolution
was first proposed by J.B.S. Haldane and R.A. Fischer, and more recently it
has been discussed by W.D. Hamilton and E.O. Wilson.
Military-industrial complexes
In his farewell address, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned his na-
tion against the excessive power that had been acquired during World War
II by the military-industrial complex: “We have been compelled to create an
armaments industry of vast proportions,” Eisenhower said, “...Now this con-
junction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is
new in American experience. The total influence - economic, political, even
spiritual - is felt in every city, every state house, every office in the federal
government. ... We must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our
toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our
society. ... We must stand guard against the acquisition of unwarranted in-
fluence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our democratic
processes. We should take nothing for granted.”
Because the world spends roughly two trillion dollars each year on arma-
ments, it follows that very many people make their living from war. This is
the reason why it is correct to speak of war as a social, political and economic
4
institution, and also one of the main reasons why war persists, although ev-
eryone realizes that it is the cause of much of the suffering of humanity.
We know that war is madness, but it persists. We know that it threatens
the survival of our species, but it persists, entrenched in the attitudes of
historians, newspaper editors and television producers, entrenched in the
methods by which politicians finance their campaigns, and entrenched in the
financial power of arms manufacturers - entrenched also in the ponderous
and costly hardware of war, the fleets of warships, bombers, tanks, nuclear
missiles and so on.
Colonialism
The Industrial Revolution opened up an enormous gap in military strength
between the industrialized nations and the rest of the world. Taking advan-
tage of their superior weaponry, Europe, the United States and Japan rapidly
carved up the remainder of the world into colonies, which acted as sources
of raw materials and food, and as markets for manufactured goods. Between
1800 and 1914, the percentage of the earth under the domination of colonial
powers increased to 85 percent, if former colonies are included.
The English economist and Fabian, John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940),
offered a famous explanation of the colonial era in his book “Imperialism: A
Study” (1902). According to Hobson, the basic problem that led to colonial
expansion was an excessively unequal distribution of incomes in the indus-
trialized countries. The result of this unequal distribution was that neither
the rich nor the poor could buy back the total output of their society. The
incomes of the poor were insufficient, and rich were too few in number. The
rich had finite needs, and tended to reinvest their money. As Hobson pointed
out, reinvestment in new factories only made the situation worse by increas-
ing output.
Hobson had been sent as a reporter by the Manchester Guardian to cover
the Second Boer War. His experiences had convinced him that colonial wars
have an economic motive. Such wars are fought, he believed, to facilitate
investment of the excess money of the rich in African or Asian plantations and
mines, and to make possible the overseas sale of excess manufactured goods.
Hobson believed imperialism to be immoral. The cure that he recommended
was a more equal distribution of incomes in the manufacturing countries.
5
Nuclear war
Do our “Defense Departments” really defend us? Absolutely not! Their
very title is a lie. The military-industrial complex sells itself by claiming to
defend civilians. It justifies vast and crippling budgets by this claim; but it
is a fraud. For the military-industrial complex, the only goal is money and
power. Civilians like ourselves are just hostages. We are expendable. We are
pawns in the power game, the money game.
Nations possessing nuclear weapons threaten each other with “Mutually
Assured Destruction”, which has the very appropriate acronym MAD.
What does this mean? Does it mean that civilians are being protected?
Not at all. Instead they are threatened with complete destruction. Civilians
here play the role of hostages in the power games of their leaders.
A thermonuclear war today would be not only genocidal but also omnici-
dal. It would kill people of all ages, babies, children, young people, mothers,
fathers and grandparents, without any regard whatever for guilt or inno-
cence. Such a war would be the ultimate ecological catastrophe, destroying
not only human civilization but also much of the biosphere.
6
8
Contents
2 TRIBALISM 55
2.1 Ethology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 Population genetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3 Formation of group identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4 Religion and ethnic identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5 Tribal markings; ethnicity; pseudospeciation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.6 The mystery of self-sacrifice in war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.7 Fischer, Haldane, Hamilton and Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.8 Cooperation in groups of animals and human groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.9 Trading in primitive societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.10 Interdependence in modern human society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.11 Two sides of human nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.12 Tribalism and agreed-upon lies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.13 From tribalism to nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.14 Nationalism in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
9
10 CONTENTS
“The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our ways of thinking, and
thus we drift towards unparalleled catastrophes.”
“I don’t know what will be used in the next world war, but the 4th will be fought with stones.”
Besides being one of the greatest physicists of all time, Albert Einstein was a lifelong
pacifist, and his thoughts on peace can speak eloquently to us today. We need his wisdom
today, when the search for peace has become vital to our survival as a species.
13
14 WHY WAR?
and miserable in Munich, where he was supposed to finish his course at the gymnasium.
Einstein’s classmates had given him the nickname “Beidermeier”, which means something
like “Honest John”; and his tactlessness in criticizing authority soon got him into trouble.
In Einstein’s words, what happened next was the following: “When I was in the seventh
grade at the Lutpold Gymnasium, I was summoned by my home-room teacher, who ex-
pressed the wish that I leave the school. To my remark that I had done nothing wrong, he
replied only, ‘Your mere presence spoils the respect of the class for me’.”
Einstein left gymnasium without graduating, and followed his parents to Italy, where
he spent a joyous and carefree year. He also decided to change his citizenship. “The
over-emphasized military mentality of the German State was alien to me, even as a boy”,
Einstein wrote later. “When my father moved to Italy, he took steps, at my request, to
have me released from German citizenship, because I wanted to be a Swiss citizen.”
The financial circumstances of the Einstein family were now precarious, and it was clear
that Albert would have to think seriously about a practical career. In 1896, he entered
the famous Zürich Polytechnic Institute with the intention of becoming a teacher of math-
ematics and physics. However, his undisciplined and nonconformist attitudes again got
him into trouble. His mathematics professor, Hermann Minkowski (1864-1909), considered
Einstein to be a “lazy dog”; and his physics professor, Heinrich Weber, who originally had
gone out of his way to help Einstein, said to him in anger and exasperation: “You’re a
clever fellow, but you have one fault: You won’t let anyone tell you a thing! You won’t let
anyone tell you a thing!”
Einstein missed most of his classes, and read only the subjects which interested him. He
was interested most of all in Maxwell’s theory of electro-magnetism, a subject which was
too “modern” for Weber. There were two major examinations at the Zürich Polytechnic
Institute, and Einstein would certainly have failed them had it not been for the help of his
loyal friend, the mathematician Marcel Grossman.
Grossman was an excellent and conscientious student, who attended every class and
took meticulous notes. With the help of these notes, Einstein managed to pass his ex-
aminations; but because he had alienated Weber and the other professors who could have
helped him, he found himself completely unable to get a job. In a letter to Professor F.
Ostwald on behalf of his son, Einstein’s father wrote: “My son is profoundly unhappy
because of his present joblessness; and every day the idea becomes more firmly implanted
in his mind that he is a failure, and will not be able to find the way back again.”
From this painful situation, Einstein was rescued (again!) by his friend Marcel Gross-
man, whose influential father obtained for Einstein a position at the Swiss Patent Office:
Technical Expert (Third Class). Anchored at last in a safe, though humble, position, Ein-
stein married one of his classmates. He learned to do his work at the Patent Office very
efficiently; and he used the remainder of his time on his own calculations, hiding them
guiltily in a drawer when footsteps approached.
In 1905, this Technical Expert (Third Class) astonished the world of science with five
papers, written within a few weeks of each other, and published in the Annalen der Physik.
Of these five papers, three were classics: One of these was the paper in which Einstein ap-
1.1. FAMILY BACKGROUND 15
Figure 1.4: Olympia Academy founders: Conrad Habicht, Maurice Solovine and
Einstein.
1.1. FAMILY BACKGROUND 19
Figure 1.9: Einstein (left) and Charlie Chaplin at the Hollywood premiere of
City Lights, January 1931.
24 WHY WAR?
plied Planck’s quantum hypothesis to the photoelectric effect. The second paper discussed
“Brownian motion”, the zig-zag motion of small particles suspended in a liquid and hit
randomly by the molecules of the liquid. This paper supplied a direct proof of the validity
of atomic ideas and of Boltzmann’s kinetic theory. The third paper was destined to estab-
lish Einstein’s reputation as one of the greatest physicists of all time. It was entitled “On
the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, and in this paper, Albert Einstein formulated his
special theory of relativity. Essentially, this theory maintained that all of the fundamental
laws of nature exhibit a symmetry with respect to rotations in a 4-dimensional space-time
continuum.
coordinates). The law will then be independent of the motion of the observer, provided
that the observer is moving uniformly.
Einstein was able to show that, when properly expressed, Maxwell’s equations are
already Lorentz-invariant; but Newton’s equations of motion have to be modified. When
the needed modifications are made, Einstein found, then the mass of a moving particle
appears to increase as it is accelerated. A particle can never be accelerated to a velocity
greater than the velocity of light; it merely becomes heavier and heavier, the added energy
being converted into mass.
From his 1905 theory, Einstein deduced his famous formula equating the energy of a
system to its mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of light. As we shall see, his
formula was soon used to explain the source of the energy produced by decaying uranium
and radium; and eventually it led to the construction of the atomic bomb. Thus Einstein,
a lifelong pacifist, who renounced his German citizenship as a protest against militarism,
became instrumental in the construction of the most destructive weapon ever invented - a
weapon which casts an ominous shadow over the future of humankind.
Just as Einstein was one of the first to take Planck’s quantum hypothesis seriously, so
Planck was one of the first physicists to take Einstein’s relativity seriously. Another early
enthusiast for relativity was Hermann Minkowski, Einstein’s former professor of mathe-
matics. Although he once had characterized Einstein as a “lazy dog”, Minkowski now
contributed importantly to the mathematical formalism of Einstein’s theory; and in 1907,
he published the first book on relativity. In honor of Minkowski’s contributions to relativity,
the 4-dimensional space-time continuum in which we live is sometimes called “Minkowski
space”.
In 1908, Minkowski began a lecture to the Eightieth Congress of German Scientists and
Physicians with the following words:
“ From now on, space by itself, and time by itself, are destined to sink completely into
the shadows; and only a kind of union of both will retain an independent existence.”
Gradually, the importance of Einstein’s work began to be realized, and he was much
sought after. He was first made Assistant Professor at the University of Zürich, then full
Professor in Prague, then Professor at the Zürich Polytechnic Institute; and finally, in
1913, Planck and Nernst persuaded Einstein to become Director of Scientific Research at
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. He was at this post when the First World War
broke out
While many other German intellectuals produced manifestos justifying Germany’s in-
vasion of Belgium, Einstein dared to write and sign an anti-war manifesto. Einstein’s
manifesto appealed for cooperation and understanding among the scholars of Europe for
the sake of the future; and it proposed the eventual establishment of a League of Euro-
peans. During the war, Einstein remained in Berlin, doing whatever he could for the cause
of peace, burying himself unhappily in his work, and trying to forget the agony of Europe,
whose civilization was dying in a rain of shells, machine-gun bullets, and poison gas.
1.3. GENERAL RELATIVITY 27
Figure 1.11: Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein (public domain). Their ex-
change of letters entitled “Why War?” deserves to be read by everyone con-
cerned with the human future.
30 WHY WAR?
“Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?
“It is common knowledge that, with the advance of modern science, this
issue has come to mean a matter of life and death for civilization as we know
it; nevertheless, for all the zeal displayed, every attempt at its solution has
ended in a lamentable breakdown.
“I believe, moreover, that those whose duty it is to tackle the problem
professionally and practically are growing only too aware of their impotence to
deal with it, and have now a very lively desire to learn the views of men who,
absorbed in the pursuit of science, can see world-problems in the perspective
distance lends. As for me, the normal objective of my thought affords no
insight into the dark places of human will and feeling. Thus, in the enquiry
now proposed, I can do little more than seek to clarify the question at issue
1.4. EINSTEIN’S LETTER TO FREUD: WHY WAR? 31
and, clearing the ground of the more obvious solutions, enable you to bring
the light of your far-reaching knowledge of man’s instinctive life to bear upon
the problem...
“As one immune from nationalist bias, I personally see a simple way of
dealing with the superficial (i.e. administrative) aspect of the problem: the
setting up, by international consent, of a legislative and judicial body to settle
every conflict arising between nations. Each nation would undertake to abide
by the orders issued by this legislative body, to invoke its decision in every
dispute, to accept its judgments unreservedly and to carry out every measure
the tribunal deems necessary for the execution of its decrees. But here, at the
outset, I come up against a difficulty; a tribunal is a human institution which,
in proportion as the power at its disposal is inadequate to enforce its verdicts,
is all the more prone to suffer these to be deflected by extrajudicial pressure.
This is a fact with which we have to reckon; law and might inevitably go hand in
hand, and juridical decisions approach more nearly the ideal justice demanded
by the community (in whose name and interests these verdicts are pronounced)
in so far as the community has effective power to compel respect of its juridical
ideal. But at present we are far from possessing any supranational organization
competent to render verdicts of incontestable authority and enforce absolute
submission to the execution of its verdicts. Thus I am led to my first axiom: the
quest of international security involves the unconditional surrender by every
nation, in a certain measure, of its liberty of action, its sovereignty that is
to say, and it is clear beyond all doubt that no other road can lead to such
security.
“The ill-success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during
the last decade to reach this goal leaves us no room to doubt that strong psycho-
logical factors are at work, which paralyse these efforts. Some of these factors
are not far to seek. The craving for power which characterizes the govern-
ing class in every nation is hostile to any limitation of the national sovereignty.
This political power-hunger is wont to batten on the activities of another group,
whose aspirations are on purely mercenary, economic lines. I have specially in
mind that small but determined group, active in every nation, composed of
individuals who, indifferent to social considerations and restraints, regard war-
fare, the manufacture and sale of arms, simply as an occasion to advance their
personal interests and enlarge their personal authority.
“But recognition of this obvious fact is merely the first step towards an
appreciation of the actual state of affairs. Another question follows hard upon
it: how is it possible for this small clique to bend the will of the majority, who
stand to lose and suffer by a state of war, to the service of their ambitions?
(In speaking of the majority, I do not exclude soldiers of every rank who have
chosen war as their profession, in the belief that they are serving to defend
the highest interests of their race, and that attack is often the best method
of defense.) An obvious answer to this question would seem to be that the
32 WHY WAR?
minority, the ruling class at present, has the schools and press, usually the
Church as well, under its thumb. This enables it to organize and sway the
emotions of the masses, and make its tool of them.
“Yet even this answer does not provide a complete solution. Another ques-
tion arises from it: How is it these devices succeed so well in rousing men to
such wild enthusiasm, even to sacrifice their lives? Only one answer is possible.
Because man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction. In normal times
this passion exists in a latent state, it emerges only in unusual circumstances;
but it is a comparatively easy task to call it into play and raise it to the power
of a collective psychosis. Here lies, perhaps, the crux of all the complex of fac-
tors we are considering, an enigma that only the expert in the lore of human
instincts can resolve.
“And so we come to our last question. Is it possible to control man’s mental
evolution so as to make him proof against the psychoses of hate and destruc-
tiveness? Here I am thinking by no means only of the so-called uncultured
masses. Experience proves that it is rather the so-called ‘Intelligentzia’ that is
most apt to yield to these disastrous collective suggestions, since the intellec-
tual has no direct contact with life in the raw, but encounters it in its easiest,
synthetic form upon the printed page.
“To conclude: I have so far been speaking only of wars between nations;
what are known as international conflicts. But I am well aware that the ag-
gressive instinct operates under other forms and in other circumstances. (I am
thinking of civil wars, for instance, due in earlier days to religious zeal, but
nowadays to social factors; or, again, the persecution of racial minorities). But
my insistence on what is the most typical, most cruel and extravagant form of
conflict between man and man was deliberate, for here we have the best occa-
sion of discovering ways and means to render all armed conflicts impossible.
“A. Einstein”
Freud replied with a long and thoughtful letter in which he said that a tendency towards
conflict is an intrinsic part of human emotional nature, but that emotions can be overridden
by rationality, and that rational behavior is the only hope for humankind.
produces roughly 100 gram-calories of heat per hour. This did not seem like much energy
until Rutherford found that radium has a half-life of about 1,000 years. In other words,
after a thousand years, a gram of radium will still be producing heat, its radioactivity only
reduced to one-half its original value. During a thousand years, a gram of radium produces
about a million kilocalories, an enormous amount of energy in relation to the tiny size of
its source! Where did this huge amount of energy come from? Conservation of energy was
one of the most basic principles of physics. Would it have to be abandoned?
The source of the almost-unbelievable amounts of energy released in radioactive decay
could be understood through Einstein’s formula equating the energy of a system to its
mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of light, and through accurate measurements
of atomic weights. Einstein’s formula asserted that mass and energy are equivalent. It
was realized that in radioactive decay, neither mass nor energy is conserved, but only a
quantity more general than both, of which mass and energy are particular forms. Scientists
in several parts of the world realized that Einstein’s discovery of the relationship between
mass and energy, together with the discovery of fission of the heavy element uranium meant
that it might be possible to construct a uranium-fission bomb of immense power.
Meanwhile night was falling on Europe. In 1929, an economic depression had begun
in the United States and had spread to Europe. Without the influx of American capital,
the postwar reconstruction of the German economy collapsed. The German middle class,
which had been dealt a severe blow by the great inflation of 1923, now received a second
heavy blow. The desperate economic chaos drove German voters into the hands of political
extremists.
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor and leader of a coalition
cabinet by President Hindenburg. Although Hitler was appointed legally to this post,
he quickly consolidated his power by unconstitutional means: On May 2, Hitler’s police
seized the headquarters of all trade unions, and arrested labor leaders. The Communist
and Socialist parties were also banned, their assets seized and their leaders arrested. Other
political parties were also smashed. Acts were passed eliminating Jews from public service;
and innocent Jewish citizens were boycotted, beaten and arrested. On March 11, 1938,
Nazi troops entered Austria.
On March 16, 1939, the Italian physicist Enrico Fermi (who by then was a refugee in
America) went to Washington to inform the Office of Naval Operations that it might be
possible to construct an atomic bomb; and on the same day, German troops poured into
Czechoslovakia.
A few days later, a meeting of six German atomic physicists was held in Berlin to
discuss the applications of uranium fission. Otto Hahn, the discoverer of fission, was not
present, since it was known that he was opposed to the Nazi regime. He was even said to
have exclaimed: “I only hope that you physicists will never construct a uranium bomb! If
Hitler ever gets a weapon like that, I’ll commit suicide.”
The meeting of German atomic physicists was supposed to be secret; but one of the
participants reported what had been said to Dr. S. Flügge, who wrote an article about
uranium fission and about the possibility of a chain reaction. Flügge’s article appeared in
the July issue of Naturwissenschaften, and a popular version in the Deutsche Allgemeine
34 WHY WAR?
Zeitung. These articles greatly increased the alarm of American atomic scientists, who
reasoned that if the Nazis permitted so much to be printed, they must be far advanced on
the road to building an atomic bomb.
In the summer of 1939, while Hitler was preparing to invade Poland, alarming news
reached the physicists in the United States: A second meeting of German atomic scientists
had been held in Berlin, this time under the auspices of the Research Division of the
German Army Weapons Department. Furthermore, Germany had stopped the sale of
uranium from mines in Czechoslovakia.
The world’s most abundant supply of uranium, however, was not in Czechoslovakia,
but in Belgian Congo. Leo Szilard, a refugee Hungarian physicist who had worked with
Fermi to measure the number of neutrons produced in uranium fission, was deeply worried
that the Nazis were about to construct atomic bombs; and it occurred to him that uranium
from Belgian Congo should not be allowed to fall into their hands.
Szilard knew that his former teacher, Albert Einstein, was a personal friend of Elizabeth,
the Belgian Queen Mother. Einstein had met Queen Elizabeth and King Albert of Belgium
at the Solvay Conferences, and mutual love of music had cemented a friendship between
them. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Einstein had moved to the Institute of Advanced
Studies at Princeton; and Szilard decided to visit him there. Szilard reasoned that because
of Einstein’s great prestige, and because of his long-standing friendship with the Belgian
Royal Family, he would be the proper person to warn the Belgians not to let their uranium
fall into the hands of the Nazis. Einstein agreed to write to the Belgian king and queen.
On August 2, 1939, Szilard again visited Einstein, accompanied by Edward Teller
and Eugene Wigner, who (like Szilard) were refugee Hungarian physicists. By this time,
Szilard’s plans had grown more ambitious; and he carried with him the draft of another
letter, this time to the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Einstein made a few
corrections, and then signed the fateful letter, which reads (in part) as follows:
“Some recent work of E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in
manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into an important
source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation seem to call for
watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration. I believe,
therefore, that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following..”
“It is conceivable that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may be constructed.
A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded a port, might very well destroy
the whole port, together with some of the surrounding territory..”
The letter also called Roosevelt’s attention to the fact that Germany had already
stopped the export of uranium from the Czech mines under German control. After making
a few corrections, Einstein signed it. On October 11, 1939, three weeks after the defeat
of Poland, Roosevelt’s economic adviser, Alexander Sachs, personally delivered the letter
to the President. After discussing it with Sachs, the President commented,“This calls for
action.” Later, when atomic bombs were dropped on civilian populations in an already
virtually-defeated Japan, Einstein bitterly regretted having signed Szilard’s letter to Roo-
sevelt. He said repeatedly that signing the letter was the greatest mistake of his life, and
his remorse was extreme.
1.6. A FEW MORE THINGS THAT EINSTEIN SAID ABOUT PEACE: 35
Throughout the remainder of his life, in addition to his scientific work, Einstein worked
tirelessly for peace, international understanding and nuclear disarmament. His last public
act, only a few days before his death in 1955, was to sign the Russell-Einstein Manifesto,
warning humankind of the catastrophic consequences that would follow from a war with
nuclear weapons.
It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.
The world is a dangerous place to live; not because of the people who are evil, but because
of the people who don’t do anything about it.
Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting to get different results.
Nothing will end war unless the people themselves refuse to go to war.
Past thinking and methods did not prevent world wars. Future thinking must prevent war.
Taken as a whole, I would believe that Gandhi’s views were the most enlightened of all
political men of our time.
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54 WHY WAR?
Chapter 2
TRIBALISM
2.1 Ethology
In the long run, because of the terrible weapons that have already been produced through
the misuse of science, and because of the even more terrible weapons that are likely to be
invented in the future, the only way in which we can ensure the survival of civilization is
to abolish the institution of war. But is this possible? Or are the emotions that make
war possible so much a part of human nature that we cannot stop humans from fighting
any more than we can stop cats and dogs from fighting? Can biological science throw any
light on the problem of why our supposedly rational species seems intent on choosing war,
pain and death instead of peace, happiness and life? To answer this question, we need to
turn to the science of ethology - the study of inherited emotional tendencies and behavior
patterns in animals and humans.
In The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin devoted a chapter to the evolution of instincts,
and he later published a separate book on The Expression of the Emotions in Man and
Animals. Because of these pioneering studies, Darwin is considered to be the founder of
ethology.
Behind Darwin’s work in this field is the observation that instinctive behavior patterns
are just as reliably inherited as morphological characteristics. Darwin was also impressed by
the fact that within a given species, behavior patterns have some degree of uniformity, and
the fact that the different species within a family are related by similarities of instinctive
behavior, just as they are related by similarities of bodily form. For example, certain
elements of cat-like behavior can be found among all members of the cat family; and
certain elements of dog-like or wolf-like behavior can be found among all members of the
dog family. On the other hand, there are small variations in instinct among the members
of a given species. For example, not all domestic dogs behave in the same way.
“Let us look at the familiar case of breeds of dogs”, Darwin wrote in The Origin of
Species, “It cannot be doubted that young pointers will sometimes point and even back
other dogs the very first time they are taken out; retrieving is certainly in some degree
inherited by retrievers; and a tendency to run round, instead of at, a flock of sheep by
55
56 WHY WAR?
shepherd dogs. I cannot see that these actions, performed without experience by the
young, and in nearly the same manner by each individual, and without the end being
known - for the young pointer can no more know that he points to aid his master than the
white butterfly knows why she lays her eggs on the leaf of the cabbage - I cannot see that
these actions differ essentially from true instincts...”
“How strongly these domestic instincts habits and dispositions are inherited, and how
curiously they become mingled, is well shown when different breeds of dogs are crossed.
Thus it is known that a cross with a bulldog has affected for many generations the courage
and obstinacy of greyhounds; and a cross with a greyhound has given to a whole family of
shepherd dogs a tendency to hunt hares...”
Darwin believed that in nature, desirable variations of instinct are propagated by nat-
ural selection, just as in the domestication of animals, favorable variations of instinct
are selected and propagated by kennelmen and stock breeders. In this way, according
to Darwin, complex and highly developed instincts, such as the comb-making instinct of
honey-bees, have evolved by natural selection from simpler instincts, such as the instinct
by which bumble bees use their old cocoons to hold honey and sometimes add a short wax
tube.
In the introduction of his book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals,
Darwin says “I thought it very important to ascertain whether the same expressions and
gestures prevail, as has often been asserted without much evidence, with all the races of
mankind, especially with those who have associated but little with Europeans. Whenever
the same movements of the features or body express the same emotions in several distinct
races of man, we may infer with much probability, that such expressions are true ones, -
that is, are innate or instinctive.”
To gather evidence on this point, Darwin sent a printed questionnaire on the expression
58 WHY WAR?
of human emotions and sent it to missionaries and colonial administrators in many parts
of the world. There were 16 questions to be answered:
1. Is astonishment expressed by the eyes and mouth being opened wide, and by the
eyebrows being raised?
2. Does shame excite a blush when the colour of the skin allows it to be visible? and
especially how low down on the body does the blush extend?
3. When a man is indignant or defiant does he frown, hold his body and head erect,
square his shoulders and clench his fists?
4. When considering deeply on any subject, or trying to understand any puzzle, does he
frown, or wrinkle the skin beneath the lower eyelids?
and so on.
Darwin received 36 replies to his questionnaire, many coming from people who were
in contact with extremely distinct and isolated groups of humans. The results convinced
him that our emotions and the means by which they are expressed are to a very large
extent innate, rather than culturally determined, since the answers to his questionnaire
were so uniform and so independent of both culture and race. In preparation for his
book, he also closely observed the emotions and their expression in very young babies and
children, hoping to see inherited characteristics in subjects too young to have been greatly
influenced by culture. Darwin’s observations convinced him that in humans, just as in
other mammals, the emotions and their expression are to a very large extent inherited
universal characteristics of the species.
The study of inherited behavior patterns in animals (and humans) was continued in
the 20th century by such researchers as Karl von Frisch (1886-1982), Nikolaas Tinbergen
(1907-1988), and Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989), three scientists who shared a Nobel Prize in
Medicine and Physiology in 1973.
Karl von Frisch, the first of the three ethologists who shared the 1973 prize, is famous
for his studies of the waggle-dance of honeybees. Bees guide each other to sources of food
by a genetically programmed signaling method - the famous waggle dance, deciphered in
1945 by von Frisch. When a worker bee has found a promising food source, she returns to
the hive and performs a complex dance, the pattern of which indicates both the direction
and distance of the food. The dancer moves repeatedly in a pattern resembling the Greek
letter Θ. If the food-discoverer is able to perform her dance on a horizontal flat surface in
view of the sun, the line in the center of the pattern points in the direction of the food.
However, if the dance is performed in the interior of the hive on a vertical surface, gravity
takes the place of the sun, and the angle between the central line and the vertical represents
the angle between the food source and the sun.
The central part of the dance is, in a way, a re-enactment of the excited forager’s flight
to the food. As she traverses the central portion of the pattern, she buzzes her wings and
waggles her abdomen rapidly, the number of waggles indicating the approximate distance
2.1. ETHOLOGY 59
to the food 1 . After this central portion of the dance, she turns alternately to the left or
to the right, following one or the other of the semicircles, and repeats the performance.
Studies of the accuracy with which her hive-mates follow these instructions show that the
waggle dance is able to convey approximately 7 bits of information - 3 bits concerning
distance and 4 bits concerning direction. After making his initial discovery of the meaning
of the dance, von Frisch studied the waggle dance in many species of bees. He was able
to distinguish species-specific dialects, and to establish a plausible explanation for the
evolution of the dance.
Among the achievements for which Tinbergen is famous are his classic studies of instinct
in herring gulls. He noticed that the newly-hatched chick of a herring gull pecks at the beak
of its parent, and this signal causes the parent gull to regurgitate food into the gaping beak
of the chick. Tinbergen wondered what signal causes the chick to initiate this response by
pecking at the beak of the parent gull. Therefore he constructed a series of models of the
parent in which certain features of the adult gull were realistically represented while other
features were crudely represented or left out entirely. He found by trial and error that
the essential signal to which the chick responds is the red spot on the tip of its parent’s
beak. Models which lacked the red spot produced almost no response from the young chick,
although in other respects they were realistic models; and the red spot on an otherwise
crude model would make the chick peck with great regularity.
In other experiments, Tinbergen explored the response of newly-hatched chicks of the
common domestic hen to models representing a hawk. Since the chicks were able to rec-
ognize a hawk immediately after hatching, he knew that the response must be genetically
programmed. Just as he had done in his experiments with herring gulls, Tinbergen ex-
perimented with various models, trying to determine the crucial characteristic that was
recognized by the chicks, causing them to run for cover. He discovered that a crude model
in the shape of the letter T invariable caused the response if pulled across the sky with the
wings first and tail last. (Pulled backwards, the T shape caused no response.)
In the case of a newly-hatched herring gull chick pecking at the red spot on the beak
of its parent, the program in the chick’s brain must be entirely genetically determined,
without any environmental component at all. Learning cannot play a part in this behav-
ioral pattern, since the pattern is present in the young chick from the very moment when
it breaks out of the egg. On the other hand (Tinbergen pointed out) many behavioral
patterns in animals and in man have both an hereditary component and an environmen-
tal component. Learning is often very important, but learning seems to be built on a
foundation of genetic predisposition.
To illustrate this point, Tinbergen called attention to the case of sheep-dogs, whose
remote ancestors were wolves. These dogs, Tinbergen tells us, can easily be trained to
drive a flock of sheep towards the shepherd. However, it is difficult to train them to drive
the sheep away from their master. Tinbergen explained this by saying that the sheep-dogs
regard the shepherd as their “pack leader”; and since driving the prey towards the pack
1
The number of waggles is largest when the source of food is near, and for extremely nearby food, the
bees use another dance, the “round dance”.
60 WHY WAR?
Figure 2.3: The red spot on the beak of the parent gull proved to be the crucial
signal needed to activate the instinctive response of the chick.
Figure 2.4: Nikolaas Tinbergen (1907-1988) on the left, with Konrad Lorenz
(1903-1989). Together with Karl von Frisch (1886-1982) they shared the 1973
Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine for their pioneering work in Ethology.
2.1. ETHOLOGY 61
Figure 2.5: Konrad Lorenz with geese who consider him to be their mother.
leader is part of the hunting instinct of wolves, it is easy to teach the dogs this maneuver.
However, driving the prey away from the pack leader would not make sense for wolves
hunting in a pack; it is not part of the instinctive makeup of wolves, nor is it a natural
pattern of behavior for their remote descendants, the sheep-dogs.
As a further example of the fact that learning is usually built on a foundation of genetic
predisposition, Tinbergen mentions the ease with which human babies learn languages. The
language learned is determined by the baby’s environment; but the astonishing ease with
which a human baby learns to speak and understand implies a large degree of genetic
predisposition.
The third of the 1973 prizewinners, Konrad Lorenz, is more controversial, but at the
same time very interesting in the context of studies of the causes of war and discussions
of how war may be avoided. As a young boy, he was very fond of animals, and his
tolerant parents allowed him to build up a large menagerie in their house in Altenberg,
Austria. Even as a child, he became an expert on waterfowl behavior, and he discovered
the phenomenon of imprinting. He was given a one day old duckling, and found, to his
intense joy, that it transferred its following response to his person. As Lorenz discovered,
young waterfowl have a short period immediately after being hatched, when they identify
as their “mother” whomever they see first. In later life, Lorenz continued his studies of
imprinting, and there exists a touching photograph of him, with his white beard, standing
waist-deep in a pond, surrounded by an adoring group of goslings who believe him to be
62 WHY WAR?
death in battle in defense of country and religion is still praised by nationalists. However,
because of the development of weapons of mass destruction, both nationalism and narrow
patriotism have become dangerous anachronisms.
In thinking of violence and war, we must be extremely careful not to confuse the behav-
ioral patterns that lead to wife-beating or bar-room brawls with those that lead to episodes
like the trench warfare of the First World War, or to the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. The first type of aggression is similar to the rank-determining fights of ani-
mals, while the second is more akin to the team-spirit exhibited by a football side. Heroic
behavior in defense of one’s community has been praised throughout the ages, but the
tendency to such behavior has now become a threat to the survival of civilization, since
tribalism makes war possible, and war with thermonuclear weapons threatens civilization
with catastrophe.
