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Hindutva's Impact on Indian Politics

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68 views17 pages

Hindutva's Impact on Indian Politics

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© © All Rights Reserved
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Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity:

Examining Modi’s Administration

Sabina Babar*

Abstract

The idea of India as an inclusive and secular nation-state has been


challenged by the rise of Hindu nationalist ideology known as Hindutva.
Promoted by organisations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)
and political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Hindutva
advocates for the establishment of a Hindu Rashtra (nation) in India by
marginalising minority groups. It involves the “otherisation” of non-
Hindus, especially Muslims and Christians, and promotes the Hindu-
centric narrative in the country’s history, culture, legislative and
administrative setup, which seeks to transform India from a secular
democratic republic to an authoritarian Hindu-supremacist one. The
paper aims to analyse the widespread resentment towards Indian
Muslims arguing that the formation of Hindu identity is deeply
intertwined with political processes influenced by the ideologies of the
RSS and BJP. It examines various facets of Indian politics, especially
under Modi’s government to gain insights into the normative
implementation of Hindutva within the contexts of institutionalism and
linguistic discourse. It posits that the BJP’s policies and the narrative of
Hindus as the ‘sons of the soil’ contribute to the marginalisation of other
identities, particularly Indian Muslims. The paper examines modes to
understand Hindutva’s normative approach in Modi’s government
within the framework of institutionalism and linguistic discourse,
focusing on Indian polity.

Keywords: India, Hindutva, BJP, Identity Politics, RSS.

*
The author is IR scholar at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-
i-Azam University. Email: [email protected]

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Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

Introduction

Against the backdrop of India’s diverse history and its intrinsic civilisation,
the nation’s identity has faced a persistent challenge rooted in political
intricacies. The complicated tapestry of India’s multiethnic composition,
encompassing numerous ethnic and tribal groups has coexisted within its
borders. 1 Nevertheless, the very idea of India has become entangled in
ambiguity and contention, primarily fuelled by political considerations.
Furthermore, the leaders of the largest democracy aim at an inclusive
society, but are still unable to define the “idea of India.” This uncertainty
has given rise to a questioning of the intended nationalist values that were
meant to unite its people. 2 The process of India’s independence, while
liberating the nation from colonial rule, inadvertently embedded sectarian
divisions, adding layers of complexity to its national narrative. The rejection
of majoritarianism by the democratic dispensation underscores the constant
struggle to reconcile diverse identities within a democratic framework.3 The
preamble of the Indian Constitution, emphasising the unification of the
nation, positions this goal as a cornerstone, yet historical inequalities have
cast a shadow over the realisation of India’s democratic principles since the
constitution’s inception in 1950.4

As the political landscape has evolved, the Bharatiya Janata Party


(BJP) emerged as a formidable force in Indian politics, altering the
dynamics of governance. 5 However, this rise has been marked by
growing polarisation in Indian politics which has led to a sense of
animosity among some members of the majority groups toward the
minority groups.6 Since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister leading
the BJP in 2014, he has advanced a Hindu nationalist agenda that aligns
with Hindutva ideology. This has involved utilising both political

1
Amit Kumar Sharma, “Elements of Indian Civilisation: A Sociological
Perspective,” Indian Anthropologist 33, no. 1 (2003): 82.
2
Lars Tore Flåten, Hindu Nationalism, History and Identity in India: Narrating a
Hindu Past under the BJP (Taylor & Francis, 2016), 78.
3
Sanjaya Baru, India’s Power Elite : Class, Caste and a Cultural Revolution, 2021, 97.
4
Edward Anderson and Arkotong Longkumer, Neo-Hindutva: Evolving Forms, Spaces,
and Expressions of Hindu Nationalism (Taylor & Francis Limited, 2021), 68.
5
Shaila Seshia, “Divide and Rule in Indian Party Politics: The Rise of the Bharatiya
Janata Party,” Asian Survey 38, no. 11 (1998): 1045, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645684.
6
“The Secret behind Success of India’s Ruling Party BJP,” BBC News, December 2,
2020, sec. India, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-55049627

81
Strategic Studies

rhetoric and policy to promote a Hindu-centric narrative of India while


targeting minority groups. For instance, controversial moves like the
revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy and the passage of the Citizenship
Amendment Act, which discriminates against Muslims, have been
enacted.7 These moves have been accompanied by a surge in violence
and intimidation against minorities indicative of a broader effort to
reshape India’s secular pluralist democracy into what some perceive as
an authoritarian Hindu Rashtra. 8 In the context of this transformative
phase, this research paper delves into an analysis of Modi’s promotion of
Hindutva and its profound impacts on Indian politics and society.
Providing a nuanced background on the Hindutva ideology and its
underlying assumptions, the paper systematically dissects how Hindu
nationalism has manifested under BJP rule. The examination extends
beyond mere political discourse, encompassing both linguistic and
institutional mechanisms employed to advance this agenda. The central
argument posits that Modi’s strategic exploitation of religious identity
for political gains poses a tangible threat to the foundational principles of
India’s inclusive democracy. As the paper unfolds, it scrutinises the
implications of Hindutva for Indian democracy and diversity, weaving
together the narrative of a nation at the crossroads of its identity.

