Existentialism Isa Humanism ‘My purpose here is eo defend existential agains some charges thathave been brought against. Firs, i hasbeen blamed for encouraging people to re- ‘main na stat of quitism and desi. For fall solutions are barred, we have to regard any action in this word as futile, and soa ist we arrive ata contemplative philosophy. And inasmuch s contemplation ta Janay, we are only espousing yet another kind of bourgeois philosophy. These are the ‘main reproaches made by the Communists, Ochershave condemned us for emphasing whats despice- be about himaniy, for exposing ll that ssa, suspicious, or base, while ignoring beauty andthe bightr side ofhuman ature. For erample, according to Miss Mercier, a Catholic titi, we have forgotten the innocence of chil smile ‘One group afer another censure us for overlooking hie sanity’ soda, and for considering man as an isolatedEXISTENTIALIS 1S A HUMANISM Deing. This, contend the Communists, is primarily because we base our doctrine on pure subjectivity —that is, on the (Caresian I thiok—on the very moment in which man lly comprehends his isolation, rendering us incapable of re= cesublishing solidarity with those who exist outside of the self,and who ae inaccessible wus through the cit. ‘Christan, on the other hand, reproach us for denying the realty and validity of human enterprise, fr inasmuch a we choose ignore God commandments andl aes thought tobeeteral llhatremainsisthesticly gratitouseveryone ‘candowhateverhepleasesandisineapabe, from hisown small, ‘vantage point, of indng fuk with the points of view rations of others Te is these various charges that T want ro adress toy “which is why Thave entitled this bref discourse “Existential- jamlsa Humanism.” Many willbe surprised by whaeThaveto ‘say here about humanism. We shall temp ro discover in ‘whatsense weunderstandit Inanycase levusheginby sying ‘that what we mean by “existentialism” isa doctrine that ‘makes human life possible and seo afm that every truth and every action imply an environment and a human subjec- tive. lis public knowledge thatthe Fundamental reproach brought agnnst usis that we stress the darkside ofhuman life. Recently someone told me about lady who, whenever she Inadvertenty utes some vulgar expression in a moment of anger, excuses herself by saying: "I think I'm becoming an cistentalis.”Soiewould appear thatexistntslim isasoc- [EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM sed with something ugly, which is why some people call ws naturalists IF we ae, tis strange that we should frighten or shock people far more than naturalism per se frightens ot offends them, Those who easily stomach Zalanovel ike Tbe [Bart are sickened when they open an existentialist novel ‘Those who find solace inthe wisdom ofthe people —which is asad, depressing thing find ws even sadder. Ye, what could ‘bemoredisilsioning than such sayingsas “Charity begins at home," or even “Appoint a rogue and hel do you damage, lock him down and he'l do you homage.” We all know ‘countless such popular sayings, all of which always point co the same ching: one should not ty to fight against the eta lishment one should not be more royalist chan the king, ot ‘medal in matters hat exceed one station in life any action not in keeping with raion is mere romanticism; any effort not based on proven experiences doomed ince experience shows that men are invariably nelined todo ei there must be strict rales to restrain them, otherwise anarchy ensues, However, since it isthe very same people who are forever spouting these dreary old proverbs—the ones who say “Itis so human!” whenever some repugnant acts pointed ou to them, che ones who ae always harping on reat Hitanies — ‘who also accuse existentialism of Being to gloomy, it makes me wonder if what they are really annoyed about is not its pessimism, bu rather is optimism. For when lis sid and done, ould ic be hat what fights them abot the doctrine ‘hat I shall ry to present to you here shat offers man theEXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM possibilty of individual choice? To vetify this, we need to reconsider the whole issue ona stiedy philosophical plane ‘Whar, then, i “existentialism”? “Most people who use this word would be ata las to ex- plain what ie means, For now thatit has become fashionable, people ike ro allthis musician or that painter an “ersten tials.” A columnist in Clr goes by the pen name “The “Existentialist” Indeed, che word is being so losey applied ‘so many things uae thas come to mean nothing a all. Te ‘would appear that, fr lack of en avant-garde doctrine anlo- gous ta sure, those who thrive on the latest scandal fad have seized upon a pilsophy eat hardly suits their purpose. The truth is that of ll doctrines, this i the least, scandalous and the most austere: iis strictly intended for specialists and philosophers, Yet it can be ensily defined. ‘What complicates the matter is chat there are two kinds of existentialist: on one hand, the Christian, among whom I ‘would include Kar Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both pro- {essed Catholics; and, on th other, che atheistic exstental- ss, among whom we should plce Heidegger, a well a the French existentialist and mysel{! What they have in com= ‘mon issmply their belie that existence precodes essence oF, ifyou prefer, that subjectivity mustbe ou pint of departure. What exactly do we mean by that? IFwe consider manufac tured object, suchas abookora paper nif, we note tha this object was produced bys craftman who drew his inspiration from a concep: he referred both tothe concept of what a [BXISTENTIALISM 15 4 HUMANISM sper knife, and vo anown production technique that isa pare of that concept and is, by and large, a formula. The per knife is ths both an object produced in certain way and one that, on the other hand, serves a definite purpose. ‘We cannot suppose that a man woul produce a paper knife ‘without knowing what purpose it would serve. Let 8 “sumef formule and popes hat ene ite rote and defined ~ pees is exten. Ths th prec be — then weareeving he werd om eel sandpy, whey wean sy production perenne” ee ecient thins super tan Whatere daca enay be couieg Does tae oae re CL verylecconpnisie so thewhen Gere ks tcty what else Tn te cone a athe rind of Gods compte tthe comepeahe perio inthe mind ofthe manfrarer God pede nan low. ing crn eniqus and semen, uo ea im lowing dein an a ecnig pode» pet hfe Ths ach india an the anon ee tsar nic pilowphen peel th ie of God, ee eee We cnr hie erly rere ia he workDiderot, Vlei, nd even Kant Man posses 2 haan tre; hs “human ot” which he concept of hat ‘hich shaman found inal me, wich meas hat ch thanisa paar came of univers concep. In aon wor his very een of enmpas fore dcr mun in a te of nate —and he bow 08 mening tha th al poses the ae basque. Here apn te sence of man precedes his histeialy print evstence nate ‘Abit eit, which represent, sore oni cen Isat thai God does no as, ee aes one teingin hom estes precedes exec: SSB eins omes before eens, being who ai bfre “hecanbedtndby any coneptofit. Ta: beings man as Heidegger puit dheluman reality Whatdowemeanhere by eens pee cc We mw a: meni only afterward defines himself 1 man as exstentalists con- ceive ofhim cannotbe define its because tobepin with eis othing. He wll ot