In an essay entitled The Urge to Self-Destruction 3 , Arthur Koestler says:
“Even a cursory glance at history should convince one that individual crimes, committed
for selfish motives, play a quite insignificant role in the human tragedy compared with the
numbers massacred in unselfish love of one’s tribe, nation, dynasty, church or ideology...
Wars are not fought for personal gain, but out of loyalty and devotion to king, country or
cause...”
“We have seen on the screen the radiant love of the Führer on the faces of the Hitler
Youth... They are transfixed with love, like monks in ecstasy on religious paintings. The
sound of the nation’s anthem, the sight of its proud flag, makes you feel part of a wonder-
fully loving community. The fanatic is prepared to lay down his life for the object of his
worship, as the lover is prepared to die for his idol. He is, alas, also prepared to kill anybody
who represents a supposed threat to the idol.” The emotion described here by Koestler
is the same as the communal defense mechanism (“militant enthusiasm”) described in
biological terms by Lorenz.
In his book On Aggression, Konrad Lorenz gives the following description of the emo-
tions of a hero preparing to risk his life for the sake of the group:
“In reality, militant enthusiasm is a specialized form of communal aggression, clearly
distinct from and yet functionally related to the more primitive forms of individual ag-
gression. Every man of normally strong emotions knows, from his own experience, the
subjective phenomena that go hand in hand with the response of militant enthusiasm. A
shiver runs down the back and, as more exact observation shows, along the outside of both
arms. One soars elated, above all the ties of everyday life, one is ready to abandon all for
the call of what, in the moment of this specific emotion, seems to be a sacred duty. All
obstacles in its path become unimportant; the instinctive inhibitions against hurting or
killing one’s fellows lose, unfortunately, much of their power. Rational considerations, crit-
icisms, and all reasonable arguments against the behavior dictated by militant enthusiasm
are silenced by an amazing reversal of all values, making them appear not only untenable,
but base and dishonorable.
3
in The Place of Value in a World of Facts, A. Tiselius and S. Nielsson editors, Wiley, New York,
(1970)
64 WHY WAR?
Men may enjoy the feeling of absolute righteousness even while they commit atrocities.
Conceptual thought and moral responsibility are at their lowest ebb. As the Ukrainian
proverb says: ‘When the banner is unfurled, all reason is in the trumpet’.”
“The subjective experiences just described are correlated with the following objectively
demonstrable phenomena. The tone of the striated musculature is raised, the carriage is
stiffened, the arms are raised from the sides and slightly rotated inward, so that the elbows
point outward. The head is proudly raised, the chin stuck out, and the facial muscles
mime the ‘hero face’ familiar from the films. On the back and along the outer surface of
the arms, the hair stands on end. This is the objectively observed aspect of the shiver!”
“Anybody who has ever seen the corresponding behavior of the male chimpanzee de-
fending his band or family with self-sacrificing courage will doubt the purely spiritual
character of human enthusiasm. The chimp, too, sticks out his chin, stiffens his body, and
raises his elbows; his hair stands on end, producing a terrifying magnification of his body
contours as seen from the front. The inward rotation of the arms obviously has the purpose
of turning the longest-haired side outward to enhance the effect. The whole combination
of body attitude and hair-raising constitutes a bluff. This is also seen when a cat humps
its back, and is calculated to make the animal appear bigger and more dangerous than it
really is. Our shiver, which in German poetry is called a ‘heiliger Schauer’, a ‘holy’ shiver,
turns out to be the vestige of a prehuman vegetative response for making a fur bristle which
we no longer have. To the humble seeker for biological truth, there cannot be the slightest
doubt that human militant enthusiasm evolved out of a communal defense response of our
prehuman ancestor.”
Lorenz goes on to say, “An impartial visitor from another planet, looking at man as
he is today - in his hand the atom bomb, the product of his intelligence - in his heart
the aggression drive, inherited from his anthropoid ancestors, which the same intelligence
cannot control - such a visitor would not give mankind much chance of survival.”
There are some semantic difficulties connected with discussions of the parts of human
nature that make war possible. In one of the passages quoted above, Konrad Lorenz speaks
of “militant enthusiasm”, which he says is both a form of communal aggression and also
a communal defense response. In their inspiring recent book War No More, Professor
Robert Hinde and Sir Joseph Rotblat use the word “duty” in discussing the same human
emotional tendencies. I will instead use the word “tribalism”.
I prefer the word “tribalism” because from an evolutionary point of view the human
emotions involved in war grew out of the territorial competition between small tribes
during the formative period when our ancestors were hunter-gatherers on the grasslands of
Africa. Members of tribe-like groups are bound together by strong bonds of altruism and
loyalty. Echos of these bonds can be seen in present-day family groups, in team sports, in
the fellowship of religious congregations, and in the bonds that link soldiers to their army
comrades and to their nation.
Warfare involves not only a high degree of aggression, but also an extremely high degree
of altruism. Soldiers kill, but they also sacrifice their own lives. Thus patriotism and duty
are as essential to war as the willingness to kill. As Arthur Koestler points out, “Wars are
not fought for personal gain, but out of loyalty and devotion to king, country or cause...”
2.2. POPULATION GENETICS 65
Tribalism involves passionate attachment to one’s own group, self-sacrifice for the sake
of the group, willingness both to die and to kill if necessary to defend the group from its
enemies, and belief that in case of a conflict, one’s own group is always in the right.
Figure 2.6: Sir Ronald Aylmer Fischer (1890-1962). Together with J.B.S Hal-
dane he pioneered the theory of population genetics. Recent contributions to
this theory have been made by W.D. Hamilton and E.O. Wilson.
2.3. FORMATION OF GROUP IDENTITY 67
our hunter-gatherer ancestors of 70,000 years ago, but cultural evolution has changed our
way of life beyond recognition.
Humans are capable of cultural evolution because it is so easy to overwrite and modify
our instinctive behavior patterns with learned behavior. Within the animal kingdom,
humans are undoubtedly the champions in this respect. No other species is so good at
learning as we are. During the early stages of cultural evolution, the tendency of humans
to be religious may have facilitated the overwriting of instinctive behavior with the culture
of the tribe. Since religions, like languages, are closely associated with particular cultures,
they serve as marks of ethnic identity.
In his book The Biology of War and Peace, Eibl-Eibesfeldt discusses the “tribal mark-
ings” used by groups of humans to underline their own identity and to clearly mark the
boundary between themselves and other groups. One of the illustrations in the book shows
the marks left by ritual scarification on the faces of the members of certain African tribes.
These scars would be hard to counterfeit, and they help to establish and strengthen tribal
identity. Seeing a photograph of the marks left by ritual scarification on the faces of
African tribesmen, it is impossible not to be reminded of the dueling scars that Prussian
army officers once used to distinguish their caste from outsiders.
Surveying the human scene, one can find endless examples of signs that mark the bearer
as a member of a particular group - signs that can be thought of as “tribal markings”:
tattoos; piercing; bones through the nose or ears; elongated necks or ears; filed teeth;
Chinese binding of feet; circumcision, both male and female; unique hair styles; decorations
of the tongue, nose, or naval; peculiarities of dress, fashions, veils, chadors, and headdresses;
caste markings in India; use or nonuse of perfumes; codes of honor and value systems;
traditions of hospitality and manners; peculiarities of diet (certain foods forbidden, others
preferred); giving traditional names to children; knowledge of dances and songs; knowledge
of recipes; knowledge of common stories, literature, myths, poetry or common history;
2.5. TRIBAL MARKINGS; ETHNICITY; PSEUDOSPECIATION 69
festivals, ceremonies, and rituals; burial customs, treatment of the dead and ancestor
worship; methods of building and decorating homes; games and sports peculiar to a culture;
relationship to animals, knowledge of horses and ability to ride; nonrational systems of
belief. Even a baseball hat worn backwards or the professed ability to enjoy atonal music
can mark a person as a member of a special “tribe”. Undoubtedly there many people in
New York who would never think of marrying someone who could not appreciate the the
paintings of Jasper Johns, and many in London who would consider anyone had not read
all the books of Virginia Wolfe to be entirely outside the bounds of civilization.
By far the most important mark of ethnic identity is language, and within a particular
language, dialect and accent. If the only purpose of language were communication, it would
be logical for the people of a small country like Denmark to stop speaking Danish and go
over to a more universally-understood international language such as English. However,
language has another function in addition to communication: It is also a mark of identity.
It establishes the boundary of the group.
Within a particular language, dialects and accents mark the boundaries of subgroups.
For example, in England, great social significance is attached to accents and diction, a
tendency that George Bernard Shaw satirized in his play, Pygmalion, which later gained
greater fame as the musical comedy, My Fair Lady. This being the case, we can ask why
all citizens of England do not follow the example of Eliza Doolittle in Shaw’s play, and
improve their social positions by acquiring Oxford accents. However, to do so would be
to run the risk of being laughed at by one’s peers and regarded as a traitor to one’s own
local community and friends. School children everywhere can be very cruel to any child
who does not fit into the local pattern. At Eton, an Oxford accent is compulsory; but in
a Yorkshire school, a child with an Oxford accent would suffer for it.
70 WHY WAR?
Figure 2.8: An example of the dueling scars that Prussian army officers once
used to distinguish their caste from outsiders.
2.5. TRIBAL MARKINGS; ETHNICITY; PSEUDOSPECIATION 71
Next after language, the most important “tribal marking” is religion. As mentioned
above, it seems probable that in the early history of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, religion
evolved as a mechanism for perpetuating tribal traditions and culture. Like language, and
like the innate facial expressions studied by Darwin, religion is a universal characteristic
of all human societies. All known races and cultures practice some sort of religion. Thus
a tendency to be religious seems to be built into human nature, or at any rate, the needs
that religion satisfies seem to be a part of our inherited makeup. Otherwise, religion would
not be so universal as it is.
Religion is often strongly associated with ethnicity and nationalism, that is to say, it
is associated with the demarcation of a particular group of people by its culture or race.
For example, the Jewish religion is associated with Zionism and with Jewish nationalism.
Similarly Islam is strongly associated with Arab nationalism. Christianity too has played
an important role in in many aggressive wars, for example in the Crusades, in the European
conquest of the New World, in European colonial conquests in Africa and Asia, and in the
wars between Catholics and Protestants within Europe. We shall see in a later chapter
how the originators of the German nationalist movement (the precursors of the Nazis),
used quasi-religious psychological methods.
The religious leaders of today’s world have the opportunity to contribute importantly
to the solution of the problem of war. They have the opportunity to powerfully support
the concept of universal human brotherhood, to build bridges between religious groups, to
make intermarriage across ethnic boundaries easier, and to soften the distinctions between
communities. If they fail to do this, they will have failed humankind at a time of crisis.
72 WHY WAR?
If we examine altruism and aggression in humans, we notice that members of our species
exhibit great altruism towards their own children. Kindness towards close relatives is also
characteristic of human behavior, and the closer the biological relationship is between
two humans, the greater is the altruism they tend to show towards each other. This
profile of altruism is easy to explain on the basis of Darwinian natural selection since two
closely related individuals share many genes and, if they cooperate, the genes will be more
effectively propagated.
To explain from an evolutionary point of view the communal defense mechanism - the
willingness of humans to kill and be killed in defense of their communities - we have only to
imagine that our ancestors lived in small tribes and that marriage was likely to take place
within a tribe rather than across tribal boundaries. Under these circumstances, each tribe
would tend to consist of genetically similar individuals. The tribe itself, rather than the
individual, would be the unit on which the evolutionary forces of natural selection would
act.
According to the group selection model, a tribe whose members showed altruism to-
wards each other would be more likely to survive than a tribe whose members cooperated
less effectively. Since several tribes might be in competition for the same territory, suc-
2.8. COOPERATION IN GROUPS OF ANIMALS AND HUMAN GROUPS 73
cessful aggression against a neighboring group could increase the chances for survival of
one’s own tribe. Thus, on the basis of the group selection model, one would expect hu-
mans to be kind and cooperative towards members of their own group, but at the same
time to sometimes exhibit aggression towards members of other groups, especially in con-
flicts over territory. One would also expect intergroup conflicts to be most severe in cases
where the boundaries between groups are sharpest - where marriage is forbidden across
the boundaries.
murderous. Humans have developed a genius for cooperation, the basis for culture and
civilization; but they are also capable of genocide; they were capable of massacres during
the Crusades, capable of genocidal wars against the Amerinds, capable of the Holocaust,
of Hiroshima, of the killing-fields of Cambodia, of Rwanda, and of Darfur
As an example of the two sides of human nature, we can think of Scandinavia. The
Vikings were once feared throughout Europe. The Book of Common Prayer in England
contains the phrase “Protect us from the fury of the Northmen!”. Today the same people
are so peaceful and law-abiding that they can be taken as an example for how we would
like a future world to look. Human nature has the possibility for both kinds of behavior
depending on the circumstances. This being so, there are strong reasons to enlist the help
of education and religion to make the bright side of human nature win over the dark side.
Today, the mass media are an important component of education, and thus the mass media
have a great responsibility for encouraging the cooperative and constructive side of human
nature rather than the dark and destructive side.
The enlargement of the fundamental political and social unit has been made necessary
and possible by improved transportation and communication, and by changes in the tech-
niques of warfare. In Europe, for example, the introduction of canons in warfare made
it possible to destroy castles, and thus the power of central monarchs was increased at
the expense of feudal barons. At the same time, improved roads made merchants wish to
trade freely over larger areas. Printing allowed larger groups of people to read the same
books and newspapers, and thus to experience the same emotions. Therefore the size of
the geographical unit over which it was possible to establish social and political cohesion
became enlarged.
The tragedy of our present situation is that the same forces that made the nation-state
replace the tribe as the fundamental political and social unit have continued to operate
with constantly-increasing intensity. For this reason, the totally sovereign nation-state
has become a dangerous anachronism. Although the world now functions as a single unit
because of modern technology, its political structure is based on fragments, on absolutely-
sovereign nation states - large compared to tribes, but too small for present-day technology,
since they do not include all of mankind. Gross injustices mar today’s global economic
interdependence, and because of the development of thermonuclear weapons, the continued
existence of civilization is threatened by the anarchy that exists today at the international
level.
In this chapter, we will discuss nationalism in Europe, and especially the conflicts
between absolutely sovereign nation-states that led to the two World Wars. However, it is
important to remember that parallel to this story, run others, equally tragic - conflicts in
the Middle East, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, conflicts between India and
Pakistan, the Korean War, the two Gulf Wars, and so on. In all of these tragedies, the
root the trouble is that international interdependence exists in practice because of modern
technology, but our political institutions, emotions and outlook are at the stunted level
of the absolutely sovereign nation-state. Although we focus here on German nationalism
as an example, and although historically it had terrible consequences, it is not a danger
today. Germany is now one of the world’s most peaceful and responsible countries, and
the threats to world peace now come from nationalism outside Europe.
Since all political power was now believed to be vested in the “nation”, the question of
national identity suddenly became acutely important. France itself was a conglomeration
of peoples - Normans, Bretons, Provencaux, Burgundians, Flemings, Germans, Basques,
and Catalans - but these peoples had been united under a strong central government since
the middle ages, and by the time of the French Revolution it was easy for them to think
of themselves as a “nation”. However, what we now call Germany did not exist. There
was only a collection of small feudal principalities, in some of which the most common
language was German.
The early political unity of France enabled French culture to dominate Europe during
the 17th and 18th centuries. Frederick the Great of Prussia and his court spoke and wrote
in French. Frederick himself regarded German as a language of ignorant peasants, and
on the rare occasions when he tried to speak or write in German, the result was almost
incomprehensible. The same was true in the courts of Brandenburg, Saxony, Pomerania,
etc. Each of them was a small-scale Versailles. Below the French-speaking aristocracy was
a German-speaking middle class and a German or Slavic-speaking peasantry.
The creators of the nationalist movement in Germany were young middle-class German-
speaking students and theologians who felt frustrated and stifled by the narrow kleinstädtisch
provincial atmosphere of the small principalities in which they lived. They also felt frus-
trated because their talents were completely ignored by the French-speaking aristocracy.
This was the situation when the armies of Napoleon marched across Europe, easily de-
feating and humiliating both Prussia and Austria. The young German-speaking students
asked themselves what it was that the French had that they did not have.
The answer was not hard to find. What the French had was a sense of national identity.
In fact, the French Revolution had unleashed long-dormant tribal instincts in the common
people of France. It was the fanatical support of the Marseillaise-singing masses that made
the French armies invincible. The founders of the German nationalist movement concluded
that if they were ever to have a chance of defeating France, they would have to inspire the
same fanaticism in their own peoples. They would have to touch the same almost-forgotten
cord of human nature that the French Revolution had touched.
The common soldiers who fought in the wars of Europe in the first part of the 18th
century were not emotionally involved. They were recruited from the lowest ranks of
society, and they joined the army of a king or prince for the sake of money. All this was
changed by the French Revolution. In June, 1792, the French Legislative Assembly decreed
that a Fatherland Alter be erected in each commune with the inscription, “The citizen is
born, lives and dies for la patrie.” The idea of a “Fatherland Alter” clearly demonstrates
the quasi-religious nature of French nationalism.
The soldiers in Napoleon’s army were not fighting for the sake of money, but for an
ideal that they felt to be larger and more important than themselves - Republicanism and
the glory of France. The masses, who for so long had been outside of the politics of a larger
world, and who had been emotionally involved only in the affairs of their own village, were
now fully aroused to large-scale political action. The surge of nationalist feeling in France
was tribalism on an enormous scale - tribalism amplified and orchestrated by new means
of mass communication.
78 WHY WAR?
This was the phenomenon with which the German nationalists felt they had to contend.
One of the founders of the German nationalist movement was Johan Gottlieb Fichte
(1762-1814), a follower of the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Besides rejecting
objective criteria for morality, Fichte denied the value of the individual. According to him,
the individual is nothing and the state is everything. Denying the value of the individual,
Fichte compared the state to an organism of which the individual is a part:
“In a product of nature”, Fichte wrote, “no part is what it is but through its relation
to the whole, and it would absolutely not be what it is apart from this relation; more, if
it had no organic relation at all, it would be absolutely nothing, since without reciprocity
in action between organic forces maintaining one another in equilibrium, no form would
subsist... Similarly, man obtains a determinate position in the scheme of things and a fixity
in nature only through his civil association... Between the isolated man and the citizen
there is the same relation as between raw and organized matter... In an organized body,
each part continuously maintains the whole, and in maintaining it, maintains itself also.
Similarly the citizen with regard to the State.”
Another post-Kantian, Adam Müller (1779-1829) wrote that “the state is the intimate
association of all physical and spiritual needs of the whole nation into one great, energetic,
infinitely active and living whole... the totality of human affairs... If we exclude for ever
from this association even the most unimportant part of a human being, if we separate
private life from public life even at one point, then we no longer perceive the State as a
phenomenon of life and as an idea.”
The doctrine that Adam Müller sets forth in this passage is what we now call Totali-
80 WHY WAR?
tarianism, i.e. the belief that the state ought to encompass “the totality of human affairs”.
This doctrine is the opposite of the Liberal belief that the individual is all-important and
that the role of the state ought to be as small as possible.
Fichte maintains that “a State which constantly seeks to increase its internal strength
is forced to desire the gradual abolition of all favoritisms, and the establishment of equal
rights for all citizens, in order that it, the State itself, may enter upon its own true right -
to apply the whole surplus power of all its citizens without exception to the furtherance of
its own purposes... Internal peace, and the condition of affairs in which everyone may by
diligence earn his daily bread... is only a means, a condition and framework for what love
of Fatherland really wants to bring about, namely that the Eternal and the Divine may
blossom in the world and never cease to become more pure, perfect and excellent.”
Fichte proposed a new system of education which would abolish the individual will and
teach individuals to become subservient to the will of the state. “The new education must
consist essentially in this”, Fichte wrote, “that it completely destroys the will in the soil
that it undertakes to cultivate... If you want to influence a man at all, you must do more
than merely talk to him; you must fashion him, and fashion him, and fashion him in such
a way that he simply cannot will otherwise than you wish him to will.”
Fichte and Herder (1744-1803) developed the idea that language is the key to national
identity. They believed that the German language is superior to French because it is an
“original” language, not derived from Latin. In a poem that is obviously a protest against
the French culture of Frederick’s court in Prussia, Herder wrote:
Another poem, “The German Fatherland”, by Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860), ex-
presses a similar sentiment:
2.14. NATIONALISM IN EUROPE 81
It must be remembered that when these poems were written, the German nation did not
exist except in the minds of the nationalists. Groups of people speaking various dialects
of German were scattered throughout central and eastern Europe. In many places, the
German-speaking population was a minority. To bring together these scattered German-
speaking groups would require, in many cases, the conquest and subjugation of Slavic
majorities; but the quasi-religious fervor of the nationalists was such that aggression took
on the appearance of a “holy war”. Fichte believed that war between states introduces
“a living and progressive principle into history”. By war he did not mean a decorous
limited war of the type fought in the 18th century, but “...a true and proper war - a war
of subjugation!”
The German nationalist movement was not only quasi-religious in its tone; it also
borrowed psychological techniques from religion. It aroused the emotions of the masses to
large-scale political activity by the use of semi-religious political liturgy, involving myth,
symbolism, and festivals. In his book “German Society” (1814), Arndt advocated the
celebration of “holy festivals”. For example, he thought that the celebration of the pagan
festival of the summer solstice could be combined with a celebration of the victory over
Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig.
Arndt believed that special attention should be given to commemoration of the “noble
dead” of Germany’s wars for, as he said, “...here history enters life, and life becomes part of
history”. Arndt advocated a combination of Christian and pagan symbolism. The festivals
should begin with prayers and a church service; but in addition, the Oak leaves and the
sacred flame of ancient pagan tradition were to play a part.
In 1815, many of Arndt’s suggestions were followed in the celebration of the anniversary
of the Battle of Leipzig. This festival clearly exhibited a mixing of secular and Christian
elements to form a national cult. Men and women decorated with oak leaves made pilgrim-
ages to the tops of mountains, where they were addressed by priests speaking in front of
alters on which burned “the sacred flame of Germany’s salvation”. This borrowing of psy-
chological techniques from religion was deliberate, and it was retained by the Nazi Party
when the latter adopted the methods of the early German nationalists. The Nazi mass
rallies retained the order and form of Protestant liturgy, including hymns, confessions of
82 WHY WAR?
who risked his own life to save a German child in a burning house. Hearing this report,
Hermann exclaims, “May he be cursed if he has done this! He has for a moment made my
heart disloyal; he has made me for a moment betray the august cause of Germany!... I was
counting, by all the gods of revenge, on fire, loot, violence, murder, and all the horrors of
unbridled war! What need have I of Latins who use me well?”
At another point in the play, Hermann’s wife, Thusnelda, tempts a Roman Legate into a
romantic meeting in a garden. Instead of finding Thusnelda, the Legate finds himself locked
in the garden with a starved and savage she-bear. Standing outside the gate, Thusnelda
urges the Legate to make love to the she-bear, and, as the bear tears him to pieces, she
faints with pleasure.
Richard Wagner’s dramas were also part of the nationalist movement. They were
designed to create “an unending dream of sacred völkisch revelation”. No applause was
permitted, since this would disturb the reverential atmosphere of the cult. A new type of
choral theater was developed which “...no longer represented the fate of the individual to
the audience, but that which concerns the community, the Volk... Thus, in contrast to the
bourgeois theater, private persons are no longer represented, but only types.”
We have primarily been discussing the growth of German nationalism, but very similar
movements developed in other countries throughout Europe and throughout the world.
Characteristic for all these movements was the growth of state power, and the development
of a reverential, quasi-religious, attitude towards the state. Patriotism became “a sacred
duty.” According to Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel, “The existence of the State is the
movement of God in the world. It is the ultimate power on earth; it is its own end and
object. It is an ultimate end that has absolute rights against the individual.”
Nationalism in England (as in Germany) was to a large extent a defensive response
against French nationalism. At the end of the 18th century, the liberal ideas of the En-
lightenment were widespread in England. There was much sympathy in England with the
aims of the French Revolution, and a similar revolution almost took place in England.
However, when Napoleon landed an army in Ireland and threatened to invade England,
there was a strong reaction towards national self-defense. The war against France gave
impetus to nationalism in England, and military heros like Wellington and Nelson became
objects of quasi-religious worship. British nationalism later found an outlet in colonialism.
Italy, like Germany, had been a collection of small principalities, but as a reaction to
the other nationalist movements sweeping across Europe, a movement for a united Italy
developed. The conflicts between the various nationalist movements of Europe produced
the frightful world wars of the 20th century. Indeed, the shot that signaled the outbreak
of World War I was fired by a Serbian nationalist.
War did not seem especially evil to the 18th and 19th century nationalists because
technology had not yet given humanity the terrible weapons of the 20th century. In the
19th century, the fatal combination of space-age science and stone-age politics still lay
in the future. However, even in 1834, the German writer Heinrich Heine was perceptive
enough to see the threat:
“There will be”, Heine wrote, “Kantians forthcoming who, in the world to come, will
84 WHY WAR?
Figure 2.12: Wagner’s dramas were part of the quasi-religious cult of German
nationalism-
2.14. NATIONALISM IN EUROPE 85
Figure 2.15: Goya’s Enterrar y callar (Bury them and keep quiet). Atrocities,
starvation and human degradation.
88 WHY WAR?
Figure 2.16: One of a series of prints which the German artist Käthe Kollwitz
(1867-1945) made as a protest against the atrocities of World War I.
know nothing of reverence for aught, and who will ravage without mercy, and riot with
sword and axe through the soil of all European life to dig out the last root of the past.
There will be well-weaponed Fichtians upon the ground, who in the fanaticism of the Will
are not restrained by fear or self-advantage, for they live in the Spirit.”
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Review, October, (2002).
272. W.R. Pitt, The Greatest Sedition is Silence, Pluto Press, (2003).
273. J. Wilson, Republic or Empire?, The Nation magazine, March 3, (2003).
274. W.B. Gallie, Understanding War: Points of Conflict, Routledge, London, (1991).
275. R. Falk and S.S. Kim, eds., The War System: An Interdisciplinary Approach, West-
view, Boulder, CO, (1980).
276. J.D. Clarkson and T.C. Cochran, eds., War as a Social Institution, Colombia Uni-
versity Press, New York, (1941).
277. S. Melman, The Permanent War Economy, Simon and Schuster, (1974). Morgan
278. H. Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, 1910-1928, Ithaca Books, London, (1976).
279. D. Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, Routledge, New York,
(1991).
280. M. Klare, Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World’s Oil, For-
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281. J. Fitchett and D. Ignatius, Lengthy Elf Inquiry Nears Explosive Finish, International
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2.14. NATIONALISM IN EUROPE 103
307. W. Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II
308. J.M. Cypher, The Iron Triangle: The New Military Buildup, Dollars and Sense mag-
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310. C. Johnson, Time to Bring the Troops Home, The Nation magazine, May 14, (2001).
311. W. Hartung, F. Berrigan and M. Ciarrocca, Operation Endless Deployment: The
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312. C. Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Repub-
lic, Henry Hold and Company, New York, (2004).
313. C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, Henry
Hold and Company, New York, (2000).
314. I. Ramonet, Servile States, Le Monde diplomatique, Paris, October (2002), World
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315. J.K. Galbraith, The Unbearable Costs of Empire, American Prospect magazine,
November, (2002).
316. G. Monbiot, The Logic of Empire, The Guardian, August 6, (2002), World Press
Review, October, (2002).
317. W.R. Pitt and S. Ritter, War on Iraq, Context Books
318. W.R. Pitt, The Greatest Sedition is Silence, Pluto Press, (2003).
319. J. Wilson, Republic or Empire?, The Nation magazine, March 3, (2003).
320. R. Dreyfuss, Just the Beginning: Is Iraq the Opening Salvo in a War to Remake the
World?, The American Prospect magazine, April, (2003).
321. D. Moberg, The Road From Baghdad: The Bush Team Has Big Plans For the 21st
Century. Can the Rest of the World Stop Them?, These Times magazine, May,
(2003).
322. J.M. Blair, The Control of Oil, Random House, New York, (1976).
323. R.S. Foot, S.N. MacFarlane and M. Mastanduno, US Hegemony and International
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324. P. Bennis and N. Chomsky, Before and After: US Foreign Policy and the September
11th Crisis, Olive Branch Press, (2002).
325. J. Garrison, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rouge Power?, Berrett-Koehler
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326. A.J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy,
Harvard University Press, (2002).
327. D.R. Francis, Hidden Defense Costs Add Up to Double Trouble, Christian Science
Monator, February 23, (2004).
328. A. Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies of the World and How
They Were Made, Hodder and Staughton, London, (1988).
329. D. Yergin, The Prize, Simon and Schuster, New York, (1991).
330. E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, (1982).
Chapter 3
MALTHUS: POPULATION
PRESSURE AND WAR
105
106 WHY WAR?
Jaques Rousseau, David Hume and William Godwin. The famous book on population by
the younger Malthus grew out of conversations with his father.
Daniel Malthus attended Oxford, but left without obtaining a degree. He later built
a country home near Dorking, which he called “The Rookery”. The house had Gothic
battlements, and the land belonging to it contained a beech forest, an ice house, a corn
mill, a large lake, and serpentine walks leading to “several romantic buildings with appro-
priate dedications”. Daniel Malthus was an ardent admirer of Rousseau; and when the
French philosopher visited England with his mistress, Thérése le Vasseur, Danial Malthus
entertained him at the Rookery. Rousseau and Thérése undoubtedly saw Daniel’s baby
son (who was always called Robert or Bob) and they must have noticed with pity that he
had been born with a hare lip. This was later sutured, and apart from a slight scar which
marked the operation, he became very handsome.
Robert Malthus was at first tutored at home; but in 1782, when he was 16 years old, he
was sent to study at the famous Dissenting Academy at Warrington in Lancashire. Joseph
Priestly had taught at Warrington, and he had completed his famous History of Electricity
there, as well as his Essay on Government, which contains the phrase “the greatest good
for the greatest number”.
Robert’s tutor at Warrington Academy was Gilbert Wakefield (who was later impris-
oned for his radical ideas). When Robert was 18, Wakefield arranged for him to be admit-
ted to Jesus College, Cambridge University, as a student of mathematics. Robert Malthus
graduated from Cambridge in 1788 with a first-class degree in mathematics. He was Ninth
Wrangler, which meant that he was the ninth-best mathematician in his graduating class.
He also won prizes in declamation, both in English and in Latin, which is surprising in
view of the speech defect from which he suffered all his life.
3.2. DEBATE ON THE VIEWS OF GODWIN AND CONDORCET 107
and women above their their present state of ignorance and vice. Much of the savage
structure of the penal system would then be unnecessary, Godwin believed. (At the time
when he was writing, there were more than a hundred capital offenses in England, and this
number had soon increased to almost two hundred. The theft of any object of greater value
than ten shillings was punishable by hanging.) In its present state, Godwin wrote, society
decrees that the majority of its citizens “should be kept in abject penury, rendered stupid
with ignorance and disgustful with vice, perpetuated in nakedness and hunger, goaded to
the commission of crimes, and made victims to the merciless laws which the rich have insti-
tuted to oppress them”. But human behavior is produced by environment and education,
Godwin pointed out. If the conditions of upbringing were improved, behavior would also
improve. In fact, Godwin believed that men and women are subject to natural laws no less
than the planets of Newton’s solar system. “In the life of every human”, Godwin wrote,
“there is a chain of causes, generated in that eternity which preceded his birth, and going
on in regular procession through the whole period of his existence, in consequence of which
it was impossible for him to act in any instance otherwise than he has acted.”
The chain of causality in human affairs implies that vice and crime should be regarded
with the same attitude with which we regard disease. The causes of poverty, ignorance,
vice and crime should be removed. Human failings should be cured rather than punished.
With this in mind, Godwin wrote, “our disapprobation of vice will be of the same nature
as our disapprobation of an infectious distemper.”
In France the Marquis de Condorcet had written an equally optimistic book, Esquisse
d’un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l’Esprit Humain. Condorcet’s optimism was un-
affected even by the fact that at the time when he was writing he was in hiding, under
sentence of death by Robespierre’s government. Besides enthusiastically extolling Godwin’s
ideas to his son, Daniel Malthus also told him of the views of Condorcet.
Condorcet’s Esquisse, is an enthusiastic endorsement of the idea of infinite human per-
fectibility which was current among the philosophers of the 18th century, and in this book,
Condorcet anticipated many of the evolutionary ideas of Charles Darwin. He compared
humans with animals, and found many common traits. Condorcet believed that animals
are able to think, and even to think rationally, although their thoughts are extremely
simple compared with those of humans. He also asserted that humans historically began
their existence on the same level as animals and gradually developed to their present state.
