2021 FORECAST - Remedial Law (Part 1)
2021 FORECAST - Remedial Law (Part 1)
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary. There is, therefore, no
justification to relax the rules and excuse the petitioner’s noncompliance therewith. This Court
had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief of certiorari to observe the rules, since
nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside as a “mere technicality.” Procedural rules are
not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice. Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of
action is to dismiss outright the present petition. De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA 1, G.R. No.
229781 October 10, 2017
The Supreme Court (SC) has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an
important component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for
whimsical and arbitrary reasons; Exceptions.
Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court. It will not
entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component of the
orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons. In
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court explained the
reason for the doctrine thusly: The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal
with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time for
the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy. x x x Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule
and direct resort to this Court were allowed in some instances. These exceptions were
summarized in a case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, 814 SCRA 41 (2017), as follows: In a fairly
recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present:
(1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2)
when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6)
when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes
questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy. De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781
October 10, 2017
It is established that the issue of whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it is from a review
of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including
other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information.
Petitioner’s argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be disregarded as her case
involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the grounds upon which petitioner
anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit
of cases involving pure questions of law. It is established that the issue of whether or not probable
cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact,
determinable as it is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the
Information. This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate court,
which is in the better position to review and determine factual matters. De Lima vs. Guerrero,
843 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
Section 5(2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of “final
judgments and orders of lower courts” before the Supreme Court (SC) can exercise its power to
“review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari” in “all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.”
Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be overemphasized considering that
petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to
Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion
to Quash, will be pre-empting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said
motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious
rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the
trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality on
the instant petition. Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set
before this Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5(2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution explicitly requires the existence of “final judgments and orders of lower courts”
before the Court can exercise its power to “review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari” in “all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.” De Lima vs.
Guerrero, 843 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other.
The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia,
or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping
therefore exists when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843
SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
The prosecution has the authority to amend the information at any time before arraignment.
Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the
elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as in this case, possibly
bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend the information
at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the
information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads: SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution.—A
complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused. De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781
October 10, 2017
The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable by an
amendment amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power.
The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable by an
amendment amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power. So, this Court held in Dio v. People, 792
SCRA 646 (2016): This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity
to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power. In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): When
a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect
may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution
to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to
charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such
instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should
grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows
a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment,
unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the
proceedings, are avoided. More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process
underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any
other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court’s refusal to grant the prosecution the
opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of
Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the
State’s right to due process. De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781 October 10,
2017
An order sustaining the motion to quash the information would neither bar another
prosecution or require the release of the accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint or information
be filed without discharging the accused from custody.
Should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of the Information, the
prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order sustaining the motion to
quash the information would neither bar another prosecution or require the release of the
accused from custody. Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court can
simply order that another complaint or information be filed without discharging the accused from
custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus: Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.—If
the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be
filed except as provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody,
shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no
new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the
court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also
in custody for another charge. De Lima vs. Guerrero, 843 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 229781 October 10,
2017
There is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first resolve a motion to quash,
whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration.
In the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission on Elections, 344 SCRA 358 (2000), We have
interpreted the provision to limit the remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a COMELEC division
for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy of a motion for reconsideration. Villarosa vs. Festin, 732 SCRA 110, G.R. No. 212953
August 5, 2014
With the availability of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at petitioner’s disposal, his hasty
resort to certiorari to the Supreme Court (SC) cannot be justified.
Stark is the contrast between the two cited rules. To reiterate, under the 1993 COMELEC Rules,
the COMELEC En Banc is strictly prohibited from entertaining motions for reconsideration of
interlocutory orders unless unanimously referred to the En Banc by the members of the division
that issued the same, whereas under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, all motions for
reconsideration filed with regard to decisions, resolutions, orders and rulings of the COMELEC
divisions are automatically referred to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, in view of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804’s applicability in the instant petition, a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC En Banc is available to petitioner herein unlike in Kho. From the foregoing,
petitioner’s procedural lapse becomes manifest. With the availability of a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at petitioner’s disposal, his hasty resort to certiorari to this Court cannot be
justified. On this ground alone, the instant petition can and should be dismissed outright.
Villarosa vs. Festin, 732 SCRA 110, G.R. No. 212953 August 5, 2014
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First
Division are two distinct bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case
between the two.
No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC when the Special
First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. Contrary to petitioner’s claim,
it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct bodies and
that there has been consequent transfers of the case between the two. Strictly speaking, the
COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in
both of its Divisions. The additional term “special,” in this case, merely indicates that the
commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution.
Villarosa vs. Festin, 732 SCRA 110, G.R. No. 212953 August 5, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
As a general rule, second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are forbidden.
Nevertheless, there are situations in which exceptional circumstances warrant allowing such
motions for reconsideration, and for that reason the Court has recognized several exceptions to
the general rule. We have extensively expounded on the exceptions in McBurnie v. Ganzon, 707
SCRA 646 (2013), where we observed: At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and
subsequent motions for reconsideration are, as a general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of
the Rules of Court provides that “[n]o second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained.” The rule rests on the basic tenet of
immutability of judgments. “At some point, a decision becomes final and executory and,
consequently, all litigations must come to an end.” The general rule, however, against second
and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions. For one, the present
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, particularly Section 3, Rule 15 thereof, provides: Sec. 3.
Second motion for reconsideration.—The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of
justice by the Court En Banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is
reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally
erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by
the Court’s declaration. Laya, Jr. vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, 850 SCRA 315, G.R. No. 205813
January 10, 2018
The Supreme Court (SC) may entertain second and subsequent motions for reconsideration
when the assailed decision is legally erroneous, patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
Under these circumstances, even final and executory judgments may be set aside because of the
existence of compelling reasons. Laya, Jr. vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, 850 SCRA 315, G.R. No.
205813 January 10, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion
for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment.”
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall
not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.”
It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings,
and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their
conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed.
Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be
limited, because to do so — x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So
wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control
over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the
ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People, 797 SCRA 241, G.R.
No. 220598, G.R. No. 220953 July 19, 2016
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon when the policy of the court
is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override substantial justice.
As the Court has expounded in Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 784 (2000): The court has
the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant’s appeal. It is a power conferred on the
court, not a duty. The “discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.”
Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause
of justice. The court’s primary duty is to render or dispense justice. “A litigation is not a game of
technicalities.” “Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when
it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts.” Litigations must be decided on their merits and not
on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal
of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice. Peñoso vs. Dona, 520 SCRA 232, G.R. No. 154018 April 3, 2007
The emerging trend in the rulings of the this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not
to override substantial justice. (Emphasis supplied) Rules of procedure being designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, their rigid application resulting in technicalities that tend to
delay or frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Peñoso vs.
