SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE
1. INTRODUCTION
a. The South China Sea has been a focal point of regional activity in Southeast Asia
for the past few years. It has made headlines for multiple reasons, from the
construction of artificial islands to provocative military exercises and
encroachment.
b. In the summer of 2016 the International Court of Justice at the Hague ruled
against Chinese claims in the South China Sea, stating they had no legal
founding, in the proceedings the Philippines had first filed against China in 2013.
2. GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AREA
a. LOCATION
i. What, then, is the South China Sea? In short, it is 1.4 million square miles
of ocean and islands (with a cumulative land area of about six square
miles) caught between the coasts of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and the southernmost Chinese province of Hainan.
The two largest island chains, known as the Spratlys and the Paracels,
are largely uninhabited and carry no real importance in either size or
resources.
b. Strategic Importance
i. The real treasure is found below, where the waters of the South China
Sea can run as deep as 4000 meters, giving enough room for nuclear
submarines to maneuver freely and, more importantly, stealthily, while
preliminary tests indicate that the area may be rich in unproved oils and
hydrocarbons.
c. IMPORTANCE AS A FOOD SOURCE AND MARINE BIODIVERSITY
i. For the nations surrounding it, the South China Sea is the number one
food source, totaling 8% of the world's total commercial fishing output,
and is responsible for feeding several of the most populated nations today
ii. Home to the single largest marine biodiversity, 40% of the world's tuna,
and accounts for 22% of the average Asian diet.
d. OIL AND HYDROCARBON
i. According to the World Bank, the South China Sea holds proven oil
reserves of at least seven billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas,
e. TRADE ROUTE
i. 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China
Sea, which is three times more tanker traffic than the Suez Canal and
M.HASSAN
03216607344
more than five times that of the Panama Canal, making the waters one of
the world’s busiest international sea lanes.
3. DIAGRAM
4. HISTORY
a. The main conflict in the South China Sea can be traced as far back as 1279,
when China drew up a territorial map of its influence which included the whole of
the South China Sea. Since then, influence in the region has switched hands
between regional powers and, later, colonial states. However, most would agree
that the bulk of the issues are a result of the San Francisco Treaty of 1951
following Japan's defeat in World War II. In the terms of surrender, Japan gave
up its rights to its islands in the South China Sea and effectively left a power
vacuum in the region. No one nation was explicitly given sovereignty over these
waters, and China pressed their advantage by submitting, in 1946, the now
infamous “nine-dashed line” claim covering the near-entirety of the South China
Sea.
b. The United States Seventh Fleet positioned itself one year later, 1947, in Pacific
waters near Japan and Guam and has looked to the defense of Japan, South
Korea, and the 1Philippines ever since. Vietnam then submitted its own claim in
1954, backed by historical data dating from the 15th and 17th century as well as
a French colonial territory records. Filipino claims are on shakier ground, having
only settled part of the Spratlys after Wold War II. The Philippines put forth the
argument of “prescriptive acquisition”, basing their claims on their usage of the
island settlements they have installed in the Spratlys and the essential strategic
and economic role they play.
c. The rest of the claimants are limited by their own size and power. Taiwan, the
official heir to the Nationalist China that submitted the original claim in 1947,
presents the same nine-dashed claim and controls the largest natural islet in the
Spratlys. Meanwhile, Malaysia and Brunei have submitted claims to islands off
their respective coasts based on the principles of continental shelf and exclusive
economic zones. These claimant states stand no chance in a test of military
might with China and while Vietnam is fervently increasing its deterrence
capacities, these nations have also opted to wield the law as their weapon of
choice, a move that was spearheaded by the Philippines.
5. THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION'S RULING
a. In 2013, the Philippines submitted a case to the International Court of Justice's
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. It challenged China's maritime
claims and the actions it has taken in the South China Sea.
b. On July 12th 2016, the International Court ruled in favor of the Philippines and
declared the nine-dash line claim as invalid under international law.
M.HASSAN
03216607344
c. Prior to his fifth official visit to China in August, Philippine President Rodrigo
Duterte announced that he would raise with his host, President Xi Jinping, the
2016 decision in Manila’s favor by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in
The Hague that Beijing has no historical rights to resources within the area in the
South China Sea falling within its claimed nine-dash territorial line. (8-019)
d. CHINA'S RESPONSE
i. Chinese officials, who immediately reacted stating that the tribunal's
award has no binding force, and that China would neither accept nor
recognize it. Although the ruling is legally binding, there are no actual
means in place to enforce the decisions, and nobody strong enough to
impose them on the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
6. CHALLENGES / RISKS / THREATS
a. Environmental
i. Today, 40% of the sea's fish stocks have disappeared, while 70% of the
remaining coral reefs are categorized as being in “fair to poor” conditions
due in no small part to the reclamation works and dredging activities
carried out by China, Vietnam, and the other claimant states
ii. Disruption of vital sea channels
iii. Overlap of Chinese claims and EEC of other countries.
