Colonialism in Geography
One of the perennial questions in the social sciences is to explain "the rise of the West." "The
West" is a vague term roughly corresponding with the developed world or global North,
excluding Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea. Looking at Figure 1, we know that
certain parts of our world have been at the forefront of economic growth, becoming the core
of the capitalist world economy. More specifically, we know that the industrial revolution began
in the English Midlands, and spread first to the rest of Europe and North America. But why
those countries instead of others?
A huge variety of theories have been proposed to explain why certain countries have come to
dominate the world economy. One long-popular theory was race: Europeans, and their
descendants elsewhere in the world, were said to be simply more intelligent and harder-
working (Kobayashi 2003). But as we learned in an earlier chapter, race is not a biologically
valid concept when applied to people. And if the white race is not biologically distinct from
other races, then we can’t explain the economic growth of Europe on the basis of biological
characteristics. A related theory was environmental determinism. We will discuss
environmental determinism in detail later. For now, we can summarize by saying that some
people argued that the temperate climate of Europe was invigorating to its inhabitants,
whereas tropical climates in much of the rest of the world made people lazy and sensual
(Frenkel 1992). This theory too has been discredited, as no evidence exists to support it. Other
writers have tried to find something inherent in European culture to explain the difference. In
his essay "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism," sociologist Max Weber argued
that the Protestant doctrine of predestination -- which held that God had already decided who
would go to Heaven and who would go to Hell, and there was nothing an individual could do
about it -- caused people to work hard and invest their savings in the economy rather than
wasting them on Earthly pleasures. If they succeeded in their economic endeavors, people
would take that as proof that they were favored by God and thus likely to be among those
predestined for Heaven (Weber 1904). Weber’s theory fails to account for the greater
economic dynamism of Asia during much of the period after the Protestant reformation or the
recent economic success of Catholic (Spain, Ireland) and Confucian (Taiwan, South Korea,
Singapore) societies.
Today, geographers hold that one critical piece of the puzzle of the rise of the West is
colonialism. Colonialism is a process by which a country takes over new land, and
reorganizes that land's economy to benefit the colonizing power, rather than to benefit the
residents of the colony. Colonialism works to funnel wealth back to the colonizer while
inhibiting the development of the colony.
World Systems Theory
As geographers, we are interested in the way that the spatial arrangement of societies may
influence the development of economic systems. One important synthesis of the way these
spatial arrangements work is World Systems Theory. We can think of World Systems Theory
as making several core propositions (Frank 1998, Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997):
1. Large areas of the world have been integrated into single economic systems for a long
period of time. The formation of some of the early trans-regional economic linkages can be
dated to as early as 3000 BCE, when the Sumerians living in what is now Iraq traded with
Egypt and the Harappan civilization in what is now Pakistan (Frank and Gills 1992). Over time,
these trans-regional economic linkages have spread farther and grown stronger, leading
eventually to our modern globe-spanning economy.
2. In any widespread economic system, a division into a core, semiperiphery, and periphery
can emerge. The important idea here is that long-distance trade is not carried on for the equal
benefit of all parties. Rather, the system is typically organized so that the bulk of the profits
accrue to one area of the world, called the core. Other portions of the system, called
the periphery, experience a loss of wealth due to their participation in the system.
The semiperiphery is composed of areas in between the core and periphery. Semiperipheral
areas often aspire to become the core, in order to reap the rewards of long-distance trade. For
example, imagine what happens when a mining company opens a new mine in Papua New
Guinea. The world's major mining companies are headquartered in places like North America
and Europe. This means that the profits from selling the mine's products will go to investors in
those regions. Meanwhile, Papua New Guinea may receive a few low-paying jobs. But they
also lose potential mineral wealth, and have to deal with pollution from the mine. Since Papua
New Guinea is so poor, they lack the power to say no to the foreign mining company, or to
mine the minerals themselves.
3. Large economic systems go through boom and bust phases on a long historical time scale.
We're familiar with short-term economic ups and downs, which last perhaps a few years at a
time. But economic historians have also identified long-lasting waves of economic growth and
decline, lasting several hundred years. During the growth phase, economic activity picks up,
populations rise, and the volume of trade between regions increases. But eventually, the
system becomes too rigid and overexploits its resources, and there is a downswing (Chew
2001). During this contraction phase, regions refocus on local subsistence and trade declines.