Examining Complex Roots and Evolution of Hindutva Ideology in


Indian Polity

Contested Origins and Colonial Influences

The contemporary form of Hindu identity and Hindutva ideology have


complex roots. These include the political mobilisation of the Brahmin
caste interests as well as orientalist interpretations of Indian society and
history institutionalised under Britain’s colonial rule.

7
Angana P. Chatterji, Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot, Majoritarian
State: How Hindu Nationalism Is Changing India (Oxford University Press, 2019), 89.
8
Wesley Rahan, “India: Is ‘Hindutva’ a Civilizational Principle?,”
https://www.dw.com/en/india-is-the-ruling-bjps-hindutva-approach-a-civilizational-
principle/a-60835665

82
Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

Time and again the Hindu identity is redefined under the notion of
Hinduism.9 Hindutva is considered as a movement by many experts which
is founded and led by the upper caste of Hindus and it has used the lower
caste as a showman to establish its authority.10 Similarly, the formation of
Hindu identity is considered — a construct by the Brahmin Elite which is
five% of the population to remain politically relevant in the modernised
system of Britain. 11 The introduction of the quota system, election, and
implementation of a democratic style of governance threatened the status of
the Brahmin elite. 12 Reinterpreting Hinduism’s essence facilitated their
continued claim to leadership of a seemingly unified Hindu bloc in alliance
with imperial interests. This also enabled targeting Muslims as threatening
“others” wielding influence disproportionate to their number.13 What is now
referred to as Hinduism had no religious connotation for Hindus till the 15th
century.14 Consequently, the meaning of “Hindu” loses a lot of complexity
in Hindutva. Instead, it represents the amalgamation of several ideas,
including land, language and religion into a wholly racist entity.15 Through
strategic syncretism, the Brahminical elite forged a nationalist ideology
perpetuating their traditional caste privileges within a modern institutional
context. Their primary goal was to insulate their ascendancy against
democratizing pressures by forging a numerical majority united through
symbols of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. 16 Hindutva, thus, represents the
upper-caste Hindu elite with their entrenched socio-cultural capital,
manoeuvering to shape mass politics in a manner that perpetuates their

9
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (Hindi Sahitya Sadan,
2003), 57.
10
Savarkar, 58.
11
Christophe Jaffrelot, “Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology
Building,” Economic and Political Weekly 28, no. 12/13 (1993): 519.
12
Jaffrelot, “Hindu Nationalism,” 520.
13
Sagarika Dutt, “Identities and the Indian State: An Overview,” Third World
Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1998): 427.
14
Giorgio Shani, “Towards a Hindu Rashtra: Hindutva, Religion, and Nationalism
in India,” Religion, State and Society 49, no. 3 (May 27, 2021): 267,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1947731
15
M. A. Muqtedar Khan and Rifat Binte Lutful, “Emerging Hindu Rashtra and Its
Impact on Indian Muslims,” Religions 12, no. 9 (September 2021): 694,
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12090693
16
Kusum Sharma, Ambedkar and Indian Constitution (Ashish Publishing House,
1992), 89.

83
Strategic Studies

historical domination. 17 Their quest relies on forging a seeming Hindu


majority united by symbols of Muslim antagonism rather than common
material interests.18 According to Hindutva ideology, the territory of Hindus
encompasses the entire Indian subcontinent, referred to as ‘Akhand Bharat’
(undivided India). 19 Hindi is projected as the national language while
Hinduism is depicted as the religion quintessentially representing this
supposed racial and geo-cultural bloc descended from groups inhabiting this
land since ancient times. This subsumes the tremendous diversity among
residents into a singular Hindu subject targeted against non-Hindu
minorities as alleged outsiders.20

In effect, Hindutva transforms the fluid, multivalent lived experiences of


inhabitants marked as Hindus into a monolithic ethno-religious project for
majoritarian domination. Disparate caste and linguistic identities are
repackaged behind the veil of Hinduness to serve political ambitions, not
dismantling the underlying socioeconomic hierarchies. It forges an
exclusionary ideology fundamentally at odds with the syncretism and
pluralism otherwise underlying Indian civilisation.21

Colonial Roots

In term of its roots, Hindutva’s premises rest upon questionable assumptions


about India’s past and the nature of religious conversions that can be traced
back to colonial rule. The British administration sought to categorise Indian
society into neatly delineated groups to better understand and control the
population. 22 They relied upon Orientalist erudition that essentialised

