Alonte v Savellano Jr

GR no 131652 & 131728; March 9, 1998

General Matters re criminal procedure

Facts:
An information for rape was filed by Juvielyn Punongbayan (JP). It is alleged that
the accused gave the complainant-child drinking water which made her feel
dizzy and weak. Alonte was the one who raped her and Concepcion brought
her to Alonte for the sum of money. While this case was pending, JP executed
an Affidavit of Desistance, for reasons such as: slow legal process, parents gave
up their jobs and her sibling had to stop schooling. Judge Savellano found
probable cause for issuance of warrants of arrest of the petitioners. Alonte then
surrendered himself while Concepcion posted bail. Petitioners were arraigned
and plead not guilty. They also manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. Both
parties agreed to proceed with the trial of case on merits, but Alonte argued
that Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only
to question of voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. Following
the arraignment, JP reiterated that there was no pressure exerted upon her to
sign the affidavit. Asst. Prosecutor Campones then manifested that in light of
the decisions of the parents and private complainant, she moved for the
dismissal of the case. The trial court rendered a judgement finding accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration. According to Alonte, the Respondent Judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion without affording the petitioner of his Constitutional
right to due process of law. He averred that there was no trial on the facts that
would establish that the complainant was raped by petitioner, thus, violating
Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue:
Whether due process in criminal procedure was properly

Issue:
No; Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings,
in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the
accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered
only upon lawful hearing.

Rule 119, Sec 3. Order of Trial - The trial shall proceed in the following order:
a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and civil liability
b) Accused may present evidence to prove his defense
c) The parties may then present rebutting evidence unless the Court permits
them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue
d) Upon admission of evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless Court directs parties to argue orally or submit memoranda
e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of the trial may be
modified accordingly

In the case at bar, the deviation from the regular course of trial was not done
with consideration of the rights of all the parties to the case. The existence of the
waiver must be positively demonstrated. The waiver requires that it is voluntary
and also knowingly and intelligently done. Petitioners have not been directed to
present evidence to prove their defenses. The parties have also not been given
the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have the dates been set by
the Respondent Judge for this purpose. The petitioners also have not admitted
the act charged in the Information, as the promulgation of the decision

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proceeded even without them. There can be no excuse for not affording the
petitioners their day in Court as due process is included in the Bill of Rights as an
invaluable right. Thus, for failure to observe due process in criminal procedure,
the decision convicting the petitioners is NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.

Affidavit of Desistance:
The general rule is that retractions are generally unreliable and looked upon with
disfavor by the Courts. The retraction is an afterthought that should not be given
probative value. An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a
pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the
criminal case once the action has been instituted.

ZJI
People v Dapitan
GR no 90625; May 23, 1991
General matters re criminal procedure

Facts:
An Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Dapitan. He was later
apprehended. When arraigned with the assistance of counsel de oficio Atty.
Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty. At the scheduled hearing, a
new counsel de oficio for the accused, Atty. Alberto, manifested that the
accused had expressed the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. As
a result, the scheduled hearing was cancelled and reset. On various dates
thereafter, hearings were had until the parties completed the presentation of
their evidence. Two witnesses for the prosecution testified during the
incumbency of Judge Rodriguez, Jr. The rest testified before the former’s
replacement, Judge Noblejas., the RTC found Dapitan guilty of robbery with
homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
RTC’s decision was later elevated to the SC on appeal. In his appeal, Dapitan
argues that the RTC erred in not applying the indeterminate sentence law that
favors him and that as the result of the alleged error, the imposition over him of
the penalty of reclusion temporal by the RTC is tantamount to deprivation of life
or liberty without due process of law.

Issue:
Whether the accused-appellant was denied of due process

Held:
No; Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must
be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3)
the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment
must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and

proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and
a judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has
had due process. In this case, all the requisites or conditions of due process are
present in this case. He was also given the chance to confront the witnesses
presented against him and to present his own evidence. Therefore, the
accused-appellant Dapitan was not denied of due process.

ZJI
De Lima v Guerrero
GR no 229781; October 10, 2017
Hierarchy of Courts

Facts:
The Senate and the HOR conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison, inviting inmates who
executed affidavits. As a result, he DOJ Panel of Prosecutors was directed to
conduct the requisite preliminary investigation. Petitioner alleged evident
partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ
prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of
the Ombudsman. The DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and in its Joint Resolution, recommended the filing of
Informations against petitioner De Lima. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,
mainly raising that the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against
petitioner. Respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her
co-accused. Thereafter, petitioner repaired to the SC via a petition praying for
granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Orders and the
Warrant of Arrest of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on hierarchy
of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the CA

Held:
No; The Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can actually be
sought in the lower courts. The strictness of the policy regarding said hierarchy is
designed to shield the court from having to deal with cases that are well within
the competence of the lower courts, leaving time for the Court to work on more
essential and fundamental tasks which the Constitution has assigned to it.

However, there are exceptions to the rule on hierarchy where resort to the SC is
allowed:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed
immediately;
(2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel;
(4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
(5) when time is of the essence;
(6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law;
(8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice;
(9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.

In the present case, none of these exceptions were established. Thus, the
petitioner may not be excused from complying with the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts.

ZJI
People v Go
GR no 168539; March 25, 2014
Custody of law distinguished from jurisdiction over the person

Facts:
A certain Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was
herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Enrile in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Later, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The
prosecution is given a period of 10 days within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official
Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an
accused in this case. The prosecution complied with the above Order
contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail.

Issue:
Whether the court has jurisdiction over the person of respondent Go despite the
fact that he has already posted bail for his provisional liberty

Held:
Yes; it is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019.
It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them
can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability.
His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge
of conspiracy between him and private respondent.

Private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation
vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of
an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

It does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person
of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that
the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the
alleged offenders.

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Miranda v Tuliao
GR no 158763; March 31, 2006
Custody of law distinguished from jurisdiction over the person

Facts:
Two burnt cadavers were discovered which were later identified as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Two information for murder were filed
against SPO1 Leaño, SPO2 Maderal, et al., in the RTC. The RTC convicted all
except SPO2 Maderal for being at large. The case (People v. Leańo) was
appealed to the SC where the SC acquitted the accused therein on the ground
of reasonable doubt. Later, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Bauzon and Tuliao. Warrants of arrest were issued by Judge Tumaliuan against
petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion to complete preliminary investigation and
recall/quash the warrants of arrest. However, they did not attend the urgent
hearing on the motions, so the motions were denied for failure of the court to
acquire jurisdiction over them. Hence, Judge Tumaliuan ordered the serving of
the warrants. A new presiding Judge was appointed and ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrests issued by Judge Tumaliuan due to lack of
probable cause. This prompted respondent Tuliao to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari, mandamus and prohibiton. The Court of Appeals ordered the
reinstatement of the criminal case, consistent with the initial decision of Judge
Tumaliuan. Petitioners aver that the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the petitioners when they filed for an urgent motion for complete
preliminary investigation and motion to quash warrants of arrest.

Issue:
Whether the filing of the motions allowed the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the accused

Held:
No; As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

There is, however, an exception; This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a
special appearance. These pleadings are:
(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included
(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and
(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest

Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet
not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the

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person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

ZJI
David v Agbay
GR no 199113; March 18, 2015
Custody of law distinguished from jurisdiction over the person

Facts:
Renato David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the
Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach where they constructed a
residential house. However, they came to know that the portion where they built
their house is public land and part of the salvage zone, so David filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR at
the CENRO. In the said application, David indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that David, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against David.
Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict David for violation of Article 172 of the RPC. The MTC ruled that
David was still a Canadian citizen at the time. David filed a motion for
reconsideration at the MTC, but it was denied. David then elevated the case to
the RTC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The RTC
denied the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court. David filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
The Solicitor General contends that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC
when he filed his Urgent Motion for Redetermination of Probable Cause, David is
deemed to have submitted his person to the said court's jurisdiction by his
voluntary appearance.

Issue:
Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Held:
Yes; custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than
an application for bail. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have

submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. In
criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in
cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. (Motion to dismiss or quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction against the person of the accused or defendant and motion to
quash warrants of arrest).

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for
redetermination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it
lacked jurisdiction over his person.

ZJI
Alva v CA
GR no 157331; April 12, 2006
Custody of law distinguished from jurisdiction over the person

Facts:
A criminal case was filed against petitioner Alva for the crime of estafa. His bail
bond issued was approved by the Executive Judge of the RTC. Thus, the warrant
of arrest issued against him was recalled. Upon his arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty with assistance of a counsel. On the said date of promulgation, both
petitioner and his counsel failed to appear. In response, RTC issued an Order
directing the promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of a
bench warrant of arrest against petitioner for his failure to appear before it
despite due notice. Thus, the RTC issued
its decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to
imprisonment. The warrant of arrest issued was returned because the address of
the accused was not within our area of responsibility. Examination of the records
of the case revealed that petitioner already moved out of his address on record
without informing the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused

Held:
Yes; Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender;
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused.

One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a
warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet
not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced.

Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an

accused escapes from the custody of the law but continues until the case is
terminated. In the case at bar, the RTC already acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused petitioner - when he appeared at the arraignment and
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged - notwithstanding the fact that he
jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive.

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Cruz v CA
GR no 123340; August 29, 2002
Territorial Jurisdiction

Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of "Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document" before the Manila RTC. Petitioner executed
before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a
parcel of land located in Bulacan stating that she was the sole surviving heir of
the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs.
Since the offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action
arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The trial court acquitted the petitioner and court rendered
judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the surviving
heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan. Likewise, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court stating that since there was neither
reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one
been instituted to the criminal action, the institution of a criminal action carries
with it the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense
charged. Petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court the present petition maintaining the argument that the
court presided by respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property
because it is located in Bulacan — outside the territorial jurisdiction (Manila) of
said court.

Issue:
Whether respondent Judge’s court (Manila) acquired jurisdiction over the civil
aspect of the case even if the property in question is in Bulacan

Held:
Yes; There are three important requisites which must be present before a court
can acquire criminal jurisdiction.
1. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense
was
committed.
3. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the
law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa
through
falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the
offense
charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial
court also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because
she voluntarily
submitted to the court’s authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. The action for
recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless
reserved by the offended party. In the instant case, the offended party did not
reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal
action.

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AAA v BBB
GR no 212448; January 11, 2018
Territorial Jurisdiction

Facts:
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married in Quezon City. Later, BBB started working
in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status. BBB
supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel
Mok with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a
head when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during her visit with their kids. Thus, an information in RTC Pasig was filed by AAA
alleging that she has suffered mental and emotional anguish constituting
psychological violence under RA 9262, caused by her husband’s marital
infidelity. Thereafter, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also
able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the
warrant of arrest. In his response, BBB filed an omnibus motion to quash
information, lift hold departure, and warrant of arrest. RTC Pasig granted the
motion to quash on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, thereby dismissing the
case. AAA now went to SC arguing that mental and emotional anguish is an
essential element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by
her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair
takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take cognizance
of the case. In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A.
No. 9262, which provides that the case shall be filed in the RTC where the crime
or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.

Issue:
Whether the Philippine courts can exercise jurisdiction over an offense under RA
9262 when the alleged illicit relationship occurred outside the country

Held:
Yes; the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule
that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information.

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court
wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. RA 9262
criminalizes psychological violence causing mental or emotion suffering and not
the marital infidelity.

ZJI
Guevarra v Almodovar
GR no 75256; January 26, 1989
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend (Almine,
Jr.) and three other children in their backyard. They were target-shooting a
bottle cap placed around 15 to 20 meters away with an air rifle borrowed from
a neighbor. In the course of their game, Almine, Jr. was hit by a pellet on his left
collar bone which caused his unfortunate death. After conducting preliminary
investigation, the Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the
unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim’s parents
appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case
against petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Petitioner averred that the case against him should have first been filed before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa pursuant to, Sec. 2(3), PD 1508.

Issue:
Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding that it did
not go through the Lupon Tagapamayapa

Held:
Yes; in the case of Lupon v IAC, the SC held that ordinarily, non-compliance with
the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not
prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case,
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during
the entire proceedings a quo.

In my understanding:
Di siya ground to dismiss the case motu proprio BUT the other party MAY file a
motion to dismiss om the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity,
hence, madismiss na din yung case.

ZJI
Atienza v People
GR no 188694; February 12, 2014
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Atibula, Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA
Reporter’s Division, was invited by Castro to attend Atienza’s birthday party
where he was introduced to a certain Dario whom he assisted in searching for a
CA decision. Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision in one of the volumes
of the CA Original Decisions. Further, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of
₱50,000.00 in exchange for Volume 260, which the latter turned down. A few
weeks later, Atibula discovered that Volume 266 was missing. When such was
found, Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the
decisions and noticed that there were two new documents inserted therein. NBI
conducted laboratory analysis and comparative examination and found that
Volume 266 had indeed been altered. Consequently, a criminal complaint was
filed charged. The RTC rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether petitioner may raise jurisdictional defect on appeal

Held:
Yes; the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case since
Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1) 90 of the RPC, which is
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or
imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) 91 and a fine of not
more than P5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MeTCs, MTCs
and MCTCs pursuant to Section 32 (2) of the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980,". 94 While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the
present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same.

Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution
or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is
well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable
even if raised for the first time on appeal.

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Lacson v Executive Secretary
GR no 128096; January 20, 1999
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
11 people who were allegedly members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were
slain By the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group and other police
officers among which is the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission – Task Force
Habagat headed by petitioner Lacson. The Ombudsman recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against the petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan, which found the petitioner to be merely an accessory to the
offense. All accused then filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan asserting that under the information, the case should fall
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Arguing that under RA 7975 the law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
“principal accused” are government officials with SG 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. In the case, the highest
was only a Chief Inspector, and none of them has the equivalent of at least SG
27. While the motions for reconsiderations were pending resolution, RA 8249 was
approved into law expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it also
deleted the word “principal” before the
word accused in the old law, making the case under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, Section 4(b) which required that the offense
charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for
the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.

Issue:
Whether the case is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Held:
No; the jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The
elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors
falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the
offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.

However, in this case, while the information states that the accused committed
the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting. Failure to show in the amended
information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions, the offense charge in the subject criminal case is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, not the
Sandiganbayan.

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Crisostomo v Sandiganbayan
GR no 152398; April 14, 2005
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
SPO 1Edgar Crisostomo (member of PNP & jail guard at Solano Municipal Jail)
along with 6 others were charged with the murder of Renato Suba, a detention
prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail, with the use of rough-surfaced instruments,
including fist blows, inflicting upon him serious injuries resulting to his death.
Crisostomo assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued. Only Crisostomo and Calingayan stood trial while the
other accused were at large. The Sandiganbayan found sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict Crisostomo and Calingayan of murder.
Crisostomo argues that the Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to try the
case. Crisostomo points out that the crime of murder is not listed in Section 4 of
PD 1606 as one of the crimes that the Sandiganbayan can try. Crisostomo insists
that there is no direct relation between the commission of murder and
Crisostomo's public office. Crisostomo further contends that the mere allegation
in the Information that the offense was committed in relation to Crisostomo's
office is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime of murder charged
against Crisostomo

Issue:
Yes; the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case will stand or fall on this
test: Does the Information allege a close or intimate connection between the
offense charged and Crisostomo's public office? The Information passes the test.

A public officer commits an offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the

offense while performing, though in an improper or irregular manner, his official
functions and he cannot commit the offense without holding his public office. In
such a case, there is an intimate connection between the offense and the
office of the accused. If the information alleges the close connection between
the offense charged and the office of the accused, the case falls within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

In this case, Crisostomo, as the jail guard, could not have conspired with the
inmates to murder the detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were not a
jailer.

ZJI
Sanchez v Demetriou
GR no 111771-77; November 9, 1993
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, the Mayor of Calauan
Laguna, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing
of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the DoJ conducted a preliminary investigation. Upon the
“invitation” petitioner was positively identified by witnesses who both executed
confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the
killing of
Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice in Manila. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was
served on Sanchez. The respondent prosecutors filed with the RTC 7 information
with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. The petitioner argues that the
seven informations filed against him should be quashed because only the
Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation and as a
public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
Whether the case is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Held:
No; Sec 4(a) of PD 1606 states that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office. The crime of rape with homicide with
which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under this
paragraph.

There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with
homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is
not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information
that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the
exception.

ZJI
Adaza v Sandiganbayan
GR no 154886; July 28, 2005
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Adaza was the mayor of Jose Dalman, Zamboanga del Norte where a building
for classrooms was being constructed in a school by DPWH. However, on the
turnover of the building, the last check for the payment was claimed by the
President of Teacher´s Association that he has not yet received the check. Upon
verification to the DPWH, said check was already issued to the PTA which in
conclusion turned out that the mayor has claimed the check and falsified the
signature of the PTA and his wife the signature of indorsement. Hence, the
complaint for falsification of public document, which was forwarded to the
Office of the Ombudsman. Mejorada, the PTA, however, during the
pendency of the preliminary investigation, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
Subsequently, the resolution of the Ombudsman found probable cause against
the petitioners charging for 2 counts of falsification in the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioners claimed that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged of falsification of public documents under Article 172 of RPC against
the mayor with salary grade 27 who did not take advantage of his official
position, thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime allegedly
committed by the accused

Held:
No; Under Sec 4 of RA 8294 states that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of RA 3019 and other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees in relation to their office.

For an offense to be committed in relation to the office, the relation between

the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, such that the
offense cannot exist without the office. It does not thus suffice to merely allege
in the information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in
relation to his office or that he took advantage of his position as these are
conclusions of law. The specific factual allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the offender's official
duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime
as having been committed in relation to public office are controlling.

In the case at bar, although herein petitioner was described in the information
as "a public officer being then the Mayor with salary grade 27 of Jose Dalman,
Zamboanga del Norte," there was no allegation showing that the act of
falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to
the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he made use of
his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. Hence,
the RTC has jurisdiction.

ZJI
Cariaga v People
GR no 180010; July 30, 2010
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Petitioner Cenita Cariaga, the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a
Salary Grade of 24 was charged before the RTC with three counts of
malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the RPC. RTC found
her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation. Petitioner filed
a Notice of Appeal which stated the intention to appeal the said decision to
CA. CA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It held that jurisdiction over
the offense is vested with the RTC considering that the position of Municipal
Treasurer was below salary grade 27. Pursuant PD No.
1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, it is the Sandiganbayan, to the
exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the offense. Thus,
the appeal was improperly made. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. Hence this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the said
decision

Held:
Yes; Under Sec 4 of PD 1606 as amended by RA 8249 states that the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases
involving cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to SG 27 or higher....

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgements, resolutions or orders of RTC whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner had
salary grade of 24. Appellate jurisdiction in this case pertained to the
Sandiganbayan.

ZJI
De Lima v Guerrero
GR no 229781; October 10, 2017
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
The Senate and the HOR conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison, inviting inmates who
executed affidavits. As a result, he DOJ Panel of Prosecutors was directed to
conduct the requisite preliminary investigation. Petitioner alleged evident
partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ
prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of
the Ombudsman. The DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and in its Joint Resolution, recommended the filing of
Informations against petitioner De Lima. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,
mainly raising that the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against
petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case (RA 9165
Comprehensive dangerous drugs Act)

Held:
No; A plain reading of RA 9165 will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related
cases is exclusively vested with the RTC and no other. RA 9165 specifies the RTC
as the court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively try and hear cases involving
violations of [RA 9165).” This is an exception, couched in the special law on
dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as
amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law
prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to
the general.

In this case, the jurisdiction is vested upon the RTC as designated by the SC as
the drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in
relation to the public officials’ office.

ZJI
Dizon v People
GR no 227577; January 24, 2018
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Dizon was charged with 6 counts of Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents at the RTC. He was holding the position of
Special Collecting Officer at the Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau, which is a
position with a salary grade less than 27. He was being charged for allegedly
forging the ORs issued by the City Treasurer of the City of Manila by changing
the date and putting a lower amount on the receipt than what was paid to him
and misappropriating the remaining amount. The RTC convicted Dizon of the 6
counts of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents.
Dizon then filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC, and so the court ordered
the case to be elevated to the appellate tribunal for appropriate action.
However, the records were forwarded to the CA by the RTC, which in turn sent
Dizon a Notice to File Appellant’s Brief. However, Dizon noticed that his appeal
was erroneously taken to the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan, which has
appellate jurisdiction over his case as per Section 4(c) of RA 8249, and so he
filed a Motion to Endorse case to the Sandiganbayan. The CA however denied
the Motion to Endorse and dismissed his appeal for having been erroneously
filed, reasoning that he should have promptly moved for the endorsement of
the case within the original period of 15 days instead of requesting for numerous
extensions and belatedly claiming that his case was filed in the wrong court.

