African Identities

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Impacts of blood feud in Amhara National

Regional State, Ethiopia

Gubaye Assaye Alamineh, Abebe Dires Dinberu, Mohammed Seid Ali &
Kumilachew Siferaw Anteneh

To cite this article: Gubaye Assaye Alamineh, Abebe Dires Dinberu, Mohammed Seid Ali &
Kumilachew Siferaw Anteneh (2021): Impacts of blood feud in Amhara National Regional State,
Ethiopia, African Identities, DOI: 10.1080/14725843.2021.1876634

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AFRICAN IDENTITIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2021.1876634

ARTICLE

Impacts of blood feud in Amhara National Regional State,

Ethiopia
Gubaye Assaye Alamineh , Abebe Dires Dinberu, Mohammed Seid Ali
and Kumilachew Siferaw Anteneh
Faculty of Social Sciences, Bahir Dar University, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This article discusses the major impacts of blood feud in Amhara Received 24 August 2019
National Regional State (ANRS), northern Ethiopia. In-depth inter­ Accepted 21 October 2020
views, focus group discussions and document analysis were used to KEYWORDS
generate data. The findings revealed that blood feud has both Blood feud; impacts; Amhara
positive and negative impacts. The positive impact is its role in Region; northern Ethiopia
promoting and strengthening unity within the relatives of counter­
parts. Moreover, blood feud serves as an instrument of deterrence
for further killings and acts of revenges. On the same token, it
facilitates family integration and cohesion of the feuding parties
to ensure a common security defense. However, blood feud costs
human lives in addition to its huge psychological and financial
externalities upon concerned parties. It has also been resulting in
family disintegrations, migration and social vulnerabilities of groups
in the study areas.

Introduction
Blood feud across many societies is said to have existed as a self-governing practice
parallel to the state authority. Blood feud is a culturally embedded action of groups,
where individuals or groups take the law into their own hands (Ford & Blegen, 1992). The
effects of blood feud are so dynamic and long-lasting on the lives of individuals, groups
and the public at large having its own impacts on children, youth, men, and women.
Existing literature explains that the impacts of blood feuds are both positive and negative
(Amato & Monge, 1990; Kaufman, 2013; Newman & Lynch, 1987). The causes of blood feud
are so many that they range from apparently minor causes such as insults, lying, and
issues regarding the property to trafficking of persons, accidental killing, murder, and
conflicts over water rights (Roche, 2010; Sonne, 1982). Blood feud also commonly stems
from more acute economic factors such as land disputes, conflicts relating to water,
grazing, looting of properties, and inheritance. In most cases, blood feud results from
existing conflicts and homicides (Busataa, 2006; Bohem, 1987; Dennis, 1976). Killings in
connection with all types of conflicts can end in blood revenge. Killings resulting in blood
feuds occur more frequently in connection with some conflict categories than others. This
study tries to deal with the positive and negative impacts as well as the intensity of blood
feud in Amhara Region. Dealing with the negative impacts of blood feud seems more

CONTACT Gubaye Assaye Alamineh [email protected]

© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 G. A. ALAMINEH ET AL.

obvious yet complicated to put in objective terms. In addition to prolonged and inter­
mittent hostilities, the defining characteristic of blood feuds is that one person is pun­
ished for another’s transgressions based solely on their shared group membership. In
these kinds of feuds, every member of the contending clan may be supposed a suitable
target for vengeance, even though they played no contributing role in the original
transgression (Cushman et al., 2012; Savishinsky, 1972). The attitudes of the people
towards blood feuds are mixed. Some consider blood-revenge as an irrational act and
a character of an uncivilized society. Others describe it as both ‘rational and morally
justifiable in the face of injustice’ (Schumann and Ross, 2010b).
The negative impacts of blood feuds are so wide-ranging that individuals, groups,
villages, and states usually are victims in many ways. One of these is the long process of
litigation and settling revenge-loaded conflicts that cost money, time, and other
resources. Mostly, revenge might often motivate counter-revenge and prolonged feud.
As such, revenge seekers may rate the revenge as equitable, whereas transgressors may
rate it as excessive (Diamond, 1977; Patenaude, 1989; Schumann and Ross, 2010b).
This perception probably contributes to increasing cycles of revenge: transgressors
perceive revenge-seekers’ attempts to ‘get even’ as disproportionately severe and thus
deserving of counter-revenge (Schumann & Ross, 2010b; Caulk, 1984; Costanzo, 1997).
The first consequence of blood feuds is family isolation. A blood feud has an isolation
impact not only on males but also on women and children who are subject to home
confinement. The male members of a kinship who committed blood feud have to leave
the residence and locality for a certain period of time to avoid/escape from counter
retaliation. Such families are denied their rights not just to freedom of movement, but
also to education, childhood development, social security, and access to health care and
to vote (Kressel, 1996; Hyams, 2010; Meçe, 2017).
The highest death is the central result of blood feuds. Various death reports indicate
the brutality of blood feud across the world. A high number of imprisoned persons have
been reported in various societies as the result of it while migration and displacement are
also the other outcomes. Large numbers of families have been displaced by blood feuds
(Fletcher & Fletcher, 2003; Kressel, 1996; Torres, 2007).
On the other hand, studies have identified the personal and societal advantages of
blood feud. Evolutionary psychologists discovered that blood feud provides three adap­
tive functions (McCullough, 2008 as cited in Schumann & Ross, 2010b). These three
functions are described by Schumann & Ross as follows:

First, the mere possibility of revenge deters potential transgressors. Individuals with reputa­
tions for being vengeful are less likely to be victimized because the potential costs are high.
Second, if a transgression does occur, revenge deters further harm by penalizing wrongdoing.
Finally, revenge fosters cooperation by preventing individuals from taking advantage of the
work carried out by others (free riding). If our ancestors had been able to get away with free
riding, those who cooperated in joint efforts, such as hunting or defending the group, would
have been disadvantaged. Revenge deters free riding by removing any advantage free riders
might have gained. (p. 1195)

‘People’s use of blood feuds to restore justice is also put forwarded to be psychologically
rewarding. According to equity theory, individuals experience distress when they have
been treated unfairly. Blood feud reduces the victims’ stress by repairing equity with the
offender’ (Donnerstein & Hatfield, 1982 cited in Schummann & Ross, 2010b; Sonne, 1982).
 AFRICAN IDENTITIES 3

‘Blood feud can also assist to reinstate the balance of power between the victims and the
transgressors. By imposing injury, transgressors imply that their victims are unworthy of
respect. Through vengeance, victims can restore their self-worth by showing they are not
powerless’ (Frijda, 1994 cited in Schummann & Ross, 2010b; Otterbein & Otterbein, 1965).
Different studies affirmed that the possibility of revenge inhibits the use of monetary
and physical penalties. ‘Participants in an economic game fined their partner less when
they faced an 80% compared to a 20% chance of revenge’ (Ford & Blegen, 1992 as cited
in Schumann & Ross, 2010b). In another study, ‘individuals who had ostensibly been
insulted were provided with an opportunity to administer electric shocks to their
insulter. Participants were less punitive when they supposed that their insulter would
have the opportunity to seek revenge' (Diamond, 1977 as cited in Schumann & Ross,
2010b; Roche, 2010).
Generally, it is worth noting that theorists and researchers have given due attention to
the favorable aspects of revenge/feuds, in part, because they seek to explain why
apparently negative and disreputable behavior is so common. ‘As the mixed attitudes
toward revenge imply, however, revenge also has a dark side, not only for the revenge
recipient but also for the avenger’ (Schumann & Ross, 2010b; Içli, 1994).
A blood feud delimited, accomplished strife, commenced habitually in circumstances
where open battling is not endured. ‘Examples are inter- and intra-tribal retaliations in
simple societies and gang conflicts within modern, complex communities, such as cities
and within small states and regions such as in parts of the Middle East’ (Lanpher, 2010).
Modern political and nationalistic clashes share numerous of these characteristics. In
blood feud, the group aspect of enmity is unequivocal; resulting in acts of ‘self-sacrifice
and destruction’ that otherwise might not appear sound (Lanpher, 2010).
‘In small-scale societies, tally-keepers and goaders are frequently women. The
accountings, which are the most part open, take the form of lamentations, tallies, and
narrative stories that fuel humiliation and long-term hostility’ (Lanpher, 2010). Even
though deception frequently happens in the course of feud or vendetta, infrequently is
there complete mystery concerning the identities of people who are the cause of
harmful actions or insults. People recognize or suspect who is accountable, and parti­
cipants deliberate and express in terms of vengeance for injustices committed; that is,
in-kind punishment according to rules of honour: ‘an eye for an eye’ (Lanpher, 2010;
Otterbein & Otterbein, 1965).
In traditional societies, shaming and the removal of shame are pivotal to feud. The
concept of shame is usually related to ‘justice, demands of honour, duty of vengeance,
and the sweetness of revenge’. The significance of the first offenses reduces; every new
transgression turns into a fresh outrage in the thoughts of sufferers even after substantial
time has passed since the last exchange. In due course, third parties, habitually women
and other score attendants in traditional societies intensify and diminish the action in
such individuals recall memory. They recall of honor and dishonor. ‘Animosity and shame
can be inherited, lasting for generations’ (Sonne, 1982; Lanpher, 2010, p. 177).
The General objective of this study is to explore the impacts and intensity of blood feud
in the Amhara National Regional State in three successive regimes: the imperial period,
Dergue period, and the post-1991, i.e. the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) period. The study particularly aims to discuss the social, economic, and
cultural impacts of blood feud and examination of the magnitude of blood feud in ANRS
4 G. A. ALAMINEH ET AL.

