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AMPHIBIOUS
WARFARE DEVELOPMENT IN
BRITAIN AND AMERICA
FROM 1920-1940

by Kenneth J. Clifford
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

As with his first book, Col. Kenneth J.

Clifford of the United States Marines has
once again given us truly an insider’s view
of military politics and decision-making. In
this authoritative study, we are shown the
simultaneous—separate but remarkably
equal—development of amphibious opera-
tions in the United States and Great Britain.
Resisted by doubters at many points
along the way, advocates of a strong amphibi-
ous program ultimately prevailed; amphibi-
ous assaults became a key element of the
Allied efforts in the Second World War.
The intimacy of Colonel Clifford with
his subject is evident everywhere. For exam-
ple, his portrayals of Andrew Higgins and
Donald Roebling, boat builders and design-
ers, are vivid and memorable. (Higgins’s
Eureka boat and tank lighter were forerunners
of the LCVP and LCM, and the Roebling
Alligator was the precursor of the LVT.)
“Any time during the war,” writes
Clifford, “in whatever theatre, whenever am-
phibious assault was utilised, it was success-
ful.”
In these pages lies the opportunity to
see why.

Front cover photo

copyright PRO DEFE 2/1327

Edgewood, Inc.
Crow Hill Road
Laurens, New York 13796
 Amphibious Warfare Development
in Britain and America from 1920-1940
 By the Same Author

Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the U.S.

Marine Corps, 1900-1970
 Amphibious Warfare Development
in Britain and America from
1920-1940
Kenneth J. Clifford
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

EDGEWOOD, INC.
Laurens, New York
 FIRST EDITION

All rights reserved, including the right of

reproduction in whole or in part in any form.

Copyright © 1983 by KennethJ. Clifford

Published by Edgewood, Inc.

Laurens, New York

Manufactured in the United States of America

ISBN: 533-05370-6

Library of Congress Catalog Card No.: 81-69339

Printed by Vantage Press
516 W. 34th Street, New York, New York 10001
 Contents

Preface vil

. Organisations and Functions l

British and American Naval Organisation for Com-
bined Operations between the Wars; Functions of the
Royal Marines and United States Marines in Combined
Operations
. The British at Work 30
Evolution of a Combined Operations Manual; The
Watson Memorandum and Its Effects on Combined
Operations; Work of the Inter-Service Training and
Development Centre to June 1940
. The Americans at Work 85
Fleet Exercises (FLEXS) and Landing Craft Develop-
ment in the 1920s; Marine Corps Schools (MCS); Ten-
tative Landing Operations Manual; Development of
Landing Craft in the 1930s
. Organisation and Training for Combined Operations
1940-1944 126
Raids and Forces; American Amphibious Operational
Organisation and Training; Combined Operations in
Europe; Royal Marines and the Future of Amphibious
Warfare
. The Other War in the Pacific 198
Background for Strategic Planning; Organisation;
Guadalcanal to Okinawa; Amphibious Operations in
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC)
6. Comparative Techniques and Achievements 220
Naval Gunfire Support; Close Air Support (CAS); Fire
Support Co-ordination; Troop Transport and the
Beach Party Organisation; General Air Support

Summary 247

Appendi:: A: Photo Plates 200

Appendix B: Watson Memorandum 258
Appendix C: Glossary of Abbreviations 267
Appendix D: Chronology of Amphibious (Combined) Opera-
tions Development rh.
Bibliography at Bt
Index EOS
 Preface

The period between the wars (1919-1939) was a period

of amphibious development in both Britain and America.
Two nations working independently of each other pro-
duced during the interwar period, sound amphibious doc-
trine that was almost identical. By 1940, the degree of
preparedness to conduct amphibious assaults varied be-
tween the two nations because of the likelihood of its use.
In Britain, the Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that
the use of combined operations in the early states of the
war was remote and any use of combined operations would
be for diversionary purposes. Many British writers after
World War II simply summed up the interwar period and
combined operations development to the effect that little
or nothing was done during the period.
As with anything, there are degrees of development,
and perhaps on the grand scale of what was being done
in other areas and given the economic situation, in their
view, little was accomplished. To say nothing was done 1s
not accurate.
Whether it was recognised or not, amphibious doc-
trine was being accumulated by the Staff Colleges, where
in their annual paper exercises concerning combined op-
erations, their theoretical assumptions in landing an assault
force became reality for the Ministries as they attempted
to prove or disprove the assumptions. The solutions of the
paper problems found their way into the Field Service
Regulations and the provisional combined operations man-

vil
uals of 1922, 1925, and the Manual of Combined Operations,
1931 and 1938. The fact is that there was never a time,
starting in 1920 and continuing to the beginning of the
war in 1939, that a committee of some kind was not work-
ing on a manual or regulation that directly had to do with
combined operations.
The relatively few actual landing exercises in the 1920s
and 1930s, brought about by money constraints, not lack
of interest by the military and naval forces, had been said
by some to be disasters and that nothing was learned from
them. That is nonsense. Combined operations exercises in
peacetime are practice exercises for both the landing forces
and the Fleet. If everybody knew how to do their job, there
would never be a need for practice. Practice was indeed
needed, and a great deal was learned from the exercises.
Combined operations interest from other sources
came from the Madden Committee in 1924, which sug-
gested the Royal Marines be used as a “striking force” in
combined operations. A decade later, the Director of the
Royal Naval Staff College recommended a similar role for
the Royal Marines and further suggested the establishment
of a combined operations inter-service training centre and
a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff to oversee it.
By the Summer of 1939, Britain had a written doctrine
in the form of the Manual of Combined Operations 1938, a
product of the previous eighteen years written experience.
In addition, there was established an Inter-Service Train-
ing and Development Centre (ISTDC) and Deputy Chiefs
of Staff, Inter-Service Sub-Committee to look after things.
The training centre had little equipment and material, but
they had a great deal of plans and experienced Staff. Boat-
building firms of Fleming and Thornycroft were working
on specifications for a first and second flight landing craft.
Plans were in the works to convert suitable merchant ships
for landing craft carriers. Construction requests for small
and large landing craft, along with armament, davits and
winches, were approved by the Chiefs of Staff in July 1939
for the sum of over £150,000.

Vill
 The development of combined operations did not be-
gin in 1939 nor after Dunkirk; it began in 1920 by the
Staff Colleges and proceeded to the skeletal framework it
was in the Summer of 1939. All that was needed was to
build on the framework.
In America, during the same interwar period, exten-
sive war plans against the potential enemy—Japan—had
been prepared and continually updated since 1904 to safe-
guard the Philippines and other American bases against
attack.
In the same way that the Staff Colleges of Britain
worked on combined operations paper exercises each year,
the Marine Corps Schools and the Naval War College
worked together on a series of “advanced base problems,”
which were based on the premise of a naval war in the
Pacific with the extensive use of amphibious assaults.
The Marine Corps participated in the Fleet Exercises
in the 1920s and 1930s, including seven successive years
prior to the American entry into war. A vast amount of
experience in landing exercises, along with the mistakes,
were culled in the after-action reports and studied at length
at the Marine Corps Schools. The time had come when the
experience and guidelines used in an assault landing were
put into written form, a manual.
In 1931, the Marines at Quantico began writing and
by the Summer of 1934, the Tentative Manual for Landing
Operations—I1 934 was produced. This manual was not used
outside of the Marine Corps Schools but the next edition,
with a new name, the Tentative Landing Operations Manual
produced in July 1935, was given wide distribution. Again
after several name changes, a 1938 version became known
as the Fleet Training Operations Doctrine (FTP 167), US Navy
1938. The FTP 167, with change 1, was the guide for the
Guadalcanal landing in August 1942. The written doctrine
worked.
The Marine Corps Equipment Board, along with the
Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair (later Bureau
of Ships), struggled to obtain suitable landing boats for a
1X
minimum of dollars. The suitable landing boats came in
the form of the Higgins’ “Eureka” boats, the forerunners
of the LCVP and the LCMs and the Roebling “Alligator,”
the precursor of the LVT.
In spite of the economics of the times and the priority
that Britain and America each envisioned the use of am-
phibious (combined) operations, development was indeed
accomplished during the interwar period.
The majority of research for this book was done in
Britain. Many times, however, -I needed a fast answer to
an American Navy/Marine Corps question or perhaps ar-
rangements made to interview a British counterpart in the
amphibious warfare establishment. Without hesitation I
would go-for help to the United States Marine Corps rep-
resentative—at the Joint Warfare Establishment, which was
then located at Old Sarum, Salisbury — Colonel Al J.
Doublet, USMC. Special thanks to this outstanding and
knowledgeable Officer-of-Marines.
My thanks also go to the unsung people at the Public
Record Office, Kew, who routinely do their job in a profes-
sional manner, day in and day out, searching the files,
returning the manuscripts and answering a thousand ques-
tions.

Kenneth J. Clifford

Walton-on-Thames, Surrey
October 1981
 Amphibious Warfare Development
in Britain and America from 1920-1940
 I
Organisations and Functions

British and American Naval Organisations for

Combined Operations between the Wars

In Britain, during the interwar period, “combined oper-

ations,” as reflected in the 1920 Field Service Regulations
and the 1931 edition of the Manual of Combined Operations,
were understood to mean “forms of operations where na-
val, military, or air forces in combination are co-operating
with each other, working independently under their re-
spective commanders, but with a common strategical ob-
ject.” The definition was unsatisfactory as it could fit the
situation of land campaigns with no landings involved so
long as two or more of the services participated. The 1938
edition of the Manual of Combined Operations, however,
qualified the meaning of combined operations as “any
landing [no distinction was drawn between opposed or
unopposed] is an offensive operation when two or all of
the services are engaged with a common strategical aim.”
In other sections of the 1938 Manual, mention was made
of “opposed landings,” and the Staff Colleges reports on
combined operations exercises by student officer syndi-
cates considered landings against “strong opposition.” In
reality, there were no existing plans in the War Office or
Admiralty for combined operations against enemy oppo-
sition.
 The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), with the
help of numerous subcommittees, formulated for the con-
sideration of the Cabinet, general principles on which de-
fence policy was to be based. The CID prepared detailed
plans to ensure that naval, military, and civil authorities,
at home and abroad, would be prepared for co-ordinated
action in the event of war. These plans were promulgated
in the “War Book,” which was a detailed blueprint ofaction
to be taken by all departments in the event of war.' Com-
bined operations were not part of overall strategy during
the interwar period. As late as November, 1938, the naval
member of the Chiefs of Staff indicated that he could not
visualise any particular combined operation taking place
in the next war. The Army member stated that plans for
a combined operations landing in the face of strong op-
position was not contemplated. As it will be shown later,
there were other voices such as the Staff Colleges and the
Madden Committee that believed that, in a future naval
war, there would be a need for combined operations to
establish new naval bases and carry out raids on the en-
emy’s coast line and existing bases. For this mission, the
Madden Committee suggested that a ‘Striking Force’ was
necessary and that the Royal Marines were ideally suited
and trained to accomplish the task.
While there might not have been plans on the CID
shelf for combined operations, the study and development
of material, techniques, and tactics necessary for conduct-
ing all types of combined operations, on an inter-service
level, became a reality with the formation of the Inter-
Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) in
1938. In addition, a permanent sub-committee of the Dep-
uty Chiefs of Staff (DCOS), the Inter-Service Training
Committee, was appointed to oversee the work of the
ISTDC.
To sum up, combined operations in overall strategic
planning were not high on the agenda of the CID during
the interwar period. Nevertheless, combined operations
 development in all areas progressed as a direct result of
the interest shown by the Staff Colleges, Madden Com-
mittee and the Watson Memorandum. A detailed discus-
sion of the Watson Memorandum is made in the next
chapter.
In America, during the interwar period, “landing op-
erations” as reflected in the Tentative Landing Operations
Manual of 1935 were understood to mean those “landing
operations conducted by naval and marine forces for se-
curing bases for the fleet and denying bases to the enemy.”
The Chief of Naval Operations added that the Manual was
a “guide for forces to conduct a landing against opposi-
tion.”
Planning for landing operations or, as it will eventually
be called, amphibious operations, was a direct responsi-
bility of the General Board of the Navy. The General
Board was established in 1900, after the Spanish-American
War, to fill the need for a permanent organisational staff
to advise the civilian Secretary of the Navy. The Board had
no executive or administrative responsibilities and no com-
mand authority over other elements of the Navy Depart-
ment. Its most important task was to develop plans and
furnish advice. More particularly, it was charged with the
drawing up and constant revision of war plans with the co-
ordination of the work of the Naval War College and the
Office of Naval Intelligence. The General Board became
one of the most influential bodies within the naval estab-
lishment and remained so up until 1942 when the emphasis
was shifted from the Board to the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations as naval member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
There are marked differences between the British and
American organisational and functional structures as they
pertained to amphibious operations. The development of
amphibious operations was not an interservice matter. The
Navy—Marine Corps, as a joint partner of the naval estab-
lishment, was directly responsible for amphibious opera-
tions, and it was not shared by the Army or Army Air
Force. Amphibious warfare planning for a naval war
against the probable enemy, Japan, was an integral part
of American strategy in the Pacific.
With the exception of Puerto Rico and the Panama
Canal, America’s territorial possessions and interests lay
in the Pacific. Its major responsibility was the defence of
the Philippines. The broad concept of anti-Japanese war
plans before World War I was that the Army would defend
the Philippines against an attack by Japan-until the Fleet
could carry reinforcements across the Pacific. Naval strat-
egists realised that before a relief expedition could be dis-
patched, Japan certainly would have seized Guam, thus
depriving America of its only Fleet anchorage between
Pearl Harbor and Manila Bay. The Navy conjectured that
either Guam would have to be retaken by Marines or some
other site seized as a coaling and repair station. After
World War I, war planning took on broader dimensions
when Japan gained control over the former German pos-
sessions in the Pacific, the Marshalls, Carolines, and Mar-
ianas. The Philippines were more vulnerable than before
and Guam was now ringed by Japanese outposts. Additions
and revisions of the war plans were continually being made
during the interwar period.
In Britain, the “Striking Force” in amphibious oper-
ations had not actually been settled on the Royal Marines
until 1927 and then in a limited role. In America, the U.S.
Marines were designated to provide the assault forces in
landing operations as early as 1900. However, it is only
after the formation of the Fleet Marine Force in 1933 that
the Marines could realistically perform their mission.
A discussion of the functions of the Royal Marines
and the United States Marines during the interim period
between the wars is important at this point.
 Functions of the Royal Marines and United States
Marines in Combined Operations

Royal Marines

In the military definition of “function,” as it pertains

to the military services, the word itself is interchangeable
with duty, responsibility, mission, or task. It is appropriate
to, or assigned by, higher authority, to an individual, office,
or organisation.
The appropriate duty assigned to the Royal Marines
during the interwar period was the same as it had been
since founding in 1664, when a regiment of one thousand
two hundred land soldiers was raised by the Admiralty for
“service in the Fleet.” The Seventeenth-Century land sol-
diers of the Maritime, or Admiral’s, Regiment, after having
been trained and disciplined, were distributed among the
ships of the Fleet “to make good the deficiencies of the
ships’ companies and to preserve good order and discipline
on board.” It was still the era of the “press,” and most of
the King’s ships were manned by unwilling seamen. The
introduction provided the Admiralty with a regular body
of seamen for manning the Fleet. The training and dis-
cipline of the regular service seamen ultimately eliminated
the original task of the Marines aboard ship.
The Eighteenth-Century Marines, no longer a stand-
ing force, was raised only during a war and disappeared
when no longer required by the Navy. It did become a
permanent Service under the Admiralty in 1755. Anadded
task for Marines during this period was “seizure and land-
ing operations.” Gibraltar, Minorca, Catalonia, and the
West Indies were examples. During naval engagements
Marines fought as riflemen and boarders.
In the latter part of the Eighteenth Century, devel-
opments in ships’ ordnance thrust upon the Marines an
additional duty—that of artillerymen. From time to time,
it was necessary to embark detachments of land artillery-
men in Bomb vessels to support the Fleet. The arrange-
ment did not work smoothly and, in 1804, a company of
Marine Artillery was formed at each Division to replace
the Royal Artillery. This branch of the Corps was discon-
tinued in 1832 but was revived again in 1841, reconstituted
as a separate Division in 1862, and continued as such until
amalgamation again in 1923.°
By the middle of the Nineteenth Century, the position
of the Marine detachments afloat in relation to their ships’
armament gradually changed. The developments in ar-
mament greatly reduced, if they did not altogether elim-
inate, the value of rifle fire and boarding parties in a naval
engagement. Because of the ever-increasing strain on ac-
commodations aboard ships, it became impossible to retain
any personnel on board who did not take an effective part
in the fighting organisation. Thus it was necessary for the
whole of the Marine detachments embarked, and not the
Marine Artillerymen only, to take a share in manning the
ships’ guns, and to undergo training in naval gunnery for
this purpose. As naval gunnery became more and more
technical and specialised, this part of the functions and
training of the Marine became more and more important
to the fighting efficiency of the Fleet.
With the large expansion and development of the
British Empire overseas, the total numbers of naval per-
sonnel steadily increased in the latter part of the Nine-
teenth Century. The Royal Marines, however, did not
increase proportionately, since the need for additional per-
sonnel was due mainly to the increasing requirements for
engine-room ratings and for manning types of vessels
which did not include Marines in their complements. The
result was that the proportion of Marines to total naval
personnel declined steadily from about 28 percent in 1838
to about 12 percent in 1914. There was also a steady decline
in the ratio of the Marines’ shore service to sea service. In
the middle of the Nineteenth Century, a Marine spent

6
about half of his service on shore; by 1914 the proportion
of his shore service had fallen to about one-third of his
total service and out of this third, an ever-increasing por-
tion had to be devoted to training on shore in naval gun-
nery to keep pace with developments afloat.‘
The decade before World War I was a low ebb for the
Royal Marines: “The Royal Marine vote declined from
19,800 in 1902-1904 to 16,500 in 1912-1913.” Not only
did they decrease in strength, they were also underem-
ployed.
Their primary role at this period was the provision of
Marine detachments for the Fleet, specifically Marine gun
crews. A Continental war with massive land armies was in
the offing, for Britain’s potential enemies were just across
the channel. Strong naval bases at home had been pre-
pared, or were being completed against the potential en-
emy, and other permanent bases had been established at
points of strategic importance abroad. Strangely, naval
bases abroad were guarded for the most part by the Army
and not the Royal Marines.
The possibility of Marines being required to perform
in a Continental war or, if the occasion arose, to be available
in sufficient numbers to carry out any of the landing op-
erations, which had been characteristically a feature of
their employment a century before, were remote.
By 1912, however, the Admiralty had considered that
the Fleet might in the future need “advanced naval bases”
and accordingly appointed a committee within the Ad-
miralty to “consider the organisation of a flying column
of three thousand Marines, half of them active service
ranks and the remainder reserves, for securing and hold-
ing an advanced base of the Fleet, either in British, neutral,
or hostile territory.”° | ;
The report of this committee, issued in 1913, contem-
plated the employment of such a force not only for these
objectives but also for securing and covering the landing
of a large force on a hostile coast and executing raids
against an enemy coast. Although no definite decision on
7
the committee’s recommendations appears to have been
reached before the outbreak of war in 1914, the fact is
that the Royal Marines did indeed carry out some of the
objectives contemplated by the Committee during the war,
securing advanced bases home and abroad, such as at Cro-
marty, Scapa Flow, the Falkland Islands, and the Aegean
bases. They also provided independent forces for the sei-
zure of threatened positions and attacks on the enemy’s
coastline and bases, with naval objectives in view, such as
took place in the defence of Antwerp in the early days of
the war, the main attack on the Dardanelles, and the attack
on Zeebrugge.
With the outbreak of war in 1914, the Royal Marines’
strength increased from 16,900 active service and 5,150
reservists to over 33,000 active service and 6,600 reservists
at the Armistice, exclusive of the Royal Marines Labour
Corps. The Labour Corps, whose numbers rose eventually
to over 5,000, was made up of personnel employed in
unloading transports at French ports.
The ensuing period after the war was not only aperiod
of peace; it could also have been called the “Examination
Period.” The Admiralty had little money and a great deal
of time to look closely at how and what to cut back in view
of the stringent operation budget. During this peace pe-
riod, the services could only train to do assigned functions
in time of war. It was at this time (1923) that two funda-
mental questions were raised by the Director of Training
and Staff Duties Division (DTSD) of the Admiralty: What
were the functions of the Royal Marines in wartime, and
were they being trained accordingly?®
The DTSD recommended that a committee be formed
to establish the functions of the Royal Marines in order to
fix their training on a sound and efficient basis. The DTSD
stated that the reason for such an examination was to avoid
the peril to the Royal Marines of major financial cutbacks:

When the Services are placed at the mercy of Economy

Committees, it is of the utmost importance that a valuable

8
 force like the Royal Marines should rest on a sure foun-
dation and that clear ideas should exist concerning their
necessity as part of the Royal Navy. It has been pointed out
that under existing conditions a case could be made for the
abolition of the Marines which would be difficult to resist,
especially in view of the substantial saving (£400,000),
which abolition seems to involve.’

The DTSD minute must have sent chills through the

Corps of the Royal Marines. Talk of the lack of knowledge
of functions and training had come up two years before
when an anonymous contributor to Globe and Laurel, the
official periodical of the Corps, suggested:

Although the Royal Marines have performed invaluable

services to the Navy, the absence of any definite policy has
prevented them from receiving from the Board of Admi-
ralty that attention with regard to employment and training
which is accorded to other branches of H.M. Naval Serv-
ice. . . The Royal Marines role is a link between the Navy
and Army, requiring considerable knowledge of both Serv-
ices. The Marine Officer should be the expert on the Staff
of the Commander-in-Chief to advise him on all matters
concerning the landing of military units or the movements
of these units by sea.... The Officers and men of the
Royal Marines, in addition to their Gunnery duties, must
be able to perform duties in connection with such landings
and movements, and also be prepared to land as advanced
troops in localities in which military forces are not imme-
diately available.®
The lack of established functions and training were
indeed on the minds of some Royal Marines as well as the
DTSD. The Director of Plans Division (DPD), Captain
Alfred Pount; General H. E. Blumberg, Adjutant-General
Royal Marines (AGRM); and Rear-Admiral John Mc-
Clintock, Director of Mobilisation Department (DMD), all
concurred on the need for a conference to select a com-
mittee to consider the Royal Marines case.’
Before approving a conference, however, Rear-

9
Admiral Charles K. Waistell, Assistant Chief Naval Staff
(ACNS) and Deputy Chief Naval Staff (DCNS) Vice-
Admiral Roger Keyes suggested that “terms of reference”
and names of prospective members to be part of a con-
ference should be submitted. They both agreed that a Flag
Officer, but not a member of the Admiralty Board, should
preside. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry F. Oliver, the 2nd Sea
Lord, specifically suggested that the AGRM and the Colo-
nel Commandant of the Royal Marines, Alexander R. M.
Hutchinson, be members of the Conference. Oliver also
noted that he was concerned that over-emphasis on gar-
rison duty by the Marines would “reduce the naval utility
of the Marines and their value as amphibious fighting
men.”'° There seemed to be no question in the 2nd Sea
Lord’s mind as to the Royal Marines function.
After some thought on the matter, the ACNS, the
DTSD, and the AGRM submitted proposed terms of ref-
erence for the committee:

(a) For what function is a Corps of Royal Marines required

as part of the Naval Forces?
(b) What strength, organisation, training and equipment
are required to enable the Royal Marines to carry out
those functions?
(c) What modifications in organisation and training are
recommended, with the Marines at approximately their
present strength, in order to fulfill as nearly as possible
the functions in (a) above?
(d) Are any other modifications required to enable the
most efficient use to be made of the Royal Marines?!

They recommended that the committee should consist

of a Flag Officer as President, and that the other members
be the DMD, DPD, DTSD, AGRM, and the Colonel Com-
mandant of the Royal Marines.
The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Beatty,
approved the terms of reference and membership of the
committee. The First Lord, Leopold Amery, advised a
month later that Admiral Sir Charles Madden had ac-

10
cepted his invitation to preside over the “Committee on
the Corps of the Royal Marines.”
The Madden Report. The Madden Committee had, as
a member, in addition to those already noted, Sir Charles
Walker, the Accounting-General of the Navy. The com-
mittee met regularly during the period from February to
August, 1924, holding fourteen formal, and many infor-
mal, meetings. The Committee had, as background papers,
a seventeen-page memorandum from the DTSD on the
training of Marines and two memoranda from the AGRM,
one examining the DT'SD memo and the other stating his
views on Marine training.'* In addition, it obtained state-
ments On various points from Admiralty Departments con-
cerned and from a number of Marine officers of ranks not
represented on the committee.
Another background paper that the Committee used
as guidance in its deliberations was a copy of an address
made by the Commandant of the United States Marine
Corps, Major-General John A. Lejeune, to the U.S. Naval
War College describing the functions and organisation of
the United States Marine Corps.'* On the Lejeune paper,
the Committee reported:

While the purposes for which this Corps (USMC) is main-

tained are different in several respects from those of the
British Marines, the functions of the two forces have many
points of similarity, and many of the observations in Major-
General Lejeune’s report apply forcibly to the British Corps
also... . We wish here to point out that there is much in
the report to show that the United States authorities have
given considerable thought and attention to the functions,
organisation, and training, of their Marine Corps, and have
included in it a considerable body of men trained to operate
with their fleet and to secure for it suitable oversea bases,
so essential in a Naval war conducted at some distance from
bases in the United States. We should be glad to see the
value of the Royal Marine Corps for similar operations
appreciated with equal clearness.'”

11
Admiral Madden emphasised that, from his understand-
ing of Admiralty intentions, the committee should attempt
to answer the first two questions contained in the terms of
reference: (a) For what functions is a Corps of Royal Ma-
rines required as part of naval forces, and (b) What
strength, organisation, training and equipment are re-
quired to enable the Marines to carry out those functions?
The committee pointed out that its recommendations
would be based solely on the requirements of the Navy in
war and peace, irrespective of financial or other extra-
neous difficulties. The recommendations were thus for-
mulated on an “ideal policy” from the purely naval point
of view.
In answering the first question on the function of the
Royal Marines, the committee first noted that Britain’s past
enemies were European nations close to her shores. For
the great land campaigns, Britain had usually had the ad-
vantage of friendly territory on which to land and assemble
her armies. The committee felt that these favourable con-
ditions could not be counted upon in every war and in
“estimating present and future Naval requirements, ac-
count must be taken of the possibility, if not the proba-
bility” that the next naval war would be conducted against
an enemy whose geographical distance and other condi-
tions would render it a great advantage. No mention of
the enemy was made but, like America’s choice, Japan
would probably fit the bill.
The Committee emphasised the fact that in this kind
of naval war there would be a need for operations in es-
tablishing adequate naval bases, destruction of the enemy’s
bases, and the protection of places important to the naval
lines of communications. They concluded that adequate
preparation for conducting these operations was essential;
operations such as these must form an integral part of the
plans for and conduct of the naval campaign; a relatively
small, lightly armed force, moving with the mobility and
secrecy of the Fleet and accustomed to working in co-

12
operation with it, was superior in operations such as these
to a large mass of troops that were organised and trained
only for service in the field, and encumbered with equip-
ment necessary for a land campaign; the Royal Marines,
if given the necessary numbers and training, are ideally
suited for carrying out operations of these kinds.!6
The committee made quick work in answering the
question of functions for the Royal Marines. They sum-
marised them in order of their importance:

1. The Royal Marines are an integral and essential part of the

Navy. They are to provide detachments in war and peace for
the larger ships capable of manning their share of the gun-
nery armament.
2. They are to provide independent forces to join the Fleet on
mobilisation and to carry out operations for the seizure and
defence of temporary bases and raids on the enemy’s coast
line and bases, under the direction of the Naval Commander-
in-Chief.
3. They will serve as a connecting link between the Navy and
the Army, and will supply the Army in war with units for
special duties for which Naval experience is necessary.

The Madden Report indicated that the members de-

signedly omitted two other functions capable of being as-
signed to the Royal Marines. The first of these was that of
providing units for service with the Army in the field, a
function which the Corps had in fact discharged to a con-
siderable extent during World War I. The committee felt
that it was not part of the duty of the Admiralty to maintain
or train forces solely with a view to their employment in
operations which are the special province of another Serv-
ice. The other omission was that of manning the defences
of existing or proposed permanent naval bases abroad in
the event it was decided that the Admiralty should take
over the defence of some or all of the bases that were then
the responsibility of the War Office. The committee mem-
bers felt that garrison duty abroad would cause a deteri-

13
oration in the quality of personnel. They pointed to the
fact that the Fleet, at about its existing size, required Royal
Marines to be afloat about two-thirds of the time, whereas
if garrison duty abroad became a requirement, a Marine
would spend only one-third of his total service afloat such
as he did before 1914. Such duty, they contended, would
tend to divorce the Royal Marines from the Navy.
In order to carry out the functions of the Royal Ma-
rines as stated above, the aim of an “ideal policy” dimmed
in the light of reality. It was almost certain that no one on
the Committee had the slightest hope that an increase of
Vote A for 1924-1925 had a chance of being passed by
Parliament. Nevertheless, they went ahead and recom-
mended that provision for not less than “four brigade bat-
talions made of 1,800 fully trained active service and 1,600
reservists called upon mobilisation” was required to carry
out the functions stated. Vote A would require an addi-
tional 1,900 men over the existing figure of 8,900.
The committee obtained additional estimates from the
AGRM and the Accountant General of the Navy, showing
that savings in Vote A requests could be made by releasing
some active service ranks such as those who did cleaning
and maintenance and replacing them with civilians. Other
Marines made articles of uniform and boots; if that task
could also be contracted out to civilians, additional savings
could be made. It was estimated that for the sum of £51,000
per year, duties such as those mentioned could be taken
over by civilians or Marine pensioners, thus releasing 330
men for training purposes without requesting an addition
to Vote A. Examples such as these were given by the com-
mittee to indicate that other savings could be made along
these same lines.
With regard to training, the committee recommended
that a separate training centre should be set up at a place
near the coast, such as Deal; that in general the Corps
should be trained as an infantry force; that all combatant
ranks should be required to attain a satisfactory standard

14
in naval gunnery and marine infantry duties before spe-
cialising in other subjects; that Marine detachments afloat
should be landed for shore exercises as frequently as pos-
sible; and that whenever practicable, exercises of the in-
dependent Marine forces should be carried out in co-
operation with the Fleet during Naval manoeuvres.
In addition, special training was necessary for the bat-
talions of the striking force in the following areas:

1. Selection and allocation of landing places.

2. Embarkation of units and gear in boats; disembarkation and
assembly on beach piers.
3. Erection of temporary and permanent piers and landing sites.
4. Communications within the forces landed, and with ships
present.
5. Observation and control of the covering gunfire of the Fleet.
6. Selection of objectives for attack, advance from landing
places, and the methods of carrying out such operations and
the consolidation of positions gained."

These recommendations were indeed an invitation for

the development of a written doctrine for the major phases
of a landing operation.
The committee recognised that trials were needed to
decide what would be suitable equipment of arms, stores,
and transport for the independent Marine forces and
shore defence units. It did not recommend, however, who
should carry out these experiments.
Admiral Madden submitted the completed confiden-
tial report to the Admiralty Board on 20 August 1924. In
a closing comment, and in recognising the then-obvious
difficulty in obtaining the necessary increase in Vote A
that had been recommended by his committee, he sug-
gested leaving the door open on this matter. He stated,
“It is possible that in the next decade or so, improvements
in the financial situation may enable, and changes in the
international situation require, further steps in the same
direction to be taken.”!®

PD
 The Madden Report was fully reviewed by the mem-
bers of the Admiralty Board and Parliamentary Secretary.
They all concurred on the first two functions for the Royal
Marines. The ACNS, Rear-Admiral Waistell, thought that
the third function—“to serve as a connecting line between
the Navy and Army’—should be erased. He was concerned
that this suggested function might indicate that the Ma-
rines were “partly Navy and partly Army.” He repeated
that the Marines were an integral part of the Navy and
had nothing to do with the Army. Liaison with the Army
was a function of the Naval Staff.'® All reviewers of the
report agreed with Waistell, including the First Lord, Wil-
ham Bridgeman.
After considering the Madden Report nearly thirteen
months, the Admiralty Board concluded that the recom-
mendations concerning an increase in Vote A for the Ma-
rines for an independent striking force could not be
implemented for reasons of economy. It is important to
reiterate that there were no objections to the concept of
the striking force. The concept was found; the funds were
simply not likely to be available in the immediate future.
Small increases in Marine personnel were made dur-
ing the three years after the Madden Report was submit-
ted, but the personnel were already nominated for Marine
complements of ships in the Naval programmes of 1926,
1929-1930.
The First Lord summed up the situation at the end
of the remarks of the reviewing body: “In view of the
urgent need for economy, it does not seem an auspicious
moment to press for an increase in the strength of the
Royal Marines.”?°
In addition to the functions discussed in the Madden
Report, other matters of less importance were considered.
In the years subsequent to the report, these lesser matters
resulted in the following changes within the Royal Marines:
(a) While the three divisional headquarters organisation
remained intact, the AGRM moved into the Admiralty
buildings; (b) Senior Marine Officers were given additional
‘
16
interstaff duties; (c) A Marine recruit training centre was
established at Deal; (d) The Royal Marines did not take
over duties abroad from the Army. However, the concept
of a mobile force along these lines, to reinforce existing
garrisons, recurred several times. In January 1927, the
Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet requested one
thousand Marines to guard the international settlement at
Shanghai against the advance of the Chinese Nationalist
Armies. The 12th Battalion Royal Marines was formed,
assembled at Eastney and within a week was ready to em-
bark. The Marines served as part of the Shanghai Defence
Force for a year, after which they returned to England to
be disbanded.*! Again in 1935, against a possible Italian
threat to the Mediterranean Fleet, some 1,600 Marines
were sent to Alexandria to provide base defences as part
of an inter-service force, commanded by a Marine Briga-
dier. A year later they returned home for disbandment.
Naval estimates and specific functions notwithstanding, the
Admiralty did indeed call upon the Royal Marines when
they needed a task done well and in a hurry.
Through exposure to critical examination, followed
by recommendations of the Madden Committee, the Royal
Marines specific functions, in war and peace, were spelled
out for the first time. The term “amphibious operations”
became officially associated with the Royal Marines im-
mediately after the report was considered by the Admiralty
Board. By 1927, the “Royal Marines Striking Force” was
attainable when the forces were drawn from Royal Marine
Divisions or from the Fleet.
A glance at the amendments to the /nstructions for Royal
Marine Divisions, an official publication promulgated by the
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, demonstrates the
progression of changes made. The 1922 Fourth Edition
of the Instructions, Section I, General, read as follows:

1. The Corps of Royal Marines is a military body organised

and trained for service in the fleet as well as on shore. It

17
 forms part of the Regular Forces of the Crown, with theuF
sanction of Parliament renewed annually in the Army Act.™

The 1922 Fourth Edition of the Instructions was amended

sometime after the Madden Report was submitted and last
reviewed by the First Sea Lord, 9 September 1925. The
amendment to Section I of the Instructions changed from
“General” to “Constitution of the Royal Marines,” and it
appears it was issued in 1926.

1. The Corps of Royal Marines is a military body specially

organised and trained for service in the fleet and for am-
phibious operations (my italics). It forms part of the Regular
Forces of the Crown, with the sanction of Parliament, re-
newed annually in the Army Act.”

The 1927 amendment to the /nstructions used, for the

first time, the terms “striking force” and “function” in war
and peace. Section I, General, was changed to Section I,
Constitution of the Corps of the Royal Marines. It read:

la: The Corps of Royal Marines is a military body specially

organised and trained for service in the fleet as well as on
shore. Its function in war and in peace is to provide de-
tachments which, whilst fully capable of manning their
share of the gun armament of ships, are specially trained
as small-arms men in order that a striking force drawn
either from the R.M. Depots or from the Fleet may be
immediately available for use under the direction of the
Naval Commander-in-Chief for amphibious operations,
such as raids on the enemy coast-line and bases, or the
seizure and defence of temporary bases for the use of our
own Fleet.”*

It is important to note that the Royal Marines were

given a “striking force” role but that the personnel making
up this force were to be drawn from “either the RM Depots
(or Divisions as noted in the 1930 amendment), or from
the Fleet.” The forces were not separate from and addi-

18 ‘
tional to the remainder of the Corps but were to be drawn
from shore duty and detachments from the Fleet. A “strik-
ing force” from these sources prevented increases in the
Vote A figure and made it possible for the concept of a
striking force to come into being.
Considering the climate of the economy at the time
and the relatively small likelihood of needing a large scale
striking force, the designation of the Royal Marines for a
limited striking force role was realistic. The Madden Com-
mittee members did see their recommendation for a Royal
Marines striking force come into being in a limited way.
Coincidentally, at the time (1927), Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Charles E. Madden was First Sea Lord (1927-1930).
The 1930 amendment to the /nstructions was basically
the same as the 1927 amendment, except as noted above
Depots to Divisions.*° A discussion of another amendment
in 1943 to the /nstructions is made in chapter four.
In summary, the Madden Committee Report was not
detrimental to the Royal Marines status. The fact that a
committee of Flag Officers of the Admiralty considered
functions, organisation, training and the like, of the Royal
Marines, during a decade of severe economic restraint 1n-
dicated the Navy’s concern and willingness to maintain the
status quo of the Corps. Not to be overlooked was the
important addition to the Corps responsibility to provide
a “striking force” for immediate use for amphibious op-
erations to the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

United States Marine Corps (USMC)

American Marines mark their birthday as 10 Novem-
ber 1775, when the Colonial Congress formally established
a military organisation of two battalions of Marines and
resolved that “no persons be appointed to office, or inlisted
into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so
acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to
advantage by sea when required.”