Eventually, the stage is set for a renewal of growth.
Origins of the Modern World System
In order to explain how "the West" became the core of our current world economic system, we
have to go back to a time when it wasn't. Economic historians calculate that the emergence
of Europe as the core of the world economy occurred relatively late in history -- possibly as
late as 1850. Prior to that, other regions of the world, specifically China and India, could be
considered the core (Frank 1998).
We can begin to trace the causes of "the rise of the West" in the 1200s. At this time, most of
the Eastern Hemisphere -- from Britain to Japan, and from Russia to Zimbabwe -- was
connected in one large trade network (Abu-Lughod 1989), shown in Figure 2. India and China
were the dominant economic powers in this system. Europe was attracted by the riches of
Asia, but had few products that it could trade for Asian goods. European trade with Asia was
further hampered by a lack of easy trade routes to the East. Ships sailing in the Mediterranean
were blocked by the African, Arabian, and central Asian land masses, the rulers of which could
limit trade or extract taxes from merchants. Much of the trade within Asia was carried on by
Arab and Chinese ships, and caravans through Central Asia.
In the 1300s, this world system experienced a decline (Abu-Lughod 1989). This was in part
triggered by the Black Plague. The plague originated with rats from central Asia. It spread
quickly along trade routes throughout the Eastern Hemisphere, devastating populations and
thereby disrupting economies. Long-distance trade fell off as people focused on maintaining
their own local livelihoods. But by the late 1400s, the world economy was on its way back. As
trade routes began to grow again, European rulers and merchants committed themselves to
capturing more of the trade surplus -- to becoming less of a semiperiphery and more of a core
part of the world economic system.
Europe had a breakthrough in 1492 with the voyage of Christopher Columbus (Blaut 1993).
Popular culture portrays Columbus as having the insight that the world was round -- and thus
that China could be reached by sailing westward -- while his ignorant contemporaries insisted
the world was flat. But in fact this is a myth, invented by storyteller Washington Irving in 1828.
Educated people in Europe had known the world was round since the ancient Greeks proved
it around 200 BCE. The real disagreement was over how big the earth was. The Greeks had
calculated a relatively accurate figure -- 39,690 km around, as compared to an actual
measurement of 40,008 km. If there was nothing but ocean between Europe and China, the
sailing ships available in Europe at the time could not make the voyage. But Columbus was
convinced that the Earth was smaller than that, and therefore that he could sail all the way to
China (Blaut 1989).
What Columbus found, of course was that there were two whole continents lying west of
Europe and east of China. It was Europe that stumbled upon them simply because Europe
was located much closer to the Americas than China or India were. These continents proved
far more lucrative for Europe than any trade route. Conquest and colonization of the Americas
provided Europe with a huge boost in resources and markets that enabled it to hitch a ride on
the Asian train – and eventually take over that train.
Conquest, De-population, and Re-population
Europe had two key advantages that enabled colonial powers such as Spain, Portugal, Britain,
and France to take over large swaths of the Americas. The first was technological superiority
(Diamond 1997). Europe had benefited from being connected to the large Afro-Eurasian
landmass, giving it access to the technological ingenuity of a large population of people, and
creating competition that drove those people to devise new technologies for projecting power
over new lands. In particular, Europeans brought with them steel (known since antiquity but
greatly improved by Indian smiths), and guns (invented by the Chinese). (Note that contrary
to popular myth, the Chinese did not use gunpowder solely for fireworks -- indeed, one would
have to be rather dense to invent something that makes a dramatic explosion, and not figure
out that you could use it to kill someone!) Native Americans were often skilled fighters, and
they quickly took up European weaponry, but they remained largely dependent on trade with
European allies to keep up in the arms race.
But Europe's advantages in military technology alone would have been insufficient to
guarantee victory. In his first assault on the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan, Hernán Cortéz's
forces -- armed with guns, swords, steel armor, and war horses -- were defeated by the Aztecs.