be anything wilt, id will beswhar he makes Of himself Thus there sno human nature since her sno God eo conceive of Ma nt nly that _which he conceives himself to be, but that which he wills aD exis, just ashe wil himself tobe after being thrown into cxistence, man is nothing other than what he makes of him- sel Thisische frst principle of existentialism, Teisalo what refered ot subjectig” the very word wed asa reproch gainer us Bot what dowe mean by thai outhatman has more dignity than atone ora ble? What sre mean to ay is hat man fet xi chat that man primarily exes that man befor al ele, something that | projects itseFino farare,andisconscions of doing so. Man is indeed a projec that has subjrieextene, rater un- | ike that ofa patch of mos, spreading ung, oF a eau | we. rir to tat projection ofthe self nothing exits, || notevenin divin intelligence, and man shall atin existence | only when he what he projects himself tobe —not what he | would ike tobe. What we asually understand by “wil” i | concious decion hat mon of us ake afer we have made | cases wat we ar. I may want to join «pany, write @ | hook, or get married —butall of thats only a manifestation | ofan eller and more spontaneous choice than what i | Inown as “will” If, however, existence erly dots precede ‘essence, man is responsible for what he is _ effect of existentialism is to make every man conscious of ‘what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his own erlsence. CAE SERS _ self, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own Individuality, bu that he is esponsile forall men. ‘The word “subjetvim” hatwo possible interpretations, and our opponents play with both of them, at our expense Sabjetivism means, on the one hand, che freedom of the individual subject to choose what he willbe and, on the[EXISTENTIALISM IS 4 HUMANISM ‘other, man inability to ranscend human subjectivity. The fandamental meaning of existentialism resides in the Inter ‘When we say that man choose himself, notonly do we mean that each ofus must choose himself, hut alsothtin choosing himself he is choosing forall men. In face, in creating the san each of us wills ourselves tobe, there is nota single one ‘four actions that does nota the sime time crete an image ‘ofman aswe thinkhe ought to be. Choosing tobe this or that {sto allem atthe same time the vale of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and nothing canbe good for any of us ules itis good forall, moreover, existence precedes essence and we will testa the same time as we fashion ou image, that image {s valid forall and for our whole era. Our responsiblity i thus much grater than we might have sopposed, because it ‘concerns all mankind. fT ama worker and I choose o join a Christan wade union rather than to become a Communi, andi by that membership, choose to sigify chat resin tion is, after al, the mos suitable solution for man, and that the kingdom of man isnot on this earth, am not commiting ‘myself alone—T am choosing to be resigned on behalf of all—consequently my action commits all mankind, Or, to ‘use a more personal example, if decide to marry and have clildren — granted such a mariage proceeds solely from my own circumstances, my pasion, or my desire [am none theless committing not oaly myself, buc all of humanity, 0 the prectice of monogamy. I am therefore responsible for myself and for everyone els, and Iam fshioning a certain image of man as T ehoose him to be. In choosing myself, choose man. This allows us to understand the meaning behind some rather ofy-sounding words such a8 “anguish,” “sbandon- 1mens," and “despair” As you are about to see itis all quite simple, First, what do we mean by anguish? Exstntalists like to say chat man is in anguish. This is what they mean "maa. who commits himself, and who realizes that he is not be, cannot help but be aware of his own fll and profound responsibilty. True, many people do not appear especially anguished, but we maintain ha hey sre merely hiding their anguish or uying not o face it, Cerny, many believe that ‘their actions involve no one but themselves, and were we to as them, "But what iFeveryone acted that way?” they would shrug their shoulders and reply, “But everyone doesnot act. thar wa.” In ruth, however, one should always ask oneself, "What would happen ifeveryone did what Lam doing?” The ‘only way to evade that disturbing thought is through some kindof ba fit. Someone who lie to himself and excuses himself by saying “Everyone doesnot act hit way” is strug- ing with a bad conscience, for the act of lying implies ‘ributng a universal valu wis Anguish can be seen even when concealed. ‘This isthe anguish Kierkegaard called the anguish of Abrsham. Youknow the story an angel orders Abram to sscrie his som ‘This would be olay provided iis relly an angel who appears to him and says, *Thoo, Abraham, shale scrifce thy son.” ‘But any sane person may wonder frst whether itis uly an angel, and second, whether Iam relly Abraham. What proof do Ihave? There was once a mad woman safering from hallucinations who claimed that people were phoning her and giving her orders. The doctor asked her, “Bat who ex sctly speaks to you?” She replied, “He sty itis God.” How id she actually now for certain thatit was God? Ifan angel ppears tome, what proof do Ihave catitisan angel? Orif hear voices, what profi there tht they come from heaven snd not from hell, or from my ox subconscious, or some pathological condition? What proof is there that they are Jnwended for me? What proof is there that am the proper person to impose my conception of man on humanity? Iwill ever ind any proof at all, nor any convincing sign oft fa voice speaks to me itis always I who must decide whether or not thisis the voice ofan ange; if regard cera course of action a good, its T who wil choose to say that tis good, rather than bad, There is nothing to show that Iam Abra tham, and yet Tam constantly compelled to perform exem- plary deeds, Everything happens to every man aifthe entire human race were searing at him and measuring itselfby what he does, So every man ought to be asking himself, “Am T really man who i entitled to act in such away thatthe en= EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM tire human race should be measuring itself by my actions?” ‘Andie does not ask himlf that, he masks his anguish ‘The anguish we are concerned with is not the kind that could lead to quiets or ination, Te is anguish pure and simple, of the kind experienced by all who have bore re= sponsibilites. For example, when s military leader takes it ‘upon himself launch an attack and sends a numberof men 1 their deaths, he chooses to do so, and ultimately, makes ‘that choice lone, Some orders may come fom his superiors, ‘but their scope is so broad that he is obliged to interpret them, and it on his interpretation that the lives often, fourteen, or twenty men depend. In making sucha decision, Ihe is bound wo feel some anguish All leaders have experi- ‘enced that anguish, butt does norprevent them fom acting “To the contrary i is the very condition oftheir action, for ‘they frst contemplate several options, and, in choosing one ‘of them, realize chat its ony valu is in the fice hat twas chosen, Ii ths kind of anguish that existentialism desribes, and as we shall se itcan