19
 There were, however, Colonial Marines going back to
1740 when four battalions were raised to join six Maritime,
or Admiralty, Marines to fight Spain in the so-called war
of Jenkins’ Ear. The Colonial Marines, about three thou-
sand strong, were designated as the 43rd Regiment of Foot
and participated in the battle at Cartagena, now Colombia,
during April 1741. Colonial Marines fought again against
the French during the Seven Years’ War, which began in
the colonies in 1754.
The pattern of service, for both Colonial and Conti-
nental Marines, was to serve in ships’ detachments in sup-
port of landing parties and boarding parties. They were
also used from the tops and rigging as sharpshooters and
grenadiers.
After the end of the American Revolutionary War,
the Continental Navy and Marines ceased to exist. With
the ratification of the Constitution by the States, the re-
establishment and rebuilding of the armed forces of the
United States began. The Act of 1798 established the Ma-
rine Corps practically as it exists today. Although the Act
placed the Marine Corps directly under the President, it
also created a disturbing role factor for the Marines by
providing that they would be part of the Navy or Army,
“according to the nature of the service in which they shall
be employed.” These words created an ambiguous or di-
vided jurisdiction for the Corps. From 1798 to 1834, it was
a moot point as to whether Marines serving ashore were
not to some degree under the jurisdiction of the Army.
Such a condition was extremely difficult for the Marine
Corps, but the Act of 30 June 1834 clarified the matter.
This provided that the Marine Corps was part of the Navy
(“Naval establishment” was not used in the Nineteenth
Century) except when detached for service with the Army
and only when ordered by the President.
Apart from the Establishing Act of 1798, the Marine
Corps had no directed roles or missions. Within the Act
itself, Marines were to “act on board frigates and any of
the armed vessels of the United States, ... at any time be

20 \
liable to do duty in the forts and garrisons of the United
States, on the sea coast, or any other duty on shore, as the
President in his discretion shall direct.” The usual duties
of sharpshooting and boarding parties continued along
with keeping discipline aboard ships. The Marines would
and could do anything the President directed; but as for
their part in the naval scheme of warfare, they were on an
“on-call” basis: they might be called upon to land to protect
American property or personnel, or could easily be used
in a landing party. Aside from shipboard duties, the Ma-
rines had no specific task to make them responsible for
landing operations of any sort. Such responsibility did
come, however, during the Spanish-American War of
1898.
Prior to that war, there was a controversy within the
Navy Department: to whom should the landing and assault
mission of a naval force be assigned? On one side, some
naval officers wanted to keep the Navy in exclusive control
of landing operations. Other naval officers believed that
seamen were simply too busy for landing parties, since they
had to concentrate on working the ship and its guns. The
controversy focused attention on the landing-force issue,
and many high-ranking naval officers concluded that the
Marine Corps was the logical choice. In the Spanish
—American War their decision was vindicated when, in the
battle for Guantanamo in Cuba, a Marine battalion under
Marine command seized the advanced base, an outstand-
ing accomplishment which ensured victory. The Guantan-
amo precedent of successfully seizing advanced bases was
strengthened by similar experiences in the Philippines and
China.?° A precedent of great value to the Marine Corps
was established, and the assignment of the “assault mis-
sion” went to the Marines. After bases were secured, how-
ever, the Marines were still to be used in defence and
development of these bases. The authority for this mission
came from the General Board immediately after it was
organised in April 1900.
At the first meeting of the General Board, Colonel

All
George C. Reid, member of the Board, was requested to
put before it

the number and organisation of a force of Marines suffi-

cient to hold each of three positions at Culebra in the West
Indies, Samana, in Santo Domingo, and Guantanamo in
Cuba; composition of this force as to infantry and artillery
to maintain a position against cruisers or naval brigades
landing to attack it.*’

In addition, the General Board recommended to the

Secretary of Navy that

two transports of capacity sufficient to carry 500 Marines

each with 2 months’ commissary and Quartermaster stores
etc., be made ready in the event of a naval campaign in
Asiatic waters and that they be moved to an advanced base
near the scene of hostilities.**

The General Board specifically recommended that the

Marines would be “best adapted and most available for
immediate and sudden call for use in defending any ad-
vanced base.” The Army’s role was considered at this time,
but in the opinion of the General Board,

the requirements of the naval establishment of the United

States include a military organisation of sufficient strength
in numbers and efficiency, to enable the Navy to meet all
demands upon it for services within its own sphere of op-
erations, without dependence upon the co-operation of the
Army for troops and military supplies, for such a force of
the Army may not always be available.*°

With the “who” completed, the “how” and “where”

phase of the advanced base problem got underway. The
General Board requested the Secretary of Navy to direct
the Brigadier-General Commandant to organise immedi-
ately four companies of 104 enlisted men each, and “have
provided for such battalion and stored at Philadelphia,

22 ;
ready for instant use, a complete equipment for expedi-
tionary field service for such force.”
The Board recommended that officers and men of
this battalion be thoroughly trained and instructed in the
following areas: (a) construction of field fortifications, gun
emplacements, gun platforms and magazines; (b) the trans-
portation of guns of less than 8-inch calibre from ship to
point of emplacement and the mounting of same; (c) the
construction and operating of field telegraph and tele-
phone lines, signal, searchlight, and range-finder stations;
(d) the planting of mines, counter-mining, and the oper-
ating of torpedoes for harbour defence. The Board also
recommended that the companies composing such a bat-
talion be kept organised and maintained at their full
strength, ready, in all respects, for immediate service.*°
The request by the General Board to the Secretary of
the Navy to direct the Marine Corps to organise, train, and
equip a unit to accomplish a specific task was a first of its
kind. Colonel George C. Reid, a member of the Board,
and Brigadier-General Commandant Charles Heywood set
about forming a fixed defence battalion to fulfill the re-
quirements set by the Secretary of Navy.
Within a couple of years, equipment for advanced
base work for the Atlantic was assembled for storage on
the East Coast at Philadelphia and for the Pacific at Olon-
gapo in the Philippines. The Commandant of the Marine
Corps (CMC) was given the responsibility for the custody
and care of all advanced base material. In addition, he was
to “take the necessary steps to instruct the officers and
men under his command in the use of this material.”*!
The Commandant opened the first Advanced Base
School at New London, Connecticut, in July 1910. Al-
though it was to be primarily an officers’ school, forty
enlisted ranks were assigned to the first class. The courses
of instruction were in defence—gun defence, mobile def-
ence, and mine defence. The Advanced Base School
courses of instruction were taught over a period of a year

23
and almost all Marine officers attended, in addition to
some Naval and a few Army Officers. The school was suc-
cessful, although interrupted during the subsequent years
by calls to expeditionary service in Nicaragua, Cuba, and
Mexico.
The Advanced Base Force strength was 1,250 Marines
assembled on the East Coast at Philadelphia and another
1,250 Marines at Mare Island, off the West Coast, having
been transferred from Olongapo, Philippines. They were
technically considered “fixed defence regiments,” avail-
able, however, for duty anywhere as a reinforcing body to
overseas garrisons or as a force to seize new advanced
bases. The figures of 1,250 men for each regiment were
peacetime strengths. The General Board recommended
that*?

two mobile defence regiments about 1,250 men each, may

be required in war to reinforce the fixed defence regiments,
one on each coast such organisation in peace are desirable
but not strictly necessary.

The Secretary of Navy approved the strength of fixed and

mobile defence regiments in both peace and wartime.
The Advanced Base Force, with its mission of seizing
and defending advanced naval bases, changed its name to
the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force (MCEF) in 1923
and again to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in 1933, which
remains in existence today with its basic mission still intact.
With the exception of a three-day landing and paci-
fication operation at Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1914* the Ad-
vanced Base Force did not participate in seizing advanced
bases or landing operations against hostile forces during

*In fairness to the Navy, and invariably seldom mentioned by Marines, and
Advanced Base Force available for the landing about 2,500 Marines. They were
consequently reinforced by 3,000 seamen from the Fleet off-shore. The whole
landing force came under the command of R-Adm Frank F. Fletcher, although
Marines commanded their own regiments.

24 .
World War I nor during the period between the wars. The
Advanced Base Force was kept intact for duty in the Car-
ibbean, South America, Philippines, China, and Guam,
and other oversea bases. During World War I, Marine
personnel strength went from 13,725 to a peak of 75,101
at the time of the armistice, of which 30,000 served with
the Army in France.**
For the most part during the war and after (1917-1934),
the Advanced Base Forces were used to garrison cities and
towns in Haiti and Nicaragua against insurgent forces at-
tempting to overthrow the legitimate governments.
One of the few major benefits that came from World
War I for the Marine Corps was that wartime expansion
caused it to receive its own aviation component. When the
United States entered the war, Marine aviation consisted
of only four officers and thirty men, all part of the com-
plement of the Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida. By
the end of the war, the total officers and enlisted ranks
exceeded two thousand four hundred.
As in all parts of the world after World War I, re-
trenchment and economy became the key issues. In Con-
gress the budgets of the military forces would have to be
cut drastically. The Marine Corps, whose operating budget
was submitted as part of the Navy’s estimates, fought
against any reduction in the appropriated strength of
21,000 by requesting additional funds for the authorised
strength of a Corps of 27,400.
In 1922 the Commandant, Major-General John Le-
jeune, wrote to the General Board recommending that the
personnel strength of the Marine Corps should be deter-
mined by its peacetime duties and wartime missions. He
pointed out that,
whereas the Conference on the Limitation of Armament
has restricted the immediate material means (navies) for
waging war on sea, there is no restriction on the size of the
mobile forces which may be attached to, or be held in read-
iness for service with, the Fleet.**

25
In the same memorandum, the Commandant set forth the
Marine Corps duties and missions as reflected in Federal
legislation and instructions from the Secretary of the Navy:

1. The duties which the Marine Corps is required to per-

form in time of peace are as follows:
(a) As marine detachments on board the vessels of the Fleet
in full commission.
(b) As guards for navy yards, naval stations, ammunition
depots, naval prisons, etc., at home and abroad.
(c) As garrisons for Haiti, Santo Domingo, Virgin Islands,
Guam, Peking, Managua, etc.
(d) As a mobile force in training for use on expeditionary
duty abroad for the purpose of carrying out the foreign
policy of our Government, or for emergency use at home.
(e) As detachments necessary for the recruitment service,
for training recruits, and for administrative purposes.
2. The primary war mission of the Marine Corps is to sup-
ply a mobile force to accompany the Fleet for operations
on shore in support of the Fleet. This force should be of
such size, organisation, armament and equipment as may
be required by the plan of naval operations. Also it should
be further utilised in conjunction with Army operations on
shore, when the active naval operations reach such a stage
as to permit its temporary detachment from the Navy.
3. (a) The secondary mission of the Marine Corps in time
of war is to continue the performance of its peacetime
duties as outlined in Paragraph 2, immediately above.*

The Marine Corps did not get the added men re-
quested, but its personnel strength did balance out to
21,233, a slight increase over the appropriated amount.
The importance of the Commandant’s memorandum in
February 1922 was not the superficial request for added
personnel for the Corps, but rather the terminology and
basis for doctrine that would evolve from it.
In the same memorandum to the General Board Le-
jeune alluded to the fact that between Honolulu and Ma-
nila the United States had no developed naval base. In a

26 i
war, such a base would be necessary. The Commandant
pointed out that “the loss of Guam under this situation
would be most serious and its recapture would be necessary
to the conduct of successful naval operations in the Pa-
cific.”* He further stated that the advantage of having
immediately available a mobile Marine Corps force ade-
quate to conduct offensive landing operations against hos-
tile naval bases was apparent.
Since there were no objections from the General
Board to Lejeune’s remarks, the memorandum basically
changed the tactical direction of the Marine Corps in the
succeeding decades. The Commandant envisioned a mo-
bile force, in readiness and capable of offensive operations.
The key appeared to be in the term “offensive operations.”
Up to this point, “seizing an advanced naval base” was
understood to mean a base undefended or uninhabited.
Lejeune turned the matter around by reminding those
who would listen that a mobile Marine force would have
to conduct offensive landing operations against hostile
naval bases.
In summary, the United States Marine Corps’ func-
tions relating to landing operations were set as early as
1900 with the establishment of the Advanced Base Force.
The “seizing and defending” element in the Advanced
Base concept, for the first twenty-five years, really referred
to a base not occupied by an enemy. The thought, or term
itself, “opposed landing” did not come up. It was not until

*Lejeune recounts in his memoirs that his old friend retired Royal Marine, Sir
Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the British Delegation to the Washington Naval
Conference (Nov—Dec 1921) and Arthur James Balfour, then Head ofthe British
Delegation, dined with the Lejeune family while in Washington. After dinner
the Commandant presented Balfour with a walking stick which the Marine
forester in Guam had sent him. Lejeune said that Balfour was pleased as a child
with a new toy and said he had never heard of Guam (pronouncing it with a
very short a) before coming to the Conference, but it seems he heard more about
it than any other place. In retrospect, Guam appears to have been as unknown
to the British, certainly to Balfour, as Trincomalee or Chittagong was to the
Americans.

ae
the mid-1920s that the realisation of seizing an advanced
base from a hostile enemy, such as Japan, was indeed prob-
able. This probability was pointed out to the General Board
by the Commandant of the Marine Corps who received no
dissenting views. Asa result, a new direction for the Marine
Corps was begun. It had the organisation in the form of
the Advanced Base Force to carry out the “offensive” as-
pect but in order to properly train and equip this force,
a written doctrine for landing operations was needed.
The next chapter describes the work of the British in
developing a written doctrine and chapter three describes
the American effort.
. List of Papers of the CID to 1914 (London, 1964).
Tentative Landing Operations Manual (Washington, 1935), Chap. I, Sec. I.
NOvoAdm Sir Charles Madden to Adm, Comm on the Corps of the Royal Marines,
6 Aug 1924, ADM 1/8664 (CW12035/23); hereafter referred to as the Mad-
den Rpt.
4, Ibid., p. 5.
5. Madden Rpt, Sec II, p. 5, and Adm Paper X3313/1913, ADM 1/8664.
6. DTSD Min, 5 Sept 1923, ADM 1/8664.
7. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
8 . Globe and Laurel, Apr 1920, Vol. 27, p. 15.
9 . AGRM Min, 2 Oct 1923, ADM 1/8664 (A.4739/23P).
10 . 2nd Sea Lord Min, 2 Nov 1923, ADM 1/8664.
11. ACNS Min, 28 Nov 1923, ADM 1/8664.
12. Naval sec min, 17 Dec 1923. Committee appointed Adm ltr 17 Dec 1923,
ADM 1/8664 (CW 12035/23).
13. DT'SD Memo, 5 Sept 1923, and AGRM to DTSD, 15 Sept 1923, ADM 1/8664.
14. NID Paper, 1924, ADM 1/8664 (6628/24). Lejeune’s paper will be cited again
later when discussing the USMC functions.
15. Madden Rpt, Sec. I, p. 1.
16. Ibid., p. 9.
ie tbtds ip. 24s
18. Ibid., p. 29.
19. ACNS Min, 3 Dec 1924, ADM 1/8664.
20. First Lord Min, 9 Sept 1925, ADM 1/8664.
21. Maj-GenJ. L. Moulton, The Royal Marines (London, 1973), pp. 89-90.
22. Instructions for Royal Marines Divisions, Fourth Edition (Eastney, 1922)
23. Ibid., amendment, n.d.
24. Ibid., amendment, 1927.
25. Ibid., amendment, 1930.
26. William Russell, “The Genesis of Fleet Marine Force Doctrine: 1879-1899,”
Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 35, No. 7 (July 1951), Part IV, p. 59.
27. GB Memo, 29 May 1915, NHD.
28. Adm George Dewey to SECNAV, 6 Oct. 1900, NHD.

28 .
29) Dewey to SECNAV, | Nov 1900, NHD.
30. RAdm A. S. Crowninshield to SECNAV,1 Nov 1901, NHD.
Bile SECNAV to CMC, 24 Mar 1910, NHD (Ser. 16721-39).
2: GB to SECNAV, 13 Nov 1913, NHD.
Sep Maj Edwin N. McClellan, USMC, The USMC in the World War (Washington,
1920).
34. CMC to GB, 11 Feb 1922, USMC RG 432, NHD.
oD. Ibid., The CMC Memo to the GB, 11 Feb 1922 containing the above “duties
and missions” of the USMC was classified Secret as the complete memo-
randum contained sensitive material. The duties and missions of the Corps
were public knowledge and General Lejeune used this theme many times
in public addresses. The Lejeune Report cited by Admiral Madden in Feb-
ruary 1924, with reference number NID 6628/24, was from Commandant
Lejeune’s address to the U.S. Naval War College 14 December 1923.

29
 2
The British at Work

Evolution of a Combined Operations Manual

Military Staff College Report and the Field Service

Regulations

“Tt may be said that a successful landing will require very

careful thinking out by the three Services working in close
cooperation, very thorough preparation, including the ad-
aptation to our needs of every resource that science can
devise, ample practice for all the personnel taking part,
elaborate orders and perfect secrecy.”
The quotation above is not from a current edition of
a service manual on amphibious operation but rather from
a report from the Director of the Royal Naval Staff College
(RNSC), Captain E. E. Drax RN, in December 1919.! This
quotation is important in two respects. First, it demon-
strates positive thinking about combined operations and
how to improve them. Second, it places stress on “close co-
operation” among the Services. Co-operation between the
Army and Navy before World War I was almost non-
existent. The successful co-operation among all of the
Services after the Great War is directly attributable to the

30 ‘
staff and students of the three Staff Colleges. For the first
time in their respective service careers, they became aware
of the other fellow’s problems—a giant step.
Immediately after the First World War, when the Staff
Colleges commenced their courses, there were only a few
hours ofinstruction on combined operations. This instruc-
tion was primarily a historical account as to how Britain
became a great Empire, sprinkled with examples of “Con-
junct Operations,” such as Wolfe’s capture of Quebec in
1759, a great feat of the Eighteenth Century but not rel-
evant to the problems of the interwar period. The serious
study came during the five or six days spent at the Military
Staff College at Camberley when students of all three Staff
Colleges got together to work out and criticise all aspects
of an elaborate scheme of combined operations pertaining
to the defence or recapture of Singapore or Hong Kong.
In the first such gathering of the Staff College students
immediately after the First World War, the meeting at
Camberley (15—19 October 1919) was notable in that nearly
all of the student officers, 26 Naval and Royal Marines, 3
RAF, and 140 Army, had had great experience in the late
war. The lessons of Gallipoli were more than a past ex-
perience; they had been discussed and thrashed out by the
students, who submitted a copy of the collective report of
the combined operation problem to their respective service
chiefs at the Admiralty, Army Council, and Air Ministry.
Although their findings and suggestions were seldom in
agreement, there was one major exception: all agreed
upon the need for an immediate updating of the existing
Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, 1913.
The 1913 Manual had eight chapters dealing with the
most general subjects, which were more historical than
instructional. By 1919 the Manual’s major fault had be-
come obvious—it had been compiled before the aeroplane
had proved its value as a weapon of war. This, along with
the lessons of World War I and the experience of Gallipoli,
necessitated a new manual.

Dl
 Major General Anderson, as Commandant of the Staff
College at Camberley, sent his report of the 1919 exercises
to the War Office, with a copy to the Royal Naval Staff
College. Captain Drax, Director of the RNSC, forwarded
both his report and Anderson’s to the Admiralty with a
suggestion prompted by what the majority of students had
concluded from the combined exercises:

The official Manual of Combined Operations requires to be

amended, brought up-to-date and much amplified. This
cannot be efficiently done by any body of Naval or Military
officers working separately. It is therefore recommended
that a joint committee, including an RAF officer, should
sit at the Admiralty or War Office to compile a new Manual.
Representatives of the Ministry of shipping should be called
in from time to time as required.”

When Anderson forwarded his report to the War

Office, he requested that copies and annexures be printed
“for issue to those officers who took part in the exercise
and to next year’s students at the Staff College.”* The Staff
College report also included in their recommendations
that the 1913 Manual of Combined Operations be updated
and listed topics to be included in any future revision of
the 1913 Manual. The War Office stated it would print the
Staff College report but only after using it as a “draft”
chapter to replace the 1914 version of Chapter XIII, Field
Service Regulations, Volume II on Combined Operations.
The War Office was responsible for publishing Field Service
Regulations (FSR) and apparently concluded that it might
as well utilise the fine work of the Staff College and its
report on combined operations for a needed revision of
Chapter XIII of FSR on combined operations.
The Training Division of the Admiralty requested
fifty copies of Anderson’s printed report for the “use of
the Naval Staff” and further suggested to the War Office
that “the time is ripe for a revision of the 1913 Manual of
Combined Operations so that it may embody the experi-
ence of the war while this is fresh in the minds ofOfficers.”
The War Office replied to the Admiralty letter and
stated it would send copies of the printed Staff College
report, now identified as “draft Chapter XIII,” FSR, Vol-
ume II. It proposed that a committee be formed to study
the draft chapter on combined operations inasmuch as it
affected all of the military services. The committee, if ap-
pointed, would use draft Chapter XIII as its terms of ref-
exence-
By the end of May, the War Office advised the Ad-
miralty that the committee mentioned in the 11 March
letter “be assembled in the course of next month.” It fur-
ther proposed that the Chairman of the Committee be a
Major-General and that the “War Office representative
should consist of two officers of or below the rank of Colo-
nel, the War Office providing the Secretary and accom-
modation for the meeting.”®
Within a week, the Admiralty replied, agreeing to the
terms of reference and nominating three representa-
tives—Captain Barry E. Domville, RN, from Division of
Plans; Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Huddleston, RMA, rep-
resenting the Director of Gunnery Division; and Com-
mander H. G. Thursfield, RN, from Training and Staff
Duties Division. The Admiralty also had standing by three
additional naval captains to give evidence as might be nec-
essary.’
On 22 June 1920, the first meeting of the Inter-de-
partmental Committee on Combined Operations met, with
Major-General G. F. Dawnay presiding. The initial dis-
cussion took an unexpected turn, with the naval members
pointing out that the draft chapter forming the basis of
discussion dealt with one form of combined operation
only—an opposed landing—and stating that the chapter
should not be limited in this way. The naval members
believed that all forms of combined operations should be

33
included in the chapter, including support by ships at sea
of military operations by land forces, support by river craft
of land forces operating on the flanks of a river, occupa-
tion, equipment, and defence of advanced bases by naval
and military forces, and coast defence.*
General Dawnay was taken aback and pointed out that
a question of principle was involved, since this rearrange-
ment would bring into question the terms of reference.
He further pointed out the difficulties of rewriting the
chapter as it stood and argued that the committee should
keep to the guidelines of the War Office. One Army mem-
ber, Colonel L. R. Beadon, suggested the committee could
rewrite the chapter and include the naval proposals, while
the other Army member, Lieutenant Colonel C. O. Place,
concluded it was a waste of time to consider the naval
proposals.
Dawnay closed the first meeting by sending a letter to
the War Office for guidance as to whether the naval pro-
posals should be included in the scope of the committee.®
The War Office, after submitting a copy of its in-
tended reply to Dawnay to the Admiralty and Air Ministry,
advised that the Committee

cannot of itself expand the scope of the draft chapter to

deal with the further subjects mentioned (naval proposals)
but that the Committee should expand the section on
“General Principles” into a general section dealing with the
general principles of cooperation applicable to any type of
combined operations.!°

In effect, the War Office amended the terms of ref-

erence and concluded that the other forms of combined
operations would have to be resolved by a separate manual.
Both the Admiralty and Air Ministry agreed with the War
Office reply to Dawnay.!!

34 ‘
 In Chapter XIII of the FSR, Volume II, the definition
given to combined operations was:

Those operations in which more services than one are

jointly engaged, the command of each in its own sphere
being independent of, though acting in concert with, that
of the others.

In this definition, there is no room for anything ap-

proaching a single commander or supreme commander.
However, the chapter did cite an example advocating the
single command concept:

In cases where the nature of the operations is such that the

forces of one or more of the Services may be considered
as acting merely in an auxiliary role to those of another
service, it may be decided to entrust the command of the
whole to the senior officer of the service which is taking
the main share in the operations. The formation of a com-
bined staff becomes in these circumstances practicable.

The recommendations of the Staff Colleges, contained

in their respective reports of the 1919 combined-opera-
tions exercises, called for a combined staff, of some degree,
to handle combined operations. The Military Staff College
recommended

the formation of a special Combined Naval, Military and

Air Staff, whose duty it would be to consider these and
other cognate problems and to formulate, during peace
time, plans for combined operations in war. When war
breaks out, this Staff would of course be the body who
would assist in putting these plans into execution. It is very
strongly felt that separate Staff, working each primarily for
their respective Services, will never attain the same degree
of combined efficiency as will one combined staff.’

The Royal Naval Staff College report suggested that

35
 plans for a combined operation should always be prepared
by a Combined Naval and Military Staff. If there are two
Staffs it is certainly fatal to separate them. From start to
finish they should work side by side, in the closest possible
co-operation. It is also suggested that the Naval and Military
Staff should each have a liaison officer of the opposite
service permanently attached throughout the operation.'*

Despite the recommendations of the Staff College’s

report the Interdepartmental Committee did not agree
with these views and Chapter XIII reflected

the system of staff organisation for combined operations

must correspond to the system of command adopted. If
there are separate commanders for each of the Services,
then there should be separate staffs to deal with its own
service requirements but working in the closest accord with
each other (service staff) from the outset.

The only example of a change in this principle was

contained in the “auxiliary role” mentioned above.
Chapter XIII included a completely new section,
“Aerial Co-operation,” concerning the Royal Air Force
units working under the RAF Commander and units work-
ing under naval and military commanders. It was pointed
out that the primary function of RAF units was to “main-
tain supremacy in the air.” Its independent status, plan-
ning, and staff would be the same as that for the Navy and
the Army, including its role as adviser to the other services.
Capabilities and limitations of various kinds of aircraft
were discussed but no specific tactical use of them was
mentioned.
The section, “Naval artillery co-operation and obser-
vation of fire,” was quite detailed. When considering this
section, General Dawnay, in the committee’s first meeting
stated:

36 :
 . . mistaken ideas prevailed as to the power of naval guns
to keep down fire from trenches, etc. While later on in the
war in Palestine extremely accurate covering fire from na-
val guns was provided but that involved a very elaborate
system. There should be no mistaken understanding on
the part of the Army as to the degree of support that the
Navy was able to render.'#
The chapter gave detailed description of the limita-
tions of naval gunfire. Other sections of the chapter dealt
generally with types of combined operations, staff organ-
ization, preliminary plans, and secrecy in combined op-
erations. m,
When submitting the chapter for approval by the War
Office, Dawnay stated, “the Chapter now forwarded rep-
resents the agreed views of the members of the Committee,
drawn from all three services, on the principles underlying
the conduct of combined operations generally.”®
The FSR Chapter XIII, Volume II, was published
early in 1922 but was dated 1920. The importance of Chap-
ter XIII was twofold: first, it was the prime written work
on combined operations after World War I; second, it con-
tained most of the recommendations made by the Military
Staff College. As it will later be seen, the recommendations
by the Royal Naval Staff College report were incorporated
into the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Force
Operations, 1922—Provisional. In a way, the 1919 Staff Col-
lege’s report on combined operations set a precedent
whereby recommendations from subsequent staff college
reports would find their way into the official doctrinal
manuals on combined operations of 1925, 1931, and 1938.

Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Force

Operations, 1922, Provisional

While Dawnay’s Interdepartmental Committee was

meeting during the Autumn of 1920, the Director of Gun-

ah
nery Division at the Admiralty, Captain F. A. Dreyer, RN,
sent a copy of a precis to the committee, entitled, “Pro-
posed Manual of Combined Operations.” The precis was
sent for possible consideration in connection with the com-
mittee’s work. The precis was an expanded version of the
naval proposals that were introduced at the first committee
meeting. The theme ranged from “landing on a hostile
coast,” “river expedition,” and “coast and harbour de-
fences” to “landing an expeditionary force in an Allied
country.”
The author of the outline was identified by the Ad-
miralty as Captain Edward Altham, RN, a student in Oc-
tober 1920, at the Senior Officers’ War Course, Greenwich.
Altham’s precis was returned to the Admiralty by the Inter-
departmental Committee, after copies were sent to the Air
Ministry and War Office. Lieutenant Colonel A. B. N.
Churchill, Secretary to the Committee, advised the Ad-
miralty that “the committee have perused this valuable
Precis with great interest, but they are unanimously of the
opinion that the subject matter is outside of their terms of
reference.”'® Churchill, nevertheless, went on to state that
“the Committee have shown the need for the compilation
of a work on the lines of this Precis.”
Captain F. Dreyer, RN, suggested in a minute to the
Director of Training and Staff Duties Division (DTSD) that
Altham’s “Precis of Proposed Manual of Combined Op-
erations” ought to be taken up and that Altham should be
directly associated with the preparation of a combined op-
erations manual. Rear Admiral E. Ruston, DTSD, agreed
and stated that he would recommend that Altham be put
in charge of the preparation of a manual of combined
operations. He further recommended that Altham write
the naval sections of the manual, in addition to heading
the committee that would have to collect and collate the
military and air sections.!”
The Admiralty sent out letters to the War Office and

38 ‘
Air Council in January 1921, proposing that a committee
be established to compile a manual of combined operations
with responsibility for publication going to the Admiralty.
In addition, the Air Ministry and War Office were to bear
proportional costs of publication.!*
The War Office and Air Ministry replied affirmatively
to the Admiralty letter and named their representatives to
the Committee—Colonel R. G. Finlayson from the General
Staff and Air Vice-MarshalJ. F. Higgins.!9
The committee, headed by Altham, began work on
the manual in March 1921. The title of the work was now
Manual of Combined Naval Military and Air Force Operations.
Within a few months, the War Office was passing along
a request from the Commandant of the Staff College Cam-
berley to obtain galley proofs of whatever chapters were
completed that bore upon the combined operation exercise
scheduled at the Staff College in November and December
(O21)
Within a period of four days, the Admiralty received
the same request from the Royal Naval Staff College, Air
Ministry and Rear-Admiral H. Richmond, Director of the
Senior Officers Course. The Admiralty advised those re-
questing the galley proofs that three parts of the manual
would be completed by the end of September for use by
the Staff Colleges. The chapters expected to be completed
were I, General Principles; II, The Opposed Landing; and
III, Advanced Base. As promised, these three chapters
were in the hands of those conducting the combined ex-
ercises by September. By June 1922, approximately 350
copies of the completed manual were published with a
confidential classification and a “Provisional” added to the
title. Copies were sent out to the Fleets and Military Com-
mands throughout the Empire for comment and criticism.
By 1925 the Provisional 1922 Manual was reissued with
corrections and recommendations from the Staff Colleges,
Fleets and Military Commands.

ao
 The 1922/1925 editions of the Manual of Combined
Naval, Military and Air Force Operations were basically Al-
tham’s precis of 1920 with military and air sections almost
identical to that contained in the FSR Chapter XIII. Aside
from the great detail as to the importance of preparation
and maintenance of plans in peacetime for combined op-
erations in wartime, the notable points appear to be con-
cerned with tanks, supporting fire, and beach parties.
The manual suggested that in order to land tanks
rapidly on an open beach, special vessels with specially
strengthened derricks would have to be designed to carry
them. Special motor lighters would then be needed to
steam them to the beach with a platform being fitted in
each lighter to allow the tank to go ashore. As a result of
this comment, a committee was nominated to investigate
the best means of transporting tanks overseas and to make
recommendations as to experiments which should be con-
ducted with existing material for landing tanks rapidly on
an open beach.
Naval gunfire support was discussed in detail, as it was
in the FSR, with an added suggestion that the use of land
service guns, howitzers, and field guns from decks of ves-
sels supporting an opposed land might be feasible.
While beach parties were discussed and recommended
by the Staff Colleges in the 1919 Exercise, the problem of
moving supplies from the beach to inland dumps was still
unresolved in 1922. The Manual suggested that moving
supplies successfully from the beach would require large
working parties under naval control. In the past, the Army
found it a great inconvenience to provide parties for these
duties and the Manual advocated that a trained naval la-
bour corps be organised. The labour corps would consist
of dockers, fishermen, wharfingers and so forth. These
personnel, however, could not land until a few hours after
the first flight of infantry; consequently, the initial per-
sonnel would have to be provided by the Army, Navy, or
Royal Marines.
 The 1922/1925 Manual became a working guide to the
Staff Colleges in their combined operations exercises that
were conducted twice a year, usually in December and
again in March. There was no wide dissemination made
of the Manual throughout the Services. It was used only
for the Staff Colleges and those departments concerned
in the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry.

Manual of Combined Operations, 1931

In their endeavour to solve paper exercises on com-

bined operations, the Staff College syndicates had to “as-
sume” certain propositions as being fact. After the exercises,
the Staff Colleges requested the War Office, Admiralty,
or Air Ministry to verify the soundness of their “assump-
tions.” In most cases, the Ministry concerned would request
information from the Fleets or Military Commands
throughout the world to prove or disprove the assump-
tions. As an example, in the combined exercise conducted
by the Staff Colleges in March 1923 on the defence of
Singapore against the Japanese, it was assumed that British
submarines could menace Japanese capital ships in the
waters off Singapore without being seen from the air. The
War Office requested the Admiralty and Air Ministry to
test this assumption and resolve it for future syndicates.
As a result of this specific request, aerial photographs and
aerial reconnaissance before and during a combined op-
eration became a standard operating procedure and found
its way into the 1931 and 1938 combined operations man-
ual. Another question from the March 1923 Exercise took
a considerably longer time to answer. The assumption was
that a main Japanese attack on Singapore Island would be
preceded by a subsidiary attack at Mersing on the East
Coast of Johore. By travelling south on the Sedili Besar
River to Mawai in ships 250-feet long, drawing nine feet
of water, the Japanese would draw British troops away

4]
from the garrison at Singapore to stop the advance from
Mawai. The Staff Colleges report stated that they based
this assumption on the fact that two military officers had
reconnoitered the Sedili River in the Autumn of 1922 and
found that it was navigable flowing South from Mersing.
The War Office requested the Admiralty to verify this
assumption and also requested the GOC Malaya Command
to comment.
The Admiralty reported the next year, September
1924, that intelligence sources in the area indicated that
“the Mersing was rendered unsuitable for the landing of
heavy stores owing to the bar off shore on which there is
only two feet of water at low tide.”?! GOC Major General
T. Fraser’s report of 8 October 1924 also confirmed the
poor choice of Mersing and the Sedili River for operations
in that “the depths of not more than eighteen feet of the
river extend for only a distance of one and a half miles
from the Coast. The river is navigable for small craft and
the channel could be readily blocked.”*?
The information sent to the Staff Colleges not only
affected the future syndicates, in that they could carry on
a more realistic exercise, but also the intelligence depart-
ments, war-planning and other interested government of-
ficials, who all benefited. The Staff Colleges became the
repository of accurate information and theory in the area
of combined operations. This information and theory be-
came the basis for the manuals of combined operations in
1931 and 1938.
The 1931 Manual was prepared by the Naval Staff of
the Training and Staff Duties Division of the Admiralty.
It was not a radical departure from anything cited in the
previous manuals, but again many-additions, based on the
combined staff exercises and schemes, were included.
While taking in all forms of combined operations, the
eighteen chapters and appendices emphasized mostly the
problem of landing a military force and an air force in a
hostile country and maintaining them there.
The definition of combined operations in the 193]
Manual—“refers to forms of operations where naval, mil-
itary or air forces in any combination are cooperating with
each other, working independently under their respective
commanders but with a common strategical object.” Al-
though cooperation was stressed, it seems vitiated by the
concept of the independent commander. The manual cited
a new explanation of the “sequence of initial steps taken
for instituting a combined operation.” A combined oper-
ation is not an afterthought of one man or one service.
The manual stated that appreciations were made of the
necessity of the operation by the Admiralty, War Office
and Air Ministry, along with consultation with the Board
of Trade to “ensure that the attainment of the object of
the expedition is practicable from the point of view of the
resources of the three services.” A list of points had to be
made and considered when drawing up the combined ap-
preciation and plan. The object of the expedition headed
the list.
The failure to fix a clearly defined object was a pri-
mary cause of the general vagueness which marked the
initial stages of the Gallipoli operation. Instruction in the
1931 manual precluded any doubt of the importance of
knowing what the object is from the start. A complete
chapter (III) on plans and preparations was written em-
phasising the vast amount of information needed before
planning should begin. Someone was thinking of Sir Ian
Hamilton, who was reported to have said, “the Dardanelles
Bosphorous might be in the moon for all the military in-
formation I have to go on.”
There was a complete chapter (V) on “surprise, se-
crecy and deception.” In the British view, surprise and
secrecy in landing operations were essential. It was not
until the North African landings, and at American naval
insistence, that the British attitude began to change. The

43
unfortunate daylight landings at Gallipoli had indeed left
their mark, andjustifiably so.
While Gallipoli was not mentioned by name, various
sections within the chapters stressed certain steps in an
authoritative way that could only come from experience
rather than theory. The Dardanelles expedition lacked
planning as to the packing of transports and had to be
diverted to Alexandria, where the ships had to be re-
stowed. Section 78, Chapter VII, pointed out that in pack-
ing transports, “it is necessary to know how and in what
order the men and stores in them are to be landed. This
particularly applies to guns and heavy stores, which have
to be unloaded in the reverse order to that in which they
are embarked.”
With regard to a landing place, the manual stated that
the covering forces should be landed at several different
points if suitable beaches were available. It points out that
the bulk of these forces should be landed all at once if the
number of landing craft permit. However, Section 124,
Chapter X advocated that a part of the forces should be
kept in reserve, ready to land later in order to exploit
success at one or more different points. Such a force is
known as the “floating reserve.” Flexibility in landing was
quite strenuously advocated by the RNSC report of 1919.
It was pointed out that “extreme rigidity which often char-
acterises the plan or programme for landing is a serious
handicap. From a naval point of view, greater flexibility
seems easily attainable.”** Flexibility and decisiveness in a
landing using a floating reserve would perhaps avoid con-
sequences of another “Y” Beach.*
*April 1915 at Cape Helles, Gallipoli Peninsula, the King’s Own Scottish Bor-
derers and Plymouth Marine Battalion had got ashore at Y Beach unopposed.
Sir Ian Hamilton and Commodore Keyes wanted to divert troops from W or V
beaches, where the landings were held up, in order to exploit the situation. This
was suggested to Maj-Gen Hunter-Weston, commanding the 29th Division and
this particular area of the operations, but he considered it undesirable to alter
the plan. Hamilton refused to override his subordinate and, having no reserves
available himself, the opportunity was lost.