Yet in their second assault, they were successful. The difference was that while the Spanish
were regrouping, a plague (historians think it was likely smallpox) wiped out many of
Tenochtitlan's warriors. The pattern would be repeated throughout the Americas. In Peru,
Francisco Pizarro defeated the Incas by taking advantage of a civil war that broke out when a
disease (probably smallpox as well) killed the emperor Huayna Capac and his designated heir,
Ninan Cuyochi. In what is now Massachusetts, the generosity of the Wampanoags to the
arriving Pilgrims was not merely a matter of altruism. Rather, the tribe had been devastated
by a disease epidemic. This meant that they had a lot of land to give away, but were at a
distinct military disadvantage against inland tribes who had not been hit so hard, and thus they
wanted allies. (Unfortunately for the Wampanoags' strategic calculations, the English soon
turned against all of New England's native people).
Throughout the Americas, European diseases wiped out countless native people. Among the
diseases causing significant epidemics were "smallpox, chickenpox, influenza, measles,
mumps, rubella, yellow fever, common cold, pneumonia, scarlet fever, whooping cough,
diphtheria, typhus, dysentery, cholera, bubonic plague, malaria, and amoebic dysentery"
(Krech 1999). The pre-European population of the Americas is estimated to have been
somewhere in the range of 40 to 80 million, but the population was reduced to only 6 million
by 1650 (Denevan 1992). It was not uncommon for tribes to lose 90% or more of their
members. And disease spread quicker than European explorers and conquerors. So as
Europeans pushed into the heart of the Americas, they found tribes already devastated by
disease and "wilderness" that had only recently been abandoned.
Three key factors explain why European diseases were so devastating to Native Americans,
whereas with the exception of syphilis, no American diseases ever became a problem for
Europeans: domestic animals, population size, and time (Dobson and Carper 1994).
Most of the devastating epidemic diseases are derived from diseases common to herd
animals. Smallpox derives from cowpox, measles from rinderpest, and human influenza from
related diseases of a variety of livestock. Acquisition of deadly diseases from animals
continues today, with recent concerns over bird flu and swine flu. Humans caught these
diseases by domesticating animals like cattle, sheep, and chickens. Farmers living in close
proximity to their livestock gave ample time for the bacteria and viruses to jump the species
barrier. As a result of the vagaries of biogeography, the Afro-Eurasian landmass contained a
number of suitable domesticable species. The Americas, on the other hand, produced only
three domesticated animals -- turkeys, llamas and alpacas, and guinea pigs (Native Americans
also had dogs, which were brought from Asia). None of these are the sort of herd animals that
commonly pass diseases to humans (Diamond 1997).
For a disease to persist in a population, it needs to strike a balance between being too virulent
and not virulent enough (Dobson and Carper 1994). A disease that is too slow to infect new
victims will disappear, as everyone who has it dies or gets better without passing it on to new
victims. A disease that infects too quickly will soon find itself without any new victims because
everyone in the population is either dead or healed. It is much easier for a disease to hit this
sweet spot in a large, dense population. At the time of colonization, Europe was much more
densely populated than the Americas. And the hemisphere-wide economic system that had
emerged connected Europe into a huge total population of people. Thus, the diseases that
people in Afro-Eurasia got from their livestock could easily find new victims in the local area,
and pass on to new areas when the local epidemic's peak passed. The population of the
Americas, on the other hand, was smaller, less densely settled, and less tightly linked into
long-distance trade.
Finally, diseases have a much more devastating impact when they come to a new population
for the first time. This is a simple matter of evolutionary biology. For any given disease, human
genetic variation will produce people with a variety of levels of susceptibility to the disease.
Epidemics will tend to kill the people who are most susceptible, preventing them from passing
on their genes. Over time, only the genes conferring high resistance to the disease will be left.
Thus, millennia of living with various diseases had turned them into childhood nuisances but
not terrible plagues for Europeans. Native Americans, on the other hand, had never had an
opportunity to evolve resistance to diseases like smallpox or measles, and so they were killed
in huge numbers.
Once the American colonies (Figure 3) were conquered, the new European rulers had to find
someone to extract the resources and produce the products that would make the colonies
worthwhile. Initial attempts to use Native American labor were disappointing, as so many of
them had died of diseases. So the colonial rulers brought about two major migration streams:
settlers from Europe, and slaves from Africa.
