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Authentication

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
7 views49 pages

Authentication

Uploaded by

Hossam Selim
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Authentication Protocols

Guevara Noubir
College of Computer and Information Science
Northeastern University
[email protected]
Outline
 Overview of Authentication Systems
 [Chapter 9]

 Authentication of People
 [Chapter 10]

 Security Handshake Pitfalls


 [Chapter 11]

 Strong Password Protocols


 [Chapter 12]

Network Security Authentication Protocols 2


Who Is Authenticated?
 Human:
 Limited in terms of computation power and memory
 Machine:
 More powerful: long secrets, complex computation
 Hybrid:
 User is only authorized to execute some actions from a
restricted set of machines
 Users equipped with computation devices

Network Security Authentication Protocols 3


Password-Based Authentication
 Node A has a secret (password): e.g., “lisa”
 To authenticate itself A states the password
 No cryptographic operation because:
 Difficult to achieve by humans when connecting from dumb
terminals (less true today with authentication tokens)
 Crypto could be overly expensive in implementation time or
processing resources
 Export or legal issues
 Problems:
 Eavesdropping, cloning, etc.
 Should not be used in networked applications

Network Security Authentication Protocols 4


Offline vs. Online Password Guessing
 Online attack:
 How? try passwords until accepted
 Protection:
 Limit number of trials and lock account: e.g., ATM machine
 DoS problem: lock all accounts
 Increase minimum time between trials
 Prevent automated trials: from a keyboard, Turing tests
 Long passwords: pass phrases, initials of sentences, reject easy passwords
 What is the protection used by Yahoo? Hotmail? Gmail?

 Offline attack:
 How?
 Attacker captures X = f(password)
 Dictionary attack: try to guess the password value offline
 Obtaining X in a unix system: “ypcat passwd”
 Unix system: using the salt

 Protection:
 If offline attacks are possible then the secret space should be large

Network Security Authentication Protocols 5


L0pht Statistics (old)
 L0phtCrack against LM (LanMan – Microsoft)
 On 400 MHz quad-Xeon machine
 Alpha-numeric: 5.5 hours
 Alpha-numeric some symbols: 45 hours
 Alpha-numeric-all symbols: 480 hours
 LM is weak but was still used by MS for compatibility reasons up to
Windows XP, … NTLM, …
 Time-memory tradeoff technique (rainbow tables: Oechslin Crypto’03)
 Using 1.4GB of data can crack 99.9% of all alphanumerical passwords
hashes (237 ) in 13.6 seconds
 Side Note on choosing good passwords:
 Best practice from: SANS, MS, Red-Hat, etc.
 Long, with a mix of alphanumeric, lowercase, uppercase, and special
characters
Network Security Authentication Protocols 6
Password Length
 Online attacks:
 Can 4/6 digits be sufficient if a user is given only three trials?

 Offline attacks:
 Need at least: 64 random bits = 20 digits
 Too long to remember by a human!
 Or 11 characters from a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and punctuation marks
 Too long to remember by a human
 Or 16 characters pronounceable password (a vowel every two
characters)
 Conclusion:
A secret a person is willing to remember and type will not be as good as
a 64-bit random number

Network Security Authentication Protocols 7


Storing User Passwords
 Alternatives:
 Each user’s secret information is stored in every server
 The users secrets are stored in an authentication
storage node
 Need to trust/authenticate/secure session with the ASN
 Use an authentication facilitator node. Alice’s
information is forwarded to the authentication facilitator
who does the actual authentication
 Need to trust/authenticate/secure session with the AFN
 Authentication information database:
 Encryption
 Hashed as in UNIX (allows offline attacks)
Network Security Authentication Protocols 8
Other Issues Related to
Passwords
 Using a password in multiple places:
 Cascade break-in vs. writing the list of passwords
 Requiring frequent changes
 How do users go around this?
 A login Trojan horse to capture passwords
 Prevent programs from being able to mimic the login:
X11 (take the whole screen), read keyboard has “?”,
“Ctrl-Alt-Del”
 What happens after getting the password?
 Exit => alarm the user, freeze, login the user

Network Security Authentication Protocols 9


Initial Password Distribution
 Physical contact:
 How: go to the system admin, show proof of identity,
and set password
 Drawback: inconvenient, security treats when giving
the user access to the system admin session to set the
password
 Choose a random strong initial password (pre-
expired password) that can only be used for the
first connection