44 ‘
 The tentative arrangement or suggestion of the han-
dling of beach parties in the 1922/1925 manual appeared
to be settled in the 1931 version. The manual stated that
the actual work of handling boats, lighters, etc., on the
beach and getting the troops and their impedimenta out
of them was to be accomplished by naval beach parties.
Military and RAF parties would initially clear the beaches
with the Naval Beach Master in charge of all personnel on
the beach up to a line. The position of the line must be
settled by agreement before the landing. The bulk of the
naval beach parties should then land with or immediately
after the covering force and start organising the beach for
the main body.
Chapter XIV of the manual went into great detail
about naval gunfire support and what the Army could
expect in way of help from it. Aside from what was already
expressed in previous manuals, it suggested that in the
later phases ofa landing operation, when the area has been
mapped and telephone communication rigged to observ-
ing positions, “ships’ guns should often be able to give
valuable help to the Army, especially if air observation is
also available.”
The 1931 Manual indicated specific responsibilities
that the Services have in combined operations. Questions
had been hammered out during the previous years by the
Service Ministries, and responsibility was assigned. The
Navy was responsible for local air defence until the air
defence plan drawn up by the three services could be put
into operation, at which time the Air Officer Commanding
(AOC) would take over the responsibility. The Navy was
responsible for the covering or assault forces landing until
it was well established ashore and then relinquished re-
sponsibility to the Board of Trade. The Army was re-
sponsible for the order in which the troops were landed
while the Navy provided and worked the landing craft and
organised the anchorage. The Transport Department of
the Board of Trade detailed the ships, lighters, tugs, and

45
 so forth necessary to carry out the shipping requirement.
The Manual of Combined Operations 1931 was officially
approved by the Admiralty, Army Council, and Air Coun-
cil. The paragraphs relating to sea transport had the con-
currence of the Board of Trade, which had responsibility
for the Transport Department, formerly part of the Ad-
miralty.

Manual of Combined Operations, 1938

The period after the printing of the 1931 Manual was

extremely busy for the Service Ministries in preparing
changes and appendices and rewriting existing chapters
for a new edition of the Manual. The Admiralty was busy
appointing omissions to answer questions from the Staff
Colleges concerning the manual and directing the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, to conduct experiments to
satisfy these questions. As a result of these inquiries, three
major problems were worked out and included in what
would become the 1938 Manual. One of the first problems
arose, immediately after the 1931 printing, from a request
by the syndicates of the Combined Operations Exercise of
December 1931. The syndicates decided that they would
“take up a suitable merchant vessel and fit her as HQ ship
for the naval, military and air commanders and their
staffs.” What they wanted to know was (a) what signal com-
munication equipment should be fitted? and (b), how long
the fitting of this equipment would take.**
The Admiralty advised the Staff Colleges that they
were investigating the exact requirements for signal com-
munication for a headquarters ship. Its resulting estimate
was that it would take six weeks to outfit a converted mer-
chant vessel. They would test this estimate sometime in the
future and that, while they would use a converted vessel,
they would prefer to have a specially fitted communica-

46
tions transport if ever the naval estimates would allow.2>
The syndicates of the combined operations exercises
of 1932 and again in 1933 had made assumptions of what
number of ships and their equal gross tonnage would be
necessary to land the main body of forces. They assumed
that a force representing that part of a division left afloat,
after the covering force had landed, would be 12,500 men
and 3,500 animals with relevant motor transport. Using
the general shipping and weight tables in the 1931 Manual,
the syndicates assumed that a British division would re-
quire “215,000 gross tons of shipping, with a month’s
stores—about forty ships in all.” In addition, it was esti-
mated that small craft necessary to accomplish the landing,
not including ships boats or Motor Landing Craft (MLC),
would number 124 craft.
Since the assumptions were realistically based on what
was contained in the inventory of the Royal Navy, the
Admiralty concluded that, given the assumptions in the
combined operations exercise, “the outstanding fact aris-
ing from this problem is that unless a very large number
of landing craft, boat piers, and roadways is provided, the
operation cannot, practically, be undertaken at all.”°® The
estimated number of ships, which it didn’t have, to land
the troops and material was a mild surprise to the Admi-
ralty. To make matters worse, the Admiralty had received,
a year earlier, an eye-witness report from C-in-C, China,
in HMS Kent at Shanghai, that the Japanese in three days
had landed a division of a force of 12,000 men and equip-
ment, including sixty field guns and howitzers, fifteen
tanks, twelve crated aeroplanes, for a gross tonnage of
66,341 tons. The number of ships needed for the operation
was only fourteen.*’
The questions brought forth by the syndicates in 1932
and 1933, using the 1931 Manual general tables of ship-
ping, were directly responsible for having the Admiralty
call for an interservice conference on the problem of what

47
it took to land the main force in a combined operation.
The first meeting of the conference was held at the Ad-
miralty on 28 June 1934 with representatives from the War
Office, Air Ministry, and Board of Trade. The DTSD
chaired the conference and for the first time, the Adjutant-
General, Royal Marines was the independent Admiralty
representative.
At the conference, problems on landing the main
force and the realistic shipping needed to do so became
only part of the general discussion. Equally important were
ancillary problems of transporting medium tanks and the
need for modern MLCs, the latter requirement spawning
a new Landing Craft Committee. The members of the
conference concluded that their recommendations should
be included in a new edition of the Manual of Combined
Operations rather than have them appear as “changes” to
the 1931 edition.?* All of the problems discussed at the
conference appeared in new sections of the 1938 Manual,
including new data for “use in calculating the Ocean Ton-
nage required for Transportation of a Field Force” (Ap-
pendix VIII).
Other recommendations for inclusion into the C.O.
Manual came from an actual combined-operation exercise,
held off the Yorkshire coast on 10-13 September 1934, by
way of a Report by the C-in-C, Home Fleet, in HMS Nelson,
at Portsmouth, Admiral Lord Cork and Orrery. Just under
two thousand men from the 5th Division embarked in
cruisers and destroyers, and landed at the mouth of the
Humber River near Hull, against the 15th Infantry Bri-
gade, the Army opposition. It was a large exercise with
eleven capital ships and thirty-one other ships involved.
The main object of the exercise was to test signal com-
munications in an opposed landing, and the Admiral felt
quite sure that this was achieved. His recommendations
would be considered by two separate interservice commit-
tees appointed by the Admiralty to decide what alterations
should be put into the signal and artillery chapters of the
Manual.*9
Lord Cork and Orrery also had recommendations on
tactics in combined operations, ranging from the disem-
barkation of troops from HMS ships, using gangplanks
onto open beaches, to exercising the fleet in a night ap-
proach and anchoring of an expedition off an enemy
coast.*° In addition, he recommended that “a further nine
landing craft of improved MLC 10 type should be built
and that the building of them should be an Admiralty
commitment.” This was a novel recommendation; tradi-
tionally, the Army paid for landing barges used for troops.
By the late 1920s and early 1930s the costs of MLCs being
built, ever so slowly, were shared by Army and Navy. Lord
Cork and Orrery simply thought that “landing craft” ought
to be entirely an Admiralty commitment (see Appendix A,
Plate 1).
The Admiralty sent copies of the C-in-C Home Fleet’s
report to the War Office and Air Ministry requesting that
they consider the proposal to build nine of these vessels
(MLCs) and “to proceed with the production of armoured
protection for them and that such protection be considered
a matter of urgency.” They also pointed out that they were
already on record as to their desirability of making the
building of MLCs an Admiralty commitment.’!
By June 1936 it became apparent that the 1931 Man-
ual, because of the schedule of so many revisions and many
rewritten chapters, would not do. General Sir Cyril Dev-
erell, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, suggested that
a completely revised manual of combined operations be
made with the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), a subcom-
mittee of the Chiefs of Staff (COS) responsible.
Air Vice-Marshall C. L. Courtney, Deputy Chief of
the Air Staff (DCAS), recommended that since the JPC is
“already heavily loaded with work, an ad hoc drafting com-
mittee ought to be responsible for assembling the new

49
 manual, and that they should be directly answerable to the
Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee.”*” He said that a similar
committee was quite successful in preparing the Coast De-
fence Manual.
His recommendation was acted upon and an ad hoc
Committee, called the Drafting Committee, with one rep-
resentative from each Service, consisting of aCommander,
a GSO II, and a Squadron Leader, was approved with the
stipulation that any points of difficulty would be referred
to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) Committee, under
whose general direction they would be working.®* The
DCOS asked the Drafting Committee for an outline of
what the new Manual should contain and passed on to
them guidelines on questions to be discussed, one of which
was Command and Control including within it the concept
of a Supreme Commander-in-Chief. As with many other
questions, the concept of a Supreme Commander ap-
peared in the Staff Colleges’ report on combined opera-
tions in December 1935. Major General C. C. Armitage,
Commandant of the Military Staff College, noted that Ad-
miral Lord Cork and Orrery had, in a lecture at the Col-
lege, actually brought up the question of a Supreme
Commander.
The Admiral had raised the question whether a Com-
mander-in-Chief ought not be appointed to co-ordinate
the three services (in a combined operation) or whether
alternatively, the Commander of one of the Services should
be nominated to give final decisions in cases of disagree-
ment. Armitage passed along the report to the War Office
with a notation that “there were points of interest in the
exercise, one of which was a lecture by Admiral the Earl
of Cork and Orrery on Combined Operations of the future
and the question of command.”** General Sir Cyril Dev-
erell, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), in sub-
mitting comments on the Staff College report to the other
COS, had stated that “the points raised in the report do
not, in my opinion, call for discussion by us at the present
time.” The COS did, however, refer the Staff College re-
port to the DCOS, who in turn passed it along to the Draft-
ing Committee in July 1936.
By November 1936, the Secretary to the Drafting
Committee, Lieutenant Colonel J. K. McNair, had sub-
mitted a paper to the DCOS setting out the views of the
Army, Air Force, and Naval representatives on the Com-
mittee dealing with the question of Command and Control
and the Supreme Commander.*? The committee stated
that it had considered alternatives to what the 1931 Manual
reflected: “the Command of a combined operation is
vested equally in the Commanders of the Services engaged
and (that) Commanders have a collective as well as an in-
dividual responsibility.”
There appeared to the Drafting Committee, at that
time, three alternatives to the 1931 statement:

1. The appointment of a Supreme Commander-in-Chief above

the Commanders of the Services engaged, such Commander-
in-Chief to be provided with a full staff and to be responsible
for planning and operational control. The staff in this case
would have to be ajoint staff drawn from personnel of the
Services engaged.
2. The appointment of a Supreme Commander-in-Chief above
the Commanders of the Services engaged, but provided with
only a small liaison staff. Such a Commander would be re-
sponsible for decisions of policy only, and all planning work
would be done on the level of the staffs of the three Com-
manders. This distinction between two types of Commanders-
in-Chief does not appear to have been brought out previously.

3. The appointment of one of the Commanders of a given Ser-

vice to be responsible for making a decision when disagree-
ment arises. There are two possible methods of doing this:
One of which is to appoint the Commander of that Service
which is providing the largest force or is playing the predom-

51
 inant role, the appointment to stand for the whole period of
the operations; the other to appoint the Commander of that
Service which is playing the predominant role, the appoint-
ment to change as the importance of the roles of the Services
vary.

In selecting its respective alternatives, the committee

had considered the reports by the Staff Colleges. The Serv-
ices differed in their views on a Supreme Commander.
The Military Staff College stated that the present system
was against the teaching of history. Their report rejected
the idea of appointing a Commander-in-Chief over and
above the Commanders of the Services engaged, on the
score that it would tend to slow up planning and opera-
tions, and would increase the number of headquarters and
consequently the accommodation and signal facilities re-
quired. The report recommended that one of the Com-
manders should be appointed to make a decision in case
of disagreement, and that such Commander should be
appointed by the Cabinet on the recommendation of the
Chiefs of Staff. The report, however, made it clear that
the recommendation applied to a combined operation of
the type of an opposed landing and foresaw that the ap-
pointment of a Supreme Commander-in-Chief might on
other occasions be necessary. The Royal Air Force Staff
College, Andover, Report of 1934 considered that the time
was ripe to reconsider the doctrine in the 1931 Manual
and inclined to the idea of a Supreme Commander-in-
Chief. The 1935 class at Andover, in its report, however,
reversed this and advocated the appointment of the pre-
dominant partner to give decisions. The Royal Naval Staff
College, Greenwich, 1934 Report recommended the con-
tinuation of the existing system.*°
After due deliberation, the Drafting Committee sub-
mitted the views on Command and Control that it would
recommend for consideration in the 1938 Manual. Ac-

52
tually, it did not recommend a specific method, but rather
four possible methods by which higher command might
be exercised: (a) The appointment of a Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief above the Commanders of the Services
engaged, such Commander-in-Chief to be provided with
a full staff and to be responsible for all planning and op-
erational control; (6) The appointment of aSupreme Com-
mander-in-Chief above the Commanders of the Services
engaged, but provided with only a small liaison staff. Such
a Commander would be responsible for decisions of policy
only, and all planning work would be done on the level of
the staffs of the three Commanders; (c) The appointment
of one of the Commanders of a given Service to be re-
sponsible for making a decision when disagreement arises;
(d) In cases where one Service is obviously playing a pre-
dominant role and the closest co-operation by the other
Services is required, the placing of the other Services di-
rectly under the command of the Commander of the pre-
dominant Service.
It was obvious that the Drafting Committee members
did not agree on any one method of command in a com-
bined operation as evidenced by the four possibilities
above. The Army and Air Force members were, however,
in agreement that any war may assume as a whole the
aspect of a combined operation. It was pointed out that if
the main theatre is at a considerable distance from the
home country and all three Services are engaged in this
theatre, it would almost certainly be necessary to appoint
some local supreme authority owing to the difficulty of
controlling operations from a distance. At the other end
of the scale comes the individual operation of war which
may only be a minor incident—such as the capture of a
small island. Between such extremes lie an infinity of pos-
sible situations, and it is not possible to lay down definitely
a system of command which will hold good for all. It was
therefore concluded that the Cabinet must decide in what

53
form command and control is to be exercised, and the
Chiefs of Staff would then make a recommendation to the
Cabinet to this effect on the outbreak of war or on the
launching of a particular project.
The naval member of the Drafting Committee, ex-
pressing the views of the Admiralty, as did the other mem-
bers of the Committee and their Service, believed strongly
in the existing system ofjoint responsibility as the method
most likely to achieve success in all operations involving
two or three of the services in roles on the same plane of
importance, and that, for this type of operation, no other
system should be included in the new Manual. He ex-
pressed the belief that the principle of each Commander
having the final responsibility for his own service should
be maintained even in such operations as those mentioned
in the 1931 Manual (in which one Service was acting in a
comparatively subordinate role). The naval member gave
his reasons for his view as follows:

The advantages of unity of command, the difficulties what

may arise when effective action depends on the authority
of three officers who may not be in agreement, are easily
stated. Were these considerations to stand by themselves
one of the alternative systems of command set out above
would no doubt be preferable to joint responsibility. But
unfortunately any system of unity of command brings with
it disadvantages which, though less obvious and less clear-
cut than the advantages, would outweigh any benefits likely
to be derived. These disadvantages depend mainly on the
difference of outlook which is bound to exist between Of-
ficers whose lives have been spent in their several Services:
Services which differ greatly in organisation and in the
conditions under which their members live, work and fight.
Joint study and joint staff work, such as has been under-
taken to an increasing extent in recent years, can do much
to help an Officer of one Service understand the problems
and appreciate the difficulties of the others; but they cannot
enable him to decide on those problems with the balanced

54
 judgment of one who has been familiar throughout his
career with the atmosphere surrounding them.*’

The DSOS Sub-Committee discussed the Command

and Control problem at considerable length, with partic-
ular reference to the recommendations from the Drafting
Committee, and generally agreed that “certain types of
operations may call for unified control, whereas in other
cases it will be unnecessary to go beyond the co-operational
system which exists in peacetime and to which the Services
are accustomed. Accordingly, the new Manual should lay
down that the supreme command of operations may be
exercised under either of these alternative systems.”** The
DCOS concluded that it was impossible to lay down any
hard and fast rules as to when and how unified control
should be exercised, or as to when the peace system of
combined control would suffice. They pointed out that
each case would have to be judged on its merits.
The final product of the much deliberated “Command
and Control” chapter appeared in the 1938 Manual as
follows:
1. The command of an offensive operation involving more
than one Service (whether under the direct orders of the
government or under the orders of a Supreme Com-
mander) may be exercised under one or other of the fol-
lowing systems:
(i) Joint Command, in which the commander of each
Service has also a joint responsibility for the enterprise
as a whole.
(ii) Unified Command, in which responsibility for the
operation as a whole is vested in a Combined Com-
mander-in-Chief having as his subordinates the com-
manders of the Services taking part.
(ili) Command by One Service, in which responsibility
for the operation is vested in the commander of the
Service playing the chief part.
2. Under the system of unified command, responsibility
for the enterprise as a whole is vested in a Combined

55
 Commander-in-Chief with Naval, Military and Air Com-
manders (or as any two of them whose Services are taking
part) under his orders.
—He will control the planning in its broader aspects and
the general conduct of the operation.
—Subject to this, the method by which each commander
controls the operations of his own Service will be the
same as in the system of joint command, and there will
be the same need for close collaboration between the
commanders both in planning and execution.
3. The Combined Commander-in-Chief will be provided
with a small staff, including a senior staff officer and a
liaison officer from each of the services engaged.
4. The officer selected as Combined Commander-in-Chief
will need to possess qualities specially suited to his duties:
consideration of personality and temperament will be of
as great importance in this respect as more strictly profes-
sional qualifications.*°

The chapter “Command and Control” made it clear

that Joint Command and Command by one Service were
not superseded in any way. It pointed out that when a
combined operation was instituted at home, the govern-
ment would decide on the system of command. The Su-
preme Commander in a war zone would initiate a combined
operation and the system of command would be decided
by him. In any instance, the combined operation Com-
mander-in-Chief “should have direct access to the Service
Departments.”
The term “combined” was used frequently in the 1938
Manual, and it was understood to mean “all-Service rep-
resentative.” Notable sections were the Combined Intelli-
gence Board, Combined Security Section, Combined Signal
Plan and Board. “Combined” was the natural progression
from “liaison.” The Staff Colleges, Imperial Defence Col-
lege, and Sub-Committees of the CID all had combined
working staff members. By 1938, there would be in exist-
ence an Inter-Service Training Development Centre, op-
erated by a combined staff.

56
 There were other changes, minor in nature, contained
in the Manual. Captain C. E. Douglas-Pennant, RN, noted
that the term “opposed landing” was changed to “a landing
on a hostile shore.” He said this was done to convey that
a landing in enemy territory may or may not be “opposed.”
The term “covering force” was changed to “assaulting
force,” a better description of the true nature of the mis-
sien
When the combined operations manual was com-
pleted in galley-proof form in July 1937, the DCOS ap-
proved the sending of copies immediately to the Staff
Colleges for their use in the combined operations exercise
scheduled in November—December 1937.*!
The 1938 Manual, along with subsequent amend-
ments, was the written doctrine on the conduct of com-
bined operations which Britain would have before entering
World War II. Of all the major powers participating in
World War II, including the enemy, only the United States
would have a similar written doctrine on combined oper-
ations prior to the war.
The 1938 edition of the Manual of Combined Operations
was issued as a Confidential Book (CB 3042), having been
approved by the Admiralty, Army Council, and Air Coun-
cil, and was promulgated “for information and guidance.”
The paragraphs relating to sea transport had received the
concurrence of the Board of Trade.

The Watson Memorandum and Its Effects

on Combined Operations

Five months before the Drafting Committee on assem-

bling a new manual on combined operations met, and sev-
enteen months before galley proofs of the 1938 Manual
were sent to the Staff Colleges for use in their Novem-
ber—December 1937 exercise, one of the most important
papers in British combined-operation history was written.

at
Captain B. C. Watson, RN (later Vice-Admiral), Director
of the Royal Naval Staff College, wrote a memorandum
to the President, Royal Naval College, Rear Admiral R. M.
Colvin, RN, entitled “Memorandum on the Naval Side of
Combined Operations and the Necessity for its Develop-
ment in Peace.” Watson’s object in the memorandum was
to suggest improvements in the organisation and devel-
opment of the naval side of combined operations. He
stated that he desired to emphasize the fact that the “Navy
is more directly interested in the question of combined
operations than either of the other Services; and that any
progress in their organisation and development must de-
pend largely on the initiative taken by the Navy.”** Watson
believed that the Navy bore greater responsibility for the
success of a combined operation because it was intimately
concerned with its planning and preparation. In addition,
the Navy was responsible for the safety of transport to the
scene of action, the landing and subsequent operations in
securing the objective.
The Watson memorandum stressed that the landing
had now become the keynote on which success or failure
depended, owing to the development in the power of the
defence. No matter how carefully the expedition may be
planned, and however competent the military forces may
be to secure their objective, the whole expedition will col-
lapse and may suffer destruction unless a landing can be
effected. Watson suggested that the Navy had specific re-
sponsibilities in the matter of the landing: (a) the trans-
porting of troops to the beaches; (b) the destruction or
neutralisation of beach defences; (c) the support of the
troops after landing; and (d) the exploitation of the prin-
ciple of surprise. .
Captain Watson pointed out that the problem of land-
ing a force in the face of opposition had become one of
extreme difficulty, which could only be solved by means
of highly specialised training and material. He maintained
that training and development of material must be carried

58
out in peace, and not delayed, as formerly, until after the
outbreak of war. Watson made a case for the Navy when
he said,

if combined operations were the sole responsibility and

interest of the Navy, there can be little doubt that this
change in their nature would have been recognised long
ago, and steps taken to ensure the necessary training and
development. But, belonging as they do to all three Serv-
ices, they can claim the concentrated attention of none,
with the inevitable result that no real progress has been
made.*?

Watson suggested that to effect change and obtain the

specialised training and material needed to successfully
land a force against opposition, the following were consid-
ered to be essential: a permanent Committee on Combined
Operations and a Training and Development Centre. In
recommending a permanent committee on combined op-
erations, he said that the committee should consist of rep-
resentatives of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry,
to whom all questions could be referred and whose func-
tions would be as follows:

(i) to recommend practical exercises and paper schemes

to the three Services. To study and record the results of
these, and try out any suggestions received.
(ii) to supervise the training and development oflanding
operations carried out by the Training and Development
Centre.
(ili) to study the development of Service and commercial
material suitable for Combined Operations; and to con-
duct trials of such material.
(iv) to consider plans for possible Combined Operations
in any future war.
(v) to rewrite and keep up to date the Manual of Com-
bined Operations.

Watson believed that the Training and Development

59
Centre should consist of a military force, such as the Royal
Marines, and certain of H.M. ships, Army units, and air-
craft attached as requisite. The functions of the Training
and Development Centre would be to train in all methods
for the seizure of defended beaches; to develop the ma-
terial necessary for such methods, with special regard to
protection of troops, of landing, and to the attainment of
surprise. Methods and material for the destruction or neu-
tralisation of enemy defences, including bombardment
and aircraft co-operation, should be developed.
Perhaps the most significant recommendation Watson
made in his memorandum was the suggestion that in time
of war the Royal Marines, whom he recommended as the
military force within the Centre, be employed for carrying
out minor operations alone; or in conjunction with military
forces (Army), as the covering force to seize and hold
beaches for the main landing.
Watson pointed out that the Royal Marines would be
ideal because, in their normal life afloat, they naturally
acquired considerable experience of the methods em-
ployed in landing operations. He suggested they would
require less training than a military force and that their
required training would involve the handling of special
material for which a knowledge of the sea would be of
value.
Captain Watson stated that he made the above pro-
posals, including the role for Royal Marines, from a review
of the current situation. He was not aware of similar rec-
ommendations made by Admiral Madden’s Committee in
1924 (discussed in Chapter One). He wanted to point out
that Madden had strongly recommended the establish-
ment of a Marine Striking Force and a Training Centre
for landing operations; but no suggestion was made for
the development of methods and material for the seizure
of beaches, which were an essential part of his proposals.
The Watson memorandum was forwarded by Rear-
Admiral R. M. Colvin, President RNC, to the Admiralty
for “favourable” consideration.

60 :
 Four months later, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Ernle
Chatfield, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, men-
tioned the Watson memo in a COS meeting, referring to
it as a suggestion “for the formation of Committees to
consider the Co-ordination of Training and Material” that
had emanated from the Head of the Naval Staff College.
At Chatfield’s suggestion, the COS agreed that it was
not necessary to appoint other “Sub-Committees for the
Co-ordination of Training and Equipment but that the
report on these matters from the Head of the Naval Staff
College should be laid before the ad hoc committee.”*> The
ad hoc committee referred to by the COS was the newly
appointed Drafting Committee responsible for assembling
the new manual of combined operations.
There was nothing in the correspondence or final re-
port of the Drafting Committee to suggest that it did or
did not use as a guideline the Watson memorandum sent
to it by the COS. The Drafting Committee certainly fol-
lowed the spirit of Captain Watson’s observation that the
“landing has now become the keynote on which success or
failure depends.” Instructions in “landing on a hostile
shore” totalled ten pages in the 1931 Manual and fifty
pages in the 1938 Manual, a figure that did not include
instructions from other chapters such as signal, beach par-
ties, and so forth, pertaining to a hostile shore landing.
It is known for certain that the Drafting Committee
had received the Watson memorandum, as it sent a copy
to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) Committee. The
memorandum became an agenda item for the DCOS in
their meeting of 29 July 1937.*° At the time, members of
the DCOS Committee were Vice-Admiral Sir William
James, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Chairman); Major
General R. H. Haining, Director of Military Operations
and Intelligence; and Air Vice-Marshal R. E. D. Peirse,
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. Secretary to the Committee
was Colonel H. L. Ismay.
Haining summarised Watson’s memorandum as pro-
posing (a) the establishment of a permanent committee to

61
exercise a general control over the investigation of the
problems of opposed landings and over the training of the
Services in this type of operation, and (b) a Training and
Development Centre consisting of elements of all three
Services, charged with the duty of developing the material
required for opposed landings and of training a special
force to carry out these operations.*’
Haining thought that it was very desirable to have
someone who would keep alive interest in the subject of
combined operations. He believed that there was a danger
that when the present three DCOS who had been closely
connected with the revision of the Manual of Combined Op-
erations left their appointment, the subject of combined
operations might become overlooked. His own idea was
that the permanent committee suggested by Watson should
be a sub-committee of the CID. He feared that if it were
merely an inter-service committee, outside the CID organ-
isation, it would not function with any great efficiency.
Ismay pointed out that Watson’s recommendations
came under the general area of training, which was some-
what outside the ordinary functions of the CID, although
the inculcation of a common doctrine was obviously within
its functions. He said that since the CID Secretariat already
had seventy-eight sub-committees with which to deal, he
would suggest that the committee be run on the lines of
the Combined Signal Board as an inter-service committee.
James believed that any Committee appointed would
not be employed full-time on the work, in any case. He
had envisaged that they would be Staff Officers of the
three Service Departments who would carry out the work
of the Committee in addition to their ordinary duties in
their own Departments.
To whom should the committee report? This was
Peirse’s concern. Ismay, on the other hand, doubted
whether it would be necessary for the committee to render
reports at all. Whatever form the committee would take,
the members would presumably be those responsible

62 i
within their Departments for carrying out the recommen-
dations of the committee.
After much discussion, the DCOS Committee went
along with James’ suggestion that “as a start an inter-service
committee with a Secretary found by one of the Depart-
ments would suffice.” James suggested that its terms of
reference might be along the following lines:

(a) To study Inter-Service exercises and to present col-

lated and agreed reports on the lessons arising from
them.
(b) To make recommendations for the study of prob-
lems in connection with inter-service operations, and to
arrange for the production of schemes for appropriate
exercises.
(c) To make recommendations for the development of
equipment for inter-service operations.
(d) To keep under review the Manual of Combined
Operations and to draw up amendments to it as and
when required.**

After the DCOS Committee agreed on an Inter-

Service Committee along with its terms of reference, they
said that the first duty of the committee should be to ex-
amine the question of the establishment of aTraining and
Development Centre. It was not going to be the DCOS’s
job to do it, but the Inter-Service Committee’s.
It is interesting to note the diverse views the members
of the DCOS had on what, in their opinion, was the value
of a training and development centre. Peirse believed its
chief task was the development of equipment for landing
operations, although this type of operation “was the most
unlikely, and in any case the problem of equipment seemed
to be one mainly for the Admiralty and War Office.”
Haining thought that the Centre would be valuable
in maintaining interest in combined operations. He said
that from the training point of view, at least so far as the

63
War Office was concerned, “opposed landings were low
in order of priority.”
James believed that the scale which was suggested for
the Centre by the Director of the RNSC was very ambitious.
He said that Watson envisaged the collection of units of
all three Services in one place in time of peace and con-
tinuous training of these units together.
Lieutenant Colonel J. K. McNair, from the War Of-
fice, was also present at the DCOS meeting. McNair was
still then Secretary to the Drafting Committee for assem-
bling a new Manual of Combined Operations. He said that the
Drafting Committee was not in favour of forming a special
force for combined operations. They thought the most
that the Training Centre should do was to carry out ex-
periments and disseminate ideas among the three Services.
McNair was the only one to mention a “special force.”
The DCOS recommendations on the Watson memo-
randum were sent to the COS and came up for discussion
in November 1937. The DCOS recommendations were
identified as Paper No. COS 628 (DC). The Chiefs ofStaff
at the time were Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, First
Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff; Field Marshal Sir Cyril
Deverell, CIGS; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall,
Chief of the Air Staff, with Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister
for Co-ordination of Defence, Chairman.
The Chiefs of Staff all stated that they were in full
agreement with the recommendations contained in the
paper of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Deverell observed
that the Director of the Royal Naval Staff College had
proposed the training of a special force to carry out op-
posed landing operations. He noted that no reference was
made to this suggestion in the DCOS report, “but in any
event, he himself was opposed to any such idea.” Newall
and Chatfield also agreed with Deverell’s opposition to a
special force.

64
 What the COS did agree to was the following:

(i) That a Training and Development Centre for the

study and development ofmaterial, technique and tactics
necessary for the success of opposed landings is desir-
able.
(ii) That a Sub-Committee of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Sub-Committee should be appointed,* composed as un-
der
Admiralty— Assistant Chief of Naval Staff or
his representative.
War Office— Director of Military Operations
and Intelligence or his repre-
sentative.
Air Ministry Deputy Chief of the Air Staff or
his representative.*®

The Chiefs of Staff approved the terms of reference

for the sub-committee of the DCOS as outlined by them
in their Paper 628 of 29 July 1937. The COS concluded
by stating that the first task of the new sub-committee
should be to make detailed proposals for the establishment
of the Training and Development Centre.
Theoretically, the DCOS (IT) Sub-Committee came
into being after approval by the Chiefs of Staff in Novem-
ber 1937. It was not, however, until four months later that
the first meeting of the new sub-committee was held. The
Secretary of the Inter-Service Training Committee was the
same as for the DCOS, Colonel H. L. Ismay. Ismay en-
couraged the representatives of the new Sub-Committee
to forward their proposals for the establishment of a Train-
ing and Development Centre to him, for circulation prior

*The Sub-Committee of the DCOS became the Sub-Committee on Inter-Service

Training, DCOS (IT).

65
to consideration at the first meeting of the Committee.”°
Within six weeks, Ismay received a copy of a paper
sent to the Deputy Secretary of the CID from Vice-Admiral
Sir William James, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and mem-
ber of the Inter-Service Training Sub-Committee. James
sent the other members of the Sub-Committee copies of
his paper entitled “The Establishment ofa Special Striking
Force for Amphibious Operations.” James endeavoured
to point out the reason why the Special Striking Force
should be the Royal Marines. He reviewed the situation as
follows:

Amphibious operations in the face of modern weapons and

under the conditions of modern warfare demand a high
standard of specialist training and the provision of special
technical equipment. This particularly applies to the initial
striking force or “spear head” of the operation. Other mar-
itime powers have forces specially equipped and trained
for amphibious operations, 1.e., the United States Marine
Corps, the French Infanterie de Marine, and the Japanese
Guard divisions. During the present operations in the Far
East the Japanese have shown that not only can successful
preparations for amphibious operations be made in peace,
but that, with adequate preparation, equipment and train-
ing, the amphibious operation becomes a practical opera-
tions of war and affords the attacker the advantage of
strategical surprise. It has frequently been suggested that
an amphibious striking force should be provided by the
Corps of Royal Marines. This could not be effected without
considerable expansion and drastic re-organisation of the
Corps. Unless, however, some useful peace role could be
found for this Force, such as the manning of some of our
overseas garrisons, the proposal would be uneconomical
and impracticable.... An arrangement of this nature
might be the ideal from the point of view of amphibious
operations and if put into effect would greatly simplify the
questions of provision of personnel for the Mobile Naval
Base Defence Organisation. Its implication [sic] would,
however, necessitate drastic changes in the existing consti-
tution of our naval, and possibly military, forces which
might be undesirable during the present period of expan-

66 .
 sion and would take some years to complete.°!
James had made a good case for the Royal Marines
as a striking force, the best since Admiral Madden. He was
obviously representing the views of the Admiralty and per-
haps this time the pro—Striking Forces concept could carry
the day. Unfortunately, however, James listed an alter-
native to the already strong case he had made. He weak-
ened this stance presenting an alternative to the
opposition—the Army. It is axiomatic that expansion of
one Service in its mission or specialty affects the funding
of the other Service or Services. The Army is the Service
most directly affected by any changes in the role of the
Marines—whether it be the Royal Marines or United States
Marines. Quite naturally, and to its credit, the Army put
up a gallant and, in most cases, successful fight.
James inadvertently defeated his own proposals when
he listed his alternative as follows:

If the proposal for the role of the initial striking force to

be vested in the Corps of Royal Marines is considered to
be impracticable, it may be desirable to augment training
and practice in amphibious operations by some or all of the
following methods—(a) by extending the scope of the study
of amphibious operations at the three Staff Colleges and
the Imperial Defence College; (b) by making arrangements
at naval ports at home and abroad between the local com-
manders of the three Services for frequent exercises in
embarkation and disembarkation of personnel and mate-
riel and minor tactical exercises in amphibious operations;
(c) by arranging for large scale amphibious exercises with
troops to be carried out at more frequent intervals and
possibly under more realistic conditions then has been the
case in the past; (d) in order to produce a cadre of more
specialised units for service with the initial striking force,
for arrangements to be made for the Artillery and Infantry
Brigades and Tank Battalions stationed at or near the three
home port commands and at Malta to carry out a regular
and intensive annual programme of amphibious opera-
tions, in conjunction with the naval and air forces based on
the command.
67
 I would suggest that the Deputy Chiefs of Staff should
consider the necessity for providing a special force for the
initial striking force in amphibious operations or alterna-
tively augmenting the training of existing forces, on the
lines suggested above.”