17
Sanjaya Baru, India’s Power Elite: Class, Caste and Cu: Caste, Class and
Cultural Revolution (Gurgaon, Haryana: Penguin Books India, 2021), 90.
18
Francis Robinson, “The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia,”
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 8 (1998): 278,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3679298
19
Shani, “Towards a Hindu Rashtra,” 276.
20
Walter Andersen and Shridhar D. Damle, Messengers of Hindu Nationalism: How
the RSS Reshaped India (Oxford University Press, 2018), 94.
21
Aniket Nandan, “Revival of Hindu Nationalism: Interplay of Religion and Caste
in 21st Century India,” 5, no. 4 (October 2018): 445.
22
Volker Kaul and Ananya Vajpeyi, Minorities and Populism – Critical
Perspectives from South Asia and Europe (Springer Nature, 2020), 165.

84
Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

religious identities and interpreted history through a communal lens. 23


Colonial historians propagated the notion that an ancient “Hindu society”
defined India until the entrance of Muslim invaders. Supposedly, these
conquering armies violently converted Hindus to Islam, spurring communal
conflict ever since.24 However, pre-colonial Indian society lacked clearly
demarcated religious boundaries. Rather, complex, fluid religious and
regional identities prevailed without neat categorisation. The colonial
project of classifying Indian ethnicities and social groups into discrete
communities is an overly simplified reality.25 As historian Romila Thapar
notes, “The colonial interpretation of Indian society as being divided into
major religious communities is no longer regarded as accurate.” 26 By
reinterpreting Hinduism into a political force of resistance under the new
Hindutva banner, Hindu’s sought to preserve caste hierarchy amidst societal
change. Critically, Hindutva transforms diverse communities practicing
localized Hindu customs into a singularised Hindu identity for nationalist
consolidation. Segregating communities fostered a sense of separateness
that politicised religious differences.

Over time, Hindutva evolved from its questionable premises around


Hindu victimisation to become a contemporary vehicle for the political
unification of the majority religious community.27 While instrumentally
harnessing selective Hindu symbols and grievances, its core thrust is to
establish cultural dominance rather than theology. Distinct from
Hinduism’s pluralism, Hindutva deploys identity politics towards the
political end of consolidating the majority vote. Thereby, the essence of
Hindutva lies in establishing Hindu nationalist hegemony through
majoritarian consolidation not as an ideology per se.28

23
Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (Penguin Books
Limited, 2016), 76.
24
Prashant Waikar, “Reading Islamophobia in Hindutva: An Analysis of Narendra
Modi’s Political Discourse,” Islamophobia Studies Journal 4, no. 2 (2018): 167,
https://doi.org/10.13169/islastudj.4.2.0161.
25
Lucy Carroll, “Colonial Perceptions of Indian Society and the Emergence of
Caste(s) Associations,” The Journal of Asian Studies 37, no. 2 (February 1978):
240, https://doi.org/10.2307/2054164.
26
Romila Thapar, “Communalism and the Historical Legacy: Some Facets,” Social
Scientist 18, no. 6/7 (1990): 6, https://doi.org/10.2307/3517476.
27
Farahnaz Ispahani, Politics of Hate: Religious Majoritarianism in South Asia
(HarperCollins Publishers India, 2023), 87.
28
Chatterji, Hansen, and Jaffrelot, Majoritarian State, 87.

85
Strategic Studies

Key Hindutva Groups and Constitutional Contradictions

Distinguishing itself from Hinduism, Hindutva emerges as a contemporary


political ideology that envisions establishing India as a Hindu nation-state.
This involves aligning the cultural fabric with selectively defined Hindu
values. A key distinction is that while Hinduism denotes a decentralised
world religion with diverse beliefs and localised variants, Hindutva
promotes a homogenised political conception of Hindu identity in order to
unify and consolidate broader Hindu interests across communities. 29
Instrumental groups promoting Hindutva include the Sangh Parivar, an
umbrella of radical Hindu nationalist organisations led by the paramilitary
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), as well as the more moderate Hindu
support-oriented Bharatiya Hindu Parivar (BHP). Their roles are crucial in
understanding the dynamics of Hindutva ideology within Indian politics
particularly during Modi’s regime.

The Sangh Parivar is an umbrella of Hindutva groups led by the


Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a paramilitary organisation founded
in 1925. It includes groups such as the Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena and the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad. 30 They articulate a militant Hindu nationalist
politics opposing the Muslims as ‘others.’ On the other hand, the BHP is a
charitable organisation focused on providing support to the Hindu
community.31

The organisation is involved in various charitable activities such as


providing food, clothing, and shelter to those in need. In the early
buildup of Hindutva, these organisations play a pivotal role in building
connectivity within the Hindu community and promoting the vision of
India as a Hindu nation. While their activities differ, they share roots in
furthering Hindutva’s majoritarian religious nationalism vision of India’s
identity and policies.

