Calleja v Executive Secretary (2021) Link to Full Text

Subject CONSTITUTIONAL Session/Topic Expanded Certiorari Jurisdiction Digest Maker Agravante, Jra & Tan,
LAW 1 under 1987 Constitution Raphael

Date December 7, 2021 G.R. No/s G.R. No. 252578 Ponente Carandang, J.
Summary: The Supreme Court examined 37 consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
11479, otherwise known as the "Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020." In its ruling, the Supreme Court affirms the constitutionality of
ATA, but declared some provisions unconstitutional. Specifically, it invalidated the clause in the proviso of Section 4, which
limits actions to those not intended to cause death, serious harm, endanger lives, or pose serious risks to public safety. It
also struck down the second mode of designation in Section 25, paragraph 2, along with any related provisions in the
Act's Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Doctrine: The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of
this nature.
Legal Basis

● Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution- The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Relevant Facts-
● Before this Court are 37 separate Petitions for Certiorari and/or Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), all assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11479 or the "Anti-Terrorism Act of
2020" (ATA).

BRIEF BACKGROUND
● Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; but due to the lack of a well-accepted definition, even scholars have
encountered difficulty in pinpointing its exact origin.
o One of the earliest examples is that of the Jewish Zealots known as the Sicari - a group active during the
Roman occupation of the Middle East during the first century
o By the 19th century, the Narodnaya Volya ("People's Will" or "People's Freedom") was organized for the
deliberate and methodical killing of selected victims
o In the 20th century, violence was the motivating factor for many contemporary acts of terrorism which
added new methods brought about by the technological and social developments of the time.
▪ Terrorism is now associated with a plethora of acts which may be categorized according to the
methods and means used, the goals pursued, and the actors behind them
▪ "9/11" gave rise to a cohesive global response to intensify the fight against terrorism

FOUR DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

1. It is violence (or its threat) for political effect
2. It is a planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act
3. It is not bound by established rule of warfare or codes of conduct
4. It is designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate target or victim

TERRORISM IN THE PH
● According to the Global Terrorism Index of 2020, there have been more than 7,000 deaths due to terrorism in the
Asia-Pacific region from 2002 to 2019, and over 3,000 of these have occurred in the country.
● In 2017, pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants forcibly took over Marawi City and displaced 98
percent of the city's total population and residents from nearby areas.23 It was considered the most violent urban
terrorist attack in the Philippines' recent history
● Local extremist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Jemaah
Islamiyah have claimed responsibility for the terrorist acts. The ISIS has conducted terrorist operations through
several local groups such as the Maute group, the ASG, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement.
 ● As a response to the growing problem of terrorism, R.A. No. 9372, otherwise known as the "Human Security
Act of 2007" (HSA), was enacted, on February 8, 2007. However, despite its passage, the prevalence of
terrorism in the country not only persisted but even escalated.
● On June 18, 2012, R.A. No. 10168 or the "Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012" was
signed into law. it was passed pursuant to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution No. 137328
and other binding terrorism-related resolutions of the UNSC issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

LEGAL HISTORY AND UNDERPINNINGS OF ATA

● On August 13, 2019, the Senate Committees on National Defense and Security, Peace, Unification and
Reconciliation, and Finance jointly conducted a hearing on Senate Bill (SB) Nos. 6, 21, and 640, all of which
sought to amend certain provisions of the HSA. On September 30, 2019, the Senate Committees jointly
submitted Committee Report No. 9, recommending the approval of SB No. 1083 to substitute SB Nos. 6, 21, and
630.
○ Sponsored at the Senate plenary in 2019
● On May 29, 2020, the Committees on Public Order and Safety and on National Defense and Security adopted
the Senate version of the bill as an amendment to House Bill (HB) No. 6875, entitled "An Act to Prevent, Prohibit,
and Penalize Terrorism, thereby Repealing Republic Act No. 9372 Otherwise Known as the 'Human Security Act
of 2007.'" On May 30, 2020, the House Committees jointly submitted Committee Report No. 340 to the House of
Representatives, recommending the approval, without amendment, of HB No. 6875.
● June 2, 2020: HB 6875 was sponsored for approval on second reading. Approved with no amendments accepted
● June 3, 2020: HB 6875 passed third reading with House voting 172-31 with 29 absentions
● June 9, 2020: enrolled bill signed by Speaker of the House Cayetano and Senate Pres Sotto
● July 9, 2020: signed by Duterte RA 11479 otherwise known as ATA. The legislation was published in the Manila
Bulletin and the Official Gazette on July 6, 2020, and took effect on July 22, 2020.
● Principal author: Senator Panfilo Lacson