Dona, 520 SCRA 232, G.R. No. 154018 April 3, 2007
In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara (475 SCRA 54 [2005]), this Court
held: while it is true that rules of procedures are intended to promote rather than frustrate the
ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it nevertheless
must not be met at the expense of substantial justice.
Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools
intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective
of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints
of technicalities. Thus, the CA should have refrained from hastily dismissing the petition on
procedural flaws. Peñoso vs. Dona, 520 SCRA 232, G.R. No. 154018 April 3, 2007
When insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 (2005), the Court held: “Time and again, the
Court has held that the Manchester rule has been modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL)
vs. Asuncion, which defined the following guidelines involving the payment of docket fees: x x x
x Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long
as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.
Peñoso vs. Dona, 520 SCRA 232, G.R. No. 154018 April 3, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
It has been consistently held that an action for collection of sum of money is a personal action.
Taking into account that no exception can be applied in this case, the venue, then, is “where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, . . . at the election of the plaintiff.” For a corporation, its residence is
considered “the place where its principal office is located as stated in its Articles of
Incorporation.” Hygienic Packaging Corporation vs. Nutri-Asia, Inc., doing business under the
name and style of UFC Philippines (formerly Nutri-Asia, Inc.), 891 SCRA 176, G.R. No. 201302
January 23, 2019
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an official address to which all
notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules on summons under
the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding.
On matters relating to procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that will govern.
Proper court procedures shall be determined by the Rules as promulgated by this court. Service
of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special proceeding is court
procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure. The Cooperative Code
provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives’ activities as administered by the
Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern
court processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an official address
to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot take the place of the rules on
summons under the Rules of Court concerning a court proceeding. This is not to say that the
notices cannot be sent to cooperatives in accordance with the Cooperative Code. Notices may be
sent to a cooperative’s official address. However, service of notices sent to the official address in
accordance with the Cooperative Code may not be used as a defense for violations of procedures,
specially when such violation affects another party’s rights. Cathay Metal Corporation vs.
Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 728 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 172204 July 2, 2014
In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person is not required as long as there is jurisdiction
over the res.
This is not a matter of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of respondent since this is an action
in rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the person is not required as long as there is
jurisdiction over the res. This case involves the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are
accorded due process. In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered
mail and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in respondent’s Certificate
of Registration. Summons was not served upon respondent’s officers. It was also not published
in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to
present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an order
cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims. Cathay Metal Corporation vs. Laguna
West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 728 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 172204 July 2, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it also has the power to issue all auxiliary writs
necessary to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts.
Even if the law had vested the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in real
property tax cases such as this, the Court of Appeals was still correct in dismissing the petition
before it. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it also has the power to issue all auxiliary
writs necessary to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts. Thus,
once the Court of Tax Appeals acquired jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals
would have been precluded from taking cognizance of the case. Philippine Ports Authority vs.
City of Davao, 864 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 190324 June 6, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
There is forum shopping when: as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another.
The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending. Stronghold
Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Stroem, 746 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 204689 January 21, 2015
This court has enumerated the elements of forum shopping: “(a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect
to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other case.”
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Stroem, 746 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 204689 January 21,
2015
Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be
cured by the silence, by acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties.
Generally, parties may not raise issues for the first time on appeal. Such practice is violative of
the rules and due process and is frowned upon by the courts. However, it is also well-settled that
jurisdiction can never be waived or acquired by estoppel. Jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution or by law. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Stroem, 746 SCRA 598, G.R. No.
204689 January 21, 2015
The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that when a dispute arises from a construction contract, the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) has exclusive and original jurisdiction.
This court has ruled that when a dispute arises from a construction contract, the CIAC has
exclusive and original jurisdiction. Construction has been defined as referring to “all on-site works
on buildings or altering structures, from land clearance through completion including excavation,
erection and assembly and installation of components and equipment.” Stronghold Insurance
Company, Inc. vs. Stroem, 746 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 204689 January 21, 2015
The state has continuously encouraged the use of dispute resolution mechanisms to promote
party autonomy.
The CIAC was created through Executive Order No. 1008 (E.O. 1008), in recognition of the need
to establish an arbitral machinery that would expeditiously settle construction industry disputes.
The prompt resolution of problems arising from or connected with the construction industry was
considered of necessary and vital for the fulfillment of national development goals, as the
construction industry provides employment to a large segment of the national labor force and is
a leading contributor to the gross national product. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs.
Stroem, 746 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 204689 January 21, 2015
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Jurisprudence has recognized that forum shopping can be committed in several ways.
Jurisprudence has recognized that forum shopping can be committed in several ways: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case
not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been
finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the
ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, it has been recognized that forum shopping exists “where a party attempts to obtain a
preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the same from the original court.”
City of Taguig vs. City of Makati, 793 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
Litis pendentia “refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious.”
For its part, litis pendentia “refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious.” For litis pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must concur: The requisites of litis
pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in
both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. City of Taguig vs. City of
Makati, 793 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
Res Judicata
Res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following requisites are satisfied:
(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the
first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. City
of Taguig vs. City of Makati, 793 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
Esquivel v. Alegre, 172 SCRA 315 (1989), discussed the nature of amended judgments and
contrasting it with supplemental judgments: In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower
court makes a thorough study of the original judgment and renders the amended and clarified
judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified
decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision. . . [A] supplemental
decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name
denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists
side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it supplements. City of Taguig vs.
City of Makati, 793 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
A petition for annulment of judgment is based only on two (2) grounds: first, extrinsic fraud; and
second, lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. In contrast, a motion for reconsideration of
a judgment or final order may cover “grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the
evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is
contrary to law.” City of Taguig vs. City of Makati, 793 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
Clearly, lack of jurisdiction may be invoked as a ground in a motion for reconsideration. It can
thereby serve as basis for setting aside or amending a judgment or final order. Accordingly, it is
as much a cause for pursuing a motion for reconsideration as it is a petition for annulment of
judgment. City of Taguig vs. City of Makati, 793 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
When a judge retired, all his authority to decide any case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate
the decision thereon also ‘retired’ with him. In other words, he had lost entirely his power and
authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.
Makati points out that there is jurisprudence to the effect that a petition for annulment of
judgment, if based on lack of jurisdiction, need not “allege that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, reconsideration or appeal were no longer available through no fault of his.” Indeed, as
explained in Tiu v. First Plywood Corporation, 615 SCRA 117 (2010), “[t]his is so because a
judgment rendered or final order issued by the [Regional Trial Court] without jurisdiction is null
and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action, or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked.” Moreover, it is
correct that Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 378 SCRA 28 (2002), stated that “[a] judgment
promulgated after the judge who signed the decision has ceased to hold office is not valid and
binding.” This is so because “[w]hen a judge[,] retired all his authority to decide any case, i.e., to
write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon also ‘retired’ with him. In other words, he had
lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior to his retirement.”