be made explice through asense of, iret responsibilty toward the oder men who willbe af- fected by it. Is not a sereen that separates us from action, bora condition of action itself, ‘And when we speak of “abandonment” —one of Heideg- ger favorit expressions we merely mean tos that doesnot exis, and chat we must bear the fll consequences of that aserion, Existentialist are strongly opposed ro a cer-‘ain ype of secular morality that seeks to eliminate God as painlessly as possible Around 1880, when some French pro- fessors attempted to formulate a secular morality, they ex pressed it more or less in chese words: God isa useless and costly hypothesis, so we will do withoutit. However ifwe re to have a morality, il society, and a law-abiding worl, it is essential that certain values be taken seriously; hey must ‘have an a prioiexstence ascribed to them, Iemust be consid ‘ered mandatory 2 pris for people to be hones, not to le, ‘ot to beat their wives, to rise children and so forth. We ‘therefore willneed to doa lite more thinking on this subject. inorder to show that such values exis all the sme, and that ‘they ae inscribed in an ineligible heaven, eventhough God doesnot exist In other words and I think this the gist of everyting chat we in France call “radicalism” —noching will have changed if God does nat exist; we will encounter the same standards of havesty, progress, and humanism, and we will ave earned God into an obsolete hypothesis tha wil die cout quietly on its own, Existentialist, om the other hand, find it extremely die curbing that God no longer exists, for along with is disap- pearance goes the possibilty of finding values in anitelligi= ble heaven. There could no longer be any2priei good, since ‘there would be no infinite and perfect consciousness to con that good exists, that we ‘must be honest or mustnotlie since weareona plane shared conly by men. Dostoyevsky once wrote: “If God does not cxive of it. Nowhere i ¢ wri EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM. si, retin pemisible” Thin the sing pinto ‘steal Inded, everyting is peril Go dos etx and mm seonsequendy abandoned, fore amor find nyting ely on neither within or ition Fst he neh re no exes precedes cae, we can neve emi ot acon ye ‘sence 2 given and immusble human nae fh oher ‘words, there is no deerminism—man is fre, man is free= dom. If, however, God does not exit we will encounter no values or orders tht can legitimize our conduct. Ths, we Ihave neither behind ws, or before ws, in the huminows realm of values, any means of usication or excuse, We ar left alone and without excuse. That is what I mean when T aay that man is condemned to be free: condemned, because he did not create himself, yet nonetheless fee, because once cast into the world, hes responsible for everything he does, Existentialist donot believe inthe power of paso. They will never regard a great passion asa devastating torrent that inevitably compels man to commit certain acts and which, ‘therefore, isan excuse: They think that man is responsible {for his own passion. Neither do existentialist believe that ‘man can ind refuge in some given sign that wll guide him on arth; they think that man inerprets the sign ashe pleases nd chat man is therefore without ny support or help, con demsed a all times to invent man. In an exellent article, Francis Ponge once wrote: "Man the fare of man”” This is absolutely ue. However, if we were to interpret this toBXISTENTIALISM [5 A HUMANISM ‘mean tht such a future is inscribed in heaven, and that God Inows what iis, that would be file, for then i would no longer even bea future. I, onthe other hand, it means chat ‘whatever man may appear tobe, there i a facure waiting to be created —a virgin farare~then the saying i tre. Bu for now, we are abandoned, ‘To give youan example hat will elp you to beter under stand what we mean by abandonment, Iwill mention the ease ‘of one of my seudents, who sought me out under the follow- ing circumstances: his father had broken off with is mother and, moreover, was inclined to bea “collaborator.” His older brother had been ile inthe German offensive of 1940, and ‘his young man, with primisive bu noble felings, wanted to avenge him. His mother, ling alone with him and deeply hurt by the partial betrayal ofis father and the death of her ‘oldest son, found her only comioein him. At the time, the ‘young man had the choice of going to England to join the Free French Forees—which would mean abandoning his ‘mother ~or remaining by er side to helper goon with her Iie, He realized that his mother lived only for him and that his absence—perhaps his death—would plunge her into utter despair. He also realized that, lkmately any action he might tke on her behalf would provide the concrete benefit ‘ofhelping her olive, while any actin he might ake to leave and fight would be of uncertain outcome and could disappear pointes lke water sand, For instance, in trying to reach England, he might pas through Spain and be detained there EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM. indefinitely ina campy or afer asving in England or Algiers, ‘ne might be assigned to an ofc toda paperwork, He was ‘therefore confronted by two tally different modes of ac- tion: one conerete and immediate bu directed toward only ‘one individual the ocher involving an infinitely vaster group 8 national corps-—yet more ambiguows forth very te son nd which could be interrupted befor bing carried out ‘And, a the same time, he was vaillatng between swo kinds ‘of morality: morality motivated by sympathy ad invidal devotion, and another morality with broader sope, butles likly tobe fruitfl, He had to choose beoween the two What eould help him make that choice? The Christan Aoctrine? No, The Christian doctrine tell us we must be charitable, love our neighbor, sacrifice ourselves fr others, choose the “narrow wa,” etcetera. But whit isthe narrow way? Whom should-we love like a brother—the soldier o the mother? Which isthe more useful aim the vague one of fighting 2s parc ofa group, of the more concrete one of helping one particular person keep on ving? Who can de~ cide that a prior? No one. No code of ethics on record an- ‘wes that question. Kantian morality instruct us to never ‘reat another asa means, but always as an end. Very well: ‘therefor, if stay with my mother, Iwill eather as an end, notasa means. Buty ch same token, wil be eating those ‘who are fighting on my behalFas« means. Conversely, fT join those who ae fighting wil tee them as an end, and, nso doing, risk treating my mother aa meansIf values are vague and if they are always too broad in scope to apply othe specific and concrete ease unde consid eration, we have no choice but wo rely on our instines. That {is what tis young man tied to do, and when Tlas saw ima, the was saying: “All things considered its feelings dat mat- ter should choose what truly compels me to follow cer ‘ain path. If fel that Llove my mocher enough to sctifice everything else for her—my desire for vengeance, my desire for ation, my desir for adventure —chen I should stay by Ihr side. If tothe contrary, fel that my ove for may mother ‘snorstrong enough, I should go.” Buchow can we measure the strength of fecling? What gave any value wo the young man's feclings for his mother? Precisely