#38 [G.R. No. 238334. July 3, 2019.
]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSELINE KASAN y
ATILANO and HENRY LLACER y JAO , accused-appellants.
SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW – ILLEGAL DRUGS
FACTS:
Appellants Roseline Kasan and Henry Llacer were charged with violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165; and on a separate information, Henry Llacer was also charged with violation
of Section 11 of RA 9165.
On December 10, 2015, SPO1 Mike Lester Pacis and SPO2 Rommel Ladiana arrested
appellants for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs through a buy bust
operation.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of conviction despite the procedural
deficiencies in the chain of custody compliance?
RULING:
YES. The Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of conviction despite the
procedural deficiencies in the chain of custody compliance.
In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by
the accused is the same substance presented in court. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labelling, and recording, and must exist
from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account
for each link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third,
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
On its face, the joint affidavit of arrest of SPO1 Pacis and SPO2 Ladiana bears the
following procedural deficiencies in the chain of custody of the drugs in question.
First. The seized drugs were not marked, inventoried, or photographed at the place of
arrest.
Here, appellants got arrested at the corner of Osmeña and JB Roxas Sts., Brgy.
Olympia, Makati City. But police officers brought them first to the barangay hall of Brgy.
Olympia, Makati City. Since there was no available barangay official there, the team
transferred to the barangay hall of Brgy. West Pembo, Makati City. It was only after two
hours from the time of arrest that the seized items were finally marked by SPO1 Pacis.
All through the two-hour gap, the drug items were exposed to switching, planting and
contamination while in transit.
The police officers, nonetheless, invoked "security reasons" to justify their failure to
mark, inventory, and photograph the drug items at the situs criminis. Standing alone,
such bare allegation should be rejected. What exactly these "security reasons" were
and why the place of arrest was considered to be risky for marking and inventory or
taking of photographs — are material details which the arresting officers failed to
present during the trial. In People v. Lim, it was held that "immediate physical
inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest may
be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending
officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are
threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of
those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault."
This principle was applied in People v. Tampan wherein one of the grounds in acquitting
the accused therein was the arresting officers' failure to explain why the inventory and
taking of photograph were not immediately done at the situs criminis.
Second. Only an elected official was present at the time of the inventory and taking of
photograph. RA 9165, as amended, requires an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media during inventory and
taking of photographs. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to
ensure not only the compliance with the chain of custody rule but also remove any
suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
Third. Notably, the parties stipulated that PSI Rendielyn Sahagun was the forensic
chemical officer who prepared Chemistry Report No. D-1297- 2015 pursuant to the
Request for Laboratory Examination. By reason of this stipulation, the parties agreed to
dispense with her testimony.
People v. Cabuhay ordained that the parties' stipulation to dispense with the testimony
of the forensic chemist should include:
In People v. Pajarin , the Court ruled that in case of a stipulation by the parties
to dispense with the attendance and testimony of the forensic chemist, it should
be stipulated that the forensic chemist would have testified that he had taken the
precautionary steps required to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized item, thus: (1) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as
marked, properly sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of
the content; and (3) that he placed his own marking on the same to ensure that
it could not be tampered with pending trial.
Here, the parties' stipulation to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist did
not contain the vital pieces of information required in Cabuhay: i.e., PSI Sahagun
received the seized drugs as marked, properly sealed, and intact; PSI Sahagun resealed
the drug items after examination of the content; and, PSI Sahagun placed her own
marking on the drug items — thus leaving a huge gap in the chain of custody of the
seized drugs. People v. Ubungen emphasized that stipulation on the testimony of a
forensic chemist should cover the management, storage, and preservation of the seized
drugs.
Finally, the fourth link was also broken because of the absence of the testimony from
any prosecution witness on how the drug items were brought from the crime laboratory
and submitted in evidence to the court below. In People v. Alboka, the prosecution's
failure to show who brought the seized items before the trial court was considered a
serious breach of the chain of custody rule.
Indeed, the repeated breach of the chain of custody rule here had cast serious
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain
did not link at all, albeit it unjustly restrained appellant's right to liberty. Verily,
therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order.
Strict adherence to the chain of custody rule must be observed; the precautionary
measures employed in every transfer of the seized drug item, proved to a moral
certainty. The sheer ease of planting drug evidence vis-àvis the severity of the
imposable penalties in drugs cases compels strict compliance with the chain of custody
rule.