29
Anderson and Longkumer, Neo-Hindutva, 93.
30
“The Musclemen of Hindutva,” Hindu, December 11, 2015, sec. Lead,
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/On-the-Bajrang-Dals-borth-evolution-and-
activity/article62116497.ece.
31
Brinda Karat, RSS_book, 2014, 12, http://archive.org/details/rss_book

86
Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar and Golwalkar’s Theorisation of


Hindu Dominance

Hindutva took its aspiration from the 1923 treatise by the Hindutva
ideologue Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar, the ideology posits that Hindus
alone can be considered true Indians, as their pitrbhu (fatherland) and
punyabhu (holy land) reside within India. Sarvarkar excludes Muslims and
Christians from this definition, asserting that their holy lands are situated in
“far off Arabia or Palestine.” 32 Building upon Sarvarkar’s ideas, his
ideological successor, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, a key figure in the
RSS, emphasises that the “foreign races” in India, referring to Muslims and
Christians, must either assimilate into Hindu culture, language, and religion
or exist subordinated to the Hindu Nation. 33 Golwalkar advocates for a
scenario where these communities lose their separate identities, merging
into the broader Hindu race, or accept a subordinate status within the
country without claiming privileges or preferential treatment including
citizen’s rights. Hindutva’s upper-caste essence manifests in Golwalkar’s
assertions, too.34 He framed caste identities performing their ritual duties,
however degrading as an orderly system, denouncing dissent as “anti-
national.”35

This ideological framework, distinguishing between Hindutva and


Hinduism, underscores the inherently political nature of Hindutva as it
endeavours to shape India’s cultural and national identity. It is crucial to
recognise that this philosophy primarily hinges on religious doctrine or an
organised system, commonly referred to as an “ism.” However, delving into
the fundamental meaning of Hindutva reveals a lack of both theocratic and
practical aspects to be unequivocally labelled an ideology. 36 Instead, it
emerges as a political unification of all Hindus in India, marking a shift
from religious conflict to a political one, where religion serves as a tool to
achieve political motives. 37 Subsequently, RSS advanced Savarkar’s
32
Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Essentials of Hindutva (Independently Published,
2019), 123.
33
V. D. Savarkar Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Essentials of Hindutva, 1923, 11,
http://archive.org/details/essentials-of-hindutva.
34
M S Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined, 1st ed., vol. 1 (India: Bharat
Parkashan, 1944), 72, http://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.66003.
35
Golwalkar, 1:123.
36
Savarkar, Essentials of Hindutva, 102.
37
Nandan, “Revival of Hindu Nationalism,” 448.

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Strategic Studies

Hindutva ideas towards sharpening divides between Hindutva’s narrow


conceptualisation of Indian nationalism and minority groups portrayed as
outsiders refusing to assimilate. 38 The RSS operates clandestinely to
propagate its vision of Indian culture defined by Hindu hegemony. 39 The
RSS constructive ideology based on campaign Ghar Wapsi campaign is a
refurbished version of purification based on cultural nationalism. 40 This
ideology was further adopted by BJP where LK Advani started cultural
violence and culminated in violent action against the cultural disparities
existing in India. Decades later, the 1980s Ram Janambhoomi agitation
exemplified weaponising religious symbols of historic subjugation to spark
a popular movement that galvanised these latent Hindutva ideas.41 The 1992
Babri Masjid demolition represented the symbolic manifestation of this kind
of virulent cultural nationalism serving political consolidation of radical
Hindu interests.42 The BJP not only embraced this ideology but, during the
1996 Lok Sabha election, pledged support to Hindutva in their political
manifesto.43 It cemented Hindutva’s meteoric rise from the fringes to centre
stage of Indian politics.

Currently in power since 2014, the BJP regime demonstrates an


effective blend of symbolic moves that pander to the Hindu majority
along with institutional changes eroding minority rights. 44 Thereby,
contemporary Hindutva retains its core essence as political instrument
centered on identity politics and selective historical interpretations to
achieve the enduring goal of consolidating the majority Hindu vote
behind a majoritarian platform.

38
Savarkar, Essentials of Hindutva, 128.
39
Koushiki Dasgupta, Sadhus in Indian Politics: Dynamics of Hindutva (SAGE
Publishing India, 2021), 134.
40
Yashasvini Rajeshwar and Roy C. Amore, “Coming Home (Ghar Wapsi) and
Going Away: Politics and the Mass Conversion Controversy in India,” Religions 10,
no. 5 (May 2019): 5, https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10050313.
41
P. K. D. Nambiar, “Ram Janmabhoomi: The Movement That Changed India’s
Political Landscape,” Sunday Guardian Live,
https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/ram-janmabhoomi-the-movement-that-
changed-indias-political-landscape.
42
Amom Malemnganba Singh, “The BJP and the Rise of Communal Violence,”
South Asian Voices, February 7, 2022, https://southasianvoices.org/the-bjp-and-the-
rise-of-communal-violence/.
43
Flåten, Hindu Nationalism, History and Identity in India, 120.
44
Subramanian Swamy, Hindutva and National Renaissance (Har-Anand
Publications, 2010).