Since this evolution took place historically, he reasoned, it is probable, or even inevitable,
that a similar evolution in the future will bring mankind to a level of physical, mental
and moral development which will be as superior to our own present state as we are now
superior to animals. In his Esquisse, Condorcet called attention to the unusually long
period of dependency which characterizes the growth and education of human offspring.
This prolonged childhood is unique among living beings. It is needed for the high level
of mental development of the human species; but it requires a stable family structure to
protect the young during their long upbringing.
Thus, according to Condorcet, biological evolution brought into existence a moral pre-
cept, the sanctity of the family.
Similarly, Condorcet maintained, larger associations of humans would have been impos-
110 WHY WAR?
sible without some degree of altruism and sensitivity to the suffering of others incorporated
into human behavior, either as instincts or as moral precepts or both; and thus the evolu-
tion of organized society entailed the development of sensibility and morality.
Condorcet believed that ignorance and error are responsible for vice; and he listened
what he regarded as the main mistakes of civilization: hereditary transmission of power,
inequality between men and women, religious bigotry, disease, war, slavery, economic in-
equality, and the division of humanity into mutually exclusive linguistic groups.
Condorcet believed the hereditary transmission of power to be the source of much of
the tyranny under which humans suffer; and he looked forward to an era when republican
governments would be established throughout the world. Turning to the inequality between
men and women, Condorcet wrote that he could see no moral, physical or intellectual basis
for it. He called for complete social, legal, and educational equality between the sexes.
Condorcet predicted that the progress of medical science would free humans from the
worst ravages of disease. Furthermore, he maintained that since perfectibility (i.e. evolu-
tion) operates throughout the biological world, there is no reason why mankind’s physical
112 WHY WAR?
structure might not gradually improve, with the result that human life in the remote future
could be greatly prolonged. Condorcet believed that the intellectual and moral facilities of
man are capable of continuous and steady improvement; and he thought that one of the
most important results of this improvement will be the abolition of war.
As Daniel Malthus talked warmly about Godwin, Condorcet, and the idea of human
progress, the mind of his son, Robert, turned to the unbalance between births and deaths
which he had noticed among his parishioners at Okewood Chapel. He pointed out to
his father that no matter what benefits science might be able to confer, they would soon
be eaten up by population growth. Regardless of technical progress, the condition of the
lowest social class would remain exactly the same: The poor would continue to live, as they
always had, on the exact borderline between survival and famine, clinging desperately to
the lower edge of existence. For them, change for the worse was impossible since it would
loosen their precarious hold on life; their children would die and their numbers would
diminish until they balanced the supply of food. But any change for the better was equally
impossible, because if more nourishment should become available, more of the children of
the poor would survive, and the share of food for each of them would again be reduced to
the precise minimum required for life.
Observation of his parishioners at Okewood had convinced Robert Malthus that this
sombre picture was a realistic description of the condition of the poor in England at the
end of the 18th century. Techniques of agriculture and industry were indeed improving
rapidly; but among the very poor, population was increasing equally fast, and the misery
of society’s lowest class remained unaltered.
Daniel Malthus was so impressed with his son’s arguments that he urged him to develop
them into a small book. Robert Malthus’ first essay on population, written in response to
his father’s urging, was only 50,000 words in length. It was was published anonymously in
1798, and its full title was An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the future
improvement of society, with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet,
and other writers. Robert Malthus’ Essay explored the consequences of his basic thesis:
that “the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce
subsistence for man”.
where the population had doubled every 25 years for a century and a half. Malthus called
this type of growth “geometrical” (today we would call it “exponential”); and, drawing on
his mathematical education, he illustrated it by the progression 1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128,256,..etc.
In order to show that, in the long run, no improvement in agriculture could possibly keep
pace with unchecked population growth, Malthus allowed that, in England, agricultural
output might with great effort be doubled during the next quarter century; but during
a subsequent 25-year period it could not again be doubled. The growth of agricultural
output could at the very most follow an arithmetic (linear) progression, 1,2,3,4,5,6,...etc.
Because of the overpoweringly greater numbers which can potentially be generated by
exponential population growth, as contrasted to the slow linear progression of sustenance,
Malthus was convinced that at almost all stages of human history, population has not
expanded freely, but has instead pressed painfully against the limits of its food supply. He
maintained that human numbers are normally held in check either by “vice or misery”.
(Malthus classified both war and birth control as a forms of vice.) Occasionally the food
supply increases through some improvement in agriculture, or through the opening of new
lands; but population then grows very rapidly, and soon a new equilibrium is established,
with misery and vice once more holding the population in check.
Like Godwin’s Political Justice, Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population was
published at exactly the right moment to capture the prevailing mood of England. In
1793, the mood had been optimistic; but by 1798, hopes for reform had been replaced
by reaction and pessimism. Public opinion had been changed by Robespierre’s Reign of
Terror and by the threat of a French invasion. Malthus’ clear and powerfully written essay
caught the attention of readers not only because it appeared at the right moment, but also
because his two contrasting mathematical laws of growth were so striking.
One of Malthus’ readers was William Godwin, who recognized the essay as the strongest
challenge to his utopian ideas that had yet been published. Godwin several times invited
Malthus to breakfast at his home to discuss social and economic problems. (After some
years, however, the friendship between Godwin and Malthus cooled, the debate between
them having become more acrimonious.)
In 1801, Godwin published a reply to his critics, among them his former friends James
Mackintosh and Samuel Parr, by whom he recently had been attacked. His Reply to Parr
also contained a reply to Malthus: Godwin granted that the problem of overpopulation
raised by Malthus was an extremely serious one. However, Godwin wrote, all that is needed
to solve the problem is a change of the attitudes of society. For example we need to abandon
the belief “that it is the first duty of princes to watch for (i.e. encourage) the multiplication
of their subjects, and that a man or woman who passes the term of life in a condition of
celibacy is to be considered as having failed to discharge the principal obligations owed to
the community”. “On the contrary”, Godwin continued, “it now appears to be rather the
man who rears a numerous family that has to some degree transgressed the consideration
he owes to the public welfare”. Godwin suggested that each marriage should be allowed
only two or three children or whatever number might be needed to balance the current
rates of mortality and celibacy. This duty to society, Godwin wrote, would surely not be
too great a hardship to be endured, once the reasons for it were thoroughly understood.
114 WHY WAR?
extirpated the whole race; for the people of each hamlet or village, by turns, applied to me
to destroy the other”. According to Cook, the New Zealanders practiced both ceaseless
war and cannibalism; and population pressure provided a motive for both practices.
In later chapters on nomadic societies of the Near East and Asia, war again appears,
not only as a consequence of the growth of human numbers, but also as one of the major
mechanisms by which these numbers are reduced to the level of their food supply. The
studies quoted by Malthus make it seem likely that the nomadic Tartar tribes of central
Asia made no use of the preventive checks to population growth. In fact the Tartar tribes
may have regarded growth of their own populations as useful in their wars with neighboring
tribes.
Malthus also described the Germanic tribes of Northern Europe, whose population
growth led them to the attacks which destroyed the Roman Empire.
He quoted the following passage from Machiavelli’s History of Florence: “The people
who inhabit the northern parts that lie between the Rhine and the Danube, living in a
healthful and prolific climate, often increase to such a degree that vast numbers of them
are forced to leave their native country and go in search of new habitations. When any of
those provinces begins to grow too populous and wants to disburden itself, the following
method is observed. In the first place, it is divided into three parts, in each of which
there is an equal portion of the nobility and commonality, the rich and the poor. After
this they cast lots; and that division on which the lot falls quits the country and goes to
seek its fortune, leaving the other two more room and liberty to enjoy their possessions at
home. These emigrations proved the destruction of the Roman Empire”. Regarding the
Scandinavians in the early middle ages, Malthus wrote: “Mallet relates, what is probably
true, that it was their common custom to hold an assembly every spring for the purpose
of considering in what quarter they should make war”.
In many of the societies which Malthus described, a causal link can be seen, not only
between population pressure and poverty, but also between population pressure and war.
As one reads his Essay, it becomes clear why both these terrible sources of human anguish
saturate so much of history, and why efforts to eradicate them have so often met with
failure: The only possible way to eliminate poverty and war is to reduce the pressure of
population by preventive checks, since the increased food supply produced by occasional
cultural advances can give only very temporary relief.
In Book II, Malthus turned to the nations of Europe, as they appeared at the end of the
18th century, and here he presents us with a different picture. Although in these societies
poverty, unsanitary housing, child labour, malnutrition and disease all took a heavy toll,
war produced far less mortality than in hunting and pastoral societies, and the preventive
checks, which lower fertility, played a much larger roll.
Malthus had visited Scandinavia during the summer of 1799, and he had made partic-
ularly detailed notes on Norway. He was thus able to present a description of Norwegian
economics and demography based on his own studies. Norway was remarkable for having
the lowest reliably-recorded death rate of any nation at that time: Only 1 person in 48
died each year in Norway. (By comparison, 1 person in 20 died each year in London.) The
rate of marriage was also remarkably low, with only 1 marriage each year for every 130
116 WHY WAR?
Figure 3.5: Captain James Cook, FRS (1728-1779). According to Cook, the
native New Zealanders practiced both ceaseless war and cannibalism; and pop-
ulation pressure provided a motive for both practices. Malthus based his de-
scription of hunter-gatherer societies on the writings of explorers such as Cook
and Vancouver.
3.4. THE SECOND ESSAY PUBLISHED IN 1803 117
inhabitants; and thus in spite of the low death rate, Norway’s population had increased
only slightly from the 723,141 inhabitants recorded in 1769.
There were two reasons for late marriage in Norway: Firstly, every man born of a
farmer or a labourer was compelled by law to be a soldier in the reserve army for a period
of ten years; and during his military service, he could not marry without the permission of
both his commanding officer and the parish priest. These permissions were granted only to
those who were clearly in an economic position to support a family. Men could be inducted
into the army at any age between 20 and 30, and since commanding officers preferred older
recruits, Norwegian men were often in their 40’s before they were free to marry. At the
time when Malthus was writing, these rules had just been made less restrictive; but priests
still refused to unite couples whose economic foundations they judged to be insufficient.
The second reason for late marriages was the structure of the farming community. In
general, Norwegian farms were large; and the owner’s household employed many young
unmarried men and women as servants. These young people had no chance to marry
unless a smaller house on the property became vacant, with its attached small parcel of
land for the use of the “houseman”; but because of the low death rate, such vacancies were
infrequent.
Thus Norway’s remarkably low death rate was balanced by a low birth rate. Other
chapters in Book II are devoted to the checks to population growth in Sweden, Russia,
Central Europe, Switzerland, France, England, Scotland and Ireland.
Malthus painted a very dark panorama of population pressure and its consequences
in human societies throughout the world and throughout history: At the lowest stage of
cultural development are the hunter-gatherer societies, where the density of population is
extremely low. Nevertheless, the area required to support the hunters is so enormous that
even their sparse and thinly scattered numbers press hard against the limits of sustenance.
The resulting competition for territory produces merciless intertribal wars.
The domestication of animals makes higher population densities possible; and wherever
this new mode of food production is adopted, human numbers rapidly increase; but very
soon a new equilibrium is established, with the population of pastoral societies once more
pressing painfully against the limits of the food supply, growing a little in good years, and
being cut back in bad years by famine, disease and war.
Finally, agricultural societies can maintain extremely high densities of population; but
the time required to achieve a new equilibrium is very short. After a brief period of
unrestricted growth, human numbers are once more crushed against the barrier of limited
resources; and if excess lives are produced by overbreeding, they are soon extinguished by
deaths among the children of the poor.
Malthus was conscious that he had drawn an extremely dark picture of the human
condition. He excused himself by saying that he has not done it gratuitously, but because
he was convinced that the dark shades really are there, and that they form an important
part of the picture. He did allow one ray of light, however: By 1803, his own studies of
Norway, together with personal conversations with Godwin and the arguments in Godwin’s
Reply to Parr, had convinced Malthus that “moral restraint” should be included among
the possible checks to population growth. Thus he concluded Book II of his 1803 edition by
118 WHY WAR?
saying that the checks which keep population down to the level of the means of subsistence
can all be classified under the headings of “moral restraint, vice and misery”. (In his first
edition he had maintained that vice and misery are the only possibilities).
control, some forms of which existed at the time when he was writing; and in this passage
we see that he was opposed to the practice. He preferred late marriage or “moral restraint”
as a means of limiting excessive population growth.
After his arguments against Condorcet, Malthus discussed William Godwin’s egalitar-
ian utopia, which, he said, would be extremely attractive if only it could be achieved: “The
system of equality which Mr. Godwin proposes”, Malthus wrote, “is, on the first view of
it, the most beautiful and engaging which has yet appeared. A melioration of society to be
produced merely by reason and conviction gives more promise of permanence than than
any change effected and maintained by force. The unlimited exercise of private judgement
is a doctrine grand and captivating, and has a vast superiority over those systems where
every individual is in a manner the slave of the public.”
“The substitution of benevolence, as a master-spring and moving principle of society,
instead of self-love, appears at first sight to be a consummation devoutly to be wished. In
short, it is impossible to contemplate the whole of this fair picture without emotions of
delight and admiration, accompanied with an ardent longing for the period of its accom-
plishment.”
“But alas!” Malthus continued, “That moment can never arrive.... The great error
under which Mr. Godwin labours throughout his whole work is the attributing of almost all
the vices and misery that prevail in civil society to human institutions. Political regulations
and the established administration of property are, with him, the fruitful sources of all evil,
the hotbeds of all the crimes that degrade mankind. Were this really a true state of the
case, it would not seem a completely hopeless task to remove evil completely from the
world; and reason seems to be the proper and adequate instrument for effecting so great a
purpose. But the truth is, that though human institutions appear to be, and indeed often
are, the obvious and obtrusive causes of much misery in society, they are, in reality, light
and superficial in comparison with those deeper-seated causes of evil which result from the
laws of nature and the passions of mankind.”
The passions of mankind drive humans to reproduce, while the laws of nature set limits
to the carrying capacity of the environment. Godwin’s utopia, if established, would be very
favorable to the growth of population; and very soon the shortage of food would lead to its
downfall: Because of the overpowering force of population growth, “Man cannot live in the
midst of plenty. All cannot share alike the bounties of nature. Were there no established
administration of property, every man would be obliged to guard with his force his little
store. Selfishness would be triumphant. The subjects of contention would be perpetual.
Every individual would be under constant anxiety about corporal support, and not a single
intellect would be left free to expatiate in the field of thought.”
Malthus believed that all systems of equality are doomed to failure, not only because
of the powerful pressure of population growth, but also because differences between the
upper, middle, and lower classes serve the useful purpose of providing humans with an
incentive for hard work. He thought that fear of falling to a lower social status, and hope
of rising to a higher one, provide a strong incentive for constructive activity. However,
he believed that happiness is most often found in the middle ranks of society, and that
therefore the highest and lowest classes ought not to be large. Malthus advocated universal
120 WHY WAR?
education and security of property as means by which the lowest classes of society could
be induced to adopt more virtuous and prudent patterns of behavior.
Figure 3.6: Coleridge’s notes on Malthus: “I do not believe that all the heresies
and sects and factions which ignorance and the weakness and wickedness of man
have ever given birth to, were altogether so disgraceful to man as a Christian,
a philosopher, a statesman or citizen, as this abominable tenet.”
Figure 3.7: Shelley: “.. after the poor have been stript naked by the taxgatherer
and reduced to bread and tea and fourteen hours of hard labour by their
masters.. the last tie by which Nature holds them to benignant earth (whose
plenty is garnered up in the strongholds of their tyrants) is to be divided...They
are required to abstain from marrying under penalty of starvation...”
124 WHY WAR?
Figure 3.8: Tiny Tim, from Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol. When he is
informed that Tiny Tim will die unless he receives medical treatment, Scrooge
remarks, “Then he had better die and reduce the surplus population!”. Many
of the events in Dickens’ books can be viewed as protests against the ideas of
Malthus.
3.7. REPLIES TO MALTHUS 125
Figure 3.9: Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist asks for a second portion of gruel,
provoking a storm of outrage. As a boy, Dickens himself spent some time in a
workhouse.
126 WHY WAR?
Figure 3.10: A portrait of the British political economist, author and social the-
orist Harriet Martineau (1802-1876). She was a very close friend of Charles
Darwin’s older brother, Erasmus. Commenting on the ideas of Malthus, she
wrote: “Prudence as to time of marriage and making due provision for it
was, one would think, a harmless recommendation enough, under the circum-
stances.” Martineau’s books were highly successful, sometimes outselling those
of Charles Dickens.
3.8. RICARDO’S IRON LAW OF WAGES; THE CORN LAWS 127
corruption of morals, and at best, marriage between pauper boys and girls; while multitudes
of respectable men and women, who paid rates instead of consuming them, were unmarried
at forty or never married at all. Prudence as to time of marriage and for making due
provision for it was, one would think, a harmless recommendation enough, under the
circumstances.”
Figure 3.11: The economist David Ricardo (1772-1823), a close friend of Malthus.
The joint pessimism of Ricardo and Malthus caused Carlyle to call economics
“the dismal science”.
3.9. THE IRISH POTATO FAMINE OF 1845 129
multiplies rapidly, labor becomes a plentiful commodity, and wages fall again.
Thus, according to Ricardo, there is an Iron Law which holds wages at the minimum
level at which life can be supported. The combined pessimism of Malthus and Ricardo
caused Carlyle to call economics “the dismal science”.
Figure 3.14: Both Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace arrived at their
theories of natural selection in evolution as a result of reading Malthus.
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16. A. Peccei, The Human Quality, Pergamon Press, Oxford, (1977).
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18. V.K. Smith, ed., Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered, Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, (1979).
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ability, Colombia University Press, New York, (1991).
20. IPCC, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Sci-
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140 WHY WAR?
Chapter 4
RESOURCE WARS
141
142 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worse for Society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his
own interest, he frequently promotes that of Society more effectively than when he really
intends to promote it.”
In other words, Smith maintained that self-interest (even greed) is a sufficient guide
to human economic actions. The passage of time has shown that he was right in many
respects. The free market, which he advocated, has turned out to be the optimum prescrip-
tion for economic growth. However, history has also shown that there is something horribly
wrong or incomplete about the idea that individual self-interest alone, uninfluenced by eth-
ical and ecological considerations, and totally free from governmental intervention, can be
the main motivating force of a happy and just society. There has also proved to be some-
thing terribly wrong with the concept of unlimited economic growth. Here is what actually
happened:
In pre-industrial Europe, peasant farmers held a low but nevertheless secure position,
protected by a web of traditional rights and duties. Their low dirt-floored and thatched
cottages were humble but safe refuges. If a peasant owned a cow, it could be pastured on
common land.
With the invention of the steam engine and the introduction of spinning and weaving
machines towards the end of the 18th Century, the pattern changed, at first in England, and
afterwards in other European countries. Land-owners in Scotland and Northern England
realized that sheep were more profitable to have on the land than “crofters” (i.e., small
tenant farmers), and families that had farmed land for generations were violently driven
from their homes with almost no warning. The cottages were afterwards burned to prevent
the return of their owners.
The following account of the Highland Clearances has been left by Donald McLeod,
a crofter in the district of Sutherland: “The consternation and confusion were extreme.
Little or no time was given for the removal of persons or property; the people striving
to remove the sick or helpless before the fire should reach them; next struggling to save
the most valuable of their effects. The cries of the women and children; the roaring of
the affrighted cattle, hunted at the same time by the yelling dogs of the shepherds amid
the smoke and fire, altogether presented a scene that completely baffles description - it
required to be seen to be believed... The conflagration lasted for six days, until the whole
of the dwellings were reduced to ashes and smoking ruins.”
Between 1750 and 1860, the English Parliament passed a large number of “Enclosure
Acts”, abolishing the rights of small farmers to pasture their animals on common land
that was not under cultivation. The fabric of traditional rights and duties that once had
protected the lives of small tenant farmers was torn to pieces. Driven from the land, poor
families flocked to the towns and cities, hoping for employment in the textile mills that
seemed to be springing up everywhere.
According to the new rules by which industrial society began to be governed, traditions
were forgotten and replaced by purely economic laws. Labor was viewed as a commodity,
like coal or grain, and wages were paid according to the laws of supply and demand, without
regard for the needs of the workers. Wages fell to starvation levels, hours of work increased,
4.1. ADAM SMITH’S INVISIBLE HAND IS AT OUR THROATS 143
Figure 4.1: A watercolor painting by Vincent van Gogh showing wives of Belgian
miners carrying bags of coal.
Figure 4.3: A girl pulling a coaltub through the narrow space left by removal of
coal from a seam.
swallow a hasty meal or hurry to the mill without taking any food whatever... At twelve
o’clock the engine stops, and an hour is given for dinner... Again they are closely immured
from one o’clock till eight or nine, with the exception of twenty minutes, this being allowed
for tea. During the whole of this long period, they are actively and unremittingly engaged
in a crowded room at an elevated temperature.”
Dr. Gaskell described the housing of the workers as follows: “One of the circumstances
in which they are especially defective is that of drainage and water-closets. Whole ranges
of these houses are either totally undrained, or very partially... The whole of the washings
and filth from these consequently are thrown into the front or back street, which, often
being unpaved and cut into deep ruts, allows them to collect into stinking and stagnant
pools; while fifty, or even more than that number, having only a single convenience common
146 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
to them all, it is in a very short time choked with excrementous matter. No alternative is
left to the inhabitants but adding this to the already defiled street.”
“It frequently happens that one tenement is held by several families... The demoralizing
effects of this utter absence of domestic privacy must be seen before they can be thoroughly
appreciated. By laying bare all the wants and actions of the sexes, it strips them of outward
regard for decency - modesty is annihilated - the father and the mother, the brother and
the sister, the male and female lodger, do not scruple to commit acts in front of each other
which even the savage keeps hid from his fellows.”
The landowners of Scotland were unquestionably following self-interest as they burned
the cottages of their crofters; and self-interest motivated overseers as they whipped half-
starved child workers in England’s mills. Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” no doubt guided
their actions in such a way as to maximize production. But whether a happy and just
society was created in this way is questionable. Certainly it was a society with large areas
of unhappiness and injustice. Self-interest alone was not enough. A society following purely
economic laws - a society where selfishness is exalted as the mainspring for action - lacks
both the ethical and ecological dimensions needed for social justice, widespread happiness,
and sustainability.
Figure 4.5: An oxymoron: The vultures of greed never protect the dove of peace.
for their campaigns by the military-industrial complex. This pernicious circular flow of
money, driving endless crises, has sometimes been called “The Devil’s Dynamo”. Thus
the world is continually driven to the brink of thermonuclear war by highly dangerous
interventions such as the recent ones in North Africa, the Middle East, Ukraine, South and
Central America, and the Korean Peninsula.
It is doubtful that any of the political or military figures involved with this arrogant
risking of human lives and the human future have any imaginative idea of what a thermonu-
clear war would be like. In fact it would be an ecological catastrophe of huge proportions,
making large areas of the world permanently uninhabitable through long-lived radioactive
contamination. The damage to global agriculture would be so great as to produce famine
leading to a billion or more deaths from starvation. All the nations of the earth would
suffer, neutrals as well as belligerents.
Besides supporting the appalling war machine, our bought-and-paid-for politicians also
fail to take the actions that would be needed to prevent the worst effects of climate change.
The owners of the fossil fuel industries have even mounted advertising campaigns to con-
vince the public that the threat of anthropogenic climate change is not real. Sadly, the
threat of catastrophic climate change is all too real, as 99 percent the worlds climate
scientists have warned.
The world has recently passed a dangerous landmark in atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion, 400 ppm. The last time that the earth experienced such high concentrations of this
148 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
Figure 4.6: The ship in the cartoon is drawn so as to resemble the Titanic.
greenhouse gas were several million years ago. At that time the Arctic was free from ice,
and sea levels were 40 meters higher than they are today. Global warming is a slow and
long-term effect, so such high sea levels will be slow in arriving, but ultimately we must
expect that coastal cities and much of the world’s low-lying land will be under water. We
must also expect many tropical regions of the world to become uninhabitable because of
high temperatures. Finally there is a threat of famine because agriculture will be hit by
high temperatures and aridity.
There are several very dangerous feedback loops that may cause the earth’s tempera-
tures to rise much faster than has been predicted by the International Panel on Climate
Change. By far the most dangerous of these comes from the melting of methane hydrate
crystals that are currently trapped in frozen tundra and on the floor of seabeds.
At high pressures, methane combines with water to form crystals called hydrates or
clathrates. These crystals are stable at the temperatures currently existing on ocean floors,
but whenever the water temperature rises sufficiently, the crystals become unstable and
methane gas bubbles to the surface. This effect has already been observed in the Arctic seas
north of Russia. The total amount of methane clathrates on ocean floors is not precisely
known, but it is estimated to be very large indeed, corresponding to between 3,000 and
11,000 gigatons of carbon. The release of even a small fraction of this amount of methane
into our atmosphere would greatly accelerate rising temperatures, leading to the release of
still more methane, in a highly dangerous feedback loop. We must at all costs avoid global
temperatures which will cause this feedback loop to trigger in earnest.
4.2. OUR GREED-BASED ECONOMIC SYSTEM TODAY 149
Figure 4.7: Temperature changes will be greatest in the polar regions. Far
greater changes in global temperatures are to be expected in the 22nd and
23rd centuries and in subsequent centuries, because the thermal inertia of the
oceans makes climate change a very slow and long-term effect.
Figure 4.8: The isotope ratios in ice cores from the Greenland ice sheet allow
us to see the close correlation between atmospheric CO2 concentration and
temperatures over a very long period of time. Thus regardless of questions of
cause and effect, we can expect rising concentrations of CO2 to be accompanied
by rising temperatures. As we can see from the graphs, the rate of increase in
carbon emissions has shown no sign of slowing in recent years.
150 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
4.4 Neocolonialism
In his book, “Neocolonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism” (Thomas Nielsen, London,
1965), Kwamai Nkrumah defined neocolonialism with the following words: “The essence of
neocolonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent, and has all
the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus
its political policy is directed from the outside. The methods and form of this direction
can take various shapes. For example, in an extreme case, the troops of the imperial power
may garrison the territory of the neocolonial State and control the government of it. More
often, however, neocolonial control is exercised through monetary means...”
“The struggle against neocolonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the de-
veloped world from operating in less developed countries. It is aimed at preventing the
financial power of the developed countries from being used in such a way as to impoverish
the less developed.”
1
http://techrig.blogspot.dk/2013/11/confessions-of-economic-hit-man.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yTbdnNgqfs8
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporatocracy
152 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
4.7. DEBT SLAVERY 153
“Just as governments like the US and UK need oil companies to secure fuel for their
global war-making capacity, so the oil companies need their governments to secure control
over global oilfields and transportation routes. It is no accident, then, that the world’s
largest oil companies are located in the world’s most powerful countries.”
“Almost all of the world’s oil-producing countries have suffered abusive, corrupt and un-
democratic governments and an absence of durable development. Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,
Libya, Iraq, Iran, Angola, Colombia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Mexico, Algeria - these and many
other oil producers have a sad record, which includes dictatorships installed from abroad,
bloody coups engineered by foreign intelligence services, militarization of government and
intolerant right-wing nationalism.”
Iraq, in particular, has been the scene of a number of wars motivated by the West’s
thirst for oil. During World War I, 1914-1918, the British captured the area (then known
as Mesopotamia) from the Ottoman Empire after four years of bloody fighting. Although
Lord Curzon denied that the British conquest of Mesopotamia was motivated by oil, there
4.8. BLOOD FOR OIL 155
is ample evidence that British policy was indeed motivated by a desire for control of the
region’s petroleum. For example, Curzon’s Cabinet colleague Sir Maurice Hankey stated in
a private letter that oil was “a first-class war aim”. Furthermore, British forces continued
to fight after the signing of the Murdos Armistice. In this way, they seized Mosul, the
capital of a major oil-producing region, thus frustrating the plans of the French, who had
been promised the area earlier in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement.
Lord Curzon was well aware of the military importance of oil, and following the end of
the First World War he remarked: “The Allied cause has floated to victory on a wave of
oil”.
During the period between 1918 and 1930, fierce Iraqi resistance to the occupation
was crushed by the British, who used poison gas, airplanes, incendiary bombs, and mobile
armored cars, together with forces drawn from the Indian Army. Winston Churchill, who
was Colonial Secretary at the time, regarded the conflict in Iraq as an important test of
modern military-colonial methods.
In 1932, Britain granted nominal independence to Iraq, but kept large military forces
in the country and maintained control of it through indirect methods. In 1941, however,
it seemed likely that Germany might try to capture the Iraqi oilfields, and therefore the
British again seized direct political power in Iraq by means of military force. It was not
only Germany that Britain feared, but also US attempts to gain access to Iraqi oil.
The British fear of US interest in Iraqi oil was soon confirmed by events. In 1963 the
US secretly backed a military coup in Iraq that brought Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party
to power. In 1979 the western-backed Shah of Iran was overthrown, and the United States
regarded the fundamentalist Shi’ite regime that replaced him as a threat to supplies of
oil from Saudi Arabia. Washington saw Saddam’s Iraq as a bulwark against the militant
Shi’ite extremism of Iran that was threatening oil supplies from pro-American states such
as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
In 1980, encouraged to do so by the fact that Iran had lost its US backing, Saddam
Hussein’s government attacked Iran. This was the start of a extremely bloody and de-
structive war that lasted for eight years, inflicting almost a million casualties on the two
nations. Iraq used both mustard gas and the nerve gases Tabun and Sarin against Iran, in
violation of the Geneva Protocol.
Both the United States and Britain helped Saddam Hussein’s government to obtain
chemical weapons. A chemical plant, called Falluja 2, was built by Britain in 1985, and
this plant was used to produce mustard gas and nerve gas. Also, according to the Riegel
Report to the US Senate, May 25, (1994), the Reagan Administration turned a blind eye
to the export of chemical weapon precursors to Iraq, as well as anthrax and plague cultures
that could be used as the basis for biological weapons. According to the Riegel Report,
“records available from the supplier for the period 1985 until the present show that during
this time, pathogenic (meaning disease producing) and toxigenic (meaning poisonous),
and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq perusant to application and
licensing by the US Department of Commerce.”
In 1984, Donald Rumsfeld, Reagan’s newly appointed Middle East Envoy, visited Sad-
dam Hussein to assure him of America’s continuing friendship, despite Iraqi use of poison
156 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
gas. When (in 1988) Hussein went so far as to use poison gas against civilian citizens of
his own country in the Kurdish village of Halabja, the United States worked to prevent in-
ternational condemnation of the act. Indeed US support for Saddam was so unconditional
that he obtained the false impression that he had a free hand to do whatever he liked in
the region.
On July 25, 1990, US Ambassador April Glaspie met with Saddam Hussein to discuss oil
prices and how to improve US-Iraq relations. According to the transcript of the meeting,
Ms Glaspie assured Saddam that the US “had no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts,
like your border disagreement with Kuwait.” She then left on vacation. Mistaking this
conversation for a green light, Saddam invaded Kuwait eight days later.
By invading Kuwait, Hussein severely worried western oil companies and governments,
since Saudi Arabia might be next in line. As George Bush senior said in 1990, at the time
of the Gulf War, “Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly
countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell
into the hands of Saddam Hussein.”
On August 6, 1990, the UN Security Council imposed comprehensive economic sanc-
tions against Iraq with the aim of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Meanwhile, US
Secretary of State James A. Baker III used arm- twisting methods in the Security Council
to line up votes for UN military action against Iraq. In Baker’s own words, he undertook
the process of “cajoling, extracting, threatening and occasionally buying votes”.
On November 29, 1990, the Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing the use of “all
necessary means” (by implication also military means) to force Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait. There was nothing at all wrong with this, since the Security Council had been
set up by the UN Charter to prevent states from invading their neighbors. However, one
can ask whether the response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait would have been so
wholehearted if oil had not been involved.
There is much that can be criticized in the way that the Gulf War of 1990-1991 was
carried out. Besides military targets, the US and its allies bombed electrical generation
facilities with the aim of creating postwar leverage over Iraq. The electrical generating
plants would have to be rebuilt with the help of foreign technical assistance, and this help
could be traded for postwar compliance. In the meantime, hospitals and water-purification
4.8. BLOOD FOR OIL 157
plants were without electricity. Also, during the Gulf War, a large number of projectiles
made of depleted uranium were fired by allied planes and tanks. The result was a sharp
increase in cancer in Iraq. Finally, both Shi’ites and Kurds were encouraged by the Allies
to rebel against Saddam Hussein’s government, but were later abandoned by the allies and
slaughtered by Saddam.
