Journal of Personality Assessment

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The Development and Validation of the Rational

and Intuitive Decision Styles Scale

Katherine Hamilton, Shin-I Shih & Susan Mohammed

To cite this article: Katherine Hamilton, Shin-I Shih & Susan Mohammed (2016): The
Development and Validation of the Rational and Intuitive Decision Styles Scale, Journal of
Personality Assessment, DOI: 10.1080/00223891.2015.1132426

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Published online: 11 Mar 2016.

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 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2015.1132426

The Development and Validation of the Rational and Intuitive Decision Styles Scale
Katherine Hamilton,1 Shin-I Shih,2 and Susan Mohammed2
1
College of Information Sciences and Technology, Pennsylvania State University; 2Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Decision styles reflect the typical manner by which individuals make decisions. The purpose of this Received 12 November 2014
research was to develop and validate a decision style scale that addresses conceptual and psychometric Revised 28 October 2015
problems with current measures. The resulting 10-item scale captures a broad range of the rational and
intuitive styles construct domain. Results from 5 independent samples provide initial support for the
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dimensionality and reliability of the new scale, as demonstrated by a clear factor structure and high
internal consistency. In addition, our results show evidence of convergent and discriminant validity
through expected patterns of correlations across decision-making individual differences and the
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) Big Five traits. Research domains that would benefit from
incorporating the concept of decision styles are discussed.

Anecdotally, it is well understood that people vary in the way for avoidant), decision quality (Wood & Highhouse, 2014; R2
that they make decisions. Some individuals engage in lengthy D .32 for self-ratings; R2 D .10, for peer ratings), depressive
deliberation, whereas others depend on a quick “gut” feel. symptomatology (Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010; e.g., r D .27 for
Some individuals approach decision making cognitively and dependent, r D .62 for avoidant, r D –.41 for intuitive), and
systematically, whereas others adopt more of an affective and cortisol and stress levels (Thunholm, 2008; r D .62 for avoidant
unsystematic approach. Conceptually, researchers agree that style).
decision making depends on characteristics of the decision Based on a growing body of research, decision styles show
maker, as well as task and environmental factors (Einhorn, promise as a meaningful and significant construct that warrants
1970; Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry, 1989), but the for- further attention (e.g., Thunholm, 2008; Wood & Highhouse,
mer has received the least emphasis in the literature (Appelt, 2014). However, for this potential to be fully realized, system-
Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber, 2011; Highhouse, 2001; atic attention must be devoted to measurement, an area where
Mohammed & Schwall, 2009; Verplanken, 1993). Addressing the literature has been criticized for falling short (e.g.,
this discrepancy, we examine an individual difference of special Mohammed & Schwall, 2009; Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005).
relevance to decision making, namely decision style, referring Although several typologies of decision styles have been offered
to the typical manner by which individuals make decisions (e.g., Driver et al., 1990; Harren, 1979; Rowe & Boulgarides,
(Driver, Brousseau, & Hunsaker, 1990; Harren, 1979). 1992; Scott & Bruce, 1995), researchers vary substantially with
In the end, individuals are the ones who make decisions; regard to terminology, the number and type of decision styles
therefore, “decision styles form the backbone of effective deci- proposed, and measurement. Existing measures have several
sion making” (Rowe & Boulgarides, 1992, p. 23). Decision shortcomings, including a lack of construct validity evidence
styles are independent of cognitive abilities (Thunholm, 2004) (e.g., Driver et al., 1990; Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010; Shiloh,
and have shown incremental prediction in self-ratings of deci- Koren, & Zakay, 2001) and psychometric weaknesses (e.g.,
sion quality above and beyond Big Five personality traits Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008; Scott & Bruce,
(DR2 D .11; Wood & Highhouse, 2014). Their importance is 1995; Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005). Furthermore, the decision
further demonstrated in their influence on a variety of career- style construct has not been fully situated within a nomological
related and health outcomes. To illustrate, decision styles have network of relevant constructs, so not enough is known about
been associated with person–job fit (Singh & Greenhaus, 2004; how they relate to other individual differences.
DR2 D .06 for career decision-making styles), job satisfaction Responding to calls for a more systematic and theory-
(Crossley & Highhouse, 2005; DR2 D .06 for rational and intui- driven approach to research on decision styles, we critically
tive choice), job search process satisfaction (Crossley & High- evaluate existing measures and introduce a new scale that
house, 2005; DR2 D .03 when adding rational and intuitive improves on previous measures. We offer evidence regard-
choice), sales manager performance (Russ, McNeilly, & Comer, ing the dimensionality, stability, and validity (convergent
1996; overall performance rating: r D .226 for rational, r D and discriminant) of a new decision style scale over three
–.315 for avoidant; behavioral performance rating: r D –.197 studies with five samples.

CONTACT Katherine Hamilton [email protected] College of Information Sciences and Technology, Pennsylvania State University, 102A IST Building, Uni-
versity Park, PA 16802.

© 2016 Taylor & Francis

 2 HAMILTON, SHIH, MOHAMMED

The conceptualization of decision-making styles et al., 1990). As depicted in Table 1, several typologies of deci-
sion styles have been proposed, differing in number as well as
Cognitive styles are trait-based individual differences that rep-
type. Indeed, the one consistency seems to be inconsistency,
resent how someone perceives and processes information
with the number of dimensions of decision styles ranging from
across a broad range of contexts (Kozhevnikov, 2007). This
one to seven across articles. Comparisons between studies are
construct has its roots in psychology and has been applied in a
difficult because different terminology is used, but it is not
variety of contexts, including how to improve learning, creativ-
immediately clear whether the actual constructs are distinct or
ity, accuracy of perceptions, memory processes, and motivation
similar (e.g., Is decisional procrastination [Mann, 1982] the
(Rayner, 2000). Examples of cognitive styles include rational
same as an avoidant decision style [Scott & Bruce, 1995]?). On
ability and rational engagement, which reflect an individual’s
close inspection of the articles, however, it appears that there is
ability and preference to think in logical ways (Pacini &
considerable overlap in that intuitive/experiential/conceptual,
Epstein, 1999). Cognitive styles have also been discussed in
logical/rational/analytical/vigilance/compensatory, and avoi-
terms of experiential ability and experiential engagement,
dant/hesitant/decisional procrastination/indecisiveness/regret-
which represent the ability and preference to rely on impres-
avoidant are defined similarly. Consistent with previous
sions and feelings (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). These cognitive
research, we define the rational style as being characterized by a
styles bear some conceptual similarities to rational and intuitive
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thorough search for information and a systematic evaluation of

