Muhammad Haris Ijaz

Roll Number: 231459603

Philosophy of Mind, Taimoor Farouk

FINAL ASSIGNMENT

INTRODUCTION

People have been arguing over the nature of mind for centuries. Some have been materialist

and some dualistic. Former says that mind and body are material, and the latter holds that

mind and body are separate entities, with mind being nonphysical. In this paper I will outline

two materialist theories of mind and highlight their appeal and limitations. Further I will the

naturalistic dualistic non-reductive stance of David Chalmers and that we need to give non-

reductive theories a serious thought. Materialist theories do give a coherent and structural

understanding of the properties of the brain and that brain activity does correlate with

consciousness (or mind) and might causes consciousness too but monitoring the correlating

brain activity still does not tells us much about consciousness (or mind) but it fails to give us any

coherent account of it. The dualist approach also has not given any viable explanation of the

subjective experience, and while we only have a physicalist understanding of the mind I still

believe that mind and body are separate and that Chalmers works provides us alternatives and

encourages us to expand our horizon.

THE PROBLEM
One of the common views is that the natural world is the physical world. We cannot see how

consciousness could be a part of our physical reality. Materialist theories have not expanded

the physical ontology, where ontology concerns the nature of things. To fit consciousness in our

natural order, Chalmers says “we must either revise our conception of consciousness or revise

our conception of nature.”1 The word consciousness is used in different ways, it used to mean

the “the ability to discriminate stimuli, or to report information, or to monitor internal states,

or to control behavior.”2 Chalmers calls these phenomena the easy problem of consciousness.

They are crucial phenomena, and much is to be explored about them but these problems he

says are “puzzles rather than mysteries.”3 A physical system to be conscious in this sense is not

a deep problem in principle and there is no obvious hindrance to the explanation of these

phenomena in a computational or neurobiological term. The hard problem of consciousness

then according to calmers is “the problem of experience”4. Humans have subjective experience

and “these is something it is like to be them.”5 Consciousness includes perceptual experience,

mental imagery, and bodily sensation etc. These is something it is like to experience the sea or

to be nostalgic etc. These states are phenomenal, with phenomenal properties (qualia)

“characterizing what it is like to be in the state.”6

1
Chalmers, David J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.),
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.

2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
Solution to the hard problem will involve explaining the relation between consciousness and

physical processes and why is it that physical processes are linked with states of experience.

The reductive explanation of mind seeks answers based on physical properties. A materialist

explanation looks for a solution on which consciousness is a physical process. A non-materialist

explanation will be based on which consciousness is non-physical even if it related with physical

processes. A non-reductive explanation will treat consciousness as a fundamental part of the

explanation. The materialist-reductive theories so far have only been tackling the easy problem.

MATERIALISM

THE IDENTITY THEORY

Identity theory claims that physical states are mental states of our brain (one and the same

exact thing). That is, every single type of mental process is identical numerically with some type

of physical process within our central nervous system. Even though we have not mapped the all

the brain states yet that actually correspond to mental states, but identity theory insists that as

we progress, further brain research will eventually disclose them all. For example, with

scientific advancement we have discovered that light is just electro-magnetic waves. Mental

states argue the identity theory that are identical with process in the same way as these

examples. A theory explaining through reduction that our familiar phenomenal mental states

are physical states would not be surprising, but it still does not explain subjective experience or

how consciousness is caused.

FUNCTIONALISM
According to this theory, the nature of the material does not matter whether a system is

considered as a mind. They do not identify types of mental process with brain processes. For

functionalist, any system that behaves like a brain is conscious. Consciousness does not need

brain as long as its functions can be performed by some other system/machine that is

“functionally isomorphic with our own internal economy.”7 Functionalists agree with identity

theorist that each token of a mental process is identify with a brain process (physical state) but

they deny that each type of mental process is identical to a corresponding type in natural

world. Even though a given mental process at any give time is identical to a physical process,

the type of the physical material can vary for functionalist. They reject universal type/type

identity. For example, before pain fiber replacement in a patient, pain is c-fiber firing but after

the replacement, pain the firing of the new wiring. Functionalists define consciousness in terms

“of having the functional capacities of access, report, control, and the like.”8 Like Identity

theorists, they too ignore phenomenal qualia. It is true there are functional capacities like

control, access, and report, etc. that need explanation, but these materialist or computational

theories do not even begin to explain phenomenal qualia. Feelings seem to lie outside the

range of any physicalist theories. This functionalist materialist view states that upon reflection

there is nothing in consciousness that needs explanation over and above explaining the

7
Churchland, Paul M. “The Ontological Problem (the Mind – Body Problem).” Essay. In Matter and Consciousness.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013.

8
Chalmers, David J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.),
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
different functions and to explain these is to explain all that is in the vicinity of consciousness

that need to be explained.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST MATERIALISM

The explanatory argument is based on the difference between easy and hard problems. Easy

problem concerns behavior and cognitive functions, while the hard problem concerns

subjectivity. Physical accounts explain only function and structure, which are spatio-temporal

structures, and the functions play a causal role in the systems behavior. Explaining physical and

functional structure does not leads to explaining the phenomenal subjective experience of a

conscious being. The knowledge argument says there are facts about the consciousness that

cannot be deduced from physical facts. We could know all the physical truths and still be unable

to know all the facts about consciousness based on them. For example, the famous thought

experiment of a neuroscientist named Mary that learns everything there is to learn about the

physical processes concerned with color vision, but she has been brought up in a black and

white room and has never experienced red. Despite all her knowledge about colors Mary does

not know one crucial thing: she does not know what it is like to see and experience red. And

later if she gets to experience red, she will learn something new.