7. ARMS RACE AND GREAT POWER MOVES
a. Additionally, fears of an arms race increase as China, Vietnam, Malaysia and the
Philippines all publicly increase their military buildup and exercises in response to
each other’s claims and reclamation efforts. With the arrival of the politically
belligerent President Duterte in the Philippines, the increasing military budget in
Vietnam, and the as of now unpredictable implications of a Donald Trump
presidency, the future of the South China Sea is murky at best.
b. As tensions rise in these waters, the role of each surrounding nation and power is
becoming increasingly critical. The United States Seventh Task Fleet present
since 1947, originally charged with maintaining peace andstability in the region, is
now being challenged by Chinese military advancements and is seen by some as
kindle for the fire burning in Southeast Asia.
8. OTHER CLAIMANTS to THE SEA
a. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam assert sovereignty over parts of
the same sea, overlapping China’s claims. Taiwan also claims the whole sea.
b. PHILIPPINES DELICATE BALANCING ACT (between THE US AND CHINA)
i. THE US
1. The relationship between the Philippines and the United States is
an exceptional one, ranked among the very rare “special
relationships” that America holds.
M.HASSAN
03216607344
2. Philippine President Benigno Aquinas is the most outspoken of
officials who denounced Chinese action and claims in the South
China Sea.
3. He reaffirmed the basis of the US-Philippine bilateral relationship
with the 2011 Manila Declaration, had appealed to the U.S.S
North Carolina during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with
the Chinese PLAN, and, in 2013, renewed the Mutual Defense
Treaty originally signed with the United States in 1951.
4. The United States remains the Philippines premier defense ally
and largest foreign direct investor.
5. President Duterte
a. Wasted no time following his election in stating that he
would make normalizing relations with China a priority
ii. CHINA
1. During an October 2016 trip to Beijing, President Duterte met
with Chinese President Xi Jinping and signed 13 bilateral
cooperation documents, famously announcing a “separation” from
the United States.
2. The re-balancing of Philippine foreign policy towards China can be
seen as a move for the Philippine President to reclaim more
autonomy and independence in how it handles its state-to-state
affairs, a move that nations of Southeast Asia have all been
working towards.
c. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ACTORS AND ASEAN
i. VIETNAM
1. Vietnam now runs the risk of standing alone in calling out for a
stronger U.S position in Southeast Asia.
2. Of all the active claimants, Vietnam is the actor most invested in
defense and deterrence capabilities and has seen its defense
budget increase yearly since 2003. It has expanded its fleet
through deals with Russia, the United States and even India.
3. High Asymmety in Defence Capabilities b/w Vietnam and China.
ii. BRUNEI
1. Brunei has been mostly quiet on the matter, seemingly content
with stating that it has faith in the ability of China and ASEAN to
further provide the means to settle the dispute
iii. Malaysia
1. Malaysia increased its defense budget by 10% in 2014 and is
undergoing considerable modernization efforts, but has signed a
treaty increasing its naval cooperation with China as recently as
November 2016
iv. ASEAN as a whole
M.HASSAN
03216607344
1. ASEAN as a whole is now the only local counterweight to China's
presence in the region, and it has no mechanisms in place to
investigate the issues that arise in the contested waters, ranging
from environmental pollution to blockades and attacks on
fishermen from all claimant states
2. With 5 trillion dollars in trade passing through the South China Sea
every year, ASEAN has a responsibility to protect these economic
interests and the environment they find themselves in.
v. CAMBODIA AND LAOS
1. Cambodia and Laos, for example, have decided to sideline
themselves in this conflict due to their almost complete
dependence on a smooth Chinese partnership, officially throwing
their support in with China's claims.
vi. Indonesia
1. Indonesia has deployed fighter jets and warships to patrol islands
near the disputed South China Sea, the military said on
Wednesday, escalating tensions with Beijing after a diplomatic
spat over “trespassing” Chinese vessels.
