This extract is taken from R. Kuppusamy v.

State, (2013) 3 SCC 322 : (2013) 3

SCC (Cri) 151 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 167 at page 326
9. In Gura Singh case [(2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] a two-
Judge Bench of this Court was also dealing with an extra-judicial
confession and the question whether the same could be made a basis for
recording the conviction against the accused. This Court held that despite
the inherent weakness of an extra-judicial confession as a piece of
evidence, the same cannot be ignored if it is otherwise shown to be
voluntary and truthful. This Court also held that extra-judicial confession
cannot always be termed as tainted evidence and that corroboration of
such evidence is required only as a measure of abundant caution. If the
court found the witness to whom confession was made to be trustworthy
and that the confession was true and voluntary, a conviction can be
founded on such evidence alone. More importantly, the Court declared
that courts cannot start with the presumption that extra-judicial
confession is always suspect or a weak type of evidence but it would
depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession
is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak about such a
confession and whether the confession is voluntary and truthful.

This extract is taken from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,

(1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 at page 185
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following
conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said
to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances
concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not
only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and
“must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC
(Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC
para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not
merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
be proved, and
 (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability
the act must have been done by the accused.

This extract is taken from Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 452 :
1977 SCC (Cri) 614 at page 459
10. Thus taking an over-all view of the picture presented by the
prosecution case we find that there is sufficient evidence against the
accused to prove the charge of murder against them. The evidence of the
eyewitnesses is fully corroborated by the medical evidence, the evidence
of the recoveries, the evidence of the Ballistic Expert and the evidence of
PW Balbir Singh who deposed regarding the extra judicial confession
made by the accused Piara Singh. The learned Sessions Judge regarded
the extra judicial confession to be a very weak type of evidence and
therefore refused to rely on the same. Here the learned Sessions Judge
committed a clear error of law. Law does not require that the evidence of
an extra judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. In the
instant case, the extra judicial confession was proved by an independent
witness who was a responsible officer and who bore no animus against the
appellants. There was hardly any justification for the Sessions Judge to
disbelieve the evidence of Balbir Singh particularly when the extra judicial
confession was corroborated by the recovery of an empty from the place
of occurrence.
This extract is taken from Ram Lal v. State of H.P., (2019) 17 SCC 411 : (2020)
3 SCC (Cri) 362 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1730 at page 416
13. Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the court
must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by
other prosecution evidence. In order to accept extra-judicial confession, it
must be voluntary and must inspire confidence. If the court is satisfied
that the extra-judicial confession is voluntary, it can be acted upon to
base the conviction. Considering the admissibility and evidentiary value of
extra-judicial confession, after referring to various judgments,
in Sahadevan v. State of T.N. [Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC
403 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 146] , this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 410-11,
paras 15.1, 15.4 & 15.6)
“15.1. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Balwinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 59]
this Court stated the principle that : (SCC p. 265, para 10)
‘10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a
weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal
of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is
 surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes
doubtful and it loses its importance.’
***
15.4. While explaining the dimensions of the principles governing
the admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession,
this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram [State of Rajasthan v. Raja
Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1965] stated the principle that
: (SCC p. 192, para 19)
‘19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made
in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The
confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of
the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends
upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made.’
The Court further expressed the view that : (SCC p. 192, para 19)
‘19. … Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be
founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the
mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely
inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out
which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an
untruthful statement to the accused….’
***
15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the
Court in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan [Sansar Chand v. State of
Rajasthan, (2010) 10 SCC 604 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 79] held that : (SCC
p. 611, para 29)
‘29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession
can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-
judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material.
[Vide Thimma & Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore [Thimma &
Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, (1970) 2 SCC 105 : 1970 SCC (Cri)
320] , Mulk Raj v. State of U.P. [Mulk Raj v. State of U.P., AIR 1959
SC 902 : 1959 Cri LJ 1219] , Sivakumar v. State [Sivakumar v. State,
(2006) 1 SCC 714 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 470 (SCC paras 40 and 41 :
AIR paras 41 and 42)] , Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of
Maharashtra [Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 262 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1320]
 and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B. [Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B.,
(2008) 15 SCC 449 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1082] ]’ ”
This extract is taken from Ram Lal v. State of H.P., (2019) 17 SCC 411 : (2020)
3 SCC (Cri) 362 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1730 at page 417
14. It is well settled that conviction can be based on a voluntary
confession but the rule of prudence requires that wherever possible it
should be corroborated by independent evidence. Extra-judicial confession
of the accused need not in all cases be corroborated. In Madan Gopal
Kakkad v. Naval Dubey [Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3
SCC 204 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 598] , this Court after referring to Piara
Singh v. State of Punjab [Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC
452 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 614] held that the law does not require that the
evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be
corroborated. The rule of prudence does not require that each and every
circumstance mentioned in the confession must be separately and
independently corroborated.
This extract is taken from Ram Lal v. State of H.P., (2019) 17 SCC 411 : (2020)
3 SCC (Cri) 362 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1730 at page 417
15. As discussed above, if the court is satisfied that if the confession is
voluntary, the conviction can be based upon the same. Rule of prudence
does not require that each and every circumstance mentioned in the
confession with regard to the participation of the accused must be
separately and independently corroborated. In the case at hand, as
pointed out by the trial court as well as by the High Court, R.K. Soni (PW 2)
and R.C. Chhabra (PW 3) were the senior officers of the Bank and when
they reached the Bank for inspection on 23-4-1994, the accused
submitted his confessional statement (Ext. PW-2/A). Likewise, in the
enquiry conducted by R.C. Chhabra (PW 3), the accused had given
confessional statement (Ext. PW-3/A).

