Basic Legal and Judicial Ethics

Case Digests
Cayetano vs. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991
Paras, J.

FACTS:
In 1991, Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). A petitioner opposed the nomination, claiming that Monsod did not meet the
requirement of having practiced law for at least ten years. However, Monsod, a member of the
Philippine Bar since 1960, argued that he fulfilled the qualifications. He had legal experience, including
work with the World Bank, service in various capacities in the private sector, and involvement in
election-related activities. The petitioner challenged Monsod's confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, filing a petition to declare it null and void. Monsod's professional background and
contributions were cited as evidence of his legal qualifications for the position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of COMELEC.

HELD:
Yes. The case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions."

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with the grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. After passing the Bar, he worked in his father’s law office. Monsod also worked as an
operations officer for World Bank Group (1963-1970). Upon his return to the Philippines, he worked as
Chief Executive officer of Meralco Group, and subsequently rendered service to various company either
as legal and economic consultant or as chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary
General (1986), and National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987), as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers.

Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur

of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer- legislator of both the rich and the poor —
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

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In the Matter of the IBP Membership dues delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion
A.M. No. 1928
August 3, 1978
Castro, C.J.

FACTS:
In 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors recommended the removal of
Atty. Marcial A. Edillon from the Roll of Attorneys due to his refusal to pay membership dues. The IBP
submitted this recommendation to the Supreme Court, initiating a legal process. Edillon objected,
arguing that the integration of the Bar and the associated rules violated his constitutional rights by
compelling him to be an IBP member and pay dues. He also questioned the Court's jurisdiction in the
matter. This case mirrored issues raised in a previous case (Administrative Case No. 526) that the Court
had already addressed, affirming the constitutionality and legality of Bar integration. The Court had
concluded that the integration of the Philippine Bar was "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable."

ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar may be compelled to pay the required membership fee
in IBP.

HELD:
Yes. An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.

The Court sees nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the
police power of the State over an important profession.

In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G. Martinez
A.C. No. 244
March 29, 1963
Bengzon, C.J.

FACTS:

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Telesforo A. Diao passed the Bar examinations in 1953 but faced allegations from Severino Martinez
about providing false information regarding his academic qualifications in the application. The Solicitor
General investigated and recommended Diao's removal from the roll of attorneys. The investigation
found that Diao did not complete high school and never attended Quisumbing College, contradicting his
application. Diao admitted to leaving high school in his third year but argued that his U.S. Army service,
including passing a General Classification Test, was considered equivalent to completing high school by
educational authorities upon his return to civilian life.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Diao should continue practicing law despite not completing the pre- law requirements.

HELD:
No. Diao’s explanation is not acceptable since the “error” or “confusion” was of his own making. Had his
application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that
he got it in April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948- 1949) six
months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree, and then he would not have been permitted to
take the bar tests because the Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm
under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education.”

Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed
to take it and passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained
under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking
the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

Re: Voluntary Termination of Membership in the Bar of Atty. Jose Principe

B.M. No. 543
September 20, 1990
En Banc

FACTS:
Atty. Jose Principe wanted to retire from the practice of law and terminate his membership from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a voluntary termination of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in
the practice of law may be granted.

HELD:
Yes. A voluntary termination of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and in the practice
of law may be granted.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court approved the voluntary termination of Atty. Jose Principe’s
membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines after complying with the above provision and in

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consideration of his reasons. The Supreme Court further ordered that his name be dropped from the Roll
of Attorneys.

PAFLU vs. Binalbagan

G.R. No. L-23959
November 29, 1971
Reyes, J.B.L., J.

