2024-Escauriaga v. Fitness First Phil. Inc.
2024-Escauriaga v. Fitness First Phil. Inc.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J : p
The Case
Petitioners Rico B. Escauriaga (Escauriaga) Cristine Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Rene B. Severino
(Severino), Ralph Errol Mercado (Mercado), and Geraldine Guevarra (Guevarra) assail the following
dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 165342 titled Rico B. Escauriaga, Cristine Dela
Cruz, Rene B. Severino, Ralph Errol Mercado, and Geraldine Guevarra v. The Honorable National
Labor Relations Commission (Fourth Division), Fitness First, Phil., Inc.[,] and Liberty Cruz:
1) Decision 1 dated August 18, 2022 affirming the finding of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) that petitioners are independent contractors and the dismissal of
petitioners' petition for relief from judgment; and
2) Resolution 2 dated March 24, 2023 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedents
In their Complaint 3 dated June 9, 2017, petitioners sued respondents Fitness First Phil., Inc.
(Fitness First) and its Senior Human Resource Manager Liberty Cruz (Cruz) for illegal dismissal,
regularization, and other monetary claims. 4 They alleged: 5 HTcADC
As fitness trainers, they sold and marketed respondents' physical health training programs and
packages. With respondents' equipment, they also conducted actual training sessions for their clients
and were paid fixed monthly salaries, 13th month pay, and commissions. 8 On different dates,
however, they were reclassified as freelance trainers:
i) Rico Escauriaga — May 1, 2012
ii) Junnie Ordoña — October 1, 2013
iii) Rene Severino — January 1, 2008
iv) Geraldine Guevarra — December 1, 2013
v) Cristine Dela Cruz — May 1, 2012
vi) Peter John Fullante — July 1, 2013
vii) Ralph Errol Mercado — July 1, 2007 9
As freelance fitness trainers, they were paid their salaries but the other labor benefits, i.e., 13th
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month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, and rest day pay were discontinued. They were allowed to work
at their own choice of time so long as they trained clients for a minimum of 90 hours per month and
PHP80,000.00 worth of physical training program or package. Hours in between trainings were
excluded in the 90-hour cap and failure to meet quota translated to salary deduction, or worse,
disciplinary action such that repeated failure to meet the quota may subject them to warning,
suspension, and even termination of employment. 10
On March 20, 2017, respondents required them to register their alleged freelance business as
required by Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Regulation No. 4-2014 11 re: Guidelines and Policies for
the Monitoring of Service Fees of Professionals. They were assured a 3% increase in their commission
upon compliance. Non compliance, on the other hand, was penalized with 20% deduction in their
commission and termination or non-renewal of their freelance agreement. Believing they were regular
employees, they did not comply. 12 CAIHTE
Though they did not possess substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, machinery,
and work premises, they were engaged to perform activities necessary and desirable in the usual
business or trade of respondents — to conduct physical training for the clients of respondents. 13
Lastly, the agreement was a contract of adhesion, and they had no idea about the legal consequences
thereof. 14
Respondents 15 countered that petitioners, who were initially hired as instructors, were later on
promoted as freelance personal trainers. As such, they were independent contractors who were not
required to observe fixed hours of work. They were required, however, one, to guarantee a minimum
fixed monthly sale and conduct 90 hours of training; and two, to observe relevant house rules in
dealing with their clients. Petitioners since then renewed their contract until February 1, 2016. This
type of employment arrangement is distinguished from fitness instructors who were required to render
work nine hours a day, six days a week. 16
All trainers start as full-time instructors. A progressive commission scheme allows instructors
who have obtained a certain level of skill and training to get promoted as freelance personal trainers to
take advantage of the higher commissions and flexible working hours. A freelance personal trainer
though may revert to being an instructor by manifesting his or her decision to the human resource
department. 17
In compliance with BIR Revenue Regulations No. 4-2014, 18 it offered a 3% increase in
commission for those who will register their freelance business with the BIR. Those who fail to register
