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to weaken Taipei's position in interna-
The Taiwan tional organizations and to ensure that
countries, corporations, universities, and
Temptation individuals-everyone, everywhere,
really-adhered to its understanding of
the "one China" policy. As sharp as
Why Beijing Might these tactics were, they stopped well
Resort to Force short of military action. And although
Chinese officials always maintained that
Oriana Skylar Mastro they had a right to use force, that option
seemed off the table.
For more than 70 years, China and In recent months, however, there
have been disturbing signals that
Taiwan have avoided coming to Beijing is reconsidering its peaceful
blows. The two entities have approach and contemplating armed
been separated since 1949, when the unification. Chinese President Xi
Chinese Civil War, which had begun in Jinping has made clear his ambition to
1927, ended with the Communists' resolve the Taiwan issue, grown mark-
victory and the Nationalists' retreat to edly more aggressive on issues of
Taiwan. Ever since, the strait separating sovereignty, and ordered the Chinese
Taiwan from mainland China-81 miles military to increase its activity near the
wide at its narrowest-has been the site island. He has also fanned the flames of
of habitual crises and everlasting Chinese nationalism and allowed
tensions, but never outright war. For discussion of a forceful takeover of
the past decade and a half, cross-strait Taiwan to creep into the mainstream of
relations have been relatively stable. In the Chinese Communist Party (cce).
the hopes of persuading the Taiwanese The palpable shift in Beijing's thinking
people of the benefits to be gained has been made possible by a decades-
through a long-overdue unification, long military modernization effort,
China largely pursued its long-standing accelerated by Xi, aimed at allowing
policy of "peaceful reunification," China to force Taiwan back into the
enhancing its economic, cultural, and fold. Chinese forces plan to prevail even
social ties with the island. if the United States, which has armed
To help the people of Taiwan see the Taiwan but left open the question of
light, Beijing sought to isolate Taipei whether it would defend it against an
internationally, offering economic attack, intervenes militarily. Whereas
inducements to the island's allies if they Chinese leaders used to view a military
agreed to abandon Taipei for Beijing. It campaign to take the island as a fantasy,
also used its growing economic leverage now they consider it a real possibility.
U.S. policymakers may hope that
ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO is a Center Beijing will balk at the potential costs of
Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for such aggression, but there are many
International Studies at Stanford University
and a Senior Nonresident Fellow at the
reasons to think it might not. Support
American Enterprise Institute. for armed unification among the Chi-
58 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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Oriana Skylar Mastro
nese public and the military establish- years later, he stated explicitly that
ment is growing. Concern for interna- unification is a requirement for achiev-
tional norms is subsiding. Many in ing the so-called Chinese dream.
Beijing also doubt that the United States Xi has also made clear that he is
has the military power to stop China more willing than his predecessors to
from taking Taiwan-or the interna- use force. In a major speech in January
tional clout to rally an effective coalition 2019, Xi called the current political
against China in the wake of Donald arrangement "the root cause of cross-
Trump's presidency. Although a Chinese strait instability" and said that it
invasion of Taiwan may not be immi- "cannot go on generation to genera-
nent, for the first time in three decades, tion." Chinese scholars and strategists I
it is time to take seriously the possibility have spoken to in Beijing say that
that China could soon use force to end although there is no explicit timeline,
its almost century-long civil war. Xi wants unification with Taiwan to be
part of his personal legacy. When asked
"NO OPTION IS EXCLUDED" about a possible timeline by an Associ-
Those who doubt the immediacy of the ated Press journalist in April, Le
threat to Taiwan argue that Xi has not Yucheng, China's vice foreign minister,
publicly declared a timeline for unifica- did not attempt to assuage concerns of
tion-and may not even have a specific an imminent invasion or deny the shift
one in mind. Since 1979, when the in mood in Beijing. Instead, he took the
United States stopped recognizing opportunity to reiterate that national
Taiwan, China's policy has been, in the unification "will not be stopped by
words of John Culver, a retired U.S. anyone or any force" and that while
intelligence officer and Asia analyst, "to China will strive for peaceful unifica-
preserve the possibility of political tion, it does not "pledge to give up
unification at some undefined point in other options. No option is excluded."