CASE PROPER
● Petitioners primarily assail the validity of the ATA due to their perceived facial vagueness and overbreadth that
purportedly repress protected speech. It is argued further that the unconstitutionality of the definition of terrorism
and its variants will leave it with "nothing to sustain its existence.
● Petitioners who initiated the now consolidated challenges on the constitutionality of the ATA come from different
sectors of society. Petitioners in the consolidated challenges include inter alia members of party-lists, former and
incumbent members of Congress, members of socio-civic and non-governmental organizations, members of
Indigenous Peoples' (IPs) groups, Moros, journalists, taxpayers, registered voters, members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, students, and members of the academe.
Arguments of Petitioners Arguments of Respondents

● Petitions involve an actual and justiciable ● IRR of the ATA was not yet issued, nor has the
controversy government done any act in furtherance of the
● Petitioners are concerned Filipino citizens, law
members of the Philippine Bar, members of ● Petitioners filed to present a prima facie grave
Congress, taxpayers, and victims of abuse of discretion and that the burden is not
terrorist-tagging by State forces, who are under a satisfied by mere assertion that the law is
credible threat of prosecution under the ATA. unconstitutional since all laws are presumed to
● Their legal standing is satisfied due to the be valid
transcendental importance of the matters ● The petitions should be dismissed, inter alia, on
involved in this case and the serious threat the the ground that the proprietary of the ATA’s
law poses on their sacred constitutional rights enactment is a political question
● Injury to the individual is not the sole basis for the ● Petitioners have no legal standing because they
grant or recognition of standing before the Court lack direct, substantial, and personal interest in
as injury to a public right is also a sufficient basis. the case
● They are mounting a facial challenge on the ● OSG points out that using motherhood
grounds of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth, statements such as “transcendental importance”
which allow third-party standing or the violation of their constitutional rights is
● Section 4 is vague and overbroad insufficient since petitioners fail to show any
specific injury or suffering which the law has
brought about.
● Cited Southern Hemisphere, where the Court
dismissed the petitions challenging the
constitutionality of the Human Security Act on
the ground that the petitioners lacked legal
standing
Lower Court Ruling Straight to SC
Court of Appeals Ruling Straight to SC

Issue/s and Ruling-

PRELIMINARY ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have legal standing to sue - YES
2. WON the issues raised in the petitions involve actual and justiciable controversy - YES
3. WON petitioners’ direct resort to the SC is proper - YES
4. WON facial challenge is proper - YES
5. WON RA 11479 should already be declared unconstitutional in its entirety if the Court finds that
the definition and the powers of the ATC are constitutionally infirm - NO

Requisites of Judicial Review

1. An actual and appropriate case and controversy exists
2. A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question
3. The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity
4. The constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case

Justiciable Controversy
● The Court found that the requisite of an actual case or controversy has been complied at
least with respect to certain issues falling within the purview of the delimited facial analysis
● The consolidated petitions have sufficiently raised concerns regarding the freedom of
speech, expression, and its cognate rights.
● Petitions present a permissible facial challenge on the ATA in the context of the freedom of
speech and its cognate rights — and it is only on these bases that the Court will rule upon
the constitutionality of the law.
● With respect to certain provisions of the ATA, petitioners have sufficiently shown that there is
a credible and imminent threat of injury, as they may be subjected to the potential destructive
consequences of designation as well as possible detention and prosecution.
○ Court is mindful that several of the petitioners have already come under the
operation of the ATA as they have been designated as terrorists.

Locus Standi
● Refers to the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question
● Requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged
● The Court finds that petitioners have sufficiently alleged the presence of credible
threat of injury for being constant targets of "red-tagging" or "truth-tagging”,
therefore satisfying the requisites of legal standing
● The legal standing of the following individuals is recognized when specific requirements have
been met:
o (1) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
o (2) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
o (3) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled at the earliest time; and
o (4) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
● Court may choose to waive or relax legal standing in cases involving transcendental
importance to allow individuals or groups to sue even though they may not have been
personally injured by the operation of the law.