across these periods. The scope of the study is confined to six districts, namely Dega
Damot (West Gojjam) Goncha Siso Enese (East Gojjam) Este (South Gondar), Werebabo
(South Wollo), and Merha Bete and MedaWoremo (North Shewa). These districts were
selected based on the intensity of blood feud.
Methodologically, an ethnographic approach was employed in order to make ‘a closer
examination of every day, an intimate knowledge of face to face communities and groups
of the study areas’ (Yelemtu, 2014). This approach provided us with a flexible environment
in terms of access to a range of information through a number of informants with
different backgrounds and statuses within the communities. This situation, coupled
with the extended period involved with the informants gradually builds our confidence
to talk about some cultural issues and relationships between blood feuds and other socio-
cultural issues (Eriksen, 2015; Gray, 2002; Hansen, 2020; Yelemtu, 2014).
Both primary and secondary sources of data were used for this research. The basic
primary data sources were acquired through interviews, focus group discussions, key
informant interviews, and informal conversations. ‘Though there is no absolute clear-cut
distinction in terms of different phases of fieldwork, the steps of getting to know
informants and contextualizing ourselves with different sets of local lifestyles in houses,
fields, and social events represent the first phase of fieldwork’ (Yelemtu, 2014). Then, we
started to participate in a range of socio-cultural activities and events which helped us to
understand peoples’ everyday life (Teryima & Abubakar, 2018; Yelemtu, 2014).
In ethnographic research design, the process of data analysis is started in the course of
data collection. During fieldwork, we summarized our field notes to describe and record
activities. Then, the field data were systematically analyzed to identify main themes and
issues using qualitative data analysis. The primary patterns of data were identified after
we reorganized semi-analyzed and summarized materials. The data coding and transcrip­
tion were done before we categorized them into key themes. This helped us to under­
stand the general form of the entire data. Then, the data were indexed based on the
predefined codes and sub-codes. Finally, ‘the complete set of reorganized and coded field
notes as well as summarized reports were re-read and the necessary sections highlighted
according to the emerging themes’ (Yelemtu, 2014).

Data analysis and presentation

The intensity of blood feuds across regimes
The intensity of blood feuds in the study sites varied across regimes. In Werebabo, for
example, ethnic-based blood feud had not been the same across the three consecutive
regimes of H/Sillassie, Dergue, and EPRDF. However, its magnitude had not been serious
during the imperial and Derge regimes. This had been basically because of the fact that
the discourse, as well as practices of politicization of ethnicity, had not been formulated
and implemented by the previous two regimes. Besides, the role of local and indigenous
actors, particularly of religious leaders, Abagar1 and Shimagile2 had been vocal to settle
feud across borders particularly during the imperial government.
However, blood feud has been intensified during the current EPRDF administration as
they have been aggravated by identity politics, boarder and resource-related factors.
More importantly, the politicization of ethnicity has been formulated and implemented
 AFRICAN IDENTITIES 5