City of Taguig vs. City of Makati, 793 SCRA 527, G.R. No. 208393 June 15, 2016
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
There is res judicata when the following concur: a) the former judgment must be final; b) the
court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; d) and there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Makati Tuscany Condominium
Corporation vs. Multi-Ready Development Corporation, 861 SCRA 448, G.R. No. 185530 April
18, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
According to the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
on all points and matters determined in the former suit.”
The elements for res judicata to apply are as follows: (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the
court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment
was based on the merits; and (d) between the first and the second actions, there was an identity
of parties, subject matters, and causes of action. Pryce Corporation vs. China Banking
Corporation, 716 SCRA 207, G.R. No. 172302 February 18, 2014
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. Bar by prior judgment exists “when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.” On the other hand, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
finds application “when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon,
and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction.” This principle only needs
identity of parties and issues to apply. Pryce Corporation vs. China Banking Corporation, 716
SCRA 207, G.R. No. 172302 February 18, 2014
Substantial identity of parties exists “when there is a community of interest between a party in
the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first
case.”
On the element of identity of parties, res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties as
substantial identity is enough. Substantial identity of parties exists “when there is a community
of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was
not impleaded in the first case.” Parties that represent the same interests in two petitions are,
thus, considered substantial identity of parties for purposes of res judicata. Definitely, one test
to determine substantial identity of interest would be to see whether the success or failure of
one party materially affects the other. Pryce Corporation vs. China Banking Corporation, 716
SCRA 207, G.R. No. 172302 February 18, 2014
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue
and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected
with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific
finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly
referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Pryce Corporation vs.
China Banking Corporation, 716 SCRA 207, G.R. No. 172302 February 18, 2014
In res judicata, the primacy given to the first case is related to the principle of immutability of
final judgments essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice.
In res judicata, the primacy given to the first case is related to the principle of immutability of
final judgments essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice, viz.: x x x [W]ell-
settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The reason for this is that litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies. The only
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Generally, the later case is the one abated applying the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior est
jure (he who is before in time is the better in right; priority in time gives preference in law).
Generally, the later case is the one abated applying the maxim qui prior est tempore, potior est
jure (he who is before in time is the better in right; priority in time gives preference in law).
However, there are limitations to this rule as discussed in Victronics Computers, Inc. v. Regional
Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati, 217 SCRA 517 (1993): In our jurisdiction, the law itself does not
specifically require that the pending action which would hold in abatement the other must be a
pending prior action. Thus, in Teodoro vs. Mirasol, this Court observed: It is to be noted that the
Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action.
They provide that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful
detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action. We find,
therefore, no error in the ruling of the court a quo that plaintiff’s action should be dismissed on
the ground of the pendency of another more appropriate action between the same parties and
for the same cause. Pryce Corporation vs. China Banking Corporation, 716 SCRA 207, G.R. No.
172302 February 18, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy. Its scope
of review is narrow, limited only to errors of jurisdiction. Errors of judgment can only be reviewed
through an appeal. In Fernando v. Vasquez, 31 SCRA 288 (1970), this Court made a general
distinction between errors of jurisdiction and errors of judgment, thus: An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders
an order or judgment void or voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari; errors
of judgment only by appeal. Let us not lose sight of the true function of the writ of certiorari —
“to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.” And, abuse of discretion
must be so grave and patent to justify the issuance of the writ. Taar vs. Lawan, 842 SCRA 365,
G.R. No. 190922 October 11, 2017
Errors of judgment may involve a court’s appreciation of the facts and conclusions of law drawn
from such facts.
If a court acts within its jurisdiction, then “any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment[.]” In Madrigal Transport,
Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 436 SCRA 123 (2004): The supervisory jurisdiction of a
court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing
the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the
facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the
court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact
— a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy. Taar vs. Lawan, 842 SCRA 365, G.R. No.
190922 October 11, 2017
Errors of jurisdiction are those where the act or acts complained of were done without
jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Milwaukee Industries Corporation v. Court of Tax Appeals, 636 SCRA 70 (2010), discussed these
concepts; thus: Without jurisdiction denotes that the tribunal, board, or officer acted with
absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the public respondent exceeds its
power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion connotes such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
otherwise stated, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law. (Emphasis in the original) The mere allegation of grave abuse of
discretion in a petition for certiorari does not mean that the petition will automatically be given
due course. The general invocation of grave abuse of discretion is insufficient. Parties must satisfy
other exacting requirements under the Rules of Court. Taar vs. Lawan, 842 SCRA 365, G.R. No.
190922 October 11, 2017
The mere possibility of delay arising from an appeal does not warrant direct recourse to a
petition for certiorari.
A petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is specifically
required to have “no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.” Ordinarily, if an appeal can be taken from a judgment or order, then the remedy of
certiorari will not lie. The mere possibility of delay arising from an appeal does not warrant direct
recourse to a petition for certiorari. However, there are exceptions to this rule. For instance, the
availability of an appeal does not necessarily proscribe the institution of a petition for certiorari
if it is shown that an appeal is “inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve a party
from the injurious effects of the order complained of.” In Silvestre v. Torres, 57 Phil. 885 (1933):
[T]he availability of the ordinary recourse of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to
prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari; but it is necessary,
besides, that the ordinary appeal be an adequate remedy, that is, “a remedy which is equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in the future will bring
about a revival of the judgment of the lower court complained of in the certiorari proceeding,
but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that
judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal[.]” Taar vs. Lawan, 842 SCRA 365, G.R.
No. 190922 October 11, 2017
Well-settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost
appeal “especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such
loss or lapse.”
While it is true that courts may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari despite the availability
of appeal, petitioners failed to allege and prove that appeal would be inadequate to promptly
relieve them of the effects of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Office of the President.
Taar vs. Lawan, 842 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 190922 October 11, 2017
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an adverse decision rendered
by a Regional Trial Court (RTC) exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition
for review with the Court of Appeals (CA).
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed
or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition
for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction
Development Company , 857 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a
complaint and the existence of forum shopping are questions of law.
“A question of law exists when the law applicable to a particular set of facts is not settled,
whereas a question of fact arises when the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt.” This
Court has ruled that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a complaint and the
existence of forum shopping are questions of law. A petition for review under Rule 42 may
include questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. This Court has recognized
that the power to hear cases on appeal in which only questions of law are raised is not vested
exclusively in this Court. As provided in Rule 42, Section 2, errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly
committed by the Regional Trial Court in its decision must be specified in the petition for review.
Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Company , 857 SCRA 549,
G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and the Supreme Court (SC) has provided
several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being
litigated. Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which
should not be the case when the initial dispute — an ejectment case — is, by nature and design,
a summary procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.
Petitioner’s direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review
as sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. In Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015): The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy
of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its
designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts
from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they
are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within
those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring
the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances,
the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course,
would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level
would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher
courts, such as the Court of Appeals. Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction
Development Company , 857 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
Regardless of the claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
has jurisdiction over an ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite
jurisdictional facts have been alleged.
Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will remove the
Metropolitan Trial Court’s jurisdiction over the complaint. To emphasize, physical possession, or
de facto possession, is the sole issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regardless of the
claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over an
ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been
alleged, such as in this case. Courts are reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of physical possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace by
requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover possession of real property. Intramuros
Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Company , 857 SCRA 549, G.R. No.
196795 March 7, 2018
A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant’s claim for money or other relief which arises out of,
or is necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the complaint.
A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant’s claim for money or other relief which arises out of,
or is necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the complaint. In Spouses Ponciano v.
Hon. Parentela, Jr., 331 SCRA 605 (2000): A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or
other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of
suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of plaintiff’s complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the
jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in
the future if not set up. Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development
Company , 857 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
In filing complaints and other initiatory pleadings, the plaintiff or petitioner is required to
attach a certification against forum shopping, certifying that (a) no other action or claim
involving the same issues has been filed or is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial
agency, (b) if there is a pending action or claim, the party shall make a complete statement of
its present status, and (c) if the party should learn that the same or similar action has been filed
or is pending, that he or she will report it within five (5) days to the tribunal where the complaint
or initiatory pleading is pending.
In filing complaints and other initiatory pleadings, the plaintiff or petitioner is required to attach
a certification against forum shopping, certifying that (a) no other action or claim involving the
same issues has been filed or is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency, (b) if there
is a pending action or claim, the party shall make a complete statement of its present status, and
(c) if the party should learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, that he
or she will report it within five (5) days to the tribunal where the complaint or initiatory pleading
is pending. Eversely Childs Sanitarium vs. Barbarona, 860 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 195814 April 4,
2018
A motion is not presumed to have already been acted upon by its mere filing.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, mistakenly presumed that the mere filing of a
motion to withdraw has the effect of withdrawing the motion for reconsideration without having
to await the action of the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General’s basis is its reading
of Rule VI, Section 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals: Section 15. Effect of
Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court.—No motion for reconsideration or rehearing shall be
acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is
subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed
abandoned. This would have been true had the Office of the Solicitor General merely manifested
that it had already considered its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals as
abandoned, pursuant to its Internal Rules. However, it filed a Motion to Withdraw, effectively
submitting the withdrawal of its Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals’ sound
discretion. Eversely Childs Sanitarium vs. Barbarona, 860 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 195814 April 4,
2018
Ordinarily, “a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.”
When the Court of Appeals denied the Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion for
Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to Withdraw, the latter was effectively denied.
Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping when it filed its Petition before this Court despite a
pending Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. To rule in this manner,
however, is to unnecessarily deprive petitioner of its day in court despite the Court of Appeals’
failure to apply its own Internal Rules. The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals clearly provide
that a subsequent motion for reconsideration shall be deemed abandoned if the movant filed a
petition for review or motion for extension of time to file a petition for review before this Court.
Eversely Childs Sanitarium vs. Barbarona, 860 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 195814 April 4, 2018
Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by the allegations stated in the complaint.
Respondents’ Complaint before the Municipal Trial Court states: That [the occupants] are
presently occupying the above mentioned property of the [Spouses Barbarona] without color [of]
right or title. Such occupancy is purely by mere tolerance. Indeed, [the occupants’] occupying the
lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations
with the [Spouses Barbarona]. Indeed, no mention has been made as to how petitioner came to
possess the property and as to what acts constituted tolerance on the part of respondents or
their predecessors-in-interest to allow petitioner’s occupation. Eversely Childs Sanitarium vs.
Barbarona, 860 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 195814 April 4, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The signing of the verification by some petitioners already served the purpose contemplated by
the verification.
This Court, as emphasized in Altres v. Empleo, 573 SCRA 583 (2008), has consistently applied the
substantial compliance rule when it comes to a supposedly defective verification and certification
against forum shopping attached to a petition. Altres, citing Tan v. Ballena, 557 SCRA 229 (2008),
mentioned that the purpose of a verification was to assure this Court that a petition contains
allegations that are true, and that it was filed in good faith. Thus, the signing of the verification
by some petitioners already served the purpose contemplated by the verification. However,
when it comes to the certification against forum shopping, Altres ruled that the non-signing
petitioners shall be dropped from the petition. Cordillera Global Network vs. Paje, 901 SCRA
261, G.R. No. 215988 April 10, 2019
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Apart from a motion to lift order of default, other remedies are available to a defaulted
defendant even after judgment has been rendered.
Indeed, apart from a motion to lift order of default, other remedies are available to a defaulted
defendant even after judgment has been rendered. Thus, if judgment had already been rendered
but has not yet become final and executory, an appeal asserting that the judgment was contrary
to the law or to the evidence, or a motion for new trial under Rule 37, may be filed. In the case
of the latter, the same affidavits as are required in a motion to lift order of default must be
attached. If judgment has become final and executory, a defaulted defendant may file a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38. Still, should the defaulted defendant fail to file a petition
for relief, a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic
fraud remains available. Manuel vs. Ong, 738 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 205249 October 15, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both
the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest
in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 767 SCRA
282, G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
The general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to
bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 767 SCRA 282, G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.
The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist,
or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), 767 SCRA 282, G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995), “such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for
the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 767 SCRA 282, G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action.
It is true that “[i]t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action.” Cotoner-Zacarias vs. Revilla, 740 SCRA 51, G.R. No. 190901
November 12, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
It is elementary that “[a]ppeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege.” As such,
one who wishes to file an appeal “must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in
which the right to appeal is lost.” It is just as basic that a judgment can no longer be disturbed,
altered, or modified as soon as it becomes final and executory; “nothing is more settled in
law.” Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to
rest. Accordingly, [a final judgment] may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest court of the land. Gatmaytan vs. Dolor, 818 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 198120 February
20, 2017
Once a judgment becomes final, the court or tribunal loses jurisdiction, and any modified
judgment that it issues, as well as all proceedings taken for this purpose are null and void.
