EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-30173. September 30, 1971.]

GAVINO A. TUMALAD and GENEROSA R. TUMALAD , plaintiffs-

appellees, vs. ALBERTA VICENCIO and EMILIANO SIMEON,
defendants-appellants.

Castelo & Suck for plaintiffs-appellees.

Jose Q. Calingo for defendants-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; UNLAWFUL DETAINER;

CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP IS A MATTER OF DEFENSE THEREIN. — In detainer
cases the claim of ownership "is a matter of defense and raises an issue of
fact which should be determined from the evidence at the trial."
2. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; FRAUD OR DECEIT RENDERS CONTRACT
VOIDABLE, NOT VOID AB INITIO. — Fraud or deceit does not render a
contract void ab initio, and can only be a ground for rendering the contract
voidable or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the New Civil Code, by a
proper action in court.
3. ID.; ID.; PARTIES THERETO MAY TREAT AS PERSONAL PROPERTY
THAT WHICH IS REAL PROPERTY. — In the case of Manarang and Manarang
vs. Ofilada (99 Phil. 109), this Court stated that "it is undeniable that the
parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that
which by nature would be real property," citing Standard Oil Company of
New York vs. Jaramillo (44 Phil. 632).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the contract now before Us, the
house on rented land is not only expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage;
it specifically provides that "the mortgagor. . . voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and
TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage the property together with its
leasehold rights over the lot on which it is constructed and participation . . ."
Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as
personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of
chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey
the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that
they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming
otherwise. Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which
defendants-appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and although
this can not in itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so
when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the
parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as
personality.
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 5. ID.; ID.; PARTIES ESTOPPED TO ASSAIL VALIDITY THEREOF. — It is
the defendants-appellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are
attacking the validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of
estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having
treated the subject house as personality.
6. ID.; ID.; MORTGAGE; FORECLOSURE; MORTGAGOR MAY BE
ALLOWED POSSESSION DURING THE ONE-YEAR PERIOD OF REDEMPTION. —
Section 6 of the Act referred to (Act No. 3135) provides that the debtor-
mortgagor (defendants-appellants herein) may, at any time within one year
from and after the date of the auction sale, redeem the property sold at the
extra judicial foreclosure sale. Section 7 of the same Act allows the
purchaser of the property to obtain from the court the possession during the
period of redemption: but the same provision expressly requires the filing of
a petition with the proper Court of First Instance and the furnishing of a
bond. It is only upon filing of the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond that the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter
of course. No discretion is left to the court. In the absence of such a
compliance, as in the instant case, the purchaser can not claim possession
during the period of redemption as a matter of right.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURCHASER RECEIVING RENTALS DURING
REDEMPTION PERIOD IS ACCOUNTABLE TO MORTGAGOR; RATIONALE. — "In
other words, before the expiration of the 1-year period within which the
judgment-debtor or mortgagor may redeem the property, the purchaser
thereof is not entitled, as a matter of right, to possession of the same. Thus,
while it is true that the Rules of Court allow the purchaser to receive the
rentals if the purchased property is occupied by tenants, he is, nevertheless,
accountable to the judgment-debtor or mortgagor as the case may be, for
the amount so received and the same will be duly credited against the
redemption price when the said debtor or mortgagor effects the redemption.
Differently stated, the rentals receivable from tenants, although they may be
collected by the purchaser during the redemption period, do not belong to
the latter but still pertain to the debtor or mortgagor. The rationale for the
Rule, it seems, is to secure for the benefit of the debtor or mortgagor, the
payment of the redemption amount and the consequent return to him of his
properties sold at public auction." (Italics supplied)