the future." Implied in this formulation Chinese leaders, including Xi,
is that China can live with the status regularly extol the virtues of integration
quo-a de facto, but not de jure, inde- and cooperation with Taiwan, but the
pendent Taiwan-in perpetuity. prospects for peaceful unification have
But although Xi may not have sent been dwindling for years. Fewer and
out a save-the-date card, he has clearly fewer Taiwanese see themselves as
indicated that he feels differently about Chinese or desire to be a part of main-
the status quo than his predecessors land China. The reelection in January
did. He has publicly called for progress 2020 of Taiwanese President Tsai
toward unification, staking his legiti- Ing-wen, who favors pursuing more
macy on movement in that direction. In cautious ties with China, reinforced
2017, for instance, he announced that Beijing's fears that the people of Taiwan
"complete national reunification is an will never willingly come back to the
inevitable requirement for realizing the motherland. The death knell for peace-
great rejuvenation of the Chinese ful unification came in June 2020,
nation," thus tying Taiwan's future to however, when China exerted sweeping
his primary political platform. Two new powers over Hong Kong through a
60 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Taiwan Temptation
new national security law. Hong Kong's rocket force fight seamlessly together,
"one country, two systems" formula was whether during an amphibious landing,
supposed to provide an attractive a blockade, or a missile attack-exactly
template for peaceful unification, but the kinds of operations needed for
Beijing's crackdown there demonstrated armed unification. Xi urgently pushed
clearly why the Taiwanese have been these risky reforms, many unpopular
right to reject such an arrangement. with the military, to ensure that the PLA
Chinese leaders will continue to pay could fight and win wars by 2020.
lip service to peaceful unification until The voices in Beijing arguing that it
the day the war breaks out, but their is time to use these newfound military
actions increasingly suggest that they capabilities against Taiwan have grown
have something else in mind. As tensions louder, a telling development in an era
with the United States have heated up, of greater censorship. Several retired
China has accelerated its military opera- military officers have argued publicly
tions in the vicinity of Taiwan, conduct- that the longer China waits, the harder
ing 380 incursions into the island's air it will be to take control of Taiwan.
defense identification zone in 2020 Articles in state-run news outlets and
alone. In April of this year, China sent its on popular websites have likewise
largest-ever fleet, 25 fighters and bomb- urged China to act swiftly. And if
ers, into Taiwan's air defense identifica- public opinion polls are to be believed,
tion zone. Clearly, Xi is no longer trying the Chinese people agree that the time
to avoid escalation at all costs now that has come to resolve the Taiwan issue
his military is capable of contesting the once and for all. According to a survey
U.S. military presence in the region. by the state-run Global Times, 70
Long gone are the days of the 1996 crisis percent of mainlanders strongly sup-
over Taiwan, when the United States port using force to unify Taiwan with
dispatched two aircraft carrier battle the mainland, and 37 percent think it
groups to sail near the strait and China would be best if the war occurred in
backed off. Beijing did not like being three to five years.
deterred back then, and it spent the next The Chinese analysts and officials I
25 years modernizing its military so that have spoken to have revealed similar
it would not be so next time. sentiments. Even moderate voices have
Much of that modernization, includ- admitted that not only are calls for
ing updates to hardware, organization, armed unification proliferating within
force structure, and training, was the ccp but also they themselves have
designed to enable the People's Libera- recommended military action to senior
tion Army to invade and occupy Tai- Chinese leadership. Others in Beijing
wan. Xi expanded the military's capa- dismiss concerns about a Chinese
bilities further, undertaking the most invasion as overblown, but in the same
ambitious restructuring of the PLA since breath, they acknowledge that Xi is
its founding, aimed specifically at surrounded by military advisers who
enabling Chinese forces to conduct tell him with confidence that China can
joint operations in which the air force, now regain Taiwan by force at an
the navy, the army, and the strategic acceptable cost.