The most terrible misuse of power, however, was the US and UK insistence the sanctions
against Iraq should remain in place after the end of the Gulf War. These two countries used
their veto power in the Security Council to prevent the removal of the sanctions. Their
motive seems to have been the hope that the economic and psychological impact would
provoke the Iraqi people to revolt against Saddam. However that brutal dictator remained
firmly in place, supported by universal fear of his police and by massive propaganda. The
effect of the sanctions was to produce more than half a million deaths of children under
five years of age, as is documented by UNICEF data. The total number of deaths that
the sanctions produced among Iraqi civilians probably exceeded a million, if older children
and adults are included.
Ramsey Clark, who studied the effects of the sanctions in Iraq from 1991 onwards,
wrote to the Security Council that most of the deaths “are from the effects of malnu-
trition including marasmas and kwashiorkor, wasting or emaciation which has reached
twelve per cent of all children, stunted growth which affects twenty-eight per cent, diar-
rhea, dehydration from bad water or food, which is ordinarily easily controlled and cured,
common communicable diseases preventable by vaccinations, and epidemics from deteri-
orating sanitary conditions. There are no deaths crueler than these. They are suffering
slowly, helplessly, without simple remedial medication, without simple sedation to relieve
pain, without mercy.”
On the morning of September 11, 2001, two hijacked airliners were deliberately crashed
into New York’s World Trade Center, causing the collapse of three skyscrapers and the
deaths of more than three thousand people. Almost simultaneously, another hijacked
airliner was driven into the Pentagon in Washington DC, and a fourth hijacked plane
crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. The fourth plane probably was to have made a suicide
attack on the White House or the Capitol, but passengers on the airliner became aware
what was happening through their mobile telephones, and they overpowered the hijackers.
Blame for the September 11 attacks soon centered on the wealthy Saudi Arabian Is-
lamic extremist, Osama bin Laden, and on his terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. In a later
statement acknowledging responsibility for the terrorist attacks, bin Laden gave as his
main reasons firstly the massive US support for Israel, a country that, in his view, was
committing atrocities against the Palestinians, and secondly the presence of US troops in
Saudi Arabia.
Like Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden was an ex-protegé of the CIA, by whom he had
previously been armed, trained, and supported. The history of bin Laden’s relationship
with the CIA began in 1979, when the CIA, acting through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intel-
ligence Agency, began to train and arm the Mujaheddin, an international force of Islamic
fundamentalists who were encouraged to attack Afghanistan’s secular socialist government.
158 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Bryzinski anticipated that the Soviets would
respond by sending troops to protect the socialist government of Afghanistan, and he
believed that the resulting war would be the Soviet Union’s version of Viet Nam: It would
be a war that would fatally weaken the Soviet Union. Thus he saw the war that he
was provoking in Afghanistan as an important step in the liberation of Eastern Europe.
“What is most important in the history of the world?”, Polish-born Bryzinski asked in
a 1998 interview, “The Taliban, or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up
Muslims, or the liberation of central Europe...?” It was, in fact, these same “stirred-up
Muslims” who guided two hijacked aircraft into the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001.
During the spring of 2003, our television and newspapers presented us with the spectacle
of an attack by two technologically superior powers on a much less industrialized nation,
a nation with an ancient and beautiful culture. The ensuing war was one-sided. Missiles
guided by laser beams and signals from space satellites were more than a match for less
sophisticated weapons.
Speeches were made to justify the attack. It was said to be needed because of weapons
of mass destruction (some countries are allowed to have them, others not). It was said
to be necessary to get rid of a cruel dictator (whom the attacking powers had previously
supported and armed). But the suspicion remained that the attack was resource-motivated.
It was about oil.
Looking at the present and threatened conflicts in the Middle East against the back-
ground of this history, must we not ask: To what extent are they too about oil?
“Whatever happens, we have got
The Maxim gun, and they have not.”
Hilaire Beloc
4.9. EXCESSIVE INEQUALITY MAINTAINED BY MILITARY FORCE 159
5
https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/economy-1
160 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
Neocolonialism?
In his book, Neocolonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism (Thomas Nielsen, London,
1965), Kwami Nkrumah defined neocolonialism with the following words: “The essence of
neocolonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory independent, and has all
the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus
its political policy is directed from the outside. The methods and form of this direction
can take various shapes. For example, in an extreme case, the troops of the imperial power
may garrison the territory of the neocolonial State and control the government of it. More
often, however, neocolonial control is exercised through monetary means... The struggle
against neocolonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the developed world from
operating in less developed countries. It is aimed at preventing the financial power of the
developed countries from being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed.”
4.11. PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF COLONIALISM 161
Figure 4.10: A late 19th century French cartoon showing England, Germany,
Russia, France and Japan slicing up the pie of China. (Public domain)
162 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
Figure 4.11: A cartoon showing Cecil Rhodes’ colonial ambitions for Africa. The
thread in his hands represents a proposed Cape-Town-to-Cairo telegraph line.
He wanted to “paint the map British red”, and declared, “If I could, I would
annex other planets.” (Public domain)
4.12. HISTORICAL CONFLICTS RELATED TO WATER 163
http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/
• 1938, China floods Yellow River to defend from Japan: Chiang Kai-shek
orders the destruction of flood-control dikes of the Huayuankou, Henan
section of the Huang He (Yellow) River, in order to flood areas threatened
by the Japanese army. West of Kaifeng, dikes are destroyed with dyna-
mite, spilling water across the flat plain. Even though the flood destroys
part of the invading army and mires its equipment in mud, Wuhan, the
headquarters of the Nationalist government is taken by the Japanese in
October. Floodwaters cover an area variously estimated as between 3,000
and 50,000 square kilometers, and kill Chinese estimated in numbers be-
tween “tens of thousands” and “one million.”
• 1951, Israel and Syria fight over Yarmouk River: ordan makes public
its plans to irrigate the Jordan Valley by tapping the Yarmouk River;
Israel responds by commencing drainage of the Huleh swamps located in
the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria; border skirmishes ensue
between Israel and Syria.
to mediate the conflict. In May Syria closes its airspace to Iraqi flights and
both Syrian and Iraq reportedly transfer troops to their mutual border.
Saudi Arabia successfully mediates the conflict.
• 1978 onwards, Egypt threatens Ethiopia over Nile plans: Long standing
tensions over the Nile, especially the Blue Nile, originate in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s proposed construction of dams on the headwaters of the Blue
Nile leads Egypt to repeatedly declare the vital importance of water. “The
only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water’ (Anwar Sadat,
1979). “The next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile,
not politics” (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1988).
capable of handling unrest. First, more frequent weather events will surely
put a drag on resource delivery and create new emergency relief needs. In the
Middle East where foreign assistance is often critical, donors may have to work
double time to continue to fund stabilization and governance projects while
also providing more humanitarian disaster aid.
“Second, oil producers will have fewer resources as oil receipts contract
amid the inevitable global clean energy transition that will accompany cli-
mate action. Take the fact that worsening climate change is already driving a
global transition toward clean energy. In November 2018, even while pursu-
ing close cooperation with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), Russian President Vladimir Putin openly declared that “$70 suits us
completely,” referring to an ideal oil price for his country. Unlike his Middle
Eastern partners, Putin seems to acknowledge that OPEC oil will face market
competition from renewables and US shale if it reaches too high a price.
“In countries where the social contract rests upon limited political freedom
in exchange for subsidies and extravagant public works, there will be less money
to go around, and it cannot be expected to go as far. Such is the case in
Algeria, where street demonstrations have forced the country’s ailing leader,
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to step down. Protesters’ grievances are, in part, tied
to the oil, which funded social benefits that buoyed youth employment until
prices crashed.
“While countries like Saudi Arabia have the financial capacity to likely
weather the storm, worry should be aimed squarely at unstable oil producers
like Iraq and Libya, which require extraordinarily oil prices to fund budgets.
It is true that oil is a valuable, concentrated resource that factions compete
for in the region, but it may be a necessary source of reconstruction funding
once conflict abates. In the best case, foreign assistance continues to come
from western governments like the United States that still rely on the global
flow of oil to some degree. In the worst case, donor governments abdicate their
support as the mass deployment of wind turbines, solar panels, and electric
vehicles become more feasible and affordable. The consequences could be lock-
ing in the fragility of the region’s current conflict zones: Even though Libyan
militias fight to control oil infrastructure now, it is hard to imagine the country
funding its own reconstruction in the future unless oil returns to a higher price.
“Climate change might also have the Middle East’s governments warier of
their neighbors. Resource scarcity within a country can provoke nationwide
unrest, but competition over transboundary resources can elevate even higher
to bellicose levels. Knowing that water will become scarcer, it is instructive to
understand how Middle Eastern neighbors are already handling disputes over
water needed for irrigation, drinking, and hydropower production.
“The Nile River Basin provides one worrying example. Since 2011, Ethiopia
has been constructing its Grand Renaissance Dam in a bid to become a regional
170 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
electricity exporter. However, the dam will slash downstream flow to Egypt by
25 percent. Cairo alleges that the dam will interrupt water supplies to its nearly
100 million people. While Ethiopia and Egypt are currently in negotiations,
Egyptian officials have been caught considering military action over the dispute
as recently as 2013. The current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has
openly declared the dam “a matter of life and death,” highlighting its continued
importance. Climate change, which threatens to disrupt the Nile’s flows, stands
to make an already tense situation worse.
“Admittedly, direct conflict between Middle Eastern countries has become
rarer, but proxy wars are common, featuring in nearly all the region’s civil wars.
Water has already featured in at least one of them: Historically, Damascus has
leveraged support for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a group loathed
by Istanbul, to force Turkey to share Euphrates waters to Syria. Nearly every
country in the Middle East from Morocco to Iran share water resources with
a neighbor, and some have little freshwater of their own. What has played
out between Egypt and Sudan and between Turkey and Syria could become a
frequent feature of Middle Eastern politics as water becomes even more scarce.”
7. A.A. Bartlett, Forgotten Fundamentals of the Energy Crisis, American Journal of Physics,
46, 876-888, (1978).
8. N. Gall, We are Living Off Our Capital, Forbes, September, (1986).
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172 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
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52. R. Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Edu-
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53. D. Morgan and D.B. Ottaway, In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil is Key Issue as U.S.
Drillers Eye Huge petroleum Pool, Washington Post, September 15, (2002).
54. D. Rose, Bush and Blair Made Secret Pact for Iraqi War, The Observer, April 4,
(2004).
55. E. Vulliamy, P. Webster and N.P. Walsh, Scramble to Carve Up Iraqi Oil Reserves
Lies Behind US Diplomacy, The Observer, October 6, (2002).
56. Y. Ibrahim, Bush’s Iraq Adventure is Bound to Backfire, International Herald Tri-
bune, November 1, (2002).
4.14. CONCLUDING REMARKS 173
57. P. Beaumont and F. Islam, Carve-Up of Oil Riches Begins, The Observer, November
3, (2002).
58. M. Dobbs, US Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup, Washington Post, December 30, (2002).
59. R. Sale, Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot, United Press International, April 10, (2003).
60. R. Morris, A Tyrant Forty Years in the Making, New York Times, March 14, (2003).
61. H. Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Prince-
ton University Press, (1978).
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Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of
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63. P.E. Tyler, Officers Say US Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas, New York Times,
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65. S. Zunes, Saddam’s Arrest Raises Troubling Questions, Foreign Policy in Focus,
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1980-1984, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, February 25,
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68. J.R. Hiltermann, America Didn’t Seem to Mind Poison Gas, International Herald
Tribune, January 17, (2003).
69. D. Hiro, Iraq and Poison Gas, Nation, August 28, (2002).
70. T. Weiner, Iraq Uses Techniques in Spying Against its Former Tutor, the US, Philadel-
phia Inquirer, February 5, (1991).
71. S. Hussein and A. Glaspie, Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with US Envoy,
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72. D. Omissi, Baghdad and British Bombers, Guardian, January 19, (1991).
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75. C. Tripp, Iraq: The Imperial Precedent, Le Monde Diplomatique, January, (2003).
76. G.H.W. Bush and B. Scowcroft, Why We Didn’t Remove Saddam, Time, 2 March,
(1998).
77. J.A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992,
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81. G. Guma, Uneasy Empire: Repression, Globalization, and What We Can Do, Toward
Freedom, (2003).
174 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
82. W. Blum, A Brief History of U.S. Interventions: 1945 to the Present, Z magazine,
June, (1999).
83. W. Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II
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85. L. Meyer, The Power of One, (World Press Review), Reforma, Mexico City, August
5, (1999).
86. W. Hartung, F. Berrigan and M. Ciarrocca, Operation Endless Deployment: The
War With Iraq Is Part of a Larger Plan for Global Military Dominance, The Nation
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89. G. Monbiot, The Logic of Empire, The Guardian, August 6, (2002), World Press
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97. D. Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, Routledge, New York,
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98. M. Klare, Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World’s Oil, For-
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99. J. Fitchett and D. Ignatius, Lengthy Elf Inquiry Nears Explosive Finish, International
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100. T. Rajamoorthy, Deceit and Duplicity: Some Reflections on Western Intervention in
Iraq, Third World Resurgence, March-April, (2003).
101. P. Knightley and C. Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia, Nelson, Lon-
don, (1969).
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103. D. Rose, Bush and Blair Made Secret Pact for Iraq War, Observer, April 4, (2004).
104. B. Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge Strategy
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105. M. Fletcher and M. Theodoulou, Baker Says Sanctions Must Stay as Long as Saddam
Holds Power, Times, May 23, (1991).
4.14. CONCLUDING REMARKS 175
106. J. Pienaar and L. Doyle, UK Maintains Tough Line on Sanctions Against Iraq, In-
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109. H. Thomas, Preventive War Sets Serious Precedent, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, March
20, (2003).
110. C. Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Repub-
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111. C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, Henry
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114. W. Greider, Fortress America, Public Affairs Press, (1998).
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122. T. Bodenheimer and R. Gould, Rollback: Right-wing Power in U.S. Foreign Policy,
South End Press, (1989).
123. G. Guma, Uneasy Empire: Repression, Globalization, and What We Can Do, Toward
Freedom, (2003).
124. W. Blum, A Brief History of U.S. Interventions: 1945 to the Present, Z magazine,
June, (1999).
125. W. Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II
126. J.M. Cypher, The Iron Triangle: The New Military Buildup, Dollars and Sense mag-
azine, January/February, (2002).
127. L. Meyer, The Power of One, (World Press Review), Reforma, Mexico City, August
5, (1999).
128. C. Johnson, Time to Bring the Troops Home, The Nation magazine, May 14, (2001).
129. W. Hartung, F. Berrigan and M. Ciarrocca, Operation Endless Deployment: The
War With Iraq Is Part of a Larger Plan for Global Military Dominance, The Nation
magazine, October 21, (2002).
176 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
130. C. Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Repub-
lic, Henry Hold and Company, New York, (2004).
131. C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, Henry
Hold and Company, New York, (2000).
132. I. Ramonet, Servile States, Le Monde diplomatique, Paris, October (2002), World
Press Review, December, (2002).
133. J.K. Galbraith, The Unbearable Costs of Empire, American Prospect magazine,
November, (2002).
134. G. Monbiot, The Logic of Empire, The Guardian, August 6, (2002), World Press
Review, October, (2002).
135. W.R. Pitt and S. Ritter, War on Iraq, Context Books
136. W.R. Pitt, The Greatest Sedition is Silence, Pluto Press, (2003).
137. J. Wilson, Republic or Empire?, The Nation magazine, March 3, (2003).
138. R. Dreyfuss, Just the Beginning: Is Iraq the Opening Salvo in a War to Remake the
World?, The American Prospect magazine, April, (2003).
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Century. Can the Rest of the World Stop Them?, These Times magazine, May,
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140. J.M. Blair, The Control of Oil, Random House, New York, (1976).
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142. P. Bennis and N. Chomsky, Before and After: US Foreign Policy and the September
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143. J. Garrison, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rouge Power?, Berrett-Koehler
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144. A.J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy,
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145. D.R. Francis, Hidden Defense Costs Add Up to Double Trouble, Christian Science
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146. A. Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies of the World and How
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147. D. Yergin, The Prize, Simon and Schuster, New York, (1991).
148. E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Prince-
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149. W.B. Gallie, Understanding War: Points of Conflict, Routledge, London, (1991).
150. R. Falk and S.S. Kim, eds., The War System: An Interdisciplinary Approach, West-
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151. J.D. Clarkson and T.C. Cochran, eds., War as a Social Institution, Colombia Uni-
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152. S. Melman, The Permanent War Economy, Simon and Schuster, (1974).
153. D. Yergin, The Prize, Simon and Schuster, New York, (1991).
4.14. CONCLUDING REMARKS 177
154. A. Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies of the World and How
They Were Made, Hodder and Staughton, London, (1988).
155. J.D. Rockefeller, Random Remaniscences of Men and Events, Doubleday, New York,
(1909).
156. M.B. Stoff, Oil, War and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on
Oil, 1941-1947, Yale University Press, New Haven, (1980).
157. W.D. Muscable, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy,
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158. J. Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis, Monthly Review, New York, (1976).
159. F. Benn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, St. Martin’s Press, New York,
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160. R. Sale, Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot, United Press International, April 10, (2003).
161. K. Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, McGraw-Hill, New
York, (1979).
162. E. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Prince-
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163. J. Fitchett and D. Ignatius, Lengthy Elf Inquiry Nears Explosive Finish, International
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164. J.M. Blair, The Control of Oil, Random House, New York, (1976).
165. M.T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, Owl Books
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166. P. Grose, Allen Dulles: The Life of a Gentleman Spy, Houghton Mifflin, Boston,
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167. H. Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, 1910-1928, Ithaca Books, London, (1976).
168. P. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, Ithaca Press, London, (1976).
169. D.E. Omissi, British Air Power and Colonial Control in Iraq, 1920-1925, Manchester
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170. V.G. Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies, 1815-1960, Sutton, Stroud, (1998).
171. R. Solh, Britain’s 2 Wars With Iraq, Ithaca Press, Reading, (1996).
172. D. Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, Routledge, New York,
(1991).
173. S. Warren, Exxon’s Profit Surged in 4th Quarter, Wall Street Journal, February 12,
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174. R. Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House and the Edu-
cation of Paul O’Neill, Simon and Schuster, New York, (2004).
175. D. Morgan and D.B. Ottaway, In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil is Key Issue as U.S.
Drillers Eye Huge Petrolium Pool, Washington Post, September 15, (2002).
176. D. Rose, Bush and Blair Made Secret Pact for Iraqi War, The Observer, April 4,
(2004).
177. E. Vulliamy, P. Webster and N.P. Walsh, Scramble to Carve Up Iraqi Oil Reserves
Lies Behind US Diplomacy, The Observer, October 6, (2002).
178. Y. Ibrahim, Bush’s Iraq Adventure is Bound to Backfire, International Herald Tri-
bune, November 1, (2002).
178 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
179. P. Beaumont and F. Islam, Carve-Up of Oil Riches Begins, The Observer, November
3, (2002).
180. C.J. Cleveland, Physical and Economic Aspects of Natural Resource Scarcity: The
Cost of Oil Supply in the Lower 48 United States 1936-1987, Resources and Energy
13, 163-188, (1991).
181. C.J. Cleveland, Yield Per Effort for Additions to Crude Oil Reserves in the Lower
48 States, 1946-1989, American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin, 76,
948-958, (1992).
182. M.K. Hubbert, Technique of Prediction as Applied to the Production of Oil and Gas,
in NBS Special Publication 631, US Department of Commerce, National Bureau of
Standards, (1982).
183. L.F. Ivanhoe, Oil Discovery Indices and Projected Discoveries, Oil and Gas Journal,
11, 19, (1984).
184. L.F. Ivanhoe, Future Crude Oil Supplies and Prices, Oil and Gas Journal, July 25,
111-112, (1988).
185. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook, 2001, US Depart-
ment of Energy, (2001).
186. Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea Region, US Department of Energy,
(2001).
187. National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy, The White
House, (2004). (http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/)
188. M. Klare, Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World’s Oil, For-
eign Policy in Focus, (Interhemispheric Resource Center/Institute for Policy Stud-
ies/SEEN), Washington DC and Silver City NM, January, (2004).
189. M. Dobbs, US Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup, Washington Post, December 30, (2002).
190. R. Sale, Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot, United Press International, April 10, (2003).
191. R. Morris, A Tyrant Forty Years in the Making, New York Times, March 14, (2003).
192. H. Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Prince-
ton University Press, (1978).
193. D.W. Riegel, Jr., and A.M. D’Amato, US Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related
Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of
the Persian Gulf War, Report to US Senate (“The Riegel Report”), May 25, (1994).
194. P.E. Tyler, Officers Say US Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas, New York Times,
August 18, (2002).
195. D. Priest, Rumsfeld Visited Baghdad in 1984 to Reassure Iraqis, Documents Show,
Washington Post, December 19, (2003).
196. S. Zunes, Saddam’s Arrest Raises Troubling Questions, Foreign Policy in Focus,
(http://www.globalpolicy.org/), December (2003).
197. D. Leigh and J. Hooper, Britain’s Dirty Secret, Guardian, March 6, (2003).
198. J. Battle, (Ed.), Shaking Hands With Saddam Hussein: The US Tilts Towards Iraq,
1980-1984, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, February 25,
(2003).
4.14. CONCLUDING REMARKS 179
199. J.R. Hiltermann, America Didn’t Seem to Mind Poison Gas, International Herald
Tribune, January 17, (2003).
200. D. Hiro, Iraq and Poison Gas, Nation, August 28, (2002).
201. T. Weiner, Iraq Uses Techniques in Spying Against its Former Tutor, the US, Philadel-
phia Inquirer, February 5, (1991).
202. S. Hussein and A. Glaspie, Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with US Envoy,
The New York Times, International, September 23, (1990).
203. T.E. Lawrence, A Report on Mesopotamia by T.E. Lawrence, Sunday Times, August
22, (1920).
204. T. Rajamoorthy, Deceit and Duplicity: Some Reflections on Western Intervention in
Iraq, Third World Resurgence, March-April, (2003).
205. P. Knightley and C. Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia, Nelson, Lon-
don, (1969).
206. G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, (1962).
207. Y. Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq, Princeton University Press, (1994).
208. D. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the
Creation of the Modern Middle East, Owl Books, (2001).
209. S.K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, Bloomsbury, London,
(2001).
210. M. Muffti, Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq,
Cornell University Press, (1996).
211. C. Clover, Lessons of the 1920 Revolt Lost on Bremer, Financial Times, November
17, (2003).
212. J. Kifner, Britain Tried First. Iraq Was No Picnic Then, New York Times, July 20,
(2003).
213. D. Omissi, Baghdad and British Bombers, Guardian, January 19, (1991).
214. D. Vernet, Postmodern Imperialism, Le Monde, April 24, (2003).
215. J. Buchan, Miss Bell’s Lines in the Sand, Guardian, March 12, (2003).
216. C. Tripp, Iraq: The Imperial Precedent, Le Monde Diplomatique, January, (2003).
217. G.H.W. Bush and B. Scowcroft, Why We Didn’t Remove Saddam, Time, 2 March,
(1998).
218. J.A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992,
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, (1995).
219. D. Rose, Bush and Blair Made Secret Pact for Iraq War, Observer, April 4, (2004).
220. B. Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge Strategy
Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, Washington Post, June 23, (1991).
221. M. Fletcher and M. Theodoulou, Baker Says Sanctions Must Stay as Long as Saddam
Holds Power, Times, May 23, (1991).
222. J. Pienaar and L. Doyle, UK Maintains Tough Line on Sanctions Against Iraq, In-
dependent, May 11, (1991).
223. C. Johnson, America’s Empire of Bases, TomDispatch.com, January, (2004).
224. B. Blum (translator), Ex-National Security Chief Brzezinski Admits: Afghan Is-
lamism Was Made in Washington, Nouvel Observateur, January 15, (1998).
180 THE DEVIL’S DYNAMO
225. D. Rose, Bush and Blair Made Secret Pact for Iraq War, The Observer, Sunday April
4, (1994).
226. G. Vidal, Dreaming War: Blood for Oil and the Bush-Cheney Junta, Thunder’s
Mouth Press, (2002).
227. H. Thomas, Preventive War Sets Serious Precedent, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, March
20, (2003).
228. C. Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Repub-
lic, Henry Hold and Company, New York, (2004).
229. C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, Henry
Hold and Company, New York, (2000).
230. M. Parenti, Against Empire: The Brutal Realities of U.S. Global Domination, City
Lights Books, 261 Columbus Avenue, San Francisco, CA94133, (1995).
231. E. Ahmad, Confronting Empire, South End Press, (2000).
232. W. Greider, Fortress America, Public Affairs Press, (1998).
233. R. Mahajan, Full Spectrum Dominance: U.S. Power in Iraq and Beyond, Seven
Stories Press, (2003).
234. J. Pilger, Hidden Agendas, The New Press, (1998).
235. S.R. Shalom, Imperial Alibis, South End Press, (1993).
236. C. Boggs (editor), Masters of War: Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American
Empire, Routledge, (2003).
237. J. Pilger, The New Rulers of the World, Verso, (2992).
238. G. Vidal, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got To Be So Hated, Thun-
der’s Mouth Press, (2002).
239. W. Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, Common Courage
Press, (2000).
240. M. Parenti, The Sword and the Dollar, St. Martin’s Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New
York, NY 10010, (1989).
241. K. Grossman, Weapons in Space, Seven Stories Press, (2001).
242. R.J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World,
World Publishing, (1968).
243. T. Bodenheimer and R. Gould, Rollback: Right-wing Power in U.S. Foreign Policy,
South End Press, (1989).
244. G. Guma, Uneasy Empire: Repression, Globalization, and What We Can Do, Toward
Freedom, (2003).
245. W. Blum, A Brief History of U.S. Interventions: 1945 to the Present, Z magazine,
June, (1999).
246. W. Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Intervention Since World War II
247. M. Klare, Endless Military Superiority, The Nation magazine, July 15, (2002).
248. J.M. Cypher, The Iron Triangle: The New Military Buildup, Dollars and Sense mag-
azine, January/February, (2002).
249. L. Meyer, The Power of One, (World Press Review), Reforma, Mexico City, August
5, (1999).
250. C. Johnson, Time to Bring the Troops Home, The Nation magazine, May 14, (2001).
4.14. CONCLUDING REMARKS 181
183
184 WHY WAR?
offering this assessment of their Vietnam carnage: ‘The picture of the world’s
greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week,
while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose
merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.’
He knew it then, and, give him this, the dimensions of that horror never
left him. When I interviewed him for the Los Angeles Times in 1995, after the
publication of his confessional memoir, his assessment of the madness he had
unleashed was all too clear:
‘Look, we dropped three to four times the tonnage on that tiny little area as
were dropped by the Allies in all of the theaters in World War II over a period
of five years. It was unbelievable. We killed - there were killed - 3,200,000
Vietnamese, excluding the South Vietnamese military. My God! The killing,
the tonnage - it was fantastic. The problem was that we were trying to do
something that was militarily impossible - we were trying to break the will; I
don’t think we can break the will by bombing short of genocide.’
We - no, he - couldn’t break their will because their fight was for national
independence. They had defeated the French and would defeat the Americans
who took over when French colonialists gave up the ghost. The war was a lie
from the first. It never had anything to do with the freedom of the Vietnamese
(we installed one tyrant after another in power), but instead had to do with
our irrational cold war obsession with ‘international communism.’ Irrational,
as President Richard Nixon acknowledged when he embraced detente with the
Soviet communists, toasted China’s fierce communist Mao Tse-tung and then
escalated the war against ‘communist’ Vietnam and neutral Cambodia.
It was always a lie and our leaders knew it, but that did not give them
pause. Both Johnson and Nixon make it quite clear on their White House
tapes that the mindless killing, McNamara’s infamous body count, was about
domestic politics and never security.
The lies are clearly revealed in the Pentagon Papers study that McNamara
commissioned, but they were made public only through the bravery of Daniel
Ellsberg. Yet when Ellsberg, a former Marine who had worked for McNamara
in the Pentagon, was in the docket facing the full wrath of Nixon’s Justice De-
partment, McNamara would lift not a finger in his defense. Worse, as Ellsberg
reminded me this week, McNamara threatened that if subpoenaed to testify
at the trial by Ellsberg’s defense team, ‘I would hurt your client badly.’
Not as badly as those he killed or severely wounded. Not as badly as the
almost 59,000 American soldiers killed and the many more horribly hurt. One
of them was the writer and activist Ron Kovic, who as a kid from Long Island
was seduced by McNamara’s lies into volunteering for two tours in Vietnam.
Eventually, struggling with his mostly paralyzed body, he spoke out against
the war in the hope that others would not have to suffer as he did (and still
does). Meanwhile, McNamara maintained his golden silence, even as Richard
Nixon managed to kill and maim millions more. What McNamara did was evil
5.2. THE PENTAGON PAPERS 185
- deeply so.
The Pentagon Papers, officially titled Report of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense Vietnam Task Force, is a United States Department of Defense
history of the United States’ political and military involvement in Vietnam
from 1945 to 1967. The papers were released by Daniel Ellsberg, who had
worked on the study; they were first brought to the attention of the public on
the front page of The New York Times in 1971.A 1996 article in The New York
Times said that the Pentagon Papers had demonstrated, among other things,
that the Johnson Administration ‘systematically lied, not only to the public
but also to Congress.’
More specifically, the papers revealed that the U.S. had secretly enlarged
the scope of its actions in the Vietnam War with the bombings of nearby
Cambodia and Laos, coastal raids on North Vietnam, as well as Marine Corps
attacks, none of which were reported in the mainstream media. For his dis-
closure of the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg was initially charged with conspiracy,
espionage, and theft of government property, but the charges were later dis-
missed after prosecutors investigating the Watergate scandal discovered that
the staff members in the Nixon White House had ordered the so-called White
House Plumbers to engage in unlawful efforts to discredit Ellsberg...
To ensure the possibility of public debate about the papers’ content, on June
29, US Senator Mike Gravel, an Alaska Democrat, entered 4,100 pages of the
papers into the record of his Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds.
These portions of the papers, which were edited for Gravel by Howard Zinn and
Noam Chomsky, were subsequently published by Beacon Press, the publish-
ing arm of the Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations. A federal
grand jury was subsequently empaneled to investigate possible violations of
federal law in the release of the report. Leonard Rodberg, a Gravel aide, was
subpoenaed to testify about his role in obtaining and arranging for publication
of the Pentagon Papers. Gravel asked the court (in Gravel v. United States)
to quash the subpoena on the basis of the Speech or Debate Clause in Article
I, Section 6 of the United States Constitution.
Daniel Ellsberg believed that when U.S. citizens discovered that the Vietnam War was
based on lies, the war would end. However, it continued for many more years.
186 WHY WAR?
Figure 5.2: Napalm burn victims during the war being treated at the 67th
Combat Support Hospital. 1967-1968 Innocent children become burn victims
in the Vietnam War.
188 WHY WAR?
“Up to four million people in Vietnam were exposed to the defoliant. The
government of Vietnam says as many as three million people have suffered
illness because of Agent Orange,[4] and the Red Cross of Vietnam estimates
that up to one million people are disabled or have health problems as a re-
sult of Agent Orange contamination.The United States government has de-
scribed these figures as unreliable, while documenting higher cases of leukemia,
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and various kinds of cancer in exposed US military vet-
erans. An epidemiological study done by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention showed that there was an increase in the rate of birth defects of
the children of military personnel as a result of Agent Orange. Agent Orange
has also caused enormous environmental damage in Vietnam. Over 3,100,000
hectares (31,000 km2 or 11,969 mi2) of forest were defoliated. Defoliants eroded
tree cover and seedling forest stock, making reforestation difficult in numerous
areas. Animal species diversity sharply reduced in contrast with unsprayed
areas.”
190 WHY WAR?
Figure 5.4: Nguyen Xuan Minh lies in a crib at the Tu Du Hospital May 2, 2005
in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
5.3. EFFECTS OF AGENT ORANGE 191
Figure 5.5: A disabled and malformed victim of foliant Agent Orange, begs on
the streets of Saigon to make a living, 1996.
192 WHY WAR?
According to an article by Jessica Pearce Rotondi entitled Why Laos Has Been Bombed
More Than Any Other Country2 ,
By 1975, one tenth of the population of Laos had been killed by the bombs, and a
quarter of the population were refugees.
2
https://www.history.com/news/laos-most-bombed-country-vietnam-war
5.4. BOMBING OF CAMBODIA AND LAOS 193
Cambodia
Here are some quotations from an article by Maximilian Wechsler entitled America’s ‘Se-
cret War’ and the Bombing of Southeast Asia3 :
“On March 18, 1969, USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 bombers
began carpet bombing Cambodia on the order of President Nixon. The overall
covert operation was code-named ‘Operation Menu’, with various phases named
‘Breakfast’, ‘Lunch’, ‘Dinner’, ‘Snack’, ‘Supper’ and ‘Dessert’.