by October 30, 2017, shall suffer termination or non-renewal of their agreement. Only 62 of its
freelance trainers complied. Hence, on March 20, 2017, it revoked its offer of higher commission. On
June 29, 2017, they then offered petitioners to revert to being instructors. Petitioners, however, would
want to enjoy the benefits of both an instructor and freelance trainer. They reiterated their offer on July
18, 2017 but to no avail. 19
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
By Decision 20 dated April 5, 2018, the labor arbiter declared petitioners as independent
contractors, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds that complainants are
independent contractors, and there is no basis for their claim of constructive dismissal. The
complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Other claims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit.21
The labor arbiter held that the selection of petitioners based on their expertise was indicative of
their nature as independent contractors. 22 They voluntarily signed the freelance agreement,
successively renewed for years, and were paid on commission basis. 23 They also undertook the
responsibility to pay and remit their respective monthly contributions to the Social Security System
without fail and to file the required income tax returns on time. 24 The parties may terminate the
agreement with or without cause. 25 aScITE
Even if the relationship of the parties was to be gauged under the power of control test, they
would still be considered as independent contractors. As freelance trainers, they were not required to
report for work on a fixed schedule. They controlled the time and manner they conduct physical training
with their respective clients. 26
As for petitioners' monetary claims, the same were denied for lack of merit. 27
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Ruling of the NLRC
Through its Decision 28 dated December 28, 2018, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter. It
essentially ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties as shown by
the freelance agreement. Too, petitioners failed to show that respondents reserved not only the right to
control the end to be achieved but also the means used in the performance of their work.
Petitioners moved to reconsider but the same got denied by Resolution 29 dated February 28,
2019.
Per Entry of Judgement dated May 23, 2019, the Decision dated December 28, 2018 lapsed into
finality on April 12, 2019. 30
On June 26, 2019, petitioners moved 31 to recall Entry of judgment ad cautelam on the ground
that they were yet to receive the resolution of their motion for reconsideration.
On August 27, 2019, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment 32 praying anew that the
Entry of Judgment dated May 23, 2019, be set aside having been entered through extrinsic fraud which
precluded them from availing of the remedies provided for by law. Per the Bailiff's Return dated March
27, 2019, it was the Decision dated December 28, 2018 and not the Resolution dated February 28,
2019 as shown by the shaded box beside the words "Decision dated" which was furnished them.
In its Resolution 33 dated October 31, 2019, the NLRC denied the Petition for Relief from
Judgment. Contrary to the claim of petitioners, they were duly furnished a copy of the Resolution dated
February 28, 2019. Though the box beside the phrase "Decision dated" was shaded, the item beside
Resolution dated bore the date 2/28/2019. Too, the date of service "4/2/19" was annotated with
"refused to receive." Despite the issuance of the Entry of Judgment, petitioners were not precluded
from filing a Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners moved to reconsider but the same got denied by Resolution 34 dated December 27,
2019. DETACa
Procedural considerations
Respondents move for the dismissal of the Petition on the following grounds: one, only petitioner
Escauriaga signed the Petition sans proof that he was duly authorized to sign on behalf of his co-
petitioners; two, not all the counsels of petitioners signed the pleading; three, petitioners erroneously
impleaded the NLRC as respondent in violation of Rule 45, Section 4, 53 of the Rules of Court; and
lastly, the assailed Decision and Resolution dated December 28, 2018 and February 28, 2019 of the
NLRC long attained finality.
Generally, the verification and certification against forum shopping must be signed by all
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rule. 54 Here, Dela Cruz,
Severino, Mercado, and Guevarra share the same cause with Escauriaga in advancing their right to
regular employment against respondents.