FACTS:
In the case of "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." (Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo), the Court of
Industrial Relations issued a final decision on March 29, 1961, ordering the reinstatement with
backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Cipriano Cid & Associates, the counsel
of record, and Atty. Atanacio Pacis filed notices of attorney's lien for a percentage of the backwages.
Complainants Entila and Tenazas did not object to a 25% attorney's fee, and on the same day, Quintin
Muning, a non-lawyer, filed a petition for a 20% fee. Cipriano Cid & Associates opposed Muning's
petition on the grounds that he is not a lawyer. The Court of Industrial Relations, on May 12, 1964,
awarded 25% of the backwages for professional services, allocating 10% to Cipriano Cid & Associates,
10% to Quintin Muning, and 5% to Atty. Atanacio Pacis. The petition at hand seeks to void the 10% award
to Muning, emphasizing his non-lawyer status as per the court's order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a non-lawyer may recover attorney’s fee for legal services rendered.

HELD:
No. In Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., it was stated that
an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and
cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a
contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 provides that, "In the proceeding before the Court
or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel . . ." is
no justification for a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that, "it shall
be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on
behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence." thus making it clear that the
representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf
of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation.
As Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court imports the existence of attorney-client relationship as a
condition for the recovery of attorney’s fee. Such relationship cannot exist unless the representative is a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.

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People vs. Villanueva
G.R. No. L-19450
May 27, 1965
Paredes, J.

FACTS:
In 1959, Simplicio Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in Alaminos, Laguna. City Attorney
Ariston Fule of San Pablo City represented the complainant as a private prosecutor, with permission from
the Secretary of Justice. The accused's counsel objected, citing a precedent that attorneys appointed as
prosecutors should cease private practice. The objection was dismissed. In 1961, the accused's counsel
filed a motion to inhibit Fule, invoking a rule against certain attorneys practicing law. The JP Court upheld
Fule's right to appear. The case went to the CFI of Laguna, which affirmed Fule's appearance, stating he
acted as an agent or friend of the offended party without payment. The court concluded there was no
conflict in Fule's duties and dismissed the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Fule violated Section 32, Rule 127, now Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

HELD:
No. The isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning
and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent
or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. Further, Atty. Fule had been given permission by his immediate Superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case.

Atty. Mane vs. Judge Belen

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
June 30, 2008
Carpio Morales, J.

FACTS:
Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a complaint against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, accusing him of
demeaning and berating during a hearing on February 27, 2006. Mane cited Judge Belen's insulting
remarks questioning his legal education. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Belen's
conduct violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, emphasizing judges should be patient and courteous.
Despite Mane's withdrawal, the OCA recommended reprimanding Judge Belen, who complied with the
Supreme Court's resolution process. The case revolves around whether Judge Belen's actions constituted
conduct unbecoming of a judge. The OCA recommended reprimanding him for his behavior.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements and actions made by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute conduct

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unbecoming of a judge and a violation the Code of Judicial Conduct.

HELD:
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. An alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers,
taking of the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent
to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he
obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the
basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in argumentum ad hominem.

A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that
his integrity and dignity were being "assaulted", he acted properly when he directed complainant to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the
above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and
personal discourse.

People vs. Maceda

G.R. No. 89591-96
January 24, 2000
Pardo, J.

FACTS:
In 1990, the court denied a motion for reconsideration, affirming that Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda did
not abuse discretion in giving custody of Avelino T. Javellana to the court clerk during pending criminal
cases. Despite an order to detain Javellana at the clerk's residence, he freely engaged in activities,
violating a subsequent court resolution. In 1997, a prosecutor sought clarification on Javellana's status,
questioning his custodianship and potential fugitive status. The court noted the motion in 1997 but
provided no resolution. After denying a reconsideration in 1999, the trial court resumed hearings.
Javellana later sought clarification on the 1997 motion. The document concludes that Javellana, arrested
for new criminal cases, is now under legal custody, and the clerk's obligation to detain him ceased upon
the clerk's appointment as a judge. The succeeding court clerk is considered the new custodian.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Maceda committed grave abuse of discretion when he insisted in continuously
hearing Atty. Javellana’s petition for bail and in ordering the arrest of APP Turalba of contempt of court.

