Thayer Vietnam and The Philippines - Comparing Defence Cooperation
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Carlyle Alan ThayerThayer Vietnam and The Philippines - Comparing Defence Cooperation
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Carlyle Alan ThayerThayer Consultancy Background Brief
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Vietnam and the Philippines:
Comparing Defence Cooperation
August 8, 2024
We seek your assessment of last week’s announcement between India and Vietnam
boosting cooperation, and contrasting Vietnam’s approach in boosting security ties as
compared to the Philippines.
We seek your insights into the following issues:
Q1. Like the Philippines, Vietnam has also forged security ties with several countries
in the region and beyond. For example, over the weekend the Philippines and
Germany committed to signing a defence cooperation arrangement this year.
How would you contrast the approach taken by Vietnam and the Philippines that has
led to somewhat different results/expectations? As in, despite the slew of security
cooperation, there is still the sense that – unlike Vietnam – the Philippines’ relations
with China are far from calm and could easily spiral out of control.
ANSWER: The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States. The 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty has been revitalised by President Marcos Jr. President Marcos Jr.
Under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, President Marcos Jr. expanded
the number of bases to which the United states has temporary access from five to
nine. The United States and the Philippines also conduct a wide number of varied
military exercises including the annual Balikatan or Shoulder to Shoulder Exercise.
Vietnam has a Defence Policy of four no’s: no military alliances, no foreign military
bases, no joining one country against a third, and no use of force or threat to use force.
However, the 2019 Defence White Paper added a caveat “depending on
circumstances and specific conditions, Viet Nam will consider developing necessary,
appropriate defence and military relations with other countries…”
Both the Philippines and Vietnam have maritime disputes with China in the South
China Sea. President Marcos Jr. reversed the servile pro-China policy of his
predecessor, President Duterte, with strong assertions of Philippine sovereignty and
sovereign jurisdiction over features in the West Philippines Sea. Philippine resupply
missions to the beached naval ship BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal are the
focal point of tensions. The Philippines has adopted a policy of “assertive
transparency” to publicize Chinese harassment and intimidation in near real time.
The Philippine Navy and Philippine Coast Guard have begun conducting exercises in
the South Chia Sea with their counterparts, bilaterally, trilaterally and multilaterally.
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In contrast, since 2003, Vietnam has adopted a policy of “cooperation and struggle” in
its relations with all major powers, including China. In 2011, Vietnam and China signed
an Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea-related Issues. Their
disputes in the South China Sea are on the agenda when party leaders meet.
Vietnam refrains from deploying its navy to confront Chinese incursions into its
Exclusive Economic Zone. Vietnam sends out Coast Guard and civilian Maritime
Surveillance Force vessels to monitor Chinese activities. Vietnam tightly controls its
media coverage of incidents, preferring diplomatic channels instead.
Vietnam makes a distinction between military exercises (tập trận) and training
exercises (diễn tập). Vietnam does not conduct military exercises with foreign
countries because of their war-fighting connation.
Vietnam also only authorizes one naval visit to a military port per country each year.
A naval visit can include two or more ships. Cam Ranh International Port is classified
as a civilian facility and is distinct from the military port at Cam Ranh Bay.
Q2) What is the main difference between Vietnam and the Philippines in the
framework of their defence cooperation with foreign countries?
ANSWER: Vietnam structures its foreign relations into three categories: fourteen
comprehensive partners, nine strategic partners and seven comprehensive strategic
partners for a total of thirty. Agreements for each of these partnerships invariably
includes a clause on defence and security cooperation. These are non-binding defence
cooperation agreements that mainly focus on high-level visits, other exchanges,
training and specialised areas of mutual interest.
China, Russia, India, South Korea, United States, Japan and Australia are all
comprehensive strategic partners with Vietnam.
In 2021, Vietnam announced its most major program to modernize the Vietnam
People’s Army. Vietnam was expected to rely on the Russian Federation as its largest
supplier of big ticket military weapons, platforms and technology. This was put on hold
a year later due to the threat of western sanctions following Russia’s invasion of the
Ukraine. Vietnam has stated it will diversity its arms procurements but nothing major
has been announced.
The Philippines has adopted as more ad hoc approach. It has negotiated separate
defence cooperation agreements with Australia (2019), South Korea (2023), Japan
(2024) and Germany (2024).
In January 2024, the Philippines approved a major modernization of its armed forces
called Re-Horizon 3 that aims to spend US $35 billion over the next decade, including
an increase in defence expenditure of US $6.2 billion by 2029, focusing on maritime
and air defence.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam and the Philippines: Comparing
Defence Cooperation,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, August 8, 2024. All
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
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