“President Nixon ordered the campaign without consulting Congress and
even kept it secret from top military officials. Five members of Congress were
informed several months after the start of Operation Menu, but it was kept
secret from the American people until The New York Times broke the story
in May 1969. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s National Security Adviser,
was reportedly outraged over the leaked information in the story and ordered
the FBI to wiretap the phones of top White House aides and reporters to find
the source.
“More reports of the secret bombing campaign surfaced in the press and
records of Congressional proceedings, but it was not until 2000 that official the
USAF records of US bombing activity over Indochina from 1964 to 1973 were
declassified by President Bill Clinton.
“Some sources say that during the first phase of the bombings lasting un-
til April 1970, ‘Operation Breakfast’, the SAC conducted 3,630 sorties and
dropped 110,000 tons of bombs and that in the entire four-year campaign the
US dropped about 540,000 tons of bombs. In the book Bombs Over Cambodia,
historians Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen state that, based on their analysis
of the declassified documents, 2,756,941 tons of ordnance was dropped during
Operation Menu, more than the US dropped on Japan during World War II.
“The authors also say that US planes flew 230,516 sorties over 113,716 sites.
Estimates of casualties vary widely as well, but it is believed that somewhere
between 100,000 and 600,000 civilians died in the bombing and two million
became homeless. Some sources say that hundreds of thousands more Cam-
bodians died from the effects of displacement, illness or starvation as a direct
result of the bombings.
“The carpet bombing of Cambodia lasted until August 1973. It devastated
the countryside and the chaos and upheaval it unleashed played a big part in
the installation of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot. The
Khmer Rouge was responsible for the deaths of up to two million Cambodians
through executions, forced labour and starvation.”
3
https://www.thebigchilli.com/feature-stories/americas-secret-war-and-the-bombing-of-southeast-asia
194 WHY WAR?
5.4. BOMBING OF CAMBODIA AND LAOS 195
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ed., Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land (pp. 74-95). Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
66. Robbins, Mary Susannah (2007). Against the Vietnam War: Writings by Activists.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
198 WHY WAR?
67. Roberts, Anthea (2005). The Agent Orange Case: Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of
Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Co. ASIL Proceedings. 99 (1): 380-85.
68. Roberts III, Mervyn Edwin. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968 (2018)
69. Schandler, Herbert Y. (2009). America in Vietnam: The War That Couldn’t Be
Won. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
70. Schell, Jonathan. The Time of Illusion (1976).
71. Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975
(1997).
72. Sheehan, Neil (1989). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Viet-
nam. New York: Vintage.
73. Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of Amer-
ica’s Last Years in Vietnam. (1999), based upon still classified tape-recorded meet-
ings of top level US commanders in Vietnam,
74. Spector, Ronald. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992), very broad
coverage of 1968.
75. Stanton, Shelby L. (2003). Vietnam order of battle (2003 ed.). Stackpole Books.
76. Stone, Richard (2007). Agent Orange’s Bitter Harvest. Science. 315 (5809): 176-79.
77. Stuart-Fox, Martin (1997). A History of Laos. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
78. Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio
press (1982),
79. Thayer, Thomas C. (1985). War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Viet-
nam. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
80. Tucker, Spencer. ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, (1998) 3 vol. reference set;
also one-volume abridgement (2001).
81. Tucker, Spencer (2011) [1998]. The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political,
Social, and Military History. ABC-CLIO.
82. Turner, Robert F. (1975). Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development.
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
83. Turse, Nick (2013). Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam.
New York: Metropolitan Books.
84. Vietnam Task Force (1969). Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam
Task Force. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
85. Westheider, James E. (2007). The Vietnam War. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press.
ISBN 978-0313337550.
86. Willbanks, James H. (2009). Vietnam War almanac. Infobase Publishing. ISBN
978-0816071029.
87. Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991).
88. Woodruff, Mark (2005). Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of The Viet Cong and The
North Vietnamese. Arlington, VA: Presidio Press.
89. Young, Marilyn B. (1991). The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990. New York: HarperPeren-
nial.
Chapter 6
199
200 WHY WAR?
and others as human beings. When asked who he is, his automatic response is that he is
a German, a Russian, a Japanese, a Christian, a Muslim, a member of a certain tribe or
family. He has no purpose, worth or destiny apart from his collective body, and as long as
that body lives, he cannot really die. ...”
“The effacement of individual separateness must be thorough. In every act, however
trivial, the individual must, by some ritual, associate himself with the congregation, the
tribe, the party, etcetera. His joys and sorrows, his pride and confidence must spring
from the fortunes and capacities of the group, rather than from his individual prospects
or abilities. Above all, he must never feel alone. Though stranded on a desert island, he
must feel that he is under the eyes of the group. To be cast out from the group must be
equivalent to being cut off from life.”
“This is undoubtedly a primitive state of being, and its most perfect examples are found
among primitive tribes. Mass movements strive to approximate this primitive perfection,
and we are not imagining things when the anti-individualist bias of contemporary mass
movements strikes us as being a throwback to the primitive.”
The conditioning of a soldier in a modern army follows the pattern described in Eric
Hoffer’s book. The soldier’s training aims at abolishing his sense of individual separateness,
individual responsibility, and moral judgment. It is filled with rituals, such as saluting,
by which the soldier identifies with his tribe-like army group. His uniform also helps to
strip him of his individual identity and to assimilate him into the group. The result of
this psychological conditioning is that the soldier’s mind reverts to a primitive state. He
surrenders his moral responsibility, and when the politicians tell him to kill, he kills.
Figure 6.3: The Most Terrible Night. View of Kongens Nytorv in Copenhagen
During the English Bombardment of Copenhagen at Night between 4 and 5
September 1807.
204 WHY WAR?
Figure 6.4: Picasso’s famous painting Guernica was a protest following the Nazi
bombing of civilians in a Basque town,
end to the other and a huge column of smoke was towering well above us - and we were
on 20,000 feet! It all seemed almost incredible and, when I realized that I was looking at
a city with a population of two millions, or about that, it became almost frightening to
think of what must be going on down there in Hamburg.”
Below, in the burning city, temperatures reached 1400 degrees Fahrenheit, a temper-
ature at which lead and aluminum have long since liquefied. Powerful winds sucked new
air into the firestorm. There were reports of babies being torn by the high winds from
their mothers’ arms and sucked into the flames. Of the 45,000 people killed, it has been
estimated that 50 percent were women and children and many of the men killed were el-
derly, above military age. For weeks after the raids, survivors were plagued by ”...droves
of vicious rats, grown strong by feeding on the corpses that were left unburied within the
rubble as well as the potatoes and other food supplies lost beneath the broken buildings.”
The German cities Kassel, Pforzheim, Mainz, Dresden and Berlin were similarly de-
stroyed, and in Japan, US bombing created firestorms in many cities, for example Tokyo,
Kobe and Yokohama. In Tokyo alone, incendiary bombing caused more than 100,000
civilian casualties.
hundred thousand were hurt. Many of the injured died later from radiation sickness. A
few days later, Nagasaki was similarly destroyed.
The tragic destruction of the two Japanese cities was horrible enough in itself, but it
also marked the start of a nuclear arms race that continues to cast a very dark shadow over
the future of civilization. Not long afterwards, the Soviet Union exploded its own atomic
bomb, creating feelings of panic in the United States. President Truman authorized an
all-out effort to build superbombs based on thermonuclear reactions, the reactions that
heat the sun and stars.
In March, 1954, the US tested a thermonuclear bomb at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific
Ocean. It was 1000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. The Japanese fishing
boat, Lucky Dragon, was 135 kilometers from the Bikini explosion, but radioactive fallout
208 WHY WAR?
from the explosion killed one crew member and made all the others seriously ill. The
distance to the Marshall Islands was equally large, but even today, islanders continue to
suffer from the effects of fallout from the test, for example frequent birth defects.
Driven by the paranoia of the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons on both sides
reached truly insane heights. At the worst point, there were 50,000 nuclear weapons in the
world, with a total explosive power roughly a million times the power of the Hiroshima
bomb. This was equivalent to 4 tons of TNT for every person on the planet - enough to
destroy human civilization many times over - enough to threaten the existence of all life
on earth.
At the end of the Cold War, most people heaved a sigh of relief and pushed the problem
of nuclear weapons away from their minds. It was a threat to life too horrible to think
about. People felt that they could do nothing in any case, and they hoped that the problem
had finally disappeared.
Today, however, many thoughtful people realize that the problem of nuclear weapons
has by no means disappeared, and in some ways it is even more serious now than it was
during the Cold War. There are still over 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world, many
of them hydrogen bombs, many on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired with only a few
minutes warning. The world has frequently come extremely close to accidental nuclear
war. If nuclear weapons are allowed to exist for a long period of time, the probability for
such a catastrophic accident to happen will grow into a certainty.
Current dangers also come from proliferation. Recently, more and more nations have
come to possess nuclear weapons, and thus the danger that they will be used increases. For
example, if Pakistan’s less-than-stable government should fall, its nuclear weapons might
find their way into the hands of terrorists, and against terrorism deterrence has no effect.
Thus we live at a special time in history - a time of crisis for civilization. We did not
ask to be born at a moment of crisis, but such is our fate. Every person now alive has a
special responsibility: We owe it, both to our ancestors and to future generations, to build
a stable and cooperative future world. It must be a war-free world, from which nuclear
weapons have been completely abolished. No person can achieve these changes alone, but
together we can build the world that we desire. This will not happen through inaction,
but it can happen through the dedicated work of large numbers of citizens.
Civilians have for too long played the role of passive targets, hostages in the power
struggles of politicians. It is time for civil society to make its will felt. If our leaders
continue to enthusiastically support the institution of war, if they will not abolish nuclear
weapons, then let us have new leaders.
Today, despite the end of the Cold War, the world spends roughly 1.7 trillion (i.e. 1.7
million million) US dollars each year on armaments. This colossal flood of money could
have been used instead for education, famine relief, development of infrastructure, or on
urgently needed public health measures.
The World Health Organization lacks funds to carry through an antimalarial program
on as large a scale as would be desirable, but the entire program could be financed for less
than our military establishments spend in a single day. Five hours of world arms spending
is equivalent to the total cost of the 20-year WHO campaign that resulted in the eradication
of smallpox. For every 100,000 people in the world, there are 556 soldiers, but only 85
doctors. Every soldier costs an average of $20,000 per year, while the average spent on
education is only $380 per school-aged child. With a diversion of funds consumed by three
weeks of military spending, the world could create a sanitary water supply for all its people,
thus eliminating the cause of almost half of all human illness.
A new drug-resistant form of tuberculosis has recently become widespread in Asia and
in the former Soviet Union. In order to combat this new and highly dangerous form of
tuberculosis and to prevent its spread, WHO needs $500 million, an amount equivalent to
1.2 hours of world arms spending.
Today’s world is one in which roughly ten million children die every year from starvation
or from diseases related to poverty. Besides this enormous waste of young lives through
malnutrition and preventable disease, there is a huge waste of opportunities through inad-
equate education. The rate of illiteracy in the 25 least developed countries is 80%, and the
total number of illiterates in the world is estimated to be 800 million. Meanwhile every 60
seconds the world spends $6.5 million on armaments.
It is plain that if the almost unbelievable sums now wasted on the institution of war
were used constructively, most of the pressing problems of humanity could be solved, but
today the world spends more than 20 times as much on war as it does on development.
6.6 Refugees
Human Rights Watch estimates that in 2001 there were 15 million refugees in the world,
forced from their countries by war, civil and political conflict, or by gross violations of
human rights. In addition, there were an estimated 22 million internally displaced persons,
violently forced from their homes but still within the borders of their countries.
In 2001, 78% of all refugees came from ten areas: Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Bu-
rundi, Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Somalia and Sudan. A
quarter of all refugees are Palestinians, who make up the world’s oldest and largest refugee
population. 45% of the world’s refugees have found sanctuaries in Asia, 30% in Africa,
19% in Europe and 5% in North America.
Refugees who have crossed an international border are in principle protected by Article
14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms their right “to seek and to
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. In 1950 the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Refugees was created to implement Article 14, and in 1951 the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the UN. By 2002 this legally binding
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6.7. DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE 211
treaty had been signed by 140 nations. However the industrialized countries have recently
adopted a very hostile and restrictive attitude towards refugees, subjecting them to arbi-
trary arrests, denial of social and economic rights, and even forcible return to countries in
which they face persecution.
The status of internally displaced persons is even worse than that of refugees who have
crossed international borders. In many cases the international community simply ignores
their suffering, reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In fact,
the United Nations Charter is self-contradictory in this respect, since on the one hand it
calls for non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, but on the other hand,
people everywhere are guaranteed freedom from persecution by the Charter’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.3
University of Vermont, conclude that “a military presence anywhere in the world is the
single most reliable predictor of ecological damage”.
Modern warfare destroys environments to such a degree that it has been described as
an “environmental holocaust.” For example, herbicides use in the Vietnam War killed an
estimated 6.2 billion board-feet of hardwood trees in the forests north and west of Saigon,
according to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Herbicides such as
Agent Orange also made enormous areas of previously fertile land unsuitable for agriculture
for many years to come. In Vietnam and elsewhere in the world, valuable agricultural land
has also been lost because land mines or the remains of cluster bombs make it too dangerous
for farming.
During the Gulf War of 1990, the oil spills amounted to 150 million barrels, 650 times
the amount released into the environment by the notorious Exxon Valdez disaster. During
the Gulf War an enormous number of shells made of depleted uranium were fired. When
the dust produced by exploded shells is inhaled it often produces cancer, and it will remain
in the environment of Iraq for decades.
Radioactive fallout from nuclear tests pollutes the global environment and causes many
thousands of cases of cancer, as well as birth abnormalities. Most nuclear tests have been
carried out on lands belonging to indigenous peoples. Agent Orange also produced cancer,
birth abnormalities and other serious forms of illness both in the Vietnamese population
and among the foreign soldiers fighting in Vietnam5
than wasted) on the institution of war could also help the world to make the transition
from fossil fuel use to renewable energy systems.
Military might is used by powerful industrialized nations to maintain economic hege-
mony over less developed countries. This is true today, even though the colonial era is
supposed to be over (as has been amply documented by Professor Michael Klare in his
books on “Resource Wars”).
The way in which the industrialized countries maintain their control over less developed
nations can be illustrated by the “resource curse”, i.e. the fact that resource-rich developing
countries are no better off economically than those that lack resources, but are cursed with
corrupt and undemocratic governments. This is because foreign corporations extracting
local resources under unfair agreements exist in a symbiotic relationship with corrupt local
officials.
One might think that taxation of foreign resource-extracting firms would provide de-
veloping countries with large incomes. However, there is at present no international law
governing multinational tax arrangements. These are usually agreed to on a bilateral basis,
and the industrialized countries have stronger bargaining powers in arranging the bilateral
agreements.
Another important poverty-generating factor in the developing countries is war - often
civil war. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are, ironically, the
five largest exporters of small arms. Small arms have a long life. The weapons poured into
Africa by both sides during the Cold War are still there, and they contribute to political
chaos and civil wars that block development and cause enormous human suffering.
The United Nations website on Peace and Security through Disarmament states that
“Small arms and light weapons destabilize regions; spark, fuel and prolong conflicts; ob-
struct relief programmes; undermine peace initiatives; exacerbate human rights abuses;
hamper development; and foster a ’culture of violence’.”
An estimated 639 million small arms and light weapons are in circulation worldwide,
one for every ten people. Approximately 300,000 people are killed every year by these
weapons, many of them women and children.
There is also another, less obvious, link between intolerable economic inequality war:
Abolition of the institution of war will require the replacement of “might makes right” by
the rule international law. It will require development of effective global governance. But
reform and strengthening of the United Nations is blocked by wealthy countries because
they are afraid of loosing their privileged positions. If global economic inequality were less
enormous, the problem of unifying the world would be simplified.
Let us work to break the links between poverty and war! To do that, we must work
for laws that will restrict the international sale of small arms; we must work for a fair
relationship between developing countries and multinational corporations; and above all,
we must question the need for colossal military budgets. By following this path we can free
the world from the intolerable suffering caused by poverty and from the equally intolerable
suffering caused by war.
214 WHY WAR?
“...No public health hazard ever faced by humankind equals the threat of nuclear war.
Never before has man possessed the destructive resources to make this planet uninhabit-
able... Modern medicine has nothing to offer, not even a token benefit, in the event of
nuclear war...”
“We are but transient passengers on this planet Earth. It does not belong to us. We
are not free to doom generations yet unborn. We are not at liberty to erase humanity’s
past or dim its future. Social systems do not endure for eternity. Only life can lay claim
to uninterrupted continuity. This continuity is sacred.”
The danger of a catastrophic nuclear war casts a dark shadow over the future of our
species. It also casts a very black shadow over the future of the global environment. The
environmental consequences of a massive exchange of nuclear weapons have been treated in
a number of studies by meteorologists and other experts from both East and West. They
predict that a large-scale use of nuclear weapons would result in fire storms with very high
winds and high temperatures, which would burn a large proportion of the wild land fuels
in the affected nations. The resulting smoke and dust would block out sunlight for a period
of many months, at first only in the northern hemisphere but later also in the southern
hemisphere.
Temperatures in many places would fall far below freezing, and much of the earth’s
plant life would be killed. Animals and humans would then die of starvation. The nuclear
winter effect was first discovered as a result of the Mariner 9 spacecraft exploration of
Mars in 1971. The spacecraft arrived in the middle of an enormous dust-storm on Mars,
and measured a large temperature drop at the surface of the planet, accompanied by a
heating of the upper atmosphere. These measurements allowed scientists to check their
theoretical models for predicting the effect of dust and other pollutants distributed in
planetary atmospheres.
Using experience gained from the studies of Mars, R.P. Turco, O.B. Toon, T. Ackerman,
J.B. Pollack and C. Sagan made a computer study of the climatic effects of the smoke
and dust that would result from a large-scale nuclear war. This early research project is
sometimes called the TTAPS Study, after the initials of the authors.
In April 1983, a special meeting was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where the
results of the TTAPS Study and other independent studies of the nuclear winter effect
were discussed by more than 100 experts. Their conclusions were presented at a forum
in Washington, D.C., the following December, under the chairmanship of U.S. Senators
Kennedy and Hatfield. The numerous independent studies of the nuclear winter effect all
agreed of the following main predictions:
High-yield nuclear weapons exploded near the earth’s surface would put large amounts
of dust into the upper atmosphere. Nuclear weapons exploded over cities, forests, oilfields
and refineries would produce fire storms of the type experienced in Dresden and Hamburg
after incendiary bombings during the Second World War. The combination of high-altitude
dust and lower altitude soot would prevent sunlight from reaching the earth’s surface, and
the degree of obscuration would be extremely high for a wide range of scenarios.
A baseline scenario used by the TTAPS study assumes a 5,000-megaton nuclear ex-
change, but the threshold for triggering the nuclear winter effect is believed to be much
216 WHY WAR?
lower than that. After such an exchange, the screening effect of pollutants in the atmo-
sphere might be so great that, in the northern and middle latitudes, the sunlight reaching
the earth would be only 1% of ordinary sunlight on a clear day, and this effect would
persist for many months. As a result, the upper layers in the atmosphere might rise in
temperature by as much as 100 ◦ C, while the surface temperatures would fall, perhaps by
as much a 50 ◦ C.
The temperature inversion produced in this way would lead to superstability, a con-
dition in which the normal mixing of atmospheric layers is suppressed. The hydrological
cycle (which normally takes moist air from the oceans to a higher and cooler level, where
the moisture condenses as rain) would be strongly suppressed. Severe droughts would thus
take place over continental land masses. The normal cleansing action of rain would be
absent in the atmosphere, an effect which would prolong the nuclear winter.
In the northern hemisphere, forests would die because of lack of sunlight, extreme
cold, and drought. Although the temperature drop in the southern hemisphere would be
less severe, it might still be sufficient to kill a large portion of the tropical forests, which
normally help to renew the earth’s oxygen.
The oxygen content of the atmosphere would then fall dangerously, while the concen-
tration of carbon dioxide and oxides of nitrogen produced by firestorms would remain high.
The oxides of nitrogen would ultimately diffuse to the upper atmosphere, where they would
destroy the ozone layer.
Thus, even when the sunlight returned after an absence of many months, it would be
sunlight containing a large proportion of the ultraviolet frequencies which are normally
absorbed by the ozone in the stratosphere, and therefore a type of light dangerous to life.
Finally, after being so severely disturbed, there is no guarantee that the global climate
would return to its normal equilibrium.
Even a nuclear war below the threshold of nuclear winter might have climatic effects
very damaging to human life. Professor Paul Ehrlich, of Stanford University, has expressed
this in the following words:
“...A smaller war, which set off fewer fires and put less dust into the atmosphere, could
easily depress temperatures enough to essentially cancel grain production in the northern
hemisphere. That in itself would be the greatest catastrophe ever delivered upon Homo
Sapiens, just that one thing, not worrying about prompt effects. Thus even below the
threshold, one cannot think of survival of a nuclear war as just being able to stand up after
the bomb has gone off.”6
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6.10. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR 217
Figure 6.5: U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres addressed the Human
Rights Council at the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland February 26,
2018.
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218 WHY WAR?
But the old man would not so, but slew his son,
And half the seed of Europe, one by one.
We condemn human sacrifice in primitive cultures, but does not our modern industrial
society also practice this abominable custom? We sacrifice countless young men and women
in endless and unnecessary wars.
alists for their Pan-Slavic ambitions. When the result was a world-destroying war, they
said “That is not what we intended.” Of course it is not what they intended, but nobody
can control the escalation of conflicts. The astonishing unrealism of the Netanyahu-Barak
statements also reminds one of Kaiser Wilhelm’s monumentally unrealistic words to his
departing troops: “You will be home before the leaves are off the trees.”
The planned attack on Iran would not only violate international law, but would also
violate common sense and the wishes of the people of Israel. The probable result would
be a massive Iranian missile attack on Tel Aviv, and Iran would probably also close the
Straits of Hormuz. If the United States responded by bombing Iranian targets, Iran would
probably use missiles to sink one or more of the US ships in the Persian Gulf. One can
easily imagine other steps in the escalation of the conflict: a revolution in Pakistan; the
entry of nuclear-armed Pakistan into the war on the side of Iran; a preemptive nuclear
strike by Israel against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; and Chinese-Russian support of Iran.
In the tense atmosphere of such a war, the danger of a major nuclear exchange, due to
accident or miscalculation, would be very great.
Today, because the technology of killing has continued to develop, the danger of a
catastrophic war with hydrogen bombs hangs like a dark cloud over the future of human
civilization. The total explosive power of today’s weapons is equivalent to roughly half a
million Hiroshima bombs. To multiply the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by a factor
of half a million changes the danger qualitatively. What is threatened today is the complete
breakdown of human society.
There are more than 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world today, about 4,000 of them
on hair-trigger alert. The phrase “hair trigger alert” means that the person in charge has
only 15 minutes to decide whether the warning from the radar system was true of false,
and to decide whether or not to launch a counterattack. The danger of accidental nuclear
war continues to be high. Technical failures and human failures have many times brought
the world close to a catastrophic nuclear war. Those who know the system of “deterrence”
best describe it as “an accident waiting to happen”.
No one can win a nuclear war, just as no one can win a natural catastrophe like an
earthquake or a tsunami. The effects of a nuclear war would be global, and all the nations
of the world would suffer - also neutral nations.
Recent studies by atmospheric scientists have shown that the smoke from burning
cities produced by even a limited nuclear war would have a devastating effect on global
agriculture. The studies show that the smoke would rise to the stratosphere, where it would
spread globally and remain for a decade, blocking sunlight, blocking the hydrological cycle
and destroying the ozone layer. Because of the devastating effect on global agriculture,
darkness from even a small nuclear war could result in an estimated billion deaths from
famine. This number corresponds to the fact that today, a billion people are chronically
undernourished. If global agriculture were sufficiently damaged by a nuclear war, these
vulnerable people might not survive. A large-scale nuclear war would be an even greater
global catastrophe, completely destroying all agriculture for a period of ten years.
The tragedies of Chernobyl and Fukushima remind us that a nuclear war would make
large areas of the world permanently uninhabitable because of long-lasting radioactive
6.11. ATOMS FOR PEACE? 221
contamination.
The First World War was a colossal mistake. Today, the world stands on the threshold
of an equally enormous disaster. Must we again be lead into a world-destroying war by a
few blind individuals who do not have the slightest idea of what such a war would be like?
Figure 6.6: People evacuated from the region near to Fukushima wonder when
they will be able to return to their homes. The honest answer is “never”.
6.11. ATOMS FOR PEACE? 227
0.7 percent.
A paper published in 1939 by Niels Bohr and John A. Wheeler indicated that it was
the rare isotope of uranium, U-235, that undergoes fission. A bomb could be constructed,
they pointed out, if enough highly enriched U-235 could be isolated from the more common
isotope, U-238 Calculations later performed in England by Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls
showed that the “critical mass” of highly enriched uranium needed is quite small: only a
few kilograms.
The Bohr-Wheeler theory also predicted that an isotope of plutonium, Pu-239, should
be just as fissionable as U-235. Both U-235 and Pu-239 have odd nucleon numbers. When
U-235 absorbs a neutron, it becomes U-236, while when Pu-239 absorbs a neutron it
becomes Pu-240. In other words, absorption of a neutron converts both these species to
nuclei with even nucleon numbers.
According to the Bohr-Wheeler theory, nuclei with even nucleon numbers are especially
tightly-bound. Thus absorption of a neutron converts U-235 to a highly-excited state of U-
236, while Pu-239 is similarly converted to a highly excited state of Pu-240. The excitation
energy distorts the nuclei to such an extent that fission becomes possible. Instead of trying
to separate the rare isotope, U-235, from the common isotope, U-238, physicists could
just operate a nuclear reactor until a sufficient amount of Pu-239 accumulated, and then
separate it out by ordinary chemical means.
Thus in 1942, when Enrico Fermi and his coworkers at the University of Chicago pro-
duced the world’s first controlled chain reaction within a pile of cans containing ordi-
nary (nonenriched) uranium powder, separated by blocks of very pure graphite, the chain-
reacting pile had a double significance: It represented a new source of energy, but it also
had a sinister meaning. It represented an easy path to nuclear weapons, since one of the
by-products of the reaction was a fissionable isotope of plutonium, Pu-239. The bomb
dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 used U-235, while the Nagasaki bomb used Pu-239.
By reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods, using ordinary chemical means, a nation with
a power reactor can obtain weapons-usable Pu-239. Even when such reprocessing is per-
formed under international control, the uncertainty as to the amount of Pu-239 obtained
is large enough so that the operation might superficially seem to conform to regulations
while still supplying enough Pu-239 to make many bombs.
The enrichment of uranium, i.e. production of uranium with a higher percentage of
U-235 than is found in natural uranium is also linked to reactor use. Many reactors of
modern design make use of low enriched uranium (LEU) as a fuel. Nations operating such
a reactor may claim that they need a program for uranium enrichment in order to produce
LEU for fuel rods. However, by operating their ultracentrifuges a little longer, they can
easily produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), i.e. uranium containing a high percentage
of the rare isotope U-235, and therefore usable in weapons.
Nuclear power generation is not a solution to the problem of obtaining energy without
producing dangerous climate change: Known reserves of uranium are only sufficient for
the generation of about 25 terawatt-years of electrical energy (Craig, J.R., Vaugn, D.J.
and Skinner, B.J., ”Resources of the Earth: Origin, Use and Environmental Impact, Third
Edition”, page 210). This can be compared with the world’s current rate of energy use of
228 WHY WAR?
over 14 terrawatts. Thus, if all of our energy were obtained from nuclear power, existing
reserves of uranium would only be sufficient for about 2 years.
It is sometimes argued that a larger amount of electricity could be obtained from the
same amount of uranium through the use of fast breeder reactors, but this would involve
totally unacceptable proliferation risks. In fast breeder reactors, the fuel rods consist of
highly enriched uranium. Around the core, is an envelope of natural uranium. The flux of
fast neutrons from the core is sufficient to convert a part of the U-238 in the envelope into
Pu-239, a fissionable isotope of plutonium.
Fast breeder reactors are prohibitively dangerous from the standpoint of nuclear prolif-
eration because both the highly enriched uranium from the fuel rods and the Pu-239 from
the envelope are directly weapons-usable. It would be impossible, from the standpoint of
equity, to maintain that some nations have the right to use fast breeder reactors, while
others do not. If all nations used fast breeder reactors, the number of nuclear weapons
states would increase drastically.
It is interesting to review the way in which Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, India and
North Korea obtained their nuclear weapons, since in all these cases the weapons were
constructed under the guise of “atoms for peace”, a phrase that future generations may
someday regard as being tragically self-contradictory.
Israel began producing nuclear weapons in the late 1960’s (with the help of a “peaceful”
6.11. ATOMS FOR PEACE? 229
Figure 6.8: The Israeli nuclear technician and whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu
called public attention to Israel’s nuclear weapons while on a trip to England.
He was lured to Italy by a Mossad “honey trap”, where he was drugged, kid-
napped and transported to Israel by Mossad.
230 WHY WAR?
Figure 6.9: Vanunu was imprisoned for 18 years, during 11 of which he was
held in solitary confinement and subjected to psychological torture, such as
not being allowed to sleep for long periods.
6.11. ATOMS FOR PEACE? 231
nuclear reactor provided by France, and with the tacit approval of the United States) and
the country is now believed to possess 100-150 of them, including neutron bombs. Israel’s
policy is one of visibly possessing nuclear weapons while denying their existence.
South Africa, with the help of Israel and France, also weaponized its civil nuclear pro-
gram, and it tested nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean in 1979. In 1991 however, South
Africa destroyed its nuclear weapons and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
India produced what it described as a ”peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. By 1989
Indian scientists were making efforts to purify the lithium-6 isotope, a key component of
the much more powerful thermonuclear bombs. In 1998, India conducted underground
tests of nuclear weapons, and is now believed to have roughly 60 warheads, constructed
from Pu-239 produced in “peaceful” reactors.
Pakistan’s efforts to obtain nuclear weapons were spurred by India’s 1974 “peaceful
nuclear explosion”. As early as 1970, the laboratory of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, (a metal-
lurgist who was to become Pakistan’s leading nuclear bomb maker) had been able to obtain
from a Dutch firm the high-speed ultracentrifuges needed for uranium enrichment. With
unlimited financial support and freedom from auditing requirements, Dr. Khan purchased
restricted items needed for nuclear weapon construction from companies in Europe and
the United States. In the process, Dr. Khan became an extremely wealthy man. With
additional help from China, Pakistan was ready to test five nuclear weapons in 1998.
The Indian and Pakistani nuclear bomb tests, conducted in rapid succession, presented
the world with the danger that these devastating weapons would be used in the conflict
over Kashmir. Indeed, Pakistan announced that if a war broke out using conventional
weapons, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons would be used “at an early stage”.
In Pakistan, Dr. A.Q. Khan became a great national hero. He was presented as the
person who had saved Pakistan from attack by India by creating Pakistan’s own nuclear
weapons. In a Washington Post article (1 February, 2004) Pervez Hoodbhoy wrote: “Nu-
clear nationalism was the order of the day as governments vigorously promoted the bomb
as the symbol of Pakistan’s high scientific achievement and self- respect...” Similar mani-
festations of nuclear nationalism could also be seen in India after India’s 1998 bomb tests.
Early in 2004, it was revealed that Dr. Khan had for years been selling nuclear secrets
and equipment to Libya, Iran and North Korea, and that he had contacts with Al Qaeda.
However, observers considered that it was unlikely that Khan would be tried, since a trial
might implicate Pakistan’s army as well as two of its former prime ministers.
There is a danger that Pakistan’s unpopular government may be overthrown, and that
the revolutionists might give Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to a subnational organization.
This type of danger is a general one associated with nuclear proliferation. As more and
more countries obtain nuclear weapons, it becomes increasingly likely that one of them will
undergo a revolution, during the course of which nuclear weapons will fall into the hands
of criminals or terrorists.
There is also a possibility that poorly-guarded fissionable material could fall into the
hands of subnational groups, who would then succeed in constructing their own nuclear
weapons. Given a critical mass of highly-enriched uranium, a terrorist group, or an or-
232 WHY WAR?
ganized criminal (Mafia) group, could easily construct a crude gun-type nuclear explosive
device. Pu-239 is more difficult to use since it is highly radioactive, but the physicist Frank
Barnaby believes that a subnational group could nevertheless construct a crude nuclear
bomb (of the Nagasaki type) from this material.