HELD:
Yes. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a
defiance of the court. While courts are inherently empowered to punish for contempt to the end that
they may enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and insure the
effectiveness of the administration of justice, nevertheless, such power should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, for the power to punish for contempt, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

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A perusal of the transcript of the hearing held on 14 September 1989 shows that Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor John Turalba had not made any statement that could be considered as "contumacious" or an
affront to the dignity of the court. And, while the act of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba of
"walking out" does not meet our approval — as he should have stayed after the respondent Judge had
denied his motion for permission to leave the courtroom — yet, the respondent Judge, in ordering the
incarceration of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba, acted beyond the permissible limits of his power
to punish for contempt.

A restraining order was issued on August 31, 1989 ordering Judge Maceda to cease and desist from
continuing the hearing of Atty. Javellana’s petition for bail until the motion for discharge of Oscar Tianzon
as state witness is resolved. When respondent Judge, therefore, denied the prosecution's motion for
deferment of the scheduled hearings on private respondent's petition for bail and in proceeding to hear
the said motion, by ordering the prosecution to present its evidence — which precipitated the walk-out
of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and his consequent arrest and commitment to the Provincial Jail —
he (respondent judge) was acting in violation of the restraining order issued by this Court. Had the
respondent Judge granted the prosecution's motion for deferment, this incident could have been
avoided.

In re: Petition to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, Michael Medado

B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
Sereno, CJ.

FACTS:
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1979 and
passed the bar exams the same year. Despite taking the Attorney’s Oath in 1980, he failed to sign the Roll
of Attorneys due to misplacing the notice. Years later, he discovered the oversight but continued working
in corporate and taxation without actively engaging in litigation. In 2005, during Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he couldn't provide a roll number, prompting him to file a petition in
2012 to sign the Roll of Attorneys. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended denying the petition,
citing gross negligence and misconduct, as Medado couldn't provide a valid justification for the delay
during a clarificatory conference.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Medado should be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys despite the lapse of several
years.

HELD:
Yes. Medado demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant
Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s
attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,
albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar.

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Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office,Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company,
and the Energy Development Corporation.

However, the Court cannot fully exculpate Medado from liability for his years of inaction. While an
honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his actsas it
negates malice or evil motive,a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim
an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was
not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.

OCA vs. Ladaga

A.M. No. P-99-1287
January 26, 2001
Kapunan, J.

FACTS:
In 1998, Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, a Branch Clerk of Court, requested permission to appear as pro bono
counsel for his cousin in a criminal case. He later admitted to appearing without authorization, justifying
it by citing the family's financial constraints and alleging a powerful complainant seeking vengeance.
Despite his unauthorized appearances, he claimed they were covered by approved leave applications.
The court denied authorization, leading to an administrative complaint for violating ethical standards. In
response, Ladaga defended his actions, emphasizing the familial relationship, financial need, and lack of
personal gain. The court referred the matter to the Executive Judge for investigation. The investigation
found Ladaga appeared pro bono during approved leaves, with the presiding judge's knowledge. The
recommendation was a reprimand, considering it was his first such instance, without a fee, and with
judicial awareness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin
constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

HELD:
No. The "private practice" of the law profession that is prohibited by law does not pertain to an isolated
court appearance. It contemplates succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. Here, the isolated instances when respondent appeared as
pro bono counsel of his cousin does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession
contemplated by law. Nonetheless, respondent failed to obtain a written permission therefore from the
head of the Department, which is the SC as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service

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Rules, and not the Presiding Judge of the court to which respondent is assigned, as the Judge is not the
head of the department contemplated by law. And despite the fact that respondent filed leave
applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. Respondent was reprimanded with stern
warning that any repetition of the act would be dealt with more severely.

In the Matter of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-taking of Succesful Bar applicant Al C. Argosino
B.M. No. 712
July 13, 1995
Feliciano, J.