decision styles. However, the constructs are different in scope.
all choices and potential alternatives, whereas an intuitive style
Whereas decision styles more narrowly focus on capturing
is characterized by the use of a quick decision-making process
decision-making processes, cognitive styles more broadly cap-
that is primarily based on hunches and feelings (Phillips,
ture general information processing and problem solving.
Pazienza, & Ferrin, 1984; Scott & Bruce, 1995). Individuals
Some authors treat cognitive and decision styles inter-
with an avoidant style attempt to escape decision making at all
changeably (e.g., Andersen, 2000), and others consider cogni-
costs (e.g., Mann, 1982). In our measure of decision styles, we
tive styles a subset of decision styles (e.g., Thunholm, 2004).
focus on the rational and intuitive styles as described in greater
The more recent perspective is to view decision styles as a sub-
detail in the next section.
set of cognitive styles (e.g., Dalal & Brooks, 2013; Kozhevnikov,
2007). We adopt the latter perspective, narrowly defining deci-
sion styles as “the individual’s characteristic mode of perceiving
The measurement of decision styles
and responding to decision making tasks” (Harren, 1979, p.
125), and more broadly defining cognitive styles as general pro- Table 1 highlights a variety of measurement options available
pensities toward organizing and processing information (Koz- for assessing decision styles. However, the list quickly dwindles
hevnikov, 2007). Nevertheless, we reference work labeled as when applying the criteria of a readily accessible, widely gener-
cognitive or thinking styles, but measure dimensions similar to alizable, easy-to-use, self-report measure of decision style with
those in the decision style literature (e.g., Armstrong & Priola, strong psychometric and construct validity evidence. For exam-
2001; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Witteman, van den Bercken, ple, several scales are not publicly available, either because they
Claes, & Godoy, 2009). are copyrighted (e.g., AIM Survey, Agor, 1989; Decision Style
The conceptual framework of decision-making styles is also Inventory III, Rowe & Boulgarides, 1992; Cognitive Style Index,
not well established. Whereas some authors view decision styles Allison & Hayes, 1996) or unpublished (e.g., Harren, 1978;
as a learned habit to make decisions in a certain way (Driver et Mann, 1982; Nygren, 2000). Lowering research feasibility,
al., 1990; Scott & Bruce, 1995), others view them as value- and Arroba’s (1978) qualitative measure requires coding, and the
personality-based (e.g., Rowe & Boulgarides, 1992). According Driver Decision Style Exercise needs to be sent to the authors
to Driver and colleagues (1990), differences in decision styles for scoring (Driver et al., 1990). Some of the unique dimensions
are based on contextual variables such as the amount of infor- of Leykin and DeRubeis’s (2010) scale (e.g., brooding, anxiety)
mation considered and the number of alternatives identified are designed to assess depressive symptoms, limiting
when reaching decisions. In contrast, Rowe and Boulgarides generalizability.
(1992) based decision styles on trait-based variables such as Calling into question the alignment between measurement
cognitive complexity and value orientation. We adopt the view and conceptualization, some measures in Table 1, such as the
that decision styles is a “habit-based propensity” to respond in Myers–Briggs Personality Inventory (e.g., Andersen, 2000;
a particular manner to decision making (Scott & Bruce, 1995, Henderson & Nutt, 1980; Hunt et al., 1989) and need for cogni-
p. 820). We view decision styles as likelihoods of behavior (Ley- tion (e.g., Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002; Witteman et al.,
kin & DeRubeis, 2010) that allow for some change or develop- 2009) are not specifically designed to assess decision styles.
ment in response to factors such as environmental load and Despite its popularity, the Myers–Briggs measure has been crit-
pressure (Driver, Svensson, Amato, & Pate, 1996), decision icized on numerous conceptual and methodological grounds,
time, and task familiarity (Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005). Deci- raising questions concerning its suitability for measuring deci-
sion styles are therefore viewed as having both trait-based and sion styles (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007). Furthermore, the face
contextual antecedents. validity of some scales is suspect when items do not specifically
Although independent, decision-making styles are not reference decision making (e.g., faith in intuition: “I have a
viewed as reciprocally exclusive (Scott & Bruce, 1995; Spicer & good sense of rhythm,” “I trust my initial feelings about peo-
Sadler-Smith, 2005). However, individuals are considered to ple”; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). In addition to
have a dominant style even if they use multiple styles (Driver content validity concerns, construct validity evidence is
 DECISION STYLES SCALE 3

Table 1. Dimensions and measures of decision style.

Author(s) Dimensions of decision style Measure of decision style

Agor (1989) Intuitive ability AIM Survey, measures potential intuitive ability and
whether individuals use intuitive ability to make
decisions
Andersen (2000) Extrovert–introvert Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI),
Sensing–intuition Keegan Type Indicator (KTI), measures extraversion,
Thinking–feeling sensation, intuition, thinking, and feeling
Armstrong & Priola (2001) Analytic-intuitive dimension Cognitive Style Index (Allison & Hayes, 1996)
Arroba (1978); Hesketh (1982) No thought Qualitative (interviews coded) or six self-report items
Compliant assess the six decision-making styles
Logical
Emotional
Intuitive
Hesitant
Baiocco, Laghi, & D’Alessio (2009); Galotti et al. (2006); Rational General Decision Making Style (GDMS) instrument (Scott
Gambetti, Fabbri, Bensi, & Tonetti (2008); Loo (2000); Russ, Intuitive & Bruce, 1995)
McNeilly, & Comer (1996); Sager & Gastil (1999); Scott & Dependent
Bruce (1995); Spicer & Sadler-Smith (2005); Thunholm Avoidant
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(2004, 2008, 2009) Spontaneous