This extract is taken from State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 1965 at page 187
8. Before analysing the factual aspects it may be stated that for a
crime to be proved it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to
have been committed and must, in all circumstances be proved by direct
ocular evidence by examining before the court those persons who had
seen its commission. The offence can be proved by circumstantial
evidence also. The principal fact or factum probandum may be proved
indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from factum probans, that
is, the evidentiary facts. To put it differently, circumstantial evidence is
not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other
facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken
together they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of
the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed.
This extract is taken from State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 1965 at page 192
19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit
state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to
be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession,
like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to
whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession
depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not
open to any court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial
confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of
the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the
credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a
confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if
the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses
who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused,
and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate
that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the
accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and
unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and
nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After
subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the
touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted
and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.
This extract is taken from State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 1965 at page 192
20. If the evidence relating to extra-judicial confession is found
credible after being tested on the touchstone of credibility and
acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction. The requirement of
corroboration as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the
respondent-accused, is a matter of prudence and not an invariable rule of
law. It is improbable, as rightly held by the High Court that the accused
would repose confidence in a person who is inimically disposed towards
him, and confess his guilt. Similarly, PW 3 is a close relative of PW 4 and
as records reveal, a person of doubtful antecedents being a history-
sheeter. Though that alone cannot be a ground to discard his evidence,
the totality of circumstances cast an indelible shadow of doubt on his
evidence. It is to be noted that the accused examined himself as DW 1.
Though it was the prosecution version that there was also extra-judicial
confession before informant Sahi Ram (PW 6), that was disbelieved by
both the trial court and the High Court in view of the fact that he stated
differently from what was allegedly stated by him during investigation. He
disowned that the accused made any confessional statement before him.
Though the prosecution during cross-examination of the accused (DW 1)
suggested that he had made an extra-judicial confession before PW 6,
significantly, not even such a suggestion was given in respect of PWs 3
and 4.

This extract is taken from Podyami Sukada v. State of M.P., (2010) 12 SCC
142 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 161 at page 145
12. Evidentiary value of extra-judicial confession depends upon
trustworthiness of the witness before whom confession is made. Law does
not contemplate that the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should
in all cases be corroborated. It is not an inflexible rule that in no case
conviction can be based solely on extra-judicial confession. It is basically
in the realm of appreciation of evidence and a question of fact to be
decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.