FACTS:
In 1992, A.C. Argosino and thirteen others were charged with homicide in connection with the death of
Raul Camaligan during a university fraternity initiation hazing in September 1991. Through plea
bargaining, they pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced to imprisonment. Argosino and his co-accused applied for probation, which was granted in
June 1993, with a two-year probation period. In July 1993, Argosino petitioned to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations, revealing his criminal conviction and probation status. He passed the exams but was not
allowed to take the lawyer's oath. Argosino later filed a petition to be admitted to the practice of law,
stating that his probation was terminated in April 1994. The probation period lasted less than ten
months. As of the information provided, he has filed multiple motions for the early resolution of his
petition for admission to the Bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD:
Yes. After a very careful evaluation of this case, the SC resolved to allow petitioner to take the lawyer's
oath.

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the SC recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic duties and public service. Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan.

The SC stressed to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly
be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

Grande vs. Atty. De Silva

A.C. No. 4838
July 29, 2003
Ynares-Santiago, J.

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FACTS:
Emilio Grande filed criminal cases against Sergio Natividad, represented by Atty. Evangeline de Silva, for
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. During the proceedings, Atty. De Silva offered a check
as settlement, which Grande reluctantly accepted. However, when Grande tried to cash the check, it
bounced due to a closed account. Despite Grande's demand for payment, Atty. De Silva ignored him.
Grande then filed a criminal complaint, leading to Atty. De Silva being charged with Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 violation. Grande also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment, and after due process,
the IBP Board of Governors suspended Atty. De Silva from practicing law for two years based on findings
of deceit, gross misconduct, and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

HELD:
Yes. The SC found the respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath
for which she was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. According to the Court,
the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and
constituted a violation of her oath for which she should be accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes
gross misconduct. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such
conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyer's professional and
personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. Moreover,
respondent's persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an
explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct, which merits no compassion. The SC cannot tolerate
any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

Ferdinand A. Cruz vs. Alberto Mina, et al.

G.R. No. 154207
April 27, 2007
Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed to act as a private prosecutor in a criminal case involving his father, citing Rule
138 of the Rules of Court and a previous court decision. However, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
denied permission, citing a different rule, Circular No. 19. Cruz sought reconsideration, but both the
MeTC and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rejected his plea. Cruz then filed a petition directly to the
Supreme Court, challenging the denial of his request to act as a private prosecutor. The Supreme Court
decided to consider the case due to its significance in interpreting various legal rules and precedents.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.

HELD:
Yes. The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father,

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the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by
the law school.

However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified that the rule is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts,
a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Thus, a law
student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former,
the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the
latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may
appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule
138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor
against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non- lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Sps. Constante Agbulos & Zenaida Agbulos v. Nicasio Gutierrez, et al.

G.R. No. 176530
June 16, 2009
Nachura, J.

FACTS:
In 1997, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners, alleging fraud in the sale
of inherited land. The petitioners argued that the case fell under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) due to
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) initially dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, favoring DARAB.
Respondents appealed to the RTC, but there was uncertainty about their intention to
pursue the appeal. In 2007, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision,
determining the dispute as civil, not agrarian, and ordered the reinstatement of the
complaint for further proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty.
Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents' knowledge and consent.

HELD:
No. A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client before
the appellate court, Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:

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SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney
who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his
client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

A reading of respondent Elena Garcia's letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw
Atty. Magbitang's authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there
was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.

In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or
impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer's first appearance and validates the action
taken by him. Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by
acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom. Respondents' silence or lack of remonstration
when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.

Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence and diligence". Consequently, a
lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. In light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitang's act of filing the
notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not
commendable.

Tomas Tan, Jr. vs. Atty. Haide Gumba

A.C. No. 9000
October 5, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J.

FACTS:
The complainant, a self-made businessman, filed a complaint against the respondent, a lawyer, accusing
her of deceit and fraud in a loan transaction. The respondent borrowed money, offering a property as
security through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that allegedly granted her authority to sell the
property. However, she defaulted on the loan, and when the complainant attempted to register the
property sale, he discovered that the SPA only allowed the respondent to mortgage the property, not sell
it. The respondent failed to respond to the allegations, missed multiple hearings, and was ultimately
found guilty by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP recommended a one-year suspension
from the practice of law, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

ISSUE:
Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the period of her
suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?