thefactthathe chose to say with her- may say that ove s fiend well enough to sacrifice acerain sum of money for his sake, but I en clara that only if have done so. ean say that Iove my mother enough to say by her side oly if actualy sayed with he. ‘The only way I can measure the strength ofthis affection is precisely by performing an action tht confi and defines it However, since lam depending on this fection wo justify ‘my action, Ind myself caught in vicious circle “Moreover, a Gide once pointed out, itis almost impossi- ‘le to distinguish between playneing and tre felings. To decide that I ove my mother and wll say with her, oro sty ‘wth her by puting ona charade, amount tothe same thing. In other words, felings are developed through the actions ‘we take; therefore Ieannot use them s guidelines for aeton. EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM. ‘Thismeans that shoulda’ seek within myself some authen- tic state that will compel me to act any more than T can ‘expect any morality to provide the concepts that wil enable ‘me to act: You may ay, “Well he went to see professor for sevice” Bucif you cons pres, for instance, eb you who has chosen to consult him, and you already know in your hear, more or less, what advice he is key to give. In other ‘words, to choose one advise is only another way 9 commit ‘oneself. This is demonstrated by che fact that, if you are Christan, you will say “consul priest.” But there are col- Iaborating priests, temporisng press, and priests connected tothe Resistance: which do you choose? Had this young man chosen to consulta priest connected to the Resistance, of callaborsting priest, he would have decided beforehand what kind of advice he was to receive. Therefore, in seeking me ‘out, he Inew what my answer would be, and there was oly ‘one answer I could give him: “Vou ar free, so choose in other words invent: No general code of ethics can tll you ‘what you ought to do; there are no signs in this word.” Catholic will reply: “Bue there are sign!” Be that sit ‘may, it is who chooses what chose signs mean, When I was ina German prison camp, Imet a rather remarkable man, ‘who happened tobe a Jesuit. Thisis how he came to join the ‘order: he had experienced several fratatng setbacks in his ie. His father ded while he was stil child, leaving him in poverty bc he was awarded a scholarship to a religious ine stimtion where he was constantly reminded that he had beenaccepted only out of charity. He was subsequently denied a numberof distinctions and honors that would have pleased any child. Then, when he was about eightean years old, he thadan unfortunate lve afr that broke his heart. Finally, at ‘the age of twenty-two, what should have been a tlle was actually the last straw: he unked out of military waining school. This young man had every right to believe he was 2 ‘al flue, twas sign —buta sgn of what? He could have sought refuge in biterness or despa Instead ~and it was very lever of him—he chose to take it sa sign that he was not destined for secular succes, and that his achievements ‘would be attained onlin the realms of religion, sanctity, and faith, He sar in all ofthis « message from God, and so he joined the order. Who can doubt thatthe meaning of the sign was determined by him, and by him alone? We might have concluded something quite diferent from this set of reversls—for example, that he might have been beter off training to be a carpenter or 2 revolutionary. He therefore ears che fll responsibility for his interpretation ofthe sig. ‘This is what “abandonment” implies itis we, ourselves who decide who we ae tobe, Such abandonment entail anguish, {As for “despi” i ha avery simple meaning. Ie means that we mast limi ourselves to reckoning only with those ‘things tha depend on our will, or on the set of probabilities that enable action. Whenever we desire something, there are always elements of probability. IFT am counting on a visit from a friend who is waveling by rin or trolley then T EXISTENTIALISM IS 4 HUMANISM. ‘sume that dhe rain wll arrive on time, or thatthe trolley will not derail. I operate within realm of possibilities, But ‘we credit such posibilies only to the ste extent that our action encompasses them, From the moment that the posi- bilities Iam considering cease w be rigorously engaged by iy action, Imustno longer take interest in them, forno God or greater design can bend che world and its posibilies to ‘my will Inthe final analysis, when Descartes sid “Conquer yourself rather than the worl” he actully meant the same thing: we should act without hope. Marsss, with whom I have discussed this, reply: “Obviously, your ation will be limited by you death; ur youcan rely on the help of others. ‘You can count both an what others are doing elsewhere, in (China, in Rusia, to help you, and on what they wil do later, thatis after your death o cary on your work and bring it to fruition, which will be the revolution, What is more, you ust rely ont; not to do so would be intmoral” _My inal response to thisisthatT wil aways depend on ‘my comrades-in-arms inthe struggle, inasmuch a they are ‘committed, 2s Iam, toa definite common cause, in the soli- arity of party ora group that Tean more or less control — that so say, tha joined the group asa mitant and so its ‘very moves familiar to me. In that context, counting on the solidarity and wll ofthis parry is exact lke counting on the fact thatthe tain wil arrive on time, or thatthe lly will ‘noc deri, But I cannot count on men whom I do not know based on faith in the goodness of humanity or in man’ inter-EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM tin society welfare, given that mani free and there is no aman nature in which Tean place my erst. Ido not know ‘where the Russian Revolution mightlead. Tan admire itand hold it up as an example co che extec that itis clear, to date, that the proletariat plays part in Rusia tha it has aained jn no other nation. Bue T cannot asert that this Rewoltion wll necessarily lead to the triumph ofthe proletariat; must confine myself to what I can ste. Nor can Tbe certain that comradesin-arms will earry on my work ater my death and bring ic to competion, secing that those men ae fee and will rely choose, morrow, what man is to become, To- morrow, after my death, men may choose co impos fascism, while others may be cowardly or distraught enough to let them getaway wit i Fascism will hen become humanity's ‘ruth, and o much the worse for us. La reality, ehings willbe ‘what men have chosen them to be. Does that mean that 1 mvst resort to quiets? No. Fist, I must commit myself, and then act according to the old adage: "No hope is neces- sry to underake anything." This does not mean that Iean~ not belong toa party, just chat I should have no illusions and do whatever can, For instance ifT were toask myselé "Will collecivization ever bea realty?" Thave no idea, All Tknow is that Iwill do everything in my power to make it happen. Beyond tht, [cannot count on anything Quiersm isthe attude of people who say: “Others can do what I cannot do,” The doctrine that am presenting t you is precisely the opposite of quietism, since it declares that EXISTENTIALISM IS & HUMANISM, realty exits only in action. Ieventres even further than that, since it adds: “Man is nothing