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J : p

Case certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27824-
R) for the reason that only questions of law are involved.
This case was originally commenced by defendants-appellants in the
municipal court of Manila in Civil Case No. 43073, for ejectment. Having lost
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 therein, defendants-appellants appealed to the court a quo (Civil Case No.
30993) which also rendered a decision against them, the dispositive portion
of which follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay
jointly and severally the former a monthly rent of P200.00 on the
house, subject-matter of this action, from March 27, 1956, to January
14, 1967, with interest at the legal rate from April 18, 1956, the filing
of the complaint, until fully paid, plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P300.00 and to pay the costs."
It appears on the records that on 1 September 1955 defendants-
appellants executed a chattel mortgage 1 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees over
their house of strong materials located at No. 550 Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, over Lot No. 6-B and 7-B, Block No. 2554, which were being
rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage was registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Manila on 2 September 1955. The herein mortgage was
executed to guarantee a loan of P4,800.00 received from plaintiffs-
appellees, payable within one year at 12% per annum. The mode of payment
was P150.00 monthly, starting September, 1955, up to July 1956, and the
lump sum of P3,150 was payable on or before August, 1956. It was also
agreed that default in the payment of any of the amortizations would cause
the remaining unpaid balance to become immediately due and payable and
—
"the Chattel Mortgage will be enforceable in accordance with
the provisions of Special Act No. 3135, and for this purpose, the
Sheriff of the City of Manila or any of his deputies is hereby
empowered and authorized to sell all the Mortgagor's property after
the necessary publication in order to settle the financial debts of
P4,500.00, plus 12% yearly interest, and attorney's fees. . ." 2
When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at
public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder, plaintiffs-
appellees were issued the corresponding certificate of sale. 3 Thereafter, on
18 April 1956, plaintiffs-appellees commenced Civil Case No. 43073 in the
municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that the house be
vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for defendants-
appellants to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the
time the possession is surrendered. 4 On 21 September 1956, the municipal
court rendered its decision —
". . . ordering the defendants to vacate the premises described
in the complaint; ordering further to pay monthly the amount of
P200.00 from March 27, 1956, until such (time that) the premises is
(sic) completely vacated; plus attorney's fees of P100.00 and the
costs of the suit." 5
Defendants-appellants, in their answers in both the municipal court
and court a quo impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage, claiming that
they are still the owners of the house; but they waived the right to introduce
evidence, oral or documentary. Instead, they relied on their memoranda in
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 support of their motion to dismiss, predicated mainly on the grounds that:
(a) the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to try and decide the case
because (1) the issue involved is ownership, and (2) there was no allegation
of prior possession; and (b) failure to prove prior demand pursuant to Section
2, Rule 72, of the Rules of Courts. 6
During the pendency of the appeal to the Court of First Instance,
defendants-appellants failed to deposit the rent for November, 1956 within
the first 10 days of December, 1956 as ordered in the decision of the
municipal court. As a result, the court granted plaintiffs-appellees' motion for
execution, and it was actually issued on 24 January 1957. However, the
judgment regarding the surrender of possession to plaintiffs-appellees could
not be executed because the subject house had been already demolished on
14 January 1957 pursuant to the order of the court in a separate civil case
(No. 25816) for ejectment against the present defendants for non-payment
of rentals on the land on which the house was constructed.
The motion of plaintiffs for dismissal of the appeal, execution of the
supersedeas bond and withdrawal of deposited rentals was denied for the
reason that the liability therefor was disclaimed and was still being litigated,
and under Section 8, Rule 72, rentals deposited had to be held until final
disposition of the appeal. 7
On 7 October 1957, the appellate court of First Instance rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which is quoted earlier. The said decision
was appealed by defendants to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, certified
the appeal to this Court. Plaintiffs-appellees failed to file a brief and this
appeal was submitted for decision without it.
Defendants-appellants submitted numerous assignments of error
which can be condensed into two questions, namely:
(a) Whether the municipal court from which the case
originated had jurisdiction to adjudicate the same;
(b) Whether the defendants are, under the law, legally
bound to pay rentals to the plaintiffs during the period of one (1)
year provided by law for the redemption of the extrajudicially
foreclosed house.
We will consider these questions seriatim.
(a) Defendants-appellants mortgagors question the
jurisdiction of the municipal court from which the case originated,
and consequently, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance a quo, on the theory that the chattel mortgage is void ab
initio; whence it would follow that the extrajudicial foreclosure,
and necessarily the consequent auction sale, are also void. Thus,
the ownership of the house still remained with defendants-
appellants who are entitled to possession and not plaintiffs-