88
Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

This majoritarian ideology rooted in Hindu nationalism has clear


foundations in India’s history that the BJP has strategically tapped into.
Under Modi’s regime, the BJP has translated this manifesto into action,
targeting the cultural and educational setup of other religions. 45 The
conflict, predominantly rooted in culture and politics, intricately links
with the past, marking a significant chapter in India’s complex socio-
political landscape.46

Hindu Nationalism under Modi’s Administration:


Structural and Linguistic Discourse Analysis

Hindutva retains its essence as an instrument of identity politics and


selective historical interpretations aiming to consolidate the Hindu vote
under a majoritarian Hindu nationalist platform. This ideology, rooted in
India’s history, has been strategically revived by the BJP, particularly under
the Modi government. This political manoeuver involves translating the
Hindutva manifesto into action, with a specific focus on targeting minority
cultural and educational institutions, thereby intertwining culture and
politics in a conflict that shapes India’s socio-political landscape. 47 The
utilisation of history and interpretation becomes evident in the linguistic
construction of a Hindu nationalist reality under the Modi administration.48
Drawing from social constructivist theory which emphasizes the role of
discourse, rhetoric and language in shaping social and political realities. It is
argued that language plays a crucial role in constructing the world. 49
According to theorists like Habermas, Searle, and Onuf, people construct
social reality through language making it a principal means of social
construction. 50

45
“Bharatiya Janata Party,” Bharatiya Janata Party, 2019, https://www.bjp.org/.
46
Various, Making Sense of Modi’s India (HarperCollins, 2016), 102.
47
Waikar, “Reading Islamophobia in Hindutva,” 169.
48
Hajira Maryam, “Identity and Belonging in Modi’s India:,” The World Research
Centre, February 2020, 6.
49
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social
Theory and International Relations, Routledge (Routledge, 2012), 92,
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203722428.
50
John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, The Construction of Social
Reality, New Ed (Penguin, 1996), 98.

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Strategic Studies

Modi, through speeches actively promotes Hindutva as a defining


national ideology, seeking to establish Hindu primacy and reconstruct
India’s identity along majoritarian Hindu lines.51 The periodisation of the
Hindu community in India, through the lens of Hindutva, involves a
deliberate move away from the secularism that characterised India before
Modi’s ascension to power. This shift is marked by the adoption of
discriminatory language and silence against religious extremism.
Hindutva’s otherisation, a key element in this narrative, projects the
inferiority of other identities within India, with a specific focus on Muslims,
Sikhs and Christians. 52 Aligning with the RSS vision of Hindu
authoritarianism, Modi constructed a narrative suggesting that Hindus were
historically suppressed by Muslims creating a sense of victimhood. 53 This
narrative is substantiated by the events in Gujarat, where the Muslim
community was depicted as being rightfully targeted, as conveyed by
Modi’s statement in his 2013 speech: “will do the same with people who
will support Pakistan.” The backdrop of the Red Fort replica in the speech
serves as a symbolic reinforcement for his campaign.54

On international platforms, Modi further amplifies his polarised


stance by comparing events like 9/11 to radical Islamic terrorism,
blaming Muslims for conspiracies against the West. 55 This rhetoric,
coupled with slogans like “Mujhe Ganga Maiyya ne bulaya hai”
(Mother Ganga has summoned me) and “Unke liye Ganga ek nadi hai,
mere liye Ganga Maa Hai,” (for them Ganga is a canal but for me it is
my mother (motherland)) and I am Hindu nationalist, serves to instigate
resentment and hatred against other identities particularly Muslims. 56

51
Amy Kazmin and India Ross, “How Hindu Nationalism Went Mainstream in
Modi’s India,” Financial Times, May 9, 2019, sec. FT Magazine,
https://www.ft.com/content/4b68c89c-711c-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5.
52
Milan Vaishnav, “Religious Nationalism and India’s Future — The BJP in Power:
Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalism,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/04/religious-
nationalism-and-india-s-future-pub-78703.
53
Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic
Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021), 55.
54
“In Chhattisgarh, a Red Fort Replica for Narendra Modi Speech Today.”
55
Rohit Chopra, The Virtual Hindu Rashtra: Saffron Nationalism and New Media
(HarperCollins India, 2019), 132.
56
“PM Modi Says; Na Main Yahan Aaya Hoon, Na Laya Gaya Hoon…mujhe Maa
Ganga Ne Bulaya Hai,” Azir Khobor blog, December 13, 2021,

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Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