Issue:
Whether CA erred when it dismissed Dizon’s motion to endorse

Held:
Yes; According to Sec. 4(c) of RA 8249, in case none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher as prescribed in RA 6758,
or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC and MCTC as the case may be,
and that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgements, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the
exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. In this case, since Dizon’s position corresponds to one with salary
grade lower than 27, Sandiganbayan has appellate jurisdiction over his case,
and so his appeal was erroneously taken to the CA.

In this case, the CA wrongly faulted Dizon for belatedly moving for endorsement
of the case, as the motion was timely filed within the extended period that the
CA itself granted, and the dismissal of the case due to this ground will result in
the injudicious dismissal of his appeal.

ZJI
Antiporda Jr v Garchitorena
GR no 133289; December 23, 1999
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
The accused were charged with the crime of kidnapping of one Elmer Ramos
which was filed with the First Division of the SB comprised of the respondents.
Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that there were inadequacies in the
allegations in the Information for which reason she beg leave to amend the
same. The Court for its part expressed anxiety as to the Courts jurisdiction over
the case considering that it was not clear whether or not the subject matter of
the accusation was office related. The prosecution complied with the said order
and filed an Amended Information adding therein that Antiporda as Municipal
Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan took advantage of his position, which was admitted
by the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the petitioners-accused filed a Motion to
Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the
SB does not have jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

Held:
Yes; the original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that
the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the
same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional
fact was omitted therein. However, the petitioners are estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for it was they who challenged the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their
Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work-connected.

It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to

secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(kasi nga, ininvoke ng petitioners na kulang daw yung nasa information noon
kaya ibnigyan ng court yung prosecutor ng time para iamend ung information
tapos ngayon na unfavorable, iaassail nila jurisdiction ng SB??? NOOOO)

We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the
amendment of the Information.

ZJI
People v Go
GR no 168539; March 25, 2014
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
A certain Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was
herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Enrile in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Later, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The
prosecution is given a period of 10 days within which to show cause why this
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official
Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an
accused in this case. The prosecution complied with the above Order
contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over respondent’s person

Held:
Yes; it is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019.
It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them
can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability.
His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge
of conspiracy between him and private respondent.

Private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation
vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of
an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

It does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person
of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that
the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the
alleged offenders.

ZJI
People v Benipayo
GR no 154473; April 24, 2009
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Respondent Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC, delivered a speech,
which has been subsequently published in the issues of Manila Bulletin.
Thereafter, petitioner corporation filed an Affidavit-Complaint for libel. The City
Prosecutor filed an Information for libel against the respondent with RTC.
Respondent then moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer
and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the
Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be
filed with the SB. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an
impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress,
it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that
the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office—he
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it
was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion
of all other courts.

Issue:
Whether the jurisdiction over libel cases or written defamations is shared by the
RTC with the Sandiganbayan

Held:
No; uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear
and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. Article 360 of the RPC is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try
cases of written defamations, thus: The criminal and civil action for damages in
cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense.

It is the RTC which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over written
defamations. Hence, jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the
RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on
whether the crime is committed in relation to office. The grant to the SB of
jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office did not divest
the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases
regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office.

ZJI
Soller v Sandiganbayan
GR no 144261-62; May 9, 2001
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
A criminal complaint was filed against herein petitioners wherein they are
charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders as defined and penalized under PD 1829. It was alleged that they
were in conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry
Macabael by altering his wound, concealing his brain, falsely stating in police
report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one and
falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his
wound when in truth there was. According to the spouses Soller, that they did
not tamper the cadaver of Jerry Macabel and that petitioner Prudente
Soller, who was then the Municipal Mayor, is also a doctor who assisted the
autopsy. The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an
Information for Obstruction of Justice with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners then
filed a motion to quash on the principal ground that Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged. The motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.

Issue:
whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case at bar

Held:
No; what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific
factual allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy
between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of
the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.

In the case at bar, the information of the case failed to allege that petitioners
had committed the offenses charged in relation to their office. Neither are there
specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection between
the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions of
the offenders. There was no allegation that the altering and suppressing the
gunshot wound of the victim was done in the performance of official function.
Indeed, the offense may be committed by any person whether a public officer
or a private citizen, and accordingly, public office is not an element of the
offense. Moreover, the information alleged that the son of herein petitioner
spouses was the one who shot the victim. Thus, there is an indication that
petitioner spouses had a personal motive to commit the offenses and would
have committed such even if they did not hold the position of Mayor and
Municipal Health Officer.

ZJI
Serana v Sandiganbayan
GR no 162059; January 22, 2008
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Petitioner Serana is a senior student of UP Cebu. She was appointed by former
President Joseph Estrada as student regent of UP. Petitioner, together with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of OSRFI is the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gavePhp15M to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. As reflected in the Information, the
source of the funds was the Office of the President. However, the renovation of
the Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and property
with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother for Estafa and filed the case to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the complaint, contending that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in
her capacity as UP student regent.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa case

Held:
Yes; Sec 4(b) of PD 1606 states that the SB has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. This jurisdiction is subject
to the twin requirement that the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Sec4(a) of PD 1606 and that the offense was
committed in relation to their office.

Section 4 (A) (1) (g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. In this case, the Board of
Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

ZJI
People v Dela Torre-Yadao
GR no 162144-54; November 13, 2012
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
The combined forces of the PNP Task Forces/Groups killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. After investigation the Deputy
Ombudsman absolved all the police officers involved. On review, however, the
Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charged of murder
against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan, acting on respondents’ motion, ordered the transfer of their
cases to RTC on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending resolution, Congress passed RA 8249
that expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by deleting the word
“principal” from the word “principal accused” to apple to all pending cases.
As a result, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the case. The
Sandiganbayan, nonetheless, ordered the transfer of the cases to the RTC since
the amended information contained no allegations that respondents
committed the offense charged in relation to, or in the discharge of their
official functions. Later, the parents of the two victims submitted birth certificates
showing that they were minors. This prompted the prosecution to amend the
information and call the attention of the Executive Judge for the re-raffle of
the case to a family court. However, request for recall was denied.

Issue:
Whether the Family Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in this case

Held:
No; Sec 5 of RA 8369 states that the Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide criminal cases where one or more of the victims
is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense. However, in the case at
bar, even if there were 2 minor victims, they are no longer living in this murder
case. Hence, this case does not require the special attention and protection of
a family court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during trial
since the minor victims are represented by their parents who had become the
real private offended parties.

ZJI
Bureau of Customs v Devanadera
GR no 193253; September 8, 2015
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Commissioner Morales of petitioner BOC issued an Audit Notification letter
informing the President of OILINK that BOC will conduct a compliance audit,
including the examination, inspection, verification and investigation of all
pertinent records of OILINK’s import transactions for the past three years. OILINK
was able to submit some documents to the audit team, but was not able to
produce other documents. Morales then approved of an administrative case
against OILINK for failure to comply with the requirements of a Customs
Administrative Order. The DOJ stated that OILINK should pay and a Hold order
was issued against shipments of OILINK. The State Prosecutor then
recommended the dismissal of the complaint affidavit for lack of probable
cause. This was approved by the Asst. Chief State and Chief State Prosecutors.
Thus, BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed this, as well as
the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the petition assailing the DOJ resolution in a
preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses

Held:
No, it should be with the CTA but the SC took cognizance; The general rule is
that CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, in
line with the policy of hierarchy of Courts, SC said that it was proper to refer the
petition to the CTA, as it was also dedicated exclusively to the study and
consideration of revenue-related problems.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and that it has full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special
civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition. One of the recognized exceptions to the said rule is when the
petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice,
or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. Since the present case includes
questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, as well as to avoid
multiplicity of suits and further delay in its disposition, the Court shall directly
resolve the petition for certiorari, instead of referring it to the CTA.

ZJI
Samson v Daway
GR no 160054-55; July 21, 2004
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Two information for unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code (RA
No 8293) were filed against petitioner Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes.
Later, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the information and motion for
reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend challenging the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He contended that since
under Section 170 of RA No 8293, the penalty of imprisonment for unfair
competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the MTC
and not by the RTC, per RA No 7691. The trial court denied petitioner’s twin
motions. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. Hence, the
instant petition for certiorari alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in issuing the assailed orders.

Issue:
Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of
intellectual property rights

Held:
RTC; under Section 170 of the IPC, the criminal penalty for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine
ranging from P50,000 to P200,000. Corollary, Section 163 of the same Code
states that actions (including criminal and civil) shall be brought before the
proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The existing law
referred here is Section 27 of The Trademark Law (RA No 166) which provides
that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair
competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is
lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court).

Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over
that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, the
Intellectual Property Code and Trademark Law are special laws conferring
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial
Court. They should therefore prevail over RA No 7691, which is a general law.

Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is
properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is
imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from
P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.

ZJI
Gonzales v Abaya
GR no 164007; August 10, 2006
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
A few armed members of the AFP abandoned their designated assignments
with the intention to destabilize the government. Having proceeded with their
plan, they entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments in
Makati City, led by Navy Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security guards, and planted
explosives within the premises of the building. Consequently, the DOJ filed with
the RTC an Information for coup d’etat against those soldiers while respondent
The said pre-investigation panel then recommended that by virtue of the
“doctrine of absorption,” those charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should
not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court martial
against the accused are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat."

Issue:
Whether those charged with coup d’état should be tried in the military tribunal

Held:
Yes; generally, members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law
who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the RPC, special penal laws, or
even local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. However, this is
subject to the exception where the civil court, before arraignment, has
determined the offense to be service connected. In such situations, the
offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial.

It is also worth noting that there is an exception to the exception: where the
President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment
that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.

In this case, the charge against petitioners must be tried by the military tribunal
since such charge concerns their professional conduct and behavior as military
officers as they have violated their solemn oath to defend the Constitution, the
law, and the duly constituted authorities therein and is thus indicative of being a
service-connected crime. Moreover, Section 1 of Republic Act no. 7055 vests
jurisdiction on military tribunals to try such crimes. Thus, the Regional Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared that Article
96 is merely absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat.

ZJI
People v Ocaya
GR no L-47448; May 17, 1978
Jurisdiction determined by allegations in the complaint or information

Facts:
The office of the Provincial fiscal of Bukidnon, after preliminary investigation filed
an information in the court of respondent judge, charging the three private
respondents-accused for serious physical injuries. The records do not show that
arraignment or trial on the merits has been held much less that warrants for the
arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead after "scanning the records of
(the) case" and noting that the attached medical certificate stated that the
injuries suffered by the victim Lolita Ares "may either be slight or less serious
physical injuries only" contrary to victim’s affidavit that she was incapacitated
from her customary labor for more than 30 days and the fiscal’s findings as to
the prominent scar left on the victim’s face as a result "which considerably
deforms her face" (as duly alleged in the information), respondent judge motu
proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical
injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court".

Issue:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case

Held:
Yes; it is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the
trial would indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial court’s jurisdiction was
committed does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in
it under the allegations of the information as filed since" (once) the jurisdiction
attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent
happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to
oust jurisdiction already attached."

ZJI
Arkoncel v CFI of Basilan City
GR no 27204; August 29, 1975
When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal prosecution

Facts:
Petitioner Arkoncel, a lawyer, was charged with qualified theft by the City Fiscal
of Basilan City in the CFI, together with his laborers. It was alleged in the
information that the accused stole 5,000 coconuts from the land of Gerardo
Esperat. The Fiscal, after certifying that he had conducted the proper
preliminary investigation, added "that the accused were duly subpoenaed but
failed to appear". According to the Fiscal, when Arkoncel appeared in court
and was about to be arrested, the arrest was not effected because of his
supplication that the case be settled and, if it could not be settled, that he be
allowed to go home so that he could prepare the requisite bail bond. Instead of
posting bail, Arkoncel filed an instant special civil action of prohibition in
order to enjoin his prosecution for qualified theft. He alleged that he was denied
due process because he was not subpoenaed to appear at the preliminary
investigation.

Issue:
Whether petitioner’s prosecution can be enjoined

Held:
No; this case falls within the general rule that injunction or prohibition does not lie
to restrain a criminal prosecution. It does not fall within the exceptions where the
prosecution may be enjoined (a) for the orderly administration of justice, (b) to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner, (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions, (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights, and (e) where the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or
was declared void.

The reason for the general rule is that the accused has an adequate remedy at
law by establishing as a defense to the prosecution that he did not commit the
act charged, or that the statute, on which the prosecution is based, is void, and,
in case of conviction, by taking an appeal. Public interest requires that criminal
acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society
Moreover, Arkoncel did not exhaust his remedies. He did not raise in the lower
court the alleged lack of due process. He came to this Court without first filing in
the lower court a motion to quash or asking for a reinvestigation. His contention
in this Court that his prosecution was merely an act of harassment, while he was
in the lawful performance of his duties as a government officer, is a factual
allegation that has no basis in the record. It is controverted by the respondents.
He should have raised that issue in the lower court.

ZJI
Samson v Guingona
GR no 123504; December 14, 2000
When injunction may be issued to restrain criminal prosecution

Facts:
Patrolmen of the Central Police District Command posted at the intersection of
Scout Reyes Street and Mother Ignacia Street flagged a taxicab, with Datu
Gemie Sinsuat, a son of a politician from Cotabato, as passenger. Instantly, the
patrolmen shot Datu Sinsuat in different parts of the body, inflicting upon him
multiple gunshot wounds, causing his death. The PNP-Criminal Investigation
Service and Central Police District Command district director and the heirs of
Gemie Sinsuat filed with the DOJ a complaint for murder against petitioners for
the killing of Datu Gemie Sinsuat. The trial court then ordered the reinvestigation
of the case. Petitioners did not file any motion for reconsideration of the order.
However, before the DOJ could conduct a reinvestigation, petitioners filed with
the SC the instant petition to enjoin respondents from further proceeding with
the reinvestigation of the case or from resolving the same.

Issue:
Whether the SC may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a
reinvestigation of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court

Held:
No; As a general rule, the court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason
will injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation
or reinvestigation. However, in extreme cases, the Court has laid the following
exceptions:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused
(2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions
(3) when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
(5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance, or regulation
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent
(7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
(8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
(9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance
(10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

Petitioners have not shown that the case at bar falls within any of the
recognized exceptions set forth above. As a rule, the Court does not interfere in
the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against an offender.

ZJI
People v Aruta
GR no 120915; April 13, 1998
Rule 113

Facts:
Rosa Aruta was arrested, charged and then convicted with violation of Sec 4,
Art II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant
that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day
with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, a team was assembled
and proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. At around 4:00 P.M., when
a bus stopped two females got off, the informant pointed out to the team "Aling
Rosa" who was then carrying a travelling bag. The team approached the
woman and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When they asked
about the contents of her bag, Aling Rosa handed it to them. Upon inspection,
the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag.
On trial, instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to
Evidence" alleging the illegality of the search and seizure conducted. The same
was denied without the trial court ruling on thereon. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case. But after the prosecution made a formal offer of
evidence, the defense filed its Comment contesting the admissibility of the items
seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest violated respondent’s constitutional rights

Held:
Yes; in the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a
warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-
appellant's bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
Section 5 of Rule 113.

In this case, accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime.

Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime.
Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the
informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the
carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM
agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the
furtive finger of the informant.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause
and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise,
the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search
was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in
favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as
evidence against accused-appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree"
and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the
Constitution.

ZJI
Sindac v People
GR no 220732; September 6, 2016
Rule 113

Facts:
The prosecution alleged that PNP, Real, Quezon, conducted surveillance
operations on Sindac's alleged drug trade. One morning, the PNP Real
conducted a briefing, and thereafter, proceeded to the port of Barangay
Ungos. There, PO3 Bonifacio Peñamora and PO1 Asis saw Sindac headed for
prompting them to follow him. Along the national road of said barangay, PO3
Peñamora and PO1 Asis saw Sindac meet with a certain Cañon who sold and
handed over a plastic sachet to him. Suspecting that the sachet contained
shabu, PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis rushed to the scene and introduced
themselves as police officers. Cañon escaped but the policemen were able to
apprehend Sindac. When ordered to empty his pocket, Sindac brought out his
wallet which contained a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. After initially determining that such substance is shabu, the
policemen arrested Sindac and brought him to the police station. There,
Sindac's arrest was recorded, the seized item was marked in Sindac's presence,
and a request for chemical test was prepared. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that the plastic sachet seized from Sindac contained shabu.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest

Held:
No; One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a
search may be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed.

Sec 5, Rule 113 dentifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which
had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of
his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In arrests made in flagrante delicto, 2 elements must concur, namely: a) the

person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and b)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
ON the other hand, hot pursuit arrests requires that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed.

Considering that PO3 Peñamora was at a considerable distance away from the
alleged criminal transaction (5 to 10 meters), not to mention the atomity of the
object thereof, the Court finds it highly doubtful that said arresting officer was
able to reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to
prompt him to conduct a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and, thereupon, a
warrantless search.

Neither has the prosecution established that the conditions set forth in Section 5
(b), Rule 113 have been complied with. Based on the foregoing, it is, in fact,
quite perceivable that PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis had proceeded to

ZJI
apprehend Sindac solely on account of information retrieved from previous
surveillance operations conducted on Sindac's alleged drug dealing activities.
Advancing to a warrantless arrest based only on such information, absent
circumstances that would lead to the arresting officer's "personal knowledge" as
described in case law, unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of
Section 5, Rule 113.

ZJI
People v Manago
GR no 212340; August 17, 2016
Rule 113

Facts:
An Information was filed before the RTC, charging Manago of Possession of
Dangerous Drugs. According to the prosecution, PO3 Antonio Din of the PNP
Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty
Parlor when 2 persons entered and declared a hold-up. PO3 Din identified
himself as a police officer and exchanged gun shots with the two suspects. After
the shootout, one of the suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other
boarded a red Toyota Corolla. Upon verification with the Land Transportation
Office, the police officers found out that the motorcycle was registered in
Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was registered in the name of
Zest-O Corporation, where Manago worked as a District Sales Manager.
With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers conducted a "hot
pursuit" operation 1 day after the robbery incident by setting up a checkpoint.
The red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by Manago, passed through the
checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the vehicle. The police officers
then ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a thorough
search of the vehicle, resulting in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance which was later on found to be shabu.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest

Held:
No; Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, there
are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These
are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto, (b) an arrest of a suspect
where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency
of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the

element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of
immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the
items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be rendered
inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.

In this case, the required element of immediacy was not met. This is because, at
the time the police officers effected the warrantless arrest upon Manago's
person, investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted,
which consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects.

ZJI
People v Galano
GR no L-42925; January 31, 1977
Rule 110 – Prescriptive period of crimes, interruption

Facts:
October 2, 1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court
against private respondent Santos by Juanito Limbo. Upon his arrest, posted a
bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter arraigned, and
he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its merits.
However, on September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. It was not until
September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was rearrested,
and the trial of the said case resumed. While the said case was pending trial,
private respondent Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that the Batangas court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case,
the evidence showing that the crime was committed in Manila which caused
the dismissal. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled
the same case against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. On July
29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the CFI. On November 12,
1975, the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
prescription and double jeopardy. The CFI issued an order dismissing the case
on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed.

Issue:
Whether the offense for estafa for which respondent accused stands prescribed

Held:
No; Article 91 of the RPC provides that the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when the proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962, when respondent
failed to account for and instead misappropriated to his own use the amount
that had been entrusted to him by the complainant, who promptly filed on
October 2, 1962 within the ten-year prescriptive period. The prescriptive period
was thereupon interrupted. After his plea of not guilty and during the trial,
respondent accused jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years. When the
Batangas court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion
dismissed the complaint "for lack of jurisdiction" since the evidence showed that
all elements of the crime were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas) the
proceedings therein terminated without conviction or acquittal of respondent
accused and it was only then that the prescriptive period (which was
interrupted during the pendency of the case) commenced to run again.
When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29,
1975, the same case against respondent accused in the Manila court of first
instance, (after having conducted a preliminary investigation), it is clear that not
even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been consumed.