James’ co-members on the DCOS, Lieutenant-General Sir

Ronald F. Adam, Deputy CIGS, and Air Vice-Marshal W.
S. Douglas, ACAS, answered his paper quickly and pre-
dictably. Adam stated, “from the Army point of view I fear
it would be impracticable in existing circumstances. With
our many commitments, we could not afford to set units
aside for training in amphibious operations only. In any
case, the low strength of units at home would militate
against any useful result.”** Adam pointed out that the
Army already was doing a great deal in combined training
with a brigade involved in combined exercises every year
at home. He stated that combined exercises involving
Army personnel were held almost annually in Malta, Sin-
gapore, and Hong Kong. He believed that for the time
being “we must be satisfied with the training on these
lines.” Adam suggested that if any shortcomings arose in
the system of training for amphibious operations, the
Training and Development Centre, when it is established,
and the DCOS (IT) Sub-Committee could handle the mat-
ter, including the subject of a striking force. He said there
was no advantage in putting this subject on the agenda for
a DCOS meeting.
Peirse felt that the Watson Memorandum and James
paper were mainly the concern of the Army and Navy. He
did set down a few reflections on the matter; he thought
that the landing of troops on an enemy coastline against
Opposition was a “very doubtful form of operation for
British forces to have to undertake in the future. It seems
hardly so probable as to justify our training and equipping
a special force to carry it out. With the very exiguous land
forces that we are able to maintain in these days is it sound
policy to specialise them more than we can avoid? We have

68 :
a corps of experts in this sort of thing in the Royal Ma-
rines.’°* Peirse appears to have missed the whole point of
the Watson Memorandum and the James paper.
Peirse stated that he was aware that this form of com-
bined operation required special technical equipment, the
value of which was amply proved by the Japanese with
their operations in China. He felt that apart from the fi-
nancial difficulty of providing an adequate stock of any
special equipment for this “rather improbable operation,
would the research and experiment in this direction not
be one of the tasks of the training and development
centre?” Peirse’s comment on air operations during a com-
bined operation was as follows:
One of the greatest difficulties in this form of operation
will be the essential need for establishing a favourable air
situation before bringing crowded troop ships within close
range of enemy shorebased air attack. If we are making an
opposed landing against a fourthrate Power such as the
Chinese, it seems to me doubtful whether any special train-
ing would be required—the main difficulty would surely
be to get ashore against the machine gun. But if we are
considering undertaking such an operation against a first-
class Power, I frankly do not believe that it is a practical
proposition against an unbroken air force, and I do not
believe for a moment that anti-aircraft fire from ships can
give anything like the necessary degree of protection to a
landing, especially to low-flying attacks. .. . The Japanese
have done one or two well executed landings against some
ground opposition; but they have never had to face air
opposition in any landing—the remnants of the Chinese
Air Force surprisingly made no attempt to deal with the
(Japanese) landing at Woosung. .. .””
In 1938, Peirse was representative of an old idea dying
hard and a new idea about to be discovered. The old idea
was that with the advent of the aeroplane, combined op-
erations were a thing of the past. The new idea was that
air superiority over the enemy would be the essential ele-
ment in all amphibious operations.

69
 Peirse had taken exception to one of James’ sugges-
tions about extending the scope of the study of amphibious
operations at the three Staff Colleges. He said the “Staff
Colleges now spend over a month every year—in our case
about one-eighth of the whole course—studying amphib-
ious operations. We have long felt that this represents a
higher proportion of our available time than we are really
justified in devoting to this subject.” He said he realised
that the combined exercise promoted liaison and mutual
understanding between the three Services, but he was op-
posed to any extension of the scope of the study of am-
phibious operations at the Staff Colleges.
After James received copies of the Adam and Peirse
papers, he notified them as to his agreement with Adam’s
suggestion that “this subject can best be dealt with by the
Inter-Service Training Sub-Committee and the Training
and Development Centre when these have been formed.”°®
The DCOS Inter-Service Sub-Committee finally met
in March 1938 with the following present: Rear-Admiral
L. E. Holland, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Chairman);
Lieutenant General Sir Ronald F. Adam, Deputy Chief of
the Imperial General Staff; and Air Vice-Marshal W. S.
Douglas, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff.°’
Douglas suggested that the terms of reference for the
Sub-Committee were wide and covered all sorts of inter-
service operations. He pointed out that in the conclusions
of the COS 221st meeting, the Training and Development
Centre was only mentioned with reference to opposed
landings. Douglas said that the Air Ministry thought that
its terms of reference should be no less wide than those
of the Sub-Committee and that they believed that the
“Centre should not confine its study solely to opposed land-
ings but should include in its purview all the possible types
of combined operations.” Adam and Holland agreed with
Douglas and concluded that the Centre, when established,
should study the development of material, technique, and
tactics necessary for all types of inter-service operations

70 ‘
and not confine itself only to opposed landings.
As for the actual location of the Centre, Holland be-
lieved that a ship would be suitable for this purpose, stating
that it would be able to move round the coasts to suitable
points for carrying out landing operation schemes in con-
junction with military and air forces in various parts of the
country. Holland’s suggestion got a cool reception from
Adam and Douglas who thought that the other Services
involved might be cramped if the Centre was accommo-
dated in a ship. Adam believed that the Centre would be
best located where there were Army and Air units in close
proximity to naval establishments, and suggested the area
of Portsmouth.
Holland quickly agreed and then proposed that the
project for a mobile naval base training centre for the Royal
Marines on the Dale Peninsula near Pembroke Dock
(Wales) which was still under consideration might be a
suitable place. He did caution that the Admiralty might
not implement the project and therefore suggested an al-
ready established location, the Royal Marines depot at East-
ney.
, After further discussion on accommodations, staff,
and the selection of July 1938 as opening date of the
Centre, the sub-committee agreed to recommend to the
DCOS:
(i) That, provided the necessary administrative arrange-
ments could be made, the Training and Development
Centre would be most suitably located in the Royal Marines
establishment at Eastney. In addition, invite the Assistant
Chief of Naval Staff to enquire into and report as to the
possibility of finding the necessary accommodations for the
Centre in the Royal Marines barracks.
(ii) That in the first instance the staff of the Centre should
consist of a Captain, RN, in Command, a Major (Brevet
Lieutenant-Colonel) from the Army and a Wing Com-
mander from the RAF, with an officer from the Royal
Marines, preferably with a Staff College qualification, as
Adjutant.

al
 (ili) That the clerical staff of the Centre should preferably
be on a civilian basis and that the administrative and fi-
nancial arrangements for the organisation of the Centre
should be made interdepartmentally between the Admi-
ralty, War Office and Air Ministry, on the same lines as in
the case of the Imperial Defence College.
(iv) That the Centre when established should take over the
duties in connection with landing operations from any
other Committee then in existence.
(v) That it was highly desirable for the Centre to be estab-
lished and at work before July 1938.°°

Within two weeks the COS approved the “Report of

the Sub-Committee on Inter-Service Training on the es-
tablishment of a training and development centre.” With
further approval of the Admiralty, Eastney became the
location of the Inter-Service Training and Development
Centre (ISTDC).
The Inter-Service Training Sub-Committee of the
DCOS held a total of eight meetings, the last one being 24
July 1939, and produced forty-eight papers, the last dated
4 September 1939, before being overtaken by events. The
subject of a special striking force did not come up in the
meetings or the papers. It would not be until 1944 that the
proposal of Royal Marines and their “amphibious respon-
sibility” would be raised again.

Work of the Inter-Service Training and Development

Centre to June 1940

The ISTDC opened its doors about the middle of July

1938, and had on board Captain L. E. H. Maund, RN, as
Commandant, Major M. W. M. MacLeod from the Army,
Wing-Commander G. Knocker RAF, and Captain Picton-
Phillips from the Royal Marines.
One of the first duties of Maund and his staff was to
witness a combined exercise under the command of Ad-

v2 .
miral Edward Collins held in the last week of July 1938
off Slapton Sands, six miles southwest of Dartmouth. Be-
cause the weather was so dreadful in the Channel, the
landing was delayed two days. When the weather did mod-
erate a bit, one brigade finally was landed in whalers and
dumb barges from destroyers and a cruiser. The whalers
were brought to the beach under oars and the barges were
towed. Although two or three MLCs were available for the
exercise, they could not be used as there was no merchant
ship with a derrick heavy enough to hoist out the 22-ton
MLC. Consequently, heavy guns and stores, which the
MLC would normally transport to the beach, were not
available.
After the ISTDC had been in operation for only a
month, Maund submitted an interim report to the DCOS
in order to obtain money for a landing craft carrier before
the 1939 Estimates had to be submitted. The report con-
tained the following recommendations:”®

(a) that a Landing Craft carrier should be provided the

Admiralty. At the time, the only method by which the
first flight of infantry could be landed was in ships’ boats,
and that guns, stores and motor transport had to be
landed in a 22-ton MLC which could only be hoisted out
by ships’ derricks, from store ships or other merchant
ships.
(b) that designs should be prepared for a self-propelled
assault landing craft to carry a platoon of infantry at
8-10 knots and to have a low silhouette so as to attain
some surprise.
(c) that experiments should be carried out with beach
piers over which to discharge stores.

Maund’s idea of a landing craft carrier and a first flight

landing craft later materialised in the form of a Landing
Ship Infantry (Large)—LSI(L), an ocean liner carrying
craft, and a Landing Craft Assault, LCA, a lightly-ar-
moured 10-ton craft able to land troops in 18 inches of
water.

73
 The DCOS did not take up the ISTDC Interim Report
until November 1938. Lieutenant General Adam, DCIGS
(in the Chair) stated that to provide a landing craft carrier
in peace time seemed an unnecessary luxury, since “we
should usually have time to convert a suitable merchant
vessel for this purpose after the outbreak of war. As for
motor landing craft, they could always be put to good use
in time of peace and would not therefore represent waste-
ful expenditure. It could not be regarded as to our credit
that a great overseas power like Great Britain possessed
practically no modern landing craft.”®°
The DCOS Committee decided that “as a combined
landing on a large scale against opposition was not a likely
operation in the early stages of war, no landing craft carrier
should be provided but that plans should be prepared for
the conversion of suitable merchant ships, and that a list
of such ships should be completed.” They further rec-
ommended that “one self-propelled landing craft should
be constructed.” They recommended to the ISTDC that
they should investigate the use of infra-red rays for beach
finding, naval gunfire in support of the Army and beach
piers for the discharge of stores. They concluded that each
Service should contribute £10,000 a year towards the
ISTDa™
In the meantime, a strange thing happened: the
IS'TDC was closed down for about a week during the Mun-
ich crisis in September 1938. Under the circumstances, it
was not an unusual thing to happen, since the faculty of
the Staff Colleges all had war stations to go to in the event
of general mobilisation. The courses of the Staff Colleges
would proceed. It was during the Munich crisis that the
Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, Air-Mar-
shal Sir Arthur Longmore, reminded the Secretary of the
CID that he was standing by to take up his war situation
at short notice. Of the Directing Staff both Naval and Army
members were still there but the Air member, Air Com-
modore Donald, had gone to his war station. The ISTDC

74 ‘
 had no precedent but followed the Staff Colleges proce-
dure of closing down in a general mobilisation, although
at this time there was none.*
The DCOS met with Maund in December 1938 to
discuss and agree on what the ISTDC would be doing
during 1939. In addition to Adam and Peirse on the DCOS
Committee, Vice-Admiral A. B. Cunningham had replaced
James as Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. James had been
promoted to Admiral and had moved on to the COS Com-
mittee.
The problem in the mind of all the members of the
DCOS seemed to be at what point in a future war and on
what scale would the nation be involved with amphibious
operations? This seemed to be a good time to let Maund
know their thoughts concerning combined operations.
Adam said that in the next war it was quite likely that
we “should have to undertake a combined operation on
the scale of the Tanga expedition (Tanga, East Africa,
1915, unopposed landing). There was no question that an
attempt to land troops in hostile territory in the face of
either superior air, land or naval forces would be doomed
to failure.... The Training and Development Centre
should be aware that we were not basing our plans on a
combined landing in the face of strong opposition.”®
Cunningham stated that the Admiralty could not vis-
ualise any particular combined operation taking place and
was not therefore prepared to devote any considerable

*The next year (1939) when war seemed on its way again, the DCOS (IT)
requested the DCOS to clarify what the status of the personnel of ISTDC would
be in the event of a future emergency (DCOS (IT) Paper 34, 2 June 1939). The
DCOS agreed that the personnel of the ISTDC would in the event of an emer-
gency be that “each officer of the Centre should be appointed to the appropriate
planning department of his own service” (DCOS, 39, 23 June 1939). When war
came in September 19339, all officers, including Maund, went to their respective
Services, except MacLeod who was instructed to carry on. By December 1939,
the DCOS had re-established the ISTDC and Maund returned to the Centre on
20 Jan 1940 as Commandant. (Notes of RAdm L. E. H. Maund, 29 Sept 1943.)
DEFE 2/699.

the
sum of money to equipment for combined training. Cun-
ningham believed that it was possible that a combined op-
eration might be necessary in the later stages of a war but
it was improbable that one would take place in the opening
phases.®°
Peirse suggested that consideration might be given to
the question of landing troops from troop-carrying air-
craft, either by the aircraft themselves landing the troops,
or by parachuting them, as had frequently been done in
the Soviet Russia and in France.
Major-General H. L. Ismay, Secretary to. the DCOS
as well as Secretary to CID, suggested that “as our strong
suit was command of the sea, we should be making poor
use of our hand if we relegated combined operations to
the background of our war plans. Indeed it seemed that
we should be laying ourselves open to justifiable criticism
if we made no effort in time of peace to train on modern
lines for a possible combined operation in time of war.”
After more discussion and close questioning of Maund
by the DCOS, they concluded that “the provision of ma-
terial for training in combined operations in peacetime
should be based on the assumption that a combined land-
ing on a large scale against Opposition was not a likely
operation in the early stages of war.” They reiterated that
a special landing-craft carrier was out but that plans for
converting suitable merchant ships were to be encouraged.
They decided that a landing craft be constructed for ex-
perimental purposes, before any more were built for train-
ing purposes.® Maund had already advised the DCOS that
both the boat-building firms of Fleming and Thornycroft
were working on specifications for a first and second flight
landing craft, in close cooperation with the Director of
Naval Equipment of the Admiralty.
During the early part of 1939, several projects were
under consideration by the ISTDC and that their inves-
tigations showed considerable foresight is brought out by

76
the following list of the more important subjects then un-
der review:
Dropping troops by parachute
Landing water and petrol in amphibious operations
Landing tanks
Use of amphibian tanks
Methods of crossing underwater obstacles
Maintenance and supply from the air
Use of ships as Headquarters for amphibious operations
Production of a floating pier
Provision of landing punts for coastal raids

In addition, ISTDC was instrumental in getting the Ad-

miralty to develop a beach mine.*”
As previously instructed by the DCOS in March 1939,
the Centre submitted a list of merchant ships technically
suitable for conversion to landing craft carriers. They
pointed out that these ships were unsuitable owing to their
lack of speed, and recommended that ships with a speed
of twenty-five knots should be built, capable of employ-
ment either as mine-layers or as landing craft carriers, and
they further recommended that all future troop transports
should have a speed of twenty-five knots and be capable
of hoisting fourteen landing craft.®*
The Centre sent to the DCOS a report setting out the
degree of preparedness for amphibious operations which
then existed. Briefly the position was:

(a) Small Scale Raids—could be mounted from Malta in

two or three days as special pontoon boats, capable of
carrying 300 men, stowed in submarines, were available
there. No punts are at present in existence in the United
Kingdom although four of a new design are on order.
The time taken to build these punts is four weeks for
eight and six weeks for sixteen.
(b) Raid by a Brigade—(2 Battalions Assaulting)—a min-
imum of six months would be required to allow for the

ret
 necessary number of LCAs needed. There are no first
and second flight landing craft available and 16 weeks
must elapse before they would be ready. While there are
nine heavy type landing craft already built (MLCs, 22
tons each), they are not entirely suitable, because of
weight. It would take 16 weeks to produce a comparable
number of medium weight craft. Other factors affecting
the situation are as follows:
(i) No landing craft carriers exist, but. two or three
valuable carrying ships could be converted in six
months. This time could be considerably reduced if
the necessary davits and winches were manufactured
and stored beforehand.
(ii) To alter a merchant ship to embark tanks and
motor transport and land them directly on a beach
might take six months if drawings are prepared be-
forehand.
(c) A month’s training would be needed before the per-
sonnel of a regular Army Brigade undertook the task
of an assaulting force.

It may thus be concluded that no major landing attack

could at present be undertaken in less than 6 months
from the time the order was given. But raids from sub-
marines could be undertaken at short notice if the
trained personnel were available.®°
No doubt the report from the DCOS (IT) sub-
committee came as a surprise and disappointment to any-
one reading it. They followed up this pessimistic report
with another that gave a glimmer of hope, but one re-
quiring a considerable amount of money. The sub-
committee stated that in order to reduce the minimum
period required for the preparation of a landing attack by
a brigade force or more to three months, the following
construction and costs would have to be authorised im-
mediately:
1. 18 small landing craft and 2 support craft at £2,700 each... .
£54,000.
2. 12 large landing craft at £5,650 each. .. . £67,800

78
3. Armament and equipment for 2 additional support craft, in
addition to the 2 above at £600 each... . £2,400
Total: £124,200
4. In addition, construction of 30 sets of gravity davits and
winches with estimated cost of £20,000. It would be necessary
to prepare drawings for the installation of the davits and
winches in the 14 ships considered suitable for carrying land-
ing craft.”

Within two weeks of receiving the DCOS (IT) report,

the DCOS approved all of the construction recommen-
dations of the landing craft, armament, support craft and
the like.”!
By the end of July 1939, prototypes of the Fleming
and Thornycroft landing craft were built at no cost to the
government. The prototypes, called Landing Craft Assault
(LCA), were ready for testing.
On 11 August both prototypes were tested on the
Clyde. The LCA prototype built by Fleming of Liverpool
was constructed of Brimabrite, an aluminium alloy metal
that was used in the construction of lifeboats. The Thor-
nycroft prototype LCA was constructed of mahogany, with
a high square pram bow, giving the Fleming boat the ad-
vantage of a small silhouette. A short passage to sea was
made by each craft carrying a platoon of men in fighting
equipment. On beaching, the Fleming craft was ashore in
ten seconds and the last man was out of her before the
first man had landed from the other. Both craft were noisy
when proceeding at high speed (ten knots) but the Fleming
craft, being built of metal, was the noisier of the two.”
The Thornycroft prototype of Southampton won out
primarily because it was the quieter of the two, and it would
be easier to add light armour to the hull. Modifications
were made to the Thornycroft LCA. These modifications
included reconstruction of the bow to allow exit by two
men at a time, installation of the armoured coxswain’s po-
sition, and so forth.
Designs for Landing Craft Mechanised (1) (LCM [1])

es)
formerly MLC, and Landing Craft Support (Medium),
(LCS [M]) had been completed and no time was lost, there-
fore, in starting production on the programme ordered
by the DCOS Committee. The LCM (1) carried loads of
up to sixteen tons, had a high ramp forward and could do
seven knots and beach in four feet of water when loaded.
It was essentially designed to carry the existing twelve-ton
Army tank but would be able to take future heavier tank
designs up to a maximum of at least twenty tons. The LCS
(M) first design was the same hull as the Thornycroft LCA
and weighed ten tons. It was modified to take a four-inch
mortar which fired smoke floats to protect flotillas as they
advanced to the beach. The first one was produced after
Dieppe, in August 1942.7
It had already been noted that when war came, the
ISTDC was closed with its Naval and RAF members ap-
pointed to other jobs. Fortunately, Lieutenant-Colonel
MacLeod, the Army member, stayed on and was able to
assist the reestablishment of the Centre in November 1939.
When Captain Maund returned to the Centre in January
1940, more orders for landing craft were given. The total
amphibious fleet at the time was four LCAs, one new LCM,
and five old but reliable MLCs.
In April 1940 the naval and military members of the
ISTDC were called in to assist in the preparations for the
Narvik operation insofar as making available the landing
craft noted above. In addition, Maund was himself snatched
away to be Chief of Staff to the Naval C-in-C. Fergusson
noted that it was as “unhappy as a campaign could be,
unplanned, unprepared, divergent instructions, non-tact-
ical loading of ships, inadequate equipment and intelli-
gence.” At the end of the Norwegian campaign, all of the
landing craft, old and new, had done yeoman work before
meeting their end. The three surviving LCAs and the one
LCA were in tow back to Britain, but bad weather condi-
tions forced the Navy to abandon and sink them.
The fighting in Norway during April and May was

80
indeed an example of modern war where sea, land, and
air were involved. It was not, however, the child of ISTDC
and not part of what would become the “raiding period”
following Dunkirk.
Dunkirk came about when matters worsened by the
end of May, when it became apparent that the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) would have to be evacuated
from northwest Europe. All available ships and boats from
anywhere in Britain were requisitioned. Nine LCAs and
two LCMs were available at ISTDC and were sent to Ports-
mouth and Southampton to be embarked in ships to Dun-
kirk via Dover. MacLeod, the Army member of ISTDC,
recounted what happened to the remaining landing craft
after the action:

On arrival off Dunkirk, five LCA were lost in the Clan

Macalister which was bombed and sunk. The four remain-
ing LCA’s did extraordinarily fine work in taking off, first
French soldiers, and later British in La Panne—Dunkirk
area. One LCA took off a total of some 2,000 troops, and
finally the four craft made their way back to England at
the conclusion of the operation. The three old and one
new LCM were unfortunately lost, and it is believed that
the Germans may have secured their first specimen of the
new LCM during this evacuation, since, as far as is known,
the new LCM was abandoned but not sunk.”*

By the time the Dunkirk evacuation was completed, the

position of preparedness for amphibious operations in-
dicated that the ISTDC had four LCAs and one LCM. An
additional forty-eight LCAs, thirty LCMs, and eight sup-
port craft were being built, but no arrangements had been
made to establish a naval organisation to man and serve
these craft.
The immediate problem of the ISTDC and the mili-
tary Services after Dunkirk was to make preparations
against invasion. The long view of the military made it
clear that combined operations would be a necessary pre-

81
lude to the defeat of Germany and a central organisation
to direct this effort was needed. In addition, it was felt,
from the Prime Minister on down, that the enemy should
not rest in the occupied territory. It was because of this
view that a small Directorate of Combined Operations was
set up in the Admiralty under Lieutenant-General Alan
Bourne, until then Adjutant-General Royal Marines.
Bourne’s title was Commander, Raiding Operations
and Adviser to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Opera-
tions. Raiding operations were considered his primary
role. As a second role, the directive stated:

Your second role will be to take over command of the Inter-

Services Training and Development Centres and to act as
our (i.e. Chiefs of Staff) adviser on the organisation re-
quired for opposed landings. . . . In addition, we wish you
to press on with the development and production of special
landing craft and equipment and to advise us, when the
occasion arises, as to its allotment.”

The next chapter considers the parallel course taken by

the Americans and their efforts in combined operations.

1. RNSC to DTSD, 8 Dec 1919, ADM 116/2086.

2. Ibid.
3. Maj-Gen. W. H. Anderson to WO, Staff College Rpt, 7 Jan 1920, ADM
116/2086.
4. Adm to WO, 3 Mar 1920, ADM 116/2086.
5. WO to Adm, 11 Mar 1920, ADM 116/2086 (40/WO/7659 SD 5)
6. WO to Adm, 26 May 1920, ADM 116/2086 (40/WO/7716, C.3).
7. DTSD Memo, 31 May 1920, ADM 116/2086.
8. Min of Proceedings of Interdepartmental Comm on CO, 22 June 1920,
ADM 116/2086. :
9. Maj-Gen. G. P. Dawnay to WO, 23 June 1920, ADM 116/2086.
10. WO to Chairman, Comm on CO, 5 July 1920, ADM 116/2086.
11. ADM to WO, 29 June 1920, and Air Min to WO, | July 1920, ADM 116/2086.
12. SCR, op. cit., p. 4.
13. Capt. E. E. Drax, RN to DTSD, RNSC Rpt, 8 Dec 1919, ADM 116/2086.
14. Interdepartmental Comm Mtg, op. cit.
15. Dawnay to WO, 31 Oct 1921, ADM 116/2086.
16. Interdepartmental Comm on CO to Adm, 23 Sept 1920, ADM 116/2086.

82
 . DTSD to First Sea Lord, 8 Oct 1920, ADM 116/2086.
. Adm to WO and Air Min, 13Jan 1921, ADM 116/2086 M.035).
. WO to Adm, 18 Jan 1921, ADM 116/2086 (40/WO/7922) and WO to Air
Min, 7 Feb 1921, ADM 116/2086 (61285/21/S.6).
. WO to RAdm W. M. Ellerton, DTSD, 27 July 1921, ADM 116/2086.
. DNI to Adm, 8 Jan 1925, ADM 116/2086.
. GOC, Malaya to WO, 8 Oct 1924, ADM 116/2086 (CRMC 19153/G).
23. RNSC Rpt, 1919, op. cit., p. 4.
. DTSD Rpt on CO perce by Officers of Naval, Military and Air Force
Staff Colleges, 12 Jan 1932, ADM 116/3674.
. DTSD Min, 1 Mar 1932, ADM 116/3674.
. Adm Min, 20 Mar 1934, ADM 116/3395 (2566/33/T).
. CINC, China, H.M.S. Kent to Adm, 10 Mar 1932 (Adm 1/9551 (M.01016/32).
. DTSD Min, 30 June 1934, ADM 116/3395.
. DTSD Min, 7 Jan 1935, ADM 116/3395 (MO 3462/34).
. C-in-C, Home Fleet, H.M.S. Nelson to Adm, 27 Oct 1934, ADM 116/3674
(1676/H.F. 1360).
. DTSD Min, 7 Jan 1935, op. cit.
. COS, 178, 16 June 1936, CAB 53/6.
3. DCOS, 6, 16 July 1936, CAB 54/1.
. SCR on CO Exercise, 31 Dec 1935, DCOS, CAB 54/3.
. DCOS Paper 22, 23 Nov 1936, CAB 54/3.
. Ibid., The 1934 and 1935 SCR were contained in the DCOS Paper 22.
. Ibid., pp. 4-9.
. DCOS, 15, 7 Jan 1937, CAB 54/1.
. Man of CO, 1938 (C.B. 3042), Part II, Chap. 4, pp. 20-24, DEFE 2/709.
. Capt. C. E. Douglas-Pennant, RN, RNSC (Summer Session), 1938, DEFE
2/781.
. DCOS, 18, 29 July 1937, CAB 54/1.
. Capt. B. C. Watson, RNSC to RAdm R. M. Colvin, RNC, 22 Feb 1936, DEFE
2/697, hereafter referred to as the Watson Memorandum.
. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
. Ihid., pp. 7-8.
. COS, 178, 16 Jan 1936, CAB 53/5.
. DCOS, 18, 29 July 1937, CAB 54/1.
. Ibid.
. DCOS Paper 628, 29 July 1937, CAB 54/1.
. COS, 221, 4 Nov 1937, CAB 53/8.
. DCOS (IT) 2, 30 Nov 1937, CAB 54/12.
. VADM W. M. James, DCOS Paper 61, 13 Jan 1938, CAB 54/2.
. Ihid., pp. 3-4.
. Lt-Gen R. F. Adam, DCIGS, Paper 62, 7 Feb 1938, CAB 54/2.
. AVM R. E. C. Peirse, DCAS, DCOS Paper 64, 8 Feb 1938, CAB 54/2.
. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
. VAdm W. M. James, DCOS Paper 63, 8 Feb 1938, CAB 54/2.
. DCOS (IT) 1, 21 Mar 1938, CAB 54/12.
. Ibid., and DCOS (IT) 7, 2 May 1938, CAB 54/13.
. DCOS (IT) 11, 9 Aug 1938, CAB 54/13.
. DCOS, 30, 15 Nov 1938, CAB 54/2.
. DCOS, 31, 7 Dec 1938, CAB 54/2.

83
G2: DEOS 7307 ai.
63. DCOS, 31, op. cit.
64. Peirse’s observations came to fruition: well-established paratroop forces,
including Commandos, were used throughout the war. As early as 1937,
the Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment at Felixstowe conducted
tests to solve the problem of transferring crews to and from flying boats.
To do this, use of a special carvel built wooden dinghy designed to stow
away in the armament department of a Sunderland flying boat was em-
ployed. (MAEE Rpt. No. F/SQ/193, 6 July 1938). Later in the war, at the
request of COHQ in Apr. 1942, the Air Ministry conducted tests of landing
troops from the 6th Commando, Special Service Brigade, from Sunderland
aircraft by means of rubber inflatable dinghies. (Capt. F. A. Norton, Com-
manding MAEE, RAF, Helensburgh, 15 Aut. 1942), DEFE 2/812. See Ap-
pendix A, Plates 2 and 3.
65. DCOS, 31, pp. 9-10.
66. ISTDC Annual Rpt 1938 to DCOS (IT), Dec 1938, CAB 54/2.
67. DCOS (IT) 17, 15 Feb 1939, CAB 54/2.
68. DCOS (IT) 25, 25 Mar 1939, CAB 54/2.
69. DCOS (ET) 28, 5 Apr 1939, CAB 54/2.
70. DCOS (IT) 35, 30 June 1939, CAB 54/2.
Wh, DCOS, 40, 10 July 1939, CAB 54/2.
2s DCOS (IT) 46, 23 Aug 1939, CAB 54/2.
Woe DCOS (IT) 32, 22 May 1939, CAB 54/2.
74. Early history notes of ISTDC by RAdm Maund, 29 Sep 1943, and amplified
by Maj-Gen MacLeod, 16 Noy 1943, DEFE 2/699.
15: COS (40) 468, 17 June 1940, CAB 79/5.

84 .
 3
The Americans at Work

Fleet Exercises (FLEXS) and Landing Craft Development

in the 1920s

The term “Advanced Base Force” was changed to “Marine

Corps Expeditionary Force” (MCEF) in 1923. Organisation
and missions, however, remained the same, and both the
East Coast and West Coast units of the Force were available
for service with the Fleet. On paper, the MCEF looked
good—good organisation, good equipment. The draw-
back, however, was the fact that the post-World War I
Corps had had no experience in training with the Fleet
and, conversely, the Fleet had had no experience with the
Marine Force. Practical experience in testing men and
equipment in landing operations was needed by both par-
ties. Thus, the General Board and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps (CMC) agreed that the MCEF should take
part in the annual Fleet Exercises (FLEXS) whenever pos-
sible.
Units from the MCEF, East Coast, took part in the
Fleet Exercises of Culebra in the West Indies and Guan-
tanamo, Cuba, from January to April 1922. They made
several landings from ships’ boats, but the primary task of
the Marines was to endeavour to land heavy guns and
equipment from the transport to ships’ boats to the beach.
A Marine Company of three officers and 135 men suc-

85
cessfully transferred one 155-mm and two 75-mm guns,
and one 10-ton and three 5-ton tractors to the Guantanamo
beach. Another Marine Company repeated the task at Cu-
lebra, moving the same amount of equipment. Lieutenant
Colonel Cutts, the Marine Commander, commented that
“it had been conclusively demonstrated that artillery up to
and including 155-mm guns and 10-ton tractors can be
landed in ships’ boats.” He qualified this comment by
pointing out that “all conditions must be exceedingly fa-
vourable to obtain a successful result at the landing place;
more favourable than can normally be expected.”!
The favourable conditions referred to meant that
there must normally be a calm sea and moderate surf. That
these ideal conditions would be rarely found in operations
such as this did not make the task impossible. Cutts rec-
ommended that a “landing lighter” be constructed for
transporting heavy guns, adding that “it should not be self-
propelled owing to increased weight entailed, and the ab-
solute necessity of grounding.”
In the summary of his report, Cutts noted what must
have been obvious to officers of the Marine Corps, that
“in attempting to weigh carefully the advantages and dis-
advantages of both the attack and defence of a base, by
far the greater stress has come on the defence. ... It is
hoped some method and material may be developed to
solve the problem of the attack.”®
Years later, when the Commandant of the Marine
Corps was reviewing the advantages of Fleet Exercises and
MCEF, he noted that “while the exercises of 1922 were
defensive in their nature, they brought out the difficulties
of attack in landing operations against hostile opposition
and the further presumption that the Marine Corps should
be preparing for offensive landing operations in addition
to the defensive advanced base work.”*
The next Fleet Exercises, December 1923 through
February 1924, under the command of Admiral Richard
E. Coontz, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and later

86
Chief of Naval Operations, were again conducted at Cu-
lebra and the Canal Zone, Panama. The CMC assigned an
expeditionary force of over 3,300 officers and men under
the command of Brigadier General Eli K. Cole. The force
was divided approximately in half, with 1,550 men with
six 155-mm guns, twelve 75-mm guns, and eighteen ma-
chine guns defending Culebra against attack. This force
at Culebra was under the command of Colonel Dion Wil-
liams. The remaining portion of the expeditionary forces,
with approximately the same amount of guns, and totalling
1,750 Marines, was under the command of Cole and was
up of the 5th Marine Regiment, a headquarters company,
a radio service company, gas platoon, naval medical corps
personnel and four Army liaison officers. Cole’s forces
were the “hostile” landing force and they effected landings
in the Panama Canal Zone and at Culebra against Williams’
men.
The results of the exercises were disastrous for Cole’s
force. Landing on the wrong beaches, boats being lost for
a time, insufficient naval bombardment, and transports
poorly loaded were a few of the adverse criticisms of the
exercise.’ Yet it had been expected that many things would
not go right. What was of overriding importance in the
exercises of 1924 was the experience of a large-scale land-
ing and the many recommendations to improve future
landings. Although many of the transports were poorly
loaded, the freighter USS Szrius was not the assignment of
a detachment of twenty-five Marines and one officer (the
forerunner of the combat cargo officer) made cargo off-
loading feasible. Williams reported “that the loading and
unloading of the Sirius constituted one of the most valuable
lessons of the manoeuvres.”®
The 1924 exercises also produced the beginning of
serious experiments with landing craft more suitable than
the standard ships’ boats. Two types of boats were tested,
the first of which was a derivation of the British “Beetle”
used at Suvla Bay, Gallipoli, in August 1915. The CMC

87
requested the Chief of Naval Operations to have the one
“fifty foot motor lighter, now being built at Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, placed on board the USS Henderson for testing dur-
ing the winter manoeuvers.”” General Cole assessed the
value of the Beetle boat officially designated “Troop Barge
ae

We had with us a so-called “Beetle” capable of carrying a

75-mm gun and about 60 men, or 100 riflemen. This is a
beginning, but the present design must be altered, if for
no other reason than that its stowage on board ship reduces
the motor sailers by two—i.e. one 50 ft and one 40 ft, with
landing capacity of 160 men. Some design must be arrived
at whereby a transport can carry boats for at least 60 per-
cent of the infantry force on board, with special provisions
for artillery, transportation, supplies, etc. These boats
should be seaworthy enough to allow them to go 20 miles
under their own power, and if possible ofa design to permit
their being towed by a minesweeper or a destroyer at re-
duced speed. A design which will give protection against
machine gun fire and which provides for some machine
gun fire from the boat is desirable.®

The other boat tested during the winter manoeuvres

of 1924 was the “Christie tank.” Unlike the experiment
with the Beetle Boat, this test was scheduled to be a great
surprise to Colonel Williams’ forces defending Culebra. Its
appearance was attributed to Brigadier General Smedley
D. Butler, who had been designated to command the
MCEF but was replaced by Cole in December 1923. While
Butler was still concerned with the Exercise, he had cor-
responded with Walter Christie of the Sun Shipbuilding
Company of Chester, Pennsylvania, who had built an am-
phibious tank in 1922. After successful tests on the Hudson
River in New York, and later tests on the Potomac River
near Washington, D.C., Christie asked the CMC to test his
tank in the winter manoeuvres of 1924. The CMC accepted
his offer and Admiral Coontz gave authorisation to the

88 ;
Commander, Scouting Fleet, Vice-Admiral Newton A.
McCully, to test the Christie tank.? Butler asked Christie
and McCully to keep the use of the tank a secret in order
to surprise the defenders of Culebra.'°
The tests were conducted on the Christie tank but no
mention of its surprising the defenders of Culebra was
noted in the reports after the exercises were over. The
CMC noted to the Secretary of the Navy that “two special
types of boats for landing operations were used experi-
mentally with interesting although not decisive results.”!!
Unofficial comment from Marine officers at the time
noted that while the Christie tank proved successful on
rivers, it was apparently unseaworthy. Although there
were no official reports of this “unseaworthy” comment,
the Christie tank was never used again.
In April 1925, joint Army and Navy exercises were
held off the Hawaiian Islands. The number of Marines
employed was a simulated 42,000-man landing force. In
reality, only 1,500 took part. An important factor was an
experiment with the landing-force staff. The normal
school activities in the Field Officers School at Quantico
Marine Base were suspended in March and the students
and instructors all became members of the “Blue” MCEF
(attacking force). The group was commanded by Colonel
Robert M. Dunlap, Commanding Officer of Marine Corps
Schools. The CMC noted, “the exercises were successful,
insofar as staff work and planning by Marine students and
instructors was concerned.”
Colonel Dunlap and his staff participated in a Navy
critique at the Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor, from | to
4 May and again at Quantico from | to 5 June 1925, em-
phasizing Marine Corps problems. Recommendations
ranged from proper tactical organisation to discarding
canvas leggings. They pointed out the need for experi-
ments to develop a “boat suitable for landing the first waves
ashore on a defended coast, capable of being carried on
transports and capable of being turned out in quantity
once war is determined upon.”
89
 It was not only the Marines who mentioned the need
for suitable landing craft. The Navy, in the person of Ad-
miral Coontz, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet
the year before, noted “that the use of the regular ships’
boats for the purpose of transporting landing parties
ashore, when opposition is to be encountered, is a hazard-
ous undertaking and little likely to succeed. It is of utmost
importance that experiments be continued with a view to
determine what type of boat is best for this purpose.”!*
If there was a single unchanging thread in all of the
fleet exercises during the 1920s, it was the constant recom-
mendation that a “suitable boat” be developed to land the
landing forces. Marine participation in fleet exercises was
interrupted for the remainder of the decade because of
renewed expeditionary commitments in Nicaragua, Haiti,
and China. At home, the Marines were demoted to guard-
ing the mail trains against the villains of the 1920s.
By 1926, the Navy had two fifty-foot motor lighters
built, one for landing troops and the other for landing
artillery. An infantry platoon of Marines commanded by
First Lieutenant Charles Connette and a section of 155-
mm artillery commanded by First Lieutenant M. E. Fuller
tested the lighters during July 1926 at Hampton Roads,
Virginia.
The infantry lighter was armoured, fifty feet long and
had a fourteen-foot beam. It was to be used primarily for
the landing of the first troop wave under fire. Propelled
by two motors, it had the capacity to carry machine guns
or 37-mm guns for offensive power. The design of the
lighter had no special provisions for retraction of this boat
from the beach, but “if the landing is on a beach of such
a nature as to permit withdrawal, they may be used in
landing subsequent waves; if not, they afford protected
dressing stations, or even machine gun nests.”
Connette made three different tests of the capacity of
the boat. He had loaded as many as 126 men with light
marching packs but concluded that “it would not be prac-

90
tical to place so many men in the boat in any kind of rough
sea.” When tests were made in the landing of the boat, one
hundred men with heavy marching packs were loaded. He
reported the results:

The boat proceeded under her own power for a distance

of about four miles where landings were made through a
very light surf. The boat was put up to the beach with her
bow about three feet clear of the water. The landing from
the boat was made, clearing the boat in two minutes at first
trial and about one and one half minutes at the second
trial. Had the front hatch opening been larger the boat
could have been unloaded in less than one minute. The
boat left the beach very easily after being unloaded.