July/August 2021 61
Oriana Skylar Mastro
BATTLE READY world. China could quickly destroy
Unless the United States or Taiwan Taiwan's key infrastructure, block its oil
moves first to alter the status quo, Xi imports, and cut off its Internet ac-
will likely consider initiating armed cess-and sustain such a blockade
unification only if he is confident that indefinitely. According to Lonnie
his military can successfully gain Henley, a retired U.S. intelligence
control of the island. Can it? officer and China specialist, "U.S.
The answer is a matter of debate, and forces could probably push through a
it depends on what it would take to trickle of relief supplies, but not much
compel Taiwan's capitulation. Beijing is more." And because China has such a
preparing for four main campaigns that sophisticated air defense system, the
its military planners believe could be nec- United States would have little hope of
essary to take control of the island. The regaining air or naval superiority by
first consists of joint PLA missile and attacking Chinese missile transporters,
airstrikes to disarm Taiwanese targets- fighters, or ships.
initially military and government, then But China's fourth and final cam-
civilian-and thereby force Taipei's paign-an amphibious assault on the
submission to Chinese demands. The island itself-is far from guaranteed to
second is a blockade operation in which succeed. According to a 2020 U.S.
China would attempt to cut the island off Department of Defense report, "China
from the outside world with everything continues to build capabilities that
from naval raids to cyberattacks. The would contribute to a full-scale inva-
third involves missile and airstrikes sion," but "an attempt to invade Taiwan
against U.S. forces deployed nearby, with would likely strain China's armed forces
the aim of making it difficult for the and invite international intervention."
United States to come to Taiwan's aid in The then commander of U.S. Indo-
the initial stages of the conflict. The Pacific Command, Philip Davidson, said
fourth and final campaign is an island in March that China will have the ability
landing effort in which China would to successfully invade Taiwan in six
launch an amphibious assault on Tai- years. Other observers think it will take
wan-perhaps taking its offshore islands longer, perhaps until around 2030 or 2035.
first as part of a phased invasion or carpet What everyone agrees is that China
bombing them as the navy, the army, and has made significant strides in its ability
the air force focused on Taiwan proper. to conduct joint operations in recent
Among defense experts, there is years and that the United States needs
little debate about China's ability to pull adequate warning to mount a successful
off the first three of these campaigns- defense. As Beijing hones its spoofing
the joint strike, the blockade, and the and jamming technologies, it may be
counterintervention mission. Neither able to scramble U.S. early warning
U.S. efforts to make its regional bases systems and thereby keep U.S. forces in
more resilient nor Taiwanese missile the dark in the early hours of an attack.
defense systems are any match for Xi's military reforms have improved
China's ballistic and cruise missiles, China's cyberwarfare and electronic
which are the most advanced in the warfare capabilities, which could be
62 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Taiwan Temptation
trained on civilian, as well as military, unnamed military expert saying that "the
targets. As Dan Coats, then the U.S. PLA exercises are not only warnings, but
director of national intelligence, testi- also show real capabilities and pragmati-
fied in 2019, Beijing is capable of cally practicing reunifying the island if it
offensive cyberattacks against the comes to that." If China chooses to
United States that would cause "local- invade, the analyst added, the Taiwanese
ized, temporary disruptive effects on military "won't stand a chance."
critical infrastructure." China's offensive
weaponry, including ballistic and cruise GO FAST, GO SLOW
missiles, could also destroy U.S. bases in Once China has the military capabilities
the western Pacific in a matter of days. to finally solve its Taiwan problem, Xi
In light of these enhanced capabili- could find it politically untenable not to
ties, many U.S. experts worry that do so, given the heightened nationalism
China could take control of Taiwan of both the ccP and the public. At this
before the United States even had a point, Beijing will likely work its way
chance to react. Recent war games up to a large-scale military campaign,
conducted by the Pentagon and the beginning with "gray zone" tactics, such
RAND Corporation have shown that a as increased air and naval patrols, and
military clash between the United continuing on to coercive diplomacy
States and China over Taiwan would aimed at forcing Taipei to negotiate a
likely result in a U.S. defeat, with political resolution.