ZJI
Sanrio Co Ltd v Lim
GR no 168662; February 19, 2008
Rule 110 – Prescriptive period of crimes, interruption

Facts:
Petitioner Sanrio Company, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright of
various animated characters. While it is not engaged in business in the
Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate
Incorporated (GGI). Through market research conducted by IP Manila
Associates (IPMA), it was confirmed that respondent's Orignamura Trading in
Tutuban Center was selling imitations of petitioner's products. On May 30, 2000 a
search warrant was issued and after searching the premises of Orignmura
Trading the agents of the NBI were able to seize various Sanrio products. On April
4, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual
Property Piracy (TAPP) of the DOJ against respondent for violation of the IPC. On
September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that Orignamura Trading did not infringe
any right secured by the IPC. Thus, the complaint was dismissed due to
insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was
denied. It then filed a petition for review in the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor of the DOJ but was likewise dismissed. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA but was dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Issue:
Whether the filing of the complaint in the DOJ tolled the prescriptive period

Held:
Yes; Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of
special laws starts on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by
the institution of proceedings against respondent (i.e., the accused).

Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year,
ten months and four days after the NBI searched respondent's premises and
seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately
filed in court, respondent's alleged violation had not yet prescribed. The filing of
the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of
prescription of criminal responsibility. Thus, the prescriptive period for the
prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely
filing of the complaint affidavit before the TAPP.

Act 3326:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
a. after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both
b. after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years
c. after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less
than six years
d. after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or
more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years

Provided, however, all offenses against any law or part of law administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after five years. Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same may not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

ZJI
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.

ZJI
Republic v Cojuangco
GR no 139930; June 26, 2012
Rule 110 – Prescriptive period of crimes, interruption

Facts:
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990, the OSG filed a complaint for violation
of RA 3019 against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB BOD before the
PCGG. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the
Ombudsman in line with the ruling in Cojuangco v PCGG which disqualified the
PCGG from conducting the preliminary investigation in the case. About nine
years later or on March 15, 1999, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
issued a Memorandum stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict
respondents for violation of R.A. 3019, the action has already prescribed.
Respondents amended UNICOM’s capitalization a third time on September 18,
1979, giving the incorporators unwarranted benefits. But since UNICOM filed its
Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation with the SEC on
February 8, 1980, making public respondents’ acts as board of directors, the
period of prescription began to run at that time and ended on February 8, 1990.
Thus, the crime already prescribed when the OSG filed the complaint with the
PCGG for preliminary investigation on March 1, 1990. In a Memorandum May 14,
1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the OSP’s recommendation for
dismissal of the complaint. It additionally ruled that UCPB’s subscription to the
shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18, 1979, was the proper point at
which the prescription of the action began to run since respondents’ act of
investing into UNICOM was consummated on that date and the giving of undue
benefit to the incorporators prescribed 10 years later on September 18, 1989.
Thus, the OSG filed its complaint out of time.

Issue:
Whether respondents’ alleged violation of RA 3019 already prescribed

Held:
Yes; Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees
is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. But the Court has already it
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases
such as the complaint against respondents. Thus, the prosecution of offenses
arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated
in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.

Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed
under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by BP 195 on March
16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A.
3019 was only 10 years. Since the acts complained of were committed before
the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as
provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.

What is involved here is UCPB’s investment in UNICOM, which corporation is

allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos crony. That
investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld from the curious
or from those who were minded knowing like banks or competing businesses.
The transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when
UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible government clearing
house for increases in corporate capitalization, to accommodate UCPB’s
investment. Changes in shareholdings are reflected in the General Information
Sheets that corporations have been mandated to submit annually to the SEC.
These are available to anyone upon request.

ZJI
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB’s
investment in UNICOM during martial law at the President’s or anyone else’s
instance. Indeed, no accusation of this kind has ever been hurled at the SEC
with reference to corporate transactions of whatever kind during martial law
since even that regime had a stake in keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as
an instrumentality of investments in the Philippines.

And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the
UCPB investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second element—that the
action could not have been instituted during the 10-year period because of
martial law—does not apply to this case. The last day for filing the action was, at
the latest, on February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended.

Petitioner had known of the investment it now questions for a sufficiently long
time, yet it let those 4 years of the remaining period of prescription run its course
before bringing the proper action.

ZJI
Zaldivia v Reyes Jr
GR no 102342; July 3, 1992
Rule 110 – Prescriptive period of crimes, interruption
Valid only for ORDINANCES not SPECIAL LAWS

Facts:
Petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in violation of an Ordinance of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal. Offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The
referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information was filed with the
MTC on October 2, 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the information on the
ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied which was
affirmed by the RTC. Petitioner invokes Act No. 3326 which states that violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Sec 2 of
which also states that prescription shall being to run from the day of the
commission of the violation...... and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. Respondents contend invoking Sec 1 of Rule 110
which states that in all cases, such institution interrupts the period of prescription
of the offense charged.

Issue:
Whether the information must be quashed on the ground that the crime
punished by an ordinance has already prescribed

Held:
Yes; Section 1 of Rule 110 is meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly
signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to
summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the

offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow
that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

In this case, the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No.
3326. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the
filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was
done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribe.

Sec 9 of the Rules of Summary Procedure requires complaint or information to

be filed directly in court without the need of a prior preliminary examination.
Hence, the running of the prescriptive period for violation of ordinances that fall
under summary procedure shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed
in court and not on any date before that.

ZJI
Ampatuan v de Lima
GR no 197291; April 3, 2013
Rule 110 – who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de oficio

Facts:
Petitioner was among the suspect of the Maguindanao Massacre where 57
innocent civilians were killed in the Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao
Province. Secretary of Justice Devanadera requested the transfer of the venue
of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila
to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In a joint resolution the Panel of Prosecutors
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre. Said resolution was due to the affidavit of Dalandag who was then
admitted into the witness protection program of the DOJ. Petitioner then wrote
to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the
information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his sworn declarations. Petitioner brought
a petition for mandamus in the RTC seeking to compel respondents to charge
Dalandag as another accused but was dismissed. Hence, this appeal by
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as an accused

Held:
No; Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the
complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be
responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may be
subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the
commission of a crime becomes a state witness.

The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may

become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case
pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval
of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act).

A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a

state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the
criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the discharged
accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense, unless
he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn
statement constituting the basis for his discharge. The discharge is expressly left
to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to
see to it that the conditions prescribed by the rules for that purpose exist.

On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the
Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for
him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission
as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal,
and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information
except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is
granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile
charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to

ZJI
him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall
petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order
the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.

The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the

Government as a state witness was warranted by the absolute necessity of his
testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all
the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That
he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre
was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state
witness. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in
the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an
acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the
sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now
charged for the crimes.

ZJI
AAA v BBB
GR no 212448; January 11, 2018
Rule 110 – who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de oficio

Facts:
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married in Quezon City. Later, BBB started to work
as a chef in Singapore, where he acquired permanent resident status. AAA
claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support. BBB supposedly started
having an affair with Lisel Mok, a Singaporean woman with whom he was
allegedly been living with. Later, AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a
hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids. Despite varied forms of
abuses, the prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA
mental and emotional anguish through the alleged marital infidelity. A warrant
of arrest was issued against BBB and AAA was also able to secure a Hold-
Departure order since BBB continued to evade the warrant. The trial court
granted a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and thereby
dismissing the case. AAA filed a petitioner to this court. BBB contends that this
petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before the Court
by AAA instead of the OSG as counsel for the People in appellate proceedings.

Issue:
Whether the offended party may file the petition without the representation of
the OSG

Held:
Yes; in AAA’s motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was
awaiting the OSG’s response to her Letter requesting for representation. But
since the OSG was unresponsive to her plea, AAA filed the petition in her own
name before the lapse of the extension given her by the Court. The Court
recalled instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the
interest of substantial justice so requires.

ZJI
People v Mariano
GR no L-47437; September 29, 1983
Rule 110 – who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de oficio

Facts;
Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI because of
misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and
electric cables being the person in authority to receive the same on behalf of
mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent Mariano then moved to quash
the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the items were
the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military commission for
Malversation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found guilty,
hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the court has jurisdiction over the estafa case against Mariano

Held:
Yes; the CFI has jurisdiction “In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided
by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos” Section 44, paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of 1948.

The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with

arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6)
months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the
accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts
of first instance.

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction
over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the
malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission.
Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the
case now before ss the accused in one is different from the accused in the
other.

ZJI
Pilapil v Ibay-Somera
GR no 80116; June 30, 1989
Rule 110 – who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de oficio

Facts:
Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen and Erich Geiling, a German national were
married in Germany. The two were initially happy however due to some dispute
they separated de facto and after 3 ½ years of marriage, Geiling eventuated a
divorce proceeding against Pilapil before Schoneberg Local Court. Said divorce
is recognized in the Philippines by virtue of Article 15 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery against Pilapil alleging
that Pilapil had an affair with two different people during the time they were still
married. Having conducted much petition by Pilapil to dismiss the case against
her she finally filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the
annulment of the lower court denying her motion to quash on the ground that
the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is
a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint.

Issue:
Whether Geiling can file the criminal complaint of adultery against her former
wife

Held:
No; Geiling cannot file the criminal complaint against her former wife. Under Art
344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents, or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery
and concubinage.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery.
After a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of
the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of person. Thus, the German spouse not being married to Pilapil can no
longer file the said criminal case against his former wife.

ZJI
Cabral v Bracamonte
GR no 233174; January 23, 2019
Rule 110 – who may file them, crimes that cannot be prosecuted de oficio

Facts:
Respondent Bracamonte and petitioner Cabral executed a MOA in Makati City
for the purchase of shares of stock in WFC and AVIVER. Respondent then issued
a postdated check to petitioner. However, the drawee bank in Makati City
dishonored the check upon presentment for lack of sufficient funds. Thereafter,
petitioner instituted a complaint for estafa against respondent. Finding probable
cause, the prosecutor filed with the RTC an Information. Respondent moved to
quash the information contending that the venue was improperly laid in
Parañaque City, because the postdated check was delivered and dishonored
in Makati City. Cabral maintained that since the complaint affidavit alleged
that negotiations on the MOA were conducted in a warehouse in Parañaque
City where Cabral was convinced to sell his shares in the two corporations, then
the RTC of Parañaque City properly had jurisdiction. The RTC held that since the
complaint affidavit and the Information in the instant case duly alleged that
Bracamonte deceived Cabral in Parañaque City, the Parañaque RTC
appropriately had jurisdiction over the instant case. The Court of Appeals ruled
that deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued
and delivered, while damage was inflicted at the same place where the check
was dishonored by the drawee bank. Thus, jurisdiction solely lies in Makati City
where all the elements of the crime occurred.

Issue:
Whether Cabral had a legal standing to question the CA decision

Held:
No; Cabral filed the present petition without the participation of the OSG. The
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the SC and
the CA is solely vested in the OSG. The1987 Administrative Code explicitly
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The OSG is
the law office of the Government. Thus, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the
offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned.

In the instant case, however, the petition before the Court essentially assails the
criminal, and not only the civil, aspect of the CA Decision. Thus, the petition
should have been filed only by the State through the OSG and not by CABRAL
who lacked the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision.

It is Makati who has jurisdiction over the case.

In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any
one of the essential ingredients took place.

Here, the crime allegedly committed by respondent is estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of such crime consists
of the following: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of
an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the
time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the
bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.

ZJI
It was proven by the evidence on record are the following: (1) CABRAL and
BRACAMONTE executed a MOA in Makati City; (2) Bracamonte issued and
delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the signing of the
agreement; (3) the check was presented for payment and was subsequently
dishonored in Makati City. As such, the Court does not see why Cabral did not
file the complaint before the Makati City trial court. Not only were the MOA and
subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, it was even
expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as
venue for any action arising from the MOA because that was where it was
executed. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the element of deceit
took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and delivered,
while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank.

ZJI
Crespo v Mogul
GR no L-53373; June 30, 1987
Rule 110 – control of Prosecution

Facts:
Assistant Fiscal Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a
motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition
for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the office of
provincial Fiscal. The presiding judge, Mogul denied the motion, but the
arraignment was deferred to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to
the appellate court. Meanwhile, Undersecretary of Justice Macaraig reversed
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to
move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the
RTC, but the respondent judge denied the same and set the date and time for
the arraignment. Crespo then filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with TRO to restrain Mogul from enforcing his judgment. Later on, the
CA rendered a decision and dismissed the petition of Crespo and lifted the TRO.

Issue:
Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal
under orders from the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on
the merits

Held:
Yes; it is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the
chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to
the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the
action or opinion of the fiscal.

The Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in
Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. The filing of a complaint
or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.

ZJI
Rural Bank of Laguna Inc v Canicon
GR no 196015; June 27, 2018
Rule 110 – control of Prosecution

Facts;
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for estafa against its employees,
respondents. Prosecutor Juarez conducted a preliminary investigation and
found probable cause against the 3 employees and recommended the
filing of an information for estafa. Subsequently, the RTC, through Judge
Cabuco-Andres issued a warrant for the arrest of all three accused. Espeleta
filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner opposed the motion.
Without resolving the urgent motion for reinvestigation, the RTC arraigned both
Espeleta and Canicon. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Lomarda conducted a
reinvestigation and recommended the dismissal of the case against Espeleta
and the filing of an amended information. The amended information which was
admitted by Judge Cabuco- Andres dropped Espeleta from the list of those
originally charged, and recommended bail for all the remaining accused.
Judge Laguilles ruled that a procedural misstep was committed when
Prosecutor Lomarda conducted the reinvestigation without prior leave of court
and the admission of the same does not cure the procedural infirmity
committed. Espeleta and Canicon filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, which petitioner opposed.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in admitting the amended complaint

Held:
Yes; the public prosecutor loses the sole discretion to determine the existence of
probable cause when an information is filed in court. Hence, the prosecutor's
office cannot conduct a reinvestigation without prior leave and approval by the
court because the determination of probable cause is now at the sole discretion
of the court. Once the information is filed with the court, the disposition of the
case is subject to the discretion of the trial court. In turn, this judicial discretion is
subject to the judicial requirement that the trial court must make its own
evaluation of the case in allowing the stand taken by the prosecution.

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or

information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4
years, 2 months, and 1 day without regard to fine. The conduct of this
preliminary investigation pertains to the public prosecutor, who directs and
controls the prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information. This investigation terminates with the determination by the public
prosecutor of the absence or presence of probable cause. In case of the latter,
an information is filed with the proper court.

ZJI
Alawiya v CA
GR no 164170; April 16, 2009
Rule 110 – control of Prosecution

Facts:
Petitioners executed sworn statements before the Western Police District in UN
Ave. charging the accused police officers of the Northern Police District with
kidnapping for ransom. Petitioners alleged that while they were cruising on
board a vehicle in UN Ave, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from
behind. Several armed men alighted, brought them to an office where they
were held for ransom. State Prosecutor Velasco conducted the preliminary
investigation and issued a resolution recommending their indictment for
kidnapping for ransom. Thus, an information was filed with the RTC of Manila and
warrant of arrest was issued. The accused filed a petition for review of the
resolution of the State Prosecutor with the Office of the Secretary of Justice. The
trial court held that the jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman are not
exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the
authority lies with the DOJ to file the information and prosecute the case. The
DOJ Secretary reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the
withdrawal or dismissal of the information, finding that there was no approval by
the Office of the Ombudsman before the information was filed and that the
incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for
ransom.

Issue:
Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State
Prosecutor Velasco amounted to executive acquittal

Held:
No; the Secretary of Justice was simply exercising his power to review, which
included the power to reverse the ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once
a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its
dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges
are not bound by the Secretary of Justice's reversal of the prosecutor's resolution
finding probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their own assessment
of the existence of probable cause, separately and independently of the
evaluation by the Secretary of Justice.

Once the information is filed with the trial court, any disposition of the
information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is mandated
to independently evaluate or assess the existence of probable cause and it may
either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice amounts to an
abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine the existence of
probable cause.

Considering that the Information has already been filed with the trial court, then
the trial court, upon filing of the appropriate motion by the prosecutor, should
be given the opportunity to perform its duty of evaluating, independently of the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice recommending the withdrawal of the
Information against the accused, the merits of the case and assess whether
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial for kidnapping for ransom.

ZJI
Laude v Ginez-Jabalde
GR no 217456; November 25, 2015
Rule 110 – control of Prosecution

Facts:
Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude was killed in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US
Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton. A Complaint for murder was filed by
Jennifer's sibling, Marilou, against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of
the City Prosecutor. Later, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder
against Pemberton before the RTC. A warrant of arrest against Pemberton was
issued and Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Ginez-Jabalde and he
was then arraigned. On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion
to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused
to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. Pemberton,
petitioner is requred to obtain authority and consent from the Public Prosecutor
before filinga motion in the ongoing criminal proceeding. Petitioner contends
that the conformity of the Public Prosecutor is a mere superfluity.

Issue:
Whether the conformity of the Public Prosecutor to the urgent motion to compel
the AFP to surrender custody of accused to Olongapo City Jail is a mere
superfluity

Held:
No; procedural law basically mandates that all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of a public prosecutor. The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case
and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in
the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases
and continues to be the controlling doctrine.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to
pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due
process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.

In this case, petitioners have not shown why the Motion may be allowed to fall
under the exception. The alleged grave abuse of discretion of the Public
Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. The duty and authority to
prosecute the criminal aspects of this case, including the custody issue, are duly
lodged in the Public Prosecutor. Her refusal to give her conformè to the Motion is
an act well within the bounds of her position. The proper remedy would have
been for petitioners to have the act reversed by Secretary De Lima through
proper legal venues.

ZJI
Bumatay v Bumatay
GR no 191320; April 25, 2017
Rule 110 – control of Prosecution

Facts:
Lolita allegedly married a certain Amado when she was 16 years old. The
marriage was solemnized before Judge Rosario in Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Prior
to the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Amado, Lolita married
petitioner Jona's foster father, Jose Bumatay. Jona filed a Complaint-affidavit for
Bigamy against Lolita. In her Counter-Affidavit. Lolita claims that she learned
from her children (with Amado) that Amado had filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of their marriage. Subsequently, she was informed. by her children that
Amado had died in Nueva Vizcaya. The RTC-Dagupan City issued a Decision
declaring as null and void ab initio the marriage between Lolita and Amado.
She filed a motion to quash the information in the Bigamy case on the ground
that the first element of the crime for bigamy – that the offender has been
previously legally married – is not present. Subsequently, in its order, the RTC
granted Lolita's Motion to Quash and dismissed the complaint for bigamy. Jona
appealed said order to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Then, in her
personal capacity, filed the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether Jona may file in her personal capacity the said petition

Held:
No; petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates that all
criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of
criminal cases before the CA and the SC, the authority to represent the State is
vested solely in the OSG.

in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings before this Court. Inasmuch as the
private offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest
of the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability. It
follows therefore that in criminal cases, the dismissal of the case against an
accused can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State.

ZJI
Merciales v CA
GR no 124171; March 18, 2002
Rule 110 – control of Prosecution

Facts:
The private respondents were charged with rape with homicide in connection
to the death of one Maritess Merciales. After presenting witnesses, the public
prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of accused Nuada so he may be
used as a state witness but contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of the accused since he had already been
admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. The judge denied the
motion for discharge for failure to present the evidence as required by Sec. 9,
Rule 119. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari before the SC for the
denial. The judge called for a recess to the prosecution could decide whether
to present an NBI agent to prove the due execution of Nuada's extrajudicial
confession, but the prosecution declined and manifested he was not presenting
further evidence. The defense moved the case be deemed submitted for
decision and filed a demurrer to evidence. The trial court acquitted the
accused for lack of evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Letitia Merciales, the mother of Maritess, filed a petition to annul the
trial court's order but it was dismissed.