other than his own proj- fect He exists only to che extent that he realizes himself, therefore he is nothing more than the sum of his setions, nothing more than his fe” In view of this, we can clearly ‘understand why our doctrine horsfes many people. For ‘hey often have no other way of puting up with their misery ‘han to think: “Circumstances have been aginst me, I de serve a much beter ie than che one T have. Admitted, I have never experienced a grea ove or extraordinary friend ship, but thats because T never meta man or woman worthy ofiyfT have written no greathooks, its because [never had the leisure to do so; if have had no children to whom Leoald devote myself tis because Idd not ind a man with whom I ‘ould share my life, So Thave within mea hos of untried but pefocdy viable abilities, inclinations, and possibilities that ‘endow me with worthiness not evident from any examina- tion of my past ations.” In reality, however, fr existenial- ists theres no love other than the deeds of love; no potential forlove other than that which s manifested in loving. There is no genius other than chat which is expressed in works of at the genius of Prous resides in the totality of his works; the genius of Racine i found in the series of his tragedies, ‘outside of which chere is nothing. Why should we aruibate ‘Racine the ability to write yetanother tragedy when thatis precisely what he did no d? I if, a man commits himself and draws his own portrait, ouside of which there is nothingEXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM [No doubt this thought may sem hash to someone who has not made a succes ofhisife, But onthe other hand, it elps people to understand that realty alone evunts, and that dreams, expectations and hopes only serve to definea man as 4 broken dream, aborted hopes, and futile expectations; in other words, they define him negatively, not positively. [Nonetheless saying "You are nothing bot your lie” does not amply chat the aes ill e judged solely by his works of art, for thousand other things sso help wo define him. What we mean to sy i that a man is nothing bot e series of enter- ‘rises and that he sche sum, organization and aggregate of the relations that constsate such enterprises In light of allthis, what people reproach ws for i not ‘essentially our pessimism, but he teranes of our optimism. 1 people eriticize our works of ction in which we describe characters who are spineless, weak, ovary, and sometimes ‘even frankly evi it snot just because these characters are spineless, weak, cowardly, or ev Forif ike Zola, we were to ‘blame their behavior on their heredity, or environmental in- Fvences, thee society or factors ofan organic or paychologi ‘al ature, people woeld be reasured and would say, “Thatis the way we are. Noone can do anything aboutit” But when ancaistentialst desribes coward he says that the cowards responsible for his own cowardice. He is not the way he is because he has cowardly heart, lng, or bein. Heis not ike that asthe result of is physiological makeup; be slike that because he has made himself «coward through bis actions. EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM. ‘There is no such thing asa cowardly temperaments there are nervous temperaments, of “poor blood,” as ordinary folks call itor “rch semperamens,” hut just becuse a man has Poor blood does not make him a coward, for what produces ‘cowardice is the act of giving up, or giving in, A tempera- ‘ment isnotan action; coward is defined by the action he has taken, What people are obscurely fling, and what horsifes ‘hem, is that the coward, as we presen him, i guilty of his cowardice, People would prefer t be born a coward or be bom a hero: One of the mos frequent eiticims af Raed to Fracdam may be expressed a follows: “Frankly, how can you ‘make heroes out of people as spineless a this?” This objec- ‘ion sreally quite comical, frit implies that people are born heroes, Essentially tha is what people would ike to think IF you are born 2 coward, you need not et it concer yoo, for you will bea coward your whole if, regardless of whit you do, shrough no fal of your own. IFyou are born hero, you need notletitconcern you ther, for you will bea hero your ‘whole life and eat and drink ike one. What the existentialist saysis that the coward makes himself cowardly and the hero takes himself heroic; there is lays the posibily that one ay the coward may no longer be cowardly and the hero may. ‘cease to be a hero. What matters isthe total commitment, but there is no one particular situation or action that fly commits you, one way or the other. ‘Wehave now, I thin, dispensed with numberof charges ‘brought against existentialism. You have sen that it cannotEXISTENTIALISM 15 A HUMANISM be considered a philosophy of qictism, since it defines man ‘byhisaecions, nor can ite aed pesimisti deseiption of ‘man, forno doctrines more optimistic, since it declares that man's destiny lies within himself, Nor is existentialism an smtempt to discourage man fom taking acon, since i tells him tha the only hope residesin his actions and thatthe only ‘hing that allows him to lives action. Consequently we are dealing with morality of action and commitment. Never- theless,onthe bass ofa few wrongheadednotons, weare also charged with imprisoning man within is individal subjec- tivity In this regard, t00, we are excedingly misunderstood. For strictly philosophical reasons, ou pont of departures, indeed, the subjectivity ofthe individual —notbecausewe are bourgeois, but because weseekto base our doctrine on truth, ‘ot on comforting theories full of hope bat without any real foundation. As oar point of deparcure there can be no other ‘uth than this: Ieinkeerfre Lam. Thisis the absototetuth ‘ofconsciousnessconfrontngitsell Any dheory thateonsiders man outside ofthismoment ofself- awareness atthe outset, a thcory that suppreses the tut, for ouside ofthis Carte~ sian cgi, all objects are merely probable, and a doctrine of probabilities not rooted in any truth crumbles into nothing. Inorderta define the probable, one must possess whatis true. “Therefore in onder for any tath to exist there must fist be an absolute truth: The later is simple, easy to ata, and within everyone reach: one need only seize directly EXISTENTIALISM 1S & HUMANISM. Inthe second place, this isthe only theory that endows ‘man with any dignity, and the only one that does not turn him into an object. The effect of any form of materialism is ‘o teat all men —including oneself—as objec, which ito say as a set of predetermined reactions indstingushable fiom the properties and phenomena cat constitute, say, a tub, a char, o a stone. Our aim is excdly to establish the Jhuman kingdom as set of values distint from the material worl. But che subjectivity that we thereby attain as a stan {ard of truth is noe src indvideal in nature, for we have demonstrated that its not only oneself that one discovers in the coi, br also the existence of others, Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, or of Kant when we sy think,” ‘we each atin ourselves the presence ofthe othe, and we are just certain ofthe other as we ae of ourselves. There= fore, the man who becom aware of himself dretly in the ‘ogi also perceives all others, and he dows soa the condition of his own