China completing an all-out invasion in Psychological warfare will also be
just days or weeks. part of Beijing's playbook. Chinese
Ultimately, on the question of exercises around Taiwan not only help
whether China will use force, Chinese train the PLA but also wear down
leaders' perceptions of their chances of Taiwan's military and demonstrate to
victory will matter more than their the world that the United States cannot
actual chances of victory. For that protect the island. The PLA wants to
reason, it is bad news that Chinese make its presence in the Taiwan Strait
analysts and officials increasingly routine. The more common its activities
express confidence that the PLA is well there become, the harder it will be for
prepared for a military confrontation the United States to determine when a
with the United States over Taiwan. Chinese attack is imminent, making it
Although Chinese strategists acknowl- easier for the PLA to present the world
edge the United States' general military with a fait accompli.
superiority, many have come to believe At the same time that it ramps up its
that because China is closer to Taiwan military activities in the strait, China
and cares about it more, the local will continue its broader diplomatic
balance of power tips in Beijing's favor. campaign to eliminate international
As U.S.-Chinese tensions have risen, constraints on its ability to use force,
China's state-sponsored media outlets privileging economic rights over politi-
have grown more vocal in their praise for cal ones in its relations with other
the country's military capabilities. In countries and within international
April, the Global Times described an bodies, downplaying human rights, and,
July/August 2021 63
Oriana Skylar Mastro
above all, promoting the norms of well. If China received more interna-
sovereignty and noninterference in tional pushback than expected or became
internal affairs. Its goal is to create the embroiled in a campaign against the
narrative that any use of force against United States that started to go badly, it
Taiwan would be defensive and justified would have more opportunities to pull
given Taipei's and Washington's provo- back and claim "mission accomplished."
cations. All these coercive and diplo- But China could decide to escalate
matic efforts will move China closer to much more rapidly if it concluded that
unification, but they won't get it all the the United States was likely to intervene
way there. Taiwan is not some unoccu- militarily regardless of whether Beijing
pied atoll in the South China Sea that moved swiftly or gradually. Chinese
China can successfully claim so long as military strategists believe that if they
other countries do not respond militar- give the United States time to mobilize
ily. China needs Taiwan's complete and amass firepower in the vicinity of
capitulation, and that will likely require the Taiwan Strait, China's chances of
a significant show of force. victory will decrease substantially. As a
If Beijing decides to initiate a cam- result, they could decide to preemptively
paign to forcibly bring Taiwan under hit U.S. bases in the region, crippling
Chinese sovereignty, it will try to Washington's ability to respond.
calibrate its actions to discourage U.S. In other words, U.S. deterrence-to
intervention. It might, for example, the extent that it is based on a credible
begin with low-cost military options, threat to intervene militarily to protect
such as joint missile and airstrikes, and Taiwan-could actually incentivize an
only escalate to a blockade, a seizure of attack on U.S. forces once Beijing has
offshore islands, and, finally, a full-blown decided to act. The more credible the
invasion if its earlier actions fail to American threat to intervene, the more
compel Taiwan to capitulate. Conducted likely China would be to hit U.S. forces
slowly over the course of many months, in the region in its opening salvo. But if
such a gradual approach to armed China thought the United States might
unification would make it difficult for stay out of the conflict, it would decline
the United States to mount a strong to attack U.S. forces in the region, since
response, especially if U.S. allies and doing so would inevitably bring the
partners in the region wish to avoid a United States into the war.
war at all costs. A gradual, coercive
approach would also force Washington WISHFUL THINKING
to initiate direct hostilities between the What might dissuade Xi from pursuing
two powers. And if China has not fired a armed unification, if not U.S. military
shot at U.S. forces, the United States might? Most Western analysts believe
would find it harder to make the case at that Xi's devotion to his signature plan to
home and in Asian capitals for a U.S. achieve the "Chinese dream" of "national
military intervention to turn back a rejuvenation," which requires him to
slow-motion Chinese invasion. An maintain economic growth and improve
incremental approach would have China's international standing, will deter
domestic political benefits for Beijing, as him from using military force and
64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Taiwan Temptation
risking derailing his agenda. They argue cies, and nearly 60 percent of China's
that the economic costs of a military exports go to the United States and its
campaign against Taiwan would be too allies. If these countries responded to a
high, that China would be left com- Chinese assault on Taiwan by severing
pletely isolated internationally, and that trade ties with China, the economic
Chinese occupation of the island would costs could threaten the developmental
tie up Beijing for decades to come. components of Xi's rejuvenation plan.