Issue:
Whether private complainant Maritess Merciales, mother of deceased, has legal
standing to appeal the acquittal of respondents

Held:
Yes; it is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning a
judgment of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is
concerned. However, in the case at bar, this issue was rendered moot when the
Solicitor General, in representation of the People, changed his position and
joined the cause of petitioner, thus fulfilling the requirement that all criminal
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.

In any event, petitioner has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal

prosecution, being the mother of the deceased rape victim. The right of
offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of
due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they
cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in
double jeopardy.

The criminal case below was for rape with homicide. Although the public
prosecutor presented seven witnesses, none of these actually saw the
commission of the crime. It was only Joselito Nuada, one of the accused, who
came forward and expressed willingness to turn state witness. His testimony was
vital for the prosecution, as it would provide the only eyewitness account of the
accused's complicity in the crime. The trial court required the public prosecutor
to present evidence to justify Nuada's discharge as a state witness, but the latter
insisted that there was no need for such proof since Nuada had already been
admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. The
public prosecutor's obstinate refusal to present the required evidence prompted
the trial court to deny the motion to discharge Nuada. It is clear from the
foregoing that the public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance.

A crime is an offense against the State, and hence is prosecuted in the name of
the People of the Philippines. For this reason, Section 5 of Rule 110 provides that
"all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be

ZJI
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal . . . ." As the
representative of the State, the public prosecutor has the right and the duty to
take all steps to protect the rights of the People in the trial of an accused. If the
public prosecutor commits a nonfeasance in refusing to perform a specific duty
imposed on him by law, he can be compelled by an action for mandamus.

ZJI
People v Alba
GR no 130523; January 29, 2002
Rule 110 – sufficiency of complaint or information

Facts:
Accused-appellant Gario Alba was charged with the crime of Murder. Alba
admitted killing the victim. However, he contended that his act of stabbing the
victim is a self-defense. According to him, he was twice boxed by the victim. The
prosecution presented the evidence, testimony of the doctor who examined
the body and prepared the autopsy report and testimony of the witness.
The RTC found accused-appellant ALBA guilty of the crime of Murder finding
that the act of killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
Treachery. On appeal, accused-appellant ALBA, contended that the trial court
erred in finding ALBA guilty of murder despite clear and convincing evidence
that treachery was not present in the commission of the crime.

Issue:
Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery should be appreciated

Held:
No; Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that:
Sec. 8. Designation of Offense. – The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute....and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances...

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must
be stated in ordinary and concise language.....

Pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the information should state not only the designation of the offense
and the acts and omissions constituting it but shall also specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. Guided by the established rule that when a penal
statute, whether substantive or remedial and procedural, is favorable to the
accused, the courts shall give it a retroactive application. Thus, we held that
since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance
qualifying the killing to murder, under the present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, treachery has to be considered a generic aggravating
circumstance only. Therefore, Gario Alba is guilty of Homicide only with
aggravating circumstance of treachery.

Complaint/Information:
That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1993, at sitio Pananlaya-an, barangay
Datagon, municipality of Pamplona, province of Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, that above-named accused with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Ricky Aguilar with the use of knife with which the accused was then armed and
provided thereby inflicting upon the body of the victim, the hereunder injuries: Stab wound, 2
cm., 6th intercostal space, anterior, axillary line, right Stab wound, 6 cm., level of the 1st and 2nd
lumbar vertebra which injuries caused the instantaneous death of victim, Ricky Aguilar. Contrary
to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

ZJI
People v Dasmarinas y Gonzales
GR no 203986; October 4, 2017
Rule 110 – sufficiency of complaint or information

Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged Dasmariñas and Polo with
murder, the accusatory portion of the information dated January 25, 2008 being
as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of June 2007, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding each other without justifiable motive,
with intent to kill and with treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation, did
then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one PO2 MARLON N. ANOYA, by then and there shooting him twice on his head, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which directly caused her death. The killing of the
aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation.

According to the witnesses, the victim Anoya was drunk when he was in front of
the Sabnarra beerhouse. The victim left the place on board a motorcycle, but
he returned after around 15 minutes. While the victim was standing in front of
the beerhouse still drunk, two men came from his right side and shot him. One of
those men is accused Dasmariñas while the other person was then wearing a
cap. The assailants then rode a jeep after shooting the victim. The victim was
approached at the back and shot on his head. It was identified that it was
accused Dasmariñas who shot the victim using a 9 mm gun. Also, the victim was
shot twice at the back of the head and on the right side of his face. The RTC
found accused Dasmariñas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder for shooting to death victim PO2 Marlon Anoya which was affirmed by
the CA.

Issue:
Whether the criminal information is complete and sufficient to convict the
accused of murder

Held:
No, only Homicide; the failure of the information supposedly charging murder to
aver the factual basis for the attendant circumstance of treachery forbids the
appreciation of the circumstance as qualifying the killing; hence, the accused
can only be found guilty of homicide. To merely state in the information that
treachery was attendant is not enough because the usage of such term is not a
factual averment but a conclusion of law. The nature and character of the
crime charged are determined not by the specification of the provision of the
law alleged to have been violated but by the facts stated in the indictment,
that is, the actual recital of the facts in the body of the information, and not the
caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.
Indeed, the facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical
name given by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information,
determine the character of the crime.

ZJI
Quimvel v People
GR no 214497; April 18, 2017
Rule 110 – sufficiency of complaint or information

Facts:
AAA, who was 7 years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among the children of
XXX and YYY. AAA and her siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying with YYY in Palapas,
Ligao City. On the other hand, Quimvel, at that time, was the caretaker of the ducks of
AAA's grandfather. He lived with AAA's grandparents whose house was just a few meters
away from YYY's house. One evening, YYY went out of the house to buy kerosene since
there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand
from AAA's grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her siblings
were afraid. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep. However, she was awakened when
she felt Quimuel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right
hand inside her panty, and she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his
hand. Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in
his house. Quimvel replied that he was just accompanying the children.

AMENDED INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor of Ligao City hereby accuses EDUARDO QUIMVEL
y BRAGA also known as EDWARD/EDUARDO QUIMUEL y BRAGA of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about 8 o'clock in the evening of July 18, 2007 at Palapas, Ligao City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
and unchaste design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, insert his hand inside the panty of [AAA], a minor of 7 years old and mash
her vagina, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. ACTS CONTRARY
TO LAW.

The trial court convicted accused of acts of lasciviousness under Sec 5b of RA

7610 which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of said crime

Held:
Yes; it is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting
the offense must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be
convicted of the crime charged. This is to apprise the accused of the nature of
the accusation against him, which is part and parcel of the rights accorded to
an accused enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the
information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him
of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the
ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a
variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during
trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the
accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.

Indeed, the facts embodied in the Information constitute the offense rather than
on the designation of the offense in the caption. An investigating prosecutor is
not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal
name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or
Complaint, not the caption or preamble thereof nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions of law.

ZJI
People v Oandasan Jr
GR no 194605; June 14, 2016
Rule 110 – sufficiency of complaint or information

Facts:
Three information filed against accused (2 for murder, fatal shooting of Tamanu
and Montegrico; 1 for frustrated homicide involving the near-fatal shooting of
Paleg). Ferdinand Cutaran and his companions were having a drinking spree
outside the bunkhouse of Navarro Construction. Suddenly, appellant appeared
from back of dump trunk and aimed and fired his gun at Montegrico. Cutaran
ran away after seeing this and he did not witness the shooting of the other two
victims. When he returned to the scene of the crime, he saw the bodies of all the
victims. The 2nd paragraph of the information reads:
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have produce the
crime of Homicide as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his own will.

Issue:
Whether accused may be held guilty for murder even if the complaint averred
homicide

Held:
Yes; the averment in the second paragraph of the information filed does not
prevent finding the accused guilty of frustrated murder. The rule is that the
allegations of the information on the nature of the offense charged, not the
nomenclature given it by the Office of the Public Prosecutor, are controlling in
the determination of the offense charged. Accordingly, considering that the
information stated in its first paragraph that the accused, "armed with a gun,
with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shot one Engr. Mario Paleg y Ballad, inflicting
upon the latter a gunshot wound," the accused can be properly found guilty of
frustrated murder, a crime sufficiently averred in the information.

ZJI
Evangelista v People
GR no 84332-33; May 8, 1996
Rule 110 – sufficiency of complaint or information

Facts:
An information for the murder of Efren Arceo and another one for simple
violation of P.D. No. 1866 Illegal Possession of Firearm were filed against
accused-appellant Reynaldo Evangelista at the RTC. The information for murder
reads: “That on or about the 2nd day of JANUARY 1985, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one EFREN ARCEO Y MARCOS,
thereby inflicting serious physical injuries upon the latter, which injuries caused his death
upon arrival at the Martinez Memorial Hospital, this city.”

The information for violation of P.D. No. 1866 Illegal Possession of Firearm reads:
“That on or about the 2nd day of JANUARY 1985, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control one (1) piece homemade paltik, pistol armalite type
without ammunition and also carried outside of his residence said firearm and without the
necessary permit and/or license.”

Evangelista pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon he was tried. The
RTC found Evangelista guilty of murder and aggravated illegal possession of
firearm under P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2 after finding that Evangelista had used the
paltik gun to commit the murder.

Issue:
Whether accused is guilty of the crime of aggravated illegal possession of
firearm

Held:
No; the information charged accused-appellant with simple illegal possession of
firearm, but the RTC found him guilty of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2, after finding that accused-
appellant had used an unlicensed firearm in killing the victim. This cannot be
done. That an unlicensed firearm was used in the commission of murder or
homicide is a qualifying circumstance. Consequently, it must be specifically
alleged in the information, otherwise the accused cannot be properly
sentenced for illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form without
violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The RTC based its decision on the fact that the firearm used is
known as paltik which cannot be licensed.
The information for the violation of P.D. No. 1866 is bereft of any allegation that
the unlicensed firearm mentioned in it was used to commit murder. Neither does
the information for murder allege that accused appellant committed the
murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Indeed, accused appellant
cannot be convicted even of simple illegal possession of firearm because of
lack of evidence that the firearm is unlicensed.

ZJI
People v Jugueta
GR no 202124; April 5, 2016
Rule 110 – duplicity of the offense

Facts:
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 7698-G, Ireneo Jugueta was charged with Double
Murder and was penalized under Article 248 of the RPC for having shot
Mary Grace and Claudine Divina, who were minors, with a caliber .22 firearm.
The shooting was qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. The crime
was committed in the dwelling of the offended party and nighttime was taken
advantage of as well.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 7702-G, Ireneo Jugueta, alongside Gilbert Estores and
Roger San Miguel were charged with Multiple Attempted Murder. Their acts
were qualified by treachery with evident premeditation, and abuse of superior
strength. Norberto Divina, together with Maricel Divina, his wife and their two
minor children were not hit when firearms were used by the accused inside their
house.
The trial court found accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in
relation to Article 51 of the RPC. It bears stressing that the Informations in this
case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.

Issue:
Whether the information filed failed to comply with the requirement in Sec 13,
Rule 110 that an information must charge only one offense

Held:
No; as a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense,
otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting
duplicitous complaints or information is to give the accused the necessary
knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for
his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges
which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a
ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a
motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived. Here, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment
and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the Informations. Furthermore, it is also well-settled
that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information, but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose upon
him the proper penalty for each offense.

ZJI
Ocampo v Abando
GR no 176830; February 11, 2014
Rule 110 – amendment or substitution of complaint or information

Facts:
12 complaint affidavits were filed by relatives of alleged victims of Operation
Venereal Disease (Operation VD) accusing 71 named members (including the
petitioners) of the CPP/NPA/NDFP of murder. Upon the recommendation of
Assistant Prosecutor Vivero, an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder
against 54 named members of CPP/NPA/NDFP including the petitioners. The
Information was filed before RTC which was presided over by Judge Abando.
Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause to charge the accused
in the crime charged and issued arrest warrants. Later, acting on the
observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single Information
filed before the RTC was defective for charging 15 counts of murder, the
prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and New
Information.

Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed on the ground that the amendment of
the information was not properly made

Held:
Yes; if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were
indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court provides the remedy, to wit:

SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. —

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended
party and with leave of court.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense
in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been
simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of
the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed
in double jeopardy.

ZJI
Fronda – Baggao v People
GR no 151785; December 10, 2007
Rule 110 – amendment or substitution of complaint or information

Facts:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the RTC 4 separate Information for
illegal recruitment against petitioner Susan Fronda-Baggao and Lawrence Lee.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade. Petitioner was finally arrested.
The prosecutor with the trial court a motion to amend the Informations praying
that the four separate Informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that
there would only be one Information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
The trial court granted the motion which was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner
contends that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
refers to an amendment of one Information only, not four, which cannot be
joined in only one Information and that the amendment of the four Informations
for illegal recruitment into a single Information for a graver offense violates her
substantial rights.

Issue:
whether the 4 information for illegal recruitment could be amended and
lumped into 1 information for illegal recruitment in large scale

Held:
Yes; Sec 14, Rule 110 allows amendment stating that before the accused enters
his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information
may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.

Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet
entered her plea, the four Informations could still be amended.

ZJI
Matalam v Sandiganbayan
GR no 165751; April 12, 2005
Rule 110 – amendment or substitution of complaint or information

Facts:
An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner and
others with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their alleged
illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of DAR employees.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation, the public
prosecutor filed a “Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information
Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Matalam” to which petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the amended information charges an
entirely new cause of action. He claims he is entitled to a preliminary
investigation since he was not informed that he is being charged for the alleged
dismissal of the complaining witnesses and that he was not given the
opportunity to explain. The Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and
Motion to Admit Amended Information charging solely petitioner for Violation of
RA 3019.

Issue:
Whether the amended complaint must be admitted

Held:
No; the rule is: before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information
entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the
amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original
information, a new preliminary investigation is not required.

In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts
constituting the offense charged was definitely altered. In the original
information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal
and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private
complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from
the service of the private complainants.

If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended

charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right
to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of
evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be
denied due process.

ZJI
Pacoy v Cajigal
GR no 157472; September 28, 2017
Rule 110 – amendment or substitution of complaint or information

Facts:
An information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against Pacoy for shooting and
killing his commanding officer, 2Lt. Esquita with an armalite rifle. Upon
arraignment, Pacoy pleaded not guilty. However, on the same day and after
the arraignment, Judge Afable issued another Order directing the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which
Judge Afable registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The prosecutor
entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote
the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information. Pacoy was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for
Pacoy objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double
jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his
express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case.

Issue:
Whether the amended information should be admitted

Held:
Yes; In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to
Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information
shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case, and in the
opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of
word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There was no change
in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of
the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for
Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information
for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to
petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance.
Thus, the Court found that the amendment made in the caption and preamble
from Homicide to Murder as purely formal.

The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would
be inapplicable to the complaint or information.

ZJI
People v Tubongbanua
GR no 171271; August 31, 2006
Rule 110 – amendment or substitution of complaint or information

Facts:
Elberto Tubongbanua was employed as a family drivery by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho.
Later, he killed his employer Sua-Kho. An Information was charged against him
which was later amended to include the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim. These amendments to
the information were only made after the presentation by the prosecution of its
evidence. The RTC found him guilty. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC, but the amendments were disregarded.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in not allowing the amendments in the information
regarding the aggravating circumstances

Held:
Yes; Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, provides that an amendment
after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided
leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of
the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had
already been arraigned.

The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not

prejudiced by such amendment is whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other. Tested against these
guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult
or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a
formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the
effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of
murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of
the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The
amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant.

ZJI
Soberano v People
GR no 154629; October 5, 2005
Rule 110 – amendment or substitution of complaint or information

Facts:
After preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ, an information was filed
charging numerous people including herein petitioners for the abduction and
double murder of Dacer, together with his driver, Emmanuel Corbito. Herein
petitioners filed to quash the information, but this was denied by the Trial Court.
Accused P/Supt. Glen Dumlao was subsequently arrested. He later executed a
sworn statement implicating other police officers to the Dacer-Corbito double
murder. Hence, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reinvestigation which was
granted by the trial court and the arraignment was set. After reinvestigation, a
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information was filed by the
prosecution. The Amended Information discharged accused Lopez, Diloy, Lopez
and Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State and charged additional
accused. This was opposed by herein petitioners. The RTC denied the motion to
admit amended information discharging some accused because it is violative
of Sec 17, Rule 119. The CA admitted the amended information.

Issue:
Whether the amended information should be admitted

Held:
Yes; applying Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the Amended Information
sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support therein,
considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when
respondent judge granted the motion for reinvestigation there was in effect a
prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice
to conduct the same.

The determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an

executive function, not a judicial one. The prosecution of crimes appertains to
the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. The right to prosecute
vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether,
what and whom to charge. By virtue of the trial court having granted the
prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred
to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. While it is true that
the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case
thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.

ZJI
Quarto v Marcelo
GR no 169042; October 5, 2011
Rule 110 – Exclusion from Information

Facts:
Petitioner Quarto is the Chief of the CESPD, DPWH, Port Area, Manila. As CESPD
Chief, he is also the Head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH.
The respondents are members of the SIT. DPWH Secretary Datumanong created
a committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs
and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles where it was
discovered that it resulted in government losses of approximately P143 million.
DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit
charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and employees —including the
petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly
benefited from the anomalous transactions — with Plunder, Money Laundering,
Malversation, and violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code. After
conducting preliminary investigation, the OB filed with the SB several information
charging a number of DPWH officials and employees. On the other hand, the
OB’s granted the respondents' request for immunity in exchange for their
testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed. Quarto initially
filed a certiorari petition with the SB, questioning the OB’s grant of immunity in
the respondents' favor.

Issue:
Whether the OB has the authority to grant the immunity from prosecution to
witnesses

Held;
Yes; in the present case, the Ombudsman granted the respondents immunity
from prosecution pursuant to RA No. 6770, which specifically empowers the
Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being
conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in
the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives."

The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman
with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutor powers, freed, to the extent
possible within our governmental system and structure, from legislative,
executive, or judicial intervention, and insulated from outside pressure and
improper influence. The Court reiterates its policy of noninterference with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutor powers (among
them, the power to grant immunity to witnesses), and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman.

Following this policy, the Court deemed it neither appropriate nor advisable to
interfere with the Ombudsman's grant of immunity to the respondents,
particularly in this case, where the petitioner has not clearly and convincingly
shown the grave abuse of discretion that would call for our intervention.

ZJI
Union Bank of the Philippines v People
GR no 192565; February 28, 2012
Rule 110 – Venue of Criminal Actions

Facts:
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making
a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation
stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s 2 complaints for sum of money against
the spouses Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before
the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was
filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against
Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article
183 of the RPC in the MeTC-Makati City by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another
tribunal or agency. Filing a motion to quash, Tomas argues that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction
over the perjury case.

Issue:
Whether information for perjury should have been filed in Pasay City

Held:
No; Makati MeTC is the proper venue for the prosecution of the offense because
it is where the affidavit was executed.

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not

only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court
that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-
fold: First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such
that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within
its territorial jurisdiction; Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the
municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his defense
are available.

Venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases are placed not only in the court
where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients
took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed
sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed
or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.

Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false certificate against Forum Shopping. The crime of perjury is
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit
since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed.
When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn
statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all

ZJI
cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

In this case, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping
was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise,
the Certificate against Forum Shopping required to be under oath before a
notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been
made in Makati City. Moreover, the willful and deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as
indicated in the last portion of the Information

ZJI
Bernardo v People
GR no 182210; October 5, 2015
Rule 111 – Rule on implied institution of civil action with criminal action

Facts:
Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Bumanglag payable
on or before its maturity. Bernardo issued to Bumanglag 5 FEBTC checks posted
on different dates covering the loan's aggregate amount. Bumanglag
deposited these checks to Bernardo's account, but they were dishonored. The
reason given was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice
informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went unheeded,
prompting Bumanglag to initiate a criminal complaint against Bernardo with the
5 counts of violation of B.P. 22. The RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of
5 counts of violation of B.P. 22. On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's
conviction. Later, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's
death and provided, as well, the names of her heirs. Bernardo's heirs moved to
reconsider the earlier resolution arguing that Bernardo's death extinguished her
civil liability. In the alternative, they contended that any civil liability should be
settled in a separate civil case.