Dewberry, Juanchich, & Narendran (2013); Leykin & DeRubeis Spontaneous Decision Styles Questionnaire: Items assessing decision-
(2010) Dependent making styles related to depressive symptomatology
Vigilant
Avoidant
Brooding
Intuitive
Anxious
Driver, Brousseau, & Hunsaker (1990) Decisive Driver Decision Style Exercise
Flexible (short case and questions about the case that must be
Hierarchic sent to authors for scoring)
Integrative
Systemic
Effert & Ferrari (1989); Ferrari & Dovidio (2000, 2001); Frost & Decisional Decisional Procrastination Scale (Mann, 1982)
Shows (1993) Procrastination Indecisiveness scale
Indecisiveness
Harren (1979); Phillips, Pazienza, & Ferrin (1984); Phillips & Rational Assessment of Career Decision Making (ACDM): Agree–
Strohmer (1982); Singh & Greenhaus (2004) Intuitive disagree items asking how individuals make
Dependent important decisions such as choosing a job or college
major (Harren, 1978)
Henderson & Nutt (1980) Sensation-Intuition (ST) MBTI
Sensation-Feeling (SF)
Intuition-Thinking (NT)
Intuition-Feeling (NF)
Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry (1989) Intuitives (intuition and feeling) MBTI
Analytics (sensing and thinking)
Mixed (sensing and feeling or
intuition and feeling)
Mann (1998) Defensive avoidance Decision Making Questionnaires I and II (Mann, 1982)
Hypervigilance
Vigilance

Nygren (2000) Analytical Decision Making Style Inventory

Intuitive
Regret-avoidant
Rowe & Boulgarides (1992); Rowe & Mason (1987) Directive Decision Style Inventory III (1985): Measures an
Analytical individual’s relative scores compared with the
Conceptual population as a whole (not absolute values)
Behavioral
Shiloh, Koren, & Zaykay (2001) Compensatory Compensatory Style Questionnaire (statements
Noncompensatory representing beliefs favoring compensatory and
noncompensatory processes)
Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi (2002); Shiloh & Shenhave-Sheffer Intuitive/experiential Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini,
(2004); Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, & Godoy (2009) Analytical/rational Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996)
Faith in intuition
Need for cognition
Revised REI (Pacini & Epstein, 1999)
Rational ability and engagement
Experiential ability and engagement
Sj€oberg (2003) Intuitive Decision situations rated on whether they should be
Analytical made in an intuitive or analytic mode
 4 HAMILTON, SHIH, MOHAMMED

conspicuously absent for most decision style measures (e.g., 2011). These components include a rational/reasoning and
Driver et al., 1990; Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010; Rowe & Boulgar- intuitive/experiential component (Epstein et al., 1996; Hodg-
ides, 1992; Sj€oberg, 2003). Especially rare are confirmatory fac- kinson, Sadler-Smith, Sinclair, & Ashkanasy, 2009). The ratio-
tor analyses and convergent, discriminant, and predictive nal mode is intentional, analytic, relatively slow, rule-governed,
validity. When the factor structure has been tested, results have and logically defensible, whereas the intuitive mode tends to be
cast doubt on the construct validity of measures such as the automatic, preconscious, relatively fast, affect-laden, heuristic,
Cognitive Style Index and Rational-Experiential Inventory and experience-based (e.g., Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, &
(Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2003). Pearson, 1997; Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2003; Kahneman,
Closest to meeting the accessibility, generalizability, feasibil- 2011). These two fundamental types of information processing
ity, and validity criteria listed earlier, Scott and Bruce’s (1995) provide a strong theoretical foundation for proposing parallel
General Decision Making Style (GDMS) instrument is the decision styles capturing individual differences in the way that
most popular decision styles measure (e.g., Loo, 1999; Russ et people respond to decision-making situations.
al., 1996; Thunholm, 2004). In a study comprised of four sam- Second, content validity is especially deficient for extant
ples (military officers, MBA students, undergraduates, and rational and intuitive scales, as most do not fully capture the
engineers or technicians), Scott and Bruce (1995) concluded richness of conceptualizations of rationality and intuition. For
that there were five decision-making styles (rational, intuitive,
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example, even though thorough information gathering is a key

dependent, avoidant, spontaneous). However, raising questions aspect of their definition of rational decision processing, it is
about dimensionality, multiple studies have reported goodness- not reflected in Scott and Bruce’s (1995) GDMS items. Like-
of-fit indexes for confirmatory factor analyses that fall well wise, relying on first impressions and making quick decisions is
below recommended criteria. Although the start of acceptable part of their theoretical underpinnings of intuition, but is
fit for the comparative fit index (CFI) is .95 and root mean excluded from intuitive style GDMS items (Scott & Bruce,
square errors of approximation (RMSEAs) of .06 or below indi- 1995). Third, across the various typologies depicted in Table 1,
cate close fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), several authors reported rational and intuitive are the most commonly represented deci-
CFIs ranging from .78 to .91 and RMSEAs ranging from .07 to sion styles. Even when studies measure a variety of decision
.18 (Curseu & Schruijer, 2012; Loo, 2000; Spicer & Sadler- styles as with the GDMS, means tend to be highest for rational
Smith, 2005; Thunholm, 2004). The intuitive style was espe- and intuitive dimensions (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff,
cially problematic for model fit (Curseu & Schruijer, 2012; Loo, 2007; Curseu & Schruijer, 2012; Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005).
2000). Fourth, an analysis of existing measures revealed that the ratio-
Moreover, studies using the GDMS have found different nal and intuitive scales were especially problematic in terms of
patterns of intercorrelations between dimensions. For example, unsatisfactory internal consistency reliabilities, model fit, and
whereas some empirical work reported that a higher rational limited validation evidence (e.g., Curseu & Schruijer, 2012;
style was associated with a lower avoidant style (Scott & Bruce, Scott & Bruce, 1995). In contrast, the avoidant/decisional pro-
1995, r D –.17 to –.44; Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005, r D –.23 crastination scales evidenced strong psychometric properties
and r D –.24), others failed to find a significant negative corre- (e.g., Mann, 1982).
lation between rational and avoidant styles (Gambetti, Fabbri, Over a series of three studies, we used five samples to intro-
Bensi, & Tonetti, 2008, r D –.09; Thunholm, 2004, r D –.01). duce and assess the construct validity of the DSS representing
Furthermore, although Scott and Bruce (1995) reported alphas rational and intuitive dimensions. Study 1 presents the item
of .77 to .85 for GDMS subscales, several subsequent studies generation and reduction process that resulted in a 10-item
found lower internal consistency, resulting in some authors scale and examines test–retest reliability. Study 2 verifies the
adding additional items to improve internal reliabilities (e.g., factor structure via confirmatory factor analysis across multiple
Galotti et al., 2006). The alphas for the rational dimension have samples and Study 3 establishes a nomological network
been particularly problematic (.66 in Pranckun, 2007; .67 in through examining convergent and discriminant validity.
Russ et al., 1996; .67 in Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005; .65 in
Thunholm, 2004; .60 in Thunholm, 2009; .68 in Baiocco, Laghi,
& D’Alessio, 2009). Indeed, one rational item was omitted from Study 1: Item generation, reduction, and test–retest
the Scott and Bruce (1995) published article (Galotti et al., reliability
2006), but alphas remain low for the complete five-item sub-
Method
scale (e.g., Baiocco et al., 2009; Russ et al., 1996; Spicer &
Sadler-Smith, 2005; Thunholm, 2004, 2009). As a result of these Item generation and reduction
weaknesses, “there is a need for further refinement of the Before generating an initial pool of 33 items, the key defini-
GDMS and especially the rational scale” (Thunholm, 2009, p. tional components of rational and intuitive decision styles were
323). In response to the multiple calls for additional scale devel- identified and agreed on within our research group by thor-
opment (Mohammed & Schwall, 2009; Spicer & Sadler-Smith, oughly reviewing the decision-making literature. Conceptually,
2005), we develop and validate the Decision Styles Scale (DSS). a rational decision style involves information gathering, alter-
Our choice to limit our focus to rational and intuitive styles native generation, and thorough evaluation (e.g., Dean & Sharf-
was based on theoretical and empirical reasons. First, the man, 1993; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). An intuitive style involves
broader individual difference of cognitive style has long been relying on feelings and making decisions quickly (e.g., Dane &
conceptualized to encompass two systems of information proc- Pratt, 2007; Harren, 1979; Russ et al., 1996). To establish evi-
essing referred to as the dual-process framework (Kahneman, dence of content validity, we generated scale items representing
 DECISION STYLES SCALE 5