This elementary rule finds basis in “public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some
definite date fixed by law.” Basic rationality dictates that there must be an end to litigation. Any
contrary posturing renders justice inutile, reducing to futility the winning party’s capacity to
benefit from the resolution of a case. In accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final order
from which it arose shall become final. Gatmaytan vs. Dolor, 818 SCRA 100, G.R. No. 198120
February 20, 2017
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court; It is not without
exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses
and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness’ credibility
through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as
the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. Go vs. People, 677 SCRA
213, G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority,
justice, and dignity.
This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect
contempt. There is a contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the Regional Trial Court’s
Orders. Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its
authority, justice, and dignity. It constitutes conduct which “tends to bring the authority of the
court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
Direct Contempt
Indirect Contempt
Indirect contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her]
official duties or in his [or her] official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any
unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or
an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority; (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly
served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him [or her]. (Emphasis supplied) Indirect
contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given
to the party charged. Oca vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA 615, G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge “for
the benefit of the other party.” A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the
court’s authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.
Oca vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA 615, G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or
decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of another party.
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or
decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement
and the preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party-in-interest in the
proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor’s punishment is to compel obedience to the order.
Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt
is not necessary to prove it. Oca vs. Custodio, 832 SCRA 615, G.R. No. 199825 July 26, 2017
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may dispense with trial and
proceed to decide a case if from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Trial “is the judicial examination and determination of the issues between the parties to the
action.” During trial, parties “present their respective evidence of their claims and defenses.”
Parties to an action have the right “to a plenary trial of the case” to ensure that they were given
a right to fully present evidence on their respective claims. There are instances, however, when
trial may be dispensed with. Olivarez Realty Corporation vs. Castillo, 729 SCRA 544, G.R. No.
196251 July 9, 2014
A motion for summary judgment is filed either by the claimant or the defending party.
The trial court then hears the motion for summary judgment. If indeed there are no genuine
issues of material fact, the trial court shall issue summary judgment. Section 3, Rule 35 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.—The motion
shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party
may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admission at least three (3) days before the
hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. Olivarez Realty Corporation vs. Castillo, 729 SCRA 544, G.R.
No. 196251 July 9, 2014
A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings. Under Rule 34
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case decided
through judgment on the pleadings if the answer filed fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the claimant’s pleading. Judgment on the pleadings is proper when
the answer filed fails to tender any issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations in the
complaint. On the other hand, in a summary judgment, the answer filed tenders issues as specific
denials and affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the issues raised are sham, fictitious, or
otherwise not genuine. Olivarez Realty Corporation vs. Castillo, 729 SCRA 544, G.R. No. 196251
July 9, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis for dismissing an appeal for failure to file
the appellant’s brief within the required period.
Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis for dismissing an appeal for failure to file
the appellant’s brief within the required period: RULE 50 Dismissal of Appeal Section 1. Grounds
for Dismissal of Appeal.—An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion
or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: . . . . (e) Failure of the appellant to serve and
file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these
Rules[.] With the use of the permissive “may,” it has been held that the dismissal is directory, not
mandatory, with the discretion to be exercised soundly and “in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play” and “having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.” Sindophil,
Inc. vs. Republic, 884 SCRA 555, G.R. No. 204594 November 7, 2018
The introduction of new evidence even after a party has rested its case may, therefore, be done
but only if the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it is for good reasons and in the furtherance of
justice.
The admission is discretionary on the part of the court and, as explained in Republic, may only be
set aside if the admission was done with grave abuse of discretion or: [T]he capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or
to act at all in contemplation of the law. Sindophil, Inc. vs. Republic, 884 SCRA 555, G.R. No.
204594 November 7, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No branch clerk of court shall demand and/or receive commissioner’s fees for reception of
evidence ex-parte.
Chapter II, Section B of the Manual for Clerks of Court, published in 1991 provides (Specific Duties
of Court Employees): x x x x x x x x x When so directed by the Judge, the Branch Clerk of Court (in
a branch of a multi-sala court) receives evidence ex-parte in petitions for appointment of
administrators and/or executors, receivers, guardians, accounting reports and similar incidents.
x x x No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and/or receive commissioner’s fees for reception of
evidence ex-parte. Concepcion vs. Hubilla, 397 SCRA 640, Adm. Matter No. P-02-1594 February
19, 2003
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Attendance by the party and its counsel during a pretrial conference is mandatory as expressly
stated under the Rules.
Petitioner alleges that it filed a motion for postponement of the first pretrial setting. This
notwithstanding, it was still its duty to appear at the pretrial first set on May 8, 2000. A motion
for postponement should never be presumed to be granted. National Power Corporation vs.
Asoque, 802 SCRA 582, G.R. No. 172507 September 14, 2016
A pretrial cannot be taken for granted for it serves a vital objective: the simplification and
expedition of the trial, if not its dispensation.
Under the circumstances, petitioner cannot claim that it was denied due process. “Parties are
presumed to have known the governing rules and the consequences for the violation of such
rules.” Moreover, the essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was given
that opportunity. Yet, it failed to appear at the two (2) pretrial settings. A pretrial cannot be taken
for granted for it serves a vital objective: the simplification and expedition of the trial, if not its
dispensation. Nonappearance of a party may only be excused for a valid cause. We see none in
this case. National Power Corporation vs. Asoque, 802 SCRA 582, G.R. No. 172507 September
14, 2016
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent
to an acquittal.
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to
an acquittal. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal;
any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
Testimonial evidence is offered “at the time [a] witness is called to testify.” Documentary and
object evidence, on the other hand, are offered “after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence.” Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless permission
is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.
Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial
evidence is offered “at the time [a] witness is called to testify.” Documentary and object
evidence, on the other hand, are offered “after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence.” Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless permission is
given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. More importantly, the Rules specifically
provides that evidence must be formally offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not
offered is excluded in the determination of the case. “Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it.” Republic vs. Gimenez, 778
SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
Any document or object that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it was
“formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-
examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it.”
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due
process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them
and take the necessary actions to secure their case. Hence, any document or object that was
marked for identification is not evidence unless it was “formally offered and the opposing counsel
[was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or
identify it.” Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
The Supreme Court (SC) has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence.
This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence: A demurrer to
evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim.
It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.
Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion
to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence: What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based
on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and
the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits
of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA
261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character,
or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of
a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication
in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing,
deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking
the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a
private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court
before its acceptance as evidence in court. Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673
January 11, 2016
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. The difference between the admissibility of
evidence and the determination of its probative weight is canonical. Admissibility of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to [be] considered at
all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not
it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its
evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the
author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation
the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. Republic vs. Gimenez, 778
SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Execution issues as a matter of right only “upon the expiration of the period to appeal . . . if no
appeal has been duly perfected.”