But these arguments about the cost But Chinese leaders have good reason
of armed unification are based more on to suspect that international isolation and
American projections and wishful opprobrium would be relatively mild.
thinking than on fact. A protracted, When China began to cultivate strategic
high-intensity conflict would indeed be partnerships in the mid-1990s, it re-
costly for China, but Chinese war quired other countries and organizations,
planners have set out to avoid this including the European Union, to sign
scenario; China is unlikely to attack long-term agreements to prioritize these
Taiwan unless it is confident that it can relationships and proactively manage any
achieve a quick victory, ideally before tensions or disruptions. All these agree-
the United States can even respond. ments mention trade, investment,
Even if China found itself in a economic cooperation, and working
protracted war with the United States, together in the United Nations. Most
however, Chinese leaders may believe include provisions in support of Beijing's
they have social and economic advan- position on Taiwan. (Since 1996, China
tages that would enable them to outlast has convinced more than a dozen coun-
the Americans. They see the Chinese tries to switch their diplomatic recogni-
people as more willing to make sacri- tion to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with only
fices for the cause of Taiwan than the 15 remaining allies.) In other words,
American people. Some argue, too, that many of China's most important trading
China's large domestic market makes it partners have already sent a strong signal
less reliant on international trade than that they will not let Taiwan derail their
many other countries. (The more China relationships with Beijing.
economically decouples from the Whether compelling airlines to take
United States and the closer it gets to Taiwan off their maps or pressuring
technological self-sufficiency, the Paramount Pictures to remove the Taiwan-
greater this advantage will be.) Chinese ese flag from the Tp Gun hero Maver-
leaders could also take comfort in their ick's jacket, China has largely succeeded
ability to quickly transition to an in convincing many countries that
industrial wartime footing. The United Taiwan is an internal matter that they
States has no such ability to rapidly should stay out of. Australia has been
produce military equipment. cautious about expanding its military
International isolation and coordi- cooperation with the United States and
nated punishment of Beijing might reluctant even to consider joint contin-
seem like a greater threat to Xi's great gency planning over Taiwan (although
Chinese experiment. Eight of China's the tide seems to be shifting in Can-
top ten trading partners are democra- berra). Opinion polls show that most
July/August 2021 65
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Europeans value their economic ties boasts at least 1.5 million members,
with China and the United States whose primary mission is suppressing
roughly the same and don't want to be opposition. Compared with the military
caught in the middle. Southeast Asia task of invading and seizing Taiwan in
feels similarly, with polls showing that the first place, occupying it probably
the majority of policymakers and looks like a piece of cake.
thought leaders from member states of For all these reasons, Xi may believe
the Association of Southeast Asian he can regain control of Taiwan without
Nations believe the best approach to jeopardizing his Chinese dream. It is
U.S.-Chinese sparring is for the associa- telling that in the flood of commentary
tion to "enhance its own resilience and on Taiwan that has come out of China
unity to fend off their pressures." One in recent months, few articles have
South Korean official put it more mentioned the costs of war or the
memorably in an interview with The potential reaction from the interna-
Atlantic, comparing the need to pick tional community. As one retired
sides in the U.S.-Chinese dispute to high-level military officer explained to
"asking a child whether you like your me recently, China's main concern isn't
dad or your mom." Such attitudes the costs; it's sovereignty. Chinese
suggest that the United States would leaders will always fight for what is
struggle to convince its allies to isolate theirs. And if China defeats the United
China. And if the international reaction States along the way, it will become the
to Beijing's crackdowns in Hong Kong new dominant power in the Asia-Pacific.