Table 2. Summary of sample characteristics and analyses.

Sample Source N Gender Ethnicity Average age Analyses

1 Undergraduate students 83 62.7% female 87.8% White 20.51  Initial pool of 25 items
(48.2% juniors and seniors)  Item reduction to 17 items using EFA
2 Undergraduate students 148 69.6% female 86.5% White 23.48  Initial pool of 17 items
(98.0% juniors and seniors)  Item reduction to 10 items using EFA
3 Undergraduate students 88 69.4% female 82.4% White 23.05  EFA
(97.7% juniors and seniors)  Test–retest reliability (Time 1 and 2 separated by 2–3 weeks)
4 Undergraduate students 535 61.2% female 91.2% White 19.18  CFA
(12.4% juniors and seniors)  Discriminant/convergent validity
5 Undergraduate students 306 70.5% female 89.7% White 19.42  CFA
(32.2% juniors and seniors)  Discriminant/convergent validity

Note. Data were collected from a large Northeastern research university in the United States. Participants were recruited by the researchers through the use of institutional
review board (IRB)-approved recruitment scripts that were delivered in person or through e-mail. Participation in the study was voluntary. Each participant was given
extra credit for his or her participation. All surveys were delivered online. Participants engaged in implied consent through their completion of the online survey. IRB
approval was obtained for data collection across all five samples. EFA D exploratory factor analysis; CFA D confirmatory factor analysis.
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each dimension, ensuring that the items contained in the scales principal axis factoring) with oblique rotation (Promax), allow-
comprehensively captured the essence of the construct. This ing for interrelatedness among factors (Fabrigar, Wegener,
process was repeated after each item reduction and carried out MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). The scree plot and eigenvalues
by a group of more than three researchers. Group consensus suggested a two-factor solution, accounting for 37.26% of the
was achieved regarding the key components represented by total item variance. Items with factor loadings over .40 on the
each item. Whereas extant decision style scales have measured appropriate factor with no major cross-loadings were judged as
only a subset of the construct dimensions represented in the representative of the construct (Hinkin, 1998). Seventeen items
DSS (e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Scott & Bruce, 1995), we remained after culling items with weak loadings, strong cross-
worked to capture the broad range of the construct domain for loadings, and similar content (to avoid oversampling from a
rational and intuitive styles. After several iterations of compar- specific portion of the construct domain). Again, content valid-
ing, revising, and combining items, we selected 25 for empirical ity was established through group consensus by ensuring that
testing (13 rational and 12 intuitive). retained item content sampled the breadth of each dimension’s
Item reduction occurred in two steps involving two samples definition. As a result, one intuitive item with a .389 factor
(see Table 2 for sample descriptions). First, the initial pool of loading was retained for further investigation (see Table 3).
25 items was administered in paper-and-pencil format to 83 The 17-item scale was then administered in a second inde-
undergraduate students. The response format was a 5-point pendent sample (i.e., Sample 2; see Table 2 for sample descrip-
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly tion). Similar to the analyses conducted for Sample 1, EFAs
agree). We conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA, again unambiguously identified two factors in Sample 2,

Table 3. Factor loadings and reliabilities across all samples.