existence. He realizes that he cannot be anything athe sens in which we sy someone pris, or cruel, or jealous) unless others acknowledge him as such, I cannot discover any truth whatsoever aboot myself except through ‘the mediation of another. The other is esential to my exis- tence, a5 wll as tothe knowledge Ihave of mysel, Under these conditions, my intimate diseovery of myself is atthe same time a revelation of the other as a freedem that con frontsmy own and that cannot hink or will without doingsofor or agnnst me, We are thus immediately thrust into a ‘world that we may call “intersubjeciig:”Iisin this world that man decides what he sand what others ae. Furthermore, although ici impossible wo find in every man a universal esence that could be sid to comprise hu- man nature, there is nonetheless a univers human raison. Itisno acident that today's thinkers are more likey to speae ‘ofthe condition f man rather than ofhis nature. By “eondi- ton” they refer, more or les cea, tall imitations chat 2 prin’ define man's fundamental situation in the wniverse. ‘Hiscrial situations vary: a man may be born 2 slave in pagan socery a feudal lord ora member of the proletariat. ‘What never varies isthe necesiy fr im to bein the world, ‘to work init, to live out his life init among others, and, ‘eventually, ro dein it. These limitations are neither subjec- tive nor objective; rather they have an objective as well ata subjective dimension: objective, because they affect everyone andre evident everywhere; subjective because they ae expe- rienced a are meaningless if man does not experience them — that isto sy ifman doesnot fely determine himself and his existence in relation to chem. And, as diverse as man's projects may bea east none of hem seem will foreign to re since each presents itself as an attempt to surpass such Fimitaions,t0 postpone, deny, or to come to tems with them, Consequently, every project, however individual has a ‘universal value. Every project—cven one belonging «0 (Chinese, an Indian, or an Affican—can be understood by a ‘Baropean. To say tcan be understood means that the Buro- pean of 1945, though his sitaation ie diferent, must dea wich his own limitations in ehe same way, and so can reinvent within himself ehe project undereaken by the Chines, In- dian, or black Aican, Theres universality in every project, inasmuch as any man s eapable of derstanding any human projet: This should not be taken co mean that a certain project defines man forever, hut that it can be reinvented ‘gain and again. Given sufficient information, one canal ‘ways find 2 way to understand an idiot, a child, a person from so-ealed primitive eleure, or foreign. In this sense, we can claim chat human tnversaity exists, buticis nota given iis in perpetwal construction. In choos. ing myself I eonstruee universal I construct it by under- standing every other mank projet, regardless ofthe ers in ‘which he lives, This absolute freedom af choice does not alter the relat of each era. The fundamental aim ofexis- ‘entialsm sto reveal thelinberween the absolute character ofthe free commitment, by which evry man realizes himself in realizing «type of humanity commitment that is al- ways understandable, by anyone in any era—and the rela- tivity ofthe cultural ensemble that may result from such a choice, We mus also note the relay f Cartesian and the absolute nature ofthe Cartesian commitment. In this sense, we can say; ifyou prefer, that every one of us creates the absolute by the act of breathing, eating, seeping, or by ‘behaving in any fshion at all There sno difference betweenfree being —being a a project, being as existence choosing its essence —and absolute being. Noris there any diference between being as an absolute temporarily localized — thai, localized in history —and universally ineligible being ‘This does not entirely refte the charge of ubjectivsms in fact that erica is sill being made in several ways. The ‘most common instance is when people tellus, “So youcan do ‘whatever you lik.” This is expressed in various ways. First, they tax us with anarchy; then they say, “You cannot judge ‘others for there is no reason to prefer one project to an- other” Finally, they sy, “Since all of your choices are arbi- ‘rary, you receive into one hand what you grant with the other” These three objections should not be taken too se ously. The first objection, that you can choose whatever you like, is simply incorrect. In one sense, choice is posible, ‘whatisimposibleis oto choos. Loan always choose, but | must aso realize that, if I decide not to choose, hat stil ‘onstrates choice, Thismay seem a purely technical dtfer- cence, butitisveryimportansince it limits whim and capice. Although itis tre that in confronting sny eal situation, for ‘example that Lam capable ofhaving semua intercourse wth a member of the opposite sex and of having children, Tam obliged to choose an atsnude toward the situation, andin any case Ibear the responsibility of a choice chat, in commiting myself also commits humanity as a whole. Even fo priori value can influence my choice, the latter has nothing to do with peice; and fanyone thinks this jut another exam= EXISTENTIALISA IS A HUMANISM ple of Gide’ theory ofthe gratuitous act, he has filed to irisp the vast difference between our theory and Gide Gide does not know what a situation is he acts merely by ‘aprice, Our view, on the other an i that man finds ize selfina complex soil situation in which he himsefis com ritted, and by his choice commis ll mankind and he en not avoid choosing. He will choose to abstain from sex, oF ‘marry without having children, or marry and have children, ‘Whatever be does, he cannot avoid bearing fll respon sibility for his siuation. He must choose without reference ‘ony preesablished values, butie would be unfit tarhim with capriciousness. Rather, let us say that moral choice is like constructing work of ae -Acthispoin,weneed eo digressa moment to makeitclear tha we are not espousing an aesthetic morality, for our ad~ versries have shown such bad faith that they even reproach vsfor that. Tinvoke the ample of ats endeavor solely as 4 means of comparison. Having said that, as anyone ever blamed an artist for not fllowing rules of painting estab- lished ¢ prior? Has anyone ever told an atist what sor of Picture he should punt? Te is obvious that there is no pre= defined picture tobe made, and thatthe arts commit him- self in painting his own pictare, and that the picrue that ‘ought to be pained i precisely the one that he wil have painted. As weallinow, chee are no sesthetie values priv, bu there are values that wil subscquenly be reflected in the coherence ofthe painting, inthe relationship between the[EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM will o reste and the fnished work. No one can sty what tomorrow’ punting will lok ike; we cannot judge a pant- ing unt itis finished. What does that have wo do with moral- ity? We aein the same creative situation. We never speak of the gratitousnes ofa work of art. When we discus one of Pleasso’ paintings, we never say tha i is grataitous; we [know fl well chat his composition became what it i while the was painting it and chat the body of his work spar and parcel ofhislit ‘Thesame applies tothe moral plane. Whatareand moral- fgg