Issue:
Whether the independent civil liability may survive the death, hence, may be
recovered

Held:
Yes; an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several
distinct civil liabilities on the part of the offender. If the conduct constitutes a
felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of the RPC (ex
delicto). This particular civil liability due the offended party is rooted on facts
that constitute a crime. Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense
charged.

The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil
liabilities based on other sources of obligation. Thus, it is entirely possible for one
to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and
to still be liable civilly based on contract or by laws other than the criminal law.
Such civil actions may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the criminal action, subject however, to the caveat
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission.

Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death.
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her
criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense.
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for
recovery therefore may be generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced against the estate of the
accused.

In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the

corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a
single suit is filed and tried. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets,
which had been packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as
collectors.

As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from
the issuance of a worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for violation

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of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did not automatically extinguish the action.
The independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed instituted
in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the
present case.

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Maccay v Spouses Nobela
GR no 145823; March 31, 2005
Rule 111 – Rule on implied institution of civil action with criminal action

Facts:
Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay,
became acquainted with the spouses Nobela. The spouses then bought the
property belonging to Maccay. Serlina Nobela paid and in turn she was given
the Deed of Sale. Later, it was discovered that the deed of sale given to them
which they paid the Maccays was not the one registered but one which
obviously was forged by de la Vega and her mother Juanita Magcaling. They
then filed a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still
pending. Petitioner Maccay, on the other hand, filed the criminal complaint
against respondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document.
The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners swindled
respondent spouses. The trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the
Estafa charge against respondent spouses to turn the tables on respondent
spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered petitioner Maccay
and prosecution witness, Potenciano to pay respondent spouses ₱390,000 as
damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court and
reasoned that the award of damages was justified because it was in the nature
of a counterclaim and as the very defense put up by the respondents in the
criminal proceedings.

Issue:
Whether the trial court may rule on the civil liability of complainant in a criminal
case where the civil action was not reserved or filed separately

Held:
No; a court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the
accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the
accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the
proper proceedings to determine the private complainant’s civil liability, if any.
The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution
witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse
the ₱300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses.

Under Rule 111, Sec 1, no counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint

may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action.

In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent
spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate
proceeding.

Moreover, the trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness Potenciano,
together with petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A
judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. A decision of a
court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is not a party to the
case.

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Heirs of Simon v Chan
GR no 157547; February 23, 2011
Rule 111 – When civil action may proceed independently

Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the MeTC an information
charging respondent with a violation of BP 22. It was alleged that accused late
Eduardo Simon issued to respondent Elvin Chan a check payable to cash with
the knowledge that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank. It was
presented to the bank by respondent but was dishonored by the bank for
the account being already closed. Despite receipt of notice of dishonor, the
accused failed to pay respondent. More than 3 years later, respondent
commenced a civil action for the collection of the principal amount with a writ
of preliminary attachment. The MeTC in Pasay city issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, which was implemented. Accused then filed an urgent motion to
dismiss with application to attachment bond for damages averring that as a
consequence of another action between the instant parties, being a criminal
case, the instant action should be dismissible.

Issue:
Whether Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the check was an
independent civil action and hence, should be dismissed

Held:
Yes; Rule 111, Sec 1 of the ROC states that the criminal action for violation of BP
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to
file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

The Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced civil case
are nonetheless applicable. The retroactive application of procedural laws does
not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to
cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an
action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases,
the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.

Moreover, under SC Circular 57-97, The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding
civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed or recognized.

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Ace Haulers Corp v CA
GR no 127934; August 23, 2000
Rule 111 – When civil action may proceed independently

Facts:
The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap which
involves a truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation and driven by its
employee, Jesus dela Cruz, and a jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by
Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a motorcycle, was bumped and dragged by
the jeepney, and its rider, Fidel Abiva, was run over by the truck owned by
petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation, causing his death. A criminal information for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the two drivers,
Dela Cruz and Parma. While the criminal action was pending, a separate civil
action for damages was instituted against the two accused in the criminal case,
as well as against Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp., the owners
of the vehicles. Petitioner Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz filed a motion
to dismiss bringing to the trial court’s attention the fact that a criminal action
was pending before another branch of the same court, and that under the
ROC, the filing of an independent civil action arising from a quasi-delict is no
longer allowed.

Issue:
Whether in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident, plaintiff
may recover damages against the employer of the accused driver both in the
criminal case and the civil case for damages based on quasi delict

Held:
No; civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases, the
offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement
of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes
recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission."

Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.

Hence, in this case, respondent shall have the choice which of the awards to
take, naturally expecting that she would opt to recover the greater amount. It
has not been shown that she has recovered on the award in the criminal case,
consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner in the civil case.

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Carandang v Santiago
97 Phil 94; 1955
Rule 111 – Prosecution of Civil Action

Facts:
Valenton was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed
against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Valenton appealed
the decision to the CA where the case is now pending. The petitioner herein
filed a complaint in the CFI to recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton and
his parents, damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by
him. After the defendants submitted their answer, they presented a motion to
suspend the trial of the civil case, pending the termination of the criminal case
against Tomas Valenton in the CA. The judge ruled that the trial of the civil
action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. Petitioner invokes
Article 33 of the new Civil Code, which is as follows: "In cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence."

Issue:
Whether the term “physical injuries” used in Art 33 of the CC means physical
injuries in the RPC only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted
with intent to kill or not

Held:
The term ‘physical injuries’ should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries.

The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries.
"Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of
offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must
have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries"
should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

A claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury under the CC is
certainly "founded on injury to the person" as would be a claim to recover
damages for a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body. Hence, the
respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case.
The civil case must proceed independently from the criminal case.

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People v Oandasan Jr
GR no 194605; June 14, 2016
Rule 111 – Civil Indemnity

Facts:
Three information filed against accused (2 for murder, fatal shooting of Tamanu
and Montegrico; 1 for frustrated homicide involving the near-fatal shooting of
Paleg). Ferdinand Cutaran and his companions were having a drinking spree
outside the bunkhouse of Navarro Construction. Suddenly, appellant appeared
from back of dump trunk and aimed and fired his gun at Montegrico. Cutaran
ran away after seeing this and he did not witness the shooting of the other two
victims. When he returned to the scene of the crime, he saw the bodies of all the
victims. The RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The Civil
Liability imposed were as follows: for Murder for killing Danilo Montegrieo
P150,000; for Homicide for killing Edgardo Tamanu P50,000; and for Frustrated
Homicide for wounding Mario Paleg, none. The CA modified the civil liability to
P75,000, P75,000 and P50,000 respectively.

Issue:
Whether the civil liability of the accused was correctly given

Held:
No; for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict, Article 2206 of the Civil Code
enumerates the damages that may be recovered from the accused or
defendant. The first item of civil liability is the civil indemnity for death, or death
indemnity given to the heirs of the deceased as a form of monetary restitution or
compensation for the death of the victim at the hands of the accused. Its grant
is mandatory and a matter of course, and without need of proof other than the
fact of death as the result of the crime or quasi-delict, and the fact that the
accused was responsible therefor.

Civil indemnity for death has been increased through the years from the
minimum of P2,000.00 to as high as P100,000.00. The increases have been made
to consider the economic conditions, primarily the purchasing power of the
peso as the Philippine currency.

The Court promulgated its decision in People v. Jugueta (G.R. No. 202124),
whereby it adopted certain guidelines on fixing the civil liabilities in crimes
resulting in the death of the victims taking into proper consideration the stages
of execution and gravity of the offenses, as well as the number of victims in
composite crimes. Other factors were weighed by the Court. In the case of
murder where the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua, the Court has
thereby fixed P75,000.00 for moral damages, P75,000.00 for exemplary
damages, and P75,000.00 for civil indemnity as the essential civil liabilities, in
addition to others as the records of each case will substantiate.

It appears that the accused and the heirs of Montegrico stipulated that the civil
indemnity of the accused in case of conviction should not exceed P150,000.00.
The stipulation cannot stand because the civil indemnity arising from each
murder should only be P75,000.00. In crimes in which death of the victim results,
civil indemnity is granted even in the absence of allegation and proof. Similarly,
moral damages are allowed even without allegation and proof, it being a
certainty that the victims' heirs were entitled thereto as a matter of law.

Temperate damages of P50,000.00 should further be granted to the heirs of

Montegrico and Tamanu considering that they were presumed to have spent
for the interment of each of the deceased. It would be unjust to deny them
recovery in the form of temperate damages just because they did not establish

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with certainty the actual expenditure for the interment of their late-lamented
family members.

In this respect, Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes the grant of exemplary
damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime. For this purpose, exemplary damages of P75,000.00 are granted to
the heirs of Montegrico and Tamanu, respectively, based on the attendant
circumstance of treachery. Whether treachery was a qualifying or attendant
circumstance did not matter. On his part, Paleg, being the victim of frustrated
murder, is entitled to P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages (for
his hospitalization and related expenses).

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Coscolluela v Sandiganbayan
GR no 191411 & 191871; July 15, 2013
Rule 111 – When separate civil action is suspended

Facts:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for 3 full
terms. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head,
Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman received a letter-complaint from People’s
Graftwatch requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase
of medical and agricultural equipment for the province which resulted to a
complaint for violation of RA 3019 against accused. Coscolluela filed a Motion
to Quash arguing that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost 8
years since the complaint was instituted. Then, the accused were acquitted
from the criminal case due to violation of right to speedy disposition.

Issue:
Whether the acquittal of petitioners from the criminal case exculpated them
from any civil liability

Held:
No; the acquittal of the petitioners does not necessarily follow that petitioners
are entirely exculpated from any civil liability assuming that the same is proven in
a subsequent case which the province may opt to pursue.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal
case does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil
case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Based on the violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases as

herein discussed, the present case stands to be dismissed even before either the
prosecution or the defense has been given the chance to present any
evidence. Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to
whether petitioners indeed, committed the acts or omissions from which any civil
liability on their part might arise. Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the
Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the
delict if only to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable
to petitioners' alleged malfeasance.

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People v Bunay y Dam-at
GR no 171268; September 14, 2010
Rule 111 – Effect of the death of accused or convict on civil action

Facts:
The RTC tried and convicted Bringas Bunay of the crime of rape and sentenced
him to death and ordered him to pay P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, plus
exemplary and moral damages of P60,000.00. The court also ordered him to be
brought to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City for imprisonment while
awaiting the automatic review of the decision of the Supreme Court. The
accused was brought to the said prison and was detained there. The SC then
transferred the case to the CA for intermediate review. The CA affirmed the
conviction, and so the case was once again brought to the SC. However, while
the case was pending there, the Bureau of Corrections Assistant Director for
Operations sent a letter to the court informing them that Bunay died at the New
Bilibid Prison Hospital, the cause of death being cardio-respiratory arrest, with
pneumonia as the antecedent cause.

Issue:
What is the effect of Bunay’s death on his civil liability towards the victim?

Held:
Bunay’s civil liability is extinguished. According to Art. 89 of the RPC criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties, and that as to the pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is only
extinguished when the death of the offender occurs before final judgement.

In this case, Bunay’s death occurred while the review of his case was still
pending before the Supreme Court, and so there is no final judgement yet. Thus,
Bunay’s civil as well as criminal liability is extinguished. Only civil liability
predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict survived the death of
the accused, which the offended party may recover by means of a separate
civil action.

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People v Layag
GR no 214875; October 17, 2016
Rule 111 – Effect of the death of accused or convict on civil action

Facts:
In a Resolution dated August 3, 2015, the Court adopted in toto the Decision
dated January 29, 2014, of the CA finding accused-appellant Layag guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of 1 count of Qualified Rape by Sexual Intercourse, 2
counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, and 1 count of Acts of
Lasciviousness. Subsequently, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment dated
October 14, 2015, declaring that the aforesaid Resolution had already become
final and executory. However, the Court received a Letter dated July 18, 2016,
from the Bureau of Corrections informing of the death of accused appellant on
July 30, 2015, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death6 attached thereto.

Issue:
Whether the court can re-open the case despite its finality to remodify the same

Held:
Yes; under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates
this principle must immediately be struck down. XPN: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c)
the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (j) that
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

In this case, Layag's death which occurred prior to the promulgation of the
Resolution dated August 3, 2015 - a matter which the Court was belatedly
informed of - clearly shows that there indeed exists a special or compelling
circumstance warranting the re-examination of the case despite its finality.
Layag's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the
criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict under Article 1157 of the NCC.

Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate
of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.

Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action
is extinguished since there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused;
the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is
well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with his acts against the
victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA
may file a separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.

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Reyes v Rossi
GR no 159823; February 18, 2013
Rule 111 – Prejudicial Question

Facts:
Petitioner Teodoro Reyes entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale with
Advanced Foundation, represented by its Executive Project Director Ettore Rossi,
for the purchased a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A. It was agreed that Reyes
would pay P 3 million as down payment and the balance of P 7 million through 4
post-dated checks. Rossi deposited 3 of the checks on their maturity dates in
Advanced Foundation's bank account at PCI Bank in Makati. 2 of the checks
were denied upon Reyes's instructions to stop their payment, while the third was
honored for insufficiency of funds. Reyes filed an action for rescission of contract
and damages with the QC RTC seeking the return of the P 3 million down
payment with legal interest, attorney's fees, and damages. Rossi charged Reyes
with 5 counts of estafa and 5 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Makati. Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati for the checks were issued in Makati as well as argued
that the proceedings in Makati should be suspended because of the pendency
of the civil action for rescission.

Issue:
Whether the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial
question that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation BP
22

Held:
No; the rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will
warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute
the buyer for violations of the BP 22 arising from the dishonor of the checks the
buyer issued in connection with the sale.

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil

action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an
issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

Two elements must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a

prejudicial question (Section 7, Rule 111):
a. The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action
b. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed
c. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal

The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of B.P. 22 is whether Reyes
issued the dishonored checks knowing them to be without funds upon
presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is
whether or not the breach in the fulfillment of Advanced Foundation's obligation
warranted the rescission of the conditional sale.

The obligation to fund checks should not be tied up to the future event of
extinguishment of obligation under rescission, and, since under B.P. Blg. 22, mere
issuance of a worthless check is already an offense in itself, the criminal
proceedings for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 can proceed despite the pendency of
the civil action.

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Pulido v People
GR no 220149; July 27, 2021
Rule 111 – Prejudicial Question

Facts;
Pulido and Arcon were married in a civil wedding (September 5, 1983) at the
Municipal Hall of Rosario Cavite. Later, Pulido stopped going home to their
conjugal dwelling. Upon confrontation, Arcon found out that Pulido has an affair
with Baleda and they were married on July 31, 1995. In December 2007, Arcon
filed bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda. Pulido defended that both of his
marriage was void ab initio. His marriage with Arcon is void due to lack of
marriage license and his marriage to Baleda is also void due to lack of marriage
ceremony. Baleda on the other hand claimed that she only knew Pulido's prior
marriage sometime in April 2007 and that she filed a Petition to Annul their
marriage before the filing of the bigamy case. The court even declared their
marriage null and void for being bigamous on October 25, 2007. The trial court
convicted Pulido of bigamy but acquitted Baleda. More importantly, a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage which retroacts to the date of the celebration
of Pulido and Arcon’’s marriage attained finality on June 2016.

Issue:
Whether the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a
prosecution for bigamy

Held:
Yes; judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages
presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense,
irrespective of the time within which they are secured. Nonetheless, the Court
recognized that an action for nullity of the second marriage is a prejudicial
question to the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

The question of invalidity of marriage cannot ordinarily be decided in the

criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity
of the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be
determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie
unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that
a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all
the essentials of a marriage must first be secured. The issue involved in the action
for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner’s guilt or
innocence of the crime of bigamy. Hence, a prejudicial question

In this case, Pulido is not guilty of bigamy. First marriage being void

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San Miguel Properties Inc v Perez
GR no 166836; September 4, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc 130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, the transactions were embodied in 3 separate
deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second
deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of
the 41 parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale for which San
Miguel Properties paid the full price were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
As to B.F. HOMES, it claimed that it withheld the delivery of the TCTs under the
third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be the rehabilitation
receiver at the time of the transactions. Because of the refusal to the demand
made against B.F. HOMES, SAN MIGUEL filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office
of the City Prosecutor, charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes
with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both
of Presidential Decree No. 957. The OCP dismissed the complaint by petitioner
on the ground that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the
suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC or by the HLURB.

Issue:
Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the
TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint
for the criminal complaint on the ground of a prejudicial question

Held:
Yes; the essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would
determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand
the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide
whether or not BF Homes' directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs.

The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should
the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20
TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes
in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis
for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of PD 957 would evaporate,
thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal
case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.

ZJI
Manantan v CA
GR no 107125; January 29, 2001
Rule 111 – Rule on filing fees in civil action deemed instituted with the criminal
action

Facts:
Petitioner accused Manantan was charged with the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudent. The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of
appeal on the civil aspect of the lower court’s judgment. The CA held that even
if the accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held
him civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death
of Nicolas. Petitioner contended that the non-payment of filing fees on the
amount of the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester where it
was held that "the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment
of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate court was without jurisdiction to
hear and try, much less award indemnity and damages. The petitioner also
forwarded that the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did
not allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily
or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in the information,
the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment
thereof.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in awarding damages and indemnity since private
respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for
damages

Held:
NO; Under Rule 111, Sec 1, when the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action, the actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case,
are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid
only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if they are not so
alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Here, the Information contained no specific allegations of damages.

Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the
filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect
of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal
action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint
or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioner's allegations that the
filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court
acquired no jurisdiction.

ZJI
Serapio v Sandiganbayan
GR no 148468; January 28, 2003
Rule 112 – Preliminary Investigation

Facts:
The Ombudsman filed an amended information with the SB charging petitioner
and several others with plunder. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation of the Ombudsman's resolution finding probable cause
against him for plunder, but the same was denied. Subsequently, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused,
including petitioner. Petitioner voluntarily surrendered and was detained.
Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari against the Sandiganbayan
for denying his motion to quash the information. Petitioner claims that during the
joint preliminary investigations for the various charges against Estrada, plunder
was only one of the eight charges, and he was not furnished with copies of the
other complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the evidence presented in
relation to the other seven cases, even if the evidence presented therein were
also used against him although he was only charged in the plunder case.

Issue:
Whether petitioner’s constitutional right to due process was violated

Held:
No; the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right but is
merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same
defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information. It cannot be said that
petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the opportunity
to refute the charges against him during the preliminary investigation since
petitioner had participate therein by filing his counter-affidavit.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a

crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other
officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must
defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the
determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the
prosecutor. Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to
substantiate petitioner's claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.

True that an accused shall not be deemed to have waived his right to ask for a
preliminary investigation after he had been arraigned over his objection and
despite his insistence on the conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the
merits. However, it does not apply in the instant case because petitioner merely
prayed for a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered evidence but
failed to show such.

ZJI
Estrada v Ombudsman
GR no 212140-41; January 21, 2015
Rule 112 – Preliminary Investigation

Facts:
NBI and Atty. Baligod filed a Plunder Complaint with the Ombudsman against
Sen. Jinggoy Estrada. The following month, another Plunder complaint against
him was filed, this time, by the FIO of the Ombudsman. Estrada seasonably filed
his counter-affidavits in the two complaints. 18 of Estrada’s co-respondents in
the two complaints likewise filed their counter-affidavits. Subsequently, Estrada
filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings.” The Ombudsman
denied the said request. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Estrada then went to the SC via a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO enjoining the
Ombudsman and the NBI from conducting further proceedings. During the
pendency of Estrada’s petition before the SC, the Ombudsman furnished him
copies (most but not all) of his co-respondents’ counter-affidavits.

Issue:
Whether the denial of the OB violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due
process

Held:
No; Sen. Estrada fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

What the Rules of Procedure require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and
documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. After such affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses have
been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a
copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within 10 days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits.
What the rules refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not
the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-
respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant.

The quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence

sufficient to "engender a well-founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of
a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it
is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has

no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present.
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent
shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded
an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.