Network Security Authentication Protocols 10


Authentication Tokens
 Authentication through what you have:
 Primitive forms: credit cards, physical key
 Smartcards: embedded CPU (tamper proof)
 PIN protected memory card:
 Locks itself after few wrong trials
 Cryptographic challenge/response cards
 Crypto key inside the card and not revealed even if given the PIN
 PIN authenticates the user (to the card), the reader authenticates
the card
 Cryptographic calculator
 Similar to the previous card but has a display (or speaker)

Network Security Authentication Protocols 11


Address-Based Authentication
 Trust network address information
 Access right is based on users@address
 Techniques:
 Equivalent machines: smith@machine1 ≡ john@machine2
 Mappings: <address, remote username, local username>
 Examples:
 Unix: /etc/host.equiv, and .rhost files
 VMS: centrally managed proxy database for each <computer,
account> => file permissions
 Threats:
 Breaking into an account on one machine leads to breaking into
other machines accounts
 Network address impersonation can be easy in some cases. How?
Network Security Authentication Protocols 12
Cryptographic Authentication Protocols
 Advantages:
 Much more secure than previously mentioned
authentication techniques
 Techniques:
 Secret key cryptography, public key crypto, encryption,
hashing, etc.

Network Security Authentication Protocols 13


Other Types of Human Authentication
 Physical Access

 Biometrics:
 Retinal scanner
 Fingerprint readers
 Face recognition
 Iris scanner
 Handprint readers
 Voiceprints
 Keystroke timing
 Signature

Network Security Authentication Protocols 14


Passwords as Crypto Keys
 Symmetric key systems:
 Hash the password to derive a 56/64/128 bits key
 Public key systems:
 Difficult to generate an RSA private key from a password
 Jeff Schiller proposal:
 Password => seed for cryptographic random number generator
 Optimized by requesting the user to remember two numbers
 E.g. (857, 533): p prime number was found after 857 trials, and q after
533 trials
 Known public key makes it sensitive to offline attacks
 Usual solution:
 Encrypt the private key with the users password and store the
encrypted result (e.g., using a directory service)

Network Security Authentication Protocols 15


Eavesdropping &
Server Database Reading
 Example of basic authentication using public keys:
 Bob challenges Alice to decrypt a message encrypted with its public
key

 If public key crypto is not available protection against both


eavesdropping and server database reading is difficult:
 Hash => subject to eavesdropping
 Challenge requires Bob to store Alice’s secret in a database

 One solution:
 Lamport’s scheme allows a finite number of authentications

Network Security Authentication Protocols 16


Key Distribution Center
 Solve the scalability problem of a set of n nodes using secret key
 n*(n-1)/2 keys
 New nodes are configured with a key to the KDC
 e.g., KA for node A
 If node A wants to communicate with node B
 A sends a request to the KDC
 The KDC securely sends to A: EKA(RAB) and EKB(RAB, A)
 Advantage:
 Single location for updates, single key to be remembered
 Drawbacks:
 If the KDC is compromised!
 Single point of failure/performance bottleneck => multiple KDC?

Network Security Authentication Protocols 17


Multiple Trusted Intermediaries
 Problem:
 Difficult to find a single entity that everybody trusts
 Solution: Divide the world into domains
 Multiple KDC domains interconnected through shared
keys

 Multiple CA domains: certificates hierarchy

Network Security Authentication Protocols 18


Certification Authorities
 How do you know the public key of a node?
 Typical solution:
 Use a trusted node as a certification authority (CA)
 The CA generates certificates: Signed(A, public-key, validity information)
 Everybody needs to know the CA public key
 Certificates can be stored in a directory service or exchanged during the
authentication process
 Advantages:
 The CA doesn’t have to be online => more physical protection
 Not a performance bottleneck, not a single point of failure
 Certificates are not security sensitive: only threat is DoS
 A compromised CA cannot decrypt conversation but can lead to
impersonation
 A certification hierarchy can be used: e.g., X.509

Network Security Authentication Protocols 19


Certificate Revocation
 What if:
 Employer left/fired
 Private key is compromised
 Solution: similar to credit cards
 Validity time interval
 Use a Certificate Revocation List (CRL): X.509
 For example: lists all revoked and unexpired certificates

Network Security Authentication Protocols 20


Session Key Establishment
 Authentication is not everything
 What could happen after authentication?
 E.g., connection hijacking, message modification, replay, etc.
 Solution use crypto => need a share key between communicating
entities because public encryption/decryption is expensive
 Practically authentication leads to the establishment of a shared key for
the session
 A new key for each session:
 The more data an attacker has on a key the easier to break
 Replay between sessions
 Give a relatively “untrusted” software the session key but not the long-term key
 Good authentication protocol can establish session keys that provide forward
secrecy

Network Security Authentication Protocols 21


Delegation

 Give a limited right to some third entity:


 Example: printserver to access your files, batch process
 How?
 Give your password?
 ACL
 Delegation

Network Security Authentication Protocols 22


Security Handshake Pitfalls
 Developing a new encryption algorithm is believed to be
an “art” and not a “science”
 Security protocols build on top of these algorithms and
have to be developed into various types of systems

 Several Cryptographic Authentication Protocols exist


however:
 Several protocols were proven to have flaws
 Minor modifications may lead to flaws
 Use in a different context may uncover flaws or transform a non-
serious flaw into a serious one

Network Security Authentication Protocols 23


Login Only: Shared Secrets
 Sending the password on the clear is not safe: use shared secrets
 Challenge response: B sends R and A has to reply f(KAB, R). Weaknesses:
 Authentication is not mutual
 If the subsequent communication is not protected: hijacking treat
 Offline attack by an eavesdropper using R and f(KAB, R)
 An attacker who successfully reads B’s database can impersonate A
 Cascade effect if the same password is used on multiple servers
 Variants:
 B sends: KAB{R}, and A replies R
 Requires reversible cryptography which may be limited by export legislation
 Dictionary attacks if R is a recognizable value (padded 32 bits) don’t need eavesdropping
 A sends KAB{timestamp} (a single message)
 Requires: clock synchronization
 Problems with impersonation:
 within the clock skew: remember timestamp
 at another server: include B in message

Network Security Authentication Protocols 24


Login Only: One-Way Public Key
 Shared secrets are vulnerable if B’s database is compromised
 Public key protocols:
 A send the signature of R using its public key: [R]A
 Advantage:
 B’s database is no longer security sensitive to unauthorized disclosure
 Variant: B sends {R}public-A, A has to recover R and send it back
 Problem:
 You can trick A into signing a message or decrypting a message
 General solution: never use the same key for two purposes

Network Security Authentication Protocols 25


Mutual Authentication: Shared Secret

 Basic protocol: 5 messages,


 Optimized into 3 rounds but becomes subject to the Reflection attack:
 C impersonates A by initiating two sessions to B [both single/multiple servers]
 Solutions:
 Use different keys for A -> B authentication and B->A authentication
 For example: KB-A = KA-B +1
 Use different challenges:
 For example: challenge from the initiator be an odd number, while challenge from the
responder be an even number, concatenate the name of the challenge creator to the
challenge
 Another problem: password guessing without eavesdropping
 Solution: 4 messages protocol where the initiator proves its identity first
 Alternative two messages protocol using timestamp and timestamp+1 for R1
and R2

Network Security Authentication Protocols 26


Mutual Authentication: Public Keys
 Three messages protocol:
 A -> B: A, {R2}B
 B -> A: R2, {R1}A
 A -> B: R1
 Problems:
 Knowing the public keys
 Solutions:
 Store Bob’s public key encrypted with Alice’s password in some
directory
 Store a certificate of Bob’s public key signed by Alice’s private key

Network Security Authentication Protocols 27


Integrity/Encryption for Data
 Key establishment during authentication

 Use f(KA-B){R} as the session key where R is made out of


R1 and R2
 Example: f(KA-B) = KA-B +1
 Why not use KA-B{R+1} instead of f(KA-B)?
 Rules for the session key:
 Different for each session
 Unguessable by an eavesdropper
 Not KA-B{X}

Network Security Authentication Protocols 28


Two-Way Public Key Based
Authentication + Key Setup
 First attempt:
 A sends a random number encrypted with the public key of B
 Flaw: T can hijack the connection using her own R
 Second attempt:
 A sends [{R}B]A: encrypt using public key of B and then private key of A
 If someone records the conversation and then gets access to B key it can
recover R
 Third attempt:
 Both A and B participate through R1 and R2 shares: session key R1 ⊕ R2
 Fourth alternative:
 Use Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol and each entity signs its
contribution

Network Security Authentication Protocols 29


One-Way Public Key Based
Authentication
 Context:
 Only one of the parties has a public key (e.g., SSL server)
 First the server is authenticated
 If needed the user is authenticated (e.g., using a password)
 First solution:
 A sends a random number encrypted with B’s public key
 The random number is used as a session key
 Problem: if an attacker records the communication and later on
breaks into A it can decode the whole communication
 Second solution:
 Use Diffie-Hellman with B signing his contribution