The Regional Trial Court denied the Office of the Solicitor General’s Notice of Appeal and the
Department of Budget and Management’s Motion for Reconsideration in the Joint Order dated
March 20, 2009. From this date, the parties had 15 days to file an ordinary appeal, a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals or a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
They also had 60 days to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. Despite these clear periods for appeal, the Regional Trial Court
issued a Certificate of Finality of Judgment and a Writ of Execution on March 23, 2009, or a mere
three (3) calendar days from the issuance of its Joint Order. Republic vs. Cortez, 817 SCRA 19,
G.R. No. 187257, G.R. No. 187776 February 7, 2017
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are void.
The constitutional requirement that the basis of the decision of our courts should be clearly
articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely assure fairness. It is likewise crucial
to assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions on the basis of reasonable
inference from credible and admissible evidence and the text of law and our jurisprudence.
Decisions of all courts should not be based on any other considerations. Not only will fully
coherent and cogent reasons have greater chances to convince the litigants of their chances on
appeal; they also make appeals possible. After all, appellate courts cannot be assumed to have
so much omniscience that they can read what the trial judge has not written. Philippine National
Bank vs. Heirs of the Late Ireneo and Caridad Entapa, 802 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 215072 September
7, 2016
Obiter dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it.”
Even if the Court of Appeals had adjudicated upon the merits of the case, any discussion would
have been considered obiter dictum since the entire case was remanded to the trial court. Obiter
dictum is “an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to
the decision of the case before it.”
It is a “a remark made, or opinion expressed . . . upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument.” It
“lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such.” Philippine
National Bank vs. Heirs of the Late Ireneo and Caridad Entapa, 802 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 215072
September 7, 2016
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Relationship per se of a witness with the victim of the crime does not necessarily mean that the
witness is biased.
Petitioners’ submission that the testimonies of Jacinta del Fierro and Maria Elena Bernardo-
Almaria are hardly believable because the two are relatives of the deceased Ruben Bernardo
cannot hold water. It is a basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim of the
crime does not necessarily mean that the witness is biased. Tadeja vs. People, 496 SCRA 157,
G.R. No. 145336 July 21, 2006
Time and again, the Court has ruled that in cases brought to it from the CA, its review is limited
to errors of law allegedly committed by that court.
At bottom, the issues raised by the petitioners are factual in nature. Time and again, the Court
has ruled that in cases brought to it from the CA, its review is limited to errors of law allegedly
committed by that court. The CA is the final arbiter of questions of fact. Tadeja vs. People, 496
SCRA 157, G.R. No. 145336 July 21, 2006
Where the issues raised on appeal hinge on the credibility of witnesses, the appellate tribunal
will accord due respect to the assessment of facts made by the trial court.
Where the issues raised on appeal hinge on the credibility of witnesses, as in this case, the
appellate tribunal will accord due respect to the assessment of facts made by the trial court, said
court having the best opportunity, not only of directly receiving evidence, but also, of observing
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. Even after a careful scrutiny of the
records of the proceedings before the court of origin, the Court finds it difficult in arriving at a
conclusion that the trial court had erred in its findings. It is clear from an overall examination of
the testimonies of all the witnesses that the prosecution’s version in both cases was indeed the
more logical and straightforward one, hence more worthy of belief. Tadeja vs. People, 496 SCRA
157, G.R. No. 145336 July 21, 2006
It must be remembered that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Petitioners pleads the Court to acquit them on the basis of reasonable doubt. The conviction,
however, still stands. It must be remembered that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. We find that the two courts below had not erred in arriving at a moral
certainty as to the guilt of the petitioners for the offense of homicide charged against them in
Criminal Case No. Z-814. Tadeja vs. People, 496 SCRA 157, G.R. No. 145336 July 21, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The procedure for appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 outlined.
Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period for
appeal from final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted from
notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at forty-eight
(48) hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no
longer required except in appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides
that in these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on appeal
is required. Moreover, Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be
required for an appeal, and Section 4 thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a
final order or judgment. Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japson, 142 SCRA 208, No. L-70895 May
30, 1986
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The
period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, 469
SCRA 633, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. Neypes
vs. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Neypes vs. Court of Appeals,
469 SCRA 633, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly
complied with. A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is
dismissed outright.
Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be
counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The period counted from the
finality of judgment or final order is the six-month period. Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure states: Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.—A petition
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty
(60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Madarang vs. Morales, 725 SCRA
480, G.R. No. 199283 June 9, 2014
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment
may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. A petition for
relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in exceptional cases. It is not
available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for new trial or appeal. Madarang vs. Morales,
725 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 199283 June 9, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and
unalterable.
A final and executory judgment produces certain effects. Winning litigants are entitled to the
satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. On the other hand, courts are barred
from modifying the rights and obligations of the parties, which had been adjudicated upon. They
have the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. It is a fundamental
principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The
primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be modified or
amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or amendment is
to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment is a matter of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical consideration that
every litigation must come to an end. Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 838 SCRA 221, G.R.
No. 197654 August 30, 2017
Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may result from
inadvertence. These errors can be rectified without violating the doctrine of immutability of
judgment provided that the modification does not affect the substance of the controversy.
Clerical errors are best exemplified by typographical errors or arithmetic miscalculations. They
also include instances when words are interchanged. Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 838
SCRA 221, G.R. No. 197654 August 30, 2017
A judgment nunc pro tunc is made to enter into the record an act previously done by the court,
which had been omitted either through inadvertence or mistake.
“Nunc pro tunc” is a Latin phrase that means “now for then.” A judgment nunc pro tunc is made
to enter into the record an act previously done by the court, which had been omitted either
through inadvertence or mistake. It neither operates to correct judicial errors nor to “supply
omitted action by the court.” Its sole purpose is to make a present record of a “judicial action
which has been actually taken.” The concept of nunc pro tunc judgments was sufficiently
explained in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 (1923), thus: [A judgment nunc pro tunc] may be
used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought
to have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered,
or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors
or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence, a court in entering
a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to enter
of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of
record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc
presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgment will not furnish
the basis for such an entry. Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 838 SCRA 221, G.R. No. 197654
August 30, 2017
The exercise of issuing nunc pro tunc orders or judgments is narrowly confined to cases where
there is a need to correct mistakes or omissions arising from inadvertence so that the record
reflects judicial action, which had previously been taken.
Furthermore, nunc pro tunc judgments or orders can only be rendered if none of the parties will
be prejudiced. Parties seeking the issuance of nunc pro tunc judgments or orders must allege and
prove that the court took a particular action and that the action was omitted through
inadvertence. On the other hand, courts must ensure that the matters sought to be entered are
supported by facts or data. This may be accomplished by referring to the records of the case.