At least a few Europeans settled in every colony, in order to run its affairs and direct the
production of wealth for the ruler. But European settlement was particularly heavy in areas
that have come to be known as neo-Europes -- Canada, the US, Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay in the Americas, as well as South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. The
distinguishing feature of the neo-Europes is the similarity of their climates to that of Europe.
This made it easy for the package of plants and animals that support the European way of life
to be transferred to the new colonies (Crosby 1986). For example, English farming systems
involving wheat, peas, and cattle could be recreated in the northeastern US with little effort.
While they were set up as colonies, the wholesale transfer of the European way of life to these
areas enabled them to become rivals to the European homelands, and even, in the case of
the US, capture the status of global economic core.
Other areas of the colonies were less climatically similar to Europe, but they produced many
of the most important commodities such as sugar and tobacco. Here, the European rulers
relied heavily on slaves brought from Africa. Slavery had existed for a long time in both Europe
and Africa. But the trans-Atlantic slave trade differed in several crucial ways. First was the
scale. Between 1492 and 1900, over 10 million men and women were taken from Africa to the
Americas (Voyages 2009). Second, the trans-Atlantic slave trade was highly racialized. We
learned in an earlier chapter that the idea of race, in the sense of biologically distinct sub-
species of humans, was created during the colonial era to justify the social organization of the
colonies. In the past, slaves had been captives from war or children sold off by impoverished
parents. During the colonial era, Europeans came to believe that the people of an entire
continent were fit only to work at the behest of superior types of humans (Sundberg 2008).
Europeans did not colonize the interior of Africa during this period (though they would do so
later, after the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade). The work of capturing slaves and bringing
them to the European trading ports was done by other Africans. But the presence of massive
European demand for slaves greatly shaped Africans' incentives. European trade goods,
particularly guns, quickly became necessities. A ruler who acquired guns from the Europeans
in exchange for slaves was at a political and military advantage vis-a-vis neighbors who did
not participate in the slave trade. Raiding neighboring villages or even selling off members of
your own tribe served as insurance against becoming a victim of the slave trade yourself --
sell them before they sell you (Nunn and Wantchekon 2009).
The slave trade exacerbated conflicts among kingdoms and tribes in Africa. It depopulated
significant swaths of land, which then reverted to disease-infested swamps. And it undermined
African economies. Slave traders naturally preferred able-bodied young men and women, who
were the productive backbone of pre-slave-trade African economies. Losing these workers
made Africa more dependent on European goods and less able to produce for itself. The
effects of four centuries of slave trade on Africa are still apparent, a mere century and a half
after its end. Ethnic groups that were hardest-hit by the slave trade exhibit lower trust and
poorer economic success than their neighbors who were less devastated by slavery (Nunn
and Wantchekon 2009).
Colonial Riches and the Asian Trade
Europe's first priority in establishing American colonies was to produce things that they could
sell to China and India. One of the reasons that Europe had remained in the semiperiphery of
the world economy before 1492 was that there was little that Europe could produce that China
and India wanted. Asian manufacturing was much more productive than that of Europe. As
late as 1793, the Chinese Emperor Ch'ien Lung bragged to King George III of England: "I set
no value on objects strange and ingenious and have no use for your country's manufactures"
(Frank 1998).
One major commodity that China did demand from the outside world was precious metals,
particularly silver (Frank 1998). China's economy ran on a silver standard, and so economic
growth created an enormous hunger for silver. But unfortunately for China, there are few silver
mines in its territory. The Americas, on the other hand, had huge untapped deposits of silver.
The mines of the Americas began pumping silver into the Asian economy, either moving
directly across the Pacific in Spanish galleons, or passing to Europe and then on via the Middle
East, India, and Southeast Asia (Figure 4). As the silver flowed toward China, a variety of
commodities -- textiles, spices, ceramics, and others -- flowed back toward Europe.
Other natural resources and agricultural products were important as well (Pomeranz 2000).
European powers moved quickly to establish plantations in the Caribbean and nearby parts of
the mainland to grow sugar, tobacco, and cotton, among other products. Timber and other
forest products like turpentine were also important. These raw materials fed the manufacturers
of Europe, easing resource constraints that had grown as Europe's economy expanded.
