Constitutional Law II - Midterms Tablarin vs.

Judge Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)

Professor: Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido
Complied by: Ricardo Gamez The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs — in a
word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public
Doctrine of Preferred Freedom order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which
no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc,. 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a Such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process.
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
dubious intrusions." explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there
appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and
the legislative attempt at correction.

POLICE POWER
Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
Balacuit vs. CFI, GR No. L-38429, June 30, 1988
The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute
Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police stand sustaining police power legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such
power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be an Ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that character is deserving of the fullest
regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the
the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive weight of its support to measures that can be characterized as falling within that aspect of the
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A police power. Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. There is a misapprehension as to what was decided
with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, by this Court. That was a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on
control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely regulated the
exercise by the citizens of their property rights. mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices which
could encourage vice and immorality. This is an entirely different case. What was involved is
a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel

1
Operators Association, Inc. decision that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity, it transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and
was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a requirement if a statute were equal protection of laws
void on its face. That it certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious
and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.

Administrative Rules and Regulations

Tano vs. Socrates, GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997 Bautista vs. Juinio, GR No. L-50908, January 31, 1984

Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the
alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded
specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore,
and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold
of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be, to paraphrase another leading
sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance." which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.'

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, GR No. 118127, April 12, 2005 Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, GR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982

The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It
Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its
virtuous aims, the enactment of thewas enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police
power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
Ordinance not even under the guise of police power.has no statutory or constitutional
authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit
the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their

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Mirasol vs. DPWH, GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 Recovery of Expropriated Land

Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies to support its use. Indeed, ATO vs. Gopuco, GR No. 158563, June 30, 2005
no requirement exists that the exercise of police power must first be conclusively justified by
research. The yardstick has always been simply whether the government’s act is reasonable When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
and not oppressive. The use of "reason" in this sense is simply meant to guard against exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
arbitrary and capricious government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without
desirable, may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no government will be able to any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. (Fort
act in situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be tied up Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.)
conducting studies.
Eminent domain is generally described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation,
an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to
Sps. Yusay vs. CA, GR No. 156684, April 6, 2011 exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather
than to grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part
the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. In fact,
made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the "all separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit
owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent
as necessitating the taking of private land intended for public use, and the interest of the domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the
affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State aggregate body of people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the
decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it."
limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just
compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given
their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement
on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available. Mactan-Cebu IAA vs. Heirs of Mercado, GR No. 176625

Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file
property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
eminent domain. property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.

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In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking
consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject appropriate court action or by legislation.
to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 expropriating the
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of this Court was
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del
required factual justification. Pan Streets.

The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary
had disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated.
Genuine Necessity Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been completed.
Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only
De Knecht vs. Bautista, 100 SCRA 660, October 30, 1980 the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area.

There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property The Court finds justification in proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings through the
for public use upon the payment of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets from ESDA to Roxas Boulevard due to the aforestated
of the Philippines provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just supervening events after the rendition of the decision of this Court in De Knecht.
compensation." It is recognized, however, that the government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily' choose what private property should be taken. B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of
this Court. And the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case
pending before it on the ground of the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340.

Republic vs. De Knecht, GR No. 87351, February 12, 1990 Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in
thereafter (over two years later in this case) making its own independent assessment of the
There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980 in De Knecht circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the
vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the "choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this
streets as the line through which the EDSA should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the
arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval." It is based on the recommendation of the anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative flat.
Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the extension
will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly
motels.

While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the
case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in the
Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the

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POWER OF TAXATION Therefore, contrary to the import of respondent judge's decision, the Collector of Customs
was not precluded by law or legal principle from assuming jurisdiction over the subject goods.
CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1998) No legal infirmity attended the seizure and forfeiture proceedings over the subject goods.

The Solicitor General is correct when he says that the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the
validity of the claimed deduction. In the present case, however, we find that the onus has
been discharged satisfactorily. The private respondent has proved that the payment of the Tax Exemptions
fees was necessary and reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in
inducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise and YMCA vs. CIR, 33 Phil. 217 (1916)
involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of pesos. This was no mean feat and
should be, as it was, sufficiently recompensed.
Under a statue providing that all lands, buildings and improvements actually and directly
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes, and not for profit, shall exempt from
It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes, the government taxation:
would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the
natural reluctance to surrender part of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities,
every person who is able to must contribute his share in the running of the government. The Court ruled that while it may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house
government for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits and maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not constitute business in the
intended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values. This ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution used exclusively for religious, charitable
symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that and educational purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.Held: That
it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.

Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927)

Commissioner of Customs vs. Makasiar, 177 SCRA 27 (1989)
The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c]
On the other hand, since the Collector of Customs herein had actual possession and control Administrative Code) refers to the home of the parties who presides over the church and who
over the subject goods, his jurisdiction over the goods was secured for the purpose of has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. In therefore must, in the sense,
instituting seizure and forfeiture proceedings to determine whether or not the same were include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground
imported into the country contrary to law [See Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities where the density of the
1968, 22 SCRA 857]. This is consistent with the principle that the basic operative fact for the population and the development of commerce require the use of larger tracts of land for
institution and perfection of proceedings in rem like the seizure and forfeiture proceedings buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, it use is
pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code, is the actual or constructive possession of limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes under the exemption.lawphi1.net
the res by the tribunal empowered by law to conduct the proceedings [See Dodge v. US, 71
L. ed. 392 (1926); US v. Mack, 79 L. ed. 1559 (1935) citing The Ann, 3 L. ed. 734 (1815); In regard to the lot which formerly was the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such,
Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F. 2d 715 (1951) citing Strong v. US, 46 F. 2d 257, 79 neither is it used for commercial purposes and, according to the evidence, is now being used
ALR 150 (1931)]. as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities, which constitutes an
incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within the exemption.

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Abra Valley College vs. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988) DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school Substantive Due Process
building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of
the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao, 39 Phil. 660, (1919)
the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is
used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
school involved. degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not
been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
law, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957)
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such
right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that Void for Vagueness/Over Breadth
there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. Ople vs. Torres, 292 SCRA 141 (1998)
297).
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O.
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this
No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No.
cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O.
No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger.

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Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560 Nov 19, 2001 Publication Requirement

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and effectivity” would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms Code for its proper dissemination.
without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is
no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be Impartial Court or Tribunal
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Tanada vs. PAEC, 141 SCRA 307 (1986)
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at Respondent PAEC Commissioners cannot escape responsibility for these official pamphlets.
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Exhibit "JJ" was published in 1985, when respondent Commissioners had already been
The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not appointed to their present positions. Exhibits "KK" and "LL" were issued earlier, but the
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of majority of respondent Commissioners even then were already occupying positions of
protected freedoms." responsibility in the PAEC.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad At any rate, even if it be assumed that there are some doubts regarding the conclusion that
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen there has been a prejudgment of the safety of PNPP-1 the doubts should be resolved in favor
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as of a course of action that will assure an unquestionably objective inquiry, considering the
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all circumstances thereof and the number of people vitally interested therein.
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC Commissioners would be
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize
the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances such an important inquiry.
left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

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Prejudicial Publicity Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995)

Sheppard vs. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) We recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et
The massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity attending petitioner's prosecution prevented al. vs. Alejandro, et al. we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
him from receiving a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
Amendment. might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will
prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
(a) Though freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the fair
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
and orderly administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose of
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an
adjudicating controversies according to legal procedures based on evidence received only in
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in
open court.
criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded
by the klieg lights of publicity.
(b) Identifiable prejudice to the accused need not be shown if, as in Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S.
532, and even more so in this case, the totality of the circumstances raises the probability of
prejudice.
People vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 121039, October 18, 2001
(c) The trial court failed to invoke procedures which would have guaranteed petitioner a fair
trial, such as adopting stricter rules for use of the courtroom by newsmen as petitioner's
counsel requested, limiting their number, and more closely supervising their courtroom This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez,
conduct. The court should also have insulated the witnesses; controlled the release of leads, having failed, in his motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the
information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and counsel; proscribed part of the trial judge. Not only that, accused-appellant’s case has been exhaustively and
extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, witness, party, or court official divulging prejudicial painstakingly reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown by an
matters, and requested the appropriate city and county officials to regulate release of iota of proof that the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity
information by their employees. in affirming the sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. The charge of conviction by
publicity leveled by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand on.