The Court takes cognizance of this case under its expanded judicial power
● Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government”
○ The development of the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987
Constitution arose from the use and abuse of the political question doctrine during
the Martial Law era under former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
● The Court finds that this case mainly calls for the exercise of the Court's expanded judicial
power. This is because the primordial issue animating the 37 petitions is the constitutionality
of the ATA, a legislative (and not a judicial/quasi-judicial) act. Moreover, these 37 petitions
 undoubtedly ascribe grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of Congress in enacting a law that violates fundamental rights.
● The constitutional concerns raised by the ATA deserve a proactive judicial response
● Disagreed with OSG’s argument, citing their ruling in Tanada v. Angara
○ “Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.”

Earliest Opportunity
● Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question
should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Since the
present constitutional challenge against the statute was directly filed with this Court, the third
requisite of judicial review of "earliest opportunity" is complied with because the issue of
constitutionality is raised at the first instance.

Facial Challenge
● Philippine jurisprudence has described a facial challenge as "an examination of the entire
law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities."
○ Different from “as-applied” challenge where the question before the Court is the
constitutionality of a statute's application to a particular set of proven facts as applied
to the actual parties. It’s one where even though the statute is constitutional, it
operates unconstitutionally because of the petitioner’s particular circumstances
● The prevailing Philippine jurisprudence is that facial challenges on legislative acts are
permissible only if they curtail the freedom of speech and cognate rights based on
overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness doctrine
● The consolidated petitions, in challenging the ATA, have sufficiently raised concerns
regarding the freedom of speech, expression, and its cognate rights. As such, the petitions
present a permissible facial challenge on the ATA in the context of the freedom of speech
and its cognate rights - and it is only on these bases that the Court will rule upon the
constitutionality of the law.

RA 11479 cannot be declared unconstitutional in its entirety

● The ATA provides for a separability clause that holds as constitutional the other parts or
provisions not affected by the other provisions which may be declared unconstitutional by the
court. The separability clause states that:
○ If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or
invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are notaffected thereby shall
remain and continue to be in full force and effect.
○ The Court does not find the essential provisions of the ATA, particularly the definition
of terrorism under Section 4 of the ATA, absolutely unconstitutional.
● In the case of the ATA, it is clear from the separability clause that Congress intended for the
constitutional provisions of the law to survive, in the event that "any part or provision of this
Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid."

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. W/N Section 4 defining and penalizing the crime of "terrorism" is void for vagueness or
overbroad in violation of the constitutional right to due process, free speech and
expression, to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation, and non-detention
solely by reason of political beliefs. — NOT IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE

TL;DR: Section 4 is constitutional except for the clause in Section 4’s proviso "which are not intended
to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a
serious risk to public safety.”

● The Court does not agree that Section 4 deserves total invalidation due to the perceived
vagueness and imprecision of the definition of terrorism as a crime, as provided in the main
part of Section 4.
● Section 4 (a): it should be clarified that the crime proven is not terrorism if all that the
prosecution is able to prove is that the accused committed an act intended to cause death,
serious bodily injury, or danger to a person's life. Section 4 (a) does not punish the very act
of intending death, serious bodily injury, or danger to a person's life.
o The same observation rings true for the acts mentioned under Section 4 (b) to (e).
 ● The Court notes in this regard that neither the text nor the congressional records support
petitioners' view as to the lack of clarity and preciseness in the definition of terrorism
● A textual review of the main part of Section 4 shows that its first and second components
provide a clear correlation and a manifest link as to how or when the crime of terrorism is
produced. When the two components of the main part of Section 4 are taken together, they
create a demonstrably valid and legitimate definition of terrorism that is general enough to
adequately address the ever-evolving forms of terrorism, but neither too vague nor too broad
as to violate due process or encroach upon the freedom of speech and expression and other
fundamental liberties.
● A law remains valid if the perceived vague terms used therein can be saved by proper
judicial construction.
o To be invalidated, the law must be utterly vague on its face, such that it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.