Decision style item Sample 1 (EFA) Sample 2 (EFA) Sample 3a (EFA) Sample 3b (EFA) Sample 4 (CFA) Sample 5 (CFA)

Rational decision style (a) (.83) (.87) (.89) (.84) (.82) (.78)
I prefer to gather all the necessary information .66 .78 .81 .73 .65 .62
before committing to a decision.
I thoroughly evaluate decision alternatives .69 .78 .80 .72 .76 .60
before making a final choice.
In decision making, I take time to contemplate the .71 .75 .68 .78 .71 .66
pros/cons or risks/benefits of a situation.
Investigating the facts is an important part of my .74 .74 .84 .71 .60 .65
decision-making process.
I weigh a number of different factors when making decisions. .68 .79 .82 .61 .71 .70
Intuitive decision style (a) (.72) (.83) (.83) (.89) (.75) (.73)
When making decisions, I rely mainly on my gut feelings. .58 .81 .73 .90 .63 .64
My initial hunch about decisions is generally what I follow. .66 .82 .78 .81 .66 .63
I make decisions based on intuition. .69 .68 .72 .66 .68 .55
I rely on my first impressions when making decisions. .39 .59 .70 .84 .56 .57
I weigh feelings more than analysis in making decisions. .50 .52 .56 .69 .54 .56
Interfactor correlations (–.16) (–.42 ) (–.47 ) (–.43 ) (–.25) (–.24)
x2(34) 60.95 75.81
RMSEA .04 .06
SRMR .03 .05
NNFI .97 .91
CFI .98 .93

Note: EFA D exploratory factor analysis; CFA D confirmatory factor analysis; RMSEA D root mean square error of approximation; SRMR D standardized root mean square
residual; NNFI D Non-Normed Fit Index; CFI D comparative fit index.

p < .01.
 6 HAMILTON, SHIH, MOHAMMED

accounting for 47.62% of the total item variance. Further item time lag (M D 2.49 weeks) in between assessments. The use of
reductions were made based on lack of simple structure (high a less than 2-month time lag helps to capture the dependability
cross-loadings) in pattern matrices and item redundancy. of the measure over time as opposed to stability (Watson,
Again, the final items were discussed in our research group and 2004). Test–retest reliability was high for both the rational (r D
group consensus was reached with regard to the coverage of all .79, p < .01) and intuitive (r D .79, p < .01) dimensions
definition components. After this culling process, 10 items
remained (5 each for rational and intuitive styles; see Table 3).
Study 2: Confirmatory factor analysis
Across samples, items were normally distributed and generally
not subject to range restriction and the strength of the relation- The purpose of Study 2 was to verify the two-factor structure of
ship between the decision styles ranged from small (r D –.16) the 10-item scale developed in Study 1 with confirmatory factor
to moderate (r D –.47). analyses (CFAs). These analyses were conducted using Samples
The factor structure of the 10-item scale was also evaluated 4 and 5 (see Table 2 for sample descriptions).
using parallel analysis (PA). This process involved four key
steps (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004). First, a random data
Method
set with the same number of observations as Sample 2 (N D
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148) was generated for all 10 items. Second, a principal compo- CFAs performed with LISREL 8.80 (J€oreskog & S€orbom, 2007)
nents analysis (PCA) was conducted on the random data. Both and internal consistency reliability analyses were examined in
Steps 1 and 2 were repeated 50 times, during which the eigen- two independent samples (4 and 5 in Table 3). Multiple indexes
values for all 10 items from each PCA were recorded. Third, were used to examine goodness of fit (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988),
both the average and the 95th percentile eigenvalues from all including the x2 and relative chi-square statistics, the Non-
50 runs were calculated. Fourth, the eigenvalues from the actual Normed Fit Index (NNFI; Bentler & Bonett, 1980), the CFI
data collected in Sample 2 were compared to both the average (Bentler, 1990), the standardized root mean square residual
and the 95th percentile eigenvalues from the random data. Fac- (SRMR; Hu & Bentler, 1999), and the RMSEA (Browne &
tors were retained if the eigenvalues from the actual data were Cudeck, 1993). Values of .95 or higher for the NNFI and CFI
higher than those generated in the random data. and .06 or lower for the RMSEA and SRMR are recommended
As shown in Figure 1, the PA suggested that there were two criteria for close model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
factors in the data. The first and second eigenvalues in the
actual data (4.47 and 1.83) were larger than both the first and
Results
second mean eigenvalues in the random data (1.44 and 1.29)
and the first and second 95th percentile eigenvalues in the ran- As shown in Table 3, fit indexes were generally at or above rec-
dom data (1.56 and 1.37). Conversely, the third eigenvalue in ommended standards across both samples. Exceptions to this
the actual data (0.73) was smaller than both the third mean were the NNFI and CFI in Sample 5, which were below the rec-
eigenvalue (1.18) and the 95th percentile eigenvalue (1.24) in ommended cutoff of .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999) but above a .90
the randomly generated data. cutoff (Bentler & Bonett, 1980). Our model evaluation was
based on a set of various indexes as opposed to any one index
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1992). Given the trends across these
Test–retest reliability
indexes, the DSS best conforms to a two-factor structure. The
Although decision styles are commonly conceptualized as pat-
rational and intuitive dimensions of decision styles therefore
terns of habitual response to decision-making situations (e.g.,
seem to be both theoretically and empirically distinguishable.
Driver et al., 1990; Scott & Bruce, 1995), little empirical evi-
dence exists regarding their stability. Therefore, it was impor-
tant to assess the test–retest reliability of the newly developed Study 3: Convergent and discriminant validity
scale. Using a limited sample of 88 students (Sample 3 in
Data on discriminant and convergent validity for Study 3 were
Table 2), the DSS was administered with either a 2- or 3-week
obtained from Samples 4 and 5 (see Table 2 for sample descrip-
tions). As construct validation requires tests of both convergent
and discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959), we identi-
fied constructs theorized to be positively, negatively, or unre-
lated to rational and intuitive decision styles. To position
decision styles in the broader domain of decision making and
psychological research, we examined the relationship between
decision styles and decision making individual differences and
the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) Big Five person-
ality traits.
Based on previous research (e.g., Cursau & Schruijer, 2012;
Loo, 2000; Thunholm, 2004), we did not expect decision style
to be significantly related to personal characteristics such as
age, gender, or index of cognitive ability (grade-point average
Figure 1. Parallel analysis (PA) results from Study 1. Note: EV D eigenvalues; Mean
PA D average eigenvalues from randomly generated data; 95% PA D 95th percen- [GPA]). Although women are anecdotally assumed to have
tile of eigenvalues from randomly generated data. greater intuition, decision style research has not found support
 DECISION STYLES SCALE 7