We must remember the remark of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan after the 9/11/2001
attacks on the World Trade Center. He said, “This time it was not a nuclear explosion”.
The meaning of his remark is clear: If the world does not take strong steps to eliminate
fissionable materials and nuclear weapons, it will only be a matter of time before they
will be used in terrorist attacks on major cities, or by organized criminals for the purpose
of extortion. Neither terrorists nor organized criminals can be deterred by the threat of
nuclear retaliation, since they have no territory against which such retaliation could be
directed. They blend invisibly into the general population. Nor can a ”missile defense
system” prevent criminals or terrorists from using nuclear weapons, since the weapons can
be brought into a port in any one of the hundreds of thousands of containers that enter on
ships each year, a number far too large to be checked exhaustively.
Finally we must remember that if the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons
becomes very large, there will be a greatly increased chance that these weapons will be used
in conflicts between nations, either by accident or through irresponsible political decisions.
The slogan “Atoms for Peace” has proved to be such a misnomer that it would be
laughable if it were not so tragic. Nuclear power generation has been a terrible mistake.
We must stop before we turn our beautiful earth into a radioactive wasteland.
storage tanks, the majority of which have exceeded their planned lifetimes. The following
quotations are taken from a Wikipedia article on Hanford, especially the section devoted
to ecological concerns:
“A huge volume of water from the Columbia River was required to dissipate the heat
produced by Hanford’s nuclear reactors. From 1944 to 1971, pump systems drew cooling
water from the river and, after treating this water for use by the reactors, returned it to
the river. Before being released back into the river, the used water was held in large tanks
known as retention basins for up to six hours. Longer-lived isotopes were not affected by
this retention, and several tetrabecquerels entered the river every day. These releases were
kept secret by the federal government. Radiation was later measured downstream as far
west as the Washington and Oregon coasts.”
“The plutonium separation process also resulted in the release of radioactive isotopes
into the air, which were carried by the wind throughout southeastern Washington and
into parts of Idaho, Montana, Oregon and British Colombia. Downwinders were exposed
to radionuclide’s, particularly Iodine 131... These radionuclide’s filtered into the food
chain via contaminated fields where dairy cows grazed; hazardous fallout was ingested
by communities who consumed the radioactive food and drank the milk. Most of these
airborne releases were a part of Hanford’s routine operations, while a few of the larger
releases occurred in isolated incidents.”
“In response to an article in the Spokane Spokesman Review in September 1985, the
Department of Energy announced its intent to declassify environmental records and in
February, 1986 released to the public 19,000 pages of previously unavailable historical
documents about Hanford’s operations. The Washington State Department of Health col-
laborated with the citizen-led Hanford Health Information Network (HHIN) to publicize
data about the health effects of Hanford’s operations. HHIN reports concluded that res-
idents who lived downwind from Hanford or who used the Columbia River downstream
were exposed to elevated doses of radiation that placed them at increased risk for various
cancers and other diseases.”
“The most significant challenge at Hanford is stabilizing the 53 million U.S. Gallons
(204,000 m3) of high-level radioactive waste stored in 177 underground tanks. About a
third of these tanks have leaked waste into the soil and groundwater. As of 2008, most
of the liquid waste has been transferred to more secure double-shelled tanks; however, 2.8
million U.S. Gallons (10,600 m3) of liquid waste, together with 27 million U.S. gallons
(100,000 m3) of salt cake and sludge, remains in the single-shelled tanks.That waste was
originally scheduled to be removed by 2018. The revised deadline is 2040. Nearby aquifers
contain an estimated 270 billion U.S. Gallons (1 billion m3) of contaminated groundwater
as a result of the leaks. As of 2008, 1 million U.S. Gallons (4,000 m3) of highly radioactive
waste is traveling through the groundwater toward the Columbia River.”
The documents made public in 1986 revealed that radiation was intentionally and
secretly released by the plant and that people living near to it acted as unknowing guinea
pigs in experiments testing radiation dangers. Thousands of people who live in the vicinity
of the Hanford Site have suffered an array of health problems including thyroid cancers,
autoimmune diseases and reproductive disorders that they feel are the direct result of these
234 WHY WAR?
This possibility (or probability) has recently come to public attention through newspa-
per articles revealing that 11 of the officers responsible for launching US nuclear missiles
have been fired because of drug addiction. Furthermore, a larger number of missile launch
officers were found to be cheating on competence examinations. Three dozen officers were
involved in the cheating ring, and some reports state that an equal number of others may
have known about it., and remained silent. Finally, it was shown that safety rules were
being deliberately ignored. The men involved, were said to be “burned out”.
According to an article in The Guardian (Wednesday, 15 January, 2014), “Revelations
of misconduct and incompetence in the nuclear missile program go back at least to 2007,
when six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were accidentally loaded onto a B-52 bomber in
Minot, North Dakota, and flown to a base in Louisiana.”
“Last March, military inspectors gave officers at the ICBM base in Minot the equivalent
of a ’D’ grade for launch mastery. Â A month later, 17 officers were stripped of their
6.13. AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN 235
Figure 6.10: Peter Sellers (left) listens while Brigadier General Jack D. Ripper
tells him about the Soviet conspiracy to steal his “precious bodily fluids”.
Figure 6.11: Peter Sellers as Dr. Strangelove. He has to restrain his black-gloved
crippled hand, which keeps trying to give a Nazi salute.
Figure 6.12: General Buck Turgidson (George C. Scott) struggles with the Rus-
sian Ambassador. Peter Sellers (right) playing the US President, rebukes them
for fighting in the War Room.
6.13. AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN 237
Figure 6.13: Major T. “King” Kong rides a nuclear bomb on its way down, where
it will trigger the Soviet Doomsday Machine and ultimately destroy the world.
by the fact that several thousand nuclear weapons are kept on “hair-trigger alert” with
a quasi-automatic reaction time measured in minutes. There is a constant danger that a
nuclear war will be triggered by an error in evaluating a signal on a radar screen.
238 WHY WAR?
Figure 6.14: Benjamin Netanyahu has stated repeatedly that, with or without
US support, Israel will attack Iran, an action that could escalate uncontrollably
into World War III.
6.14. FLAWS IN THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 239
The New Agenda Resolution proposes numerous practical steps towards complete nuclear
disarmament, and it calls on the Nuclear-Weapon States “to demonstrate an unequivocal
commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and without
delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimi-
nation of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”. Thus, in addition to being ethi-
cally unacceptable and contrary to international law, nuclear weapons also contrary to the
principles of democracy.
Having said these important things, we can now turn to some of the other defects in
the concept of nuclear deterrence. One important defect is that nuclear war may occur
through accident or miscalculation - through technical defects or human failings. This
possibility is made greater by the fact that despite the end of the Cold War, thousands
of missiles carrying nuclear warheads are still kept on a “hair-trigger” state of alert with
a quasi-automatic reaction time measured in minutes. There is a constant danger that
a nuclear war will be triggered by error in evaluating the signal on a radar screen. For
example, the BBC reported recently that a group of scientists and military leaders are
worried that a small asteroid entering the earths atmosphere and exploding could trigger
a nuclear war if mistaken for a missile strike.
A number of prominent political and military figures (many of whom have ample knowl-
edge of the system of deterrence, having been part of it) have expressed concern about the
danger of accidental nuclear war. Colin S. Grey8 expressed this concern as follows: “The
problem, indeed the enduring problem, is that we are resting our future upon a nuclear
deterrence system concerning which we cannot tolerate even a single malfunction.” General
Curtis E. LeMay9 has written, “In my opinion a general war will grow through a series of
political miscalculations and accidents rather than through any deliberate attack by either
side.” Bruce G. Blair10 has remarked that “It is obvious that the rushed nature of the
process, from warning to decision to action, risks causing a catastrophic mistake.”... “This
system is an accident waiting to happen.”
Today, the system that is supposed to give us security is called Mutually Assured
Destruction, appropriately abbreviated as MAD. It is based on the idea of deterrence,
which maintains that because of the threat of massive retaliation, no sane leader would
start a nuclear war.
Before discussing other defects in the concept of deterrence, it must be said very clearly
that the idea of “massive nuclear retaliation” is a form of genocide and is completely
unacceptable from an ethical point of view. It violates not only the principles of common
human decency and common sense, but also the ethical principles of every major religion.
Having said this, we can now turn to some of the other faults in the concept of nuclear
deterrence. One important defect is that nuclear war may occur through accident or mis-
calculation, through technical defects or human failings, or by terrorism. This possibility
acceptance.
8
Chairman, National Institute for Public Policy
9
Founder and former Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Air Command
10
Brookings Institute
242 WHY WAR?
is made greater by the fact that despite the end of the Cold War, thousands of missiles
carrying nuclear warheads are still kept on “hair-trigger alert” with a quasi-automatic re-
action time measured in minutes. There is a constant danger that a nuclear war will be
triggered by error in evaluating the signal on a radar screen.
Incidents in which global disaster is avoided by a hair’s breadth are constantly occurring.
Will we use the discoveries of modern science constructively, and thus choose the path
leading towards life? Or will we use science to produce more and more lethal weapons,
which sooner or later, through a technical or human failure, will result in a catastrophic
nuclear war? Will we thoughtlessly destroy our beautiful planet through unlimited growth
of population and industry? The choice among these alternatives is ours to make. We live
at a critical moment of history, a moment of crisis for civilization.
No one alive today asked to be born at a time of crisis, but history has given each of
us an enormous responsibility. Of course we have our ordinary jobs, which we need to do
in order to stay alive; but besides that, each of us has a second job, the duty to devote
both time and effort to solving the serious problems that face civilization during the 21st
century. We cannot rely on our politicians to do this for us. Many politicians are under
the influence of powerful lobbies. Others are waiting for a clear expression of popular will.
It is the people of the world themselves who must choose their own future and work hard
to build it.
No single person can achieve the changes that we need, but together we can do it. The
problem of building a stable, just, and war-free world is difficult, but it is not impossible.
The large regions of our present-day world within which war has been eliminated can serve
as models. There are a number of large countries with heterogeneous populations within
which it has been possible to achieve internal peace and social cohesion, and if this is
possible within such extremely large regions, it must also be possible globally.
We must replace the old world of international anarchy, chronic war, and institutional-
ized injustice by a new world of law. The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court are steps in the right direction.
These institutions need to be greatly strengthened and reformed. We also need a new
global ethic, where loyalty to one’s family and nation will be supplemented by a higher
loyalty to humanity as a whole. Tipping points in public opinion can occur suddenly. We
can think, for example, of the Civil Rights Movement, or the rapid fall of the Berlin Wall,
or the sudden change that turned public opinion against smoking, or the sudden movement
for freedom and democracy in the Arab world. A similar sudden change can occur soon
regarding war and nuclear weapons.
We know that war is madness. We know that it is responsible for much of the suffering
that humans experience. We know that war pollutes our planet and that the almost
unimaginable sums wasted on war prevent the happiness and prosperity of mankind. We
know that nuclear weapons are insane, and that the precariously balanced deterrence
system can break down at any time through human error or computer errors or through
terrorist actions, and that it definitely will break down within our lifetimes unless we
abolish it. We know that nuclear war threatens to destroy civilization and much of the
biosphere.
6.14. FLAWS IN THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 243
The logic is there. We must translate into popular action which will put an end to the
undemocratic, money-driven, power-lust-driven war machine. The peoples of the world
must say very clearly that nuclear weapons are an absolute evil; that their possession does
not increase anyone’s security; that their continued existence is a threat to the life of every
person on the planet; and that these genocidal and potentially omnicidal weapons have no
place in a civilized society.
Modern science has abolished time and distance as factors separating nations. On our
shrunken globe today, there is room for one group only: the family of humankind. We
must embrace all other humans as our brothers and sisters. More than that, we must feel
that all of nature is part of the same sacred family; meadow flowers, blowing winds, rocks,
trees, birds, animals, and other humans, all these are our brothers and sisters, deserving
our care and protection. Only in this way can we survive together. Only in this way can
we build a happy future.
“But nobody can predict that the fatal accident or unauthorized act will never happen”,
Fred Ikle of the Rand Corporation has written, “Given the huge and far-flung missile forces,
ready to be launched from land and sea on on both sides, the scope for disaster by accident
is immense... In a matter of seconds - through technical accident or human failure - mutual
deterrence might thus collapse.”
Another serious failure of the concept of nuclear deterrence is that it does not take into
account the possibility that atomic bombs may be used by terrorists. Indeed, the threat of
nuclear terrorism has today become one of the most pressing dangers that the world faces,
a danger that is particularly acute in the United States.
Since 1945, more than 3,000 metric tons (3,000,000 kilograms) of highly enriched ura-
nium and plutonium have been produced - enough for several hundred thousand nuclear
weapons. Of this, roughly a million kilograms are in Russia, inadequately guarded, in
establishments where the technicians are poorly paid and vulnerable to the temptations of
bribery. There is a continuing danger that these fissile materials will fall into the hands of
terrorists, or organized criminals, or irresponsible governments. Also, an extensive black
market for fissile materials, nuclear weapons components etc. has recently been revealed in
connection with the confessions of Pakistan’s bomb-maker, Dr. A.Q. Khan. Furthermore,
if Pakistan’s less-than-stable government should be overthrown, complete nuclear weapons
could fall into the hands of terrorists.
On November 3, 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, made a speech to the United Nations in which he called for
“limiting the processing of weapons-usable material (separated plutonium and high en-
riched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes - as well as the production of new material
through reprocessing and enrichment - by agreeing to restrict these operations to facilities
exclusively under international control.” It is almost incredible, considering the dangers of
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, that such restrictions were not imposed long
ago. Nuclear reactors used for “peaceful” purposes unfortunately also generate fissionable
isotopes of plutonium, neptunium and americium. Thus all nuclear reactors must be re-
garded as ambiguous in function, and all must be put under strict international control.
One might ask, in fact, whether globally widespread use of nuclear energy is worth the
244 WHY WAR?
Figure 6.15: Recent studies by atmospheric scientists have shown that the smoke from
burning cities produced by even a limited nuclear war would have a devastating effect on
global agriculture. The studies show that the smoke would rise to the stratosphere, where it
would spread globally and remain for a decade, blocking sunlight and destroying the ozone
layer. Because of the devastating effect on global agriculture, darkness from even a small
nuclear war (e.g. between India and Pakistan) would result in an estimated billion deaths
from famine. (O. Toon, A. Robock and R. Turco, “The Environmental Consequences of
Nuclear War”, Physics Today, vol. 61, No. 12, 2008, p. 37-42)
6.15. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CRIMINAL! EVERY WAR IS A CRIME! 245
Today, war is not only insane, but also a violation of international law. Both the United
Nations Charter and the Nuremberg Principles make it a crime to launch an aggressive
war. According to the Nuremberg Principles, every soldier is responsible for the crimes
that he or she commits, even while acting under the orders of a superior officer.
Nuclear weapons are not only insane, immoral and potentially omnicidal, but also
criminal under international law. In response to questions put to it by WHO and the UN
General Assembly, the International Court of Justice ruled in 1996 that “the threat and use
of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict, and particularly the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” The only
possible exception to this general rule might be “an extreme circumstance of self-defense,
in which the very survival of a state would be at stake”. But the Court refused to say that
even in this extreme circumstance the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal. It
left the exceptional case undecided. In addition, the Court added unanimously that “there
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”
Can we not rid ourselves of both nuclear weapons and the institution of war itself? We
must act quickly and resolutely before our beautiful world and everything that we love are
reduced to radioactive ashes.
9. Massimo D’Alema, Gianfranco Fini, Giorgio La Malfa, Arturo Parisi and Francesco
Calogero, For a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Corriere Della Sera, July 24, (2008).
10. Hoover Institution, Reykjavik Revisited; Steps Towards a World Free of Nuclear
Weapons, October, (2007).
11. Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David Owen and George Robertson, Start Wor-
rying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb, The Times, June 30, (2008).
12. Des Brown, Secretary of State for Defense, UK, Laying the Foundations for Multi-
lateral Disarmament, Geneva Conference on Disarmament, February 5, (2008).
13. Government of Norway, International Conference on Achieving the Vision of a World
Free of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo, Norway, February 26-27, (2008).
14. Jonas Gahr Støre, Foreign Minister, Norway, Statement at the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva, March 4, (2008).
15. Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, Defense Minister, Norway, Emerging Opportunities for
Nuclear Disarmament, Pugwash Conference, Canada, July 11, (2008).
16. Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister, Australia, International Commission on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament, Media Release, July 9, (2008).
17. Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizäcker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Towards a Nuclear-Free World: a German View, International Herald Tribune, Jan-
uary 9, (2009).
18. Hans M. Kristensen and Elliot Negin, Support Growing for Removal of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons from Europe, Common Dreams Newscenter, first posted May 6, (2005).
19. David Krieger, President-elect Obama and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation Website, (2008).
20. J.L. Henderson, Hiroshima, Longmans (1974).
21. A. Osada, Children of the A-Bomb, The Testament of Boys and Girls of Hiroshima,
Putnam, New York (1963).
22. M. Hachiya, M.D., Hiroshima Diary, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel
Hill, N.C. (1955).
23. M. Yass, Hiroshima, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York (1972).
24. R. Jungk, Children of the Ashes, Harcourt, Brace and World (1961).
25. B. Hirschfield, A Cloud Over Hiroshima, Baily Brothers and Swinfin Ltd. (1974).
26. J. Hersey, Hiroshima, Penguin Books Ltd. (1975).
27. R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New
York, (1995)
28. R. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New York, (1988).
29. D.V. Babst et al., Accidental Nuclear War: The Growing Peril, Peace Research
Institute, Dundas, Ontario, (1984).
30. S. Britten, The Invisible Event: An Assessment of the Risk of Accidental or Unautho-
rized Detonation of Nuclear Weapons and of War by Miscalculation, Menard Press,
London, (1983).
31. M. Dando and P. Rogers, The Death of Deterrence, CND Publications, London,
(1984).
32. N.F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Futura, London, (1976).
248 WHY WAR?
33. D. Frei and C. Catrina, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, United Nations, Geneva,
(1982).
34. H. L’Etang, Fit to Lead?, Heinemann Medical, London, (1980).
35. SPANW, Nuclear War by Mistake - Inevitable or Preventable?, Swedish Physicians
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36. J. Goldblat, Nuclear Non-proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore, (SIPRI Publi-
cations), Taylor and Francis, (1985).
37. J. Schear, ed., Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Nuclear Risk, Gower, London,
(1984).
38. D.P. Barash and J.E. Lipton, Stop Nuclear War! A Handbook, Grove Press, New
York, (1982).
39. C.F. Barnaby and G.P. Thomas, eds., The Nuclear Arms Race: Control or Catastro-
phe, Francis Pinter, London, (1982).
40. L.R. Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics, Chicago University
press, Chicago, IL, (1980).
41. F. Blackaby et al., eds., No-first-use, Taylor and Francis, London, (1984).
42. NS, ed., New Statesman Papers on Destruction and Disarmament (NS Report No.
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43. H. Caldicot, Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War, William Morrow, New
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44. R. Ehrlich, Waging the Peace: The Technology and Politics of Nuclear Weapons,
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45. W. Epstein, The Prevention of Nuclear War: A United Nations Perspective, Gunn
and Hain, Cambridge, MA, (1984).
46. W. Epstein and T. Toyoda, eds., A New Design for Nuclear Disarmament, Spokesman,
Nottingham, (1975).
47. G.F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion, Pantheon, New York, (1983).
48. R.J. Lifton and R. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case
Against Nuclearism, Basic Books, New York, (1982).
49. J.R. Macy, Despair and Personal Power in the Nuclear Age, New Society Publishers,
Philadelphia, PA, (1983).
50. A.S. Miller et al., eds., Nuclear Weapons and Law, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT,
(1984).
51. MIT Coalition on Disarmament, eds., The Nuclear Almanac: Confronting the Atom
in War and Peace, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, (1984).
52. UN, Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, United
Nations, New York, (1980).
53. IC, Proceedings of the Conference on Understanding Nuclear War, Imperial College,
London, (1980).
54. B. Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, Allen and Unwin, London, (1959).
55. F. Barnaby, The Nuclear Age, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, (1974).
6.15. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CRIMINAL! EVERY WAR IS A CRIME! 249
56. D. Albright, F. Berkhout and W. Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium
1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
(1997).
57. G.T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Rus-
sian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, (1996).
58. B. Bailin, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Post-
colonial State, Zed Books, London, (1998).
59. P. Bidawi and A. Vanaik, South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the
Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2001).
60. F.A. Boyle, The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence: Could the U.S. War on Terror-
ism Go Nuclear?, Clarity Press, Atlanta GA, (2002).
61. G. Burns, The Atomic Papers: A Citizen’s Guide to Selected Books and Articles on
the Bomb, the Arms Race, Nuclear Power, the Peace Movement, and Related Issues,
Scarecrow Press, Metuchen NJ, (1984).
62. L. Butler, A Voice of Reason, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54, 58-61, (1998).
63. R. Butler, Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense, West-
view Press, Boulder CO, (2001).
64. R.P. Carlisle (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Atomic Age, Facts on File, New York, (2001).
65. G.A. Cheney, Nuclear Proliferation: The Problems and Possibilities, Franklin Watts,
New York, (1999).
66. A. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, Colombia University Press, New York, (1998).
67. S.J. Diehl and J.C. Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference
Handbook, ABC-Clio Information Services, Santa Barbara CA, (2002).
68. H.A. Feiveson (Ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and
De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C.,
(1999).
69. R. Hilsman, From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World Without War: A History
and a Proposal, Praeger Publishers, Westport, (1999).
70. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for
Energy and Environmental Research Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age,
International Physicians Press, Cambridge MA, (1992).
71. R.W. Jones and M.G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps
and Charts, 1998, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington
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72. R.J. Lifton and R. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case
Against Nuclearism, Basic Books, New York, (1982).
73. R.E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms
Race, 1939 to the Present, Oxford University Press, (1987).
74. J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B. Udgaonkar (Eds.), A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World:
Desirable? Feasible?, Westview Press, (1993).
75. The United Methodist Council of Bishops, In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear
Crisis and a Just Peace, Graded Press, Nashville, (1986).
250 WHY WAR?
76. U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (Ed.), Dismantling the Bomb and
Managing the Nuclear Materials, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.,
(1993).
77. S.R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, Harvard University Press, (1988).
78. P. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn
of the Atomic Age, University of North Carolina Press, (1985).
79. C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies, Basic Books,
(1984).
80. P. Rogers, The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism in Britain, Oxford Research Group, Ox-
ford, (2006).
81. MIT, The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpowe
(2003).
82. Z. Mian and A. Glaser, Life in a Nuclear Powered Crowd, INES Newsletter No. 52,
9-13, April, (2006).
83. K. Bergeron, Nuclear Weapons: The Death of No Dual-use, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 15-17, January, (2004).
84. E. Chivian, and others (eds.), Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War,
W.H. Freeman, San Fransisco, (1982).
85. Medical Association’s Board of Science and Education, The Medical Effects of Nuclear
War, Wiley, (1983).
86. Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister, Australia, “International Commission on Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament”, Media Release, July 9, 2008.
87. Global Zero, www.globalzero.org/paris-conference
88. Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizäcker, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
“Towards a Nuclear-Free World: a German View”, International Herald Tribune,
January 9, 2009.
89. Hans M. Kristensen and Elliot Negin, “Support Growing for Removal of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons from Europe”, Common Dreams Newscenter, first posted May 6, 2005.
90. David Krieger, “President-elect Obama and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons”,
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Website, 2008.
91. J.L. Henderson, Hiroshima, Longmans (1974).
92. A. Osada, Children of the A-Bomb, The Testament of Boys and Girls of Hiroshima,
Putnam, New York (1963).
93. M. Hachiya, M.D., Hiroshima Diary, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel
Hill, N.C. (1955).
94. M. Yass, Hiroshima, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York (1972).
95. R. Jungk, Children of the Ashes, Harcourt, Brace and World (1961).
96. B. Hirschfield, A Cloud Over Hiroshima, Baily Brothers and Swinfin Ltd. (1974).
97. J. Hersey, Hiroshima, Penguin Books Ltd. (1975).
98. R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New
York, (1995)
99. R. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon and Schuster, New York, (1988).
6.15. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CRIMINAL! EVERY WAR IS A CRIME! 251
100. D.V. Babst et al., Accidental Nuclear War: The Growing Peril, Peace Research
Institute, Dundas, Ontario, (1984).
101. S. Britten, The Invisible Event: An Assessment of the Risk of Accidental or Unautho-
rized Detonation of Nuclear Weapons and of War by Miscalculation, Menard Press,
London, (1983).
102. M. Dando and P. Rogers, The Death of Deterrence, CND Publications, London,
(1984).
103. N.F. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Futura, London, (1976).
104. D. Frei and C. Catrina, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, United Nations, Geneva,
(1982).
105. H. L’Etang, Fit to Lead?, Heinemann Medical, London, (1980).
106. SPANW, Nuclear War by Mistake - Inevitable or Preventable?, Swedish Physicians
Against Nuclear War, Lulea, (1985).
107. J. Goldblat, Nuclear Non-proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore, (SIPRI Publi-
cations), Taylor and Francis, (1985).
108. IAEA, International Safeguards and the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, (1985).
109. J. Schear, ed., Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Nuclear Risk, Gower, London,
(1984).
110. D.P. Barash and J.E. Lipton, Stop Nuclear War! A Handbook, Grove Press, New
York, (1982).
111. C.F. Barnaby and G.P. Thomas, eds., The Nuclear Arms Race: Control or Catastro-
phe, Francis Pinter, London, (1982).
112. L.R. Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics, Chicago University
press, Chicago, IL, (1980).
113. F. Blackaby et al., eds., No-first-use, Taylor and Francis, London, (1984).
114. NS, ed., New Statesman Papers on Destruction and Disarmament (NS Report No.
3), New Statesman, London, (1981).
115. H. Caldicot, Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War, William Morrow, New
York, (1984).
116. R. Ehrlich, Waging the Peace: The Technology and Politics of Nuclear Weapons,
State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, (1985).
117. W. Epstein, The Prevention of Nuclear War: A United Nations Perspective, Gunn
and Hain, Cambridge, MA, (1984).
118. W. Epstein and T. Toyoda, eds., A New Design for Nuclear Disarmament, Spokesman,
Nottingham, (1975).
119. G.F. Kennan, The Nuclear Delusion, Pantheon, New York, (1983).
120. R.J. Lifton and R. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case
Against Nuclearism, Basic Books, New York, (1982).
121. J.R. Macy, Despair and Personal Power in the Nuclear Age, New Society Publishers,
Philadelphia, PA, (1983).
122. A.S. Miller et al., eds., Nuclear Weapons and Law, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT,
(1984).
252 WHY WAR?
123. MIT Coalition on Disarmament, eds., The Nuclear Almanac: Confronting the Atom
in War and Peace, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, (1984).
124. UN, Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, United Na-
tions, New York, (1980).
125. IC, Proceedings of the Conference on Understanding Nuclear War, Imperial College,
London, (1980).
126. B. Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, Allen and Unwin, London, (1959).
127. F. Barnaby, The Nuclear Age, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, (1974).
128. D. Albright, F. Berkhout and W. Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium
1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
(1997).
129. G.T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Rus-
sian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, (1996).
130. B. Bailin, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Post-
colonial State, Zed Books, London, (1998).
131. G.K. Bertsch and S.R. Grillot, (Eds.), Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risks of
Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union, Routledge, New York, (1998).
132. P. Bidawi and A. Vanaik, South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the
Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2001).
133. F.A. Boyle, The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence: Could the U.S. War on Terror-
ism Go Nuclear?, Clarity Press, Atlanta GA, (2002).
134. G. Burns, The Atomic Papers: A Citizen’s Guide to Selected Books and Articles on
the Bomb, the Arms Race, Nuclear Power, the Peace Movement, and Related Issues,
Scarecrow Press, Metuchen NJ, (1984).
135. L. Butler, A Voice of Reason, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54, 58-61, (1998).
136. R. Butler, Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense, West-
view Press, Boulder CO, (2001).
137. R.P. Carlisle (Ed.), Encyclopedia of the Atomic Age, Facts on File, New York, (2001).
138. G.A. Cheney, Nuclear Proliferation: The Problems and Possibilities, Franklin Watts,
New York, (1999).
139. A. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, Colombia University Press, New York, (1998).
140. S.J. Diehl and J.C. Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference
Handbook, ABC-Clio Information Services, Santa Barbara CA, (2002).
141. H.A. Feiveson (Ed.), The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-
Alerting of Nuclear Weapons, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., (1999).
142. R. Hilsman, From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World Without War: A History
and a Proposal, Praeger Publishers, Westport, (1999).
143. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and The Institute for
Energy and Environmental Research Plutonium: Deadly Gold of the Nuclear Age,
International Physicians Press, Cambridge MA, (1992).
144. R.W. Jones and M.G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps
and Charts, 1998, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington
D.C., (1998).
6.15. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CRIMINAL! EVERY WAR IS A CRIME! 253
145. R.J. Lifton and R. Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case
Against Nuclearism, Basic Books, New York, (1982).
146. J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B. Udgaonkar (Eds.), A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World:
Desirable? Feasible?, Westview Press, (1993).
147. The United Methodist Council of Bishops, In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear
Crisis and a Just Peace, Graded Press, Nashville, (1986).
148. U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (Ed.), Dismantling the Bomb and
Managing the Nuclear Materials, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.,
(1993).
149. S.R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, Harvard University Press, (1988).
150. P. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American
Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, University of North Carolina
Press, (1985).
151. A. Makhijani and S. Saleska, The Nuclear Power Deception: Nuclear Mythology From
Electricity ‘Too Cheap to Meter’ to ‘Inherently Safe’ Reactors, Apex Press, (1999).
152. C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies, Basic Books,
(1984).
153. P. Rogers, The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism in Britain, Oxford Research Group, Ox-
ford, (2006).
154. MIT, The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpowe
(2003).
155. Z. Mian and A. Glaser, Life in a Nuclear Powered Crowd, INES Newsletter No. 52,
9-13, April, (2006).
156. E. Chivian, and others (eds.), Last Aid: The Medical Dimensions of Nuclear War,
W.H. Freeman, San Fransisco, (1982).
157. G. Kolko, “Another Century of War”, New Press, (2002).
158. G. Kolko, “Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980”,
Pantheon Books, (1988).
159. John A. Hobson, “Imperialism; A Study”, (1902).
160. M.T. Klare, “Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict”, Owl Books
reprint edition, New York, (2002).
254 WHY WAR?
Chapter 7
255
256 WHY WAR?
Figure 7.1: George Washington, the first U.S. president, warned against “Over-
grown Military Establishments”.
Figure 7.3: Melted steel pouring from the burning World Trade Center. An
ordinary fire is not hot enough to melt steel.
Figure 7.4: Building 7 was not hit by any aircraft, and yet it collapsed many
hours later, during the afternoon, in a manner that looked exactly like a con-
trolled demolition.
260 WHY WAR?
For those who belong to the military-industrial complex, perpetual war is a blessing,
but for the majority of the people of the world it is a curse. Since we who oppose war are
the vast majority, can we not make our wills felt?
There is much worry today about climate change, but an ecological catastrophe of equal
magnitude could be produced by a nuclear war. One can gain a small idea of what this
would be like by thinking of the radioactive contamination that has made an area half
the size of Italy near to Chernobyl permanently uninhabitable. It is too soon to know
the full effects of the Fukushima disaster, but it appears that it will be comparable with
Chernobyl.
The testing of hydrogen bombs in the Pacific half a century ago continues to cause
cancer and birth defects in the Marshall Islands today. This too can give us a small idea
of the environmental effects of a nuclear war.
In 1954, the United States tested a hydrogen bomb at Bikini. The bomb was 1,300
times more powerful than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Fallout from
the bomb contaminated the island of Rongelap, one of the Marshall Islands 120 kilometers
from Bikini.
The islanders experienced radiation illness, and many died from cancer. Even today,
half a century later, both people and animals on Rongelap and other nearby islands suffer
from birth defects. The most common defects have been “jelly fish babies”, born with no
bones and with transparent skin. Their brains and beating hearts can be seen. The babies
usually live a day or two before they stop breathing.
The environmental effects of a nuclear war would be catastrophic. A war fought with
hydrogen bombs would produce radioactive contamination of the kind that we have already
experienced in the areas around Chernobyl and Fukushima and in the Marshall Islands,
7.5. WE HAVE COME WITHIN A HAIR’S BREADTH OF DISASTER 261
What can be the reason for these actions, which seem to border on insanity? One reason
can be found in the power-drunk thinking of the “Project for a New American Century”,
one of whose members was US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz.