HELD:
Yes. While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by registered
mail, and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is
not a valid service, the fact, however, that respondent was duly informed of her suspension remains
unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for reconsideration, and the Court duly notified
her of the denial of said motion. It thus follows that respondent's six months suspension commenced

12
from the notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12,
2013.

In Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya, despite having received the Resolution anent her suspension, Atty.
Paita-Moya continued to practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel in courts. For
which reason, the Court suspended her from the practice of law for six months in addition to her initial
one-month suspension, or a total of seven months.

Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she continued to
engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her
suspension.

It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law, the
lawyer must desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal knowledge within
the period of his or her suspension. In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a
lawful order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law during the pendency of his
or her suspension.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other
grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to comply with the
order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law against
respondent is in order.

Euprocina Crisostomo, et al. vs. Atty. Philip Nazareno

A.C. No. 6677
June 10, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
In 2001, individuals purchased housing units in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex
International Development Corp. Due to construction defects, they sought rescission of contracts before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, faced
judgments of default. Despite this, false certifications against forum shopping were submitted, claiming
no similar actions were pending. Six complaints were filed in 2004 by Rudex, again denying knowledge of
similar actions. In 2005, complainants filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nazareno, alleging
false declarations and notarial malpractice. Atty. Nazareno failed to respond. The HLURB dismissed
Rudex's complaints. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended a six-month suspension for
Atty. Nazareno. The IBP Board of Governors approved, but reduced the penalty to one month in 2013.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable.

HELD:

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Yes. In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which says that, a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively liable. Atty.
Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should
have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings.

The Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and
public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a
breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Florencio A. Saladaga vs. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga

A.C. No. 4697
November 25, 2014
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
Complainant Saladaga and respondent Atty. Astorga entered a "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
in 1981 for Leyte land. Respondent failed to repurchase within the specified period. Later, complainant
discovered the property was mortgaged, leading to dispossession. Criminal charges for estafa were filed,
and administrative cases seeking disbarment were brought to the IBP. The IBP recommended a two-year
suspension, citing respondent's bad faith and deceit. Respondent was also ordered to return ₱15,000.00
with legal interest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP Board of Governor’s Finding as to the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law is correct.

HELD:
Yes. Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of
sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest
standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for
which respondent should be held administratively liable.

Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the
“Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear that
the property was covered by T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the
said certificate of title, when the truth is that the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine years
earlier by T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed
when he was subsequently issued a new copy of T-7235 on January 1982, or barely a month after the

14
execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and deceit
against complainant.

He indeed violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The actions of
respondent in connection with the execution of the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” clearly fall
within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1. They
violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. The respondent also showed a disregard for Sec. 63 of the Land
Registration Act. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

Erlinda Foster vs. Atty. Jaime V. Agtang

A.C. No. 10579
December 10, 2014
Per Curiam

FACTS:
Foster engaged Atty. Agtang for a legal dispute with Tierra Realty, paying ₱20,000 acceptance fee and
₱5,000 incidental expenses. Agtang later sought a ₱100,000 loan for car repair, and Foster, trusting him
as her lawyer, agreed without interest. Agtang recommended a case against Tierra Realty, requesting
₱150,000 filing fee. Foster discovered discrepancies and overpayment, realizing Agtang notarized the
disputed Deed.

Agtang demanded ₱50,000 for a judge's favor; Foster paid ₱25,000. Unaware of her case dismissal,
Foster learned later, finding Agtang hadn't updated her. During reconsideration, Agtang's driver sought
₱2,500 reimbursement for a gift to the judge. Foster terminated Agtang's services upon discovering his
prior acquaintance with Tierra Realty.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Agtang Violated the CPR.

HELD:
Yes. For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests,
respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance
of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.”

Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. Agtang resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He
demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to
P22,410.00.

15
Agtang received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he
could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to
return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, the client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if
the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client. Agtang displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for P50,000.00 as
“representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a
favorable decision. Agtang himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P
25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed.