As for the fact that not all the counsels of petitioners signed the pleading before the Court, the
same deserves scant consideration since a genuine signature of one counsel suffices to consider a
pleading signed. 55
To recall, per Entry of Judgment dated May 23, 2019, the Decision dated December 28, 2018
lapsed into finality on April 12, 2019. Petitioners claim that they were never served with the assailed
February 28, 2019 Resolution of the NLRC denying their reconsideration. They wasted no time to file,
albeit prohibited, a Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment on June 26, 2019 and a Petition for Relief from
Judgment on August 27, 2019. The NLRC and the appellate court upheld the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties of Bailiff Edilberto C. Arguil despite his inadvertent shading of "Decision" in
the Bailiff's Return when what was clearly being served was the NLRC's Resolution dated February 28,
2019. The lower tribunals added that petitioners could have seasonably filed a Petition for Certiorari
until June 2, 2019, but they opted to file a prohibited pleading on August 27, 2019.
A departure from the doctrine on immutability of judgment is warranted because its strict
application would defeat the constitutional policy on the protection of labor, especially so considering
the meritorious stance of petitioners in this case and the apparent misapprehension of facts by the
lower tribunals.
The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The Court's primary duty is to
render or dispense justice. A litigation is not a game of technicalities. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to
be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. Litigations
must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his or her cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. 59
In Republic v. Dagondon, 60 the Court relaxed the strict application of the rule on immutability of
judgments holding that the mandatory character of the rule was not designed to be an inflexible tool to
excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic,
fairness, and substantial justice.
Lastly, the Court notes that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a
question of fact. 61 As a general rule, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court may only raise questions of law. The Court is not duty-bound to analyze anew and weigh again
the evidence introduced in the proceedings below and considered by the administrative tribunals. 62
The rule is not without exceptions as when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, 63 as
in this case.
We resolve on the merits.
It is established that petitioners rendered services in favor of respondents. The parties, however,
differ on the employment status or classification of petitioners. Petitioners claim they are regular
employees while respondents counter that they are independent contractors. There is no inflexible rule
to determine if one is an employee or an independent contractor; thus, the characterization of the
relationship must be made based on the circumstances of each case. 64
Notably, the employment status of a person is not defined by what the parties say it should be.
Rather, the employment relationship of parties is prescribed by law. 65 When the status of the
employment is in dispute, the employer bears the burden to prove that the person whose service it
pays for is an independent contractor rather than a regular employee with or without fixed terms. 66
The rule is that where a person who works for another performs his or her job more or less at his or her
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own pleasure, in the manner he or she sees fit, not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and
is compensated according to the result of his or her efforts and not the amount thereof, no employer-
employee relationship exists. 67 ETHIDa
A n independent contractor is one who carries on a distinct and independent business and
undertakes to perform the job, work, or service on one's own account and under one's own
responsibility according to one's own manner and method, free from the control and direction of the
principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. 68
The independent contractor consists of individuals who possess unique skills and talents which set
them apart from ordinary employees and whose means and methods of work are free from the control
of the employer. Under this arrangement, there is no trilateral relationship but a bilateral relationship
because independent contractors are directly engaged by the principal. 69
An independent contractor enjoys independence and freedom from the control and supervision
of his or her principal as opposed to an employee who is subject to the employer's power to control the
means and methods by which the employee's work is to be performed and accomplished. 70
In the resolution of the issue, this Court will employ a two-tiered test: the four-fold test and the
economic dependence test. 71
Under the four-fold test, to establish an employer-employee relationship, four factors must be
proven:
(a) the employer's selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power to dismiss; and
(d) the power to control the employee's conduct. The power of control is the most significant
factor in the four-fold test. 72
On the power of hiring, it is undisputed that respondents engaged petitioners initially as fitness
consultants, and on different dates, they transitioned to become freelance personal trainers.