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Administrative Due Process Alcuaz vs. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (1988)

Montemayor vs. Araneta University Foundation, 77 SCRA 321 (1977) It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one
semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that
To paraphrase Webster, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. As far semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for
back as 1915, the American Association of University Professors adopted the principle that college teachers are for "one semester." It is thus evident that after the close of the first
"every university or college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with
the charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is
charges before a special or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the
large. At such trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to present contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456,
evidence." Thus the phrase, academic due process, hag gained currency, Joughin referred to February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of
it as a system of procedure designed to yield the beat possible judgment when an adverse Appeals, 100 SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to
decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students
fair way of reaching a conclusion. and teachers.

Non vs. Hon. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 30, 1990

Ateneo vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100 (1986) There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping
charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of
incident, then begged to be excused so he could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan
the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
side; the investigating board acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Moreover, the
due process were met.
penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.

Due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence

Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to education, and there
presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial
is such denial when students are expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their
Relations, 136 SCRA 112).
right to free speech and peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without
abiding with the requirements of due process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders to
let loose extremely critical and, at times, vitriolic language against school authorities during a
student rally. But the right of students is no license and not without limit.

9
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Public Policy

Sexual Discrimination Central Bank Employees Assoc. vs. BSP, G.R. No. 148208, Dec. 15, 2004

Phil. Assoc. of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988) Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well- classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity belonging to the same class.
of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG
law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in
of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate
female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between
the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the
legislative sense.
Administration of Justice
PJA vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993)
People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a
valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal
against Defendant-Appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
said Defendants, as means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; chan differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons
and robberies; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the maximum penalty imposable under such ISAE vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with Public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and
accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said Defendant may be allowed bail. laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

10
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Rutter vs. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953) Examination of Witnesses

But the ruling in the Blaisdell case has its limitations which should not be overlooked in the Passion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil 68 (1938)
determination of the extent to be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon the
enforcement of a monetary obligation. It must be noted that the application of the reserved Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a
power of the State to protect the integrity of the government and the security of the people search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
should be limited to its proper bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose. If must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in
these bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of the power, for the the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts would assert itself. We can cite
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
instances by which these bounds may be transgressed. (1) The impairment should only refer
to the remedy and not to a substantive right. The State may postpone the enforcement of the particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile. Another limitation refers to the
propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the alteration or change that the new In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself
legislation desires to write into an existing contract must not be burdened with restrictions and but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent
conditions that would make the remedy hardly pursuing. (2) The protective power of the Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and
State, the police power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in his witnesses, if any.
nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe
the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts. (3) "A different situation is It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She
presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow . . . The could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was
changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed in combination, with the served upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable
cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they are seen to be an oppressive
and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person
collateral security. (4) The decision in the Blaisdell case is predicated on the ground that the whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
laws altering existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the
Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
enactment. courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to
a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law.

11
Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (1937) Particularity of Description

Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1989)
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended. In the case at
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be
When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military
cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio
more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the
therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search
of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms
at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 338 (1984)

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
Before issuing a search warrant, the examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the person includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. Mere affidavits of the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive
or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to
the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the
law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on
the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and
void for being too general.

12
PICOP vs. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999) Warrantless Searches

Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, Valid Waiver
viz.: “xxx. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to People vs. Ramos, GR No. 85401-02, June 4, 1990
be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and
what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, The value of the marijuana is not the primary consideration in the concealment of the
the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It
contraband. The primary consideration is escaping detection and arrest. Obviously, the
[was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in
the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the modus operandi was to dissimulate the act of selling and possession of marijuana sticks
warrant — [was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had which carries the capital penalty (sic). Appellant could not display it among her regular wares
demarcated in the supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a of cigarettes and fruits for sale. She had to hide them from public view, but near enough to
search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, have access to them. The trash can, to her thinking, would be the last place to look for the
or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, precious commodity. Unfortunately, she was found out. The argument that it was an 'unlikely
following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment place' to hide the precious contraband is in fact the very consideration in choosing it as the
units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
hiding place for the contraband. We rule, therefore, that the twenty sticks of marijuana are
admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that the appellant is guilty of possession is
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of correct.
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well
as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994)
open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of
conducting the search. such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt.
Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan either that the appellant was a law violator or the
contents of the box were instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal
offense. The carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people, especially
those coming from the rural areas since such boxes constitute the most economical kind of
luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not received any information or "tip-
off" from an informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers before or during
the trial. The police officers also did not contend that they had detected the odor of dried
marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and
taking a seat during the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned
the carton box later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The testimony of the