The 50-foot artillery lighter was designed primarily

for a maximum effort of landing the 155-mm gun and its
tractor on any stretch of good beach in a moderate surf.
However, a secondary purpose was considered in using
the lighter for landing troops, equipment, and ammuni-
tion, “thus securing distribution at beach head, and avoid-
ing congestion at landings which are possible only for ships’
boats.”!° The lighter was not self-propelled and had to be
towed by another boat:

It had to be beached stern-to and the gun or vehicle un-

loaded over a stern ramp. Retracting was easy but the single
disadvantage was that the lighter could not be worked in
and beached until the beach had been secured."

Nothing ever came of the two lighters and they ended

up at the Quantico Marine Base for use in local landing
exercises. There was no subsequent correspondence as to
why these particular lighters were not further developed
or accepted but probably the lack of self-propulsion was
seen as a fatal objection. The troop lighter, on the other
hand, had potential—it was armoured and could carry one
hundred men or more. The drawback must have been the

91
disembarkation. Troops would have to come out ofa hatch,
jump to the beach or into shallow water. Even for 1926,
the disembarkation just didn’t look right. Tests for the
suitable boat continued for the remaining 1920s and early
1930s. For the first half of the 1930s the focus for the
Marine Corps was the education of its officers and the
development ofa landing doctrine. The centre for this was
located at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.

Marine Corps Schools (MCS)

Formal military education of officers in the Marine

Corps goes back only to 1891 when the School of Apph-
cation was founded for newly commissioned officers. ‘The
initial location of the school was at the Marine Barracks,
Washington, but subsequently it moved to three other lo-
cations and finally to Quantico, Virginia in April 1917.
The MCS at Quantico remains today as the centre of all
formal Officer instruction and doctrinal development with
the Marine Corps.
By 1920, and after going through several name
changes, the School was known as The Marine Officers
Schools. By July 1922, it had three separate courses in
session: the field officers’ course, the company officers’
course, and the basic course. The basic course, given to
Lieutenants by the Basic School, subsequently would be
moved to Philadelphia in 1923, but returned to Quantico
during World War II.
It was natural that the curriculum of all of the schools
at Quantico during the 1920s would be Army oriented,
because of the recent experiences in World War I. In ad-
dition, all texts, with the exception of Advanced Base writ-
ings, used by MCS were written by the Army. Army
orientation continued throughout the education of Marine
Officers and many senior Marine officers attended the
Army War College or the Command and Staff College of
the Army.

92 ,
 The Army’s schools were excellent, but by their nature
they were patterned for the organisation, training, equip-
ment, and mission of only a land-based operation. The
knowledge gained from the Army schools could serve as
good experience to the individual officer and even give
him new ideas as to how to improve his own development.
However, the Marine—Army graduate returning to his bat-
talion, regiment, or some staff duty, found the Marine
Corps organisation very different in strength, equipment,
and mission from that of the Army. Mission was the key.
Did the Army education train the Marine Officer in car-
rying out the mission of the Marine Corps—that of con-
ducting landing operations with the Fleet? It not only did
not, it could not. The aim of Army education was totally
different.
The Marine Corps was aware that, aside from the basic
infantry training they themselves conducted, special train-
ing was needed in amphibious warfare, which only the
Marine Corps could conceivably organise and teach. Even
the Madden Committee studying the Royal Marines train-
ing recognised that training for the Striking Force and
other Royal Marines in shore defence units “was different
in many respects from those which are undertaken by
Army units, and that while training according to Army
Systems and methods is useful and desirable up to a point,
such training is not sufficient fully to prepare Marines for
the main functions assigned them.”
So too with the U.S. Marines. Army training was not
sufficient to prepare them for their main functions of sup-
porting the Fleet and conducting amphibious operations.
With this in mind, the Marine Corps Schools would have
to develop a course of study of their own. The Marines
had already acquired some knowledge, having been in-
volved in and studied the techniques of small wars. The
experiences of the Corps in Central and South America
left a vast amount of uncorrelated information through
the years, and no attempt had been made to consolidate
it into a form which could be useful to other officers.

93
 In 1922, Major Samuel M. Harrington, while a student
at the Field Officers’ Course, undertook a comprehensive
study of small wars. As a result, he prepared a definitive
treatise entitled, The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars.'*
After Harrington left Quantico, Colonel Ben H. Fuller,
Commanding Officer of MCS, and later Commandant of
the Marine Corps, requested Harrington to send him cop-
ies of his work on small wars “in order to build up acourse
strictly patterned for Marine Corps work.”!”
Fuller had Harrington’s work incorporated into the
school’s curriculum. This publication presented certain
principles of landing operations, the seizure of cities, and
operations in the field, as they applied to its analyses of
small wars. Since small wars continued to be an immediate
concern of the Marine Corps, Harrington’s work was the
basis for more detailed writing on the subject later.
In 1935, a “Restricted” book entitled Small Wars Op-
erations was published for use within the MCS. In 1940, a
revised and corrected version entitled the Small Wars Man-
ual was published for the Marine Corps by the Government
Printing Office for general use and with no classification.
The curriculum as MCS began to change as a result
of the report of Colonel Dunlap, who succeeded Fuller as
Commanding Officer of MCS and was in command of the
attacking group in the Fleet Exercises of 1925.
The CMC directed that the subject of Overseas Ex-
peditions and Ship-to-Shore Operations be developed and
made an important feature of the tactical course in both
the Field and Company Officers Schools.2°
By 1926, tactics studies emphasized Marine Corps ac-
tivity in conjunction with the Fleet and landing operations.
The following example of subjects became part of the MCS
regular curriculum: (a) Expeditionary forces; (b) Naval
considerations for an overseas expedition; (c) Tactical prin-
ciples of securing a beachhead; (d) Landing places (con-
figuration, terrain, and naval artillery support); (e) Naval
gunfire; (f) Beach parties and Shore parties, and (g) Dis-

94 .
embarkation.*! These subjects of instruction, with respect
to landing operations, totaled forty-nine hours as com-
pared to five hours in 1925.
The increased part the MCS would play in the devel-
opment of landing operations was reflected in the curric-
ulum for the academic year 1927—28. A complete revision
and expansion of the courses tripled the emphasis on land-
ing operations. MCS added a touch of sophistication and
inter-service spirit with the addition of Army and Navy
Officers as instructors or visiting lecturers.
During the academic year 1928-29, the schools were
crippled by depletion of the staff of instructors, most of
whom were sent to Nicaragua. However, this did not result
in a decrease in the emphasis on landing operations in-
structions.*?
To round out the decade of the 1920s on a happy
note for the Marine Corps, the Joint Board of the Army
and Navy, in 1927, recognised the history, experience, and
affinity of the Marine Corps for landing operations and
assigned it as a general function the responsibility to
provide and maintain forces for land operations in support
of the fleet for the initial seizure of advanced bases and for
such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to
the prosecution of the naval campaign. ... The Marines
because of the constant association with naval units will be
given special training in the conduct of landing opera-
tions.”
This was indeed a milestone in the restatement of the
Marine Corps mission.
World-wide depression and America’s “Good Neigh-
bor Policy” of non-intervention in Central and South
American affairs in the decade of the 1930s brought home
the last remaining Marines from Cuba and Haiti by 1934.
As is always the case in times of poor economic conditions,
the military service budgets were closely scrutinized by
Congress. The Navy Department had already undergone

95
an agonizing time because of cutbacks resulting from the
naval disarmament treaties of the 1920s. The Marine
Corps’ turn came during 1931 and 1932 in the form of an
examination of its organisation and establishment.
The General Board of the Navy undertook a yearlong
study to determine the need for, and size of, the Marine
Corps in war and peace. The Board examined every aspect
of the Corps—its history, missions, aviation, and place in
the war plans of the nation. The CMC, Major-General Ben
H. Fuller, answered fully all questions of the General
Board. The pivotal question was how to show the necessity
for an appropriated strength of 21,000 men. It had been
feared by the Corps that the statutory peacetime strength
of 27,400.would be reduced. This reduction was opposed
by the CNO in his review of the General Board report to
the Secretary of Navy. He stated that the “present au-
thorised strength of 27,400 should be continued as the
legally authorised peacetime strength in order to allow
expansion to this number without the necessity of legis-
lation during a period of strained relations.”**
The Marine Corps survived the examination and the
Secretary of Navy, Charles F. Adams, approved the report
of the General Board and the CNO. The statutory peace
strength of the Marine Corps was kept at 27,400 while the
aper ynnetae strength remained at 21,000 during the dec-
ade.
Within the Marine Corps Schools, the momentum of
the late 1920s to formalise instruction in landing opera-
tions continued. By the end of 1939, out of a total of 1,092
hours of instruction, 455 hours, or 42 percent, pertained
to some aspect of landing operations.
In August 1930, Brigadier General Randolph C.
Berkeley became the first general officer to command the
MCS. In March 1931, Colonel Charles F. B. Price, an in-
structor in the Field Officers’ School, recommended to
Berkeley that work should be started on a formal text for
landing operations and that two of the instructors from

96 s
the Field Officers’ School, Majors Charles D. Barrett and
Lyle H. Miller, be assigned full-time to the preliminary
work of preparing the text.”
Price stated that “the most important part of the pre-
liminary work will be rather extensive practical experi-
ments to determine the capacity for personnel and
equipment of all of the various types of boats in use in the
Navy which might be employed in actual operations.”
Berkeley concurred and appointed a board to develop and
write the text for Landing Operations and Small Wars.?° In
addition to appointing Barrett and Miller, Berkeley added
Major P. A. del Valle and Lieutenant Walter C. Ansel,
USN, who was the chief Naval Officer instructor at MCS.
The board became known as the Landing Operations Text
Board.
It is important to note here that Boards appointed
within the Marine Corps Schools to develop a text needed
only the concurrence of the CMC. The text was only to be
for internal use within the Schools. Approval from the
Secretary of Navy, CNO, General Board, or anyone else
was not necessary. The only exception to this practice
would occur a few years later with the publication of the
Tentative Landing Operations Manual. In this instance, the
Manual was to be used within the Navy as well as the
Marine Corps.
Concurrent with the Landing Operations Text Board,
other Boards such as the Experimental Landing Lighters’
Board and a Curriculum Board were all doing yeoman
work at Marine Corps Schools. As a result of the Curric-
ulum Board’s recommendations, a revised schedule was
worked out for the following school year—1932—and
greater emphasis was placed on landing operations, de-
spite the fact that the number of hours already assigned
to these courses had been increasing steadily. Another re-
commendation of the Curriculum Board was to have MCS
construct and solve problems on the basis of Marine Corps
organisation and material.’

OF
 The changes that took place in the instruction and
curriculum pertaining to landing operations at MCS from
1931 to 1933 undoubtedly affected the Landing Operations
Text Board. By 1933, there was no publication completed
or printed from the work of this Board, and the Officers
assigned to it continued gathering material until the ap-
pointment of a new Board later in the year. The 1931
Board’s work was, however, the first effort to develop a
modern landing doctrinal text and it provided a basis for
the initial landing manual published a year later. Some of
the work accomplished by the 1931 Board was used later
in the 1934 Manual. It contained studies on units of mea-
surement for computing cargo requirements, for military
equipment, establishment of standard boat capacities for
landing operations based on specific data, and whole chap-
ters on signals, engineering, boats, air support, and artil-
lery.
In April 1932, Brigadier General James C. Breckin-
ridge succeeded General Berkeley as Commandant, MCS.
Breckinridge brought with him as an assistant, Lieutenant
Colonel Ellis Bell Miller. Miller brought a great amount
of service-school experience with him, having been a grad-
uate and later instructor at the Naval War College and
graduate. of the Army’s two top level schools, Fort Leav-
enworth School of the Line and General Staff and the
Army War College. With the encouragement of Breckin-
ridge, Miller disagreed not only with the manner in which
the MCS was run but with the content and subject matter
of many of the courses. He challenged the entire structure
upon which the education of Marine Officers was based.
The first drastic action came when all the courses de-
veloped by the Army schools and used at MCS were dis-
carded. These courses, and accompanying problems, had
long been the basis for the curriculum; but in order to
make the problems work, the Army Tables of Organisation
had to be used. Instructors were directed to rewrite all
their material and gear it to Marine Corps Tables of Or-

98 .
ganisation and equipment. In addition to the curriculum
changes, the content of a course in the study of landing
operations was revised. The Dardanelles—Gallipoli Cam-
paign formed an important part of the background in
research on this subject. During the academic year
1932-1933, each student was issued a copy of the British
official history of the Gallipoli Campaign. This book, Mil-
itary Operations, Gallipoli, Vol 1,* since it was the latest and
most accurate publication on the subject at the time, was
used as a source book for a special course in the Gallipoli
Campaign. The Gallipoli Course was organised

to acquaint the students with the Gallipoli Campaign; to

train them in military research; and to provide the Schools
and through them, the Marine Corps with the material of
value on a campaign which is in many respects of the type
we are expected to be experts in.**

Concurrent with the Gallipoli studies, the students

from the Field Officers School at MCS and the Naval War
College worked together on what had come to be called
the Advanced Base Problem. The Advanced Base Problem
series, ten in all, started during school year 1931-1932.
Each year a theoretical problem of defending or seizing
a base in a given area was considered by both groups of
students. The Pacific area was the predominant choice of
areas for such situations as evidenced by problems dealing
with Dumanquilas in the Philippines, Truk, Palau Islands,
Guam, Saipan, and Tinian—all Pacific Islands. The Ad-
vanced Base Problems afforded the Marine Corps Schools
a chance to present solutions at the Naval War College.
Most significantly, the problems awakened an understand-
ing of the importance of the establishment of organised
fleet landing units. Obviously, the American advanced-

*BG C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallhpoh, (London, 1929),

Vol. I.

99
base problems were quite similar to the British Staff Col-
leges’ combined exercises at Camberley.
Colonel Richard M. Cutts, on the staff of the Naval
War College, had written to E. B. Miller at MCS proposing
that a “Marine-Base” force be placed in the operating
forces of the Fleet. Unlike the “expeditionary forces” at a
Stateside base or in some garrison duty abroad, Cutts sug-
gested that a new Marine-base force should physically be
incorporated with the Fleet. He said it “requires the active
assistance of the Navy Department necessitating appro-
priations and constructive action.”?°
Colonel Miller replied that it was “becoming clear that
a complete reorganisation and re-equipment of forces was
necessary to carry out Marine Corps missions in support
of the Fleet? .
In an article in March 1931, Lieutenant Commander
E. W. Broadbent USN, who was one of the first naval
officers to serve at MCS (1925-1928), made the following
statement:

It is the mission of the Marine Corps to support the Fleet.

But likewise it will be the mission of some part of the fleet
to support the Marine Corps landing force. When two
forces of different arms have a mutual task, there must be
mutual understanding, common thought, study, prepara-
tion, and training. With these, if the time ever comes when
the Navy needs more and better bases, the Navy and the
Marines can take and hold them..!

In August 1933, Major General John H. Russell, As-

sistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (and later Com-
mandant), suggested to the CMC the discontinuation of
the old “expeditionary force” and the creation in its stead
a new body to be called either the Fleet Base Defence Force
or the Fleet Marine Force. The Fleet Marine Force, or
FMF, as it was to be called, was an old idea of Russell’s and
he crystallised his ideas, and those of Miller, Cutts, and

100 .
many others when he insisted that “this force should be
included in the Fleet organisation as an integral part
thereof, subject to the orders, for tactical employment, of
the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.”*? After approval by
the CMC and the appropriate authorities of the Navy De-
partment, the Secretary of the Navy, Claude A. Swanson,
signed General Order No. 241 on 7 December 1933, des-
ignating the Fleet Marine Force. The Marines would be
the old expeditionary forces and would be maintained in
a state of readiness by the CMC for operations with the
Fleet. This body provided the Navy with a “type-force” of
reinforced infantry with the specific mission of executing
landing operations. This force would not be sent on gar-
rison duty or take over a fixed defence abroad. The Com-
mandant was to keep the FMF free from all other duties
and ready to support the Fleet.**
Significant as was the creation of this force, the Fleet
did not yet possess the capability of actually seizing bases
and thus projecting itself across the oceans. The FMF
needed a basic doctrine to guide its training, and the Fleet
elements, which were to be involved in landing operations,
required guidance as to how they would perform their
tasks in concert with the landing force. The only directives
available were those published by the Joint Army—Navy
Board “prescribing methods for Army and Navy cooper-
ation in joint overseas expeditions.” Unfortunately, the
directives were concerned with the techniques and agen-
cies for co-operation and with the respective functions of
each service in the conduct of joint operations. A manual
for landing operations was still lacking.
By late 1933, plans to work on a landing manual by
MCS were interrupted by the mobilisation of a Marine
regiment for Cuban duty and the consequent drain on
personnel. The Commandant of the MCS recommended
to the CMC that all classes be discontinued at the Schools
and that students and staff alike devote all time and effort

101
towards the production of a landing operations manual.
The Commandant agreed and on 30 October 1933, di-
rected the MCS to prepare a manual on landing operations
as expeditiously as possible and to commence work not
later than 15 November. Classes were discontinued on 14
November, and the staff and students began work on the
manual.**

Tentative Landing Operations Manual

The writing of the Manual commenced 15 November

1933 and progressed in two phases. In the first phase, the
students and instructors from MCS wrote out chronolog-
ically itemized lists of the things to be done from the in-
ception of a landing operation to the tactical completion
of a landing operation. It was then that a committee of
nine was appointed to consider the itemized lists, draw up
a consolidated list embracing all recommendations, and to
group them under headings. Each member of the com-
mittee of nine formulated his own list, based on the results
of his study of all lists submitted. A committee of five then
studied and further consolidated the lists from the com-
mittee of nine. The result was a rough outline for the
contents of the manual.
The prophetic nature of the rough outline was dra-
matically exemplified by six elements into which the land-
ing operation had been subdivided: (a) Command
relationships; (6) Naval gunfire support; (c) Aerial support;
(d) Ship-to-shore movements; (e) Securing the beachhead;
(f) Logistics. The contents of the Manual itself were greatly
expanded to reflect definitive explanations of the outline.
The second phase of the writing of the Manual came
from assignments delegated by the Commandant MCS in
a conference held at Quantico 9 January 1934. Officers
from major commands throughout the Marine Corps par-

102 ‘
ticipated in the conference with respect to the outline and
assignment of officers. The outline was based not only on
personal experiences but also on reports of landing op-
erations, experimentation, and the evolution ofinstruction
and problems at the Marine Corps Schools. Some seventy
officers, from lieutenants to brigadier generals, including
four Navy officers and one Army officer, attended the
meeting. Following the conference, the manual was di-
vided into various parts, and responsibility for writing
these parts was assigned to various committees. The bulk
of the manual was grouped under three general areas:
Tactics, which included landing and defence of bases, pre-
faced by a general discussion of landing operations and
the purpose of the manual; staff functions, logistics, and
plans and orders; and training. In addition, separate parts
on naval and aviation activities were prepared by Lieuten-
ant Commander Clifford G. Richardson, USN, Chairman
of the Naval Committee and Captain Harold D. Campbell,
USMC, Chairman of the Aviation Committee.*
On 28 March 1934, committees that had been at work
in earnest submitted to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps the first parts of the manual. By 13 June 1934, the
remaining chapters were submitted. The Tentative Manual
for Landing Operations, the first of five such names, was
issued to Marine Corps Schools during the 1934—35 school
year. It was not given outside (Marine Corps) distribution
and it was in mimeograph form. Several weeks later, in
July 1934, the title was changed to Manual for Naval Over-
seas Operations and published by the Navy Department.
Again, it was not distributed outside the Navy or Marine
Corps. Comments, corrections, and suggestions were sub-
mitted by those lucky enough to get a copy of the 1934
Manual. The Commandant of the Marine Corps decided
it was time to appoint a “revision board,” the first of many,
to incorporate the comments from Navy and Marine per-
sonnel into a new edition of the Manual. On 15 May 1935,

103
a board headed by Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Barrett*
was formed for revision of the 1934 edition of the manual.
Two months later, 9 July 1935, a revised manual with
photographs, better sketches, and personnel and materiel
tables was submitted to the CMC and CNO for approval.
The Manual, now entitled, Tentative Landing Operations
Manual, 1935, contained 300 pages with nine chapters as
follows:

Landing Operations, General

Task Organisation
Landing Boats
Ship-to-shore Movement
Naval Gunfire
Aviation
Communications
Field Artillery, Tanks, Chemicals, and Smoke
Logistics

The CMC and CNO approved the Manual (1935) for

use throughout the Marine Corps, Navy, and outside agen-
cies with a “Restricted” classification.*®
A year later, the 1935 Manual was to be updated and
a board headed by Lieutenant Colonel K. E. Rockey was
convened. On 21 June 1937, this new board issued a re-
vised manual, not for general distribution but for use
within the Navy and Marine Corps, under the new title,
Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy 1937. Less than a
year later, a new board headed by Lieutenant Colonel A.
H. Turnage was convened to make revisions on this 1937

*Barrett, later Major-General, was considered by the Navy and Marine Corps
to have been an outstanding original thinker in amphibious doctrine. Unfor-
tunately, Boards of any kind, in the Marine Corps, were not required to take
extensive notes or minutes. Recommendations were announced but credit could
not be pin-pointed to any individual member. Comments later, by former mem-
bers of the 1935 Board, generally substantiated that Barrett “singlehandedly
wrote two-thirds of the Tentative Manual based on the mass of un-coordinated
material assembled at the time.”

104 ;
edition. As each new edition came out, it was noted in the
new manual that the previous editions were superseded.
On 25 November 1938, the Navy published the final
version of the Manual before World War II, under the
title, Fleet Training Publication (FTP) Number 167, also
known as the Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938.
The aspects of landing operations contained in the
contents of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual, 1935
were so important that all subsequent revised editions were
based on them. They indicated that Command relation-
ships dealt with the organisation of the landing force as
well as with command procedures. It was here that the
inherent naval character of the landing operation was de-
fined. The force was to be commanded by a Navy flag
officer. The task force would have two main components:
the landing force, made up of Fleet Marine Force units,
and the naval support groups consisting of the Fire Sup-
port Group, the Air Group, Covering Group, and the
Transport Group. The specific responsibilities of the var-
ious commanders during all phases of the operations were
enumerated, and the principle of parallelism of command,
subject to the overall authority of the amphibious force
commander, was defined. With these arrangements, one
of the causes of the Gallipoli disaster, the lack of a co-
ordinated central command, was overcome. They ensured
that naval forces would be organised so as to be responsive
to the needs of the landing force.
The 1935 Manual indicated that a landing force in the
assault followed the same pattern as conventional offensive
action but it also recognised the fact that the over-the-water
movement of troops complicated the problem of fire sup-
port. In developing a solution to this problem, an effort
was made to adapt naval guns to missions normally per-
formed by field artillery. The problems of fire direction,
the nature of projectiles, magazine capacity, and the muz-
zle velocities and trajectories of weapons were all consid-
ered; a sound doctrine for the effective delivery of naval
gunfire was developed.
105
 As a result of the many problems associated with the
delivery of naval gunfire in close support of assault troops,
the writers of the Manual explored the possibility of em-
ploying aircraft for this purpose. The Marine Corps doc-
trine of “Close Air Support,” which will be discussed later,
evolved from this possibility. At the time, the writers con-
sidered both visual and photographic reconnaissance, air
defence, and airborne fire support during the final run
of landing craft to the beach.
To no one’s surprise, the part that had the greatest
impact on the art of landing operations was the ship-to-
shore movement. The manual recognised that the ship-to-
shore movement embraced the most critical phase of the
landing operation and that it was more than a simple fer-
rying operation. The text provided a technique for the
water-borne deployment of the landing force for battle in
accordance with the principles of fire and movement. For
securing the beachhead, the Manual defined the tech-
niques which would permit the landing force to survive
during the period between sole reliance on seaborne fire
support and the landing of its own artillery. It spelled out
in detail the procedures for establishing communications
promptly between echelons ashore and those afloat, and
it addressed itself realistically to the complex problems of
supply and services required by the landing force.
In the field of logistics, the 1935 Manual emphasized
the overriding importance of tailoring all loading to the
requirements of the landing force; the ships would be
loaded in a manner which would respond precisely to the
tactical needs of the landing forces as they assaulted the
hostile shore. The practice of stowing as much materiel
into a ship as it would hold had to.be replaced by a tech-
nique that gave careful consideration to the requirements
of the troops on the beach. Recognizing this requirement
and the related requirement for standardizing procedure
for embarkation of the landing force, the Marine Corps
developed and included in the Manual instructions on em-

106 »
barkation. These instructions included the preparation of
embarkation forms, loading plans, and set forth the tech-
nique of combat unit loading of assault ships.°”
The 1935 Manual had numerous illustrations, over
sixty, ranging from “schemes of manoeuvre” to “sample
debarkation data sheets.” There were eight photographs
of artillery, water-trailers, or tractors entering or leaving
a landing lighter and a further eight photographs or plates
of the method used, in various situations, of laying a smoke
screen.
The 1935 Manual withstood the tests of a first pub-
lication on the subject of landing operations. After several
name changes, it was published by the Navy as Fleet Train-
ing Publication 167, (1938), and was widely distributed
throughout the military Services.
Fleet Training Publication 167, (1938) was the guide
used by the Americans throughout World War II.
Throughout that period, it had only three changes in May
1941, August 1942 and August 1943. The first change
included information on materiel developments of the
1938-1941 period. The other two changes were infor-
mational rather than doctrinal revisions.
It should be noted that all Service manuals, such as
the FTP 167, could be used by all of the Services. The U.S.
Army went a step further in its interpretation of “use.”
General George Marshall in 1941, then Chief of Army
Staff, authorised the publication of “FTP 167” under Army
covers, as Army Field Manual 31-5, Landing Operations on
Hostile Shores. Nothing was changed except the covers—even
the original U.S. Marine Corps illustrations were kept.
There is nothing in the British or American files to
indicate that the United States Navy or Marine Corps had
copies of the British Manual of Combined Operations, 1938,
before 1941. Copies of the British Manual were, however,
in American hands sometime during 1941, but there was
no correspondence to indicate the exact date. It is reason-
able to assume, with the exchange of information—such

107
as code and signal books and many other things, made by
the Admiralty and U.S. Navy Department prior to Pearl
Harbor, that copies of the British Manual 1938 were among
the exchange material. There is correspondence to indi-
cate that the British had copies of FTP 167—Landing Op-
erations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938, just prior to October
1941, probably as a result of or part of the exchange ma-
terial noted above. In a memorandum from the Adviser
on Combined Operations to Joint Mission, addressed to
the Joint Staff Mission, dated 28 October 1941, Paymaster
Commander H. G. A. Woolley, RN, indicated that the
Americans have a general view “that the British give in-
sufficient attention to the Air side of Combined Opera-
tions.” He goes on to say that “their views (Americans) on
the subject of Air are printed in Chapter VI, of Fleet Train-
ing Publication 167, copies of which have been supplied
to the Admiralty.”*8
The theory contained in the Manual was specifically
tested in the annual fleet training exercises from 1936
through 1941, conducted at Culebra and Vieques off
Puerto Rico, the island of San Clemente near San Diego,
and in 1941 at New River, North Carolina. These exercises
refined landing force staff work, stimulated the need for
better radio equipment, underscored the need for im-
proved gunfire and air support doctrine, and gave prac-
tical experience to the forces involved. It was the best that
could be done in a non-combatant situation. Perhaps one
of the important results coming from the exercises was the
impetus given the problem of solving that elusive “suitable
landing boat.”

Development of Landing Craft in the 1930s

Along with developments in doctrine and technique,

there was a corresponding demand for specialised equip-
ment to make the landing operation effective. In 1933, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps established a Marine

108 ;
Corps Equipment Board, composed of eleven members,
who served on an additional duty basis. The primary as-
signed duty of the Board was to recommend the types of
equipment best suited to the needs of the Marine Corps,
since the Corps was a “user” rather than a “developer” of
equipment at this time. By 1937, the Board, gaining mo-
mentum and importance in pressing the Navy Department
to buy and develop landing boats, expanded to twenty
officers assigned on a full-time basis.
The bureau within the Navy Department responsible
for designing, producing, and paying for all ships and
boats was the Bureau of Construction and Repair—in 1940
renamed the Bureau of Ships. This bureau was of course
struggling to make maximum use of the little money the
Navy had in the 1930s. The development of landing boats,
understandably, was the least important item on its agenda.
Tenacity and persistence, however, on the part of the
Marine Corps plus a few sympathetic naval officers in Con-
struction and Repair were the primary reasons for the
success of the development oflanding craft prior to United
States entry into World War II.
The problems to be solved in procuring special land-
ing craft evolved about the development and design of
three categories of landing craft: (a) landing boats, used
to carry personnel from ship-to-shore; (bd) lighters, used to
carry tanks and trucks; and (c) amphibians, thought of in
the 1930s as fire support weapons only, that is, as am-
phibious tanks. By January 1937, the importance of ob-
taining suitable landing craft became apparent when the
Secretary of Navy established a “Department Continuing
Board for the Development of Landing Boats for Training
Operations.” The board membership included represen-
tatives of the CNO, CMC, Bureau of Construction and
Repair, and Bureau of Ordnance.
In category 1, Landing Boats, in an effort to explore
the suitability of existing commercial craft for landing op-
erations, the Navy, at the request of the Marine Corps,
agreed to test, in accordance with available funds, a variety
109
of small boats. In 1935, bids were advertised by the Bureau
of Construction and Repair with specific details as to
weight and length of the boats desired. The Bureau had
in mind the available deck space, handling facilities, and
davit strength of the ships of the 1935 Navy. Undoubtedly,
these specifications hampered some bidders as only nine
replies were received by the Navy. Out of these nine, five
boats were accepted by the Bureau and the Marine Corps
Equipment Board for testing at Cape May, New Jersey, in
the summer of 1936. The boats were not superior to con-
ventional boats, although they included some improved
features and would consequently be tested again in May
of 1938 at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Four of the five boats
tested were modified fishing boats used by Atlantic. Coast
fishermen for many years and named after the ports from
which they came, such as “Freeport” (Maine), “Red Bank”
(New Jersey). The fifth boat, a metal surf boat, was a sep-
arate commercial entry. In the May 1938 tests, none of the
boats was satisfactory. The following winter, during fleet
exercises at Culebra, three of the five boats were again
tested. The report of the tests was not encouraging:
The modified fishing craft still had serious drawbacks.
Owing to their exposed rudders and propellers they tended
to dig in when retracting. They were so high forward that
Marines debarking had to drop 10 feet from the bow to
the beach. They were, moreover, all unsuitable for lowering
and hoisting.*?

In the light of the drawbacks revealed by tests, the

Bureau of Construction and Repair undertook the con-
struction of a boat embodying all the best features of the
fishing craft. This was the beginning of a long and un-
successful effort by the Bureau to develop a satisfactory
landing craft. The “Bureau Boat” in various forms showed
up regularly at Fleet Landing Exercises from 1939 through
1941, but efforts to get the bugs out of its design were
abandoned in 1940. Along with the “Bureau Boats” that
were being tested until 1940, experiments were being car-
XN
110
ried out utilizing standard Navy ships’ boats. The standard
boats, designed for other purposes, also proved unsuitable
for beaching operations. They lacked speed and man-
ee and were extremely difficult to handle in the
surf.
In 1937, Andrew Higgins, a New Orleans boat builder,
reentered the picture. He had previously endeavoured to
interest the Navy and the Marine Corps in his boat he
called the “Eureka,” which he had constructed in 1926. He
had visited Quantico in 1934 to interest the Equipment
Board in the Eureka boat; but since the Navy had little or
no money left, nothing definite could be accomplished at
the time. In the 1935 bidding for test boats, Higgins had
declined to submit a bid to the Bureau. In October 1936
however, he offered the Navy his Eureka to test as a troop-
carrying landing craft. The Eureka, also known as the
“Higgins Boat” in America, was a boat of promising design.
At the time, it was only thirty feet long and had a special
shallow draught designed by Higgins for use by fur trap-
pers and oil drillers in the Louisiana bayous. The special
features of the boat were considerable power for its size,
and a shape of hull from amidship forward to facilitate
retraction from the beach. The wooden hull form was such
that the boat grounded over only a small area forward.
The slip-stream from the propeller in backing washed
away the sand from under the boat at the point of contact,
thus releasing it from the beach. None of these features
originated with Higgins but he had brought them together
in an excellent design for the purpose for which the boats
were built.*

*Starting with Bernard Fergusson’s Watery Maze and repeated in the British
official History of Combined Operations Organisation and other PRO material, Hig-
gins was supposed to have designed his early Eureka boat not for the use of fur
trappers and oil drillers but for “rum-runners to outstrip revenue cutters” during
the Prohibition Era in America. Higgins inherited his wealth from legitimate
sources (timber) and then made another fortune in boat building. While it ap-
pears unlikely that the Eureka was initially constructed for rum-running it cer-
tainly is a more interesting story than fur-trapping and oil drilling.