Respondents' assertion that petitioners were engaged based on their talents and skills does not
necessarily prevent a regular employment status. 73 This is so when read in consonance with
petitioners' repeated engagement as an independent contractor on a fixed one-year term which the
Court construes as an effort to circumvent security of tenure. In Dumpit-Murillo v. Court of Appeals, 74
while the Court recognized the validity of fixed-term employment contracts in a number of cases, it
emphasized that when the circumstances of a case show that the periods were imposed to block the
acquisition of security of tenure, they should be struck down for being contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. TIADCc
On the payment of wages, the Freelance Personal Trainer Agreement specifically mentioned
that petitioners were paid on commission basis:
ARTICLE IV: COMPENSATION
In consideration of the performance by the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER of the
foregoing services, the COMPANY hereby binds itself to pay the FREELANCE PERSONAL
TRAINER a commission, net of value-added tax (V.A.T.), in accordance with the schedule
provided by the Company.
Also, all other training Packages/Services with corresponding applicable commission
schemes/schedule provided by the Company are subject to Value-Added Tax (VAT), if
applicable. 75
Be that as it may, the Labor Code specifically mentions commission basis as one of the forms of
paying wages, or anything paid as remuneration of earnings to employees covered by the Labor Code.
The amount paid to respondents also indicates the nature of the relationship of the parties. 76
Though the subject Agreement here mentioned that the parties may voluntarily terminate the
same with or without cause, the power to dismiss rests with respondents. For one, respondents held
the power to dismiss the freelance personal trainer if it became manifest that the latter was unqualified
or unfit to discharge his or her duties. Article VII of the Freelance Personal Trainer Agreement reads:
ARTICLE VII: TERMINATION OF ENGAGEMENT
The Company and the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER may voluntarily terminate
this Agreement at any time with or without cause, by furnishing written notice to other party.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the engagement of the FREELANCE
PERSONAL TRAINER shall be validly terminated under the following circumstances:
a. If, at any time, during the engagement of the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER,
it becomes manifest that the latter is unqualified or unfit to discharge the above-
mentioned services or that the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER'S services are
no longer required by the COMPANY;
b. Should there be just or valid cause for the termination of said engagement.
Likewise, the COMPANY may validly terminate the services of the FREELANCE
PERSONAL TRAINER for acts inimical to the interest of the COMPANY and such other
analogous causes other than those above-mentioned.
In the event the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER leaves the COMPANY for
whatever reasons, he or she may not join as a paying member of any Fitness First Club for a
period of less than twelve (12) months. 77 cSEDTC
For another, petitioners' failure to comply with the monthly Minimum Performance Standards 78 is
a ground for termination pursuant to Article III of the Agreement:
Provided, however, that if the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER fails to comply with
his/her aforementioned monthly minimum for three (3) varying months in the entire duration of
this Personal Training Agreement, the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER'S status may be
reviewed and can be a ground for the termination of the FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER's
contractual engagement. 79
Respondents' power to terminate petitioners is better understood concurrently with their power of
control.
Under the four-fold test, the right to control is the dominant factor in determining whether one is
an employee or an independent contractor. 80 The so-called control test is commonly regarded as the
most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship. Under the control test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also
the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. 81 Contrary to respondents' claim, petitioners
here did not perform their tasks at their own pleasure and in the manner they saw fit.
First, as personal trainers, petitioners performed tasks necessary and desirable to respondents'
principal business of providing health programs/packages — to conduct physical training to
respondents' clients. In its Amended Articles of Incorporation, 82 as amended on November 1, 2015,
Fitness First was formed:
To provide fully integrated sports facility management services or total club management
services which shall include but not limited to providing consultancy service to a diverse range
of development projects like hotel health clubs, gyms, large-scale residential facilities, hotels,
executive clubs and specialty sports facilities such as tennis clubs and ice rinks, providing an
effective and total management service extending to all aspects of club operations like
administration and finance, marketing, recreation strategy[,] and food and beverage
management, providing a complement of specialized services such as sports coaching,
fitness testing, personal training, pro shops, food and beverage facilities, and selling
(except on retail) club equipment and products like fitness equipment, tennis, squash and golf
installation, sports surfaces and ancillary court products, recreational and playground
equipment and sport simulation devices to governmental bodies, commercial operators and
private developers. 83 (Emphasis supplied) AIDSTE
Second, to ensure the quality of services that respondents provide, petitioners were required to
attend all educational training sessions and other such events pertaining to Fitness First Department.