Network Security Authentication Protocols 30


Privacy and Integrity
 Privacy:
 Use a secret key algorithm to encrypt the data
 Integrity:
 Generate a Message Authentication Code (MAC)
 No clean solution for merged privacy and integrity:
 Use two keys (may be one derived from the other)
 Use a weak checksum then encrypt
 Use two different algorithms for encryption/integrity (e.g., AES) and MAC (e.g., HMAC/
SHA1)
 Replays:
 Use sequence number to avoid replays, or
 Include info about previous message
 Reflection: replay the message in a different direction
 Different range for each direction
 Use a direction bit
 Use a direction dependent integrity algorithm
 Key rollover: change keys periodically during the communication
Network Security Authentication Protocols 31
Needham-Schroeder
Authentication 1978
 Basis for Kerberos and many other authentication
protocols
 Uses NONCE (Number ONCE):
1. A → KDC: N1, A, B
2. KDC → A: KA{N1, B, KAB, ticket-to-B}; ticket-to-B=KB{KAB, A}
3. A → B: ticket-to-B, KAB{N2}
4. B → A: KAB{N2-1, N3}
5. A → B: KAB{N3-1}
– Why N1? T has stolen the old key of B and previous
request from A to KDC requesting to communicate with B
– Why B in second message?
– Reflection attack?
Network Security Authentication Protocols 32
Expanded Needham-Schroeder

 Vulnerability of basic protocol:


 T steals A’s key and can impersonate A even after A
changes it’s key (ticket stays valid)
 Proposed solution [Need87]
 Before talking to the KDC B gives A a nonce that has to
be included in the ticket => 7 messages protocol

Network Security Authentication Protocols 33


Otway-Rees Authentication 1987
1. A → B: NC, A, B, KA{NA, NC, A, B}
2. B → KDC: KA{NA, NC, A, B}, KB{NB, NC, A, B}
3. KDC → B: NC, KA{NA, KAB}, KB{NB, KAB}
4. B → A: KA{NA, KAB}
5. A → B: KAB{ anything recognizable}

Network Security Authentication Protocols 34


NONCES
 Potential properties:
 Non-repeated, unpredictable, time dependent
 Context dependent
 A nonce may have to be unpredictable for some
challenge response protocols (with no session key
establishment)
 Sequence number doesn’t work for challenge response:
KAB{R}
 One solution is to use cryptographic random
number generators
Network Security Authentication Protocols 35
Random Numbers
 If the random number generation process is weak
the whole security system can be broken
 Pure randomness is very difficult to define
 Usually we differentiate:
 Random: specialized hardware (e.g., radioactive particle
counter)
 Pseudorandom: a deterministic process determined by
its initial state
 For testing purpose: hashing a seed using a good hashing
function can work
 For security purpose: long seed, good hashing function
(FIPS186)
Network Security Authentication Protocols 36
Performance Considerations
 Metrics:
 Number of cryptographic operations using a private key
 Number of cryptographic operations using a public key
 Number of bytes encrypted/decrypted using a secret key
 Number of bytes to be cryptographically hashed
 Number of messages transmitted
 Notes:
 Private key operations are usually more expensive than public key
operations
 Some optimization techniques:
 Caching information such as tickets

Network Security Authentication Protocols 37


Authentication Protocols Checklist
 Eavesdrop:
 Learn the content, learn info to impersonate A/B later or to another replica, offline
password guessing
 Initiating a conversation pretending to be A:
 Impersonate A, offline password guessing, delayed impersonation, trick B to sign/
decrypt messages
 Lie in wait at B’s network address and accept connections from A:
 Immediate/delayed impersonation of B or A, offline password guessing, trick A to
sign/decrypt messages
 Read A/B’s database:
 Sit actively/passively on the net between A and B (router):
 Offline password guessing, learn the content of messages, hijack connections, modify/
rearrange/replay/reverse direction of message
 Combinations:
 Even after reading both A and B databases T shouldn’t be able to decrypt recorded
conversations
 Even after reading B’s database and eavesdropping on an authentication exchange it
shouldn’t be possible to impersonate A to B
Network Security Authentication Protocols 38
STRONG PASSWORD PROTOCOLS

Network Security Authentication Protocols 39


Context & Solutions
 Context:
 A wants to use any workstation to log into a server B
 A has only a password
 The workstation doesn’t have any user-specific information (e.g., users’s
trusted CAs, or private keys)
 The software on the workstation is trustworthy
 Potential solutions:
 Transmit the password in the clear
 Use Diffie-Hellman key establishment (vulnerable to B impersonation)
 Use SSL (relies on trust anchors: trusts configuration and certificates)
 Challenge response authentication using a hash of the password as a
key (vulnerable to dictionary attacks)
 Use Lamport’s hash or S/KEY
 Use a strong password protocol (secure even if the shared secret could
be broken by an offline dictionary attack