The various general terms in Section 4 are not unconstitutionally vague

● Firstly, the Court is not without authority to draw from the various aids to statutory
construction, such as the legislative deliberations, to narrowly construe the terms used in the
ATA and thus limit their scope of application.
○ Ex: the phrase "engages in acts intended to" can be construed by the Court to simply
refer to acts that cause or result in the specifically listed or enumerated acts (i.e.,
death, serious bodily injury, etc.). The phrase "endangers a person's life" in
subsection (a), on the other hand, can be construed as a restatement of the
contemplated scenarios of "death or serious bodily injury" in the same provision.
● Secondly, the meaning of the other terms used in the main part of Section 4 can be found in
jurisprudence as well as in dictionaries.
○ Ex: Black's Law Dictionary defines "bodily injury" as "any physical or corporeal injury;
not necessarily restricted to injury to the trunk or main part of the body as
distinguished from the head or limbs; physical injury only; localized abnormal
condition of the living body; injury caused by external violence

Terrorism as defined in the ATA is not overbroad.

● It’s not overbroad since it fosters a valid State policy to combat terrorism and protect national
security and public safety, consistent with international instruments and the anti-terrorism
laws of other countries.
● ATA’s definition of terrorism under the main part of Section 4 is congruent with the UN’s
proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism which defines terrorism
under Article 2 (1) as follows:
○ Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present Convention if that person,
by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
■ (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
■ (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a
State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility
or to the environment; or
■ (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of
the present article resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; when the
purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act.
● The ATA definition is also similar to the definition as provided under Title II, Article 3 of
Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Union
● The Court notes that the general wording of the law is a response to the ever-evolving
nature of terrorism. The Court recognizes that Congress cannot be expected to enumerate
all specific acts which may be resorted to by terrorists in pursuing their goals.

The "Not Intended" Clause of Section 4's proviso is unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny test, as
well as the void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrinesf THIS PART OF SEC 4 WAS STRUCK
DOWN.
● The proviso reads:
○ Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent,
stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political
rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to
endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.
● The most contentious portion of the proviso is the clause "which are not intended to cause
death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious
risk to public safety.
● Congress unnecessarily included the "Not Intended Clause," thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms
 ○ it "shifts the burden" upon the accused "to prove that [his] actions constitute an
exercise of civil and political rights," contrary to the principle that it is the government
that has the burden to prove the unconstitutionality of an utterance or speech.
● The "Not Intended Clause" causes serious ambiguity since there are no sufficient parameters
that render it capable of judicial construction.
● More dangerous than the proviso's post-indictment effects are its pre-indictment effects.
○ Even prior to a court action being filed against the protester or dissenter, the proviso
creates confusion as to whether the exercise of civil and political rights might be
interpreted by law enforcers as acts of terrorism and on that basis, lead to his
incarceration or tagging as a terrorist.
● Terrorism is not ordinarily the goal of protests and dissents. Such exercises of the
freedom of speech are protected, even if they might induce a condition of unrest or
stir people to anger. Incitement aside, intimidating the government or causing public
unrest is not unlawful per se if the means taken to cause such intimidation or unrest is
through speech, discourse, or "expressive conduct". The foundation of democracy, by
design, is a populace that is permitted to influence or intimidate its government with
words, even those that induce anger or create dissatisfaction
2. Whether Sections x x x [7, 13] to 14 defining and penalizing threats to commit terrorism,
planning, training, preparing, and facilitating terrorism, conspiracy, proposal, inciting to
terrorism, material support, and other related provisions, are:
a. x x x
b. violative of the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.
● Delimited by the court for either not not relating to to the freedom of expression and its
cognate rights or being too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require the
submission of concrete evidence
3. Whether the uniform penalties for all punishable acts under Sections 4 to 14 violate the
constitutional proscription against the imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment;
● Delimited by the court for either not not relating to to the freedom of expression and its
cognate rights or being too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require the
submission of concrete evidence
4. W/N judicial authorization to conduct surveillance under Section 17 violates the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and forecloses the remedies
under the rules on amparo and habeas data– NO

● In this case, the majority did not specifically adjudicate on Petitioners’ arguments related to
privacy, and held that the Act was constitutional.