In fact, respondents kept track of petitioners' performance such that some of them were even lauded
for their exemplary performance.
Fitness First
Presented to
Cristine Dela Cruz
for her outstanding and
Exemplary performance as
(1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the employer's
business;
(2) the extent of the worker's investment in equipment and facilities;
(3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer;
(4) the worker's opportunity for profit and loss;
(5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment[,] or foresight required for the success of the
claimed independent enterprise;
(6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer;
and
(7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment
in that line of business. 90
As earlier discussed, petitioners were made to act as personal trainers in accordance with
specifications on the physical health availed of by members/customers as marketed by the freelance
personal trainer. But as to what these packages were, respondent categorized them as Single
sessions, Fast Track, Lifestyle, and Performance packages. Annexure PT.02 on Personal Training
Commission reads:
1.1 You will receive all commissions after all government tax deductions, as per the
Company's current Personal Training Price List, categorized by Single sessions, Fast
Track, Lifestyle[,] and Performance packages.
Freelance Personal Trainers will be paid a commission per single conducted session
relating to the Personal Training Package purchased . . .
1.3 xxx
The Company reserves the right to revise the commission rate or structure if deemed
necessary without notice or prior agreement. Any change in your commission rate will be
confirmed in writing. 91
In the performance of their tasks, petitioners as trainers were guided by the packages offered by
respondent and purchased by its clients. The performance of these acts is integral to respondent's
business of offering various physical health training programs/packages.
Too, petitioners were wholly dependent upon respondent for their continued employment in this
line of business. Per the Freelance Personal Trainer Agreement, they were required to sell only the
company products per its price schedule and were prohibited from providing training outside of the
club. acEHCD
Here, other than the fact that respondent held the position of human resource Manager,
petitioners failed to demonstrate how she abused her position to get petitioners in the situation they
found themselves in. Bad faith, therefore, may not be attributed to make her solidarily liable with
respondent Fitness First.
Final word
The Court's disposition in this case gives true meaning to the right to security of tenure
guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution:
ARTICLE XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS. —
LABOR
Sec. 3.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
The Labor Code echoes the right to security of tenure:
ARTICLE 294. [279] Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 97
With the precious constitutional guarantee in place for the protection of labor, the Court, in
circumstances as in this case, will not hesitate to strike down as invalid any employer act that attempts
to undermine workers' tenurial security. 98
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated
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August 18, 2022 and March 24, 2023, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 165342
are REVERSED.
Petitioners Rico B. Escauriaga, Cristine Dela Cruz, Rene B. Severino, Ralph Errol Mercado,
and Geraldine Guevarra are DECLARED REGULAR EMPLOYEES of Respondent Fitness First Phil.,
Inc. SDHTEC
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, M.V. Lopez, J.Y. Lopez and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 52-65. Penned by Associate Justice Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa and concurred in by Associate
Justices Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Emily Aliño-Geluz of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals, Manila.
2. Id. at 67-68.
3. Id. at 104-107.
4. Non-payment of 13th month pay, damages, and attorney's fees.
6. Id. at 110.
7. Id. at 107.
8. Id. at 110.
9. Id. at 110-111.
https://bir.gov.ph/images/bir_internal_communications_Full%20Text%20RR202014/fulltextRR4_2014.pdf.
15. Id. at 179-181. Respondents' Position Paper as cited in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated April 5,
2018.