have in common is creation and invention. We cannot decide a prin what ought tobe done. I believe I made that clear enough when discussing the case ofthe student who came to see me: regardless of whatever ethical system he might atempe to follow, whether Kantian or anyother, one ‘would offer any guidance. He was obliged to invent his own laws. Certainly we cannot claim that chis young man— who hose to remain wth his mothe, taking a his guiding moral principles his feelings, individual ation, and coneretechar- ity (or who could have chosen scrice by going to England) — made gratuitons choice. Man makes himself he doesnot ‘come into the world flly made, he makes himlf by choos- ing his own morality and his circumstances are such that he Inasno option ather than w choose a morality. We can define ‘man only in relation this commitments. lis therefore hi dicrous to Blame us forthe graritousnes of our choices. Ia the second pce, people tell ws: *You cannot judge others.” BXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM Tone sense this is tre in another not. Is truein the sense ‘that whenever man chooses his commitment an his project ina totally sincere and lucid wa, iis imposible for him to prefer another Iti also tre in the sense that we do not Deliewe in the ide of progress. Progress implies improve- ‘ment, but man is always the same, confronting situation that is forever changing, while choice always remains a choice in any station. The moral dilemma hs not changed from the days of the American Civil War, when many were forced to choose between taking sides for or against slavery, ‘our own time, when ones faced with the choice berween ‘the Popolar Republican Movement [a Chistian democratic party founded in 1944] and the Communists. Nevertheless we cam pass judgment, for as I sid, we choose inthe presence of others and we choose ourselves in the presence of others Fist, we may judge (and thismaybea logical rather than a value judgment) tht certain ches are ‘based on error and others on truth, We may als judge aman when we assert that he is ating in bad fith. If we define ‘man’ situation as one offre choice, in which he has no Fecours to excuses or outside ad then any man who takes refuge behind his passions, any man who fabrcates some ‘deterministic theory, is operating in bad faith. One might object by saying: "Bue why shouldnt he choose bad fait" “My answers that donot pass orl jdgment against him, bel cal his bad ith an ero. Here, we cannot avoid make {ng judgment of ruth. Bad fuiths obviously aie because it roEXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM {sa disimulation of man’ fll reedom of commitment. On ‘the same grounds, I would say that Iam also ating in bad {aithiFT declare chat Tam bound to uphold cern values, ‘because itis contradiction to embrace these values while at the sume time afirming that Iam bound by them. Ifsome= ‘one were to ask me: "What iT want co be in bad faith?” 1 ‘would reply, "Theres no reason why you should not be, but {declare chat you at, and that a strictly consistent aceude lone demonstrates good faith.” What is more, Tam able to ‘bing a moral ugmento bea. When [affirm that freedom, ‘under any concrete circumstance, can have no other aim ‘than islfand once a man realizes in his tate of abandon- ‘ment, that is he who imposes values, he can wil but one ‘thing freedom asthe foundation ofall valves ‘That doesnot mean that he wills icin the abstracyitsimply means thatthe wlimate significance of the actions of men of _good fit ethe questoffredom in itself A man who joins a ‘communist oF revolutionary group wills cerain concrete sims that imply an abstract wil to freedom, yee that freedom ust always be exercised ina concrete manner, We wl fre dom for freedom sake uhrough our individual circum cance, And in thus willing freedom, we discover that i¢ depends entirely onthe freedom of others, and thatchefree- dom of others depends on our own. Ofcourse, fresdomas the definition of man does not depend on others, but as soon as ‘there is commitment, I am obliged to will the freedom of EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM. othersat the same time as wil my own. Teannotsetamy own freedom a «goal without lo sting the freedom of others 84 goal, Consequently, when, operating on the level ofcom- plete authenticity, Ihave acknowledged that existence pre- ‘exes essence, and chat mani free being who, under any ‘ireumstances, can only ever will his freedom, Thave athe same time acknowledged that I must will the fredom of ‘others. Therefore, inthe name of this wil to freedom, im pled by freedom itself can pass judgmenton those wh seek to conceal from themselves the complete arbitrariness of their existence, and their toa freedom, Those who conceal from themselves thistotal freedom, under the guise of slem- nity or by making determinst excuses, il all cowards. Others, wh try eo prove thee existence is necessary when ‘mans appearance on earth is merely contingent, I wil cll bastards. But whether cowardsor bastards they eanbejudged ‘onlyon the grounds of strict authentic. Ths, although the ‘content of morality may ary, acenaia frm ofthat moraityis ‘iver. Kane sates tha freedom wil itself and the free- ‘dom of others. Agreed, Buthe belivesthatche formal andthe universal are adequate to constitute a morality. We, tothe contrary, believe chat principles that are to abstract fil to Aefine action. Consider aguin the case ofthe seadent: in the ‘name of what —what inviolable moral masim —could he pos- sibiy have decided, with perfer peace of min, whether he should abandon or remain with his mother? There is no wayLEXISTENTIALISM 1S A HUMANISM of judging. The content is always specific inventiveness always part ofthe process. The only thing that counts is ‘whether or notinvention is made inthe name of freedom, Consider, for example, the following two cases and you vill se to what extent they are similar, despite their obvious Aiferences. Take George Eliot’ novel The Mill onthe Fl. Inchatstory, we encounter young woma, Maggie Tllve, ‘who isthe very incarnation of pasion and isaware ofthe fact. She fils in love with a young man, Stephen, whois already ‘engaged toa very ordinary young girl Instead of recklessly pursing her own happiness, Maggie chooses, inthe name of Jnuman slidariy, self-sacrifice, giving up the man she loves. ‘On the other hand, in Stendhal The Charterouz of Porm, [La Sanseverins, who believes tht passion isthe measure of ‘man, would say hata great love jstiis any sacrifice, and mus be preferred tothe banality ofa conjugal love like the ‘one that would bind Stephen to hilly goose ofa fancée, Ie is the ater she would have chosen to sacrifice for her own, Aheppines and, as Stendhal shows, she seven willing to make the ukimate sscrifce for pasion’ sake if ife demands it. “Here, we confront two diametrically opposed morales, yet | nmaitain they are equialen, inasmuch as the ulate sim in both eases is freedom, Let ws now imagine two diferent stccudes with sikingly similar effects one girl, out ofresig- nation, prefers to give up her lover, while the other, ofall, her sera desires, prefers to avelook the previous engage- sent ofthe man she loves. On the surface both cases seem to XISTENTIALISM 15 A HUMANISM ‘mirror those we have just described. Howeve, they