Effect of irregularity of preliminary investigation - reinvestigation

The irregularity at the preliminary investigation stage arising from a violation of
the due process rights of the respondent warrants a reinvestigation and the

ZJI
suspension of the proceedings in court where an information has already been
filed. The grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the
Ombudsman in its conduct of the preliminary investigation cannot divest the
Sandiganbayan of the jurisdiction over the case considering that Informations
had already been filed, as in fact a warrant of arrest had already been issued in
connection therewith. It is a familiar doctrine that the irregularity in, or even
absence of, a preliminary investigation is not a ground for the deprivation of the
court of its jurisdiction. When the court has jurisdiction, as in this case, any
irregularity in the exercise of that power is not a ground for a motion to quash.

After an Information is filed, the exercise of discretion and authority of the

investigating officer over the criminal complaint ends; he loses control and
discretion regarding its disposition. Should the investigating officer find the need
to re-investigate the case so that the objectives of a preliminary investigation
may be served, he may do so, provided he first secures the permission of the
court, following the rule that the court now has control and disposition of the
case. Should a reinvestigation be allowed, the investigating officer, after the
reinvestigation and consistent with the court's jurisdiction over the case, must
submit his findings and recommendation to the court for the court's disposition.

Absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the validity of an issued

warrant of arrest
As the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case, so also does this irregularity does not affect the
proceedings already undertaken before the court, nor affect the validity of any
warrant that the court may have issued for the arrest of the accused.

Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the trial court judge may issue a
warrant of arrest within ten (10) days from the filing of the Information upon a
finding of probable cause that the accused should be placed under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Notably, the issuance of an
arrest warrant and the preliminary investigation both require the prior
determination of probable cause; the probable cause determination in these
two proceedings, however, differs from one another.

First, the determination of probable cause for purposes of an arrest warrant is

judicial, performed by the judge to ascertain whether the accused should be
placed under the court's custody; the determination of probable cause as basis
for the filing of the Information in court is executive, performed by the
investigating officer to ascertain whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court against those whom he believes committed the crime.

Second, the former (the probable cause needed for a warrant of arrest) refers
to "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person to
be arrested"; the latter (the probable cause to support the filing of the
Information) refers to such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

Third, the prosecutor and the judge act independently of one another in their
consideration of evidence commonly before them. One reason for this
independence is their differing objectives. Another is the differing nature of the
discretion they exercise, one being judicial and the other executive, with each
being governed by their respective standards.

ZJI
Since the Sandiganbayan already has jurisdiction and control of the present
case, the case before it inevitably cannot be affected without its consent,
except only by a cause that absolutely nullifies the proceedings before it.

ZJI
Arroyo v DOJ
GR no 199082, 199085 & 199118; September 18, 2012
Rule 112 – Who may conduct determination of existence of probable cause

Facts:
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new
witnesses indicating the occurrence of massive electoral fraud and
manipulation of election results, the Comelec issued a resolution approving the
creation of a committee jointly with the DOJ, which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed. The
Comelec and the DOJ then issued a joint order creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team. The Committee shall conduct the
necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and
the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. Thereafter, resolutions
finding probable cause for election offenses defined and penalized under the
OEC and other election laws shall be approved by the COMELEC. Later, the
Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioners be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election
results in North and South Cotabato. The Comelec’s Law Department filed with
the RTC an Information for electoral sabotage against petitioner GMA, et al. The
corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was served on GMA on the
same day. Petitioner assails the creation of the Joint Committee and the Fact-
Finding team arguing that it violates the principle of separation of powers and
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body.

Issue:
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
jointly with the DOJ

Held:
Yes; the grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute
election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all
election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the
people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional
grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in the OEC. Also
stated therein is the clause, the Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of
the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under OEC, and to prosecute the same.” As clearly set forth, the
other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses and to prosecute the same. It is, therefore, not only the
power but the duty of both the Comelec and the DOJ to perform any act
necessary to ensure the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of
election offenses.

ZJI
Basuego v Office of the Ombudsman
GR no 196842; October 9, 2013

Facts:
Private respondent Rosa filed a complaint for Concubinage, VAWC and Grave
Threats before the OB against her husband, Alfredo, with designation Chief of
Hospital, Tagum City. In the complaint, it was alleged that petitioner had extra-
marital relationships with 2 mistresses. Rosa also averred that during the course of
their marriage, apart from the marital infidelity, Alfredo physically and verbally
abused her and her family. Alfredo filed his Comment with Motion to Dismiss
and/or refer the charges to the Appropriate Provincial/City Prosecutor praying
for dismissal of the complaint for the crime of concubinage is not committed in
relation to his being a public officer. Hence, he argued, the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction. Ombudsman denied the motion and ordered for the filing of
information for Concubinage against Alfredo and Sia. All other complaints filed
by Rosa were dismissed.

Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman should have referred Rosa’s complaint to the DOJ
(Office of the City Prosecutor)

Held:
No; the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction, concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its
commission in relation to office has long been held. The Constitution, Section 15
of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, do
not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with
other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state
prosecutors.

However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, over
Rosa's complaint, and after choosing to exercise such jurisdiction, need not
defer to the dictates of a respondent in a complaint, such as Alfredo. In other
words, the Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the DOJ.

ZJI
People v Garfin
GR no 153176; March 29, 2004
Rule 112 – Effect of Preliminary Investigation without Authority (Rule 117, Sec 3d)

Facts:
Private respondent was charged with violation of the “Social Security Act”. The
case was raffled to the sala of Judge Garfin, herein respondent. The accused,
Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for
pre-trial. 3 days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of
the city prosecutor. The accused and the OSG take position that the lack of
prior authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:
No; it is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and
the subject matter of the accusation. An infirmity in the information cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the
case is invested by the act of plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the
complaint or information. Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction
over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the information.

Sec 4, Rule 112 states that no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed
by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or
his deputy.

Hence, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating

State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written
approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information
is deemed to be filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this
infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be
cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

ZJI
Pilapil v Sandiganbayan
GR no 101978; April 7, 1993
Rule 112 – Effect of improper/absence of preliminary investigation

Facts:
The Investigating OB issued an order requiring Pilapil to submit his counter-
affidavit, affidavits of his witnesses and other controverting evidence for
Malversation of Public Property. After the preliminary investigation, a resolution
was issued finding no crime of malversation but a prima facie case for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. An Information for which was thus filed
with the SB. Pilapil filed a motion to quash on the ground that respondent
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over his person because the information was
filed without probable cause since there is absolutely no proof adduced in the
preliminary investigation of any of the elements of the crime defined in Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Pilapil went to the Supreme Court via petition for
certiorari. He harped on the lack of preliminary investigation on the specific
charge of violation of Sec. 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, filed
before the Sandiganbayan. He alleged that the preliminary investigation was
conducted for the charge of malversation.

Issue:
Whether there was absence of preliminary investigation for the violation of RA
3019

Held:
No; the facts on record show that in an order, Deputy Ombudsman Domingo
required petitioner to answer the charges against him as stated in the affidavits-
complaints and supporting documents thereto. Petitioner fully complied with
said order and filed his and his witnesses' affidavits. In other words, petitioner was
properly apprised of the act complained of and given ample opportunity to
rebut the same. Thus, petitioner could not validly raise violation of his right to due
process because the bases for the information filed by the Ombudsman were all
reflected in the complaint and the evidence supporting it.

Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary investigation is merely

inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering whether a person may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his
complaint or information. The preliminary designation of the offense in the
directive to file a counter-affidavit and affidavits of one's witnesses is not
conclusive. Such designation is only a conclusion of law of Deputy Ombudsman
Domingo. The Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualification of the crime.
Rather, he is guided by the evidence presented in the course of a preliminary
investigation and on the basis of which, he may formulate and designate the
offense and direct the filing of the corresponding information.

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information.

ZJI
Callo-Claridad v Esteban
GR no 191567; March 20, 2013
Rule 112 – Procedure and resolution of preliminary investigation

Facts:
Petitioner, mother of Chase Callo-Claridad whose lifeless but bloodied body was
discovered, filed a complaint against respondents for Chase’s death. Allegedly,
Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip less than an hour before
the discovery of his lifeless body. The complaint was however dismissed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice stating
that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient
circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip
by the witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause. It was held that the
rest of the circumstances were pure suspicions and did not indicate that Philip
had been with Chase at the time of the commission of the crime. The petitioner
elevated the same to the CA, however, was dismissed. Petitioner prayed that
Philip and Teodora be charged with murder on the strength of the several
pieces of circumstantial evidence.

Issue:
Whether circumstantial evidence is enough to warrant the indictment of
respondents for murder

Held:
No; for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an
unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has
been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The
pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents
were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The requirement for the certifications under the Rule 112 was designed to avoid
self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of the
preliminary investigation, the present rules for which do not require a
confrontation between the parties and their witnesses; hence, the certifications
were mandatory. The vital objection to the admission to this kind of evidence is
its hearsay character.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits accompanying the

complaint shows that out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding
to the respective witnesses, only nine (9) thereof were sworn to before a
competent officer. The pieces of circumstantial evidence relied upon by
complainant are not admissible for either being incompetent or hearsay
evidence for not being supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness. Moreover,
this circumstantial evidence, when taken as a whole, do not lead to a finding of
probable cause that respondents committed the crime charged.

ZJI
Soliven v Makasiar
GR no 82585; November 15, 1988
Rule 112 – Procedure and resolution of preliminary investigation

Facts:
Respondent Judge Makasiar issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner Beltran
pursuant to the filing of a complaint-affidavit against them by the President of
the Philippines. Petitioner argues that the addition of the word "personally" after
the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest.

Issue:
Whether the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held:
No; By the word personally in Art. III, Sec. 2, what the Constitution underscores is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall:
1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
2. If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden
with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest,
a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Note: it is only in the issuance of search warrants that the judge needs to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses because there is no
preliminary investigation which the judge may rely on.

ZJI
Quisay v People
GR no 216920; January 13, 2016
Rule 112 – Procedure and resolution of preliminary investigation

Facts:
The Office of the City issued a resolution finding probable cause against
petitioner for violation of RA 7610. Quisay then moved for the quashal of the
Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person
who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion, petitioner pointed
out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP- Makati was penned by Assistant City
Prosecutor De La Cruz and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Hirang,
while the Pabatid Sakdal was penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval
from any higher authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De
La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.
Petitioner contended that as such, the Information must be quashed for being
tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.

Issue:
Whether the information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdiction
defect that cannot be cured

Held:
Yes; Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states
that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state of prosecutor before
a complaint or information may be filed before the courts.

The filing of an information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the
same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution
finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly
made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for
OCP-Makati, SACP (Senior Assistant City Prosecutor) as evidenced by his
signature therein. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid
Sakdal or Information led before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was
approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-Makati's
division chiefs or review prosecutors.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that
ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before
the RTC by himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of
Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written
authority or by designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-
Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought
the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to
OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal.

ZJI
Gatchalian v Office of the Ombudsman
GR no 229288; August 1, 2018
Rule 112 – Review/Remedies against resolution

Facts:
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian of one count of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, one count of malversation of public funds,
and one count of violation of Section X126.2(C) (1) and (2) of MORB in relation
to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653. The respondents in the Ombudsman cases,
including Gatchalian, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Joint
Resolution. However, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying the motions
for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul the Joint Resolution and the Joint
Order of the Ombudsman for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner argued that the
OB made a general conclusion without specifying a series of acts done by him
that would clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to
commit a crime.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari under Rule
65 for its alleged lack of jurisdiction over the case

Held:
No; appeals from decisions of the OB in administrative disciplinary cases should
be taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43. The appellate court
correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the OB in
administrative cases. It cannot be taken into account where an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as
from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition
should have been filed with this Court. The CA cannot review the orders,
directives, or decisions of the OB in criminal or non-administrative cases.

True, the law is silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the OB found
sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-administrative cases. The right to
appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must
be a law expressly granting such privilege. However, an aggrieved party is not
without recourse where the finding of the OB as to the existence of probable
cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the ROC.

Summary:
OB decision in admin cases – CA Rule 43
OB resolution in indicting or for criminal cases – SC Rule 65 only if there is
GADALEJ

ZJI
De Lima v Reyes
GR no 209330; January 11, 2016
Rule 112 – Review/Remedies against resolution

Facts:
Doc Gerry was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows who was shot
dead inside an Ukay-Ukay store. After a brief chase with police officers
Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession
admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Reyes who ordered the
killing. Petitioner Secretary issued a DO creating (First Panel) to conduct
preliminary investigation. The First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation
and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Later, Dr. Ortega
sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former
Governor Reyes and Edrad. Later, a DO creating a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case was issued. The Second
Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the
filing of information on all accused, including former Governor Reyes. Governor
Reyes argued that the RTC could not enforce the Second Panel’s Resolution
and proceed with the prosecution of his case since this Resolution was void.
The CA granted. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether the Secretary of Justice erred in filing the case against the respondent
thru the Second Panel despite the dismissal of the First Panel for lack of sufficient
evidence in the preliminary investigation

Held:
No; in a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines “whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not exercise adjudication
nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information.

The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act
on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the
conduct of a reinvestigation.

However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial,

quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of
judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Any
question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or
modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ZJI
Okabe v Guiterrez
GR no 150185; May 27, 2004
Rule 112 – Executive v Judicial Determination of Probable Cause

Facts:
Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor charging Teresita
Okabe with Estafa. After the preliminary investigation was conducted, the 2nd
Assistant City Prosecutor Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable
cause for Estafa against Okabe. Subsequently, the City Prosecutor approved
the resolution and the Information. An Information was then filed with RTC and
the case was raffled to Judge Gutierrez. Appended on the Information was
Maruyama’s complaint and Vibrandor’s resolution. The RTC, based upon these
documents, found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest against
Okabe who later on posted bail. Okabe then filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment,
alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by
the investigating prosecutor were the said complaint for estafa and the
resolution of Vibandor. Okabe filed a case against the RTC for issuing a warrant
of arrest despite the lack of probable cause.

Issue:
Whether the RTC Judge complied with the constitutional requirements, such that
there was probable cause when it issued a warrant of arrest

Held:
No; before the RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest, the judge must make a
personal determination of the existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the
issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the
investigating prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary investigation.

Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in
the Information, or any offense included therein has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the
very start those falsely charged of crimes from the tribulations, expenses, and
anxiety of a public trial.

In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of

the accused, the RTC judge may rely on the findings and conclusions in the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding probable cause for the filing of
the Information. After all, the judge just personally reviews the initial
determination of the investigating prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if
it is supported by substantial evidence. However, in determining the existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on
the said report. The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of
the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if
any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information.

If the judge is able to determine the existence of probable cause on the basis of
the records submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would no longer be
a need to order the elevation of the rest of the records of the case. However, if
the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted by the investigating
prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the case, or direct

ZJI
the investigating prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the
entire records of the preliminary investigation, to enable him to discharge his
duty. The judge may even call the complainant and his witness to themselves
answer the court’s probing questions to determine the existence of probable
cause.

In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to the respondent judge only
his resolution after his preliminary investigation of the case and the affidavit-
complaint of the private complainant, and failed to include the affidavits of the
witnesses of the private complainant, and the latter's reply affidavit, the
counter-affidavit of the petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the
private complainant as required by case law. The aforecited affidavits, more
specifically the fax message of Lorna Tanghal and the document signed by her
covering the amount of US$1,000, are of vital importance, as they would enable
the respondent judge to properly determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause.

In sum, then, we find and so declare that the respondent judge committed a
grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding
probable cause for the petitioner’s arrest in the absence of copies of the
affidavits of the witnesses of the private complainant and her reply affidavit, the
counter-affidavit of the petitioner, and the evidence adduced during the
preliminary investigation before the investigating prosecutor.

ZJI
People v Ernesto Delos Santos
GR no 220685; November 29, 2017
Rule 112 – Executive v Judicial Determination of Probable Cause

Facts:
Respondent's father died and was succeeded by Emily De Leon as President of
UM. Later, UM, represented by De Leon, filed a criminal complaint against
respondent for the qualified theft of the electricity and water supply of BPTI
before the Office of the City Prosecutor. In a Resolution, the investigating
prosecutor dismissed the complaint in view of the absence of the element of
"lack of consent or knowledge of the owner," considering that Virgilio, while
being the President and Chairman of the BOT of UM, explicitly allowed
respondent to use the electricity and water supply of BPTI. However, the
aforestated Resolution was subsequently reversed upon the UM's motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, respondent filed before the RTC an Urgent Omnibus
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. The RTC found probable
cause for the indictment of respondent which was reversed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether there is probable cause as determined by the RTC

Held:
No; a public prosecutor's determination of probable cause – that is, one made
for the purpose of filing an information in court – is essentially an executive
function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
However, a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause.

In this case, there was no probable cause against herein respondent for the
crime of qualified theft, considering the glaring absence of certain key elements
thereof. Notably, "for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the suspect is
probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all
reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime
is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no
criminal offense.

While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a

need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a
potential accused's constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom
and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false,
fraudulent, or groundless charges.

The elements of lack of owner's consent and intent to gain are evidently absent
in this case. To recount, UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution
established and owned by respondent's family. His father, Virgilio, owned 70.79%
of the entire shares of stock of the UM, and respondent himself claims 9.85%45
share thereof. Virgilio was the President and Chairman of the BOT of UM at the
time material to this case, and respondent himself was a board member and
stockholder. Records disclose that respondent was permitted by Virgilio to tap
into BPTI's electricity and water supply. As such, respondent had no criminal
intent – as he, in fact, acted on the faith of his father's authority, on behalf of UM
– to appropriate said personal property.

ZJI
Marcos v Cabrera-Faller
AM RTJ-16-2472
Rule 112 – When warrant of arrest may issue

Facts:
The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant’s grandson, Marc
Andrei Marcos, during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fraternitas at the Veluz
Farm, Dasmarinas City, Cavite. A preliminary investigation was conducted, and
the Office of the Prosecutor issued its Resolution recommending the prosecution
of several members of Lex Leonum for violation of RA 8049. Finding probable
cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued
the order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and, at the same time, the
archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest of the accused. Later,
the same judge issued the Omnibus Order, quashing, lifting, and setting aside
the warrants for their arrest and ultimately dismissing the case against all of the
for lack of probable cause. Complainant judge filed this administrative case
against Judge Cabrera-Faller, stating that the rulings of Judge Cabrera-Faller
are based solely on her own conjectures and pre-determined decision to dismiss
the case as clearly shown by the fact that she recalled the warrant of arrests she
earlier directed to be issued even without conducting hearing and without
waiting for any comment from the public and private prosecutors. The OCA
found respondent Judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.

Issue:
Whether respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of law

Held:
Yes; in judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution
mandates a judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. Clearly, Judge Cabrera-Faller was mandated
to personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, to issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was not required to personally
examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

The Court cannot accept the act of the Judge in recalling the warrants of
arrests merely indicating that they were “inadvertently issued” without any
explanation why there was such inadvertence in the issuance. As the presiding
judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. The judge must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged for it would be unfair to require the prosecution
to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused
upon the filing of the information against the latter. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that
would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.

ZJI
People v Dela Torre-Yadao
GR no 162144-54; November 13, 2012
Rule 112 – When warrant of arrest may issue

Facts:
The combined forces of the PNP ABRITG composed of Task Force Habagat, then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Lacson killed 11 suspected members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman absolved all the police officers
involved. On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the
finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before
the SB. The RTC ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the
principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.
The case was reopened but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s
petition on the ground of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter
directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled and presided by Judge Yadao
who later junked the murder case against Lacson and other police officials for
lack of probable cause. The prosecution filed the present special civil action of
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether Judge Yadao abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal
actions on the ground of lack of probable cause

Held;
No; the general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo
hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial determination of
the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to
explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier
submitted to the OB. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao,
for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to
hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related
documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the
records. The SC held that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents.

True that Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present
additional evidence Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which gives 3 options upon
the filing of the criminal information:
1. dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause
2. issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause
3. order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from
notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But the
option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory.

The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss the case
if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the
situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
against the respondents. In the absence of probable cause to indict
respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
tribulations, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial.