The doctrine of immutability of judgment is premised upon the existence of a final and
executory judgment. It is, therefore, inapplicable where the judgment never attains finality, as
in the case of void judgments.
Void judgments produce “no legal [or] binding effect.” Hence, they are deemed nonexistent. They
may result from the “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter” or a lack of jurisdiction over the
person of either of the parties. They may also arise if they were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 838
SCRA 221, G.R. No. 197654 August 30, 2017
A void judgment never acquires the status of a final and executory judgment.
Parties may, therefore, challenge them without running afoul of the doctrine of immutability of
judgment. A direct attack may be brought either through a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. A void judgment may also be challenged collaterally “by assailing its validity in another
action where it is invoked.” Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 838 SCRA 221, G.R. No.
197654 August 30, 2017
A writ of execution that exceeds the tenor of the judgment is patently void and should be struck
down.
Another effect of a final and executory judgment is that winning litigants are entitled to the
satisfaction of the judgment through a writ of execution. A writ of execution must substantially
conform to the judgment sought to be enforced. Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 838 SCRA
221, G.R. No. 197654 August 30, 2017
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction
over: (a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the
parties; and (d) the remedy.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and decide
cases of a general class. It is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is not acquired through
The court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing
it under the court’s custody. Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the power of the court to make
decisions that are binding on persons. The courts acquire jurisdiction over complainants or
petitioners as soon as they file their complaints or petitions. Over the persons of defendants or
respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a valid service of summons or through their voluntary
submission. Generally, a person voluntarily submits to the court’s jurisdiction when he or she
participates in the trial despite improper service of summons. De Pedro vs. Romasan
Development Corporation, 743 SCRA 52, G.R. No. 194751 November 26, 2014
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted from their jurisdiction.
The relation of due process to jurisdiction is recognized even in administrative cases wherein the
standard of evidence is relatively lower. Thus, in Montoya v. Varilla, 574 SCRA 831 (2008): The
cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
from their jurisdiction.
The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. De Pedro
vs. Romasan Development Corporation, 743 SCRA 52, G.R. No. 194751 November 26, 2014
Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground for annulment of judgments, circumstances that
negate the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction — including defective service of summons — are
causes for an action for annulment of judgments.
However, this court had an occasion to say that an action for annulment of judgment “may not
be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of
those remedies through his own fault or negligence.”
Thus, an action for annulment of judgment is not always readily available even if there are causes
for annulling a judgment. De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, 743 SCRA 52, G.R.
No. 194751 November 26, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law shall be applied on
a given set of facts. Questions of law do “not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented.” Its resolution rests solely on the application of a law given the
circumstances. There is a question of fact when the court is required to examine the truth or
falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact “invites a review of the evidence.” Republic vs.
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, 717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014
Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[n]o appeal may
be taken from [a]n order denying a motion for reconsideration,” is based on the implied
premise in the same section that the judgment or order does not completely dispose of the case.
We take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules of Court, which
provides that “[n]o appeal may be taken from [a]n order denying a x x x motion for
reconsideration,” is based on the implied premise in the same section that the judgment or order
does not completely dispose of the case. The pertinent portion of Rule 41, Section 1 provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable. In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an
interlocutory order. An interlocutory order or judgment, unlike a final order or judgment, does
“not completely dispose of the case [because it leaves to the court] something else to be decided
upon.” Appeals from interlocutory orders are generally prohibited to prevent delay in the
administration of justice and to prevent “undue burden upon the courts.” Republic vs. Ortigas
and Company Limited Partnership, 717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders.
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for
reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if “it puts an end to a
particular matter,” leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the decision. “An
appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint
is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.”
It is an appeal from a final decision or order. The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic
of the Philippines’ motion for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the
authority to sell its property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it
completely disposed of a particular matter.
An appeal from it would not cause delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of
the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the
former used the wrong mode of appeal. Republic vs. Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership,
717 SCRA 601, G.R. No. 171496 March 3, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
respondent Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation’s application for injunctive relief. A
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued “to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury
to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.”
In Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 110 (2002): A preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from
a particular act. As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may
therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose
during the pendency of the principal action. x x x
necessary to prevent irreparable injury.” Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office vs. De Leon, 877
SCRA 638, G.R. Nos. 236577 and 236597 August 15, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Clearly, a writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result
of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the judge
to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot simply as a
result of the parties’ having to go through the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its
merits. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) vs. City Advertising Ventures
Corporation, 808 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 182944 November 9, 2016
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte “to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction[,] which cannot be issued ex parte.”
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte “to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction[,] which cannot be issued ex parte.”
Otherwise stated, a trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior
hearing for a limited period of 72 hours “if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury.” In this instance, a summary hearing, separate
from the application of the preliminary injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour
temporary restraining order should be extended. Evy Construction and Development
Corporation vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, 842 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 207938 October
11, 2017
A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for twenty (20) days “[i]f it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.”
A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for 20 days “[i]f it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.” The trial court has 20 days
from its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the
application for preliminary injunction during this period, the temporary restraining order is
deemed to have expired. Notably, the Rules do not require that a hearing on the application for
preliminary injunction be conducted during this period. Evy Construction and Development
Corporation vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, 842 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 207938 October
11, 2017
While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in every
application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Section 5
requires a hearing only if an application for preliminary injunction is granted.
Thus, Section 5 states that “[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.” Inversely stated, an application for
preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that
of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Evy
Construction and Development Corporation vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, 842
SCRA 464, G.R. No. 207938 October 11, 2017
Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction “is an order granted at any stage
of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts” or an order “requir[ing] the
performance of a particular act or acts.”
It is an ancillary relief granted by the court where the main action or proceeding is pending. In
order to be granted the writ, it must be established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is considered an “extraordinary
event,” being a “strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy.” Thus, the power to issue the
writ “should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation.’’
Evy Construction and Development Corporation vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, 842
SCRA 464, G.R. No. 207938 October 11, 2017
An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with “actual and existing substantial rights” or
rights in esse; Thus, the writ will not issue to applicants whose rights are merely contingent or
to compel or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of action.
Further, the applicant must show “that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and
that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.” Thus,
the writ will not issue to applicants whose rights are merely contingent or to compel or restrain
acts that do not give rise to a cause of action. Evy Construction and Development Corporation
vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, 842 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 207938 October 11, 2017
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It is both a principal remedy and a
provisional relief.
Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It is both a principal remedy and a
provisional relief. When utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of
personal property that may have been wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a
provisional relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the contested property during the pendency of the
action. Enriquez vs. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., 877 SCRA 447, G.R. No. 210950 August
15, 2018
Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the party seeking the issuance of the writ must first file the
required affidavit and a bond in an amount that is double the value of the property.