The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a
positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the
trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire Judiciary. As officers of the court,
lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a
lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts.

Florence Malcampo-Sin vs. Philipp Sin

G.R. No. 137590
March 26, 2001
Pardo, J.

FACTS:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and Philipp T. Sin got married in Manila after a two-year courtship. In 1994,
Florence filed for the nullity of their marriage. The trial court dismissed the petition on June 16, 1995.
Florence appealed, but on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision. Florence filed a
motion for reconsideration on June 23, 1998, which was denied on January 19, 1999.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecuting attorney took steps to prevent collusion between the parties . (NO)

HELD:
No. The prosecuting attorney did not take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and declaration
of nullity cannot be declared in absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates that, in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

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In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment.

It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e.,
dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured.
Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case not just
at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the manifestation filed with
the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at
any stage of the proceedings.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, while we upheld the validity of the marriage, we
nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as prematurely rendered since the investigating
prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.
Having so ruled, The court decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the
province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.

Natividad P. Navarro, et al. vs. Atty. Ivan Solidom, Jr.

A.C. No. 9872
January 28, 2014
Per Curiam

FACTS:
The respondent, a lawyer, entered into multiple financial transactions with complainants involving loans,
mortgage agreements, and legal services. The first case involved a property subject to a Voluntary Offer
to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform, where the lawyer, among other things, proposed a
case for quieting of title against a bank. The second case involved the registration of a property, and the
lawyer obtained a loan for his sugar trading business from one of the complainants. The lawyer failed to
fulfill various agreements, defaulted on loans, and issues checks that bounced. Complainants alleged
deception regarding the identity and value of mortgaged properties. The lawyer, in his defense, claimed
business difficulties due to a decrease in sugar prices. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found the lawyer guilty of various violations, including misrepresentation,
failure to pay loans, and improper financial dealings. The lawyer was also accused of practicing law while
under suspension, though evidence on this was inconclusive.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Solidum violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01.

HELD:
Yes. The Court DISBARS him from practice of law.

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With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest
rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan,
he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable.
It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for
₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to
the real value of the mortgaged property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued belonged to his son. In fact, respondent signed in
the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second
batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and
complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The
test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although
Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship.
However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established
that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan
from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her
another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional collateral but he failed to do so. Clearly, respondent is
guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his
client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and
Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs
knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the
validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose
name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will
show that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.

Adriano E. Dacanay vs. Baker & Meckenzie, et al.

Adm. Case No. 2131
May 10, 1985
Aquino, J.

FACTS:
In 1980, lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, who was admitted to the bar in 1954, filed a verified complaint
seeking to stop Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, an Illinois-based law firm. The basis for this complaint was a letter dated November 16, 1979,
written by respondent Vicente A. Torres on Baker & McKenzie letterhead, requesting the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to a client named H.E. Gabriel. Dacanay, in his response on
December 7, 1979, denied Clurman's liability to Gabriel and questioned the use of Baker & McKenzie's
letterhead by Torres. As he did not receive a reply, Dacanay filed the complaint to address the alleged
unauthorized practice of law and misuse of the law firm's letterhead.

18
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

HELD:
Yes. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities
around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the
firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes
a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.”. This
is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here. Wherefore, the
respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), et al. vs. The Ombudsman, et al.
G.R. No. 125440
January 31, 2000
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

FACTS:
In 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank declared GBTC insolvent, leading to the cessation of its
banking operations. A Liquidation Plan was approved, involving the purchase of assets and assumption
of liabilities by the Lucio Tan Group. A petition for assistance in GBTC's liquidation was filed in 1977 by
the Central Bank and its Liquidator with the Court of First Instance of Manila. In 1982, minority
stockholders intervened, alleging arbitrary and bad faith actions in the closure. The case was reassigned
to Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo, and subsequent pleadings were jointly signed by Agpalo
and the respondent on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the OSG violated RA 3019 for representing conflicting interest.