111
 Unfortunately Higgins’ timing in offering the Eureka
in late 1936 to the Navy was bad. The Bureau of Con-
struction and Repair simply did not have funds available
for tests or purchase of the craft. A year later, however,
Commander Ralph S. McDowell, USN, who was respon-
sible for landing craft development in the Bureau asked
Higgins to visit the Navy Department in Washington for
further discussions of his boat. The Navy was now inter-
ested in a boat such as the Eureka, but would like it thirty-
six-feet long instead of the thirty-foot model from the year
before. Higgins was soon given a proprietary contract to
deliver one thirty-six-foot boat, which he did within thirty
days, to Norfolk, Virginia. In the Spring of 1938, Mc-
Dowell and other members of the Continuing Board went
to Hampton Roads, Virginia to see the Eureka boat go
through routine tests. They were very impressed and re-
quested Higgins to build several more models (total of five)
to be tested against several Bureau Boats and the now
venerable fishing craft, during Fleet Exercise No. 5 at Cu-
lebra in 1939.*° There was a total of eighteen experimental
landing boats. The Marine landing force consisted of the
First Marine Brigade under Brigadier General F. P. Wil-
liams, and reported that the “Eureka boat [was] far su-
perior to all the other boats.”*! The Navy cautiously
reported that “for the first time a considerable number of
new and varied types of landing boats were available and
these were tested sufficiently to indicate the most practical
types:
By 1940, money for naval procurement was beginning
to be more plentiful. In September of that year, transports
and converted merchant ships replaced warships as troop
carriers in landing exercises. The new and converted ships
were equipped with davits capable of handling thirty-six-
foot boats, and as the Eureka of thirty-six-foot length “had
twice the capacity of the thirty-footer then in service and
could make the same speed without an increase in horse-
power, the Navy decided to adopt the larger (Eureka) as
standard.”*

112
 After many years, the Navy and particularly the Ma-
rine Corps had the landing craft that they wanted. The
only existing drawback of the 1940 Eureka was the diffi-
culty in unloading troops and supplies from the fairly high
sides of the craft. On a visit to Quantico in April 1941,
Major Ernest E. Linsert, Secretary to the Equipment
Board, showed Higgins a photograph of a Japanese land-
ing craft with a ramp in the bow.* Linsert and Brigadier
General Emile P. Moses, President of the Equipment
Board, asked Higgins to determine the possibility of in-
stalling a ramp in the bow of his thirty-six-foot Eureka.
Higgins was quite enthusiastic and agreed to make a pro-
totype, converting a standard Eureka into a rampbow at
his own expense. [See Appendix A, Plates 4 and 5.]
The next month, May 1941, Brigadier General Charles
D. Barrett (see Tentative Landing Operations Manual, above),
Director of Plans and Policies at Headquarters Marine
Corps, sent Linsert to New Orleans to see how Higgins
was coming along with the prototype Eureka. Linsert
tested the Eureka boat with a ramp on Lake Ponchartrain
(New Orleans). Tests were also made with a truck and with
36 Higgins employees running on and off to simulate em-

*The Japanese landing boat (Dai-Hatsu, 14M type) with ramp, shown to Higgins,
was part of a group of photographs that were enclosures to a report prepared
by First Lieutenant Victor H. Krulak (later Lieutenant General), Assistant R-2,
4th Marines, in 1937. Unknown to the Americans, the British Naval Intelligence
submitted a report to the Admiralty on the identical Japanese type landing boat,
a year later after it was observed by Lieutenant Commander Ryder, RN. LtGen
V. H. Krulak, USMC (Retired), noted “I knew Lieutenant Commander Ryder
in China. I did not know that he was studying the landing craft subject, and I
am sure that he did not know of my activities, either. It is interesting that we
reached many of the same conclusions.” Krulak to writer, 4 Apr 1974. Krulak’s
report of 1937 was from “Report on Japanese Assault Landing Operations,
Shanghai Area 1937,” MCS. British Naval Intelligence Rpt of Lt. Commander
Ryder was from “S.O.(I), Shanghai, Japanese Combined Naval and Military
Landing Operations. Report on Military Landing Craft Carrier and Special
Military Landing Craft Employed,” 12 Oct 1938, DEFE 2/782B. [See Appendix
A, Plates 6 and 7.]

1i3
barkation and unloading of troops. Linsert reported to
General Barrett that the Eureka boat with ramp “was quite
good and definitely acceptable.”
On the recommendation of the Navy Department
Continuing Board, a special board of Marine Corps and
Bureau of Ships officers was appointed to conduct official
acceptance tests. With General Moses as senior member,
the board carried out the tests during the first week in
June 1941 in New Orleans. The ramp bow Eureka craft,
designated initially as Landing Craft Personnel (Ramp),
(LCP(R)), was an outstanding success. The LCP(R) and the
earlier (1940) Landing Craft Personnel (Large) (LCP(L))
were the precursor of the Landing Craft Vehicle, Person-
nel (LCVP). After 1942, the Americans continued to use
the designation LCVP. The British, who ultimately pur-
chased over one thousand of these boats, continued using
the designations LCP(L) and LCP(R).
The second category of landing craft to be developed
was the “Lighter.” The design of a successful tank lighter
proved as difficult a process as did the personnel landing
craft. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a fifty-foot
lighter for landing artillery was tested in 1926 at Hampton
Roads, Virginia. While it would be used during the inter-
vening years, the lighter was not satisfactory to the Navy
or Marines because it was not self-propelled and had to be
towed by another boat. The advantage of the fifty-foot
lighter, however, was the fact that it had two parallel
hinged ramps in the stern and it could be beached suc-
cessfully stern-to.
In 1935, at Quantico, a plan evolved to use a standard
fifty-foot motor launch for landing light vehicles and ar-
tillery with the help of a ready-made rig, called Boat Rig
A. The vehicle or artillery would be driven off the motor
launch with the help of moveable wooden ramps. In the
1935 Fleet exercises at Culebra, the motor launch and rig
were tested. It proved so top-heavy that it nearly capsized
ina Pe swell. The experience was accordingly writ-
ten Of .

114
 The importance of the size of lighters varied with the
size and weight of the material to be moved—ranging from
general stores to tanks. Tanks were the Army and Marine
Corps’ main interest. In three separate years—1935, 1939
and 1941—the modification of existing lighters had to be
considered with the adoption of different size tanks. In
1935, it was estimated that the Marmon-Herrington Tank,
a 9,500-pound model, could be carried by a thirty-eight-
foot lighter. Consequently, a thirty-eight-foot lighter was
built at the request of the CMC and delivered for testing
in the Fleet Exercises No. 5 in the winter of 1938-1939.
The Navy also built a forty-foot lighter, self-propelled, as
was the thirty-eight-foot lighter. Both lighters were tested
in the Fleet exercises and both were equally successful as
to the size and weight each carried. By 1939, the Marine
Corps had concluded that the 9,500 pound Marmon
—Herrington tank was too light for its tactical and organ-
isational requirements and began testing the Army’s fif-
teen-ton tank. The Navy accordingly produced a forty-
five-foot Bureau lighter capable of carrying one Army or
two Marmon—Herrington tanks.
Major John Kaluf, Secretary to the Equipment Board
in 1939, recalled that when the Board requested the pro-
curement of a fifteen-ton Army tank for evaluation, Brig-
adier General Holland M. Smith, who was then Director
of Operations and Training at Headquarters Marine
Corps, told him to stop asking for such heavy items as a
fifteen-ton tank and to confine himself to the five-ton limit.
Smith said that in the event lighters were not available, the
Navy would have to lift the artillery or tank. He said, “the
General Board had told him in no uncertain terms that
the Navy was never going to lift more than five tons, that
being the ships’ boom capacity at the time.”
While the Navy’s new forty-five-foot lighter proved
adequate during the testing in Fleet Exercise No. 6 in the
winter of 1940, subsequent doubt about its use arose the
next year, when in the last of the Fleet Exercises before
Pearl Harbor, Fleet Exercise No. 7 off Culebra, one of the

DED
Bureau lighters sank after an Army tank had shifted to
one side in a moderate sea. .
In May 1941 the Navy Continuing Board turned again
to Higgins of New Orleans. Higgins had on hand a forty-
five-foot steel lighter that had been built for the Colombian
government for customs duty and was awaiting delivery
to them. The lighter did not have a ramp, and so Higgins
was asked by Colonel Kaluf from the Equipment Board
at Quantico and Lieutenant Commander R. B. Daggett
from the Bureau of Construction and Repair to modify
the lighter and add a ramp. Ina week’s time, Higgins made
the converted tank lighter available to the Navy for ex-
amination. The converted lighter was tested during the
summer of 1941 at New River, North Carolina during the
Marine Corps manoeuvres. Again the Higgins boat proved
quite satisfactory.*° The CMC called Higgins “the wonder
man.
By the Autumn of 1941, however, the tank lighter
program had again changed direction with the introduc-
tion of the Army’s newly developed thirty-ton medium
Sherman tank. The forty-five foot lighters could not do
the job for this new tank. The Secretary of the Navy di-
rected the Bureau of Ships (formerly Construction and
Repair) to remedy this deficiency. By December 1941, ex-
isting tank lighter contracts were changed to provide fifty-
foot lighters in lieu of the forty-five-foot models. Both the
Bureau and Higgins submitted designs of 50-foot craft.
Yet before any deliveries could be made of the Bureau and
Higgins’ prototypes, the President, at a White House Con-
ference on 4 April 1942, simply ordered the procurement
of six hundred fifty-foot tank lighters by 1 September
1942, for the North African operation. The Bureau and
Higgins both started work on their models with tests sched-
uled for May 1942. The tests of the Bureau lighter and
the Higgins lighter were held near Norfolk, Virginia in
May 1942 with thirty tons of cement blocks in each
lighter.*”7 The Army sent observers to the test, inasmuch

116
as the initial projected use of the winning lighter would be
an Army operation. Krulak reported that the Higgins en-
try proved vastly superior, as everybody who knew the two
boats had predicted. In fact, the Navy lighters failed to
complete the tests. As a result, the Bureau of Ships notified
all yards making their model to shift to the Higgins design.
The Higgins fifty-foot lighter was designated by the Navy
as Landing Craft Medium (LCM), later changed to Land-
ing Craft Mechanised. The fifty-foot Higgins lighter be-
came the standard tank lighter for the Navy. The newly
designated LCM could carry sixty thousand pounds of tank
or vehicle or sixty combat troops, could travel nine knots
powered by two 225-hp diesel engines and would become
the largest landing craft carried by amphibious transports
and cargo ships.
In the third category of landing craft (the amphibi-
ans), the United States’ first modern experience with am-
phibians was the Christie tank previously mentioned. After
tests had found the Christie tank unseaworthy off Culebra
in 1924, it was subsequently rejected as a military vehicle.
Great Britain, already credited with the development
of the battlefield tank, also developed the first amphibious
combat vehicle, the Medium D Tank. The intention ap-
pears to have been to design a tank with the equipment
sufficient to get it across a body of water, yet at the same
time retain, as far as possible, the performance of the land
tank. The thirty-foot, fifteen-ton Medium D Tank was
completed after the 1918 armistice. Other tanks were de-
veloped during the 1930s; the most promising, the Car-
den—Lloyd Light Amphibian Tank, was the first screw-
propelled tank, weighed only 3.4 tons and was 13 feet long.
Although the British Army did not adopt this tank, per-
formance of this vehicle both on land and in water was
considered good. The characteristic of British design was
to experiment with land tank development and to evince
no interest in true amphibious vehicles, with flotation de-
vices for preferred land tanks.**

LA,
 The United States, particularly the Marine Corps in
the early 1930s, concluded that tanks, if landed close to
the early assault waves, would prove valuable in the assault
and even justify less naval artillery strength. The Tentative
Manual of 1935, pointed out that the “difficulties of trans-
port and movement from ship-to-shore indicate that only
light tanks can be used in the landing operation. These
may be land tanks or amphibious.” The Marine Corps
would not get the equivalent to an amphibious tank until
1943. The beginning of the 1943 answer came in the form
of anon-military vehicle designed for the rescue of aviators
and hurricane victims in the Florida swamps. The financier
John A. Roebling was shocked at the devastation of a Flor-
ida hurricane in September 1932. He suggested to his son
Donald Roebling “that some sort of amphibian vehicle
might have saved many lives by transporting victims
through swamps, over flooded roads, across debris-filled
bayous. What is needed is a vehicle that would bridge the
gap between where a boat is grounded and a car is flooded
out.”*° Roebling senior stated he would finance such a ve-
hicle if the son would design and develop it. The twenty-
eight-year old son took up the challenge and developed
what was to be called the “Alligator.”
In designing such a vehicle, Donald Roebling felt that
two things were absolutely essential, buoyancy and a single
means of propulsion for both land and water. For buoy-
ancy, the vehicle had to be constructed as light as possible,
as weight would be a prime concern. In the early 1930s
aluminium was a comparatively new product, and Roe-
bling believed that this material would be the answer to
the weight problem. In combination with the weight con-
sideration was the problem of locomotion on both land
and water. Roebling believed that the paddle-tread track
principle, similar to early paddle-wheel steamships, could
be made to work. It did work, and this paddle-tread prin-
ciple Roebling patented in 1938. He turned over his patent

118
to the government for universal use and without fee during
World War II.
Roebling, along with members of his technical staff,
took two years to build the first Alligator, which weighed
14,350 pounds, was 24 feet long and 9 feet, 10 inches wide
and was powered by a 92-hp Chrysler industrial engine.
Roebling tested the first model which achieved 25 mph on
land but slowed to a speed of only 2.3 mph in water. Such
a performance indicated that the conventional straight
tractor cleats set straight across the tracks were extremely
inefficient for water propulsion. The first model was re-
built and completed in April 1936. The cleats of the tracks
were changed to a diagonal setting across the chains to
push the water out from the sides, weight was reduced by
2,240 pounds, and a new 85-hp, Ford V8 engine was in-
stalled. After testing, the vehicle’s land speed was reduced
to 18 mph but more importantly, water speed was more
than doubled to 5.45 mph.”°
By September 1936, a modification reduced the
weight by 310 more pounds and land and water speed
slightly increased. In 1937, the original model was rebuilt,
shorter by four feet, increasing manoeuverability and de-
creasing hull and chain weight, and a new track installed.
The new track was the highlight of the 1937 model. All
tractors had used bogie and idler wheels, necessary ap-
purtences which normally supported the track and kept
it moving properly. Roebling had not particularly liked
this arrangement. He designed a chain with built-in roller
bearings, with a smooth steel channel around the track
contour for the rollers to ride on while supporting the
weight of the vehicle. He replaced idler wheels with idler
blocks and replaced straight cleats with curved cleats. ‘The
water speed of this model was 8.6 mph while the land
speed remained at 18 to 20 mph. The vehicle was reduced
by 3,100 pounds and now weighed 8,700 pounds.
It was this 1937 model that appeared with photo-

19
graphs and short story in the 4 October 1937 edition of
Life, a popular weekly American photo magazine. Rear
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, Commander, Battleships,
Battle Force, U.S. Fleet, showed Major-General Louis
McCarty Little, then commanding the FMF, the Life mag-
azine article with photographs of the strange vehicle. Little
was quick to grasp its potentialities and sent the article to
the CMC, who in turn, passed it along to the Equipment
Board at Quantico.®! The Board, headed by Brigadier
General Frederic L. Bradman, dispatched Major John
Kaluf, Secretary to the Board to Clearwater, Florida, to
see the vehicle perform and to consult with Roebling. Kaluf
recalls that Roebling “had a vehicle fully operational at the
time and put it through every kind of test that I could
dream up. I took about 400 feet of 16-mm movie film
which I brought back with me. The Board liked what it
saw and gave it a very favourable boost.”
In May 1938 the Commandant stated that “steps be
taken to procure a pilot model of this type of amphibious
boat for further tests under service conditions and during
Fleet Exercise No. 5.” Both the Continuing Board of the
Navy and the Bureau of Construction and Repair noted
the Commandant’s recommendation unfavourably on the
grounds of economy. Funds were so limited at this time
that the few dollars available had to be spent on the de-
velopment of landing boats.**
Roebling, in the meantime, had been modifying and
testing the 1937 model but in May 1940, he decided, at a
cost of $18,000, to build a new model from the ground up.
It weighed in at 7,780 pounds—6,570 pounds lighter than
the first vehicle (1935), made 25 mph by land and 8.4 by
sea, measured twenty feet by eight feet and stood nineteen
inches off the ground—a decided advantage in negotiating
stumpy terrain.
With more money in sight during 1940, the Bureau
of Ships contracted with Roebling to build a test vehicle
of the same general design that he completed in May 1940.

120
Bureau of Ships requested that the test vehicle be powered
with a 120-hp Lincoln Zephyr engine. Roebling completed
the new model Alligator for the Navy in six months by
October 1940. The model could travel 29 mph on land
and 9.72 mph in water. After initial tests were completed
in Clearwater, Florida, the model was delivered to Quan-
tico the first week in November.
Under the watchful eye of the CMC and a large party
of high ranking officers of the Army and Navy, the Oc-
tober model travelled at the same good speed as during
the Clearwater test. The Quantico demonstration was con-
sidered successful, although it demonstrated some weak-
nesses, such as the model becoming bogged down in a
creek. Further trials were scheduled.
During the last of the Fleet Exercises, Number 7, in
January and February 1941, Captain Victor H. Krulak, of
the Ist Marine Brigade Staff, with two enlisted member
of his test crew, put the (October 1940) model Alligator
through various tests at Culebra. Krulak recalls that he
went on board the USS Wyoming to request Major General
Holland M. Smith to ask Admiral Ernest J. King, then
Commander, Atlantic Fleet, who was visiting Culebra, if
he would not like to test-ride the Alligator. King agreed.
During a brief test, the vehicle broke down—much to the
chagrin of Krulak. Krulak recalls:

The track of the vehicle broke and we were in water about

4 feet deep....and 50 yards from the beach. The Ad-
miral, who was in a great hurry to return to his ship, simply
climbed over the side of the boat, and with his aide, waded
ashore and was picked up in a vehicle. My impression was
that the Admiral would never forget the “Alligator.”**

Aside from the incident with Admiral King, the Al-

ligator measured up in every respect with two exceptions.
Its aluminum construction was not considered rugged
enough for hard military use, and the track would not

tz)
endure the abrasive effect of sand and salt water. The
tractor was so impressive in every other aspect, however,
that the Navy negotiated a contract with Roebling to rede-
sign the vehicle to include military characteristics with all
steel construction in place of aluminum. Four months ear-
lier, the Marine Corps Equipment Board had recom-
mended to the Bureau of Ships, before the Fleet Exercise
tests, that “future amphibian tractors be of welded steel
construction.”°°
Roebling called on the Food Machinery Corporation
(FMC) for help in redesigning the Alligator which was now
designated by the Navy as “Landing Vehicle Tracked”
model number | (LVT-1). The Corporation had industrial
plants in nearby Dunedin and Lakeland, Florida, close to
Roebling’s workshop on his estate in Clearwater.
The Chief Engineer at Food Machinery Corporation,
James H. Hait, organised an engineering group to begin
redesigning the model. Using all steel construction and
changing from riveting to welding, considered by Hait to
be essential to the main design, two prototypes were built
within a few months.°*°
The Navy awarded Food Machinery Corporation a
contract to further develop the vehicle, along with an order
for 200 LVTs.
As a footnote to the building of the first LVT(1)s it
was asked of Roebling why all the earlier model Alligators,
including the October 1940 model, were built under 10
feet wide, usually 9 feet, 10 inches. Roebling gave, while
not a scientific answer, a humorous reply when he said
that the models were built in his own workshop on his
estate. The models produced were usually 9 feet, 10 inches
wide simply because his shop doors and gate posts on the
grounds were only 10 feet wide.
The LVT(1) had all of the potential in the world for
becoming the “landing boat and amphibious tank” of the
future. Beginning with the first American offensive op-
eration of the war at Guadalcanal in the British Solomon

122
Islands in August 1942, the LVT(1) and (2) did a herculean
task of carrying cargo, ammunition and other necessities
to the beaches and inland.
It was in November 1943, at Tarawa in the Gilbert
Islands, that 125 LVT(2) models were used tactically for
the first time in carrying three assault waves across the
coral reef.
By the end of World War II, over 15,000 LVT’s were
built with Food Machinery Corporation having manufac-
tured 11,000 of the total.
There appears to be no record of the British having
purchased or having assigned through Lend-Lease models
of the LVT. They were, however, used by the British in
two assault missions at Walcheren in November 1944, and
again in the crossing of Lake Commacchio in Northern
Italy in the final breakthrough early in 1945.
The history of the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, during
World War II was one of development and modification
both in design and tractical employment of a vehicle which
was new to the military forces. At the beginning of the war
any precedent for its use was nonexistent, but before hos-
tilities ceased, the LVT, because of its versatility in im-
promptu roles, was regarded as a major tactical weapon
of the war.
In summary, the Marine Corps participation in Fleet
Exercises during the 1920s and 1930s was the only practical
training in landing operations available. Training with the
Fleet reinforced what the Marine Corps had already
known: that Navy boats from either the warships or con-
verted transports were not suitable for landings, and that
as soon as money became available, development should
begin toward a special all-purpose landing boat and lighter.
It was only through persistent prodding by the Marines
that the Navy became convinced of the value of the Higgins
boat and the Roebling LVT.
Landing exercises with the Fleet provided excellent
staff experience for Marine Corps Officers and gave them

125
an opportunity to sort out the many problems that arose
when theory is put into practice.
While the FMF organisation became a significant ac-
complishment, the fact remained that there was nota writ-
ten doctrine to guide the organisation into accomplishing
its amphibious responsibilities. The Marine Corps Schools
filled this void by producing a truly pioneering publication,
the Tentative Landing Operations Manual. The Manual be-
came the first doctrinal treatise on amphibious operations
in 1935 and had not changed fundamentally before the
end of the War.

. C.O. Expeditionary Det Rept to CMC, 20 July 1922, USMC, RG 127, NA.
. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
. Ibid., p. 10.
. CMC to SECNAV, encl. F, 8 Sept 1931, USMC, RG 432, NHD.
. BG Eli K. Cole to CMG, 15 Feb 1924, USMC, RG 127.
. Col
OoP
One Dion Williams to CMC, 24 Mar 1924, USMC, RG 127 (Box 24). 7. CMC
to CNO, 18 Dec 1923, USMC, RG 127 (Box 23).
8. BGE. K. Cole to CMC, 4 Feb 1924, USMC, RG 127.
9. CMC to BGE. K. Cole, 14 Dec 1923, HQMC, HRB.
0. BGS. D. Butler to W. Christie and VAdm McCully, 11 Dec 1923, USMC,
RG 127.
11. Annual Rpt of CMC to SECNAV (Washington, 1924), p. 668.
12. Col R. M. Dunlap to CMC, 6 June 1925, USMC, RG 127.
13. C-in-C US Fleet to Gen Bd, 1924, USN, RG 432, NHD.
14. Col R. M. Cutts to CMC, 17 July 1926, USMC, RG 127 (Box 23).
15. Ist Lt C. Connette to C.O. Fifth Regt, 20 July 1926, USMC RG 127.
16. Cutts to CMC.
17. Capt K. E. Rockey (later Lt-Gen) was one of four observers sent by the CMC
to report on the tests of the artillery lighter, 3 July 1926, HQMC, HRB.
18. Harrington had previously published two articles entitled, “The Strategy
and Tactics of Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Dec 1921),
and Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar 1922).
19. Col Ben H. Fuller to Maj S. M. Harrington, 16 Oct 1922, USMC, RG 127.
20. HQMC Bulletin, 10 Mar 1926, HQMC, HRB.
21. MCS Curriculum for the 1920s, MCS. ‘
22. Ibid., p. c-2.
23. [U.S.] Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and Navy (Washington, 1927) i
12, para. VI, 8(b).
24. CNO to SECNAV, 25 June 1931, K/A3-1 (310624), USN, RG 127, NHD.
25. Col C. F. B. Price to CMCS, 17 Apr 1931, MGS.
26. MCS Memo, 3 June 1931, MCS.
27. Curriculum Bd Rpt, n.d., MCS.

124
. MCS Instruction Memo No. 10, 1933, MCS.
. Cutts to Miller, 23 Sept 1932, USMC, RG 127.
. Research Sec, MCS, 30 Sept 1932, MCS.
. LCdr E. W. Broadbent USN, “The Fleet and the Marines,” USNIP, Vol 57,
No. 3 (Mar 1931).
. Maj-Gen John H. Russell, “The Birth of the Fleet Marine Force,” USNIP,
Vol. 72, No. 1 (Jan 1946).
| GOD Nes 247" 7 Dee 1933, USN.
. LtCol Kenneth J. Clifford, Developmental History of the U.S. Marine Corps,
1900-1970 (Washington, 1973), pp. 46-47; 139-140.
. Campbell, later Colonel, was one of the few Marine officers to serve in
Europe during World War II. He was one of the air advisers to Lord
Mountbatten, then CCO on the air plan for the Dieppe raid.
. CMC ltr with enclosed Manual, 9 July 1935, MCS (AO-89/2275-1-10).
. Clifford, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
. ACO to JSM, 28 Oct 1941, DEFE 2/847.
. CG, Ist Mar Bde to CMC, 12 Mar 1938, HOMC, HRS.
. Capt R. S. McDowell USN, interview by Hist Br, HQMC, 19 June 1957,
USMC, RG 127.
. CG, Ist Mar Bde to CMC, | Apr 1939, HOMC, HRS.
. LtCol B. W. Gally, “A History of U.S. Fleet Landing Exercises,” Sept 1939,
MGS.
. CNO to Chief, BuShips, 23 Sept 1940 (2455-130-60), HQMC, HRS.
. LtCol E. E. Linsert to HQMC, June 1957, and Linsert to Writer, June 1970,
HQMC, HRS.
. Col John Kaluf to Writer, 19 Jan 1971.
. Maj-Gen T. Holcomb, CMC to Adm Start, CNO, 6 June 1941, HQMC, HRS.
. Lt-Gen V. H. Krulak to Writer, 3 Aug 1970.
. Borg—Warner Corp., Research, Investigation and Experimentation in the Field of
Amphibian Vehiclesfor U.S. Marine Corps (Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1957).
. Donald Roebling to Robert L. Longstreet, 27 Mar 1947, The Clearwater News,
Clearwater, Florida.
. Ihid., p. 5.
. LtCol E. E. Linsert to Hist Br, 3 June 1957, HQMC, HRS.
. LtCol John Kalufto Writer, 19 Jan 1971.
. CMC to Senior Member, Navy Dept Continuing Bd for Development of
Landing Boats, 18 May 1938, USMC, RG 127.
. Lt-Gen V. H. Krulak to CMC, 15 June 1970, HQMC, HRS.
. USMC Equip Bd to BuShips, 29 Aug 1940, USMC, RG 127.
James M. Hait, Chairman of the Board, FMC, interview with Writer, 24
June 1969, Riverside, California.

125
 4

Organisation and Training for

Combined Operations
1940-1944

Raids and Forces

In June 1940, Lieutenant General A. G. B. Bourne, up to

then Adjutant-General Royal Marines, was appointed
Commander Raiding Operations and Adviser to Chiefs of
Staff on Combined Operations. There was no counterpart
of this appointment in America. The definition of the ob-
ject of raiding operations was provided by the Prime Min-
ister: the enemy was to be harassed and his forces
dispersed. Obviously, there was a morale factor to be reck-
oned with during this time, and raiding the enemy could
provide an uplifting psychological attitude for the military
Services.
Bourne gathered together a fine staff, mostly from
the existing ISTDC, and had Captain Garnons-Williams
from the Admiralty and Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke
from the War Office to head up the raiding section.
Bourne’s immediate resources consisted of six independ-
ent companies totalling 750 men. They were all Army per-
sonnel that had been slated for operations in Norway but
never used there. After discussion with Service Depart-

126 :
ments and the Chiefs of Staff, Bourne was authorised to
raise “further independent companies.” He was given op-
erational control over personnel being trained by the War
Office and Air Ministry in irregular operations (intelli-
gence and sabotage) and parachutist volunteers.
In Bourne’s short tenure as Commander of Raiding
Operations, two abortive raids, planned by the War Office
and already in the mill, were carried out in the Pas-de-
Calais area and Guernsey. The raids of about 120 men
each were made with two destroyers debarking the men
in RAF high speed launchers operated by civilian crews.
The minor raids pointed up the unsuitability of RAF
launches and poorly trained civilian crewmen. For a time,
there were no more raids carried out pending the estab-
lishment of training bases and the training of naval landing
craft crews.
Within a month after his initial appointment, Bourne
was advised by the Prime Minister that he would be suc-
ceeded by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, “owing
to the large scope now to be given (combined) operations
and that it was essential to have an Officer of higher rank
in charge.”!
Keyes was given a new title of “Director of Combined
Operations,” but not a new directive. As it will be shown
later, it was assumed that he was to carry on with the duties
and resources given to Bourne.
The Admiral looked upon his new assignment as a
truly joint inter-services establishment and physically moved
his staff from under the wings of the Admiralty. The Naval
Operations Section of the Directorate of Combined Op-
erations (DCO), however, remained in the Admiralty and
became an Assistant Directorate of the Operations Divi-
sion.
Within the first several months volunteer personnel
from the Home Forces became available and later recruit-
ment from Young Soldiers Battalions swelled the ranks of
the new combined operations organisation. The existing

127
independent companies were disbanded in name as they
became part of the newly formed Special Service Brigade
of the DCO.2 The Special Service Brigade of five Special
Service Battalions consisted of a headquarters and two
Commandos with a total strength of over one thousand
men. This was soon found to be too cumbersome for ef-
ficient control and, in 1941, these units were again re-
organised into Commandos of about 450 men, subdivided
into a headquarters and five troops, with all the Comman-
dos coming under the Special Service Brigade.
The term “Commando” appeared on the organisa-
tional charts of the DCO in November 1940, and was taken
from the highly mobile Boer forces that harassed the Brit-
ish during the South African War. The term appears to
have been suggested by Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Clarke,
at the time on the staff of CIGS, who was born in the
Transvaal and brought up on the story of the Boer Com-
mandos.
Keyes is rightly associated with the development and
encouragement of bringing Commando units into being.
Initially, Army personnel made up the bulk of the Com-
mando units until the formation of the first two Royal
Marine Commandos in 1942.

Training Bases

With the influx of volunteers and recruitment of new

personnel, Keyes set to work, in conjunction with the Ad-
miralty, to obtain ships, landing craft and bases. The ships
and landing craft on hand were all converted types—train
ferries to landing craft motor carriers (LCM), Dutch and
Belgian ships to Landing Ship Infantry (Medium and
Small).
For the training of naval landing craft crews, estab-
lishments were set up at Warsash in Southamptom (HMS
Tormentor) and in the Hayling Island (HMS N orthney) dur-

128 ;
ing July and August 1940. Additional bases were subse-
quently located at Dartmouth and Brightlingsea. Advanced
training for the landing craft crews was established in Scot-
land at Archaracle (HMS Dorlin) and at Inveraray. With
the exception of Inveraray, these bases, in addition to their
training role, were organised as raiding bases with Special
Service troops located near them.
By August 1940, the largest and first Combined Train-
ing Centre (CTC) in Britain was established at the end of
Lock Fyne at Inveraray. It was essential that landing craft
flotillas could come together and train, in relative safety,
with large numbers oftroops. Inveraray became the centre
for large scale amphibious training for the Army. Within
six months, it was possible for the CTC to stage the first
large scale exercise involving a Guards Brigade Group.®
On | September 1940, Vice-Admiral T. J. Hallett as-
sumed command of the CTC as Vice-Admiral Combined
Training Centre (VACTC) and 15 October the naval wing
was commissioned as HMS Quebec. Within a few months,
the Admiralty and War Office agreed that the Army rep-
resentative at CTC, which ultimately became a Major-
General billet, would be “second in command, CTC.”
At about the ttme CTC Inveraray was being estab-
lished, Field Marshal (then General) Wavell asked for staff
to set up a combined operations training centre in the
Middle East. As a result, Colonel MacLeod, who was Com-
mandant of the ISTDC, was sent out in November and by
January 1941, the CTC opened at Kabrit, Egypt. Training
of the 6th Division for an attack on Rhodes (Operation
Cordite) began. However, in April 1941, the operation was
cancelled at the last moment because the Division was sent
piecemeal into the Western Desert to help in repelling
Rommel’s first attack.
The CTC Kabrit functioned for the next three years
training British and Allied troops for operations in the
Mediterranean area, particularly North Africa and Sicily.
Satellite dryshod training teams from Kabrit operated in

129
Syria, Iraq and Palestine. By mid-1943, in addition to Ka-
brit, a total of eleven overseas establishments concerned
with combined operations training, including large CTCs
in India, Australia and Canada, were in operation.
At home in Britain, the tempo of training for com-
bined operations slowed during the remaining months of
1940. In September, all the Commandos and Independent
Companies then available were placed under the command
of Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, when they assumed
an anti-invasion role. This prevented any further raids
being carried out and these forces were not released to the
DCO until the end of the year when the direct threat of
invasion had passed.

Command and Control

The year 1941 was a most important year for com-

bined operations organisation. Great numbers of person-
nel joined the combined operations organisation, and large
numbers of ships and landing craft ordered from America
began to arrive. In addition, the COS had agreed to the
construction of two hundred Landing Craft Tank? (LCT
[3]).* With that hopeful news, it became clear that a very
rapid expansion in the number of crews required to man
the landing craft had to be undertaken. New training
centres were to be established and the expansion of the
existing organisation to control both personnel and land-
ing craft were also to be accelerated. In addition, the prob-
lem of command and control of raids, which was clear in
Keyes mind, differed substantially from those of the COS.
The resolution of this problem resulted in Keyes being
replaced by the then Commodore Louis Mountbatten and
an entirely new course being set for the direction of com-
bined operations for the remainder of the war.
The problem of command and control of raids per-
haps began when the VCIGS in October 1940 drew the

130 y
attention of the COS to the fact that no new directive had
been prepared for Keyes on his appointment.’ It seems
likely that the lack of a new directive was partly responsible
for the divergence of views between the COS and the DCO.
Keyes considered that he should be responsible for the
planning and organisation of all combined operations and
that he should be regarded as the Prime Minister’s deputy
with the COS when combined operations were discussed.
The COS, however, considered that the DCO should be
responsible for the planning and mounting of raids of up
to five thousand men, but that for a larger operation, he
should advise the COS and that the planning should be
the responsibility of the Joint Planning Staff (JPS), advised
as necessary by the staff of the DCO.® Although the VCIGS
proposed a new directive in October 1940, no new directive
was, in fact, issued until the middle of March 1941.
The COS issued the DCO a new directive in March
1941, spelling out his responsibilities “under the general
direction of the Minister of Defence and the COS.”’ The
DCO was generally responsible for the command and
training of Special Service Troops specifically in landing
operations. He would be responsible for planning and ex-
ecution of raiding operations which involved not more
than five thousand men. It was pointed out that the DCO’s
staff and the JPS would work in conjunction, with the JPS
preparing the General Plan, and the DCO staff preparing
that part relative to the opposed landing. In addition, the
Commander designate would consult the DCO when work-
ing out their plans. The DCO was given command and
operational control of transport carriers and landing craft
for raiding purposes, “which will include such transports
as are from time to time allotted by the Admiralty for this
purpose.” The administration of the Special Service troops
would be the responsibility of the War Office. Finally, the
DCO was directed to continue to command and direct the
ISTDC.
Admiral Keyes had no direct comment on the new

131
directive issued in March 1941. He went ahead on a pro-
posal that he made to the COS in December 1940, when
it was approved by them to assemble a striking force to be
immediately available for combined operations in any the-
atre. One of the main reasons for the assembly of this force
was to execute a landing in the Canary Islands should
Germany invade Spain. This force included two Royal
Marine Brigades, the Special Service Brigade and sup-
porting tanks, artillery, engineers, and services. All avail-
able ships, landing craft and raiding craft were earmarked
for the use of the striking force. In order to meet the
training needs of this force, as well as future needs, the
CTC Inveraray was expanded in the summer of 1941 and
the CTC Castle Toward was opened nearby.
After some delay, the striking force was assembled
and earmarked for the Canary Islands (Operation Pilgrim).
General Alexander and Admiral Hamilton were selected
as Force Commanders for this operation and in accordance
with the new DCO directive, the force commanders pre-
pared, trained and commanded the operation.
In August, a full-scale rehearsal was carried out at
Scapa Flow (Operation Leapfrog), where the first of the
converted Maracaibo LSTs were used. As a result of this
exercise the Force Commanders submitted a lengthy re-
port to the COS in which their main recommendation ap-
pears to have been that Force Commanders should not
have to deal with the DCO even to the point of seeking
advice, but should concern themselves directly with Service
Ministers.* The report contained other complaints, and it
appears to have been a rehash of a report circulated
throughout the Admiralty six months before. The early
report recommended the abolition of the Directorate of
Combined Operations and suggested that combined op-
erations training be the concern of the Admiralty and War
Office. In addition, all development of ships and craft were
to come under the control of the Admiralty with the Com-
mandant ISTDC acting as the link between the Admiralty

132 s
and development.’ At the time, the proposals came to
naught.
The report by the Leapfrog Commanders was not
shown to Keyes and the COS, perhaps unwilling to be
drawn into a lengthy argument with him, simply took note
of the report.
When Keyes obtained a copy of the Leapfrog report
a couple of weeks later, he criticised it as well as the whole
operation. He immediately submitted two recommenda-
tions to the COS stating (a) that a Standing Committee be
set up under the Chairmanship of the DCO to consider
combined operations policy, training and other major
problems exclusive of planning, and (b) that DCO be re-
sponsible for planning of all combined operations regard-
less of their size.!°
In Septmeber 1941, the COS examined Keyes pro-
posals for a standing committee to be formed and agreed
to set up such a committee to consider combined opera-
tions problems other than planning. At the same time, they
agreed that the functions and responsibilities of DCO be
re-examined now that the offensive stage of war was ap-
proaching."!
Within a few weeks, the COS submitted to the Prime
Minister two proposals concerning the DCO. They sug-
gested that (a) DCO be responsible for the planning and
execution of raids not larger than five thousand men (a
reiteration of the DCO’s March directive) and that larger
operations be the responsibility of the Joint Planning Staff
and Force Commanders when appointed; and (b) in view
of his new responsibilities, the title “DCO” should be re-
styled “Adviser-on-Combined Operations.”
Keyes replied to the COS proposals directly to the
Prime Minister by stating that a new “inter-service organ-
isation for dealing with combined operations which I have
been asked to agree to by the COS cuts me out of the
planning of combined operations altogether. I have re-
plied that I do not accept this.”!