by the existing government. As a result, the ideals and practices of regionalism based on
‘ethnicity’ have been aggravating ethnic-based blood feuds across border Kebeles
between Chifra and Werebabo. As an illustration, the intensifications of blood feud
along the border Kebeles between Werebabo and Chifra Wereda claimed around fifty
innocent civilians from both sides in the past two years.3 Moreover, priorities have been
given to formal actors such as regional and federal governments by disregarding the roles
of informal or grass root approaches to settle the vicious circle of blood feuds.
On the contrary, intra-ethnic blood feuds in Werebabo Wereda had been intensified
during the imperial and military administrations. It was primarily because of the fact that
Welmaye Chewata,4 which had been the predominant cause of blood feud. It had been
widely practiced along with the rural central and eastern communities of Werebabo.
However, it has been diminishing through time particularly after the introduction of
Welmaye Chewata as a ‘harmful traditional practice’ by the current political administra­
tion. With the exceptions of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic blood feuds, which were visible
in Werebabo Woreda, the intensity of interpersonal blood feud has been similar across the
other study sites. It has been growing with its increasingly diverse natures and causes
from imperial through military regimes up to the current EPRDF administration.
In terms of its rural-town distribution, blood feud at the interpersonal level had been
intensified at rural Kebeles during the imperial and military administrations across all
study sites. This had been predominantly because communities had apparently been
more obsessed and deeply loyal with the tradition of blood feuds. Besides, rural areas
have been sufficient and conducive to hide and accommodate bandits/’shiftas’ since
some of the localities had been beyond the reach of effective government control.
However, the prevalence of blood feud spread from rural to towns of the Woredas in
the past recent years. This has been because of the fact that towns have been character­
ized by increasing diversity of causes as well as natures of blood feuds (alcoholism,
adultery, maladministration, urban land, and inheritance5). As a result, the intensity and
distributions of blood feuds have recently been shifted from the countryside to towns. In
general, though the causes that intensify blood feud vary across regimes, feuding in the
study sites is still at its alarming rate.

Impacts of blood feud

The impact of blood feuds can be seen in two ways. In one way, it has an implication in
promoting and strengthening unity within the feuding parties. For instance, an inter-
ethnic blood feud among Amhara and Afar communities appears to promote social
cohesion. That is, it is an instrument of mobilization of an ethnic group as a single unit
to achieve their common security. Besides, it has been an instrument of deterrence. Intra-
ethnic/-group related blood feud conflicts could also be viewed as both constructive and
destructive. In addition, in Werebabo, for example, Welmaye Chewata motivated feuds
had contributed a lot to strengthen the sense of fraternity, heroism, pride, brotherhood as
social cohesions among young men. Moreover, it had been an instrument to promote the
dignity and respect of women, particularly young girls. This had in turn been contributing
to the morally grounded and intimate gender relationships.
In interpersonal conflict, the vicious circle of blood feud could not easily be stopped
once it has started by any individual members of the family regardless of its costs. Such an
6 G. A. ALAMINEH ET AL.

informed preexisting knowledge of individuals about the predominantly destructive

impacts of blood feud has a lot of lessons to individual members of the community to
refrain from directly or indirectly engage in any blood feud. Meaning, it has been an
instrument of deterrence. Besides, once blood feuds occur, all members of the family
including nearby relatives could not be indifferent so much so that they are morally,
culturally, and socially bound to suffer the consequences. This, in turn, creates and
develops strong intimacy among family members and becomes an instrument of family
cohesion.
On the contrary, blood feuds have been affecting the communities in various ways.
Needless to say, feuding has been costing human lives in addition to material destruc­
tions. This has resulted in huge psychological and financial pressures upon concerned
parties. Moreover, in recent times, it has been aggravating inter-ethnic tensions and
political instability which could have a huge implication at the national level. It has also
been resulting in family disintegrations, migration, and social as well as economic vulner­
abilities of groups which have been the main sources of poverty, psychological, moral,
and social alienations.
According to key informants and focus group discussants, blood feuds have three
general impacts across regimes: economic, psycho-social, and political. These three
impacts are separately discussed in the following sections.
One of the enduring impacts of blood feud is economic. Migration, family disintegra­
tion, loss of property, school dropout and increasing dependency are some of the
economic impacts of blood feud. Migration can be seen as both an impact and
a solution to blood feud. According to the data obtained from FGD, the victims consider
it as revenge if the killer’s family prefers to leave their locality and migrate to another area.
In other words, feuding parties are forbidden to live in the same village. When a blood
feud has been declared, most of the time the offender and his entire family must move
away. Similar to other Woredas, the case in Werebabo can be the best example of this. As
the informant6 disclosed:

The cause of the interpersonal dispute between X and Y had been the wife of the former.
Accordingly, Y had been widely suspected of having an affair with the wife of X through his
reckless act of adultery. As a remedy, the informant (X) had been communicating the adultery
act of Y to concerned families and brothers of the latter. As he (X) revealed, however, Y had
not been willing to refrain himself from his action of disrespecting the marriage of
X. Ultimately, in 30 September 1970, the informant (X) deliberately inflicted homicide against
Y and left his home and his residence 20 kms away with his families and relatives to avoid
blood feud. As a result, the Abagar and Shimagile initiated and concluded the arbitration four
months after the death of the victim even without paying Guma (compensation to be paid to
families of the victims) since families of the victims did not want it but the arbitration.
One year after the act of homicide, the informant returned to his home. During his
one year’s displacement, his family had been disintegrated while his land had not been
ploughed. What is more, his cattle had been temporarily possessed under different relatives
far from his residence; his house had also been closed, and he had been living with the fear of
blood feud.

The above case clearly shows that blood feud causes migration and the migration, in turn,
will lead to family disintegration and loss of property. As noted above, when a blood feud
is declared, the offender and his family are expected to move away without getting
enough time to collect their property. Therefore, the family of the victim usually destroys
 AFRICAN IDENTITIES 7

the offender’s property as revenge. The case7 in Dekulkana Kebele, Dega Damot, can be
an additional example of this.

A horse grazed the crops of a man. The owner of the crops beat the horse repeatedly. Due to
this, the owner of the horse and his wife killed the man. Both persons were detained by the
government. Other relatives of the offender left their locality in fear of counter killings. Taking
this as an advantage, the relatives of the victim sold the properties of those persons who were
imprisoned.

In some cases, however, the offender’s family may not migrate to another area. As our
key informant in Dega Damot stated, ‘the offender may not leave his locality if he has
many relatives who are capable of defending him.’ However, this rarely happens in all
the study sites.
Another economic impact of blood feud is school dropout. Since blood feud causes
family disintegration and migration, children do not have the opportunity to attend their
education. Thus, they leave their school and engage in labour exploitative types of work
to survive. The families who belong to transgressors’ family face movement constraints to
minimize their liability to blood feud. In addition, blood feud also increases dependency.
As the majority of the working force engages in blood feud, it results in imprisonment and
displacement. As a result, children and the elderly remain in their localities which creates
high dependence on the relatives in particular and on the country in general.
The second major burden of blood feud is psycho-social impacts. Because of blood
feud, children, and young adults will be trapped in cycles of violence, hate, and isolation.
Hence, large numbers of children and young adults lose their fathers and relatives.
Accordingly, the loss of the main breadwinner of the family increases family’s impover­
ishment. The problem can be aggravated because other young male adults who are alive
cannot go out to work due to fear of revenge. Confinements of children at home due to
life insecurity concerns develop fear, hate and a sense of violence in the minds of children.
Consequently, they are usually motivated to use guns and protect themselves, and in the
long run to take revenge.
The political impact also had a bearing on the lives of people and groups leading to
uncertainties and state poor control over people. In recent times, blood feud causes
political instability and mutual mistrust. For instance, an inter-ethnic blood feud in
Werebabo has been aggravating inter-ethnic tension, the radicalization of ethnic nation­
alism, and political instability. Consequently, the government’s duty to ensure the security
and property rights of citizens as foundations of state–society relation has been seriously
breached. For instance, there were inter-ethnic feuds along the border Kebeles between
Werebabo and Chifra Wereda in 2017 G.C. It costs both property, and human life. This is
a huge implication for the failure of the government administration in the study area.

Concluding remarks
The impact of blood feuds can be seen in two ways. In one way, it is found to imply
promoting and strengthening unity within the feuding parties. The first importance of
blood feud is its use as an instrument of deterrence. Besides, it facilitates family integrity
and cohesion within the feuding members to ensure a common security defense. On the
contrary, blood feud has been costing human lives in addition to its huge psychological
8 G. A. ALAMINEH ET AL.