appellees. Therefore, it is argued by defendants-appellants, the
issue of ownership will have to be adjudicated first in order to
determine possession. It is contended further that ownership
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 being in issue, it is the Court of First Instance which has
jurisdiction and not the municipal court.
Defendants-appellants predicate their theory of nullity of the chattel
mortgage on two grounds, which are: (a) that their signatures on the chattel
mortgage were obtained through fraud, deceit, or trickery; and (b) that the
subject matter of the mortgage is a house of strong materials, and, being an
immovable, it can only be the subject of a real estate mortgage and not a
chattel mortgage.
On the charge of fraud, deceit or trickery, the Court of First Instance
found defendants-appellants' contentions as not supported by evidence and
accordingly dismissed the charge, 8 confirming the earlier finding of the
municipal court that "the defense of ownership as well as the allegations of
fraud and deceit . . . are mere allegations." 9
It has been held in Supia and Batiaco vs. Quintero and Ayala 10 that
"the answer is a mere statement of the facts which the party filing it expects
to prove, but it is not evidence; 11 and further, that when the question to be
determined is one of title, the Court is given the authority to proceed with
the hearing of the cause until this fact is clearly established. In the case of Sy
vs. Dalman, 12 wherein the defendant was also a successful bidder in an
auction sale, it was likewise held by this Court that in detainer cases the
claim of ownership "is a matter of defense and raises an issue of fact which
should be determined from the evidence at the trial." What determines
jurisdiction are the allegations or averments in the complaint and the relief
asked for. 13
Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, fraud or deceit does
not render a contract void ab initio, and can only be a ground for rendering
the contract voidable or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the New Civil
Code, by a proper action in court. 14 There is nothing on record to show that
the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were
taken to nullify the same. Hence, defendants-appellants' claim of ownership
on the basis of a voidable contract which has not been voided fails.
It is claimed in the alternative by defendants-appellants that even if
there was no fraud, deceit or trickery, the chattel mortgage was still null and
void ab initio because only personal properties can be subject of a chattel
mortgage. The rule about the status of buildings as immovable property is
stated in Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc., 15 cited in Associated
Insurance Surety Co., Inc. vs. Iya, et al. 16 to the effect that —
". . . it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and
distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real
properties (art. 415, New Civil Code) could only mean one thing —
that a building is by itself an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner."
Certain deviations, however, have been allowed for various reasons. In
the case of Manarang and Manarang vs. Ofilada, 17 is Court stated that "it is
undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as
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 personal property that which by ,nature would be real property", citing
Standard Oil Company of New York vs. Jaramillo. 18 In the latter case, the
mortgagor conveyed and transferred to the mortgagee by way of mortgage
"the following described personal property. " 19 The "personal property"
consisted of leasehold rights and a building. Again, in the case of Luna vs.
Encarnacion, 20 the subject of the contract designated as Chattel Mortgage
was a house of mixed materials, and this Court held therein that it was a
valid Chattel mortgage because it was so expressly designated and
specifically that the property given as security "is a house of mixed
materials, which by its very nature is considered personal property." In the
later case of Navarro vs. Pineda, 21 this Court stated that —
"The view that parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree
to consider a house as personal property for the purposes of said
contract, 'is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel'
(Evangelista vs. Alto Surety, No. L-11139, 23 April 1958). In a case, a
mortgaged house built on a rented land was held to be a personal
property, not only because the deed of mortgage considered it as
such, but also because it did not form part of the land (Evangelista vs.
Abad, [CA]; 36 O.G. 2913), for it is now settled that an object placed
on land by one who had only a temporary right to the same, such as
the lessee or usufructuary, does not become immobilized by
attachment (Valdez vs. Central Altagracia, 222 U.S. 58, cited in
Davao Sawmill Co., Inc. vs. Castillo, et al., 61 Phil. 709). Hence, if a
house belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to
another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property as so
stipulated in the document of mortgage. (Evangelista vs. Abad,
supra.) It should be noted, however that the principle is predicated on
statements by the owner declaring his house to be a chattel, a
conduct that may conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming
otherwise." (Ladera vs. C.N. Hodges, [CA] 48 O.G. 5374). 22
In the contract now before Us, the house on rented land is not only
expressly designated as Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the
mortgagor . . . voluntarily CEDES, SELLS and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel
Mortgage 23 the property together with its leasehold rights over the lot on
which it is constructed and participation . . ." 24 Although there is no specific
statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by
ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage
defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as
chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should
not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which defendants-
appellants merely had a temporary right as lessee, and although this can not