133
 Churchill, after asking Keyes to reconsider the new
arrangement and again being refused, relieved Keyes on
19 October and appointed Lord Louis Mountbatten, who
was given the rank of Commodore and the title of Adviser-
on-Combined Operations.

Mountbatten Tenure in Combined Operations

The young Royal Navy Captain of the armoured car-

rier H.M.S. Illustrious which was undergoing repairs at
Norfolk Virginia was visiting the Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor in early October 1941 when he received a telegram
from the Prime Minister which read: “Give up command
of your ship and return at once, to take up a job of the
highest interest.”!* When he arrived back in Britain two
weeks later, the Prime Minister asked him why he had
taken so long to answer his summons. Mountbatten, who
had known the Prime Minister since he was twelve years
old, said rather facetiously, “Well, Sir, I was very near the
180 meridian when you sent for me and I wasn’t sure
which way round the world you wanted me to come back.”
The Prime Minister then told him he was to relieve Ad-
miral Keyes and take charge of combined operations.
Churchill asked his views on the appointment. Mountbat-
ten quickly replied that he “would sooner be back at sea
with my friends fighting, instead of sitting on my backside
in Whitehall.”
Mountbatten later reported that the Prime Minister
“rounded on me” and said, “have you no sense of glory?
I offer you a chance to take part in the direction of the
war at the highest level and all you do is want to go back
to sea. What could you possibly hope to achieve, except to
be sunk in a bigger and more expensive ship!”* The Prime

*The Admiral pointed out to the Writer that less than five months before, he
lost his ship, a destroyer, H.M.S. Kelly off Crete.

134 .
Minister stated that he (Mountbatten) must train the Army,
Navy and Air Force to work as a single unit and that while
Great Britain was at the time preparing against the German
invasion, his organisation must think only offensively. He
told him he must continually raid the enemy and learn the
art of effecting a lodgment on the continent. Mountbatten
left the Prime Minister wholly enthused for his new ap-
pointment and set about to work.
While the Prime Minister gave the new Adviser on
Combined Operations (ACO) his personal views and di-
rection on what he was to do, the official directive from
the COS stressed that he was “an adviser on all aspects of,
and at all stages in, the planning and training for combined
operations.”!4
The directive to the new Commodore ACO appeared
as if it were written with many of the old points of disa-
greement with Keyes in mind. In planning raids on a small
scale carried out by Special Service troops only, the ACO
could appoint the Force Commander and be responsible
for the detailed plan. No mention was made of the “5,000
men limitation” contained in the Keyes directive. Outline
planning in large scale operations would be the responsi-
bility of the Joint Planning Staff with the ACO as adviser
only. The force commanders would be responsible for
producing the final plan in conjunction with JPS and with
the advise of the ACO. Implementation of the approved
plan by force commanders be assisted by JPS and Service
Ministries.!°
In the matter of training, the ACO continued to com-
mand the CTCs and was to preside over an Inter-Service
Committee consisting of the ACNS (Weapons), Admiralty
representative and the Directors of Training of the War
Office and Air Ministry. The Committee was to formulate
the training and technical policy for combined operations
and the development of airborne forces.
The ACO’s responsibility for experimental work was
covered by the instruction, “direct and press forward re-

135
search and development,” compared with the responsibil-
ity for the “development, including experiment, research
and trial, and of all forms of special equipment and craft
required for opposed landings,” which were laid down in
the Keys directive of March 1941.
It was during the Mountbatten period that the re-
examination and construction of landing craft for com-
bined operations really got under way. Shortly before the
ACO was appointed, the CIGS drew attention of the COS
to the fact that the programme for landing craft construc-
tion was based on small-scale operations only and that a
return to the Continent would entail a considerably larger
programme, especially LCT and LST.'® The CIGS rec-
ommended and the COS agreed that the JPS should re-
examine the requirements, bearing in mind the use of
American construction.!”
In October 1941, the JPS submitted their recommen-
dations which were based on the assumption that the initial
assault would be made by 17 Brigades, including four tank
brigades, and that three armoured divisions would be
landed as follow-up by D/4 with a standby of an additional
three armoured divisions. For this total force, the JPS es-
timated a need for some 2,150 LCT.'® At the same time
as this request was submitted, the British Admiralty Del-
egation (BAD) in Washington suggested that the Ameri-
cans should be asked to build LCT capable of crossing the
Atlantic. (These were at first known as “Atlantic LCT” and
subsequently called LST[2].)
The COS considered the JPS report together with a
paper by the VCNS, Rear Admiral T. S. V. Phillips, setting
out the position concerning landing craft already built and
under construction with recommendations for future pro-
grammes.
The COS were somewhat surprised by the future re-
quirements estimated in the JPS and VCNS reports.'? They
consequently set up an inter-service committee under the
Chairmanship of the Controller, Vice-Admiral Sir Bruce

136 :
Fraser. The Committee, composed of members of the Ad-
miralty, War and Air Ministries and the ACO, was to re-
view the problems of construction of special craft and to
simplify the design of the LCT so as to accelerate pro-
duction.”°
The inter-service committee, called the “Committee
on Construction of Special Craft for Combined Opera-
tions” met on 20 and 22 October 1941 at the Admiralty.
The group submitted its recommendations to the COS
stating that the production, at home, of Assault Landing
Craft (ALC) should be increased from eight to twelve per
month and reach a maximum of five hundred, including
existing craft at home and in the Middle East, by May
1943.
It was noted that an examination of the beaches of
France showed that the draught of existing types of LCTs
would be excessive. They recommended that production
be switched to the new LCT(4), which sacrificed almost
everything to reduce the draught, and that some of the
production be made in America.
The Committee also requested that Captain T. A.
Hussey, Commandant of the ISTDC, Lieutenant Com-
mander R. C. Todhunter, Director of Naval Equipment
(CO), and Mr. R. Baker, Department of Naval Construc-
tion, Bath, all be sent to the United States to pursue existing
and projected new requests for landing craft production.”!
The COS approved the recommendations, including
sending the representatives, to ascertain ships and craft
construction under Lend-Lease. The Committee to Amer-
ica was authorised to take previously prepared specifica-
tions of the LSD, LST(2) and LCT(4) and (5).”
The British Landing Ship Dock (LSD) had been de-
signed as a means of carrying LCT to the assault area as
it was considered that the LST was too vulnerable for use
in landing priority vehicles, and the LCT could not be
guaranteed to make an open sea passage under its own
power. The LCT(5) was designed to facilitate shipment

137
 across the Atlantic, carried on the deck of the LST(2).
During the visit to the United States by Todhunter,
Baker and the others, the American Landing Craft Me-
chanised (LCM) designed and manufactured by the Hig-
gins Industries was inspected by them at Norfolk, Virginia.
Several modifications were proposed, all of which were
adopted by Higgins, and the craft was subsequently pro-
duced as the LCM(3).
A major re-organisation of COHQ, that set the course
from 1942 until Operation Overlord, began to take form
in December 1941. At the request of the Admiralty, the
ACO was placed in command of all landing craft and crews
in home waters.?> The buildup of the amphibious fleet
continued as a Joint Admiralty-COHQ responsibility ow-
ing to the increasing demands for work to be carried out
both as an experimental and advisory nature. The ACO
submitted a paper setting out the responsibilities of the
combined operations command and put forth certain pro-
posals for its re-organisation. He based his re-organisation
plan on the following:** (a) Since he was requested by the
Admiralty to take over the command and administration
of ail landing craft and crews, it was estimated that he
would have, within a 16-month period, 500—700 (LCTs of
250 tons each) and two thousand smaller craft involving
two thousand Officers and twenty thousand men. He
therefore proposed to create an administrative staff at
COHQ under a Rear-Admiral Landing Craft and Bases
(RALCAB) and to appoint a “senior Officer Assault Ships
and Craft,” who would command all Landing Ships and
Craft prior to their being allocated for an operation; (0)
the ACO proposed to add a Colonel, Royal Marines, to his
staff, “since combined operations was the traditional role
of the Royal Marines,” as a Royal Marines Adviser and to
_ maintain close liaison with the Royal Marines office; (c) he
further proposed to have a pool of staff officers who could
be loaned out to Force Commanders to advise on planning
for combined operations. By this means, operational ex-

138 .
perience would also be available in COHQ and these of-
ficers, on returning from attachment to Force Commanders,
would be available to advise the JPS and CTCs.
Within a few weeks, the COS approved the ACO’s
proposed re-organisation and in view of the alteration of
his functions, stemming from the proposals, a new direc-
tive was issued.”° The directive stated that the ACO, “when
acting in an advisory capacity” should use the title “Adviser
on Combined Operations” and that when exercising his
executive functions, his title is “Commodore, Combined
Operations.”
Commodore Mountbatten made new proposals to the
COS in February 1942, recommending that co-ordination
for combined operations for India and Australia and the
Southwest Pacific be the responsibility of the ACO and
that, in view of the likelihood of amphibious operations
being carried out in the Far East, CT'Cs be set up both in
Australia and India. These CTCs would be under the local
Commander-in-Chiefs, advised as necessary by the ACO,
who would keep the COS informed on any major matters
of policy.”°
The COS approved Mountbatten’s recommendations
and the Prime Minister directed that the ACO now be
called Chief of Combined Operations (CCO) and be pro-
moted to Vice-Admiral with honourary ranks of Lieuten-
ant General and Air Marshal. A fortnight later, the CCO
became a full member of the COS when matters concern-
ing combined operations were discussed.*”
In April 1942, the COS approved a proposal by the
CCO that he have a Combined Operations Liaison Officer
(COLO) in Washington.** This appointment was necessary
to follow up on the visit of Todhunter, Baker and the
others, and to keep in touch with the progress of the ships
and craft building programmes then being implemented
in America. The CCO also wanted the COLO to keep the
Americans informed of progress and developments, both
in technique and material of combined operations in Brit-

139
ain, as well as receive from them reciprocal information.
CaptainJ.N. Knox, RN, was appointed COLO in addition
to becoming “adviser” to the BAD in Washington on all
aspects of combined operations.”
Within six months after coming to the post of
ACO/CCO, Admiral Mountbatten re-organised the com-
bined operations headquarters, established a COLO in
Washington and provided for establishment of CTCs in
Australia and India. Generally, the administrative process
was working well except in the area of raids and raiding
forces.
During Mountbatten’s first six months as CCO, three
minor raids had taken place in Europe and one large one
in the Madagascar operation. The successful European
raids were at Vaasgo Island off Norway and Bruneval and
Saint Nazaire in France. The situation regarding the “raid-
ing authority” for Northwest Europe before May 1942 was
that COHQ controlled, administered, and trained all the
specialised amphibious forces in the United Kingdom, in-
cluding the Special Service Brigade and all assault shipping
and landing craft. Since October 1941, concurrent with
Mountbatten’s appointment, the authority to raid the coast
of France and the Low Countries was held by the General
Officers Commanding-in-Chief of the various Home De-
fence Commands.*° The only area in which combined op-
eration forces could operate without infringing on the
prerogatives of the Army Commanders was the Norwegian
coast. This arrangement changed during the early months
of 1942, when the COS decided, as part of the strategy of
the war, that a series of raids, becoming progressively
greater in scale, be undertaken. In addition, the Com-
mander-in-Chief Home Forces, CCommander-in-Chief
Fighter Command and the CCO were responsible for
working out plans for capture of a bridgehead on the Con-
tinent (Operation Roundup) within the geographic area in
which adequate naval and air cover could be given during
the summer of 1942, if the opportunity occurred.*!

140 bi
 By May, it became apparent to the COS that, owing
to lack of resources, a return to the Continent during 1942
was most unlikely. Nevertheless, planning continued for
1942 and 1943. In July, the Combined Chiefs of Staff
(British and American) meeting in London had agreed
that, depending on the Russian situation, a decision
“should be undertaken in September to launch a combined
operation against North Africa (Operation Torch).”?2
With the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces busy
with Operation Round-Up, that in a year would be known
as Overlord, the CCO became, in May 1942, the mounting
authority for all raids in Northwestern Europe. Essentially
the CCO was responsible for preparing an outline plan,
appointing Force Commanders, allocating and assembling
the requisite specialised forces and assisting the Force
Commanders in the preparation of the detailed plan.
When it came to the execution of a raid, the CCO, from
the beginning, took the view that the Naval Commander-
in-Chief, in whose area the raid lay, must retain overall
command along with all ships and craft. Therefore, al-
though the CCO was responsible for making and pre-
senting to the COS the inter-service plan for a raid and
for supervising the preparation and rehearsals, the final
executive order was given by the Naval Commander-in-
Chief.
With the command and control of raids in Northwest
Europe reasonably settled, mention of the largest, and, as
it happened, last raid—Dieppe—must be noted. It was in
1942, a landmark event in the history of combined oper-
ations.
Operation Rutter, the name for Dieppe, was approved
by the COS in April 1942 with the raid date set for 20
June. It had to be cancelled owing to the weather being
unsuitable for the parachute troops, whose participation
was then an essential part of the plan, but it was subse-
quently remounted and carried out on 19 August as Op-
eration Jubilee without the use of an airborne contingent.

141
Admiral Mountbatten, CCO, stated that “Dieppe was cho-
sen because it was a suitable port and conveniently situated
for a one-day raid, reconnaissance in force, in and out.”
He said he had planned to lift one division afloat in one
fell swoop, using the Royal Marines Division and the Com-
mando Brigade, but politics came into play and the Ca-
nadians were assigned the task. The Canadians had been
in the United Kingdom, “kicking their heels for a long
while and now wished to take part in an active operation.
They had put in a bid to be allowed to do the Dieppe
operation and the Prime Minister ruled that they should
be allowed to do so.”**
Indeed the Canadians participated. Out of just over
fifteen thousand soldiers, sailors and airmen at Dieppe,
nearly five thousand Canadians, primarily the land forces,
took part, while two out of every three Canadians were
casualties. One in five were actually killed in the raidor
died in the P.O.W. camp—a total of 907.4
There was a great deal of discussion, at the time of
the raid, as to the necessity of such an operation. Quite
apart from the need for some offensive operation, from
the stand point of morale, a fairly considerable assault fleet
was already being built up, and although experience from
small operations employing LSI, LCA, and LCM had been
made, there was no experience in handling craft and LCT
in a large operation. Most importantly, any return to the
Continent entailed the early capture of a port and this raid
would be a trial run. The lessons learnt from Jubilee were
most valuable. Based on the experiences at Dieppe, the
organisation, training, technique and research against a
defended coast became the focal point of combined op-
erations. Frontal assault on a port was not practicable and
certainly costly. Preliminary bombing from the air was es-
sential. In the Dieppe raid, no preliminary bombing had
been carried out by the Force Commanders, and this lack
of technique was strongly objected to by the CCO. The
Force Commanders believed that air bombing would block

142 i
the streets with rubble and prevent the movement of tanks.
The need was emphasied for close fire support from the
sea on a scale far larger than hitherto visualised. It was
learned that from the moment the preliminary bombing
lifts, prior to the infantry landing, until the time when the
field artillery is landed and is in action, a most serious gap
exists. As it was known later, this gap will disappear with
the proper use of air support and bombardment ships.
Another lesson of the raid was that tanks should not
normally be landed in the first wave, but should come in
when the beaches are clear of anti-tank defences and
mines. Finally, the raid confirmed that the lines along
which the naval designers were developing craft, other
than support craft, were correct.
After Dieppe, the CCO sent a Memorandum to the
COS pointing out that, next to the need for naval support
fire, the second most important lesson for any amphibious
campaign involving assaults on strongly defended coasts
was to have “landing ships and craft required for the as-
saults be organized well in advance of the naval assault
forces.” They should be a permanent naval force trained
in assault stages and be ready at a moment’s notice.*° As
may be recalled, a similar concept of a “striking force” was
made by Admiral Keyes in December 1940 and assembled
for Operation Pilgrim (Canary Islands).
The CCO further recommended that other such type
forces be formed including American and Brigade groups
allotted to train with them. The Admiralty agreed with the
CCO at the time and stated that “Force J,” as the force was
called, initially consist of seven LSI carrying LCA and
LCS(M); 48 LCT; six LCI(L); 72 LCP and ten other special
type craft.
“Force J” was re-constituted after Dieppe and kept
together in the Solent area under command of CaptainJ.
Hughes-Hallett. The idea of a special naval assault force
was sound and was in readiness after Dieppe. Unfortu-
nately, the raiding policy endorsed at the Casablanca Con-

143
ference just about ended it. Landing ships out of Force J
were employed for Torch and Husky, which ended the ef-
fectiveness of the force. Hughes-Hallett replaced Admiral
Vian on 1 May 1943 as COSSAC’s principal British naval
staff officer.
The official account of the Dieppe raid, which con-
tained complete details and all the lessons learnt, was
widely distributed throughout the Services, including the
American allies.
To reiterate, the Dieppe raid was in 1942, a landmark
in the history of combined operations because for the first
time, a raid on a considerable scale had been planned,
mounted, and executed against severe opposition. All
three Services were deployed and co-operation among
them was at a high level. Planning had been accomplished
by integrated staffs from the forces to be employed and
the co-ordinating headquarters, where the existing spe-
cialised knowledge was available. There was a Joint Com-
mand and it worked well. The important thing at this time
was that the general pattern of the organisation required
to conduct a raid or major landing had been set.
It is necessary to consider the American organisation
for amphibious operations.

American Amphibious Operational Organisation

and Training

Organisation and command

There was no counterpart to the British COHQ in

America in 1940, nor at any other time during the war.
There were, of course, planning staffs in the Navy and
Marine Corps dealing primarily with amphibious opera-
tions.

144
 The principal overall military planning staff, a pred-
ecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was the Joint
Army and Navy Board, founded in 1903. The Joint Board
never received statutory authorisation, but operated under
an agreement between the War and Navy Departments
entered into by the Secretaries of the Departments. Ad-
visory in nature, the Board’s proposals were subject to the
approval of the Secretaries before being placed in effect.
The approval of the President was also required if amatter
of important policy was involved. Membership of the Joint
Board included the Chief of Staff of the Army and his
Deputy, Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans; the Chief
of Naval Operations, and his Assistant; and the Director
of the War Plans Division.
The Joint Board had a working sub-committee on
preparation of war plans, a forerunner of the Joint Plan-
ners of the JCS. Its primary duty was the study of possible
future operations and the making of plans for operations
that had been decided upon by the two Service Secretaries.
The plans were general and after approval by the Secre-
taries were issued to the appropriate Field Commander to
be used as a basis for his issuing orders for carrying out
the operation. The Field Commander was told in general
terms what to do, but not how to do it. Thus, in the case
of War Plan Orange, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps
each had their responsibilities with the Navy’s role pri-
marily preparing the Pacific Fleet against Japan. In ad-
dition, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was responsible for
“seizing or defending advanced naval bases.”
The Navy was responsible for transporting the Army
to re-inforce the Philippines in the event of war with Japan.
If the Philippines were lost, as was expected, the Army was
then scheduled to receive amphibious training in order to
retake the Philippines. All of this was in the framework of
the Orange Plan but it must be noted that the Army had
other major responsibilities in the Caribbean and Panama
Canal Zone.

145
 For the most part, the Orange Plan had delegated the
Fleet Marine Force to the Pacific where it would play its
major role in World War II. The Marine Corps conse-
quently proceeded to learn “how to do it” in the concept
of what was expected of them from the staff planners of
the Joint Board. As it was noted in Chapter Three, the
Marines proceeded to learn and develop the tactics and
techniques of amphibious operations. Aside from their
almost independent urgings in the development of a suit-
able landing boat and publication of a landing manual, the
Marines and Navy were inseparable in relation to am-
phibious operations during the war. No one Service could
conduct amphibious operations without the other. Con-
sequently, when one speaks of a naval staff, planning an
operation, it goes without saying that the planners included
Marine Corps officers.
To summarise, America had no counterpart to the
British COHQ before its entry into the war, nor did it
during the war. War plans drawn up by the Joint Board
were general in nature, giving to the military service con-
cerned the task of preparing detailed plans in carrying out
the war plan. Each Service worked closely with the other
in what was to be called “mutual co-operation.” However,
in what appears to be endemic in the military, the question
of command produced problems similar to those experi-
enced by the British counterpart in the early days of the
COHQ organisation.
The problem of command between the Army and
Navy goes back to before World War I to the defence of
Hawaii and of the Philippines, which were subjects of con-
tinuing and controversial discussions. The Army saw its
mission as essentially defence. It advocated that the com-
mand of all forces assigned to coastal regions of the United
States and outlying bases and possessions, such as the Phil-
ippines, should have what is called “unity of command”
—command by one Service, in this case, the Army. The
Navy, on the other hand, believed its mission as essentially

146 Ny
offence. The Navy favoured “unity of command” for all
overseas operations with a Navy officer commanding.
There was no agreed doctrine or system of command for
joint operations (operations composing two or more mil-
itary Services) before 1919. During the 1920s, the Joint
Board avoided the discussion by simply stating that normal
control of Army and Navy operations be by the method
of mutual co-operation.
In 1928, when the Joint War Plan Orange was again
revised, it was stipulated in the plan that unity of command
for all Joint overseas expeditions and before the Army was
landed would be the Navy’s responsibility. After the Army
landed, command would pass to that Service.
In 1935, the Joint Board issued a “Joint Action of the
Army and Navy” (JAAN). It defined joint operations as
“those usually requiring tactical co-ordination of forces of
the Army and of the Navy for the accomplishment of a
common mission.”*° It prescribed that co-ordination for
joint operations be effected by unity of command and that
the co-ordinating service be the service of paramount in-
terest, that is, the Service whose operations were “of the
greater importance for the accomplishment of a joint mis-
sion in a joint operation.” The directive stated that the
Commander exercising unity of command by virtue of the
paramount interest aspect, have a headquarters separate
from those component commanders and that he was em-
powered to co-ordinate operations of Army and Navy by
(a) organising task forces; (b) assigning missions; (c) des-
ignating objectives; and (d) providing logistic support. The
JAAN 1935, assigned the Navy responsibility for protec-
tion of shipping and the Army the responsibility for direct
defence of the coasts of the United States. It appeared that
the long battle of responsibility for the defence of the coasts
of America was put to rest. It was not so. In coastal frontier
defence, paramount interest fluctuated between the two
Services, depending on the enemy’s apparent intentions
and upon the presence or absence of the Fleet. By the

147
terms of the JAAN, it was obvious that no one commander
would ever be assigned permanent overall responsibility
for joint coastal defence operations anywhere.
In March 1938, the General Board of the Navy rec-
ommended revision of the JAAN 1935. The CNO stated
that it was unlikely that the two commanders agree as to
the intentions of the enemy, and hence the Service of par-
amount interest, and therefore the commander to exercise
unity of command would be difficult to agree on. He rec-
ommended that control of forces be by mutual co-opera-
tion, with each Service commanding its own forces, except
where specific operations were required by war plans or
by the President’s order. If that be the case, unity of com-
mand would be used as directed by the President. As a
result, JAAN was revised to specify co-operation normally
or by unity of command when specifically ordered. The
commander exercising unity of command was again au-
thorised to organise task forces, assign missions, designate
objectives and exercise such co-ordination and control as
necessary for success of the operation. He was however,
specifically forbidden to exercise control of the adminis-
tration and discipline of the Service to which he did not
belong.
While the words “supreme commander” were not
used, the evolution of the concept of supreme commander
began with this 1938 JAAN action. A designated single
commander of joint operations by the President, or as was
actually the case, the Joint Board (later JCS) resolved most
problems of “command” ofjoint forces and fixed defence
forces both in the States and such other places as Hawaii,
Philippines, Alaska and Panama. Unfortunately, in Hawaii
a single commander of all forces was not appointed until
ten days after Pearl Harbor, whereupon the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) was designated.
It should be recalled that about the time the Americans
were agreeing among themselves on the concept of a single
commander, the British were moving to the same conclu-

148
sion, with alternative positions, in what they called a unified
command with a combined commander-in-chief (see
Chapter Two, footnote 39).
In July 1941, the Americans, using the concept of a
single commander outside of American military channels,
came to an agreement with the British COS on local de-
fence measures in Bermuda and the British West Indies
where American bases were being established. The Joint
Boint Board approved the following policies relative to co-
ordinating operations of United States and United King-
dom forces in British leased bases as follows: (a) United
States Army and Navy operations be coordinated by the
principle of mutual co-operation; (6) Combined operations
of United Kingdom and United States forces be controlled
by a single commander (U.S.) under principle of unity of
command, the United Kingdom—United States Combined
Commander to be a local U.S. Army or U.S. Navy Com-
mander as appropriate. These policies were approved by
the President and the Prime Minister.*’
In America prior to 1941, there was no one person
in an organisational structure designated as Adviser or
Chief of Amphibious Operations. Within the Navy De-
partment under Naval Operations, a Fleet Training Di-
vision, designated OP-22, included an amphibious warfare
section with one Major from the U.S. Marine Corps as-
signed. By January 1942, six officers were assigned, five
of whom were Marines. The functions of the amphibious
war section were to prepare general instructions for the
guidance of the Fleet in carrying out amphibious training
programs.
The Marine Corps, within its own Headquarters, had
a Division of Plans and Policies and a Training Branch that
promulgated amphibious training schedules for all Marine
personnel ashore and in the Fleet Marine Force. The doc-
trine, tactics and techniques of amphibious warfare were
developed at the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, along
with the Tentative Landing Operations Manual. Conse-

149
quently, up to 1940, the Marines were the only Service
receiving amphibious training.
As noted in chapter three, the Marine Corps’ primary
mission was to conduct amphibious operations, “to seize
and defend advanced naval bases.” It is not surprising that
in 1933, the Marine Corps established the Marine Corps
Equipment Board to develop and procure special landing
craft needed in amphibious operations. Two years later,
the Bureau of Construction and Repair (later Bureau of
Ships), “invited bids from naval architects and commercial
boat builders for boat designs to meet the requirements
of landing operations.”** By 1937, the Navy established the
Navy Department Continuing Board for development of
landing boats for the Navy and Marine Corps, although
the Marine Corps Equipment Board continued its work
developing other equipment.
Prior to June 1942, there were no “amphibious ships
and craft” listed as such within the various divisions of
Naval Operations. The 35-31 foot personnel boats, five
tank lighters and six artillery lighters that the Navy had
on hand in February 1940 were handled by the “auxiliary
vessels—sub-section” of the Fleet Training Division.
Events in Europe and the passage of a naval expansion
bill in June 1940 gave the Navy the green light to build a
“two ocean Navy.” By the end of the fiscal year, federal
expenditures for the Army and Navy rose from $1.8 billion
for the FY 1940 to $6.3 billion for FY 1941.39
Landing craft construction began in earnest and by
30 September 1941, the Joint Planning Committee of the
Joint Board reported that boats on hand or under con-
struction were shown as follows:

133—30' personnel boats—No further construction

as 36’ Higgins boats became standard

400—36' regular landing boats, without ramps, with

197 under construction

150
 88—36’ ramp boats, with 100 under construction

46—45' tank lighters, with 100 under construction

13—45’ artillery lighters with 12 under construction

900—rubber boats under construction

300—amphibian tractors under construction

30—troop transport, needing 815 landing boats

11—<cargo transports, needing 80 landing boats*°

The Joint Planning Committee report estimated that the

construction of landing boats were based on a “Triangular
Division” used by the Army and Marine Corps.*
It was noted that to land nine combat teams from
combat loaded transports, 39-36 foot landing boats were
needed (1350 boat spaces) and seven tank lighters were
required per combat team.
With the landing boat construction under way, iden-
tical problems such as their British counterparts were ex-
periencing occurred, among them the problems of training
bases and the training of landing boat crews.

Training Bases

Sites of amphibious training facilities for Marines be-

fore World War II, aside from the landing sites in Puerto
Rico and Hawaii, were the Quantico Marine Base on the
Potomac River in Virginia and the Marine Base at San
Diego, California. There were also recruit depots at Parris

*3 Platoons to a Company; 3 Companies to a Battalion; 3 Battalions to a Kegi-

ment; 3 Regiments to a Division.

151
Island, South Carolina, and San Diego. All of these facil-
ities were expanded when the authorised strength of the
Marine Corps was increased at the outbreak of the Eu-
ropean war. The Commandant of the Marine Corps
(CMC) requested from Congress additional coastal bases
on the East and West Coast to permit large scale landing
exercises. The Congress, in February 1941, approved the
purchase of land at New River, North Carolina, totalling
125,000 acres. The Marine Corps base at New River be-
came known as Camp Lejeune and the Marine Corps Air
Station, forty miles away, was named Cherry Point. The
distance between the two bases was not too great to prevent
easy ground—air liaison and combined training, but great
enough to avoid operational interference between aviation
and ground force training.
As early as July 1941, Camp Lejeune was operational
and was staging a large-scale landing operation involving
the Ist Marine Division and the Army’s Ist Infantry Di-
vision. Many of the Marine officers and men who were to
take part in the Guadalcanal campaign a year later received
their first realistic training in amphibious operations dur-
ing that first summer at Camp Lejeune.
Camp Lejeune became the site of the First Joint Train-
ing Force in June 1941, made up of the Ist Marine Division
and the Ist Infantry Division of the Army. Under the com-
mand of Brigadier General (later Lieutenant General)
Howland M. Smith, USMC, the Joint Force units trained
together and were to be used together in an emergency
situation. Similar to the striking-force concept of Keyes
and Mountbatten, the Joint Force’s shipping came from
Headquarters of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet,
Norfolk, Virginia, under command of Rear Admiral
Henry K. Hewitt.
On the West Coast of the United States, a similar
group—the Second Joint Force, under the command of
another Marine general, Major-General C. B. Vogel—was
established at Camp Pendleton, California. The Army’s 3d

152 i
Infantry Division and the Marine’s 2d Division made up
this second force.
As with their British counterpart, the American First
and Second Joint Forces lasted only a few months. Units
of the divisions involved were shipped to other places and
the shipping reassigned. Finally, the First Marine Division
embarked for the first land offensive operation of the
war—Guadalcanal.
Training continued on the newly acquired West Coast
base, Camp Pendleton, forty miles north of San Diego.
The base contained twenty miles of beach frontage on the
Pacific Ocean and in most respects, amphibious training
of Marine and Army personnel followed the same lines as
that at Camp Lejeune. In all, six Marine divisions raised
during the war, received amphibious training at either
Lejeune or Pendleton. Marine replacement troops re-
ceived their final training before overseas assingments at
Pendleton.
The Marines at Lejeune and Pendleton trained a total
of seven of the Army division that ultimately received am-
phibious training. In addition, under the Lend-Lease Act,
the training of Royal Netherlands Marine Corps units was
conducted at Lejeune, Pendleton and Quantico.

U.S. Army Amphibious Training

With the exception of participation in several landing

operations with the Marines, the Army, in general, was not
interested in, nor required to, obtain amphibious training
before 1940. With the German occupation of Western Eu-
rope, all friendly ports on the Continent were closed. The
Axis control of French and Dutch possessions in the West-
ern Hemisphere was uncertain. By October 1940, the War
Department General Staff had initiated organising emer-
gency expeditionary forces for potential action in the Car-
ibbean and Newfoundland.*! By the summer of 1941, the

153
War Department issued a training directive in line with
new strategic plans that included amphibious operations.
An amphibious training program was expanded which in-
cluded participation with the Marines in the Joint Training
Forces mentioned above.
Joint landings of Marines and Army from the First
Joint Training Force were made at Lejeune during August
1941. It was the first phase of a far larger landing to be
made in December but rescheduled for January 1942, be-
cause of the shortage of shipping.
With the declaration of war and the appearance of
danger from submarines off North Carolina, the landing
operations scheduled for Lejeune (New River area) were
hastily shifted to Cape Henry Virginia in Chesapeake Bay.
The landing operation, under the command of Marine
General Smith, lasted only two days. There were no naval
gunfire or air support groups and “the exercise was more
of a ship-to-shore practice than a full scale amphibious
exercise;=?
The Army could send only half of its Division and the
Marines sent only a couple of battalions. The Navy, short
of Atlantic Fleet shipping, left 1,700 Army personnel at
embarkation sites because of lack of transports. What
transports were available were condemned by both the
Army and Marines for being overcrowded and generally
in poor condition.
In his final report of the operation to Commander-in-
Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Smith aimed some harsh criticism at
the Navy. He noted that the Navy failed to provide suitable
transports or adequate combatant vessels and aircraft;
combatant vessels had not practiced shore bombardment
in the past year; naval pilots were untrained for co-
operation with ground troops; and the Navy failed to land
troops on designated beaches, so that the ship-to-shore
movement was “from a tactical viewpoint a complete fail-
ure.” Results of exercise, Smith continued, were the dis-
crediting of American troops in the eyes of foreign

154
observers,* and more important, “the loss of confidence
by the first-class combat troops in the ability of responsible
command echelons to place them ashore in formations that
would offer a reasonable chance of success.”
The General Headquarters of the Army (GHQ) con-
curred with Smith and generally gave stock to a study it
was preparing in which it contended that the Army estab-
lish its own amphibious training centre. The Army ulti-
mately enacted its own amphibious training centre at Camp
Edwards, Massachusetts in June 1942. The Centre oper-
ated under Headquarters of the Army Ground Forces with
co-ordination and standardisation of procedures in am-
phibious training provided by the Commanders of the
Amphibious Forces, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and in
overseas areas by the Theatre Commanders.
The Army Engineers formed the “amphibious com-
mand” at Camp Edwards and later another at Camp Gor-
don in Florida. In total, the Army trained twenty-one of
its twenty-eight amphibious-trained divisions.
The situation of Navy versus Army amphibious train-
ing promoted competition, basically friendly, between the
two Services. As the Army expanded and prepared to un-
dertake amphibious operations in Europe, the question
arose as to whom the responsibility belonged in the move-
ment of the trained troops from the States to overseas
areas. The Army operated its own transport service of
fifteen vessels but did not have their own landing boat
crews. The Army transports had been used, in peacetime,
to transport personnel to overseas bases. The question
arose: was the Army going to continue to transport its own
personnel in wartime?
The question was resolved in the JAAN 1935 instruc-

*Among the foreign observers at the Exercise, eight members were from the
Joint Staff Mission, BAD and three additional Officers that flew in from the
U.K.—Col E. G. Wildman-Lushington, RM; Commander I. G. Robertson, RN
and Group Captain A. G. Willets, RAF (Memo from Paymaster Commander H.
G. A. Woolley, RN, Adviser on CO to JSM, 31 Dec 1941).

155
tion which quite clearly authorised the Army “to provide
and operate all vessels for the Army, except when naval
opposition by the enemy is to be expected, in which case
they are provided and operated by the Navy.” JAAN
further indicated that the “deployment into boats used for
landing be operated by the Navy.”
In 1941, JAAN was changed mainly as a clarification,
under War Plan Rainbow Five, in that “the Navy was as-
signed to provide sea transportation for the initial move-
ment and continued support of Army and Navy forces
overseas.” The Navy was specifically ordered to man and
operate the Army Transportation Service.*®
Manning transports as well as providing landing boat
crews absorbed a tremendous amount of Naval personnel.
Admiral ErnestJ.King, the Commander-in-Chief, United
States Fleet and CNO, had his views reflected in the Navy’s
official position that amphibious operations in island war-
fare be a function of the Navy, and that amphibious op-
erations against a continent be a function of the Army.*7
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Commander, Amphib-
ious Force South Pacific, citing King’s views stated that in
one case “landings would be repeated many times, and
continuous naval support is essential whereas, in the sec-
ond case, after the initial landing, the Navy’s chief interest
would be protection of the line of sea communication.”#®
The Army could not agree more. As late as the end
of April 1942, the Army was still proposing that it be re-
sponsible for all amphibious operations in the Atlantic
area, and the Marines in the Pacific area of operations.*°
Admiral King, at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff in Washington in June 1942, reiterated his strongly
held views that the “U.S. Navy should have nothing to do
with amphibious operations in Europe as it was only in-
terested in the Pacific.” On the other hand, General George
C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, indicated that the
Army was prepared to man landing craft required and
would raise Engineer Amphibious Battalions to carry out

156 :
the task. He went even further and suggested that the
Army should wear the British Combined Operations
badge.*?
Admiral Mountbatten, CCO, present at the Combined
Chiefs of Staff meeting stated:

The divergence of opinion between King and Marshall

greatly disturbed him and he went round to see Admiral
King alone after the meeting. He put forward the view, as
one sailor to another, that Admiral King should reconsider
his position. He pointed out that if Admiral King refused
to let the U.S. Navy order, supervise the production of,
and subsequently man and operate the landing ships and
landing craft for Europe, he would be surrendering the
birthright of the Navy to the Army. Further, he pointed
out that nothing could prevent the landing ships and land-
ing craft from being built and produced and sent to Eu-
rope. If the Navy refused to play its part, the job would be
done by the Army as General Marshall had made quite
clear. He pointed out to King that there were not enough
men in either the Army or Navy to man all the landing
craft required and that civilians would have to be entered
and trained and that it seemed incredible that he allow
civilians who were going to work in landing craft to be
entered by the Army instead of by the Navy. This was the
turning point in his argument and King accepted it, going
flat out to make a success of the American naval landing
craft program.”!