2. January, 2020
9. CHINA'S STRATEGY OF HANDLING THE ISSUE
a. CHINA'S SETTLEMENT WITH VIETNAM (Nov. 2017)
i. China and Vietnam have reached an agreement on managing their
dispute in the South China Sea through friendly talks, a senior Chinese
diplomat said on Friday, following an ugly spat over the summer between
the two communist neighbors
ii. Countries have long been at loggerheads over the strategic waterway,
through which more than $3 trillion in cargo passes every year, with
Vietnam having emerged as the most vocal opponent of China's claims to
the majority of the regional sea
iii. In July, 2017 under pressure from Beijing, Vietnam suspended oil
drilling in offshore waters also claimed by China
b. Muscle flexing in a time of calm
i. Upbeat talks with neighbors do not stop China from bulking up its air
defense, scholars say.
ii. International organizations have spotted Chinese aircraft in the Paracel
chain
c. Mixing Friendly gestures, assertive initiatives
i. With ASEAN
1. In November China agreed to negotiate with the 10-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a code to
M.HASSAN
03216607344
prevent accidents at sea by 2018. An official from Beijing said
then that China would ensure freedom of navigation for the
Southeast Asian states
2. At the end of the day, their South China Sea policy remains
unchanged,”
ii. BUILDING ISLANDS
1. Since 2010 China has angered its neighbors by using landfill to
build up islets and installing other military hardware to bolster
control.
iii. WARMING RELATIONS WITH PHILIPPINES
d. Joint Research Projects Help China Consolidate Power, Peacefully, at Sea
i. An increase in Sino-foreign joint maritime research, particularly in the
disputed South China Sea, is helping China improve its regional
reputation by contributing to the health and utility of international
waterways, analysts say.
ii. China helped Malaysia with atmospheric studies on the high seas last
year, among other marine science projects, the Southeast Asian country’s
chief news service Bernama reported in December.
e. Aid and investment for other maritime claimants
i. ONE BELT ONE ROAD
1. acked in part by its $11.2 trillion-plus economy and $900 billion
“One Belt, One Road” initiative to connect much of Asia for trade
growth, the country offered investment and other aid to rival
Southeast Asian maritime claimants
ii. MALAYSIA
1. China agreed to sell naval ships to Malaysia, which already counts
China as its top trade and investment source.
iii. PHILIPPINES
1. After befriending the Philippines last year, the Chinese
government pledged $24 billion in aid and investment for Manila.
This year the pair discussed funding two Philippine railway
projects for a combined $8.3 billion.
iv. THE U.S: CHINA'S KEY CONCERN
1. USA'S FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATION IN DISPUTED
SEA
a. AMERICA'S RECENT PROVOCATION (Jan. 2018)
b. Manila's Disappointing Reaction to the US FONOP Near
Scarborough Shoal. If claimant states no longer care about
freedom of navigation, the U.S. task in the South China
Sea may be impossible.
c. U.S. Navy conducted a freedom of navigation operation
(FONOP) within the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, the
M.HASSAN
03216607344
South China Sea feature Beijing seized from Manila in
2012 and holds to this day. China publicized the operation
days after it occurred
d. Under Duterte, the Philippines has pursued rapprochement
with Beijing at the expense of its traditional closeness to
the United States, its treaty-bound ally. After winning a
highly favorable award by the Hague-based tribunal at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 concerning its
maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, Manila
largely turned its back on international la
e. PHILIPPINES RESPONSE
i. “That is America’s problem because for our part,
we have different tactics in dealing with China,”
ii. “We have reached a point where we have
independent foreign relations, and a problem of
America is no longer a problem of the Philippines.”
f. CHINESE RESPONSE
i. China Signaling it May Finally 'Militarize' the South
China Sea Officially
ii. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that a
U.S. Navy destroyer violated its sovereignty over
the Scarborough Shoal by sailing within 12
nautical miles of the disputed feature in the
South China Sea on January 17th. In an unusual
step, China was the first to reveal that the transit
occurred and may be using it to signal future
military deployments to the bases it has built on
reclaimed islands in the Spratly Islands.
iii. "We're going to have to send China a clear signal
that first, the island-building stops, and second,
your access to those islands also not going to be
allowed." (Rex Tillerson)
iv. China regards the militarily stronger United States
as its key concern at sea as Washington backs
freedom of navigation rather than China’s goal of
outright control, analysts believe.
v. What China sees as the biggest threat to its
security is the American military reconnaissance
and the surveillance in the South China Sea,
vi. Former U.S. president Barack Obama’s
government irked China by shifting military
attention to East Asia, including joint naval patrols
M.HASSAN
03216607344
with the Philippines and lifting a U.S. ban on selling
lethal weapons to Vietnam.