5. Whether judicial authorization to conduct surveillance under Section 17 x x x forecloses the

remedies under the rules on amparo and habeas data;

● Delimited by the court for either not not relating to to the freedom of expression and its cognate
rights or being too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require the submission
of concrete evidence

6. Whether the following powers of the ATC are unconstitutional:

xxxx
b. power to approve requests for designation by other jurisdictions or supranational
jurisdictions for violating the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol
xxxx
c. power to adopt security classifications for its records under Section 45 for violating the right
to information;
f. power to establish and maintain comprehensive database information systems on terrorism,
terrorist activities and countcrtcrrorism operations under Section 46 (c) for violating the
constitutional rights to due process and privacy of communication and correspondence;
g. power to grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers under Section 46 (g) for
lack of clear parameters; and
h. power to require private entities and individuals to render assistance to the ATC under
Section 46 (m) for violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude.
xxxx
 ● Delimited by the court for either not not relating to to the freedom of expression and its cognate
rights or being too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require the submission
of concrete evidence

7. W/N Section 27 of R.A. No. 11479 on preliminary and permanent orders of proscription
violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, and unconstitutionally
punishes mere membership in an organization -

● The Court unanimously voted that Sections 26, 27, and 28 of the ATA on judicial proscription
are not unconstitutional.

8. Whether the detention period under Section 29 of R.A. No. 11479 contravenes the
Constitution, the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the Rules of Court, and international obligations
against arbitrary detention; - NO

● Section 29 satisfies the the compelling state interest requirement under the strict scrutiny
standard
● Section 29 also complies with the second prong of strict scrutiny, least restrictive means
○ (1) it only operates when the ATC issues a written authorization; (2) the detaining
officer incurs criminal liability if he violates the detainee's rights; and (3) the custodial
unit must diligently record the circumstances of the detention
● SC justices voted that Section 29 is not unconstitutional

9. Whether the restriction under Section 34 violates the constitutional rights to travel, against
incommunicado detention, to bail and R.A. No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009);

● Delimited by the court for either not not relating to to the freedom of expression and its cognate
rights or being too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require the submission
of concrete evidence

10. Whether Sections 35 and 36, in relation to Section 25, on the AMLC's authority to investigate
inquire, and examine bank deposits, and freeze assets, violate the separation of powers
(judicial), as well as the constitutional right to due process, and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; - NO

● The ex parte freeze order is a preventive measure because it arises from the ATC's order of
designation or the CA's preliminary order of proscription
● Due process is satisfied through subsequent notice and hearing to be conducted when a
person seeks judicial protection from the Court of Appeals, as explicitly provided under Section
36

11. Whether Section 49 on the extra-territorial application of R.A. No. 11479 violates the freedom
of association and the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder; - NO

● The only bases for the supposed unconstitutionality of Section 49 are mere theoretical
abstractions of what may happen after a group or organization has been designated or
charged under the ATA
○ none of petitioners claim that their constitutional rights have been under any credible or
imminent threat of being violated because of the extraterritorial application of the ATA

12. Whether Section 54 on the ATC and DOJ's power to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power for failure to meet the
completeness and sufficient standard tests;

13. Whether Section 56 repealing R.A. No. 9372, or the HSA violates the constitutional mandate
to compensate victims of torture or similar practices and right to due process;

● Delimited by the court for either not not relating to to the freedom of expression and its cognate
rights or being too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require the submission
of concrete evidence

14. Whether R.A. No. 11479 violates the IP's and Moros' rights to self-determination and
self-governance under the Constitution; and

● Delimited by the court for either not not relating to to the freedom of expression and its cognate
rights or being too speculative and raise genuine questions of fact that require the submission
of concrete evidence
 15. Whether the House of Representatives gravely abused its discretion by passing HB No. 6875
(consolidated version of the HBs to amend the HSA) in violation of the
constitutionally-prescribed procedure. - NO

● There is no grave abuse in deeming that the passage of a law to sufficiently address terrorism
in the country falls within the public emergency exception
○ the constant threat of terrorism, as one of the biggest menaces to national security,
definitely constitutes as an emergency which the State needs to address immediately
● In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the determination of the President that
terrorism is an emergency in order to certify a bill as urgent, which Congress has not seen fit to
controvert and has, in fact, accepted such certification as valid similar to the finding in
Tolentino, is something which the Court should not disturb
● the Court also recognizes the pressing need for the country to enact more effective
counter-measures against terrorism and terrorism financing, the lack of which has been
repeatedly flagged by international evaluation groups to which the Philippines belong

Core Issues

1. Whether to grant due course to 35 out of 37 petitions; - YES

● G.R. No. 253118 (Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Duterte)

○ dismissed outright for lack of merit
● UDK No. 16663 (Yerbo v. Offices of the Honorable Senate President and the Honorable Speaker of the
House of Representatives)
○ dismissed for being fundamentally flawed both in form and substance