These catchphrases in his speeches have not only signified his aspiration
of instigating resentment and hatred against other identities but have
established the fact that Hindutva’s ideology is a sign of unity for
Hindus.57

To bolster Hindu nationalism, the Modi government enacted the


Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), a move veiled in the assertion that it is
unrelated to religion. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was passed
in India in 2019. 58 It provides a pathway to Indian citizenship for non-
Muslim minorities from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan who entered
India illegally before 2015. 59 Specifically, it applies to Hindus, Sikhs,
Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians.60 On the surface, the government
asserted that the CAA is not related to religion. They stated it is simply
meant to provide refuge to persecuted minority groups in Muslim-majority
nations like Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, the law explicitly excludes
Muslims from its purview, making religion a criterion for citizenship. 61
CAA promotes the idea that India’s identity is fundamentally Hindu in
nature. The law aligns with Modi’s vision of India as a nation that privileges
its Hindu majority over other religious groups like Muslims. In a 2019,
Modi emphasised the accommodation of Hindu migrants while implying
the exclusion of Bangladeshi Muslims, particularly from Assam. This
sentiment was echoed by Home Minister Amit Shah, who bluntly advocated
for the expulsion of Muslim immigrants, a stance that remained unchecked
by the BJP under Modi’s leadership. 62 In 2019, Minister of Home Affairs,
Amit Shah repeated the same language by saying to terminate the Muslim
immigrants from Bangladesh and BJP will pick them up and throw them
into the Bay of Bengal.63 Furthermore, Under Modi’s administration, the

https://azirkhobor.com/2021/12/13/pm-modi-says-na-main-yahan-aaya-hoon-na-
laya-gaya-hoon-mujhe-maa-ganga-ne-bulaya-hai/.
57
Aakar Patel, Our Hindu Rashtra: What It Is. How We Got Here (Penguin Random
House India Private Limited, 2022), 127.
58
“The Citizenship Amendment Bill 2019” (Indian Government, December 2019),
https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/Refinput/New_Reference_Notes/English/09122019_104
728_1021205239.pdf.
59
“The Citizenship Amendment Bill 2019.”
60
“The Citizenship Amendment Bill 2019.”
61
“The Citizenship Amendment Bill 2019.”
62
Kai Schultz, “Modi Defends Indian Citizenship Law Amid Violent Protests,” New
York Times, December 22, 2019, sec. World,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/asia/modi-india-citizenship-law.html.
63
“Amit Shah Vows to Throw Illegal Immigrants into Bay of Bengal | Reuters.”

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Strategic Studies

exploitation of political narratives under the guise of Hindutva has expanded


its targets from anti-Muslim sentiments to encompass other minority
communities notably Christians. The BJP, alongside its affiliate Bajrang
Dal, has orchestrated a surge in violent attacks against Indian Christians,
creating fear and painting them negatively from Karnataka to Uttarakhand.64
This alarming rise in attacks during the Christmas season stems from a
deepening communal polarisation, extending the BJP’s previous focus on
Muslims to include other religious communities across India. Assam
emerges as a new focal point for Hindutva politics, where the BJP
strategically manipulates the state’s history of ethnonationalism. By
portraying Muslims as a threat to “Assamese” culture and aligning with
xenophobic Assamese ethnonationalism, the BJP intensifies animosity
towards Muslim minorities. In December 2021, the BJP’s promotion of
violence escalated during the three-day “Dharam Sansad” in Haridwar,
Uttarakhand — a state under BJP control and heading into elections.65 The
event featured hate speeches against Muslims and calls for genocide with
the participation of prominent BJP members.66 This calculated strategy led
to a significant victory for the BJP in the 2021 Legislative Assembly
elections, securing their second term in the state. Chief Minister of Assam,
Himanta Biswa Sarma further saffronises Assam’s local culture by
integrating it with the BJP’s Hindu nationalist agenda. 67 Utilising anti-
Muslim rhetoric and associating with Assamese Hindu figures like
Sankardev — the BJP solidifies its communal political base. The National
Register of Citizens (NRC) exacerbates communal polarisation in Assam
rendering Muslim minority populations stateless.68 By invoking historical
figures like Lachit Borphukan — the BJP portrays Muslims as outsiders and

64
Neel Madhav Jafri Alishan, “Why India Is Witnessing Spike in Attacks on
Christians, Churches,” Al Jazeera,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/2/india-christians-church-hindu-groups-
bjp-conversion.
65
“Haridwar Hate Speeches Target Minorities, Call for Violence; DGP Says
Illegal,” Indian Express blog, December 23, 2021,
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/haridwar-meet-seeks-weapons-for-hindus-
war-on-muslims-ex-bjp-spokesperson-among-speakers-7686714/.
66
“Haridwar Hate Speeches Target Minorities, Call for Violence; DGP Says
Illegal.”
67
Nistula Hebbar, “Himanta Biswa Sarma: The Go-to Man Who Put out Many Fires
for BJP in Assam,” Hindu, May 9, 2021, sec. Assam,
https://www.thehindu.com/elections/assam-assembly/himanta-biswa-sarma-profile-
the-go-to-man-who-put-out-many-fires-for-bjp-in-assam/article34519698.ece.
68
Singh, “The BJP and the Rise of Communal Violence.”