HELD:
No. ASG de Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In defending the
Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal duty to defend the interest of the Government and
was merely pursuing the position taken by it. Whatever legal services respondent ASG de Leon rendered
in favor of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in his official
capacity as a member of the legal staff of the OSG.

In defending the validity of the closure of GBTC, respondent ASG de Leon was merely acting in the
interest of the Central Bank, which is the client of OSG. It may be true that a successful defense of the
interest of the Central Bank in said case would also inure to the benefit of the Lucio Tan group. However,
such benefit would just be an incidental result. Certainly, it cannot be deemed as an act of causing undue
injury to a party by giving it unwarranted benefits or advantage.

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Atty. Oscar L. Embido vs. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr.
A.C. No. 6732
October 22, 2013
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
In 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya received a request from a UK Solicitor, Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, for a
copy of a court decision. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the decision had been falsified,
leading to an NBI investigation. Shirley Quioyo's brother, Dy Quioyo, claimed that the respondent
facilitated the falsification for a fee. The NBI recommended prosecuting the respondent for falsification
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and disbarment. The IBP found the respondent
guilty of serious misconduct, recommending a one-year suspension. The IBP Board of Governors
modified the recommendation, suspending the respondent for six years. Despite the respondent's
motion for reconsideration being denied, the Court treated his comment as an appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of
a sum of money.
HELD:
Yes. The respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified
decision are not persuasive. In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times
the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to
engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a
lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part.
Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby
became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

The Court thus found and pronounced Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and disbarred
him.

Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing vs. Atty. Wallen R. De Vera

A.C. No. 10451
February 4, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

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FACTS:
The complainants allege that Atty. De Vera mishandled their election protest case by filing falsified
affidavits, leading to a ruling of falsification by the court. Additionally, Atty. De Vera failed to appear at a
scheduled hearing without explanation. When confronted, he claimed hesitancy due to alleged judicial
favoritism and demanded an additional payment of ₱80,000 to secure a favorable decision. The
complainants lost trust in Atty. De Vera, asked him to withdraw as counsel, and sought reimbursement of
₱60,000 in excessive fees. Atty. De Vera denied the accusations, blaming his clients and asserting that he
withdrew from the case voluntarily. The complainants seek his disbarment. The case is pending before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline for review and recommendation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

HELD:
Yes. Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and
demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they
have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon
admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession. The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not
only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the
law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by
others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.

Here, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court, i.e., Almera’s affidavit,
before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of
Umaguing.

Dionnie Ricafort vs. Atty. Rene O. Medina

A.C. No. 5179
May 31, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
In October 1999, a tricycle driver filed a complaint alleging that he was sideswiped by Atty. Rene O.
Medina's car in Surigao City. Medina allegedly confronted and slapped the tricycle driver, causing
humiliation. The incident was reported by a traffic aide and the Mayor of Surigao del Norte. Medina
denied the slapping, claiming the tricycle driver's reckless driving caused a collision. Both parties agreed
to settle during barangay conciliation. Despite a settlement, the case reached the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, resulting in a recommendation for Medina's 30-day suspension from law practice for

21
misconduct. The Board of Governors approved the suspension, and Medina's motion for reconsideration
was later denied in 2014.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent may be held administratively liable for violating the Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
Yes. In administrative cases involving lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of
evidence. The courts presumes a lawyer to be innocent of the charges against him or her as he or she
enjoys that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath. Thus, it is the complainant who must
provide preponderance of evidence to overcome this presumption. In this case, the complainant had
successfully discharged this burden which is proven by the findings of the investigating commissioner
that the slapping incident actually occurred, the letter signed by the 19 mayors of Surigao del Norte also
reinforced the assertions, the affidavits made by the complainant and the traffic aide present were also
in great detail.

Since it was already proven by preponderance of evidence that the slapping occurred, it can be gleaned
from the acts of the respondents that he violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

In this case, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a
character that disregards the human dignity of another. Respondent’s question to complainant, “Wa ka
makaila sa ako?” (“Do you not know me?”) confirms such character and his potential to abuse the
profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.

22