2. Whether a facial challenge or an as applied challenge should be used in analyzing the ATA; - YES

● Only with respect to freedom of speech, expression, and cognate rights issues
● Does not preclude future challenges against any of the provisions on the basis of an actual and as-applied
case

3. Whether the "Not Intended Clause" in the proviso of Section 4 is constitutional; - NO

4. Whether the phrase "organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism" in the third paragraph of
Section 10 is constitutional; - NO

5. Whether the first mode of designation under Section 25 is constitutional; - YES

● Automatic adoption of the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List (1st mode of designation) in
the first paragraph of Section 25 is not unconstitutional

6. Whether the second mode of designation under Section 25 is constitutional; - NO

● Requests for designation by other jurisdictions (2nd mode of designation) in the second paragraph of
Section 25 is unconstitutional

7. Whether the third mode of designation under Section 25 is constitutional; - YES

● The designation by the ATC upon a finding of probable cause (3rd mode of designation) under Section 25 is
constitutional

8. Whether the provisions on proscription in Sections 26 to 28 are constitutional; - YES

9. Whether Section 29 on arrest and detention without judicial warrant is constitutional. - YES

RE: Unconstitutional provisions

Section 4, Proviso, ATA
● when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate the general public or a segment
thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to provoke or influence by intimidation the
government or any international organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political,
economic, or social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or seriously undermine public
safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the
benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592, otherwise known as "An Act Amending Articles
29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code":
Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of
 work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not
intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety. (Emphasis supplied)

- The “Not Intended Clause” invades the area of protected freedoms

- it "shifts the burden" upon the accused "to prove that [his] actions constitute an exercise of civil and
political rights," contrary to the principle that it is the government that has the burden to prove the
unconstitutionality of an utterance or speech
- Causes serious ambiguity since there are no sufficient parameters that render it capable of judicial
construction
- Without any sufficient parameters, people are not guided whether or not their impassioned and
zealous propositions or the intense manner of government criticism or disapproval are intended to
cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious
risk to public safety
- Void for vagueness as it has a chilling effect on the average person
- Before the protester can speak, he must first guess whether his speech would be interpreted as a
terrorist act under Section 4 and whether he might be arrested, indicted, and/or detained for it
- terrorism under Section 4 would be an unbailable offense as per Section 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure
- The danger of the clause is made graver by the fact that by shifting the burden to the accused to
explain his intent, it allows for law enforcers to take an "arrest now, explain later" approach
- The vagueness of such provision is likely to result in an arbitrary flexing of the government muscle,
which is equally aversive to due process
- Renders the proviso overbroad
- Fails the strict scrutiny test and does not pass the Brandenburg Standard

Section 25, Par. 2, ATA (Second Mode of Designation)

● Request for designations by other jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions may be adopted by the ATC
after the determination that the proposed designee meets the criteria for designation of UNSCR No. 1372

- Overbroad and does not pass the strict scrutiny test

- unbridled discretion is given to the ATC in granting requests for designation based on its own
determination
- no sufficient standard that should be observed in granting or denying such requests
- may lead to a quid pro quo designation with the requesting jurisdiction at the expense of the
rights of a prospective designee
- No proper procedural safeguards and remedies for an erroneous designation in this respect
- The ponencia compares the second mode of designation to procedures in place in other countries
like the US and the UK
- Even with these procedures to draw inspiration from, the ATA still does not provide any form
of intervention, judicial or otherwise

Disposition-
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702,
252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 252802, 252809, 252903,
252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 (UDK No.
16714), and 253420 are GIVEN DUE COURSE and PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The Court declares the following provisions of Republic Act No. 11479 UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) The phrase in the proviso of Section 4 which states "which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to
a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create serious risk to public safety;"

2) The second mode of designation found in paragraph 2 of Section 25; and

3) As a necessary consequence, the corresponding reference/provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 11479 relative to the foregoing items.

Moreover, pursuant to the Court's rule-making power, the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to prepare the rules that will
govern judicial proscription proceedings under Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 11479 based on the foregoing
discussions for submission to the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court and eventual approval and
promulgation of the Court En Banc.
The petitions in G.R. No. 253118 (Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Duterte) and UDK No. 16663 (Yerbo v. Offices of the
Honorable Senate President and the Honorable Speaker of the House of Representatives) are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.