and Xinjiang is any indication, the most The prospects are tantalizing. The
China can expect after an invasion of worst-case scenario, moreover, is that
Taiwan are some symbolic sanctions and the United States reacts more quickly
words of criticism. and effectively than expected, forcing
The risk that a bloody insurgency in China to declare victory after limited
Taiwan will drag on for years and drain gains and go home. Beijing would live
Beijing of resources is no more of a to capture Taiwan another day.
deterrent-and the idea that it would be
says more about the United States' scars NO EXIT
from Afghanistan and Iraq than about These realities make it very difficult for
likely scenarios for Taiwan. The PLA's the United States to alter China's
military textbooks assume the need for calculus on Taiwan. Richard Haass and
a significant campaign to consolidate David Sacks of the Council on Foreign
power after its troops have landed and Relations have argued in ForeignAffairs
broken through Taiwan's coastal de- that the United States could improve
fenses, but they do not express much cross-strait deterrence by ending its
concern about it. This may be because long-standing policy of "strategic ambi-
although the PLA has not fought a war guity"-that is, declining to state specifi-
since 1979, China has ample experience cally whether and how it would come to
with internal repression and dedicates Taiwan's defense. But the main problem
more resources to that mission than to is not U.S. resolve, since Chinese leaders
its military. The People's Armed Police already assume the United States will
66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Taiwan Temptation
intervene. What matters to Xi and other prevent China from using force alto-
top Chinese leaders is whether they gether. Beijing could still try to use
think the PiA can prevail even in the missile strikes to convince Taiwan to
face of U.S. intervention. For that bend to its will. To deter all Chinese
reason, successful deterrence requires military aggression, the United States
convincing China that the United States would therefore need to be prepared to
can prevent it from achieving its military destroy China's missile batteries-which
objectives in Taiwan, a difficult under- would involve U.S. strikes on the
taking that would come with its own Chinese mainland. Even if U.S. intel-
downsides and potential risks. ligence capabilities improve, the United
One way to convince Beijing would States would risk mistaking Chinese
be to develop the capabilities to physi- military exercises for preparations for an
cally stop it from taking Taiwan-deter- invasion-and igniting a war by mistake.
rence by denial. This would involve China knows this and may conclude the
positioning missile launchers and armed United States would not take the chance.
drones near Taiwan and more long-range The most effective way to deter
munitions, especially antiship weapons, Chinese leaders from attacking Taiwan is
in places such as Guam, Japan, and the also the most difficult: to convince them
Philippines. These weapons would help that armed unification would cost China
repel a Chinese amphibious and air its rejuvenation. And the United States
assault in the initial stages of an attack. cannot do this alone. Washington would
If Chinese leaders knew their forces need to persuade a large coalition of
could not physically make it across the allies to commit to a coordinated eco-
strait, they would not consider trying nomic, political, and military response to
unless Taiwan took the truly unaccept- any Chinese aggression. And that,
able step of declaring independence. unfortunately, remains a remote possibil-
The United States would also need ity, since many countries are unwilling to
to invest heavily in intelligence, surveil- risk their economic prospects, let alone a
lance, and reconnaissance in the region. major-power war, in order to defend a
The attractiveness of a full-on invasion small democratic island.
from China's perspective lies in the Ultimately, then, there is no quick and
possibility of surprise: the United States easy fix to the escalating tensions across
may not be able to respond militarily the strait. The only way the United
until after Beijing has taken control of States can ensure Taiwan's security is to
the island and the war is over. Leaving make an invasion impossible for Beijing
aside the operational challenges of such or to convince Chinese leaders that using
a response, it would be politically force will cause them to be pariahs. For
difficult for any U.S. president to the last 25 years, however, Beijing has
authorize an attack on China when no sought to prevent Washington from
shots were being fired at the time. doing either. Unfortunately for Taiwan,
An enhanced U.S. military and only now is the United States waking up
intelligence presence in the Indo-Pacific to the new reality.`
would be sufficient to deter most forms
of armed unification, but it wouldn't
July/August 2021 67