for this claim (e.g., Baiocco et al., 2009, h2 D .01; Curseu & and choose a lower threshold of acceptability (Schwartz et al.,
Schruijer, 2012, r D –.03; Sadler-Smith, 2011, r D .11). 2002, p. 1193). Although a rational style is characterized by a
thorough search for information and systematic evaluation of
potential alternatives, maximizers continue to search to the
Decision-making individual differences
point of paralysis (Purvis, Howell, & Iyer, 2011). Because maxi-
An important aspect of the validation was to demonstrate mizing has been identified as maladaptive across studies (e.g.,
that decision styles are convergent, but nonredundant, with Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischh-
other decision-making individual differences. In terms of off, 2007; Purvis et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2002), whereas
convergent validity, we expected that a DSS rational style rational and intuitive styles are viewed more neutrally, it was
would be positively correlated with rational ability (capacity predicted that these individual differences would not be signifi-
to think analytically) and rational engagement (reliance on cantly related.
and enjoyment of thinking logically; Pacini & Epstein,
1999). Similarly, we predicted that an intuitive style on the
IPIP Big Five personality traits
DSS would be positively correlated with experiential ability
(capacity to rely on impressions and feelings) and experien- We expected that the new DSS would be nonredundant with
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tial engagement (reliance on and enjoyment of feelings and the IPIP Big Five personality inventory. As such, extraversion,
intuitions; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). However, the two sets neuroticism, and agreeableness were not predicted to correlate
of constructs are nonredundant in that rational and intui- significantly with rational or intuitive styles on the DSS (Gold-
tive styles on the DSS encompass a narrower focus on deci- berg, 1990). Described as planful, thorough, self-disciplined,
sion making, whereas rational and experiential ability and goal-driven, organized, and achievement-oriented (Barrick &
engagement broaden to include general modes of thinking Mount, 1991; Goldberg, 1990), conscientious individuals over-
and problem solving (e.g., “I’m not that good at figuring lap with some of the characteristics of rational decision makers;
out complicated problems”; “I tend to use my heart as a therefore, we hypothesized a positive relationship. Because
guide for my actions”; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). intuitive styles rely on decision-making processes that are dis-
Likewise, decision styles are a subset of linear and nonlinear tinctly different from normative decision-making practices
thinking styles, which capture a multidimensional set of (Milkman et al., 2009; Nutt, 2002), it was expected that individ-
dynamics, including creativity, life changes, and information uals high on openness to experience (creative, curious, imagi-
processing (Vance, Groves, Paik, & Kindler, 2007). The main native, original, and cultured with wide interests; Goldberg,
difference between these individual differences is the breadth of 1990; Hough, 1992) would score higher on an intuitive style. In
the constructs, with linear and nonlinear thinking styles repre- addition, openness to experience individuals’ tendency to
senting a broader domain that relates to various elements of engage in divergent thinking (i.e., idea generation) might go
information processing than decision styles, which are nar- against the convergent thinking (i.e., narrow down to one
rowly focused on decision-making behaviors. We expected that choice) in which rational decision makers tend to engage
linear thinking (preference for selecting external data and facts (McCrae, 1987).
and processing this information through analysis and reason)
would correlate positively with a rational style on the DSS (but
Measures
not so highly as to suggest redundancy). Nonlinear thinking
(preference for attending to internal feelings and processing The measures used to establish discriminant and convergent
through hunches and intuition) was predicted to correlate posi- validity are described next. Unless otherwise noted, participants
tively with an intuitive style on the DSS. responded to items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1
It was also expected that individuals with a rational style on (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). All alpha levels reported
the DSS would report more decision-making self-efficacy are derived from data collected in this study.
(belief in one’s capability to make good decisions; Creed, Pat-
ton, & Bartrum, 2004) than individuals who report an intuitive Rational/experiential ability and engagement
style on the DSS. Reasons for this relationship are twofold. Participants completed the revised 40-item Rational-Experien-
First, because a systematic approach to decision making involv- tial Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), which is made up
ing information gathering, considering various alternatives, of four subscales containing 10 items each: rational ability (a D
and thorough evaluation are commonly prescribed as norma- .87), rational engagement (a D .85), experiential ability (a D
tive (e.g., Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009; Nutt, 2002), it .80), and experiential engagement (a D .82). Sample items for
is likely that rational style individuals will convey confidence in the rationality scales included, “I have no problem thinking
their decision-making abilities. Second, research has shown things through carefully” (ability) and “I enjoy intellectual chal-
that exerting higher effort on a task can result in higher levels lenges” (engagement). Examples from the experiential scales
of satisfaction and perceptions of competence (Waterman, are, “I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if
2005). I can’t explain how I know” (ability) and “I tend to use my
Maximizing and satisficing were expected to exhibit discrim- heart as a guide for my actions” (engagement).
inant validity with decision styles. Whereas maximizers opti-
mize or use “the best” as a criterion by which to make decisions Linear and nonlinear decision making
and employ an “exhaustive search and decision procedure,” sat- Participants completed the 10-item Linear–Nonlinear Thinking
isficers use “good enough” as a criterion when making decisions Style scale developed by Vance and colleagues (2007).
 8 HAMILTON, SHIH, MOHAMMED

Respondents were asked to rate themselves on items such as Table 4. Convergent and discriminant validity predictions and results.
“When making important decisions, I pay close attention to Rational decision style Intuitive decision style
when a number of people with well-justified expertise give me
the same advice” (linear) and “When making important deci- Correlate Prediction Finding Prediction Finding N
sions, I pay close attention when I experience a ‘knowing in my Demographics
bones,’ chills, tingling or other physical sensations” (nonlinear). /personal characteristics
Cronbach’s alpha was .60 for linear (5 items) and .67 for non- Gender 0 .02 0 .07 535
(1 D male, 2 D
linear (5 items) decision-making scales. female)
Age 0 .03 0 –.01 535
GPA 0 .15 0 –.05 535
Decision-making self-efficacy Decision-making
Participants completed the 5-item Decision Making Self-Effi- individual differences
cacy Scale adapted from Jones (1986). Items had an internal Rational ability C .34 – –.27 306
Rational engagement C .37 – –.20 306
consistency reliability of .85. A sample item is “I am confident Experiential ability – .10 C .38 306
in my ability to make effective decisions.” Experiential engagement – –.04 C .45 306
Linear decision making C .42 – –.35 306
Nonlinear decision – .03 C .46 306
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Maximizing making
Participants completed the 12-item Maximization scale devel- Decision making self- C .23 0 –.05 535
efficacy
oped by Schwartz and colleagues (2002). A sample item is, Maximizing orientation 0 .12 0 .03 535
“When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning through the Big Five traits

options even while attempting to watch one program.” Cron- Conscientiousness C .37 0 –.07 535
Openness to experience – .24 C .02 535
bach’s alpha was .64. Extraversion 0 .05 0 .08 535
Agreeableness 0 .24 0 .05 535
Neuroticism 0 –.01 0 .09 535
IPIP Big Five personality traits
Participants completed the 50-item International Personality Note. GPA D grade-point average; C D positive relationship hypothesized; – D
Item Pool Big Five personality scale assessing extraversion (a D negative relationship hypothesized; 0 D no relationship hypothesized.