ZJI
Larranaga v CA
GR no 130644; March 13, 1998
Rule 112 – Inquest

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga, minor, is charged with 2 counts of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Members of the PNP-CIG tried to arrest
petitioner without a warrant while attending a culinary class. Petitioner resisted
the arrest. Subsequently, petitioner went to the CIG headquarters where he was
met by his counsel. He was allowed to go home. His counsel made a written
undertaking that he and petitioner will appear before the Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation. In the morning, Petitioner's counsel appeared before
the City Prosecutor and specifically demanded for a regular preliminary
investigation for his client which was, however, denied on the ground that
petitioner was entitled only to an inquest investigation. Charged with
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal detention, petitioner refused to enter a plea
claiming that he was not accorded a regular preliminary investigation. The trial
court ruled that petitioner waived his right thereto when he failed to appear for
an inquest investigation, on which date the Executive Judge issued a warrant for
his arrest.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation

Held:
Yes; Section 7 of Rule 112 (inquest) applies only to persons lawfully arrested
without a warrant. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested
either by a peace officer or a private person. The facts show that some
members of the PNP CIG went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City to
arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant.

An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest. An arrest signifies restraint on person, depriving one of
his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.
The foregoing facts show no restraint upon the person of petitioner. Neither do
they show that petitioner was deprived of his own will and liberty. To be sure,
even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such arrest would still
be illegal because of the absence of a warrant.

A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made in clear and unequivocal

manner. Mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear before the City
Prosecutor cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to preliminary
investigation, considering that petitioner has been vigorously invoking his right to
a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings. Despite the
fact that petitioner has been, the rule is that the right to preliminary investigation
is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he was charged in
court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because
there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail of a regular
preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are
inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due
process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and
informed.

ZJI
Leviste v Alameda
GR no 182677; August 3, 2010
Rule 112 – Inquest

Facts:
Leviste was charged in an information with homicide for the death of Rafael de
las Alas before the RTC which was presided by Judge Alameda. Judge
Alameda issued a commitment order against Leviste who was then placed
under police custody. Leviste posted a cash bond which was approved by the
trial court. The private complainant heirs filed, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion asking for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the prosecutor to re-examine the evidence and to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The trial court
however admitted the amended information for murder and directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and issued an order setting a date for the
arraignment. Leviste questioned these new orders before the CA, which
dismissed the petition. The arraignment pushed through and as Leviste refused
to attend, a not guilty plea was entered for him. Leviste argues that the
prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an
investigation or reevaluation of the cases except through a petition for review
before the DOJ, and that in cases when an accused is arrested without a
warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.

Issue:
Whether private complainants should have filed a petition for review before the
DOJ instead of filing a motion for deferment of the arraignment

Held:
No; once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests
in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is
already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal. For while it is
true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had already been
brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter
should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only
qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights
of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by

the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If
after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the
information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course
of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. Once the trial court grants the prosecution's motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the
drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion — wide and far
reaching — regarding the disposition thereof subject to the trial court's approval
of the resulting proposed course of action. Since a reinvestigation may entail a
modification of the criminal information as what happened in the present case,
the Court's holding is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information
under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court: A complaint or information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea.

ZJI
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Pangasinan Legal Aid v DOJ
GR no 232413; July 25, 2017
Rule 112 – Inquest

Facts:
The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP
Legal Aid Program, as well as a series of consultations with the PNP on the extant
condition of detention prisoners, it was discovered that several detention
prisoners had been languishing in jail for years without a case being filed in court
by the prosecutor's office and without definite findings as to the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause. The petition considers such condition of
several detention prisoners as an alarming situation brought about by DOJ
issuances. The IBP represents in this case its client, Senin. Senin's rights were
allegedly violated because he has been detained for at least eight months
without any finding of probable cause or a case having been filed in court.
Senin's case started when a complaint against him and other unidentified
persons was indorsed on February 9, 2015, by Police Chief Inspector Sadino to
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office. He was arrested while engaged in the sale of
illegal drugs during a buy-bust operation. Thereafter, he executed a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. After the preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor resolved to dismiss the case. Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ
Circular, the case was forwarded to the DOJ for automatic review.

Issue:
Whether a waived of Art 125 of the RPC gives the State the right to detain a
person indefinitely by virtue of the DOJ circulars

Held:
No; The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP,
and PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and
subject him to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ.
The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period for
preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to
liberty. Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not
a license to detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be
delivered to proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC
does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was
initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before
the prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration,
reinvestigation or on automatic review.

Accordingly, a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly released

to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article
125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A.
No. 9165 ) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also
applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case,
even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a
motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation, or automatic review. The reason is
that such dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of
probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a person.

ZJI
Veridiano v People
GR no 200370
Rule 113 - Arrest

Facts:
A concerned citizen called a police radio operator, informing him that
Veridiano was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. With that, a
checkpoint was set up. The police officers on the checkpoint personally knew
Veridiano. They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he
was not on board. After some time, they chanced upon Veridiano inside a
passenger jeepney. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers
to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to
check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their
pockets. Thereafter, the police officers recovered from Veridiano a tea bag
containing what appeared to be marijuana. Thereafter, the contents of the tea
bag tested positive for marijuana. The RTC convicted Veridiano. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the conviction that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner argued that the tea bag containing marijuana
leaves was seized in violation of his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He asserts that his arrest was illegal.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest is valid

Held:
No; the first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest.
The validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test:
a. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or
she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and
b. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm.
Rule 113, Section 5 (b) pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes immediacy in point of time. That a
crime was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this
rule. An arrest under this entails a time element from the moment the crime is
committed up to the point of arrest. Law enforcers need not personally witness
the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto

arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing
a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not
exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would
incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely
on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating
that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be
committed. The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113,
Section 5 (b). The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense. A
hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought
to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable
cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5 (b).

ZJI
People v Givera
GR no 132159; January 18, 2001
Rule 113 – Arrest; Duty of Arresting Officer

Facts:
An information for the murder of Gardon was filed against accused-appellant
Givera and three others. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his
arraignment. For the prosecution, the victim's daughter Milagros Gardon and his
niece Melinda Delfin were presented as witnesses. To prove the fact and cause
of death of Eusebio Gardon, the prosecution presented in evidence the
testimony of a medico-legal officer. A death certificate evidencing the
death of the victim was presented by the prosecution. Accused-appellant
testified in his behalf. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victim who
was his relative by affinity. Accused-appellant was arrested at the East Avenue
Medical Center. He stated that the children of the victim implicated him in the
killing of Eusebio Gardon only because he was present when the incident
happened. The RTC rendered its decision finding Cesar Givera guilty of murder.
Accused Givera’s argument: Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the
East Avenue Medical Center was made without a warrant.

Issue:
Whether the arrest of accused-appellant was made without a warrant

Held:
No; he was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on April 27,
1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was returned unserved
by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be
found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest
is needed to make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the
same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled, or quashed. The 10-day
period provided in Rule 113, Sec 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the
warrant to make a return to the court.

At any rate, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to

object thereto because he failed to move for the quashal of the information
before the trial court, entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by
the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.

ZJI
Remo v People
GR no 239249; September 28, 2020
Rule 113 – Arrest without warrant, when lawful

Facts:
One evening, PO2 Isla was on duty at the Valenzuela Police Station when his
fellow police PO2 Tumbaga received a call from a concerned citizen informing
their office of the rampant sale and use of illegal drugs at Daangbakal,
Valenzuela. While conducting the surveillance operation, PO2 Isla noticed
petitioner coming out from an alley and brought out from his pocket a small
plastic sachet. PO2 Isla observed, from a distance of 5 meters, that petitioner
was inspecting the plastic sachet which he noticed to be containing white
crystalline substance. PO2 Isla, being convinced that the contents of the plastic
sachet were shabu, approached petitioner and introduced himself as a police
officer. He then seized the same from the hands of the petitioner and arrested
him. During arraignment, the petitioner failed to enter a plea and had remained
at large. Hence, the trial court ordered the case to be archived. A decade
after, the Valenzuela Police Station issued a Certificate of Detention that the
petitioner was already in custody at their station. Finally, he was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the violation charged. Petitioner argued that his
warrantless arrest was illegal since it was unlikely for PO2 Isla to see the contents
of a small plastic sachet considering that it was already nighttime and the
distance between them was about 5 meters.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest of petitioner is valid

Held:
No; in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person
may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his/her presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.

The validity of in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest requires compliance with

the overt act test: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.

Here, considering that PO2 Isla was at a considerable distance of 5 meters away
from petitioner who as he alleged was inspecting a plastic sachet of shabu with
a miniscule quantity (0.03 or 0.06 gram), it would be highly implausible for him,
especially at nighttime — even assuming that he has perfect vision — to
ascertain with reasonable accuracy that the petitioner is in illegal possession of
a plastic sachet containing dangerous drug. His act of holding and inspecting
something in his hands does not constitute an overt act or even raise a suspicion
that he was committing a crime. In short, there was not a single suspicious
circumstance. There was no probable cause for PO2 Isla to effect arrest.

It is true that lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an

invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to quash before an accused
enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived, and an
accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his or her arrest, such as in
this case.

ZJI
Go v CA
GR no 101837; February 11, 1992
Rule 113 – Arrest without warrant, when lawful

Facts:
Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan. Petitioner Go entered
Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or
"wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's
and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Go alighted from his car,
walked over, and shot Maguan inside his car. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting. Verification at the Land Transportation
Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The security
guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively
identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established
that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt
for petitioner. Later, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by 2 lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to
the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified
petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. The Prosecutor informed petitioner that he could avail himself
of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute
any such waiver. While the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before
an information could be filed in court, the victim died of his gunshot wounds.
The Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder. Counsel for petitioner filed with the prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,
alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful, and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest is valid

Held:
No; Petitioner's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section
5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected 6 days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
"when the shooting had in fact just been committed" within the meaning of
Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" of ficers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's
wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge.

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section
7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all.
When he walked into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by 2 lawyers,
he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not
state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication
he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise
guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide

ZJI
with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, the Prosecutor
proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was
applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation.
This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested; with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his
appearing at the preliminary investigation.

ZJI
Posadas v Ombudsman
GR no 131492; September 29, 2000
Rule 113 – Arrest without warrant, when lawful

Facts:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the UP, was killed in a rumble
between his fraternity and another fraternity, Scintilla Juris. Respondent Dizon,
Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. and,
on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses,
they attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla
Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two
suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between
their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity. They objected on the ground that
the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them. However, criminal charges
were filed later against the two student suspects. Later, Dizon filed a complaint
in the Office of the charging petitioner with violation PD 1829. Posadas
contends that they are not liable under PD 1829 since he claims that it does not
cover a warrantless arrest on mere suspicion. NBI agents had personal
knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their investigation
indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the
crime. NBI claims that they fall under par. b of Rule 113 Sec 5 and that they had
personal knowledge of Taparan and Narag by virtue of their investigations.

Issue:
Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspedcts by teh NBI could be
validly made without a warrant

Held:
No; Rule 113 Sec 5 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerates the valid
grounds for valid warrantless arrest:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c).
The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed.
Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped
from confinement.

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of

Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based
on actual facts. At the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were
nowhere near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men
attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime
nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were
doing anything illegal. Moreover, since the NBI tried to arrest Taparan and
Narag in just four days after the commission of the crime, they had no personal
knowledge of any facts that indicates that Taparan and Narag are the
perpetrators.

ZJI
People v Cubcubin
GR no 136267; July 10, 2001
Rule 113 – Arrest without warrant, when lawful

Facts:
A desk officer of the Cavite police station received a telephone call that a
person had been shot near the cemetery. For this reason, a police team
responded to the call and found Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which
was then parked on the road. A food server/waitress in Sting Café identified the
accused-appellant. The police officers then went to the address of the
accused-appellant. The policemen knocked on the door and it was opened by
a man who answered the description given by Danet Garcellano and who
turned out to be accused-appellant. The police operatives identified themselves
and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting
near the cemetery. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to
enter and look around the house. Upon close examination of accused-
appellant’s shirt, SPO1 Malinao, Jr said that he found it to be bloodied. When he
picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
then asked accused-appellant to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of
identification where he was positively identified as the victims companion. Inside
the house, PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a drum outside the bathroom a
homemade caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial number. He found
the gun loaded with five live bullets. As per the ballistic examination, the two
evidence bullets which had been recovered from the victim’s head and the
three test bullets fired from the seized .38 caliber firearm.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest of Cubcubin was valid

Held:
No; Under Rule 113, Section 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless
arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an offense and, second,
the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that
personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.

In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim
was killed. However, the two officer did not have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge
of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant
was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others; to
wit: by someone who called the PNP station and reported that a man had
been; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim
coming out of the Sting Café and etc.

ZJI
Pestilos v Generoso
GR no 182601; November 10, 2014
Rule 113 – Arrest without warrant, when lawful

Facts:
An altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Generoso where they
both reside. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 to report
the incident. Acting on this report, SPOl Monsalve dispatched SP02 Javier to go
to the scene of the crime and to render assistance where they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those
who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to
go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the
City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. An Information was
filed against the petitioners, and they were indicted for attempted murder. The
petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid
warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.

Issue:
Whether petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant

Held:
Yes; the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the
scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling
and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same
neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent

upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113, specifically, the requirement of
immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances;
and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested committed the crime. The records show that soon after
the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched
the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. This
fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not
have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed - the police
immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor
conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

ZJI
In re: Harvey v Santiago
GR no 82522; June 28, 1988
Rule 113 – Arrest without warrant, when lawful

Facts:
Petitioners Harvey and Sherman, are both American nationals, while Elshout is a
Dutch citizen, all three are residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Petitioners were
apprehended by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the
CID Detention Center. They were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles
who were apprehended after 3 months of close surveillance by CID agents.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos
of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and
girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes. The “Operation Report” read that Harvey was
found together with two young boys and Sherman was found with two naked
boys inside his room. While Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that
two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed
being live-in for some time now.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest

Held:
Yes; an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a
private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has,
in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5a).

In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined
after close surveillance for 3 months during which period their activities were
monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure
of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in
evidence.

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with
John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia"
defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children", Paraphilia (or unusual
sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object". While not a
crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals
and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the
physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth.

At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be

considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them
from questioning its validity.

ZJI
Reyes y Capistrano v People
GR no 229380; June 6, 2018
Rule 113 – Arrest without warrant, when lawful

Facts:
A group of police was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona,
Rizal when 2 teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with
long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in
Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes,
who matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police
officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out.
Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that
point, turned her back, pulled something out from her breast area and held a
small plastic sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated
the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it. Reyes
denied the charges, saying there was no valid warrantless arrest.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest committed in the case at bar is valid

Held:
No; the accused must be seen exhibiting overt acts within the view of the police
officers. Such overt acts must suggest that the person is about to or is
committing a crime. Absent this, the warrantless arrest will be deemed invalid.
In the present case, Reyes was merely passing by, she did not perform any overt
acts which would raise any doubts or suspicions. The act of walking while
reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act.

Also, the prosecution failed to establish the conditions in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime.
"Personal knowledge" is determined from the testimony of the witnesses that
there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the
accused. The records in the present case failed to show that PO1 Monteras had
any personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Reyes, as in fact,
he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers' tip and that,
everything happened by "chance." It is said that a hearsay tip by itself does not
justify a warrantless arrest.

Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their

observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
Finally, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly
seized from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. And since the
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be
acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.

ZJI
Mallari v CA
GR no 110569; December 9, 1996
Rule 114 – Methods of Arrest

Facts:
Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then assigned at the Capas
Police Station, received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari,
who has a standing warrant of arrest for Homicide was seen at Capas, Tarlac.
Upon reaching the place, the arresting officers surrounded the house of
appellant, arrested him, and told him to remain stationary. Thereupon, the
arresting officers searched him and found a homemade gun. Appellant was
handcuffed and brought to the Capas Police Station where he was endorsed to
the chief investigator while the homemade gun and live ammunition were
endorsed to the property custodian. The incident was then entered in the police
blotter after which the spot and investigation reports were prepared. After
investigation, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition and pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the
merits ensued, after which, the RTC convicted petitioner of the crime charged.

Issue:
Whether there indeed existed a standing warrant for the arrest of the petitioner

Held:
No; this is not a case of a warrantless arrest but merely an instance of an arrest
effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their possession
at that precise moment. The applicable provision is not Section 5, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court on warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113. The abovequoted
rule clearly allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest. Thus, appellant’s arrest being lawful, the
search and seizure made incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted
without a warrant in the absence of any motive on their part to falsely testify
against the petitioner. It has been repeatedly held that without proof of such
motive, law enforcers are, presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
Thus, absent strong and convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption that
the arresting officers were aware of the legal mandates in effecting an arrest
and strictly complied with the same.

ZJI
Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v Olalia Jr
GR no 153675; April 19, 2007
Rule 114 – Bail

Facts:
Private respondent Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with 3 counts of the offense of violation of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance
of Hong Kong and 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy by the common law of
Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from
the HK-DOJ a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ
forwarded the request to the NBI which, in turn, filed with the RTC an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. Said court issued an Order of
Arrest against private respondent and he was then arrested and detained. On
appeal to the CA, the Order of Arrest was declared void. DOJ then filed with the
SC a petition for review on certiorari which was granted. Order of Arrest
became valid again. HK filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition
of private respondent, presided by Judge Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case, a petition for bail. After hearing, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is
no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent
is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the
case.

Issue:
Whether a prospective extraditee can avail himself of the right to bail

Held:
Yes; the Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in the Constitution.
The Philippine authorities are therefore under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to remedy which includes the right to be admitted to bail.

The exercise of the State's power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine have likewise been detained.
To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons
in detention during pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights.

Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by

treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within
its territorial jurisdiction, and correlative duty of the other state to surrender him
to the demanding state. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal. An extradition proceeding,
while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail,
a right to due process under the constitution.

ZJI
Comendador v De Villa
GR no 93177, 95020, 96948, 97454; august 2, 1991
Rule 114 – Bail

Facts:
These are four cases that have been consolidated because they involve
practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.

In G.R. No. 95020, the order of the respondent judge of the RTC is assailed
on certiorari on the ground that he has no authority to set aside the ruling of the
General Court Martial denying bail to Ligot. Lieutenant colonel Ligot, one of the
officers of the AFP facing prosecution for his alleged participation in the failed
coup d'etat, applied for bail, but the application was denied by the General
Court Martial (GCM). Ligot thereupon filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary
injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the
president and members of GCM No. 14, Judge Asuncion issued an order
granting provisional liberty to Ligot on the ground that the military can apply for
bail. However, this was countered by the General Court Martial, arguing that
military officers are not entitled to bail. Hence, the order of Judge Asuncion is
being assailed in this petition.

Issue:
Whether Ligot is entitled to bail

Held:
No; the right to bail invoked by Ligot has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in
the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military
where the right to bail does not exist. The justification for this exception is that
because it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers, who operate within the
framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by
the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are
paid out of revenues collected from the people.

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court
that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent as they
could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of
government and justice.

ZJI
People v Valdez
GR no 216007-09; December 8, 2015
Rule 114 – Bail

Facts:
Respondent Valdez was a mayor of Bacolod City who was charged with the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds Thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents with “no bail recommendation” by the Ombudsman. Thus, Valdez
filed a Motion to Set Aside No Bail and to Fix the Amount of Bail”. At the time of
the filing, Valdez was still at-large

Issue:
Whether the motion sought prosper despite Valdez being at-large

Held:
Yes; falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and
proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature
to rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only
when the trial has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a
means of committing malversation.

Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the
constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of
official/public documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a
capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659.

The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused.38 When there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.