Finally, the American colonies provided a captive market for European manufactured goods
(Blaut 1993). While Asians had little interest in Europe's poorer-quality textiles, ceramics, etc.,
settlers in European colonies had little choice but to buy them. The colonies' external trade
was controlled by the ruling power (so they couldn't trade with China themselves), and they
were often forbidden from developing their own manufacturing base to compete with the
mother country.
Colonizing the East
A mere boost to Europe's fortunes was not enough to turn Europe into the core of the world
economy. Extracting resources from the Americas got Europe into the economic game,
making it more competitive and richer, and giving it the ability to become an important
middleman in intra-Asian trade as well as trading directly for Asian goods. Lacking access to
colonies put a strain on China's production. Yet at the same time, the increased economic
activity generated by the influx of American silver and other resources, as well as a population
boom fueled by new American crops like potatoes and maize, was causing the economies of
China and India -- the old cores -- to expand too (Frank 1998). To gain control over the world
economy, Europe had to take out its competition. As historian Janet Abu-Lughod put it, "the
'fall of the East' preceded the 'Rise of the West'" (Abu-Lughod 1989). So as the American
colonies began to gain their independence, European colonial efforts shifted to the east
(Figure 5).
As discussed earlier, the world economy goes through cyclical ups and downs. Each
downswing is an opportunity for the system to be reorganized as different powers seize the
advantage. This is basically how Europe, boosted by the products of its American colonies
and skilled in colonial domination by its practice there, brought down China and India.
India fell first. An economic recession in the mid-1700s created an opportunity for the British
East India company to move in and take over, uniting the various empires and principalities
into a colony encompassing what are now the nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
(Frank 1998). The East India Company ruled the colony as a corporate asset for 100 years,
until the British government took over and ran the colony for another 100 years.
During the two centuries of British rule in India, India's economy was restructured to benefit
Britain (Davis 2001). India's major commodity export for a long time had been textiles,
produced in rural shops all through the region. But Britain's emerging industrial economy was
also focused (among other things) on textile manufacture. The solution was simple: Britain
banned India from exporting textiles. Britain's mills could now buy cotton from its colonies in
India and Egypt, as well as slave-grown cotton from the southern US, turn it into cloth, and
make a profit selling that cloth around the world, including in the cotton-producing colonies.
Britain also established a free-market doctrine that undercut India's social support programs
(Davis 2001). The unreliability of India's climate had led native princes to develop systems to
accumulate and store food during good years, and redistribute that food in bad ones. Under
British rule, these programs were eliminated. Instead, food was distributed by the international
market, flowing to whoever could pay the most for it. In many cases, that was British
consumers rather than Indian ones. A series of unprecedented famines struck India and other
colonies in the late 1800s, even as these colonies were exporting food to Britain. Note how
this resembles the recent spike in Mexican tortilla prices in response to US ethanol demand.
Given this history, it is not surprising that the entitlement theory of famine was developed by
Amartya Sen, an Indian.
In China, the colonizing impact was less direct, as no European power ever directly ruled
China. Nevertheless, European powers were able to use their increasing control over world
trade to force China into making trade concessions favorable to Europe (Davis 2001). Britain
and other powers extracted tax breaks and special deals as well as trade monopolies over
certain regions. Each of these concessions was then exploited to further tighten Europe's grip
on the Chinese economy. China soon began to suffer some of the same problems as India,
as its economic activity came to serve European wealth and systems to provide for people in
the event of a catastrophe like a drought weakened.
Impacts of Colonialism
Only a few of today's countries were never ruled by a European or neo-European power, and
even those came under heavy European influence in their internal affairs and ability to
participate in the world market. By the end of the colonial era, the world economy had been
remade to place Europe and the neo-Europes in a dominant position. In addition to the
violence of the conquest itself, a variety of consequences were felt by colonized societies.
Colonized societies were forcibly incorporated into the emerging global capitalist economy,
typically on bad terms. Pre-colonial economies in many areas were oriented toward production
for local subsistence. Colonizing powers used a variety of techniques to shift economic activity
toward cash cropping and resource extraction (e.g. mining). The bluntest instrument was to
simply seize land and convert it into plantations run by Europeans. In the Americas, lands
were cut up into haciendas run by Spanish or Portuguese masters, with poor and native people
having little option but to work for the masters (even if they weren’t formally enslaved). In
Africa, it was common for the best and most fertile lands to be seized by British colonists,
forcing native Africans to crowd into poorer lands (Rocheleau 1995). But even where land was
left in native hands, colonial rulers found ways to change their economic calculus. One
mechanism was taxation (Watts 1983). Colonial rulers charged native people taxes that must
be paid in cash -- in contrast to native rulers, who had accepted payment in grain, hides, or
other products. The only way to acquire cash was to grow crops that could be sold to colonial
trading monopolies, or to work as a laborer in colonial mines or other jobs. The taxes were
often timed to force native producers to sell their crops at times of the year when markets were
glutted and thus prices were low.