p < .01.
.89), conscientiousness (a D .81), openness to experience (a D
.77), agreeableness (a D .83), and neuroticism (a D .88; Gold-
berg, 1999; International Personality Item Pool, 2001). Scale Contrary to predictions, a DSS rational style was positively cor-
anchors ranged from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate). related with openness to experience and agreeableness.

Results Discussion
As shown in Table 4, the pattern of correlations helps to sup- Despite intuitive appeal, decision styles have received little system-
port both discriminant and convergent validity across the DSS atic scholarly attention in the decision-making literature (e.g., Dalal
rational and intuitive styles. As expected, age, gender, and cog- & Brooks, 2013; Mohammed & Schwall, 2009). Based on a limited
nitive ability were not significantly related to either DSS sub- number of studies (e.g., Crossley & Highhouse, 2005; Russ et al.,
scale. GPA had a small to moderate positive correlation with 1996; Thunholm, 2008), decision-making style appears to be a
the DSS rational style. meaningful and potentially important construct that warrants fur-
Our results provide initial evidence that suggests that the ther attention. However, for its promise to be fully realized, atten-
DSS is convergent with, but distinct from, other decision- tion must be devoted to measurement. In response to the
making individual differences. As predicted, REI rational weaknesses of extant measures, the purpose of this research was to
ability and engagement were positively associated with a develop and validate an improved decision style measure. As such,
DSS rational style and negatively associated with a DSS our first goal was to develop a concise measure that would capture
intuitive style. Likewise, REI experiential ability and engage- a broad conceptual range of rational and intuitive styles. Our sec-
ment were positively related to a DSS intuitive style, but ond goal was to assess the construct validity of decision styles, using
not significantly related to a DSS rational style. Also consis- a more expansive range of decision-making correlates within a
tent with expectations, linear thinking correlated positively nomological network than have been reported in other studies
with DSS rational style and negatively with DSS intuitive (e.g., Loo, 2000; Scott & Bruce, 1995; Thunholm, 2004).
style. Similarly, nonlinear thinking correlated positively with We developed a 10-item DSS representing rational and intu-
DSS intuitive style but did not correlate significantly with itive dimensions. Across five independent samples, the
DSS rational style. DSS rational styles reported dimensionality and reliability of the DSS was evaluated. These
higher decision-making self-efficacy and higher maximizing results show that the scale has a clear factor structure and high
orientation. internal consistency. In addition, results from the expected pat-
Results also indicated that the DSS is nonredundant with the terns of correlations across decision-making individual differ-
popular IPIP Big Five personality inventory. As hypothesized, ences and IPIP Big Five traits lend support to the convergent
conscientiousness exhibited a positive relationship with a DSS and discriminant validity of the DSS. The overall pattern of
rational style. Neuroticism and extraversion were also not signif- results across five samples provides preliminary support for the
icantly correlated with rational or intuitive styles on the DSS. construct validity of the DSS.
 DECISION STYLES SCALE 9

Explanation of unexpected findings screened out by irrational decision makers (McCrae,1994).

Supporting this rationale, in McCrae’s (1994) theorization
Even though many of our hypotheses in Study 3 were sup-
about openness to experience, he noted that, “As Rokeach
ported, a few were not. Among the unexpected findings, an
(1960) argued, closed individuals have beliefs that are tightly
interesting pattern of relationships was seen between the DSS
compartmentalized, not easily affected by contradictory beliefs
and the decision-making individual differences. We originally
or by corrective information (Davies, 1993). Open individuals
hypothesized and found that the decision-making individual
by contrast, have more flexible attitudes” (McCrae, 1994, p.
differences experiential ability, experiential engagement, and
258). High openness individuals’ flexible attitudes toward new
nonlinear decision making were positively related to intuitive
information are reflected in rational decision makers’ through
decision styles. However, instead of these individual differences
evaluation of choices.
being negatively related to rational decision styles, our findings
With regard to agreeableness, Costa, McCrae, and Dye
show that these relationships were weak and nonsignificant.
(1991) identified six facets of agreeableness: trust, straightfor-
The asymmetry of these findings provides additional confirma-
wardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-minded-
tion that rational and intuitive decision styles are two orthogo-
ness. These are considered positive traits related to
nal constructs, instead of two ends of the same continuum.
interpersonal relationships. We suspect that although agree-
It is also noteworthy that all rational related constructs
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ableness would not influence a person’s levels of rational deci-