It is ruled that an accused charged with the complex crime of Malversation of

Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that involves an
amount in excess of P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right. An
affirmative relief may be obtained from the court despite the accused being still
at-large. Except in petition for bail, custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs sought by the defendant (such as a motion to set aside
no bail recommendation and to fix the amount of bail in this case) where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

ZJI
Lavides v CA
GR no 129670; February 1, 2000
Rule 114 – Conditions of Bail

Facts:
Petitioner Lavides was arrested for child abuse. His arrest was made without a
warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police because of the
reports received by the police of petitioner’s activities. Petitioner then filed an
"Omnibus Motion praying among others that the accused be allowed to bail as
a matter of right under the law on which he is charged." 10 information for child
abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant. No bail was
recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the
nine cases. The trial court issued an order granting the right to post bail under
the following conditions:
a. The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these
cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
b. In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically
cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the
cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c. The hold-departure Order of this Court stands; and
d. Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this
Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused.
Petitioner then filed a motion to reduce bail, to quash the information, and to
suspend arraignment. However, this was denied by the trial court. Accordingly,
petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty.

Issue:
Whether the conditions imposed by the RTC for the grant of bail is void

Held:
Conditions A and B are valid while Condition D is void; The condition imposed in
a, that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must
be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule
114.

For condition b of the bail, under Rule 114, Sec 2(c) is that the failure of the
accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or
his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on
the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."
The Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at
the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment
and plea; (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and
(c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense. At such stages
of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.

For condition d: In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before

arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would
then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the
trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely
by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings,
such as arraignment.

Under Rule 114, Sec 2(b), one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules," while under Rule 116, Sec1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required. To condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because

ZJI
until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine
the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid
complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to
bail.

However, although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the
arraignment of petitioner was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner’s contention,
the arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of
the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a
condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted.

ZJI
Leviste v CA
GR no 189122; March 17, 2010
Rule 114 – Negating Circumstances

Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Leviste was convicted
by the for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed his conviction to the CA.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The CA denied petitioner's
application for bail and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. The CA
averred that they made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner's case and made
a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to
overturn the evidence of petitioner's guilt. Petitioner avers that the denial of his
bail is a grave abuse of discretion considering that none of the conditions
justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present.

Issue:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal should
automatically be granted absent any circumstances mentioned in the 3rd
paragraph of Sec 5, Rule 114 of the ROC

Held:
No; Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a
matter of discretion.

The appellate court's stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be
primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of
the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances
is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. The
importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted, the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon
in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued
that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction
that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail
than before conviction.

ZJI
People v Fitzgerald
GR no 149723; October 27, 2006
Rule 114 – Negating Circumstances

Facts:
An Australian citizen, Fitzgerald, was found by the RTC guilty of violation of RA
7610. The, RTC sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of prision
mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal as maximum. Fitzgerald filed a Motion
for New Trial and a Supplemental to Accused's Motion for New Trial on the
ground that new and material evidence not previously available had surfaced.
The CA granted the Motion for New Trial and Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail.
The CA issued the herein assailed Resolution granting Fitzgerald's bail application
on the ground that appellant is already of old age and is not in the best of
health persuaded even if the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioner argues that
the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact
that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and
the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in granting respondent’s motion for bail

Held:
Yes; for respondent, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to
the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent
requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114 and Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of
bail upon evidence of the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated
therein such as those indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue
risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

In this case, the CA admitted respondent to bail based not on the grounds
stated in his Motion for Bail but primarily on the fact that he is already of old age
and is not in the best of health and notwithstanding its finding that the evidence
of guilt is strong. It disregarded substantive and procedural requirements on bail.
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical
care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It
may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are
seriously sick. Moreover, here is a finding of record on the potential risk of
respondent committing a similar offense. A highly competent Psychiatrist
testified that phedophilia is a state of sexual disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is
intense and recurrent. The possibility of the commission of a similar offense for
which the accused was convicted is great if the accused will be exposed to
"stress" and if an opportunity to commit it lurks.

ZJI
Enrile v Sandiganbayan
GR no 213847; August 18, 2015
Rule 114 – Negating Circumstances

Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion
and misuse of appropriations under the PDAF. Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he
be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The
Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not
yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. On the same day
that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered in Camp
Crame. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion to Fix Bail. The Sandiganbayan issued its
assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that before
judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is
the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the
right to bail and that the mitigating circumstances of his age and voluntary
surrender should be considered. The Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to
bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense.

Issue:
Whether Enrile is entitled to bail

Held:
Yes; the principal purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. In this case, his social
and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect
for the legal processes of this country. Even if at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being
at stake, he should be granted bail.

ZJI
Trillanes IV v Pimentel Sr
GR no 179817; June 27, 2008
Rule 114 – Negating Circumstances

Facts:
A group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the AFP
stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. Later, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. After the negotiations, the militant soldiers surrendered. After the
Oakwood incident, petitioner Antonio Trillanes IV was charged along with his
comrades with coup d’etat defined under Art. 134-A of the RPC before the RTC
of Makati. While in detention, petitioner won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year
term. Before his term begins, petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests. However, the trial court denied the request. Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration which the trial court still denied. Petitioner contends that being
a mere detention prisoner, he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since
the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Issue:
Whether there are enough precedents to allow liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail

Held:
No; the Rules state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
This provision applies to the case of petitioner, being a crime of coup d’etat
which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and
for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence
of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or
imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates
the provision that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless
of the state of the criminal action.” Such justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners
like petitioner or convicted prisoners.

It is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial

detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of
their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
Circumstances indication probability of flight find relevance as a factor in
ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary
grant of bail. In cases involving nonbailable offenses, what is controlling is the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established
that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to
all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

ZJI
Napoles v Sandiganbayan
GR no 224162; November 7, 2017
Rule 114 – Negating Circumstances

Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman received a Complaint from its Field Investigation
Office and a recommendation from the NBI charging Janet Lim Napoles, former
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, his Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes and several
other individuals with the crime of Plunder under RA 7080 and violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) for allegedly misappropriating
former Sen. Enrile’s PDAF through fictitious NGO’s. Napoles filed a Petition for Bail
arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The
prosecution presented several witnesses, but Napoles did not present any nor
any other evidence. The Sandiganbayan thereafter denied the Petition for Bail
of Napoles as well as her Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether Napoles should be granted bail

Held:
No; as a rule, bail may be granted as a matter of right prior to conviction when
the offense is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment
and the evidence of guilty is NOT strong.

In this case, Napoles was charged with Plunder which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. She cannot, thus, be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt
is strong. The burden of proof to show such is on the prosecution. The
prosecution can discharge its burden by proving that the evidence shows
evident proof of guilt or a great presumption of guilt.

ZJI
Padilla v CA
GR no 121917; July 31, 1996
Rule 114 – Bail, neither a matter of right nor discretion; non-bailable

Facts:
In an information filed before the RTC appellant was charged with illegal
possession of firearms punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
Pending trial, appellant was release on bail. Thereafter, appellant was
convicted as charged and meted an indeterminate penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. He appealed to public respondent CA, but
judgment was rendered affirming his conviction. Respondent court cancelled
his bail bond and ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied,
appellant is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari with an
application for bail praying, among others, to be allowed to post bail for his
temporary liberty. In his subsequent pleading, appellant moved for the separate
resolution of his bail application.

Issue:
Whether appellant is entitled to bail

Held:
No; bail is either a matter of right, or discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a
matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years then bail is a matter of discretion,
except when any of the enumerated circumstances 5 under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied, as it is
neither a matter of right nor discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong
bail becomes a matter of right.

In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion

perpetua. Hence, appellant not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports
that the evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary to appellant's asseveration,
a summary hearing for his bail of application for the sole purpose of determining
whether or not evidence is strong is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial
before the lower court and the appeal before respondent court are more than
sufficient in accomplishing the purpose for which a summary hearing for bail
application is designed.

ZJI
People v Nitcha
GR no 113517; January 19, 1995
Rule 114 – Bail; neither a matter of right nor discretion; non-bailable

Facts:
Jojo Belmonte went out of his house to buy some cigarettes in a nearby store.
Before Jojo Belmonte could buy the cigarettes, Doro Nitcha arrived, uttered the
words "You are one of them" in the vernacular, then started mauling him. Unable
to endure the pain, Jojo fought back. May and Joselito tried to pacify. The
fighting stopped upon the arrival of Doro's sister Baby who dragged Doro away
from the fight and brought him home. Not long thereafter and while they were
still on their way, appellant, brother of Doro, arrived at the sari-sari store
brandishing a gun and shouting in Tagalog, "Walanghiya kayo, putangina ninyo,
papatayin ko kayong lahat!". After uttering those words, appellant fired his gun
in the direction of the Sibayans, the bullet hitting May at the back of her head
and existing through the middle of her forehead. Appellant then aimed his gun
at Joselito but missed. May, however, expired on the way to the hospital. Shortly
after the shooting incident, appellant went back to his mother's house before
proceeding to the police station of San Quintin, Pangasinan where he
surrendered himself together with his service firearm. An indictment for murder
was filed against appellant who, after trial, was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt on account of the positive identification made by the People’s witnesses.

Issue:
Whether accused is entitled to bail

Held:
Yes; the crime committed is homicide punishable by reclusion temporal, not
murder. Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other
hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes
a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right.

The clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a

crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of
the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the
court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong —
which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it
would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the
pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Hence, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense

punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter
of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly
imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

ZJI
Panganiban v Cupin-Tesorero
AM MTJ-02-1454-27; August 2002
Rule 114 – Where bail is filed

Facts:
Maricel Panganiban filed a complaint against Jayson Marte for violation of RA
7610 for allegedly inserting his finger into the private parts of Peewai, their 2-
year-old daughter. The complaint was filed with the MTC of Cavite for
preliminary examination by respondent Judge. Respondent judge issued an
order finding probable cause for the continued detention of the accused
Jayson for violation of RA 7610. After conducting a preliminary investigation,
respondent judge issued a resolution finding probable cause for the filing of
criminal charges against the accused JAYSON for violation of Art. 266-A, par. 2
of the RPC. She recommended bail for the provisional liberty of the accused.
Later, an information was filed against the accused for rape in violation of Art.
266-A of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610 before the RTC. No bail was
recommended for the provisional liberty of the accused however, respondent
judge nevertheless issued an order approving the bail bond of JAYSON and
directing the provincial jail warden to cause his release from custody.
Complainant alleges that, in so doing, respondent judge committed grave
misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
dishonesty, and violation of R.A. No. 3019.

Issue:
Whether respondent judge committed grave misconduct in granting bail to the
accused

Held:
Yes; Sec 17 of Rule 114 states that Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city.
If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place,
or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

In this case, Jayson was not arrested in a province, city, or municipality other
than where his case is pending. To the contrary, it appears that he was a
resident of Silang, Cavite, was detained at the Municipal Jail of Silang, Cavite
and later transferred to the Cavite Provincial Jail, Trece Martires City. He was
thus arrested in the province of Cavite and detained there. At the time of the
issuance of respondent judge's order to release him on bail, his case was
pending before the RTC of Cavite. Applying Rule 114, Section 17 (a) to the
foregoing circumstances, the accused JAYSON could file a petition for bail only
in the court where his case is pending, that is, in Branch 18 of the RTC of Cavite,
or with another branch of the same court within the province or city, that is, with
any other branch of the RTC of Cavite. Certainly, the said provision does not
allow the accused to apply for bail before a municipal circuit trial court judge.
Hence, respondent judge did not have authority to issue an order approving the
bail bond.

More importantly, however, is the fact that respondent judge had already lost
her jurisdiction over the case of the accused. At the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation and after she had recommended the filing of the
corresponding information against JAYSON and had forwarded the records of
the case to the Provincial Prosecutor, her court had lost its preliminary jurisdiction
over the said case because the case had been filed with the RTC of Cavite.

ZJI
Villanueva v Buaya
AM RTJ-08-2131; November 22, 2010
Rule 114 – Hearing of application for bail

Facts:
Villanueva filed a complaint for Qualified Seduction against Vice-Mayor Tupa.
She then filed another complaint against Tupa for the violation of RA 7610 with
the MTC. The MTC judge forwarded the case to the Office of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor after finding probable cause for two counts of violation of
RA 7610 and allowed Tupa to post bail in the amount of P100,000.00 for each
count. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Borgueta issued a Joint Resolution on
Review recommending the filing of two separate information for the violation of
RA 7610 against Tupa. He also recommended the cancellation of the bail bond
posted by Tupa, as under Sec. 31 of RA 7610, if the offender is a public officer or
employee, the penalty in Sec. 5 is imposed in the maximum period, i.e.,
reclusion perpetua. Because of this, bail is not a matter of right. The prosecutor
also found that the evidence of guilt is strong against the accused based on
Villanueva’s affidavit-complaint and her material declarations during the
preliminary investigation. Accused surrendered to the police and filed with the
RTC an urgent ex-parte motion to grant bail which was granted by the Judge
without conducting a hearing and without notice to the prosecution.

Issue:
Whether Judge Buaya is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for granting bail
without hearing and notice to the prosecution

Held:
Yes; In this case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail without
the required notice and hearing, justifying that the offense charged against the
accused is a bailable offense, and so a hearing is no longer required as bail is a
matter of right. However, under the Rules of Court, notice and hearing are
required whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. Jurisprudence is also
replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, where bail is a
matter of discretion. In cases where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or
denial of bail hinges on the issue on whether evidence of guilt is strong or not,
which is a matter of judicial discretion and which remains with the judge. The
discretion is not on whether a hearing should be held, but in the evaluation of
the weight of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused. The
hearing is also necessary in order for the court to consider the guidelines set in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing bail.

ZJI
Adalim-White v Bugtas
AM RTJ-02-1738; November 17, 2005
Rule 114 – Bail when not required / Reduced Bail or Recognizance

Facts:
This case involves a verified letter-complaint filed by Atty. Juliana Adalim-
White against Judge Bugtas for ignorance of the law relative to a criminal case
For having ordered the release of Bagaporo pending approval of the latter's
application for parole and before his completion of the minimum period
of the sentence imposed upon him. Respondent contends that his order
allowing the release on recognizance of Bagaporo is in consonance with the
provisions of Section 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Respondent argues that
since Bagaporo had already been in prison for a period which is equal to the
minimum of his sentence, his release on recognizance is in order. Moreover,
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides that upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

Issue:
Whether Judge Bugtas was correct in releasing Bagapor

Held:
No; Bagaporo was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 4 years and 2 months to 8 years and 1 day. It is not disputed that he began
to serve sentence on February 9, 1996. Counting four years and two months
from said date the minimum period of Bagaporo's sentence should have been
completed on April 9, 2000. Hence, it is wrong for respondent to claim that
Bagaporo had already served the minimum of his sentence at the time that
he was granted bail on recognizance, that is, on February 16, 2000. Section 24,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail
after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to serve
sentence. The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court
is when the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve
sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the
Probation Law.

In the instant case, there is no showing that Bagaporo applied for probation. In
fact, at the time of his application for release on recognizance, he was already
serving sentence. When he was about to complete service of the minimum of
his sentence, he filed an application for parole. However, there is no evidence
to show that the Board of Pardons and Parole approved his application neither
is there any showing that he was extended good conduct allowances by the
Director of Prisons, nor was he granted pardon by the President. Hence, there is
no basis for respondent in allowing Bagaporo to be released on recognizance.
Moreover, respondent should know that the provisions of Sections 5 and 16, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court apply only to an accused undergoing preventive
imprisonment during trial or on appeal. They do not apply to a person convicted
by final judgment and already serving sentence.

ZJI
Santos v Lorenzo
AM RTJ-02-1702; August 20, 2002
Rule 114 – Increase or reduction of bail

Facts:
Complainants Sanots and Nicodemus are the father and aunt of the victim in a
Criminal Case for Frustrated Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms and the
Criminal Case for Violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban filed with the court of
JUDGE LORENZO, whom they charge with neglect of duty and abuse
of authority. Complainants sent a letter complaint to the Office of Court
Administrator alleging that the cases were submitted for decision on February
24, 2000 but judgment was only rendered against the accused ZALDY and
ZANDY PRADO on September 11; and JUDGE LORENZO promulgated a decision
with a bond of P 130K for Illegal Possession of Firearms, while the bond for
Frustrated Murder was increased from P 17K to 22K, and the bond for violation of
the COMELEC Gun Ban was increased from P 6K to P 12K, but upon motion
of the accused, JUDGE LORENZO reduced the bail bond for Illegal Possession of
Firearms from P 130K to P 30K which was irregular.

Issue:
Whether the reduction of the bail bond from P130k to P30k was improper

Held:
Yes; the prosecution was for illegal possession of firearms. On 1195, bail was
initially fixed at P130K in view of the penalty then prescribed under P.D. No. 1866
– reclusion perpetua to death. However, R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997,
which reduced the penalty to prision correccional in its maximum period (4
years and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine of not less than P 15K. In accordance with
the new law, respondent judge sentenced the accused to an indeterminate
prison term of 2 years, 11 months, and 11 days to 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days.
As the bail was originally fixed in view of the penalty imposed in P.D. No. 1866, it
became necessary for respondent judge to fix the bail at a lower amount when
the accused applied for bail on appeal on September 19, 2000 in view of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8294.

Bail, after conviction by the Regional Trial Court, is afforded to the accused as a
matter of discretion. A trial judge acts according to law in granting bail if the
circumstances enumerated in Rule 114, Sec 5 for denying it are not present.
There is no claim that in fixing the bail for the purpose of appeal at P 30K, the
respondent judge abused her discretion. The complainants' only basis was that
the reduction was drastic, but this was because there was a considerable
reduction in the penalty attached to the crime involved.

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Esteban v Alhamra
GR no 135012; September 7, 2004
Rule 114 – Forfeiture and cancellation of bail; Cash deposit

Facts:
Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His sister-in-law, Anita Esteban,
petitioner herein, posted cash bail in each case for his temporary liberty. While
out on bail and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was
again charged with another crime for which he was arrested and detained.
“Fed up with Gerardoʼs actuation,” petitioner refused to post another bail.
Instead, she filed with the trial court an application for the cancellation of the
cash bonds she posted in the four criminal cases. She alleged therein that she is
“terminating the cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail as
certified to by the City Jail Warden. However, the respondent denied petitioner’s
application. Respondent Judge averred that petitioner did not voluntarily
surrender the accused. Instead, the accused was subsequently charged with
another crime for which he was arrested and detained and money deposited
as bail even though made by a third person is considered as the accused’s
deposit where there is no relationship of principal and surety. Hence, the money
so deposited takes the nature of property in custodia legis and is to be applied
for payment of fine and costs.

Issue:
Whether the cash bail may be cancelled by the petitioner

Held:
No; Section 22, Rule 114 states that upon application of the bondsmen, with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the
accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed automatically
cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of
the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without
prejudice to any liability on the bail.

The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where, among

others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that ordered
the latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety or
bondsman, cancels the bail bond.

We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not surrender the
accused, charged in the four criminal cases, to the trial court. The accused was
arrested and detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal case.
Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash deposit
which, as mandated by Section 14 of the same Rule 114, shall be applied to the
payment of fine and costs, and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the
accused or to any person who made the deposit.

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Leviste v Alameda
GR no 182677; August 3, 2010
Rule 114 – Application not a bar to objections in illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation

Facts:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Leviste was convicted
by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal as
maximum. He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part. The CA denied petitioner's application for bail and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioner avers that the denial of his bail
is a grave abuse of discretion considering that none of the conditions justifying
denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court was present.

Issue:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that
bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of Sec 5, Rule 114 of the RTC

Held:
No; Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a
matter of discretion.

The appellate court's stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be
primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of
the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances
is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. The
importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted, the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon
in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued
that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction
that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail
than before conviction.

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People v Quiñones
GR no 250908; November 23, 2020
Rule 115 – Rights of the Accused (right to be presumed innocent)

Facts:
At around 3:40 in the afternoon, Jail Officer Romana was conducting a roll call
of the inmates at the second floor of the Camarines Norte Provincial Jail when
he accosted Caparas, a minor and trustee-inmate, and asked him where he
was going. When Caparas answered that he was heading to the cell of inmate
Frederik Cua, JO Romana bodily searched him and recovered from his pocket a
small piece of paper sealed with black electrical tape. When he opened it, he
saw a handwritten note, a small plastic sachet containing 0.0944 gram of white
crystalline substance, and a rolled aluminum foil. JO Romana confiscated the
items. Caparas testified that the items confiscated was from herein accused-
appellant, hence he was charged with attempted illegal sale of prohibited
drugs.

Issue:
Whether there is an attempted illegal sale of prohibited drugs

Held:
No;

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