Colonization also imposed new boundaries on colonized lands. This was most famously done
at the 1884 Berlin Conference, when the major European powers drew up a map allocating
colonial control of Africa, disregarding any native ethnic or political boundaries as well as
natural features (Chamberlain 1999). This re-cutting of the colonized territory stuck groups
long at odds with each other together into the same political unit. In one sense, colonization
reduced conflict among colonized populations, as the colonizer's military power imposed
peace, e.g. the "Pax Britannica" established in Africa (Watts 1986). But the underlying tensions
did not go away, and they erupted once the colonizer was pushed out -- as we can see today
in Nigeria (Comfort 2002) and Kenya (Daily Nation 2010). Moreover, the net effect of
colonization in some cases was to exacerbate ethnic tensions. Colonizing powers brought with
them a conviction that race is a biologically real phenomenon, and so they interpreted many
differences in culture or economic way of life among colonized peoples as racial differences.
The colonizers then favored the "higher" races, placing them in positions of power. In Rwanda,
for example, the sharp (and allegedly racial) divide between Hutus and Tutsis, and the
privileging of the Tutsis that formed the basis of Hutu resentment, were created by the
Germans and Belgians during their rule (Mamdani 2001).
Colonialism also created ideological subordination. Colonizing powers brought with them
worldviews that said that Europeans were culturally, racially, and morally superior. They told
themselves it was their task to bring civilization to the backwards peoples of the world -- a task
labeled "the white man's burden" by British author Rudyard Kipling. This ideology brought two
types of subordination to colonized peoples. First, it led to efforts by colonizers to wipe out or
prevent the practice of native cultural traditions. In the United States, for example,
government- and church-run boarding schools for Native American children prohibited them
from speaking their native language, practicing their native religion, or learning traditional
native ways of making a living (e.g. hunting or native forms of agriculture) (Smith 2007).
Second, many people native to the colonies internalized the colonizer's ideologies. They came
to believe that they were an inferior or backward people and that the only hope lay in
assimilating to the colonizer's culture. Those who saw the harm in this internalization then
reacted by simply flipping to the other side and rejecting anything that allegedly carried the
taint of the colonizer. This anti-colonial nationalism then became a justification for clinging to
harmful traditions (such as female circumcision) as a form of resistance to colonialism
(Goldberg 2009).
Post-Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism
The end of formal colonialism is usually dated to the mid-1800s for the Western Hemisphere,
and the mid-1900s for the Eastern. Numerous colonies still exist today -- for example, the US
controls places such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, and some
native activists argue that Hawaii is more colony than state. But the granting of formal
independence did not necessarily end the economic and political control that the core held
over the periphery.
On the economic front, political independence did little for countries still dependent on a global
economic system in which the shots were called and the profits made in London, Paris, or
New York. Economic activity in ex-colonies continued to be funded by investors in the former
colonizer, and products were bought and sold by companies based in the former colonizer
(Davis 2001). This continuation of unequal economic relationships despite an end to formal
political control is called neo-colonialism. Many countries bear crushing debt burdens which
are owed to ex-colonizer countries, forcing them to continue producing for the world market
and making them vulnerable to demands from international creditors.
On the political front, countries in the European/neo-European core used their greater power
to interfere with the affairs of ex-colonies around the world. This was most notable during the
Cold War between the US and USSR. Techniques ranging from aid packages with strings
attached, to direct military intervention, were used to install friendly regimes, with little regard
to the consequences for the prosperity of the people in the countries in question (Faber 2002).
Such activities have continued since the fall of the USSR. Today there is fear among some
political players that China's rapid economic growth is giving them the means to compete with
the US, Japan, and Europe in manipulating poorer countries (Brautigam 2010).