These arguments begin by establishing an epistemic gap between the phenomenal and physical

domains. Each of these deny “epistemic entailment from physical truths P to the phenomenal

truths Q: deducibility of Q from P, or explainability of Q in terms of P.”9 They deny the a priori

entailment of Q by P. If we know P and cannot deduce Q as the knowledge arguments says or

9
Ibid.
an implication of Q from P would require a functional analysis of consciousness and the concept

of consciousness is not functional. From these epistemic arguments ontological differences are

inferred. Knowledge arguments infers difference in facts from failure of deducibility: and the

explanatory argument infers non physicality from the failure of physical explanation. General

from will be that materialism requires that P necessitate all truths and if there are phenomenal

truths Q which P does not necessitate then materialism is insufficient. Materialists resist these

arguments in different ways. Functionalists deny that there is any sort of epistemic gap. Identity

theorists accept the epistemic gap but reject the ontological gap. When Mary leaves the rooms,

she does learn something but not something entirely new but old facts in a new way.Despite

materialism insistence that it will eventually explain everything in terms of neurophysiology it

ignores some crucial aspects of phenomenal experience because they are afraid to consider

anything beyond the physical realm and going back to a dualism.

DUALISM

Philosopher David Chalmers considers these problems and provides alternative theories. There

exists mass, charge, spacetime in physics which are taken as fundamental structure of the

world and not explained further. He says that if the arguments from materialism are correct

then we need to expand these basic features of the world. He takes consciousness as a

fundamental feature of the world like charge or spacetime. If so, then how consciousness will

react with the world? There are always fundamental laws where there are fundamental

properties. So, it expected that there will be fundamental psychophysical laws that connect

phenomenal and physical realm. Like quantum physics or relativity laws they will not be
deducible from basic principles but are taken as primitive. Chalmers points that microphysical

feature of the world are considers causally closed that is all of the m have a sufficient cause.

How is then consciousness as a fundamental feature be integrated with a causally closed

network?

Chalmers proposes a naturalistic dualism called type-D also known as interactionism. It holds

that microphysical features are not causally closed and that phenomenal properties causally

affect the physical world. According to it both physical and phenomenal states cause each

other, and the corresponding law as run in both directions. It is objected that distinct mental

and physical states could not interact since there is not causal relation but what we learned

from Hume, and modern science is that same goes for other basic causal interactions and those

in physics. Newtonian physics reveals no causal relation by which gravitation works and the

laws are simply fundamental. Chalmers delas with the object to this theory is that it is

incompatible with physics since microphysical realm is causally closed and there is no room

from effects from mental states. Chalmers uses arguments from contemporary physics to

respond to these objections.

In a standard model of Quantum Physics, the world is described by a wave function and

according to it physical entities are in a superposition sate. that is, in two different positions,

even though superposition is never directly observed. Standardly wave function evolves in a

learn evolution which produces superposed state and nonlinear collapses from superposed to

non-superposed states. Linear Schrödinger evolution is determinist and collapses are non-

deterministic. Linear evolution is ongoing, but collapses occur on measurement. Of all the

definitions of measurement, the one on which every agrees says that it is observation by
conscious observer. Chalmers says, no purely physical criterion for a measurement can work,

since purely physical systems are governed by” linear dynamics. As such, to suggest that

measurement is a conscious observation is natural and this observation causes a collapse.

Collapses leave a way for an interactionist approach. For Chalmers, the most promising version

of this approach correlated conscious states with total quantum states of a system, with an

extra constraint that conscious states, unlike physical state can never by in a superposition. In

Chalmers words: In a conscious physical system such as a brain, the physical and phenomenal

states of the system will be correlated in a (non-superposed) quantum state. Upon observation

of a superposed system, then Schrödinger evolution at the moment of observation would cause

the observed system to become correlated with the brain, yielding a resulting superposition of

brain states and so (by psychophysical correlation) a superposition of conscious states. But such

a superposition cannot occur, so one of the potentials resulting conscious states is somehow

selected presumably by a non-deterministic dynamic principle at the phenomenal level). The

result is that (by psychophysical correlation) a definite brain state and a definite state of the

observed object are also selected.”10 He says that the same might happen in our brain between

non-conscious and conscious processes; in superposition “non-conscious processes threaten to

affect consciousness, there will be some sort of selection.”11 This way consciousness has a

causal role in the physical world. This is just a theory and Chalmers says it might be empirically

testable. There are many other factors to consider but for Chalmers this suggests that at the

very least no physical theory can immediately reject interactionist theory.

10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
CONCLUSION

Functionalism and Identity theory might be so far the only way to get a coherent physicalist

explanation and, but they have made no progress in explaining the phenomenal qualia. They

reject any ontological differences between consciousness and brain. They say its hard to see

how any dualistic approach be true and materialism be wrong we just have not got there yet.

But as Chalmers argues differently and says that so far, a functional approach has not gotten us

anywhere. All of these views need further examination. There are clearly viable alternatives to

materialism even if they are not naturalistic. I think upon further research we will have a

coherent naturalistic and dualistic understanding of mind, though not any time soon.

REFRENCES

Churchland, Paul M. “The Ontological Problem (the Mind – Body Problem).” Essay. In Matter

and Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013.

Chalmers, David J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A.

Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.