10. CHINA'S MILITARISATION OF THE AREA
a. Chinese installations in the South China Sea are now equipped with point
defense systems and the deployment of the first Chinese aircraft carrier, the
Liaoning, in the contested waters over the last week of 2016, it has become
clear that China is looking to test the incoming American president Donald Trump
as well as the other regional claimants.
b. Since 2013, China has constructed more than 3,000 dredged-up acres across
seven features that are now studded with long-range sensor arrays, port facilities,
runways, and reinforced bunkers for fuel and weapons.
c. Peacetime assets but wartime liabilities
i. The islands are useful during peacetime to monitor rivals’ air and sea
movements and as a base for coast guard and maritime militia operations
against those countries’ fishermen and hydrocarbon exploitation. But
increasing its overt military capability on the islands neither increases
China’s practical civil control over waters crowded with rival fishermen
and law enforcement vessels nor deters the presence of U.S. and other
foreign warships and planes. And in wartime, that additional militarization
may not translate to a decisive advantage over the United States anyway.
d. The bases’ distance and isolation from China’s mainland leave them
comparatively exposed, and their military utility will diminish rapidly the longer a
conflict goes on.
e. Effect of Heat and Humidity on Spratlys Island.
f. The islands are also fixed, relatively small, and isolated targets with no so-called
civilian collateral on them and provide little cover or protection, especially against
new long-range precision strike weapons and island raid and seizure operations
that the U.S. military is developing
g. In a conflict, China’s South China Sea neighbors, with help from the United
States and other coalition partners, could close those choke points to China’s
naval and merchant fleets.
11. WHY CHINA INSISTS ON BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
a. China is vastly superior to the other claimant states across the board and can
simply strong arm their way through any one-on-one negotiation.
b. bilateral negotiation limits the United States’ ability to get involved
c. Multilateral negotiations, such as through ASEAN, would be too much regional
pressure and plays against China's currently very favorable position.
12. THE ROAD AHEAD
a. The stakes of this geostrategic standoff are rising with the number of naval ships,
fighter jets and drones facing off in Asian seas
M.HASSAN
03216607344
b. JAPAN COMING OUT OF RETIREMENT
i. China’s giant and opaque land reclamation projects are placing its military
hardware throughout the region and pulling archrival Japan out of
retirement. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is working to shed Japan’s
post-war pacifism by amending the constitution.
c. MISTAKE and MISCALCULATION
i. The odds of a mistake, miscalculation or miscommunication -- two aircraft
or ships colliding, for example -- are rising.
ii. None of this means war is imminent -- even likely. But potential
flashpoints abound. What if Beijing and Tokyo -- or Beijing and Hanoi --
overreacted to some random incident? Or if a Trump White House on the
ropes saw a minor skirmish in the Asian seas as a chance to wag the
proverbial dog to change the narrative in Washington?
13. WHY WASHINGTON WON’T ACT?
a. The US pivot to Southeast Asia, coupled with the region’s myriad conflicts, raises
concerns about the future of US interests in the region. The Obama
administration has not only worked to strengthen ties with ASEAN, but has also
tried to forge tighter relations with individual countries like Myanmar, where it has
developed a new focus and strategy of engagement. Experts say that the United
States faces a dilemma and tough balancing act in the region, as some Asean
countries would like it to play a more forceful role to counter what they see as a
greater Chinese assertiveness, while others want to see less US involvement.
The priority on all sides still is to avoid military conflict.
14. QUOTES
a. According to Admiral Harry Harris, who was the US Navy's Pacific Commander:
‘Beijing is using its military and economic power to coerce its neighbours and
erode the free and open international order.’
15. RECOMMENDATIONS
a. Quest for a code of conduct
i. The idea of an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct originated on September
2, 2002, after the two parties signed the “Declaration on a Code of
Conduct for the South China Sea.” The Declaration was primarily a
political statement of broad principles of behavior aimed at stabilizing the
situation in the South China Sea and preventing accidental conflicts.
ASEAN’s goal has been to transform the Declaration from a broad
statement of principles into a legally binding code of conduct.
ii. China has suggested it could be finished by 2021 despite past fears that
the code would weaken its sovereignty claims. China had stalled talks on
a code before 2016
M.HASSAN
03216607344