16. Id.
17. Id.
a) Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
improper venue, res judicata, prescription and forum shopping;
g) Appeal from any interlocutory order of the Labor Arbiter, such as but not limited to, an order:
(1) denying a motion to dismiss;
h) Appeal from the issuance of a certificate of finality of decision by the Labor Arbiter;
i) Appeal from orders issued by the Labor Arbiter in the course of execution proceedings.
j) Such other pleadings, motions and petitions of similar nature intended to circumvent above provisions.
(5a, RIII)
46. See Sonza v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp., 475 Phil. 539 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
52. Id.
53. Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the
appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower
courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set
forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the
allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true
copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the
requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the
petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42. (2a) (Emphasis supplied)
54. See Altres v. Empleo, 594 Phil. 246 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales,En Banc].
55. Spouses Mariano, et al. v. Atty. Roberto Abrajano and Atty. Jorico F. Bayaua, A.C. No. 12690, April 26,
2021. [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
56. Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full name of the
appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower
courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set
forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the
allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true
copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the
requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the
petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42. (2a)
57. Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, 771 Phil. 391 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second
Division].
58. See Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corp., 762 Phil. 130 (2015) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
59. See Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, 582 Phil. 600 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
62. See Upod v. Onon Trucking and Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 248299, July 14, 2021. [Per J. Lazaro-Javier,
Second Division].
63. This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in
and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of
the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case
falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises[,] and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
(See Cirtek Employees Labor Union-FFW v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc., 665 Phil. 784 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-
Morales, Third Division].
64. See Orozco v. Court of Appeals, 584 Phil. 35 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
65. See Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 350 Phil. 918 (1998) [Per J.
Bellosillo, First Division].
66. See Ditiangkin v. Lazada E-Services Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 246892, September 21, 2022 [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division].
67. See Loreche-Amit Cagayan de Oro Medical Center, Inc., 852 Phil. 327 (2019) [Per J. Reyes Jr., Second
Division].
68. See Orozco v. Court of Appeals, 584 Phil. 35 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
70. See Paragele v. GMA Network, Inc., 877 Phil. 140 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
72. See Martinez v. Magnolia Poultry Processing Plant, G.R. Nos. 231579 & 231636, June 16, 2021 [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division].
73. See Dumpit-Murillo v. Court of Appeals, 551 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
74. Id.
76. See Aniceto v. Lifestyle Therapy Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 209423, December 6, 2021 [Notice, Third
Division].
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(f) "Wage" paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated,
capable, of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an
employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for
services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the
employer to the employee. "Fair and reasonable value" shall not include any profit to the employer, or to
any person affiliated with the employer. (Labor Code of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 442
(Amended & Renumbered), July 21, 2015).
78. Id. at 154. 1. To diligently perform and assume his/her duties and responsibilities as FREELANCE
PERSONAL TRAINERS of the COMPANY.
2. To be assigned by the COMPANY to any of the latter's managed health clubs, as the COMPANY may
deem necessary;
3. To act as a freelance personal trainer of the members/customers of the COMPANY'S managed
health clubs in accordance with the specifications of physical health training program/packages availed
of by members/customers as marketed by the Freelance Personal Trainer;
4. To observe rules and regulations, policies[,] and procedure, made known to the FREELANCE
PERSONAL TRAINER particularly those related to relationship with customers and conduct within the
company managed health clubs including the Fitsync terms and conditions.
5. To attend all educational training sessions and other such events pertaining to Fitness Department.
The FREELANCE PERSONAL TRAINER shall be duly notified of all aforementioned events/sessions.
80. See Orozco v. Court of Appeals, 584 Phil. 35 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
81. See Halipot v. Jade Palace Restaurant, G.R. No. 209363, November 10, 2014] [Notice, Third Division].
88. Id.
90. Id.
93. Id.
95. See Gimalay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 240123 & 240125, June 17, 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First
Division].
96. See Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, January 20, 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-
Javier, Second Division].
98. See Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corp. v. Alcon, 746 Phil. 172 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].