The Wolfowitz Doctrine states that “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence
of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses
a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.”
In other words, the Wolfowitz Doctrine is a declaration that the United States intends
to control the entire world through military power. No thought is given to the protection of
civilian populations, either in the United States or elsewhere. Civilians are mere hostages
in the power game.
The money game is important too. A great driving force behind militarism is the
almost unimaginably enormous river of money that buys the votes of politicians and the
propaganda of the mainstream media.
Numbed by the propaganda, citizens allow the politicians to vote for obscenely bloated
military budgets, which further enrich the corporate oligarchs, and the circular flow con-
tinues.
As long as tensions are maintained; as long as there is a threat of war, the military-
industrial complex gets the money for which it lusts, and the politicians and journalists
get their blood money. The safety of civilians plays no role in the money game. We are
just hostages.
There is a danger that our world, with all the beauty and value that it contains, will
be destroyed by this cynical game for power and money, in which civilians are militarism’s
hostages. Will we let this happen?
Figure 7.5: We should praise Joe Biden for his good decisions, but his aggressive
foreign policy threatens the world with disaster.
the invasion of Iraq, signaled that this would not change under Biden. Bombs would be
dropped, and people would be murdered by drones or by the dirty tricks department of
the CIA.
Since the Biden administration owes its allegiance to the corporate oligarchy, it is not
surprising that war with China is threatened, even though such a war would be suicidal.
“We, President of the United States of America Joseph R. Biden and Pres-
ident of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, note the United States and
Russia have demonstrated that, even in periods of tension, they are able to
make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic
sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.
“The recent extension of the New START Treaty exemplifies our commit-
ment to nuclear arms control. Today, we reaffirm the principle that a nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought.
“Consistent with these goals, the United States and Russia will embark to-
gether on an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue in the near future
that will be deliberate and robust. Through this Dialogue, we seek to lay the
groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.”
“We write to you , world leaders whom we know fully understand the catas-
trophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and the
cataclysmic effects on humanity of a nuclear war: the possible end of civiliza-
tion as we know it.
“We are participants of a growing international campaign for a commitment
by nuclear-armed states to a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. We
have just completed a number of successful global events, including a two-
day conference preparatory to launching this campaign, which have included
over 700 participants from Asia, Africa, Europe, Middle East, South America,
North America, and the Pacific. Arising from these events is an appeal to
you to use your summit to make a mutual bilateral commitment on No First
Use (NFU) as a first step to adoption of such a commitment by other nuclear
weapon states and to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
“We are mindful that decades ago your predecessors declared ‘A nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought’. A few years ago, Mr. Biden,
you declared in an eloquent speech about the threat of nuclear war, ‘If we want
a world free of nuclear weapons, the United States must take the initiative to
lead us there.’ Similarly, Mr. Putin, you have said ‘The understanding that a
third world war could be the end of civilization should restrain us from taking
extreme steps on the international arena that are highly dangerous for modern
268 WHY WAR?
civilization.’ The United Nations set the goal to eliminate nuclear weapons
in its very first resolution, adopted unanimously, and reaffirmed this in 2013
by establishing September 26th as the annual International Day for the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
“Now is the perfect time for you to declare a joint commitment that your
nations will not use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances, and to
make this a key step toward fulfilling the UN goal to totally eliminate nuclear
weapons from the planet. We pledge to you - as legislators, former politi-
cal/military leaders and representatives of multiple civil movements endorsing
this goal - to mobilize civil and political support for your effort.
“You should know that such a measure will be supported by most of the
other 189 States Parties of the Non-Proliferation Treaty who unanimously
agreed in 2010 to support ‘policies that could prevent the use of nuclear
weapons’ and ‘to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a
world without nuclear weapons’, and will be strongly supported by the 122 na-
tions that in 2017 approved the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
“We believe it is in your hearts to achieve this noble goal. We call on you
to initiate this vital step at your summit and to lead us all to a planet free of
nuclear weapons.”
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270 WHY WAR?
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7.7. BIDEN AND PUTIN MEET ON JUNE 16, 2021, IN GENEVA 275
159. Szamboti, Anthony and MacQueen, Graeme, The Missing Jolt: A Simple Refutation
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276 WHY WAR?
Chapter 8
Introduction
After the invention of agriculture, roughly 10,000 years ago, humans began to live in
progressively larger groups, which were sometimes multi-ethnic. In order to make towns,
cities and finally nations function without excessive injustice and violence, both ethical
and legal systems were needed. Today, in an era of global economic interdependence,
instantaneous worldwide communication and all-destroying thermonuclear weapons, we
urgently need new global ethical principles and a just and enforcible system of international
laws.
What is law?
The principles of law, ethics, politeness and kindness function in slightly different ways,
but all of these behavioral rules help human societies to function in a cohesive and trouble-
free way. Law is the most coarse. The mesh is made finer by ethics, while the rules of
politeness and kindness fill in the remaining gaps.
Legal systems began at a time at a time when tribal life was being replaced by life in
villages, towns and cities. One of the oldest legal documents that we know of is a code
of laws enacted by the Babylonian king Hammurabi in about 1754 BC. It consists of 282
laws, with scaled punishments, governing household behavior, marriage, divorce, paternity,
inheritance, payments for services, and so on. An ancient 2.24 meter stele inscribed with
Hammurabi’s Code can be seen in the Louvre. The laws are written in the Akkadian
language, using cuneiform script.
277
278 WHY WAR?
Humanity’s great ethical systems also began during a period when the social unit was
growing very quickly. It is an interesting fact that many of history’s greatest ethical teachers
lived at a time when the human societies were rapidly increasing in size. One can think,
for example of Moses, Confucius, Lao-Tzu, Gautama Buddha, the Greek philosophers, and
Jesus. Muhammad came slightly later, but he lived and taught at a time when tribal life
was being replaced by city life in the Arab world. During the period when these great
teachers lived, ethical systems had become necessary to over-write raw inherited human
emotional behavior patterns in such a way that increasingly large societies could function
in a harmonious and cooperative way, with a minimum of conflicts.
1789, it influenced the drafting of the Constitution of the United States. Lord Denning
described the Magna Carta as ”the greatest constitutional document of all times: the
foundation of the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot”.
Figure 8.3: Lord Denning described the Magna Carta as ”the greatest constitu-
tional document of all times: the foundation of the freedom of the individual
against the arbitrary authority of the despot”.
Figure 8.4: James Madison, wrote that the more he reflected on the use of force,
the more he doubted “the practicality, the justice and the efficacy of it when
applied to people collectively, and not individually.” He later introduced the
Constitutional amendments that became the U.S. Bill of Rights.
282 WHY WAR?
Of the ten amendments that constitute the original Bill of Rights, we should take
particular notice of the First, Fourth and Sixth, because they have been violated repeatedly
and grossly by the present government of the United States.
The First Amendment requires that “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.” The right to freedom of speech and freedom
of the press has been violated by the punishment of whistleblowers. The right to assem-
ble peaceably has also been violated repeatedly and brutally by the present government’s
militarized police.
The Fourth Amendment states that “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”It is hardly necessary to elaborate on the U.S. Government’s massive
violations of the Fourth Amendment. Edward Snowden’s testimony has revealed a huge
secret industry carrying out illegal and unwarranted searches and seizures of private data,
not only in the United States, but also throughout the world. This data can be used to
gain power over citizens and leaders through blackmail. True democracy and dissent are
thereby eliminated.
The Sixth Amendment requires that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”This constitutional
amendment has also been grossly violated.
In the context of federal unions of states, the Tenth Amendment is also interesting.
This amendment states that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”We mentioned above that historically, federations have been very success-
ful. However, if we take the European Union as an example, it has had some problems
connected with the principle of subsidiarity, according to which as few powers as possible
should be decided centrally, and as many issues as possible should be decided locally. The
European Union was originally designed as a free trade area, and because of its history
commercial considerations have trumped environmental ones. The principle of subsidiarity
has not been followed, and enlightened environmental laws of member states have been
declared to be illegal by the EU because they conflicted with free trade. These are diffi-
culties from which we can learn as we contemplate the conversion of the United Nations
into a federation.
The United States Bill of Rights was influenced by John Locke and by the French
philosophers of the Enlightenment. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man (August,
1789) was almost simultaneous with the U.S. Bill of Rights.
8.1. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283
We can also see the influence of Enlightenment philosophy in the wording of the U.S.
Declaration of independence (1776): “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.–That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed...”Another criticism that can be leveled against the present government of
the United States is that its actions seem to have nothing whatever to do with the consent
of the governed, not to mention the violations of the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness implicit in extrajudicial killings.
Article 2 of the UN Charter requires that “All members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.” This requirement is somewhat qualified by Article 51, which
says that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.” Thus, in general, war is illegal under the UN Charter. Self-defense against
an armed attack is permitted, but only for a limited time, until the Security Council has
had time to act. The United Nations Charter does not permit the threat or use of force in
preemptive wars, or to produce regime changes, or for so-called “democratization”, or for
the domination of regions that are rich in oil.
Clearly, the United Nations Charter aims at abolishing the institution of war once
and for all; but the present Charter has proved to be much too weak to accomplish this
purpose, since it is a confederation of the member states rather than a federation. This
does not mean that that our present United Nations is a failure. Far from it! The UN
has achieved almost universal membership, which the League of Nations failed to do. The
Preamble to the Charter speaks of “ the promotion of the economic and social advancement
of all peoples”, and UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization, the Food and
Agricultural Organization and UNESCO, have worked very effectively to improve the lives
of people throughout the world. Furthermore, the UN has served as a meeting place for
diplomats from all countries, and many potentially serious conflicts have been resolved by
informal conversations behind the scenes at the UN. Finally, although often unenforceable,
resolutions of the UN General Assembly and declarations by the Secretary General have
great normative value.
When we think of strengthening and reforming the UN, then besides giving it the power
to make and enforce laws that are binding on individuals, we should also consider giving
it an independent and reliable source of income. As it is, rich and powerful nations seek
to control the UN by means of its purse strings: They give financial support only to those
actions that are in their own interests.
A promising solution to this problem is the so-called “Tobin tax”, named after the
Nobel-laureate economist James Tobin of Yale University. Tobin proposed that interna-
tional currency exchanges should be taxed at a rate between 0.1 and 0.25 percent. He
believed that even this extremely low rate of taxation would have the beneficial effect of
damping speculative transactions, thus stabilizing the rates of exchange between curren-
cies. When asked what should be done with the proceeds of the tax, Tobin said, almost as
an afterthought, “Let the United Nations have it.”
The volume of money involved in international currency transactions is so enormous
that even the tiny tax proposed by Tobin would provide the United Nations with between
100 billion and 300 billion dollars annually. By strengthening the activities of various
UN agencies, the additional income would add to the prestige of the United Nations and
thus make the organization more effective when it is called upon to resolve international
political conflicts. The budgets of UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization,
the Food and Agricultural Organization, UNESCO and the UN Development Programme,
8.1. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 285
Figure 8.5: Clearly, the United Nations Charter aims at abolishing the institu-
tion of war once and for all.
should not just be doubled but should be multiplied by a factor of at least twenty.
With increased budgets the UN agencies could sponsor research and other actions aimed
at solving the world’s most pressing problems: AIDS, drug-resistant infections diseases,
tropical diseases, food insufficiencies, pollution, climate change, alternative energy strate-
gies, population stabilization, peace education, as well as combating poverty, malnutrition,
illiteracy, lack of safe water and so on. Scientists would would be less tempted to find
jobs with arms-related industries if offered the chance to work on idealistic projects. The
United Nations could be given its own television channel, with unbiased news programs,
cultural programs, and “State of the World” addresses by the UN Secretary General.
In addition, the voting system of the United Nations General Assembly needs to be
reformed, and the veto power in the Security Council needs to be abolished.
Figure 8.6: In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously affirmed
“the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal”. The General Assembly
also established an International Law Commission to formalize the Nuremberg
Principles.
Robert H. Jackson, who was the chief United States prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials,
said that “To initiate a war of aggression is therefore not only an international crime; it is
the supreme international crime, differing from other war crimes in that it contains within
itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” Furthermore, the Nuremberg principles state
that “The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice
was in fact possible to him.”The training of soldiers is designed to make the trainees into
automatons, who have surrendered all powers of moral judgment to their superiors. The
Nuremberg Principles put the the burden of moral responsibility squarely back where it
8.1. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 287
All people have the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood or old age. Expectant mothers are promised special care and assistance, and
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. Ev-
eryone has the right to education, which shall be free in the elementary stages. Higher
education shall be accessible to all on the basis of merit. Education must be directed
towards the full development of the human personality and to strengthening respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Education must promote understanding, toler-
ance, and friendship among all nations, racial and religious groups, and it must further the
activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
A supplementary document, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, was adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on the 12th of December, 1989. Furthermore, in
July 2010, the General Assembly passed a resolution affirming that everyone has the right
to clean drinking water and proper sanitation.
Many provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example Article 25,
might be accused of being wishful thinking. In fact, Jean Kirkpatrick, former US Ambas-
sador to the UN, cynically called the Declaration “a letter to Santa Claus”. Nevertheless,
like the Millennium Development Goals, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has
great value in defining the norms towards which the world ought to be striving.
It is easy to find many examples of gross violations of basic human rights that have taken
place in recent years. Apart from human rights violations connected with interventions of
powerful industrial states in the internal affairs of third world countries, there are many
cases where governmental forces in the less developed countries have violated the human
rights of their own citizens. Often minority groups have been killed or driven off their land
by those who coveted the land, as was the case in Guatemala in 1979, when 1.5 million
poor Indian farmers were forced to abandon their villages and farms and to flee to the
mountains of Mexico in order to escape murderous attacks by government soldiers. The
blockade of Gaza and extrajudicial killing by governments must also be regarded as blatant
human rights violations, and there are many recent examples of genocide.
Wars in general, and in particular, the use of nuclear weapons, must be regarded as
gross violations of human rights. The most basic human right is the right to life; but this
is right routinely violated in wars. Most of the victims of recent wars have been civilians,
very often children and women. The use of nuclear weapons must be regarded as a form
of genocide, since they kill people indiscriminately, babies, children, young adults in their
prime, and old people, without any regard for guilt or innocence.
Figure 8.7: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has great value in defin-
ing the norms towards which the world ought to be striving.
290 WHY WAR?
itary personnel); established protection for the wounded; and established protections for
civilians in and around a war-zone. The treaties if 1949 were ratified, in whole or with
reservations, by 196 countries.”
In a way, one might say that the Geneva Conventions are an admission of defeat by the
international community. We tried to abolish war entirely through the UN Charter, but
failed because the Charter was too weak.
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, collective punishment is war crime. Article
33 states that “No protected person may be punished for an offense that he or she did
not personally commit.” Articles 47-78 also impose substantial obligations on occupying
powers, with numerous provisions for the general welfare of the inhabitants of an occupied
territory. Thus Israel violated the Geneva Conventions by its collective punishment of the
civilian population of Gaza in retaliation for largely ineffective Hamas rocket attacks. The
larger issue, however, is the urgent need for lifting of Israel’s brutal blockade of Gaza,
which has created what Noam Chomsky calls the “the world’s largest open-air prison”.
This blockade violates the Geneva conventions because Israel, as an occupying power, has
the duty of providing for the welfare of the people of Gaza.
The most blatantly violated provision of the NPT is Article VI. It requires the member
states to pursue “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”, and negotiations
towards a “Treaty on general and complete disarmament”. In other words, the states that
possess nuclear weapons agreed to get rid of them. However, during the 47 years that have
passed since the NPT went into force, the nuclear weapon states have shown absolutely
no sign of complying with Article VI. There is a danger that the NPT will break down
entirely because of the majority of countries in the world are so dissatisfied with this long-
continued non-compliance. Looking at the NPT with the benefit of hindsight, we can see
the third “pillar”, the “right to peaceful use of nuclear technology” as a fatal flaw of the
treaty. In practice, it has meant encouragement of nuclear power generation, with all the
many dangers that go with it.
The enrichment of uranium is linked to reactor use. Many reactors of modern design
make use of low enriched uranium as a fuel. Nations operating such a reactor may claim
that they need a program for uranium enrichment in order to produce fuel rods. However,
by operating their ultracentrifuges a little longer, they can easily produce highly enriched
(weapons-usable) uranium.
The difficulty of distinguishing between a civilian nuclear power generation program
and a military nuclear program is illustrated by the case of Iran. In discussing Iran, it
should be mentioned that Iran is fully in compliance with the NPT. It is very strange
to see states that are long-time blatant violators of the NPT threaten Iran because of a
nuclear program that fully complies with the Treaty. I believe that civilian nuclear power
generation is always a mistake because of the many dangers that it entails, and because of
the problem of disposing of nuclear waste. However, a military attack on Iran would be
both criminal and insane. Why criminal? Because such an attack would violate the UN
Charter and the Nuremberg Principles. Why insane? Because it would initiate a conflict
that might escalate uncontrollably into World War III.
Somalia. After a two-year waiting period, during which no new cases were reported, WHO
announced in 1979 that smallpox, one of the most frightful diseases of humankind, had been
totally eliminated from the world. This was the first instance of the complete eradication
of a disease, and it was a demonstration of what could be achieved by the enlightened use
of science combined with international cooperation. The eradication of smallpox was a
milestone in human history.
It seems that our species is not really completely wise and rational; we do not really
deserve to be called “Homo sapiens”. Stone-age emotions and stone-age politics are alas
still with us. Samples of smallpox virus were taken to“carefully controlled” laboratories
in the United States and the Soviet Union. Why? Probably because these two Cold War
opponents did not trust each other, although both had signed the Biological Weapons
Convention. Each feared that the other side might intend to use smallpox as a biological
weapon. There were also rumors that unofficial samples of the virus had been saved by a
number of other countries, including North Korea, Iraq, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Israel,
Pakistan and Yugoslavia.
(70,000 metric tons), only 12 percent have been destroyed. One hopes that in the fu-
ture the CWC will be ratified by all the nations of the world and that the destruction of
stockpiled chemical warfare agents will become complete.
The passage of the Arms Trade Treaty by a majority vote in the UN General Assembly
opens new possibilities for progress on other seemingly-intractable issues. In particular, it
gives hope that a Nuclear Weapons Convention might be adopted by a direct vote on the
floor of the General Assembly. The adoption of the NWC, even if achieved against the
bitter opposition of the nuclear weapon states, would make it clear that the world’s peoples
consider the threat of an all-destroying nuclear war to be completely unacceptable.
2
http://www.countercurrents.org/avery101013.htm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=efI6T8lovqY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IdBDRbjx9jo
8.1. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295
Article 1: Prohibitions
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
Figure 8.8: Recently there have been a number of initiatives which aim at making
the human obligation to avert threatened environmental mega-catastrophes a
part of international law.
8.1. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity pro-
hibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or
control.
Article 2: Declarations
1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary - General of the United Nations, not
later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration
in which it shall:
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations
received to the States Parties
It is generally agreed that a full-scale nuclear war would have disastrous effects, not only
on belligerent nations but also on neutral countries. Mr.Javier Pérez de Cuéllar , former
Secretary-General of the United Nations, emphasized this point in one of his speeches:
“I feel”, he said, “that the question may justifiably be put to the leading nuclear powers:
by what right do they decide the fate of humanity? From Scandinavia to Latin America,
from Europe and Africa to the Far East, the destiny of every man and woman is affected
by their actions. No one can expect to escape from the catastrophic consequences of a
nuclear war on the fragile structure of this planet. ...”
“No ideological confrontation can be allowed to jeopardize the future of humanity.
Nothing less is at stake: today’s decisions affect not only the present; they also put at
risk succeeding generations. Like supreme arbiters, with our disputes of the moment, we
threaten to cut off the future and to extinguish the lives of innocent millions yet unborn.
There can be no greater arrogance. At the same time, the lives of all those who lived
before us may be rendered meaningless; for we have the power to dissolve in a conflict of
hours or minutes the entire work of civilization, with all the brilliant cultural heritage of
humankind.”
“...In a nuclear age, decisions affecting war and peace cannot be left to military strate-
gists or even to governments. They are indeed the responsibility of every man and woman.
And it is therefore the responsibility of all of us... to break the cycle of mistrust and
insecurity and to respond to humanity’s yearning for peace.”
The eloquent words of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar express the situation in which we now
find ourselves: Accidental nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, insanity of a person in a position
of power, or unintended escalation of a conflict, could at any moment plunge our beau-
tiful world into a catastrophic thermonuclear war which might destroy not only human
civilization but also much of the biosphere. We are reminded that such a disaster could
occur at any moment by the threat of an attack by Israel on Iran and by the threat of an
all-destroying nuclear war started by the conflict in the Korean Peninsula. It is clear that
if the peoples of the world do not act quickly to abolish nuclear weapons, neither we nor
our children nor our grandchildren have much chance of survival.
Today, there is a pressing need to enlarge the size of the political unit from the nation-
state to the entire world. The need to do so results from the terrible dangers of modern
weapons and from global economic interdependence. The progress of science has created
this need, but science has also given us the means to enlarge the political unit: Our almost
miraculous modern communications media, if properly used, have the power to weld all of
humankind into a single supportive and cooperative society.
We live at a critical time for human civilization, a time of crisis. Each of us must accept
his or her individual responsibility for solving the problems that are facing the world today.
We cannot leave this to the politicians. That is what we have been doing until now, and
the results have been disastrous. Nor can we trust the mass media to give us adequate
public discussion of the challenges that we are facing. We have a responsibility towards
future generations to take matters into our own hands, to join hands and make our own
alternative media, to work actively and fearlessly for better government and for a better
society.
We, the people of the world, not only have the facts on our side; we also have numbers
on our side. The vast majority of the world’s peoples long for peace. The vast majority
long for abolition of nuclear weapons, and for a world of kindness and cooperation, a world
of respect for the environment. No one can make these changes alone, but together we can
do it.
Together, we have the power to choose a future where international anarchy, chronic
war and institutionalized injustice will be replaced by democratic and humane global gov-
ernance, a future where the madness and immorality of war will be replaced by the rule of
law.
We need a sense of the unity of all mankind to save the future, a new global ethic for a
united world. We need politeness and kindness to save the future, politeness and kindness
not only within nations but also between nations. To save the future, we need a just and
democratic system of international law; for with law shall our land be built up, but with
lawlessness laid waste.
Figure 8.9: A stamp honoring the great Hungarian biochemist, Albert Szent-
Györgyi, who once wrote: “...Modern science has abolished time and distance
as factors separating nations. On our shrunken globe today, there is room for
one group only: the family of man.”
possible. The large regions of our present-day world within which war has been eliminated
can serve as models. There are a number of large countries with heterogeneous populations
within which it has been possible to achieve internal peace and social cohesion, and if this
is possible within such extremely large regions, it must also be possible globally. We must
replace the old world of international anarchy, chronic war and institutionalized injustice,
by a new world of law.
The Nobel laureate biochemist Albert Szent-Györgyi once wrote: “...Modern science
has abolished time and distance as factors separating nations. On our shrunken globe
today, there is room for one group only: the family of man.”
of the process of “going to zero” ( i.e, the total elimination of nuclear weapons). This is
because nuclear weapons are small enough to be easily hidden. How will we know whether
a nation has destroyed all of its nuclear arsenal? We have to depend on information from
insiders, whose loyalty to the whole of humanity prompts them to become whistleblowers.
And for this to be possible, they need to be protected.
In general, if the world is ever to be free from the threat of complete destruction by
modern weapons, we will need a new global ethic, an ethic as advanced as our technology.
Of course we can continue to be loyal to our families, our localities and our countries. But
this must be supplemented by a higher loyalty: a loyalty to humanity as a whole.
Figure 8.10: Former UN Assistant Secretary General Hans Christof von Sponeck
has stated that he considers NATO’s present Charter to be illegal.
and security.”
Thus, in general, war is illegal under the UN Charter. Self-defense against an armed
attack is permitted, but only for a limited time, until the Security Council has had time to
act. The United Nations Charter does not permit the threat or use of force in preemptive
wars, or to produce regime changes, or for so-called “democratization”, or for the domina-
tion of regions that are rich in oil. NATO must not be a party to the threat or use of force
for such illegal purposes.
In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously affirmed “the principles of
international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment
of the Tribunal”. The General Assembly also established an International Law Commission
to formalize the Nuremberg Principles. The result was a list that included Principles VI
and VII, which are particularly important in the context of the illegality of NATO:
Figure 8.11: The Sixth Nuremberg Principle lists “Planning, preparation, ini-
tiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances” as a crime under international law. The
Seventh Nuremberg Principle states that complicity in a crime against peace
is also a crime.
nuclear weapons still in Europe The air forces of the nations in which they are based are
regularly trained to deliver the US weapons. This “nuclear sharing”, as it is called, violates
Articles I and II of the NPT, which forbid the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-
weapon states. It has been argued that the NPT would no longer be in force if a crisis
arose, but there is nothing in the NPT saying that the treaty would not hold under all
circumstances.
Article VI of the NPT requires states possessing nuclear weapon to get rid of them
within a reasonable period of time. This article is violated by fact that NATO policy is
guided by a Strategic Concept, which visualizes the continued use of nuclear weapons in
the foreseeable future.
The principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been an extremely important safe-
guard over the years, but it is violated by present NATO policy, which permits the first-use
of nuclear weapons in a wide variety of circumstances.
306 WHY WAR?
Figure 8.12: At present, NATO’s nuclear weapons policies violate both the spirit
and the text of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in several respects
8.4. THE ILLEGALITY OF NATO 307
ultimate evil”, and said “By its nature, the nuclear weapon, this blind weapon, destabilizes
humanitarian law, the law of discrimination in the use of weapons... The ultimate aim of
every action in the field of nuclear arms will always be nuclear disarmament, an aim which
is no longer Utopian and which all have a duty to pursue more actively than ever.”
Figure 8.13: In 1954, the United States tested a hydrogen bomb at Bikini. The
bomb was 1,300 times more powerful than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.
NPT who have declared nuclear arsenals - India, Pakistan and North Korea, and the one
undeclared nuclear weapons state, Israel.”
On July 21, 2014, the United States filed a motion to dismiss the Nuclear Zero lawsuit
that was filed by the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) on April 24, 2014 in U.S.
Federal Court. The U.S., in its move to dismiss the RMI lawsuit, does not argue that the
U.S. is in compliance with its NPT disarmament obligations. Instead, it argues in a variety
of ways that its non-compliance with these obligations is, essentially, justifiable, and not
subject to the court’s jurisdiction.
The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) is a consultant to the Marshall Islands
on the legal and moral issues involved in bringing this case. David Krieger, President
of NAPF, upon hearing of the motion to dismiss the case by the U.S. responded, “The
U.S. government is sending a terrible message to the world - that is, that U.S. courts are
an improper venue for resolving disputes with other countries on U.S. treaty obligations.
The U.S. is, in effect, saying that whatever breaches it commits are all right if it says so.
That is bad for the law, bad for relations among nations, bad for nuclear Non-Proliferation
and disarmament - and not only bad, but extremely dangerous for U.S. citizens and all
humanity.”
David Krieger continued, “In 2009, President Obama shared his vision for the world,
saying, ‘So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.’ This lawsuit provides the perfect
opportunity for President Obama to move his vision forward. Yet, rather than seizing that
310 WHY WAR?
Figure 8.14: Babies with severe birth defects are still being born on the Marshall
Islands, 60 years after the Bikini test.
8.6. REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 311
Figure 8.15: A just system of international law is our only hope for the future.
opportunity, the U.S. government is seeking dismissal without a full and fair hearing on
the merits of the case.”
Our only hope for the future is to replace brutal rule by military power by a just system
of international law.
grow with the requirements of our increasingly interdependent global society. We should
remember that the Charter was drafted and signed before the first nuclear bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima; and it also could not anticipate the extraordinary development of
international trade and communication which characterizes the world today.
Among the weaknesses of the present U.N. Charter is the fact that it does not give the
United Nations the power to make laws which are binding on individuals. At present, in
international law, we treat nations as though they were persons: We punish entire nations
by sanctions when the law is broken, even when only the leaders are guilty, even though the
burdens of the sanctions fall most heavily on the poorest and least guilty of the citizens,
and even though sanctions often have the effect of uniting the citizens of a country behind
the guilty leaders. To be effective, the United Nations needs a legislature with the power to
make laws which are binding on individuals, and the power to to arrest individual political
leaders for flagrant violations of international law.
Another weakness of the present United Nations Charter is the principle of “one nation
one vote” in the General Assembly. This principle seems to establish equality between
nations, but in fact it is very unfair: For example it gives a citizen of China or India less
than a thousandth the voting power of a citizen of Malta or Iceland. A reform of the voting
system is clearly needed.
The present United Nations Charter contains guarantees of human rights, but there is
no effective mechanism for enforcing these guarantees. In fact there is a conflict between
the parts of the Charter protecting human rights and the concept of absolute national
sovereignty. Recent history has given us many examples of atrocities committed against
ethnic minorities by leaders of nation-states, who claim that sovereignty gives them the
right to run their internal affairs as they wish, free from outside interference.
One feels that it ought to be the responsibility of the international community to
prevent gross violations of human rights, such as the use of poison gas against civilians (to
mention only one of the more recent political crimes); and if this is in conflict with the
notion of absolute national sovereignty, then sovereignty must yield. In fact, the concept
of the absolutely sovereign nation-state as the the supreme political entity is already being
eroded by the overriding need for international law.
Today the development of technology has made global communication almost instan-
taneous. We sit in our living rooms and watch, via satellite, events taking place on the
opposite side of the globe. Likewise the growth of world trade has brought distant coun-
tries into close economic contact with each other: Financial tremors in Tokyo can shake
New York. The impact of contemporary science and technology on transportation and
communication has effectively abolished distance in relations between nations. This close
contact and interdependence will increasingly require effective international law to prevent
conflicts. However, the need for international law must be balanced against the desirability
of local self-government. Like biological diversity, the cultural diversity of humankind is
a treasure to be carefully guarded. A balance or compromise between these two desirable
goals could be achieved by granting only a few carefully chosen powers to a strengthened
United Nations with sovereignty over all other issues retained by the member states.
8.7. FEDERATIONS, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 313
Figure 8.18: Logo of the International Tennis Federation, which organizes world-
wide events in the sport. It is another example of a special-purpose federation.
8.7. FEDERATIONS, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 315
to it; and all powers not expressly delegated are retained by the individual states.
Since the federal structure seems well suited to a world government with limited and
carefully-defined powers that would preserve as much local autonomy as possible, it is
worthwhile to look at the histories of a few of the federations. There is much that we can
learn from their experiences.
In ancient Greece there were many federations, one example being the Amphictyonic
League. This was originally a league of 12 tribes, and it was devoted to regulating religious
matters and maintaining shrines. The League had meetings in the spring at the temple of
Demeter near Thermopylae and in the autumn at Delphi. The Amphictyonic League is an
example of a special-purpose federation. It had authority over certain religious matters,
but all other decisions were taken locally by the members of its constituent tribes.
Another special-purpose federation was the Hanseatic League which flourished in North-
ern Europe during the 12th-17th centuries. The Hanseatic League began as an association
of merchants who were interested in salting and selling the herring catch of the Baltic.
This was a profitable business during the late Middle Ages because there were so many
fast days on which it was forbidden to eat meat, but permissible to eat fish. At the height
of its power, the Hansa included merchants from more than sixty cities, for example mer-
chants from such cities as Bruges, Hamburg, Lubeck, Rostock, Danzig, Riga, Novgorod
and Bergen. Each city had its own merchant association, but matters concerning intercity
trade were organized by a loose federation, the Hanseatic Diet.
As a final example of a special-purpose federation, we can think of the Universal Postal
Union. Prior to the UPU, countries that wished to cooperate with each other in postal
matters did so through bilateral treaties. However, this was a clumsy solution, and in
1863 an international postal congress was held at the request of the United States. As a
result of the congress, the Treaty of Berne was signed in 1874, creating the General Postal
Union. In 1878 it was renamed, and it became the Universal Postal Union. The UPU
introduced several innovations:- a more or less uniform flat rate to mail a letter anywhere
in the world; equal treatment of foreign and domestic mail; and the retention by each
country of the money collected for international postage. After the formation of the UPU,
it was no longer necessary for a letter or package to bear the stamps of all the countries
through which it would pass, as had previously been the case. The Universal Postal Union
has proved to be incredibly robust, and it has usually continued to function well despite
the political upheavals and animosities of its constituent members.
From these examples of special-purpose federations we can see that it is possible to limit
the authority of a federation to a small domain of activities. However, we can notice in the
evolution of the Hanseatic League, a gradual enlargement of federal powers: The League
began as an organization of merchants, but it gradually acquired political and military
powers, as can be seen from the Hansa’s destruction of Copenhagen’s castle in 1369.