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Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

initiates “encroachment drives” to displace Muslim occupants. Sarma’s


influence extends beyond Assam, heading the North-East Democratic
Alliance (NEDA), a sub-regional group of Modi’s National Democratic
Alliance (NDA).69 Employing citizenship as a political tool, Sarma seeks to
alter the state’s demography for electoral gains. The BJP’s longstanding
ambition to control the Northeast, facilitated by NEDA could lead to
strategies that fracture pluralism and the region’s ethnoreligious diversity,
favouring Hindu voters. Consequently, in a strategic self-presentation, Modi
has crafted an image of a “Karmayogi” — a selfless Hindu ascetic devoted
to the nation drawing inspiration from Hindu scriptures especially the
Bhagavad Gita. 70 This image has been carefully constructed through
linguistic choice and decade of Hindutva emphasises on Hindu cultural
dominance which also resonates with supporters who connect through
vernacular tongues. 71

At the institutional level, Hindutva nationalism draws on the stereotyped


dangers of Islamophobia and the “Otherisation” of Muslims which are
presented as enemies of the purported Hindu vision of India. 72 Modi’s
vision for a developed India is a reflection of this strategy. Only Hindu
contributions are key to this development rhetoric when imagining India’s
glorious past; non-Hindus are viewed as unimportant. The ideological and
political discourse of the Indian state is being gravely altered by the
transformation of Indian territorial nationalism into religious nationalism.73
In two consecutive tenures, the Modi government has established a power
nexus by promoting Hindu nationalist discourse, sidelining secular liberalist
ideologies.74 This transformation, as highlighted by Sanjaya Baru in “India’s
Power Elite,” has shifted the public discourse on religion, caste, and

69
Angana P. Chatterji, “Detention, Criminalisation, Statelessness: The Aftermath of
Assam’s NRC,” The Wire, September 9, 2021, https://thewire.in/rights/detention-
criminalisation-statelessness-the-aftermath-of-assams-nrc.
70
The Conversation Chandrima Chakraborty, “Modi as the Karmayogi: How the Prime
Minister Has Modelled Himself as a New-Age Hindu Ascetic,” Text, Scroll.in
(https://scroll.in, May 29, 2019), https://scroll.in/article/925041/modi-as-the-karmayogi-
how-the-prime-minister-has-modelled-himself-as-a-new-age-hindu-ascetic.
71
“Narendra Modi’s Victory Speech Delivers Visions of a Hindu Nationalist
Ascetic.”
72
Wendy Doniger and Martha Craven Nussbaum, Pluralism and Democracy in
India: Debating the Hindu Right (Oxford University Press, 2015), 97.
73
Khan and Lutful, “Emerging Hindu Rashtra and Its Impact on Indian Muslims.”
74
Baru, India’s Power Elite, 120.

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Strategic Studies

language, with the BJP leveraging these elements for a Hindu nationalist
revolution.75 The identification of India under Modi’s leadership is centered
on the promotion of Hindi, Hinduism and Hindustan. Modi often justifies
ethno-national violence by invoking the concept of “Undivided India” or
“Akhand Bharat,” legitimising violence in the pursuit of a greater unified
Bharat. 76 This narrative has formed a robust power nexus between the
Hindu majority and the BJP, fostering acceptance of violence against other
communities.77 Instances like a BJP representative promoting the idea to
convert India into a Hindu Rashtra underscore how language and normative
approaches have been wielded to institutionalise Hinduism across India.78 In
symbolic shifts, Modi has focused on highlighting cultural and religious
aspects e.g. the ‘Bhumi Pujan’ (land worship) for the Ayodhya Ram temple,
marking emblematic shift toward Hindu Rashtra. The grand spectacle
signalled Modi as a monarchical protector of the community’s faith. Beyond
consecrating the temple, Modi’s act represented a novel form of political
power, aligning him with the traditional role of Hindu kingship in
consecrating and safeguarding temples. In a pivotal December 2021 speech
at the Summit of Democracy, Modi positioned Indian democracy not as a
Western institution but as a human (popular/majoritarian) institution,
reinforcing the grounds for Hindutva and asserting Hindu majoritarian rule
under his ideology of Hindu nationalism. 79 The departure of the Modi
government from Jawaharlal Nehru’s secular legacy has further resulted in a
significant reshaping of India, increasingly identifying as a Hindu nation,
thereby intensifying discrimination against minorities, particularly
Muslims. 80 This ideological shift is reflected in the restructuring of
schoolbooks, strategically eliminating references to anti-Hindu nationalism
stance and pre-Raj Mughal rulers. Furthermore, the BJP’s deliberate
75
Baru, 121.
76
Andersen and Damle, Messengers of Hindu Nationalism, 76.
77
Uday Mahurkar, Marching with a Billion: Analysing Narendra Modi’s
Government at Midterm (Penguin Random House India Pvt. Limited, 2019), 75.
78
Eviane Leidig, “Hindutva as a Variant of Right-Wing Extremism,”
Https://Doi.Org/10.1080/0031322X.2020.1759861, 2020, 231,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2020.1759861.
79
Ashutosh Nagda and Angshuman Choudhury, “Unpacking Modi’s Summit for
Democracy Speech,” The Diplomat, December 14, 2021,
https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/unpacking-modis-summit-for-democracy-speech/.
80
“The Observer View on the Growing Threat to Democracy in India,” The
Observer, April 23, 2023, sec. Opinion,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/apr/23/the-observer-view-on-
narendra-modi-growing-threat-to-democracy.