As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for the delivery of the property before
the commencement of the action or at any time before an answer is filed. Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court outlines the procedure for the application of a writ of replevin. Rule 60, Section 2 requires
that the party seeking the issuance of the writ must first file the required affidavit and a bond in
an amount that is double the value of the property. Enriquez vs. The Mercantile Insurance Co.,
Inc., 877 SCRA 447, G.R. No. 210950 August 15, 2018
Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the court, the court issues an order and
a writ of seizure requiring the sheriff to take the property into his or her custody. If there is no
further objection to the bond filed within five (5) days from the taking of the property, the
sheriff shall deliver it to the applicant.
Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the court, the court issues an order and a
writ of seizure requiring the sheriff to take the property into his or her custody. If there is no
further objection to the bond filed within five (5) days from the taking of the property, the sheriff
shall deliver it to the applicant. The contested property remains in the applicant’s custody until
the court determines, after a trial on the issues, which among the parties has the right of
possession. Enriquez vs. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., 877 SCRA 447, G.R. No. 210950
August 15, 2018
Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court, only Rule 60, Section 2 requires
that the amount of the bond be double the value of the property.
The other provisional remedies provide that the amount be fixed by court or be merely equal to
the value of the property. There is a rationale to the requirement that the bond for a writ of
seizure in a replevin be double the value of the property. The bond functions not only to
indemnify the defendant in case the property is lost, but also to answer for any damages that
may be awarded by the court if the judgment is rendered in defendant’s favor. Enriquez vs. The
Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., 877 SCRA 447, G.R. No. 210950 August 15, 2018
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; The function of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to
select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform
the act required. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to
the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent
to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion and
the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel
a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC
do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial
positions is discretionary, not ministerial.
More so, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment
to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of
candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the
discretion of the JBC. Villanueva vs. Judicial and Bar Council, 755 SCRA 182, G.R. No. 211833
April 7, 2015
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance.
“The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity
of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.”
“[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations
of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or
compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach.” Villanueva vs. Judicial and
Bar Council, 755 SCRA 182, G.R. No. 211833 April 7, 2015
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus
is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative
duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, Jr., 517
SCRA 657, G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise
indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court,
rather than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court
other than by a pleading and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to
the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. Settled is
the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the
court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule
is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion before
the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process. Festin vs. Zubiri, 827
SCRA 181, A.C. No. 11600 June 19, 2017
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; Exceptions.
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or
agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. Jurisprudence states that “[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and]
not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the
writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain,
speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. x x x.” In this light, certain exceptions
were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of
a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. These are: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, G.R. Nos.
217126-27 November 10, 2015
A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, it is nonetheless proper
to resolve the issue on the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for
certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale
is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Hence, it should be
preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this
Court to be heard on this issue, as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment
to the Ombudsman’s Memorandum. That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable
objection against ruling on this issue. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774
SCRA 431, G.R. Nos. 217126-27 November 10, 2015
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Rule 65, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the court, upon the filing of a petition for
certiorari, shall determine if it is sufficient in form and substance. Once it finds the petition to
be sufficient, it shall issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition.
Under the Rules of Court, there are two (2) types of civil actions: (1) ordinary civil actions; and (2)
special civil actions. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions. However, special
civil actions, such as petitions for certiorari, are further subject to certain specific rules. Rule 65,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the court, upon the filing of a petition for certiorari,
shall determine if it is sufficient in form and substance. Once it finds the petition to be sufficient,
it shall issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the petition: SECTION 6. Order
to Comment.—If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process, the court
shall issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in
such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes
thereto. In petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 56, shall be observed. Before giving due course thereto, the court
may require the respondents to file their comment to, and not a motion to dismiss, the petition.
Thereafter, the court may require the filing of a reply and such other responsive or other
pleadings as it may deem necessary and proper. Lim vs. Lim, 906 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 214163 July
1, 2019
Compared with an ordinary civil action, where summons must be issued upon the filing of the
complaint, the court need only issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the
petition for certiorari.
Compared with an ordinary civil action, where summons must be issued upon the filing of the
complaint, the court need only issue an order requiring the respondents to comment on the
petition for certiorari. “Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the
court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.” In any case,
despite petitioners’ insistence that they were not served with summons, it must be noted that
on January 29, 2014, the Regional Trial Court served the summons and a copy of the Petition on
petitioner Ronald, through his counsel Attorney Alfredo Arungayan III (Atty. Arungayan).
Similarly, the People of the Philippines, as represented by the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, and
Judge Ofelia M. Artuz, through her Branch Clerk of Court, were served with summons and copies
of the Petition on January 30, 2014. Lim vs. Lim, 906 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 214163 July 1, 2019
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from jurisdiction over the subject matter; Generally,
jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court.
Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction
over the remedy pertains to the court’s competence over the process. This should not be
confused with the relief, that which the party filing the case wants the court to declare, and which
addresses the breach of the right or obligation. The source of jurisdiction is important. Generally,
jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court. Thus, it is mainly a procedural
matter which this Court — the authority that promulgates the Rules of Court — may change ad
hoc, or clarify the application or interpretation of, in proper cases. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, 922 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 214546
October 9, 2019
“Subject matter” in jurisdiction over the subject matter can refer to: (a) the cause of action, or
the breach of legal right or legal duty; or (b) the res, or the thing over which the legal right or
duty breached subsists.
The source of jurisdiction over the subject matter is generally conferred by law. This is why the
doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties. Laws can only be
amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that parties do in any case can change it. Thus, the
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised even for the first time on appeal,
not simply because it is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but mainly because it is the law that
prescribes it. Parenthetically, “subject matter” in jurisdiction over the subject matter can refer
to: (a) the cause of action, or the breach of legal right or legal duty; or (b) the res, or the thing
over which the legal right or duty breached subsists. In forcible entry or unlawful detainer actions,
the subject matter refers to a breach of the general right to actual possession, which is an
attribute of ownership and the res which is always real property. Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, 922 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 214546
October 9, 2019
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Procedural rules of even the most mandatory character may be suspended upon a showing of
circumstances warranting the exercise of liberality in its strict application.
Petitioner admits that her Memorandum of Appeal was filed nine (9) days beyond the 15-day
period but that the Regional Trial Court opted to resolve her case on its merits in the interest of
substantial justice. Rule 40, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states the procedure of appeal before
the Regional Trial Court. It provides: Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.—(a) Upon
receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court shall notify the parties of such fact. (b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be
the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed
to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the appellant’s memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum.
Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (c)
Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the
case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
as are filed. Cruz vs. Christensen, 842 SCRA 65, G.R. No. 205539 October 4, 2017