in itself alone determine the status of the property, it does so when
combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that the parties,
particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personality.
Finally, unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc. 25
and Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery and Williamson, 26 wherein third
persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, 27 it is the defendants-
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 appellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the
validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel
therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having treated the
subject house as personalty.
(b) Turning now to the question of possession and rentals of the
premises in question. The Court of First Instance noted in its decision that
nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been
demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained by
the lessor of the land on which the house stood. For this reason, the said
court limited itself to sentencing the erstwhile mortgagors to pay plaintiffs a
monthly rent of P200.00 from 27 March 1956 (when the chattel mortgage
was foreclosed and the house sold) until 14 January 1957 (when it was torn
down by the Sheriff), plus P300.00 attorney's fees.
Appellants mortgagors question this award, claiming that they were
entitled to remain in possession without any obligation to pay rent during the
one year redemption period after the foreclosure sale, i.e., until 27 March
1957. On this issue, We must rule for the appellants.
Chattel mortgages are covered and regulated by the Chattel Mortgage
Law, Act No. 1508. 28 Section 14 of this Act allows the mortgagee to have
the property mortgaged sold at public auction through a public officer in
almost the same manner as that allowed by Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, provided that the requirements of the law relative to notice
and registration are complied with. 29 In the instant case, the parties
specifically stipulated that "the chattel mortgage will be enforceable in
accordance with the provisions of Special Act No. 3135 . . ." 30 (Emphasis
supplied).
Section 6 of the Act referred to 31 provides that the debtor-mortgagor
(defendants-appellants herein) may, at any time within one year from and
after the date of the auction sale, redeem the property sold at the extra
judicial foreclosure sale. Section 7 of the same Act 32 allows the purchaser of
the property to obtain from the court the possession during the period of
redemption: but the same provision expressly requires the filing of a petition
with the proper Court of First Instance and the furnishing of a bond. It is only
upon filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond
that the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course. No
discretion is left to the court. 33 In the absence of such a compliance, as in
the instant case, the purchaser can not claim possession during the period of
redemption as a matter of right. In such a case, the governing provision is
Section 34, Rule 39, of the Revised Rules of Court 34 which also applies to
properties purchased in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. 35 Construing
the said section, this Court stated in the aforestated case of Reyes vs.
Hamada,
"In other words, before the expiration of the 1-year period
within which the judgment-debtor or mortgagor may redeem the
property, the purchaser thereof is not entitled, as a matter of right, to
possession of the same. Thus, while it is true that the Rules of Court
allow the purchaser to receive the rentals if the purchased property is
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 occupied by tenants, he is, nevertheless, accountable to the
judgment-debtor or mortgagor as the case may be, for the amount so
received and the same will be duly credited against the redemption
price when the said debtor or mortgagor effects the redemption.
Differently stated, the rentals receivable from tenants, although they
may be collected by the purchaser during the redemption period, do
not belong to the latter but still pertain to the debtor of mortgagor.
The rationale for the Rule, it seems, is to secure for the benefit of the
debtor or mortgagor, the payment of the redemption amount and the
consequent return to him of his properties sold at public auction."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Hamada case reiterates the previous ruling in Chan vs. Espe. 36
Since the defendants-appellants were occupying the house at the time
of the auction sale, they are entitled to remain in possession during the
period of redemption or within one year from and after 27 March 1956, the
date of the auction sale, and to collect the rents or profits during the said
period.
It will be noted further that in the case at bar the period of redemption
had not yet expired when action was instituted in the court of origin, and
that plaintiffs-appellees did not choose to take possession under Section 7,
Act No. 3135, as amended, which is the law selected by the parties to govern
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. Neither was there an
allegation to that effect. Since plaintiffs-appellees' right to possess was not
yet born at the filing of the complaint, there could be no violation or breach
thereof. Wherefore, the original complaint stated no cause of action and was
prematurely filed. For this reason, the same should be ordered dismissed,
even if there was no assignment of error to that effect. The Supreme Court is
clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such
if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of
the case. 37
It follows that the court below erred in requiring the mortgagors to pay
rents for the year following the foreclosure sale, as well as attorney's fees.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision appealed from is reversed
and another one entered, dismissing the complaint. With costs against
plaintiffs-appellees.
Concepcion, C .J ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Exhibit "A," page 1, Folder of Exhibits.
2. See paragraph "G," Exhibit "4" supra.