and financial externalities upon concerned parties. It has also been resulting in family
disintegrations, migration, and social vulnerability of groups.
Our findings conform to some of the theories in the fields of blood feud. For instance, it
goes parallel with theories of evolutionary psychologists, functionalists, and honor-shame
complex theories. As evolutionary psychologists argue, ‘the only possibility of revenge/
blood feud hinders potential transgressors. Persons with reputations for being revengeful
are less likely to be victimized because the potential costs are high. If wrongdoing does
occur, blood feud deters further harm by punishing wrongdoing’ (Schumann & Ross,
2010b). This was also proved in most of our study sites.
In addition, our findings also chime very well with Durkheim’s functionalist theory of
blood feud. For Durkheim, blood feud is primarily one of the many passionate manifesta­
tions of personal bonding between members of a society who are interconnected with
each other. He argued that ‘blood feud is a mechanism that serves to keep violence from
spreading into society as it limits its use to the conflicting parties alone, and it is a way to
maintain social equilibrium in societies’ (Durkheim,1893as cited in Grutzpalk, 2002). This
was also evident in our findings such that blood feuds strengthen the personal bondages
of individuals with a sense of collective responsibility.
Furthermore, the concept of blood feud in our study sites is also related to the honor-
shame complex theory. It might be theorized that those who take revenge in a blood feud
do so to repair a situation that has been damaged by others. Hence, blood feud shows
itself to be a ‘sacred duty’ of groups towards members who have been harmed or even
killed by members of another group (Corso & Istituto Giovanni Trecciani, 1930; Pitt-Rivers,
1966). The social bondage that leads to the duty of blood vengeance is based on blood
ties. In short, according to Corso and Istituto Giovanni Trecciani (1930), blood feud leads
to social cohesion. The order thus attributed to violence is of course extremely weak, but it
must be recognized that the basic and primitive idea of blood feud is order and not
chaotic violence. However, our finding shows blood feud is not only accepted as a means
to the social restriction of violence, but it could also be taken as a factor in the continua­
tion of violence. Therefore, as the impacts of blood feud are complex and multifaceted
phenomena, one can thus understand them fully only by adopting an integrated per­
spective in which all approaches to blood feud must be taken into account.
To sum up, policy intervention in identifying the root causes of blood feud and taking
corresponding remedial measures to prevent it is important. Appropriate interventions in
terms of awareness creation through training and education about the negative eco­
nomic, socio-cultural and psychological impacts should be provided to the public.

Notes
1. A spiritual and community leader, who is the head of reconciliation committee which is
common in Werebabo Study Site.
2. A third party who acts as an intermediate between the disputants in study sites other than
Werebabo.
3. Data Obtained from Key informant interviews and FGDs in Worebabo Woreda, 2017.
4. Welmaye chewata had been a cultural ceremony among groups of unmarried young boys
and girls, which initiates young men to verbally, morally and physically compete for each
other over those selected girls singing around. Those young boys winning the fights could be
entitled to be Yekenfer Wedaj (literally mean boyfriend) of the most beautiful girls from those
 AFRICAN IDENTITIES 9

members of girls singing around. As such, it had been a real test for young men as an
expression of social pride and recognition in the perceptions of the community, particularly
of young girls. Thus, this competition among groups of young men to maintain their social
status had been one of the main causes of blood feud.
5. In Ethiopian political economy, land has been the most dominant source of wealth. The
overall urban land administration and tenure system, especially the inheritance law has not
been transparent, efficient and effective. As a result, such normative and administrative fault
lines aggravates blood feud.
6. Key Informant Interview, 20 October 2017 conducted at Werebabo Woreda.
7. Key Informant Interview, 15 July 2017 conducted at Dekulkana Kebele, Dega Damot Woreda.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors
Gubaye Assaye Alamineh is a lecturer of social anthropology at Bahir Dar University. He has more
than fourteen years of experience in teaching, research, project coordination and community
services at different public universities in Ethiopia. His research interests are conflict, tourism,
peace and development issues.
Abebe Dires Dinberu is an assistant professor of history and heritage management at Bahir Dar
University. His research interests include; social history, cultural heritage studies, museum and
tourism resources areas.
Mohammed Seid Ali is an assistant professor of political science and international studies at Bahir
Dar University, Ethiopia. He is also a presidential scholar at the University of Michigan, African
Studies Centre. His main research interests are political economy, human rights, and development,
governance, and peace and security issues.
Kumilachew Siferaw Anteneh is an assistant professor of social anthropology at Bahir Dar University.
He is currently working as Internal Projects Coordinator of the University. He has more than nine
years of experience in research and teaching. His research interests are conflict, migration, gender
and development.

ORCID
Gubaye Assaye Alamineh http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9394-4611

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