(rational ability, rational engagement, linear decision mak-
sion style, a rational decision maker might decide to behave in
ing) are associated with both rational and intuitive decision
ways that are consistent with high agreeableness because he or
styles but all intuitive related constructs (experiential ability,
she sees the benefits of these behaviors on interpersonal
experiential engagement, and nonlinear decision making)
relationships.
are associated with only intuitive (not rational) decision
styles. That is, individuals with a greater ability or tendency
to process information rationally or linearly are less likely Research and practical implications
to be intuitive decision makers, but individuals with a
Extant research on decision styles has been criticized as being
greater ability or tendency to process information intuitively
unsystematic (Appelt et al., 2011) and scattered (Mohammed
(or experientially) or nonlinearly can be either rational or
& Schwall, 2009), with a “regrettable lack of theory and valida-
irrational decision makers.
tion” (Dalal & Brooks, 2013, p. 85). Toward improving the state
The literature on intuition provides some explanations for
of science in this area, the creation of a psychometrically sound
this finding by its distinction between two types of intuition:
scale is a first step toward encouraging empirical work in
heuristic-based (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and expertise-
research domains where decision styles can be expected to have
based (Kahneman, 2011; Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010).
important implications. Decision styles research complements
On the one hand, heuristic-based intuition relies on using a
work on intuitive and analysis modes of cognitive processing
simplifying heuristic to make a difficult judgment. This type of
(e.g., Hammond et al., 1997; Kahneman, 2011) by introducing
intuition is not based on processes related to rational decision
individual differences into this important domain. The deci-
making, such as systematic information gathering, considering
sion-making literature has been faulted for underemphasizing
various alternatives, or thorough evaluation. On the other
individual differences (Appelt et al., 2011; Mohammed &
hand, expertise-based intuition relies on the application of
Schwall, 2009), so developing a reliable and valid DSS provides
one’s knowledge and experience in a particular domain. This
a valuable tool to help remedy this regrettable research gap.
type of intuition is based on processes related to rational deci-
Decision styles can also contribute to research on team pro-
sion making. The quick judgments that characterize this deci-
cesses and outcomes.
sion-making style are born out of repeated engagement in
Because many group tasks require that members make deci-
rational decision-making processes (i.e., systematic information
sions and come to agreement on plans and ideas, decision-
gathering, considering various alternatives, or thorough evalua-
making style is likely to emerge as a salient characteristic in a
tion) in a specific area or topic. Whereas decision makers rely-
group’s life span. However, as both decision styles have
ing on heuristic-based intuition would not be able to provide a
strengths and weaknesses, the combination of intuitive and
clear rationale behind their decisions (i.e., irrational intuitive
rational decision styles might lead to better decisions than
decision makers), decision makers relying on expertise-based
either method alone (Crossley & Highhouse, 2005). Therefore,
intuition would be able to retrieve the rationale behind their
researchers should examine how decision styles interact with
decisions (i.e., rational intuitive decision makers). This duality
one another to affect behaviors and outcomes (e.g., Singh &
in the nature of intuition helps to explain the associations
Greenhaus, 2004). As a measurement tool, the new DSS can
found between intuitive correlates and only intuitive decision
contribute to increased insight into the effects of decision style
styles and between rational correlates and both rational and
composition on team outcomes.
intuitive decision styles.
In terms of practice, the DSS can be used to better under-
Finally, the observed relationships between openness to
stand how individuals manage difficult situations. Namely,
experience and rational decision style and agreeableness and
decision styles have been associated with how individuals cope
rational decision style were unexpected. It is possible that ratio-
with regret (Ueichi & Kusumi, 2004), resilience (Ahmed, 2015),
nal decision makers’ tendency to systematically gather and
and stress (Thunholm, 2008). Decision styles have also been
evaluate all relevant information makes them more receptive to
associated with psychological conditions, such as depression
new information, ideas, and opinions that would otherwise be
(Di Schiena, Luminet, Chang, & Philippot, 2013; Leykin &
 10 HAMILTON, SHIH, MOHAMMED

DeRubeis, 2010) and clinical paranoia (Freeman, Lister, & Rowe & Boulgarides, 1992), others view them as a learned, habit-
Evans, 2014). Understanding the decision styles of patients based propensity to make decisions in a certain way (Driver
could therefore prove beneficial in being able to develop better et al., 1990). Clearly, the extent to which decision styles are flexi-
individualized treatment plans for patients. ble and capable of modification is in need of further research.
The DSS could also be used in training programs to educate In addition to temporal malleability, future empirical work
individuals about the strengths and weaknesses of their per- should investigate the situational specificity of decision styles.
sonal style and how to manage challenges effectively (e.g., According to Payne (1982), the expression as well as the effec-
Driver et al., 1996). Furthermore, the DSS could be used to tiveness of rational or intuitive styles is likely to be dependent
select employees whose styles fit the requirements of a job, on situational characteristics. For example, even if an individual
once better insight is established on the match between decision possessed more of a rational style, extreme time pressure would
style and job requirements. Decision support systems are exten- tend to inhibit trait expression and make the utilization of this
sively used to guide decision making and avoid biases in indus- decision style dysfunctional. Therefore, high time pressure
tries such as health care (e.g., to make diagnoses) and finance could constitute a strong situation, minimizing the differences
(e.g., to identify candidates for loans). Although research is between decision styles, whereas low time pressure could allow
needed, it is plausible that managers with intuitive decision more room for decision styles to manifest.
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styles might have more difficulty adjusting to the use of deci- In keeping with recommendations made by Hinkin (1998),
sion support systems because they are deliberately structured future research should also evaluate the predictive validity of the
after a rational decision-making model. scale. This process would involve showing the incremental valid-
ity of the scale over existing scales on decision styles. It is likely
that the efficacy of rational and intuitive decision styles could
Limitations and future research
vary based on the type of outcome evaluated. Promising out-
Despite the promising potential of the DSS, several limitations comes that might help to highlight the unique strengths of each
need to be acknowledged. The exclusive use of student samples style include speed (Russ et al., 1996), creativity (Dane & Pratt,
in a university setting might have contributed to an overrepre- 2007), and the avoidance of fallacies in the decision-making
sentation of the rational decision style and an underrepresenta- process (e.g., resistance to sunk costs; Arkes & Blumer, 1985).
tion of the intuitive decision style. A college-level education
might help to train and encourage the use of a systematic
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Wood, N. L., & Highhouse, S. (2014). Do self-reported decision styles 1. I prefer to gather all the necessary information before
relate with others’ impressions of decision quality? Personality and committing to a decision.
Individual Differences, 70, 224–228. 2. I thoroughly evaluate decision alternatives before making a
final choice.
Appendix: 3. In decision making, I take time to contemplate the pros/cons
or risks/benefits of a situation.
Rational and intuitive decision style scale items 4. Investigating the facts is an important part of my decision-
making process.
The following questions relate to how you make decisions. 5. I weigh a number of different factors when making
decisions.
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1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Intuitive items

Disagree (Neither agree nor disagree) Agree
1. When making decisions, I rely mainly on my gut feelings.
2. My initial hunch about decisions is generally what I follow.
There are no “right” or “wrong” answers, so please state your 3. I make decisions based on intuition.
opinion as honestly as possible. Using the scale below, please 4. I rely on my first impressions when making decisions.
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 5. I weigh feelings more than analysis in making decisions.