3. Exhibit "B," page 4, Folder of Exhibits.

4. Page 2, Defendants' Record on appeal, page 97, Rollo .
5. Page 20, Id., page 115, Rollo.
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 6. Now Section 2, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court, which reads that —
"SEC. 2. Landlord, to proceed against tenant only after demand. — No
landlord, or his legal representative or assign, shall bring such action against
a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his
lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with
such conditions for a period of .. five (5) days in the case of building, after
demand therefor, made upon him personally, or by serving written notice of
such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such
notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon."
7. See CFI order of 20 February 1957, pages 21-25, Defendants' Record on
Appeal.
8. Page 31, Defendants' Record on Appeal, page 213, Rollo .

9. See Municipal court decision, pages 17-18, Defendants' Record on Appeal,

pages 199-200, Rollo.

10. 59 Phil. 320-321.

11. Italics supplied.
12. L-19200, 27 February 1958, 22 SCRA 834; See also Aquino vs. Deala, 63
Phil. 582 and De los Reyes vs. Elepaño, et al., G.R. No. L-3466, 13 October
1950.

13. See Canaynay vs. Sarmiento, L-1246, 27 August 1947, 79 Phil. 36.
14. Last paragraph, Article 1290, N.C.C., supra.
15. No, L-10817-18, 28 February 1958, 103 Phil. 98.
16. No. L-10827-38, 30 May 1958, 103 Phil. 972.
17. No. L-8133, 18 May 1956, 99 Phil. 109.

18. No. L-20329, 16 March 1923, 44 Phil. 632.

19. Italics supplied.
20. No. L-4637, 30 June 1952, 91 Phil. 531.
21. No. L-18456, 30 November 1963, 9 SCRA 631.

22. Italics supplied.

23. Italics supplied.
24. See paragraph 2 of Exhibit "A," page 1, Folder of Exhibits.
25. Supra.
26. Supra.
27. See Navarro vs. Pineda, supra.
28. Effective 1 August 1906.
29. See Luna vs. Encarnacion, et al., No. L-4637, 30 June 1962, 91 Phil. 531.

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 30. See paragraph "G," Exhibit "A," supra.
31. Section 6, Act No. 3135, as amended, provides:
"In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special
power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successor in interest or any
judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a
lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under
which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term
of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be
governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four
hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as
these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis
supplied)
32. Section 7, Act No. 3135, as amended, states:
"In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may
petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the
property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof
during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to
the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act . . ." (Italics
supplied)
33. See De Gracia vs. San Jose, et al., No. L-6493, 25 March 1954.

34. "SEC. 34. Rents and profits pending redemption. Statement thereof and
credit therefor on redemption. — The purchaser, from the time of the sale
until a redemption, and a redemptioner, from the time of his redemption until
another redemption, is entitled to receive the rents of the property sold or
the value of the use and occupation thereof when such property is in
possession of a tenant. Put when any such rents and profits have been
received by the judgment creditor or purchaser, or by a redemptioner, or by
the assignee or either of them, from property thus sold preceding such
redemption, the amounts of such rents and profits shall be a credit upon the
redemption money to be paid; . . ."
35. See Reyes vs. Hamada, No. L-19967, 31 May 1965, 14 SCRA 215; Italics
supplied.
36. No. L-16777, 20 April 1961, 1 SCRA 1004.
37. Saura Import & Export Co. vs. Philippine international Surety Co., et al., No.
L-15184, 31 May 1963, 8 SCRA 143, 148; Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 198,
See also Sec. 7, Rule 51, of the Revised Rules of Court. Cf. Santaella vs. Otto
Lange Co., 155 Fed. 719; Mast vs. Superior Drill Co., 154 Fed., 45, Francisco,
Rules of Court (1965 Ed), Vol. 3, page 765.

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