are com= pletely diferent. La Sanseverina¥ ate has more in com- ‘mon with Maggie Tuliver than it does with careless greed. So, you can see tha this second objection isboth true and fale. One can choose anything, so long as it involves fee ‘The third objection, which we said canbe stated ae "You receive nto one hand what you grantwith the othe,” ean, atbottom, our values need not e taken very seriously since ‘we choose them ourselves In response, Tan say that very ‘much regret tshould beso, butifThave eliminated God the Father therehastobesomeone toinventvalucs. Things ist bbe accepted as they are, Whats more, to say thar we invent ‘values means neither mare nor less than this life has no meaning prior Life itself nothing unc its lived, cis we ‘who give it meaning, and valve i nothing more than the ‘meaning that we giveit Youcan se, then, thatitis posible ‘reat human commonity. Some have blamed me for pos- tnlating that existentialism is foem of humanism. People have sid tome, “Butia Newee you wrote that humanists are ‘wrong; you even ridieuleda certain ype of humanism, sowhy are you reversing your opinion now?” Actually, the word “humanism” has two very different meanings. By “human ‘smn we might mean a theory that takes man as an end and as ‘the supreme value. For example, in history Arsund th World ‘in $0 Hous, Cocteau gives expresion vo thsidea when ane of his characters, fying over some mountain in a plane, pro‘aims: “Man is amaring! Thi means: even though myself say never have builta plane, !neverthees sil benefit from the plan’ invention and, a8 man, Ishould consider myeel responsible fo, and honored by, what certain ather men have achieved. This presupposes that we can assign a valve coman nse on the most admirable deeds of certain men. Buc that ‘kind ofhumanismisabsurd, for onlyadogorahorse would be ina postion to form an overall judgment about man and declare hates amazing, which animal scarcely seemlikely to do—atleast,asfras Thnow. Norisitacceptablethatarman should pronounce judgment on mankind, Existentialism dis- nse with any judgment of this sore existentialism will never consider man as an end, because man is constantly in the making. And we have no right to believe that humanity fs something we could worship, in the manner of Auguste (Come. The cul of humanity lads wlimately co an insular ‘Comtsian humanism and—this needs to be suid—to Fas- cam, We do mit want that type of hmanism. Buc theres another meaning co the word "humanism." Ie ‘is basically thi: mani always outside of himself, andi isin projecting and losing himself beyond himself that man is realized; and, onthe other hand, tisin pursuing transcendent goals hate s able to exist. Since mans this transcendence, and grape objects ony in relation to such transcendence, he ishimself he core and focus ofthis transcendence. The only universe theists isthe himan one —the universe ofhuman subjectivity. This link between transcendence as constitutive EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISAE ‘of man (notin the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense hat man pases beyond himself) and ubjecivity inthe sense hatman snotan sland unto hinselfbutalayspresent Jina human waiverse) is what we call existentialist human- jm." Thisis humanism because we remind man that there is no legislator other dhan himself and that he must, in his aandoned state, make his own choices, and also beease we show that is noc by uring inward, but by constantly sek ing a goal outside of himself inthe form of liberation, or of some special achievement, that man will realize himself as ‘uly human. From these few comment, i is evident cha nothing is ‘more unjust than the objections people have brought against ‘us Essentials is merely an atempe ro draw ll of the conclusions inferred by a consistently atheistic point of view. Is puposeisnotacall to plunge mankind into despair Bucif| we label any attitude of unbelief “despa” 25 Christians do, then our notion of despairis vastly diferent from ts original meaning ‘xstentiasm snot so much an atheism in the sense that Je would exhaust itself atemping to demonstrate the ones istence of Goel rather, it ffims that even if God were cast it would make no diference — thats our point of view Itisnotthatwe belive that Gd exists, bue we chink thatthe ‘eal problem isnot one ofhis existence; what man needsis to rediscover himself and wo comprehend that nothing can save him from himself, not even valid proof of the existence ofEXISTENTIALISN IS A HUMANISM God In this sense, existentialism s optimistic. Ieisa doctrine ‘of action, and itis ony in bad faith—inconfasing their own despair with ours—that Christians ae able to asset that we ae “without hope.” POST-LECTURE DISCUSSION “This dcavion wok plas daring te qustion-and-ansceresbange filling Sari sr om exiresion. Te fs sere of x= tions came from an identified member ofthe anon. Pere Nall was French sural author and fis. Question: Idon'tknow ifthiscurrentefforto explain cximentiasm will make you beter or les wll understood, ‘bt think thatthe elaifcation in Action makes your position ‘somewhat harder to understand‘ “Despair” and “abandon ment” have an even greater resonance in an existentialist text than they usually do, And i sems to me that your under- sanding of despair” or “anguish” is something more funda mental than simple choice made bya man who realizes that hh is alone and so must make his own choices. Ie isan aware- ‘ness of the human condition that doesnot occur all the time “That we must choote ourselves at all times is evident, but anguish and despair are bardly common emotions. ‘Santee: Obviously Ido not mean that when I choose beeen cream pastry and a chocolate él Lam choosing in anguish, The anguish is constant in the sense that my EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM initial choice is consant ching. Indeed, in my opinion, an- gis sche total absence of justification accompanied, athe same time, by responsibilty toward all. Quustron: Twas speaking about the carifiation of- fered in Acton, and it sem to me that your viewpoint, ait ‘was expressed there, was slightly weakened Sanne: Inall sincerity, eis posible tha the article in Asin di somewhat dle my arguments: Many ofthe peo- ple who interview me are not qualified ro do so. This eaves sme with two alternatives refuse wo answer their questions, ot agree to allow discussion to take place on a simplified level. T chose the second because, when alli suid and done, when- fever we present our theories in the classroom, we agree (© dilute our thinking in order to make i understood, and that oes’: seer like such a bad thing. If we have a theory of commitment, we mstbe commited to che very end, Ifeis- eotials philosophy is, Gs and foremost, a philosophy that says existence precedes essence," itmustbe experienced iit 4s tobe sincere, To live as an existeniast means to accept the consequence of this doctrine and not merely to impose igonothersin books. Ifyou trly wantths philosophy tobe a commitment, you have an obligation to make it comprehen- sible to those who are discussing it on politcal or moral plane. Tam reproached fr using the word “humanism.” Thatis because the problem poses itself as fllows: either we mast convey the doctrine on a szicdy philosophical plane and