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Hindu and Hindutva Ideology in Indian Polity

softening towards the RSS and the removal of the ban on militant Hindu
organisations following Gandhi’s assassination reveal a calculated effort to
align with the militant ideology promoted by the RSS.81

Modi’s vision of Hindu nationalist identity contradicts India’s


constitutional secularism and democratic foundations established by
leaders like Nehru. 82 From an institutional perspective, the erosion of
secular ideals chips away at the pillars of checks and balances vital to
democracy. Concentrating authority in the hands of Modi and the BJP
undermines separation of powers. Fusion of party and state makes it
increasingly difficult to dissent. Tactical political manoeuvres to
consolidate power could be seen as democratic backsliding.

Through a constructivist lens, the cultivation of the new rhetoric and


symbols shapes a majoritarian Hindu national identity. This identity
building threatens pluralism and risks turning citizenship into a
politicised, exclusionary concept tied to religion. It may deepen social
divisions and conflict between communities. Constructing the “other” to
solidify the in group limits diversity of perspectives ─ a vital component
of substantive democracy. The trajectory signals a deficit for liberal
constitutional democracy in India.

Conclusion

Regardless of their diversity in religion, culture or history, Indians present a


unified consciousness and identity under the banner of “Indian nationalism.”
All religious minorities and ethnic groups in India are a component of the
country’s larger composite culture. However, contemporary Hindu
nationalism poses tangible threats to India’s pluralist democracy and social
fabric. Viewed structurally, the BJP regime demonstrates an effective blend
of symbolic pandering to the Hindu majority along with tangible moves that
undermine minority rights. The erosion of institutional safeguards like

81
“RSS and the Government: Tracing the History down the Years,” Indian Express,
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/rss-and-the-government-the-equation-
how-it-works/.
82
Sumit Ganguly, “The Great Fight Over India’s Myths,” Foreign Policy, blog,
November 27, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/15/india-nehru-history-
myths-modi-bjp-politics-review/.

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Strategic Studies

judicial independence and federalism concentrate power in ways that defy


separation of checks and balances vital for democracy. Meanwhile,
additions to the legal code explicitly target minorities, CAA and NRC
process reveals how citizenship can serve as a political tool for demographic
engineering. Tactically unleashing organs of the state apparatus against
dissidents also contravenes civil liberties. Collectively, these institutional
shifts exhibit features of democratic backsliding. The cultivation of
majoritarian Hindu nationalism also plays out discursively through Modi’s
rhetoric that amplifies divides. Constructing Muslims as threats intricately
tied to invaders, Pakistan and terrorism fosters an exclusionary vision of
Indian identity at odds with constitutional secularism. Deploying vernacular
slogans, Modi strategically evokes symbolic resentment around
victimisation to consolidate the Hindu vote. Connecting Hindu identity to
national identity while silencing minority persecutions shapes a majoritarian
reality. This divide serves the underlying political end of retaining power
not forging an inclusive nationalism. Overall, Hindutva under Modi
involves the state actively privileging the majority identity rather than
standing neutral between communities as expected in pluralist democracies.
The result is an erosion of the protections and separation of powers designed
to check majorities. Allowing any group to capture state institutions risks
political marginalisation of minorities. Instead of transcending differences,
contemporary Hindu nationalism instrumentalises identity politics in ways
that undermine e-pluribus-unum. The current manifestation of Hindu
nationalism signals India stands at a crossroads between an exclusionary
majoritarianism and the syncretic pluralism underpinning its civilizational
ethos.

Modi’s contemporary Hindu nationalism poses substantive threats to


Indian democracy and risks fracturing the underlying pluralism of Indian
society. But its essence remains contingent and constructed rather than
primordial. India’s future trajectory will be determined by how its
leaders and institutions respond to the rising tide of divisive religious
identity politics

96

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