13
law enforcement officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975)
S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando
Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable cause. Although petitioner Velasco was not inside the hotel room, respondent Reynolds, after
identifying himself as a police officer and after explaining his purpose, was allowed to enter
A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful the room by Mrs. Tomas Velasco who subsequently volunteered to open the suitcases and
warrantless search or arrest is personal and may not be invoked by the accused's counsel baggages of petitioner Velasco and delivered the documents and things contained therein to
during trial, it is relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time respondent Reynolds; ... The said police team did not search the room; neither did the
when objections to admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at bar, a timely members thereof forcibly open the luggages and boxes nor seized and confiscated the
objection was made by appellant Barros. Finally, the accused's silence during the warrantless documents and things contained therein, since that was not necessary because ... Mrs.
search should not be lightly taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as Tomas Velasco voluntarily opened the baggages and suitcases and gave their contents of
explained by the Court in Burgos, and as pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration documents and things to respondent Reynolds.
of regard for the supremacy of the law."
It does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot be stigmatized as
unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent be shown. Such a view is
implicit in People v. Malasugui. For this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal
People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457 (1992) right which may be waived either expressly or impliedly.

The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In Plain View Doctrine
the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise
immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities'
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to
search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
conducted by the authorities was illegal. comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the
following limitations on the application of the doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece

14
of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities
justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is
against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the
have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as
they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's
seat. Thus it has been held that:
Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal
offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
valid, are as follows: duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the
taking of the, corpus delicti.
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence , Objects whose possessions are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain
view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:

(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
Stop and Frisk
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had
committed a criminal activity. reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was
necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true
facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his
4. consented warrantless search, and
search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each
case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We merely hold today
5. customs search. that, where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where, in the course of
investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable

15
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken. contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . .

Rebellion as Continuing Offense Committed in the Presence of Police Officers

Umil vs. Ramos, GR 81567, July 9, 1990 People vs. Luisito Go, GR No. 116001, March 14, 2001

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The
an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-
Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense appellant could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or
when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As
stated by the Court in an earlier case: under the Rules.

From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested
illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein
detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing
them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant
is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious

16
People vs. Rancho, GR No. 186529 (2010) Personal Knowledge of the Offense

What prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)
by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest. without a warrant, arrest a person:

This is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item "(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, or is attempting to commit an offense;"
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding." "(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his
right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected
trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor,
arrest. Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others
had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions
did.

People vs. Cubcubin, GR No. 136267, July 10, 2001

In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was
killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the
crime. We hold that there was none. The two did not have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty
was based entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the
PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and
reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an

17
alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Validity of Conviction
Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim
was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of People vs. Conde, GR No. 113269, April 10, 2001
brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical
Appellants were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were not committing any
description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant, alias Jun Dulce and who said he
crime. Neither can it be said that the crime had just been committed. Five days had already
knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them to accused-appellants
passed from the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said that the arresting
house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them
officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge. PO3 Sevillano admitted that they
by others.
learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain unnamed informants. The third
circumstance is patently not present. The lapse of five days gave the police more than
enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest.
Time of Arrest Clearly, appellants' rights provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution were violated.

People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992) The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if
We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In disposing of illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of
this case, however, we feel that the issues raised by appellant should properly be the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the
discussed seriatim. guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante
delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling
marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.

In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet
this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged
consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of CIC
Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is
decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated
purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without
having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by
an agent of the law.

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 Briccio Polo vs. David, GR No. 181881 (2011)

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDECE Any private use of a government property, like a government-owned computer, is prohibited
by the law. Consequently, a government employee cannot expect any privacy when he uses
Alejano vs. Cabuay, GR No. 160792, August 25, 2005 a government-owned computer because he knows he cannot use the computer for any
private purpose. The CSC regulation declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail government-owned computers logically follows from the statutory rule that government-
poses a genuine threat to jail security.Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an owned property shall be used “solely” for public purpose.
envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible
[
inspection by jail officials. A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his
incoming mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection
such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the Privileged Communications
contents without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of
privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
detainees letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
contraband. [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters proceeding."
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees.
- Fortis Fortuna Adiuvat -

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