Network Security Authentication Protocols 40


Lamport’s Hash: One Time Password
 Allows authentication
 Resistant to eavesdropping and reading Bob’s database
 Doesn’t use public key cryptography
 B’s database:
 Username (e.g., A),
 n (integer decremented at each authentication)
 hashn(password)
 Initialization:
 Set n to a reasonably large number (e.g., 1000)
 The user registration software computes: xn = hashn(password)
and sends xn and n to B

Network Security Authentication Protocols 41


Lamport’s Hash (Cont’d)
 Authentication:
 A connects to a workstation and gives her username and password
 The workstation sends A’s username to B
 B sends back n
 The workstation computes hashn-1(password) and sends it to B
 B computes the hash of the received value and compares it with the
stored value of hashn(password)
 If equal: decrement n and store the last received value
 When n gets to 1, A needs to reset its password (in a secure way)
 Enhancement: Salt
 x1 = hash(password | salt)
 Advantage:
 Use the same password on multiple servers
 Makes dictionary attacks harder (similar to Unix)
 Do not have to change the password when n reaches 1 (just change the salt)
Network Security Authentication Protocols 42
Pros and Cons
 Advantages:
 Not sensitive to eavesdropping, or reading B’s database
 Disadvantages:
 Limited number of logins
 No mutual authentication, difficulty to establish a common key, or prevent man-in-
the-middle
 One can use this scheme followed by a Diffie-Hellman key establishment: but this is
vulnerable to connection hijacking
 Small n attack:
 T impersonates B’s address and sends back a small value of n (e.g., 50)
 If the real value of n at B is 100 => T can impersonate A 50 times
 Use in the “human and paper” environment:
 Print the list and give it to A (the user won’t go back on the list)
 Use 64 bits out of 128 MD5 hash function
 Resiliency to small n attack
 What if you lose the list!
 Deployed in S/Key (Phil Karn) RFC 1938
Network Security Authentication Protocols 43
Strong Password Protocols
 Goal:
 Prevent off-line attacks
 Even if eavesdropping or impersonating addresses
 Basic Form: Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [Bellovin &
Merritt]
 A and B share a weak secret W (derived from A’s password)
 A and B encrypt their DH contributions using W
 Why is it secure? because W{ga mod p} is just a random number
and for any password W their could exist a r = ga such that W{r}
 Variants:
 Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE): use g = W
 Password Derived Moduli (PDM): Use p = f(W)
Network Security Authentication Protocols 44
Subtle Details
 A simple implementation may lead to flaws
 EKE:
 If p is a little more that a power of 2
 ga has to be less than p
 The attacker can try a password and if GUESS{W{ga mod
p}} is higher that p then discard guess
 A password from a space of 50’000 can be guessed after
about 20 exchanges
 Solution?
 SPEKE:
 Small problem if W is not a perfect square mod p
Network Security Authentication Protocols 45
Augmented Strong Password Protocol
 Goal:
 If an attacker steals B‘s database but doesn’t succeed with an
offline attack he cannot impersonate A
 How:
 avoid storing W in B’s database but only something derived from
W
 Augmented PDM:
 B stores “A”, p, 2W mod p
 A sends 2a mod p
 B sends: 2b mod p, hash(2ab mod p, 2bW mod p)
 A sends hash’ (2ab mod p, 2bW mod p)

Network Security Authentication Protocols 46


Augmented Strong Password Protocol

 RSA variant:
 B stores: “A”, W, A’s public key, Y = W ’{A’s private
key}
 A sends: A, W{ga mod p}
 B sends: W{gb mod p}, (gab mod p){Y}, c
 A replies: [hash(gab mod p, c)]sign-A

Network Security Authentication Protocols 47


Secure Remote Protocol (SRP)
 Invented by Tom Wu 1998, RFC2945
 B stores gW mod p
 A choose a and sends: “A”, ga mod p
 B choose b, c1, 32-bit number u, and sends gb+gw mod
p, u, c1
 => Share key is: K = gb(a+uW) mod p
 A sends: K{c1}, c2
 B sends: K{c2}

 How is the common key computed on both ends?


Network Security Authentication Protocols 48
Credentials Download Protocols
 Goal:
 A can only remember a short password
 When using a workstation A needs its environment
(user specific information)
 The user specific information could be downloaded from
a directory if A knew its private key
 Strong Password protocols can help
 Protocol based on EKE:
 B stores: “A”, W, Y = W’{A’s public key}
 A sends: “A”, W{ga mod p}
 B sends: gb mod p, (gab mod p){Y}
Network Security Authentication Protocols 49

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