Let us next turn to the history of nations that have been formed as federations of
smaller units. Almost half of the countries of today’s world are federations.
The Swiss Federation is an interesting example, because it’s regions speak three different
languages: German, French and Italian. In 1291, citizens of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden,
standing on the top of a small mountain called Rütli, swore allegiance to the first Swiss
316 WHY WAR?
federation with the words “we will be a one and only nation of brothers”. During the 14th
century, Luzern, Zürich, Glarus, Zug and Bern also joined. Later additions during the
15th and 16th centuries included Fribourg, Solothurn, Basel, Schaffhausen and Appenzell.
In 1648 Switzerland declared itself to be an independent nation, and in 1812, the Swiss
Federation declared its neutrality. In 1815, the French-speaking regions Valais, Neuchatel
and Genéve were added, giving Switzerland its final boundaries.
The Federal Constitution of United States of America is one of the most important and
influential constitutions in history. It later formed a model for many other governments,
especially in South America. The example of the United States is especially interesting
because the original union of states formed by the Articles of Confederation in 1777 proved
to be too weak, and it had to be replaced eleven years later by a federal constitution.
Additional lessons can be learned from the tragedy of the American Civil War.
During the revolutionary war against England the 13 former colonies sent representa-
tives to a Continental Congress, and on May 10, 1776, the Congress authorized each of
the colonies to form its own local provincial government. On July 4, 1776 it published a
formal Declaration of Independence. The following year, the Congress adopted the Articles
of Confederation defining a government of the new United States of America. The revolu-
tionary war continued until 1783, when the Treaty of Paris was signed by the combatants,
ending the war and giving independence to the United States. However, the Articles of
Confederation soon proved to be too weak. The main problem with the Articles was that
laws of the Union acted on its member states rather than on individual citizens.
In 1887, a Constitutional Convention was held in Philadelphia with the aim of drafting a
new and stronger constitution. In the same year, Alexander Hamilton began to publish the
Federalist Papers, a penetrating analysis of the problems of creating a workable government
uniting a number of semi-independent states. The key idea of the Federalist Papers is
that the coercion of states is neither just nor feasible, and that a government uniting
several states must function by acting on individuals. This central idea was incorporated
into the Federal Constitution of the United States, which was adopted in 1788. Another
important feature of the new Constitution was that legislative power was divided between
the Senate, where the states had equal representation regardless of their size, and the
House of Representatives, where representation was proportional to the populations of the
states. The functions of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary were separated in
the Constitution, and in 1789 a Bill of Rights was added.
George Mason, one of the architects of the federal constitution of the United States,
believed that “such a government was necessary as could directly operate on individuals,
and would punish those only whose guilt required it”, while James Madison (another drafter
of the U.S. federal constitution) remarked that the more he reflected on the use of force,
the more he doubted “the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to
people collectively, and not individually”. Finally, Alexander Hamilton, in his Federalist
Papers, discussed the Articles of Confederation with the following words: “To coerce the
states is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised... Can any reasonable man
be well disposed towards a government which makes war and carnage the only means of
supporting itself - a government that can exist only by the sword? Every such war must
8.7. FEDERATIONS, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 317
involve the innocent with the guilty. The single consideration should be enough to dispose
every peaceable citizen against such a government... What is the cure for this great evil?
Nothing, but to enable the... laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those
of states do.”
The United Nations has a charter analogous to the Articles of Confederation: It acts by
attempting to coerce states, a procedure which Alexander Hamilton characterized as “one
of the maddest projects that was ever devised”. Whether this coercion takes the form of
economic sanctions, or whether it takes the form of military intervention, the practicability,
the justice and the efficacy of the U.N.’s efforts are hampered because they are applied to
people collectively and not one by one. What is the cure for this great evil? “Nothing”,
Hamilton tells us, “but to enable the laws to act on individuals, in the same manner as
those of states do.”
In looking at the history of the Articles of Confederation, it is important to remem-
ber that the present United Nations Charter is similar to this fatally weak union, that
lasted only eleven years, from 1777 to 1788. Like it, the UN attempts to act by coercing
states. Although the United Nations Charter has lasted almost sixty years and has been
enormously valuable, its weaknesses are also apparent, like those of the Articles. One
can conclude that the proper way to reform the United Nations is to make it into a full
federation, with the power to make and enforce laws that are binding on individuals.
Because the states were initially distrustful of each other and jealous of their indepen-
dence, the powers originally granted to the US federal government were minimal. However,
as it evolved, the Federal Government of the United States gradually became stronger, and
bit by bit it became involved in an increasingly wide range of activities. (We can recall
that during the evolution of the Hanseatic League, the League also increased its range of
activities.)
What is to be learned from the American Civil War? First we can learn that for a
federation to function successfully it requires a very careful division of the powers that
are granted to the federal government and those that are retained by the member states.
In general, this division should be made by following the principle of subsidiarity, i.e., by
the principle that a decision ought to be taken at the lowest level at which there are no
important externalities. The American Civil War was caused by a disagreement between
North and the South on the division of powers between the Federal Government and the
states. A second aspect of the Civil War was that it marked a departure from the main
principle of the US Constitution - the principle that coercion of states is neither just nor
feasible and that therefore the federal government must act on private citizens. It might
be claimed that during the American Civil War, the North successfully coerced the South,
but the counterargument is that a conflict which produced a million casualties can hardly
be characterized as a success. The lessons of the American Civil War should be borne in
mind as we work to reform and improve the United Nations.
The successes and problems of the European Union provide invaluable experience as we
consider the measures that will be needed to strengthen and reform the United Nations.
On the whole, the EU has been an enormous success, demonstrating beyond question
that it is possible to begin with a very limited special-purpose federation and to gradually
318 WHY WAR?
expand it, judging at each stage whether the cautiously taken steps have been successful.
The European Union has today made war between its member states virtually impossible.
This goal, now achieved, was in fact the vision that inspired the leaders who initiated the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1950.
The European Union is by no means without its critics or without problems, but, as
we try to think of what is needed for United Nations reform, these criticisms and problems
are just as valuable to us as are the successes of the EU.
Countries that have advanced legislation protecting the rights of workers or protecting
the environment complain that their enlightened laws will be nullified if everything is
reduced to the lowest common denominator in the EU. This complaint is a valid one, and
two things can be said about it: Firstly, diversity is valuable, and therefore it may be
undesirable to homogenize legislation, even if uniform rules make trade easier. Secondly,
if certain rules are to be made uniform, it is the most enlightened environmental laws or
labor laws that ought to be made the standard, rather than the least enlightened ones.
Similar considerations would hold for a reformed and strengthened United Nations.
Another frequently heard complaint about the EU is that it takes decision-making far
away from the voters, to a remote site where direct political will of the people can hardly
be felt. This criticism is also very valid. Often, in practice, the EU has ignored or mis-
understood one of the basic ideas of federalism: A federation is a compromise between
the desirability of local self-government, balanced against the necessity of making central
decisions on a few carefully selected issues. As few issues as possible should taken to Brux-
elles, but there are certain issues that are so intrinsically transnational in their implications
that they must be decided centrally. This is the principle of subsidiarity, so essential for
the proper operation of federations - local government whenever possible, and only a few
central decisions when absolutely necessary. In applying the principle of subsidiarity to a
world government of the future, one should also remember that UN reform will take us
into new and uncharted territory. Therefore it is prudent to grant only a few carefully
chosen powers, one at a time, to a reformed and strengthened UN, to see how these work,
and then to cautiously grant other powers, always bearing in mind that wherever possible,
local decisions are the best.
We are faced with the challenge of constructing a world government which will preserve
the advantages of local self-government while granting certain carefully chosen powers to
larger regional or global authorities. Which things should be decided locally, or regionally,
and which globally?
Security, and controls on the manufacture and export of armaments will require an ef-
fective authority at the global level. It should also be the responsibility of the international
community to prevent gross violations of human rights.
Looking towards the future, we can perhaps foresee a time when the United Nations
will have been converted to a federation and given the power to make international laws
which are binding on individuals. Under such circumstances, true police action will be
possible, incorporating all of the needed safeguards for lives and property of the innocent.
One can hope for a future world where public opinion will support international law to
8.8. THE TOBIN TAX 319
such an extent that a new Hitler or Saddam Hussein or a future Milosevic will not be able
to organize large-scale resistance to arrest - a world where international law will be seen
by all to be just, impartial and necessary - a well-governed global community within which
each person will owe his or her ultimate loyalty to humanity as a whole.
vast majority of the citizens that the system of laws is both just and necessary. Traffic
stops when the signal light is red and moves when it is green whether or not a policeman
is present, because everyone understands why such a system is necessary. Nevertheless,
although the vast majority of the citizens in a well-governed community support the system
of laws and would never wish to break the law, we all know that the real world is not heaven.
The total spectrum of human nature includes evil as well as a good. If there were no police
at all, and if the criminal minority were completely unchecked, every citizen would be
obliged to be armed. No one’s life or property would be safe. Robbery, murder and rape
would flourish.
Within a society with a democratic and just government, whose powers are derived from
the consent of the governed, a small and lightly armed force of police is able to maintain
the system of laws. One reason why this is possible has just been mentioned - the force of
public opinion. A second reason is that the law acts on individuals. Since obstruction of
justice and the murder of policemen both rank as serious crimes, an individual criminal is
usually not able to organize massive resistance against police action.
Edith Wynner, one of the pioneers of the World Federalist movement, lists the following
characteristics of police power in a well-governed society:
2. “A policeman seeing a fight between two men does not attempt to determine which
of them is in the right and then help him beat up the one he considers wrong.
His function is to restrain violence by both, to bring them before a judge who has
authority to determine the rights of the dispute, and to see that the court’s decision
is carried out.”
3. “In carrying out his duties, the policeman must apprehend the suspected individual
without jeopardizing either the property or the lives of the community where the
suspect is to be arrested. And not only is the community safeguarded against de-
struction of property and loss of life but the rights of the suspect are also carefully
protected by an elaborate network of judicial safeguards.”
2. Strengthen UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agri-
cultural Organization, UNESCO and the UN Development Programme. The budgets
of these agencies should not just be doubled but should be multiplied by a factor of
at least twenty. With increased budgets the UN agencies could sponsor research and
other actions aimed at solving the world’s most pressing problems - AIDS, drug-
resistant infections diseases, tropical diseases, food insufficiencies, pollution, climate
change, alternative energy strategies, population stabilization, peace education, as
well as combating poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, lack of safe water and so on. Sci-
entists would would be less tempted to find jobs with arms-related industries if offered
the chance to work on idealistic projects.
3. Give the United Nations its own television channel. Introduce unbiased news pro-
grams, cultural programs, and “State of the World” addresses by the UN Secretary
General.
4. Give the United Nations a Legislature with a reformed voting system. The UN
Legislature should have the power to make laws that are binding on individuals.
5. Expand the International Criminal Court and increase its range of jurisdiction.
6. Prohibit the export of arms and ammunition from industrialized countries to the
developing countries.
7. Give the UN a very strong, permanent and highly mobile Emergency Force/UN
Police Force composed of volunteers from all nations, under the direct command of
the Secretary General, The General Assembly, and the International Criminal Court.
9. Address the problem of third world debt. Reform the World Bank and other UN
financial institutions.
10. In connection with the problems of abolishing nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, legislation should be introduced to protect whistleblowers, such as Mordechai
Vanunu.
the United States, and the European Union. Many of these enormous societies contain
a variety of ethnic groups, a variety of religions and a variety of languages, as well as
striking contrasts between wealth and poverty. If these great land areas have been forged
into peaceful and cooperative societies, cannot the same methods of government be applied
globally?
Today there is a pressing need to enlarge the size of the political unit from the nation-
state to the entire world. The need to do so results from the terrible dangers of modern
weapons and from global economic interdependence. The progress of science has created
this need, but science has also given us the means to enlarge the political unit: Our almost
miraculous modern communications media, if properly used, have the power to weld all of
humankind into a single supportive and cooperative society.
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24. C.C. Moskos, Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force, Univ.
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25. John Fielden, The Curse of the Factory System, (1836).
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27. A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776),
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28. Charles Knowlton The Fruits of Philosophy, or The Private Companion of Young
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41. Wilbert E. Moore, The Impact of Industry, Prentice Hall (1965).
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324 WHY WAR?
43. Carlo M. Cipolla (editor), The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Fontana/Collins,
Glasgow (1977).
44. Martin Gerhard Geisbrecht, The Evolution of Economic Society, W.H. Freeman and
Co. (1972).
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(1980).
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to the British Cotton Industry, University of Chicago Press, (1959).
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opment in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, 2nd ed., Cambridge University
Press, (2003).
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University Press, (1981).
50. M. Kranzberg and C.W. Pursell, Jr., eds., Technology in Western Civilization, Oxford
University Press, (1981).
51. M.J. Daunton, Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain,
1700-1850, Oxford University Press, (1990).
52. L.R. Berlanstein, The Industrial Revolution and Work in 19th Century Europe, Rout-
ledge, (1992).
53. J.D. Bernal, Science and Industry in the 19th Century, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, (1970).
54. P.A. Brown, The French Revolution in English History, 2nd edn., Allen and Unwin,
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Societies in London Relative to that Event..., Dent, London, (1910).
56. J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, MacMillan, New York, (1932).
57. I.R. Christie, Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth Century Britain; Reflections
on the British Avoidance of Revolution (Ford Lectures, 1983-4), Clarendon, Oxford,
(1984).
58. H.T. Dickenson, Liberty and Property, Political Ideology in Eighteenth Century Britain,
Holmes and Meier, New York, (1977).
59. W. Eltis, The Classical Theory of Economic Growth, St. Martin’s, New York, (1984).
60. E. Halévy, A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, (transl. E.I.
Watkin), 2nd edn., Benn, London, (1949).
61. E. Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, (transl. M. Morris), new edn.,
reprinted with corrections, Faber, London, (1952).
62. W. Hazlitt, The Complete Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P.P. Howe, after the edition
of A.R. Walker and A. Glover, 21 vols., J.M. Dent, London, (1932).
63. W. Hazlitt, A Reply to the Essay on Population by the Rev. T.R. Malthus..., Long-
man, Hurst, Rees and Orme, London, (1807).
64. R. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great
Economic Thinkers, 5th edn., Simon and Schuster, New York, (1980).
8.11. GOVERNMENTS OF LARGE NATIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 325
65. R.K. Kanth, Political Economy and Laissez-Faire: Economics and Ideology in the
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67. F. Knight, University Rebel: The Life of William Frend, 1757-1841, Gollancz, Lon-
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Revolution, Jordan, London, part I (1791), part II (1792).
75. H.G. Wells, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress on
Human Life and Thought, Chapman and Hall, London, (1902).
76. B. Wiley, The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies of the Idea of Nature in the
Thought of the Period, Chatto and Windus, London, (1940).
77. G.R. Morrow, The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith: A Study in the
Social Philosophy of the 18th Century, Cornell Studies in Philosophy, 13, 91-107,
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book edition, New York, (1948).
79. F. Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill, Routledge, (2003).
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83. K. Haakonssen, The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, Cambridge University
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84. K. Haakonssen, The Science of a Legeslator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David
Hume and Adam Smith, Cambridge University Press, (1981).
85. I. Hont and M. Ignatieff, Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in
the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, (1983).
86. I.S. Ross, The Life of Adam Smith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1976).
326 WHY WAR?
327
328 WHY WAR?
Figure 9.1: From left to right: Berit Reiss-Andersen, Chairman of the Norwegian No-
bel Committee, Setsuko Thurlow, an 85-year-old survivor of the 1945 atomic bombing of
Hiroshima, and ICAN Executive Director Beatrice Fihn.
their weapons.
But we represent the only rational choice. We represent those who refuse
to accept nuclear weapons as a fixture in our world, those who refuse to have
their fates bound up in a few lines of launch code.
Ours is the only reality that is possible. The alternative is unthinkable.
The story of nuclear weapons will have an ending, and it is up to us what
that ending will be.
Will it be the end of nuclear weapons, or will it be the end of us?
One of these things will happen.
The only rational course of action is to cease living under the conditions
where our mutual destruction is only one impulsive tantrum away.
Today I want to talk of three things: fear, freedom, and the future.
By the very admission of those who possess them, the real utility of nuclear
weapons is in their ability to provoke fear. When they refer to their ”deterrent”
effect, proponents of nuclear weapons are celebrating fear as a weapon of war.
They are puffing their chests by declaring their preparedness to exterminate,
in a flash, countless thousands of human lives.
Nobel Laureate William Faulkner said when accepting his prize in 1950,
that ”There is only the question of ’when will I be blown up?’” But since then,
this universal fear has given way to something even more dangerous: denial.
Gone is the fear of Armageddon in an instant, gone is the equilibrium be-
tween two blocs that was used as the justification for deterrence, gone are the
fallout shelters.
But one thing remains: the thousands upon thousands of nuclear warheads
that filled us up with that fear.
The risk for nuclear weapons use is even greater today than at the end of
the Cold War. But unlike the Cold War, today we face many more nuclear
armed states, terrorists, and cyber warfare. All of this makes us less safe.
Learning to live with these weapons in blind acceptance has been our next
great mistake.
Fear is rational. The threat is real. We have avoided nuclear war not
through prudent leadership but good fortune. Sooner or later, if we fail to act,
our luck will run out.
A moment of panic or carelessness, a misconstrued comment or bruised ego,
could easily lead us unavoidably to the destruction of entire cities. A calculated
military escalation could lead to the indiscriminate mass murder of civilians.
If only a small fraction of today’s nuclear weapons were used, soot and smoke
from the firestorms would loft high into the atmosphere - cooling, darkening
and drying the Earth’s surface for more than a decade.
It would obliterate food crops, putting billions at risk of starvation.
Yet we continue to live in denial of this existential threat.
But Faulkner in his Nobel speech also issued a challenge to those who came
after him. Only by being the voice of humanity, he said, can we defeat fear;
9.2. THE ICAN NOBEL LECTURE BY BEATRICE FIHN 331
There are thousands of tireless campaigners around the world who work
each day to rise to that challenge.
There are millions of people across the globe who have stood shoulder to
shoulder with those campaigners to show hundreds of millions more that a
different future is truly possible.
Those who say that future is not possible need to get out of the way of those
making it a reality.
As the culmination of this grassroots effort, through the action of ordinary
people, this year the hypothetical marched forward towards the actual as 122
nations negotiated and concluded a UN treaty to outlaw these weapons of mass
destruction.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons provides the pathway
forward at a moment of great global crisis. It is a light in a dark time.
And more than that, it provides a choice.
A choice between the two endings: the end of nuclear weapons or the end
of us.
It is not naive to believe in the first choice. It is not irrational to think
nuclear states can disarm. It is not idealistic to believe in life over fear and
destruction; it is a necessity.
All of us face that choice. And I call on every nation to join the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
The United States, choose freedom over fear. Russia, choose disarmament
over destruction. Britain, choose the rule of law over oppression. France,
choose human rights over terror. China, choose reason over irrationality. In-
dia, choose sense over senselessness. Pakistan, choose logic over Armageddon.
Israel, choose common sense over obliteration. North Korea, choose wisdom
over ruin.
To the nations who believe they are sheltered under the umbrella of nuclear
weapons, will you be complicit in your own destruction and the destruction of
others in your name?
To all nations: choose the end of nuclear weapons over the end of us!
This is the choice that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
represents. Join this Treaty.
We citizens are living under the umbrella of falsehoods. These weapons are
not keeping us safe, they are contaminating our land and water, poisoning our
bodies and holding hostage our right to life.
To all citizens of the world: Stand with us and demand your government
side with humanity and sign this treaty. We will not rest until all States have
joined, on the side of reason.
No nation today boasts of being a chemical weapon state. No nation argues
that it is acceptable, in extreme circumstances, to use sarin nerve agent. No
nation proclaims the right to unleash on its enemy the plague or polio.
9.3. THE NOBEL LECTURE CONTINUED BY SETSUKO THURLOW 333
That is because international norms have been set, perceptions have been
changed.
And now, at last, we have an unequivocal norm against nuclear weapons.
Monumental strides forward never begin with universal agreement.
With every new signatory and every passing year, this new reality will take
hold.
This is the way forward. There is only one way to prevent the use of nuclear
weapons: prohibit and eliminate them.
Nuclear weapons, like chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster muni-
tions and land mines before them, are now illegal. Their existence is immoral.
Their abolishment is in our hands.
The end is inevitable. But will that end be the end of nuclear weapons or
the end of us? We must choose one.
We are a movement for rationality. For democracy. For freedom from fear.
We are campaigners from 468 organisations who are working to safeguard
the future, and we are representative of the moral majority: the billions of
people who choose life over death, who together will see the end of nuclear
weapons.
Thank you.
Today, I want you to feel in this hall the presence of all those who perished
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I want you to feel, above and around us, a great
cloud of a quarter million souls. Each person had a name. Each person was
loved by someone. Let us ensure that their deaths were not in vain.
I was just 13 years old when the United States dropped the first atomic
bomb, on my city Hiroshima. I still vividly remember that morning. At 8:15,
I saw a blinding bluish-white flash from the window. I remember having the
sensation of floating in the air.
As I regained consciousness in the silence and darkness, I found myself
pinned by the collapsed building. I began to hear my classmates’ faint cries:
”Mother, help me. God, help me.”
Then, suddenly, I felt hands touching my left shoulder, and heard a man
saying: ”Don’t give up! Keep pushing! I am trying to free you. See the light
coming through that opening? Crawl towards it as quickly as you can.” As I
crawled out, the ruins were on fire. Most of my classmates in that building were
burned to death alive. I saw all around me utter, unimaginable devastation.
Processions of ghostly figures shuffled by. Grotesquely wounded people,
they were bleeding, burnt, blackened and swollen. Parts of their bodies were
missing. Flesh and skin hung from their bones. Some with their eyeballs
hanging in their hands. Some with their bellies burst open, their intestines
hanging out. The foul stench of burnt human flesh filled the air.
Thus, with one bomb my beloved city was obliterated. Most of its resi-
dents were civilians who were incinerated, vaporized, carbonized - among them,
members of my own family and 351 of my schoolmates.
In the weeks, months and years that followed, many thousands more would
die, often in random and mysterious ways, from the delayed effects of radiation.
Still to this day, radiation is killing survivors.
Whenever I remember Hiroshima, the first image that comes to mind is of
my four-year-old nephew, Eiji - his little body transformed into an unrecogniz-
able melted chunk of flesh. He kept begging for water in a faint voice until his
death released him from agony.
To me, he came to represent all the innocent children of the world, threat-
ened as they are at this very moment by nuclear weapons. Every second of
every day, nuclear weapons endanger everyone we love and everything we hold
dear. We must not tolerate this insanity any longer.
Through our agony and the sheer struggle to survive - and to rebuild our
lives from the ashes - we hibakusha became convinced that we must warn
the world about these apocalyptic weapons. Time and again, we shared our
testimonies.
But still some refused to see Hiroshima and Nagasaki as atrocities - as war
crimes. They accepted the propaganda that these were ”good bombs” that
had ended a ”just war”. It was this myth that led to the disastrous nuclear
arms race - a race that continues to this day.
9.4. TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 335
Nine nations still threaten to incinerate entire cities, to destroy life on earth,
to make our beautiful world uninhabitable for future generations. The develop-
ment of nuclear weapons signifies not a country’s elevation to greatness, but its
descent to the darkest depths of depravity. These weapons are not a necessary
evil; they are the ultimate evil.
On the seventh of July this year, I was overwhelmed with joy when a great
majority of the world’s nations voted to adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons. Having witnessed humanity at its worst, I witnessed,
that day, humanity at its best. We hibakusha had been waiting for the ban for
seventy-two years. Let this be the beginning of the end of nuclear weapons.
All responsible leaders will sign this treaty. And history will judge harshly
those who reject it. No longer shall their abstract theories mask the genocidal
reality of their practices. No longer shall ”deterrence” be viewed as anything
but a deterrent to disarmament. No longer shall we live under a mushroom
cloud of fear.
To the officials of nuclear-armed nations - and to their accomplices under
the so-called ”nuclear umbrella” - I say this: Listen to our testimony. Heed
our warning. And know that your actions are consequential. You are each an
integral part of a system of violence that is endangering humankind. Let us all
be alert to the banality of evil.
To every president and prime minister of every nation of the world, I beseech
you: Join this treaty; forever eradicate the threat of nuclear annihilation.
When I was a 13-year-old girl, trapped in the smouldering rubble, I kept
pushing. I kept moving toward the light. And I survived. Our light now is
the ban treaty. To all in this hall and all listening around the world, I repeat
those words that I heard called to me in the ruins of Hiroshima: ”Don’t give
up! Keep pushing! See the light? Crawl towards it.”
Tonight, as we march through the streets of Oslo with torches aflame, let
us follow each other out of the dark night of nuclear terror. No matter what
obstacles we face, we will keep moving and keep pushing and keep sharing this
light with others. This is our passion and commitment for our one precious
world to survive.
“For those nations that are party to it, the treaty prohibits the develop-
ment, testing, production, stockpiling, stationing, transfer, use and threat of
use of nuclear weapons, as well as assistance and encouragement to the pro-
hibited activities. For nuclear armed states joining the treaty, it provides for a
time-bound framework for negotiations leading to the verified and irreversible
elimination of its nuclear weapons programme.
“A mandate adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 23 De-
cember 2016 scheduled two sessions for negotiations: 27 to 31 March and from
15 June to 7 July, 2017.The treaty passed on schedule on 7 July with 122 in
favour, 1 against (Netherlands), and 1 official abstention (Singapore). 69 na-
tions did not vote, among them all of the nuclear weapon states and all NATO
members except the Netherlands.”
The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to ICAN very largely because of ICAN’s successful
campaign for adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Index
A billion deaths from famine, 220 All men created equal, 283
A new cold war with Russia, 264 All nations would suffer, 220
Abe, Shinzo, 222 All-destroying nuclear war, 234, 294
Abolish nuclear weapons, 208 All-destroying weapons, 277
Abolishing war, 284 Almost 2 trillion, 146
Abolition of nuclear weapons, 214, 298, 300 Alternative energy strategies, 285
Abolition of war, 214, 298, 300 Alternative media, 299
Absolute sovereignty, 76 Altruism, 65, 72, 109
Acceleration, 27 Ambassador April Glaspie, 156
Acceleration of cultural change, 67 America, 25
Accents, 69 American Civil War, 316, 317
Accident waiting to happen, 220, 234, 241 American Indians, 114
Accidental nuclear war, 208, 214, 232, 237, Amphictyonic League, 315
241, 298 Anachronism of nation-states, 76
Actions of the sexes, 146 Anarchy, 76
Adam Smith, 141 Ancestor worship, 69
Adequate standard of living, 288 Ancient Greece, 315
Administration of property, 119 Anglican Church, 107
Adolf Hitler, 33 Angola, 154
Advantage versus truth, 75 Animal groups, 73
Advertising campaigns, 147 Annan, Kofi, 232, 245
Advisory opinions by ICJ, 307 Annihilation of civilization, 30
Afghanistan, 158 Anthropoid apes, 67
Agent Orange, 189, 212 Anti-Catholic laws, 129
Aggression, 62, 63, 65, 72 Anti-Federalists, 280
Aging storage tanks, 233 Anti-war manifesto, 26
Agreed-upon lies, 75 Antimalarial program, 209
Agricultural revolution, 74 Anxiety about the future, 210
Agricultural societies, 117 Appalling war machine, 147
Agriculture, 112, 215, 244 Arab nationalism and Islam, 71
Akkadian language, 277 Arab-Arab conflicts, 156
Alaska, 67 Arbitrary arrest prohibited, 287
Albert Einstein, 13 Archbishop of Canterbury, 279
Albury, 107 Arctic sea ice, 148
Algeria, 154 Argentina, 67
337
338 INDEX
Nagasaki, 63, 205, 219, 222, 227, 232, 261, Newton’s solar system, 107
308 Newtonian mechanics, 25, 27
Nanjing Massacre, 204 Niels Bohr, 14
Napoleon, 83, 200 Nixon, 193
Napoleon Bonaparte, 77, 81 Njal’s Saga, 277
Narcotics, 313 Nkrumah, Kwami, 160
Nation-state, 76, 79 No first use, 305
Nation-state an anachronism, 311 No one can win a tsunami, 220
Nation-states, 75, 76 Nobel Lecture by Beatrice Finn, 329
National cult, 82 Nobel Lecture by Setsuko Thurlow, 333
National identity, 77, 80, 83 Nobel Peace Prize, 293, 328
National origin, 287 Noble dead, 81
National pride, 245 Nomadic societies, 115
National Security Agency, 151 Non-Euclidean geometry, 28
National sovereignty, 312 Non-Proliferation, 290
National symbolism, 82 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 290
Nationalism, 63, 75, 76, 79, 81, 83 Normative value, 284, 288
Nationalism and religion, 71 North Africa, 147
Nationalism in England, 83 North Korea, 245, 290, 292, 302, 309
NATO, 303, 304 Norway, 115, 117
NATO illegal, 304 Norwegian Foreign Minister, 301
NATO violates no first use, 305 Not what we intended, 220
NATO’s NPT violations, 305 Novgorod, 315
NATO’s nuclear weapons, 305 NPT, 290
NATO’s Strategic Concept, 305 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 309
Natural laws, 107 Nuclear arms race, 207, 308
Natural selection, 65, 72, 132 Nuclear Ban Treaty, 295
Nazi Party, 71, 82 Nuclear black market, 243
Necessity, 121 Nuclear catastrophe, 214
Negation of humanitarian law, 307 Nuclear criminals, 231
Nelson, 83 Nuclear darkness, 244
Neocolonialism, 150, 160 Nuclear deterrence, flaws, 243
Nerve gas, 155 Nuclear disarmament, 246, 307
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 220, 235, 237 Nuclear environmental catastrophe, 215
Netherlands, 293 Nuclear genocide, 299
Neutral countries, 220, 239 Nuclear Mafia?, 232
New Agenda Resolution, 240 Nuclear nationalism, 231
New ethical principles, 277 Nuclear power generation, 291
New global ethic, 303 Nuclear power plant accidents, 214
New leaders, 208 Nuclear proliferation, 208
New York Times, 185 Nuclear sharing, 290, 305
Newspapers, 76 Nuclear terrorism, 231, 243, 245
Newton’s equations of motion, 27 Nuclear tests, 212
INDEX 351
Pforzheim destroyed, 205 Poverty, 105, 109, 112, 114, 115, 120
Philanthropy, 107 Poverty and war, 212
Philippines, 73 Poverty-generating war, 211, 213
Photoelectric effect, 14 Power, 83
Pictographic writing, 74 Power over citizens, 282
Pitt, William, 121 Power struggles, 208
Planck’s quantum hypothesis, 25, 26 Power to impose taxes, 319
Planck, Max, 26 Power-drunk thinking, 262
Planned attack on Iran, 220 Powerful nations and oil, 153
Planned lifetimes exceeded, 233 Powers not expressly delegated, 315
Planning war of aggression, 304 Pre-industrial Europe, 142
Plantations, 160 Precious bodily fluids, 234
Plato, 74 Preemptive wars, 284
Plutonium, 223, 243 Prehistoric trading, 73
Poetry, 69 Prejudices, 118
Poison gas, 26, 71, 155, 156, 218, 312 President Truman, 207
Pol Pot, 193 Prestige of the UN, 285
Police action, 318 Preventable diseases, 209
Politeness, 277, 299 Preventive checks, 114, 115
Political action, 79 Price of grain, 120
Political chaos, 213 Priest, eunuch and tyrant, 121
Political cohesion, 76 Priestly, Joseph, 106
Political conflicts, 319 Priests, 82
Political institutions, 76 Primary health care, 213
Political Justice, 107, 113 Primitive state, 200
Political opinion, 287 Primitive tribes, 75
Political unity of France, 77 Principle of Equivalence, 27
Politicians tell him to kill, 200 Principle of Population, 114
Politics, 107 Principle of population, 118
Pollution, 285, 300 Principle of subsidiarity, 282, 312, 318
Poor families, 142 Printing, 76
Poor Laws, 120, 121 Privacy, 287
Poorest and least guilty, 312 Private banks, 153
Pope Francis I, 153 Private consulting companies, 151
Population, 105, 107, 112 Private judgement, 119
Population genetics, 65 Private life, 79
Population growth, 105, 112, 113, 118, 119 Privileged position, 213
Population pressure, 114, 117 Pro-American states, 155
Population stabilization, 285 Productivity, 141
Positive checks, 114 Progress, 109, 112
Post-Kantians, 79 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 295, 302
Postures, 73 Prohibitively dangerous reactors, 228
Potentially serious conflicts, 284 Project for a New American Century, 262
INDEX 353