For the remainder of the year 1942, the naval landing

craft building programme flourished and the Army con-
tinued training its own personnel at the amphibious train-
ing centre at Camp Edwards. The Navy did its part in the
first joint Army—Navy, as well as combined, operation in
North Africa, November 1942.
By February 1943, the Navy and Army formally
agreed that the Navy continue to train landing boat op-
erating and maintenance personnel to meet future Army
requirements. The Army agreed to discontinue all am-

D57
phibious training activities in the United States. The con-
trol and assingment of amphibian units and amphibious
training activities in overseas theatres were left to theatre
commanders to determine.®2 Thus, the Army got out of
the amphibious training business and turned over its two
camps to Naval administration.
To sum up, organisation and training for amphibious
operations by the British and Americans came a long way
up to the first combined amphibious operation in Novem-
ber 1942. The British developed operationally from car-
rying out small raids to launching a large scale action
against heavy defences. Both in northwest Europe and in
the Mediterranean the effects of raiding operations were
felt and. the scale and frequency with which they were
carried out was restricted only by lack of equipment. Par-
allel with raiding, materiel had developed with the LCI,
L@vvend. LS i
In analysing the development of techniques and ma-
teriel however, it is possible to see the changes and ad-
vances in those areas. It is difficult to appreciate an
important aspect of carrying out the mission, the organi-
sation. In spite of the long resistance of the military services
to operate almost independently and that, in spite of every-
thing, there came about something on the scale of COHQ
is quite remarkable.
As was the case many times during the war, it was the
personality of an individual that made many tasks suc-
cessful. Admiral Keyes, who already appreciated the im-
portance of combined operations, also grasped the
importance of an expert organization to carry it out. Per-
haps, because of his military seniority and old-friend re-
lationship with the Prime Minister, he could not pull it off
with the military Chiefs of the day. It was left to a young
Naval Captain, Mountbatten, who admittedly did not know
anything about combined operations, who quickly ascer-
tained that if the theory were to work, organisation and
an inter-service team effort were essential. His personality
and his friendship with the Prime Minister, together with

158
a realistic attitude toward what could be done in a given
time frame, all contributed to the success of what was the
Combined Operations Headquarters.
In America, there was no comparable pressure to con-
duct raids or guard against invasion. Amphibious training,
development of techniques, tactics and equipment were in
the good hands of the United States Marine Corps in a
peacetime atmosphere. The pace of development was even
and on time. There was no central organisation and no
one military personality that represented a leader in am-
phibious warfare. Certainly within the Marine Corps there
were many leaders and pioneers in the development of
amphibious operations such as Generals Holland M.
Smith, Charles Barrett, Victor Krulak, and more. How-
ever, they were not widely known outside of the Marine
Corps.
The question might be raised: Was it necessary to have
an equivalent COHQ in America? I personally think not.
It would be sufficient to say now that America was fighting
two major wars within the Pacific and European theatres.
The British COHQ spawned the organisation necessary to
fight the European amphibious war and the U.S. Navy
Pacific Fleet Headquarters provided the naval staff organ-
isation for the Marines and Army to fight the amphibious
war in the Pacific. It would appear that it was not necessary
or desirable to have a central organisation to conduct
American amphibious operations in two major theatres.
What the Americans learned was the inescapable fact
that all military services work together, in peacetime and
in war. They effected this co-operation with good results.

Combined Operations in Europe

Fire Support, Close and Heavy Defences

It is not the intention to recount the amphibious op-

erations conducted by the Allies in Europe. It is however,
159
necessary to build on what occurred in a particular oper-
ation in the refinement of techniques and tactics that sub-
sequently affected the largest and most successful
amphibious operation in history, Overlord.
As an example of this refinement in techniques and
tactics, “fire support” makes an excellent case in European
operations. The term fire support encompasses close sup-
port for ground troops from naval gunfire, tanks, small
landing craft, self-propelled artillery and the like, to heavy
support from all of the resources of the Fleet and RAF
against a heavily defended target.
It was not until after Dieppe that heavily defended
targets became the principal aim in the refinement of fire
support. In the early days of ISTDC, the problem of close
support for troops was considered. Initial efforts were con-
centrated on the question of providing the assault troops
with covering fire during the vulnerable period of the ap-
proach to, and the crossing of the beaches. The first prac-
tical step towards the solution of this problem was the
production of a few small and lightly armoured support
craft, which were carried to the scene of operations and
accompanied the leading flights of landing craft to the
beach. When combined training first started at the CTC
Inveraray, support landing craft armed with a Naval 4-
inch smoke mortar and two 0.5-inch machine guns were
the only form of close support craft available for assault.
The Combined Operations Manuals of 1931 and 1938
envisaged that heavier support would be provided by war-
ships whose fire was controlled by Forward Observation
Officers (FOOs) landed with the assaulting troops. By the
summer of 1941, the first specially trained FOOs were sent
to the CTC to join assault formations already under train-
ing. It was a start but more important it showed awareness
of the problem.
Along the same line, in January 1942, the CCO con-
vened a meeting to consider the control of ships allotted
for bombarding support of an assault landing. All Service

160 .
Ministries and the Senior FOO were present. The meeting
decided on the principle of a central control for all types
of support and that warships, although initially allotted in
support of specific units, should remain under a central
control which could re-deploy them as the situation de-
manded. In large operations, the central control existed
in the designated Headquarters Ship. It was essentially a
clearing house for requests for fire support. The necessary
communications and codes were drawn up to put them
into effect. The staff of COHQ worked very closely with
the Service Ministries in the preparation of procedure
manuals and signal books, which were eventually issued
by COHQ in the summer of 1942.55
At Dieppe, the theory of control of bombarding ships
with the communications and signals was duly tested. All
were successful. What was not successful was that the fire
power available was inadequate. The supporting craft did
not have sufficient fire power, nor were they heavily
enough armoured to stand up to the fire from coast de-
fence batteries that had not been neutralised.
All of the faults and lessons learnt were out in the
official account of the Dieppe operation. It was brought
home to all that heavily armed support craft were required
to provide effective neutralising fire on the beaches and
that the provision of the right type of support for the
troops, once they were ashore, was a problem needing
further special study.
Admiral Mountbatten recommended to the COS that
an examination be made to include in the Naval building
programme, the construction of heavy and small monitors
to provide close support in an assault, and shallow-draught
protected gun-boats of fair speed for close inshore support
fire for the initial assaults.™
The CCO recommendations were discussed at a COS
meeting a fortnight later, and on the recommendation of
the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. Dudley
Pound, a Technical Sub-Committee was set up. Admiral

161
Pound stated that he was not at all convinced of any one
method in dealing with the neutralising of coast defences,
whether it be by gunboats or other means.
Pound suggested that the Technical Sub-Committee
consider and report on: (a) Whether the requirements of
fire assaults could be met by bombing, gunfire from ships,
or a combination of both; and (b) What special measures
were to be taken to meet this requirement.®? The Com-
mittee was formed under the Chairmanship of the ACNS
(Weapons), Rear-Admiral P. R. McGrigor with the other
members being Major-GeneralJ. E. Evetts the ACIGS, the
Director of Bomber Operations Air Commodore J. W.
Baker and VCCO Major-GeneralJ.C. Haydon.
The Technical Sub-Committee produced a paper
which was taken up by the COS on 15 December. The
conclusions of this paper were: (a) Unless old battleships
and cruisers were used, 6-inch, 15-knot monitors and self-
propelled Maunsell towers (concrete vessels mounting
Army howitzers) must be produced, and (b) In close sup-
port, fifty-two special armoured craft mounting army type
guns or howitzers were required for each assaulting Bri-
gade plus forty-eight self-propelled guns for each assault-
ing Brigade.*®
When the COS reviewed the Committee’s report they
immediately took note that the First Sea Lord was not
prepared to use old battleships in support of an assault.
They did, however, insist that design and experiment for
special gun craft proceed at once. It was also decided that
the construction of two pilot models of Maunsell towers
be accorded high priority.
The CCO, who was present at the COS meeting, and
was quite sensitive to anything affecting the use of landing
craft, pointed out that some one hundred guns would be
required to support a Brigade Group, half in armoured
craft and half in landing craft. This latter factor would
result either in displacing a corresponding number of ve-
hicles or in increasing the total number of landing craft

162 %
required, or in reducing the number of brigades which
could take part in an assault. He suggested that if Maunsell
towers proved feasible, the effect of the shortage of landing
craft would be most beneficial.°”
Design and construction of the two Maunsell towers,
officially called “Mobile Support Towers,” did not mater-
ialise, as other projects of a higher priority prevented pro-
duction being completed in time for Overlord. The work
on the prototype ceased in the Spring of 1944 before firing
trials had been conducted.
As for the “special gun craft” that the COS recom-
mended, meetings were held immediately at COHQ with
the Director of Naval Construction to produce designs for
a close support gun craft. DNC’s designs were discussed
at a further meeting on 4 February 1943 with CCO in the
chair. He stated that agreement had been reached with
American authorities that the title of support craft should
be Landing Craft Gun (LCG), but that there was little pros-
pect of these craft being built in America for use by British
Forces. The CCO noted that the DNC’s design for the craft
included one with a speed of fifteen knots, mounting two
25-pounders, 17-pounders, or 95-mm guns, and that the
quantitative demand for craft for 1944 be based on 26 X
2 gun craft per Brigade with a proviso that, if Rocket craft
were successful, this number could be reduced to twelve.*®
It became apparent that it would not be possible to
produce these LCG (M), as they were to be called, before
1944 and that improvised support craft would have to fill
the gap meanwhile. The CCO made available an LCT for
experimental conversion to a provisional gun craft mount-
ing two 4.7-inch naval guns in turrets. At the same time,
he accepted the idea for mounting rockets in LCT’s put
forward by Combined Operations Development Centre
(CODC) who saw in it a method of providing a great weight
of concentrated fire on beach defences.
Rocket craft did indeed prove successful. Six LCT (2)
were converted and equipped with rocket projectors and

163
were in service by 1 May 1943. More LCTs were converted
and resulted in nine LCG(L), manned by Royal Marines,
and three LCT(R) ready in time to take part in Operation
Husky. The LCG(L) were able to stand close inshore and
engage pillboxes and bunkers with direct fire and cover
the approach of the leading waves. Once Forward Ob-
servers were landed, these craft, grouped in threes and
under the control of a Bombardment Liaison Officer, were
able to provide indirect fire, when stopped, on area targets.
The LCT(R), mounting 1,000 5-inch rockets in fixed
mountings with a set range of 3,500 yards, fired on to the
beaches some 10 minutes before touchdown, with devas-
tating effect on the enemy, and at the same time gave
enormous encouragement to the assault troops.”
Progress in providing “close support” with the devel-
opment of LCT(R) and LCG(L) got a further boost from
a technique evolved by artillerymen. Representatives of
the Director Royal Artillery, the Director of Artillery, and
GHQ Home Forces, concluded after a meeting in March
1943 that there was a definite requirement for Self-Pro-
pelled (SP) 25-pdrs. in assault, that eight Assault Brigades,
each supported by 48 SP 25-pdrs., would amount to the
provision of 384 equipments, not including reserves, and
that further investigation be made as to whether SP artil-
lery could be waterproofed during manufacture.®°
Trials were carried out under the direction of the Staff
Officer (SO) of ForceJ firing SP 25-pdr. field guns from
LCTs approaching the beaches. A technique was evolved
enabling the Field Regiments of Assault Brigades to pro-
vide covering fire on the beach area during the run-in of
the leading waves. This became standard procedure in
subsequent operations.
The Assault Warfare Committee for the Inter-Services
Committee, which had been established at the request of
the CCO, had published, as a Combined Operations pam-
phlet, Support of the Assault. The pamphlet presented the
problem of support in a seaborne assault against a de-
fended coast after a short sea voyage; and it depicted the

164 ‘
combined resources of the three Services available for its
solution through all its phases. The pamphlet included
signal diagrams for the control of all types of seaborne and
airborne support. COHQ also published the first pamphlet
on the technique of firing SP artillery from LCTs.
Attention was now turned to the question of “support
in the assault against a heavily defended coast.” The CCO
recommended that an inter-service Committee be estab-
lished under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Director of
Experiments and Operational Requirements (DDXSR).
The Committee, known as the “Inter-Service Committee
on Fire Support of Seaborne Landings against Heavily
Defended Coasts,” in consultation with the Service Min-
istries, produced a paper of its considerations in August
1943.8
The Committee recommended that the CCO, Admi-
ralty and War Office take action to improve the accuracy
of naval and air bombardment, provide additional special
support craft and improve the design of those already in
existence, and continue the investigation and development
of all weapons for dealing with coast defence guns and
destroying beach obstacles.
The Committee recommendations were not anything
new in specifics rather, a pat on the back for the Ministries
to keep up the good work and continue to improve and
add to the existing equipment.
The COS duly noted the recommendations with the
First Sea Lord proposing that a Committee of all three
Services be set up to study the problem of the provision
of close support of troops on a heavily defended coast.
The COS approved the First Sea Lord’s proposal and
directed that an Inter-Services Committee be set up as a
matter of urgency with the following terms of reference:
“to consider all existing means of providing fire support
when landing forces on a heavily defended coast, and to
make recommendations, as a matter of urgency, for im-
proving the degree of support.”
The Inter-Service Committee first met at COHQ on

165
4 September 1943, under the Chairmanship of Air Vice-
Marshal R. Graham (AOCO). The other members of the
Committee were Rear-Admiral W. Patterson, Major-
GeneralJ. A. C. Whitaker, Major-General W. J. Eldridge,
Air Vice-Marshal W. A. Coryton and Air Vice-Marshal
Breakey. The Scientific Advisers to the three Service Min-
istries attended all meetings and representatives of the
three Service Ministries, COSSAC, C-in-C Portsmouth, C-
in-C Fighter Command, C-in-C Bomber Command, VIII
and IX U.S. Army Air Force, 21st Army Group, the Liaison
Officer Tactical Air Force and COHQ were present at the
majority of the meetings.®*
Among the papers considered were all those submit-
ted previously to the COS by the CCO. All existing means
of support and those under development by CCO were
considered at subsequent meetings.
By 17 December 1943, the final report of this Com-
mittee was submitted to the COS together with a seven-
page covering note summarising the scope of investiga-
tions, the conclusion and recommendations.® As far as
COHQ was concerned, it was recommended that action be
continued to augment the fire support from landing craft
and special craft in any way possible, investigate further
the explosive head and/or fusing of five-inch rockets, and
improve the arrangements for aircraft recognition and
control of A.A. fire.
The report became known as the Graham Report and
was finally published as a Cabinet paper on 7 January
1944. This paper had a wide distribution to planning staffs
and, on the request of CCO, copies were sent to Allied
Expeditionary Forces, Southeast Asia and Mediterranean
Commands.® .
The importance of the Graham Report lay in the fact
that it became a guide for staff planners because it con-
sisted of statistical data governing weight of support re-
quired to neutralise or destroy different types of targets
under various conditions. Unfortunately, it did not or per-

166 ‘
haps could not put forward any new methods or sugges-
tions as to how close support might be provided in future
operations.
A positive action taken was that the responsibility of
keeping the Graham Report under review, and revising
it in the light of operational experience was delegated by
the Joint Technical Warfare Committee to a standing sub-
committee, the Assault Warfare Committee. COHQ was
represented on the Assault Warfare Committee by the Sci-
entist ProfessorJ.D. Bernal and CommanderJ. H. Unwin,
both members of the Experiments and Developments De-
partment.
The Graham Committee members had studied recent
American operations in the Pacific and drew comparisons
between the weight of fire support put down by American
forces and the theoretical scales recommended in their
report. While they knew that only one-third of the theo-
retical scale was used, they could not conclude any scientific
analysis of the effects. As a result, the CCO recommended
to the Technical Warfare Committee that a scientist who
had experience on this subject be sent to America to make
a detailed study of the effect of fire support in the Pacific.
This proposal was agreed to by the COS and the Senior
Scientific Adviser to the War Office, who was due to visit
the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, was briefed
to study this aspect of the war.®®
As the time neared for operation Overlord, all sorts of
recommendations to improve the fire support necessary
for a successful landing came into the Service Ministries.
One came from the C-in-C Home Forces who put forward
a proposal to C-in-C Portsmouth, whom the Admiralty had
made responsible for co-ordinating the demands for all
support craft, to consider the possibility of mounting two
Centaur tanks, armed with 95-mm guns, on a platform in
an armoured LCT. The LCG(M) production, which had
been designed to fill the gap between “H” hour and the
deployment of the divisional field artillery, fell far short

167
of the requirement which was now assessed by the COS-
SAC planners as thirty-six craft for each Assault Division.
As an interim measure, the LCT with two Centaur tanks
with its 95-mm guns, was suggested.
The C-in-C Portsmouth readily accepted the proposal
and requested the Admiralty to make LCTs available for
this purpose. CCO provided Bombardment Liaison Offi-
cers to assist in their training which took place at Studland
Bay near Poole. The Admiralty agreed that the tanks,
which had been made available by the War Office, be
manned by Royal Marines. The Royal Marines Armoured
Support Group (RMASG) was vested with its primary role,
that of providing close support for the assault battalions.
In addition, there were five Independent Armoured Sup-
port Batteries in this role. Royal Armoured Corps drivers
were drafted to the RMASG.”
For the RMASG, their task was successfully carried
out in Overlord when they landed at “H” hour. Owing to
the fact that only sixty percent of their guns made the
passage and that there was no FOO within the RMASG,
their effectiveness was limited. They did, however,
strengthen the divisional artillery and, with the landed
tanks, operated up to ten miles inland. The two Royal
Marines Support Regiments, which made up the RMASG,
returned to other duties and the RMASG was disbanded
in October 1944.

Operation Torch and the Question of Landing Craft Crews

Operation Torch became an amphibious assault op-

eration of “firsts,” not withstanding it being the first An-
glo-American amphibious operation of the war. For
America, it was the first amphibious operation with an Ally
in this Century. For the British, it was the first combined
amphibious operation with an Ally, since Gallipoli, dis-
counting raids.

168
 The political ramifications of invading French North
Africa were enormous particularly since it involved former
Allies and the possibility of a neutral Spain becoming in-
volved. The planning of five separate assaults was carried
out in London and Washington coupled with endeavour-
ing to solve the problems of security for the vast convoys
sailing to the target areas from Britain and America.
British experience of COHQ planning staffs and in-
ter-service co-operation up to that time helped in solving
some of the problems. In America, joint planning between
the Army and Navy, other than a peacetime exercise, was
new, and being new had all of the seemingly insurmount-
able problems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the final re-
sponsibility and therefore principal interest in the planning.
Perhaps their interest accelerated the staffs of the Com-
mander of the Western Task Force, Major General George
S. Patton, and the Commander of the Western Naval Task
Force, Rear-Admiral Kent Hewitt, to fully co-operate with
one another. In all events, the three groups involved in
the Morocco landings of 35,000 men were quite successful.
The Centre and Eastern British and American landing
forces which seized Oran and Algiers were also successful.
The Torch operation did not pit the Allied landing
forces against the Germans, not for any reason other than
they were not there, but rather against the uncertain
French whose allegiance to Vichy was in question. French
opposition existed in some but not all landing areas. Where
it did exist, it was quickly overcome.
Many mistakes were made and many valuable lessons
learnt from this first combined amphibious operation.
Most mistakes were predictable, such as the consequences
of inexperienced landing craft crews that did not get troops
to designated beaches. It became apparent that some form
of Army beach organisation was necessary, in addition to
the Naval Beach Parties. In this operation, some small ports
were not captured as quickly as had been hoped and stores
were landed on the beaches and then re-loaded into lorries

169
by Pioneers. In both the British and American armies, a
form of beach organisation was instituted and used in sub-
sequent operations thus relieving naval and engineering
personnel to perform other duties.
On a higher level, integrated planning staffs of Of-
ficers of all Services and nationalities proved most suc-
cessful. The concept of an Allied Commander-in-Chief
commanding all forces assigned to the Operation set the
pattern for all subsequent operations. Lieutenant-General
D. D. Eisenhower, as Allied Commander-in-Chief, desig-
nated Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
as overall Allied Naval Commander and wanted an overall
Allied Air Commander but did not get his way on this
matter. He had to content himself with an Air Staff Officer,
Air Commodore A. P. M. Sanders, at his Headquarters.
Historian Michael Howard wrote:

Nor could (Eisenhower) persuade the British to adopt the

American system whereby the Army commander had au-
thority over his directly supporting air units. In making
such a suggestion he was treading on more delicate ground
than he knew, for the British Army and the RAF were
engaged in a long debate over precisely this question of
Army—Air Co-operation which as yet showed no sign of
being resolved. General Eisenhower was thus persuaded
to accept the working arrangement which had been de-
veloped in the Middle East between General Auchinleck
and Air Chief Marshal Tedder whereby during a battle
period, as defined by the military commander, the air com-
mander devoted his resources to the targets which his army
colleagues indicated, but had unfettered discretion in the
matter in which he carried out his task. . . .°°

Air support co-ordination under a single Supreme

Commander of all Allied forces was resolved in attendant
operations. It is likely that the air support control question
in Operation Torch was not pressed because of the simul-
taneous landings in five widespread target areas and the

170 ‘
fine support of aircraft of ground operations from the five
carriers and seven escort carriers.
What the British had learned at Dakar regarding the
need for a separate Headquarters Ship, the Americans, in
spite of British advise, learned at Torch. General George
Patton insisted on staying aboard the cruiser USS Augusta,
considering it his Headquarters. Unfortunately, the Aw-
gusta went off at full speed after some French destroyers
before Patton could join his troops ashore. The problem
of a separate Headquarters Ship and Ground Command-
ers did not arise again.
While Torch was a success, the operation had put a
most severe strain on all combined operations resources.
The requirements for Torch entailed the employment of
far more landing ships and craft than could prudently be
spared if a return to Northwest Europe (Round-Up) was to
be made in 1943. The CCO, knowing the situation ofland-
ing ships and crews before the operation, set out in two
memoranda to the COS during October the situation as
it existed.®? He pointed out that Torch had taken more
landing craft than he could produce crews and that he had
to make up the deficiency by taking men from other Royal
Navy resources. He further pointed out that the standard
of training of a large part of the craft crews and assault
forces was not high enough for a tough or protracted as-
sault. He said that so large a part of the Naval Combined
Operations Command had been given up to Torch that it
would not be possible to train an adequate new force before
the Summer of 1943.
The Joint Planning Staff, which was then engaged in
the preparation of a paper setting out global requirements
in ships and craft, took the CCO’s memoranda into account
in the paper. It estimated that even if overriding priority
were given to Round-Up, an assault in 1943 could not be
made with more than four to six Brigades. If Round-Up
were abandoned and successes in the Mediterranean ex-
ploited, operations would be limited to one at a time and

Pal
even the capture of Sicily might be beyond the resources
on hand.”°
Nevertheless, planning for combined operations con-
tinued for both a return to the Continent, in the event of
a German collapse, and for seizing a limited bridgehead.
The situation regarding the provision of crews for
landing ships and craft had become critical. To add to the
situation, the programme of more landing ships and craft
production had been accelerated.
The intake of naval personnel had, however, been
restricted by a War Cabinet decision to the extent that it
was quite impossible to meet the normal Fleet commit-
ments and at the same time provide the rapidly increasing
numbers of men for the manning of combined operations
ships and craft. The only possible solution was to increase
the intake into the Navy, a difficult matter in view of the
War Cabinet’s ruling.
The Prime Minister took note of the CCO’s messages
to the COS and sought to allay his fears about landing
craft crews. In a personal Minute to the CCO, he stated:

We must be careful not to make heavy weather over the

manning oflanding craft. No doubt there must be a nucleus
of skilled personnel to handle them and keep the engines
in order. They do not have to be kept up however like a
fleet or flotilla as they are only needed for a special op-
eration and if all goes well only for the preliminary stages
of that. If it were decided that the time had come for such
an operation both the Fleet and the Army would have to
provide men specially for the month or three weeks con-
cerned. We could not possibly afford to tie up a large mass
of men indefinitely waiting for the chance of a big cross-
Channel operation. First let us get the craft and meanwhile
make a scheme to put them into skeleton preparation ca-
pable of being brought up to fuller strength as the moment
comes nearer. In trying to be perfect you will spoil the
whole thing.”!

[72 .
 Admiral Mountbatten, CCO, attached a copy of the
Prime Minister’s Minute to a note that he sent to “every
naval department” for their comments. He felt that the
Prime Minister’s Minute “may have the most serious re-
percussions.”’? He was primarily alarmed that if any re-
duction in the manning requirements oflanding craft were
made at that time, which were already critically short, fu-
ture commitments in the Mediterranean would certainly
have to be curtailed. He based his statement on the critical
manpower shortage and the fact that he simply could not
get replacements.
The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff of the
COS replied to the CCO that perhaps a system oftraining,
such as what was done with Army personnel, could be
applied with naval personnel. In the case of Army per-
sonnel, apart from the Special Service Brigade, the men
went through a course of training in CTCs and were then
returned to the Army. They were not limited to assault
landings but were fully trained soldiers available, if re-
quired, for any kind of operation. Why not do the same
for naval personnel? Admiral Pound suggested that all
combined-operations naval personnel in the future be
taken from the general pool of the Royal Navy and re-
turned to it for normal duties after undergoing the nec-
essary course of combined operations training, being liable
to recall for refresher course and for any major operation
eventually decided upon.”
There is no indication in the CCOs reply to the Prime
Minister of Admiral Pound’s suggestion. One can only sur-
mise that any Commander, whether it be of a Staff, Fleet
or an Army, would sooner have their personnel physically
under their control, rather than have them in a “liable for
recall” status.
In any event, the CCO replied to the Prime Minister
stressing the fact that the change of strategy which involved
overseas, as opposed to cross-channel operations, “has

173
meant an increased commitment so far as the manning of
combined operations landing craft is concerned.” He
stated:
Present plans arising from our Mediterranean and raiding
strategy under consideration involve the full manning of
all types of craft, except for purely cross-channel types such
as barges which will be put into care and maintenance. The
active employment with its resultant wastage, coupled with
the greater drafting commitments introduced by operating
more remotely from the sources of supply of manpower,
all tend to increase the demands. . . . Apart from the actual
requirements in personnel for manning craft, there is also
the increased load placed on maintenance by the more
active employment of the craft. Already as a result of
“Torch” commitments and damage incurred in training
and rehearsing for that operation, the maintenance organ-
isation is stretched to its absolute limit, with the result that
it is probable that through sheer inability to keep the main-
tenance up to date, it may be necessary to curtail some of
the combined operations training of the army assault Bri-
gades required for further overseas assaults.”

No one can be at all sure what effect, if any, the CCO’s

letter had on the Prime Minister, but the pressure to re-
duce manning requirements of landing craft, for the time,
was overtaken by events two months later. In January 1943,
the CCOS met at Casablanca and while agreeing that plans
should be prepared both for a return to the Continent in
the event of German disintegration, and for seizing a lim-
ited bridgehead, they decided to attack Sicily (Husky) in
July 1943.75
The CCO went ahead on endeavouring to obtain full
crews, including maintenance personnel, for the present
and future landing craft. It was estimated by the Director
of Personnel Services of the Admiralty in February 1943
that in order to meet the July 1943 target figure, with full
crews, it was estimated that for the next six months, 390
seamen and 250 engine-room ratings would be necessary
each week for training.”°

174
 Admiral Mountbatten decided to make a direct ap-
proach to Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour. He asked
Bevin what could be done to get about ten thousand more
sailors. The Admiral explained that in order to meet future
commitments to return to the Continent, he must obtain
and train the sailors and give them as much experience as
possible in handling landing craft. Bevin noted that Field
Marshal Alan Brooke wanted ten thousand men as soldiers
for the invasion army. The CCO pointed out that, “he
(Alan Brooke) doesn’t seem to realise that they cannot be
got across to France unless the CCO can man the extra
landing craft. He said that he did not want a frightful row
by going to the War Cabinet over the heads of the COS,
which would make his position difficult.”””7 Bevins advised
the CCO that he would simply send the men to him for
training as landing craft crews, as he regarded the crews
to take the soldiers to France as part of the necessary man-
power for the Army.

Operation Husky

As noted, the Sicily operation was decided on at the

Casablanca Conference in January 1943. On 10 July 1943,
the invasion of Sicily had begun. The pattern for planning
and training for amphibious operations was well set by
COHQ. The directive issued to Eisenhower stated that the
planning for the operation was to be carried out by the
staffs, on the spot, at his Algerian Headquarters. The CCO
was not out of the picture; he was responsible for advising
the Commanders on the combined operations aspects of
the assault. Admiral Mountbatten flew to Algiers to discuss
with Eisenhower and his Commanders the provision of the
necessary additional landing ships and landing craft. He
sent additional planners from the COHQ to North Africa
to be utilised by the Supreme Commander with the inte-
grated planning staffs engaged on planning the operation.

175
 Training of the forces to be employed, which were
already in the Mediterranean, had of necessity to be carried
out on the spot. Here again, COHQ training staff was
requested to assist. The Canadian Division, to join the
forces in the Mediterranean, was trained at the CTC in
Scotland and an additional American Division coming di-
rectly from the States was trained in Massachusetts. Beach
reconnaissance by the COPPs was again utilised and fire
support by LCG and converted LCT provided LCT(R).
Of all the landing craft utilised in Husky, perhaps the
new British-American design, American built LST (2)
emerged as a prime factor in amphibious operations. The
LST, used for the first time in large numbers, had origi-
nally been designed for landing tanks and motor transport.
It was a great asset when tanks and motor transport could
be brought to the edge of the beach in addition to all other
forms of equipment and stores.
Torch and Husky set the pattern for successful am-
phibious operations in Europe up to and including Over-
lord. The formula consisted of a Supreme Commander,
with Allied integrated Staffs, Allied naval and ground com-
manders, and sufficient landing craft. With each opera-
tion, deficiencies were corrected—better fire support, air
cover and introduction of new landing craft, as the DUKW
(a 2% ton amphibian lorry) and LST (2). Development in
techniques and tactics were important. As an example,
shortly before the invasion of Sicily, it was concluded that
the capture of Pantelleria (June 1943) was essential for use
as an air base and to deny reconnaissance to the enemy.
It was decided to rely entirely on preliminary bombard-
ment for the neutralisation of the very formidable coast
defences of the island, and owing to the scarcity of suitable
beaches to assault, the port itself would be the primary
target. This operation was therefore in the nature of a trial
to assess the effectiveness of air bombing on well-protected
coast defences.
The success achieved by this form of neutralisation

176
was very satisfying and was reflected in the initial landing
force casualties which amounted to but a few minor oc-
currences. It was found that although the guns themselves
were not destroyed, all of the communications and sig-
nalling arrangements had been dislocated with the crew
casualties or temporarily stunned.
After Sicily, the desire for surprise, as opposed to pre-
naval and air bombardment was not pursued as vigorously
as before. Pantelleria was not the reason, however; the fact
that Italy was the next target came as no surprise to the
enemy. What was important was the fact that Pantelleria
was a good example of what pre-assault bombardment
could do while eschewing the element of surprise. As noted
in the next chapter, pre-assault bombardment, used by the
Americans in the Pacific, was always an integral part of
every amphibious operation.
Development of technique in the application of naval
gunfire at Husky was noted by the American Naval His-
torian Samuel Eliot Morison. He felt that the greatest con-
tribution of the operation was the “demonstration of what
naval gunfire could do in support of troops fighting within
a few miles of the shore. There were many instances where
naval gunfire was successfully utilized, much to the aston-
ishment of sceptical army commanders.”’®
In subsequent operations at Salerno and Anzio and
particularly later at Overlord, the technique of naval gunfire
in support of ground troops was generously employed.

Operation Overlord

What can be said of Overlord that has not already been

covered by the hundreds of accounts, personal and official,
of the greatest amphibious operation in history? The main
lessons learnt from Overlord largely confirmed lessons pre-
viously learned. When the outline plan for Overlord was
submitted to the COS by COSSAC, he laid down three

7
major conditions affecting the success of the operation.
Firstly, and above all other conditions, he considered that
an overall reduction in the front line strength of the Ger-
man Air Force was necessary. Secondly, a limitation in the
number or effectiveness of German offensive formations
in France. And lastly, the provision of sheltered water to
permit the continued and prolonged beach maintenance,
considered essential to a landing.
It is interesting that only the latter condition of a pro-
vision for sheltered water had anything directly to do with
an amphibious operation. The former two conditions
could ideally be applied to any ground combat as well as
an amphibious operation. There apparently was no doubt
from the COSSAC staff point of view that the phases en-
tailed in the amphibious operation itself were as perfected
as they could be; hence, it was not a condition of success.
The first two conditions outlined by COSSAC were
taken care of by the massive air offensive of the Allied air
forces. The third condition of providing sheltered water
was overcome by artificial harbours, the “Mulberries.”
While the “Mulberries” were used the first and last time
at Overlord, the imagination and resources of the Ministries
concerned has to be a highlight in the history of amphib-
ious warfare.
After Overlord, the South of France was invaded in
Operation Dragoon, formerly Anvil, in August 1944. There
were two more amphibious operations in the Scheldt Es-
tuary approach to Antwerp, Switchback in October and In-
fatuate I and ITin November 1944. The Infatuate operations
were to be the last combined operation of the European
war.

COHQ Reorganisation

It is important to note the reorganisation of COHQ

before Overlord and the recommendation affecting its or-
ganisation after Overlord.

178
 In August 1943, a further meeting of the CCOS was
held in Quebec (Quadrant). At this meeting the outline plan
for Overlord, which was prepared by COSSAC, was ap-
proved. At the same time it was decided that an operation
be carried out in the South of France (Anvil) in order to
create a diversion for Overlord. At this conference the pro-
vision of artificial harbours— “Mulberries’—were dis-
cussed in detail and it was decided to provide two. Finally,
the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) was established and
Admiral Mountbatten, at that time the CCO, was ap-
pointed Supreme Allied Commander.
On his appointment, Admiral Mountbatten submitted
a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in which
he discussed the future of COHQ.” He described how
conditions had changed since his original appointment and
reviewed the need for modifications of the headquarters.
He pointed out that, although originally he had been
charged with the planning and mounting of raids and the
buildup of an assault fleet; raiding might now devolve
upon the COS to the COSSAC so that it could be related
to future operations, and that since the summer of 1943,
the Admiralty had assumed full responsibility for the as-
sault fleet. There remained to the CCO the following func-
tions: (a) Study of tactical and technical problems of
amphibious assaults and the formulation of doctrine and
staff requirements; (b) Advice on all aspects of planning
and training for amphibious assaults; (c) Co-ordination of
the general training policy for amphibious assaults for all
three Services and the control of CT'Cs in the United King-
dom; (d) Coordination of the development of communi-
cation materiel and inter-communication technique in
amphibious warfare; and finally (e) Control of the Special
Service Force in the United Kingdom prior to the whole
or any part of it being handed over to a Force Commander.
Admiral Mountbatten then went on to explain how,
in the light of the reduced functions of the CCO and the
fact that the technique and problems of combined oper-
ation were by then widely known, the study and devel-

179
opment of the amphibious aspect of combined operations
could best be carried out both in the present and postwar
period. In his opinion, there were in principle two possible
systems which could be adapted: '
System A: The retention of an independent organi-
sation under the control of one man, who would be re-
sponsible for the functions outlined above to the Ministry
of Defence through the COS. He would have under him
a reduced organisation based on the existing COHQ and
sufficient for its reduced functions. Whether he would be
a member of the COS or not would depend on the em-
phasis laid on the active study and development of com-
bined operations and the role of the latter in future
strategy.
System B: The establishment of a Directorate of Com-
bined Operations within each Service Ministry. The study
of technique and formulation of policy for combined op-
erations would be the responsibility of a combined oper-
ations staff formed within the COS organisation and
working under the directions of three Directors of Com-
bined Operations in a similar manner to the JPS. Under
this system, the control of CT'Cs, the COXE and the Special
Service Force with its inter-service units would devolve
upon one of the Service Ministers. The combined opera-
tions staff would confine itself to the formulation of policy
for consideration by the COS and for the promulgation
of that policy when it had been approved.
Admiral Mountbatten recommended System A. He
believed that the advantages of having one head, bearing
ultimate responsibility for all decisions taken within the
scope of his functions, outweighed the disadvantages of an
establishment which had not the authority of a Service
Ministry.
Admiral Mountbatten’s proposals were first studied
by the VCOS. The Vice-Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS), Vice-
Admiral Sir E. Syfret, submitted the lone recommendation
of selecting System B, preferring a combined operations
staff within the COS organisation.*°

180 :
 When the COS read it, they agreed with Mountbatten
and his selection of System A, noting that “COHQ would
work better with a single Head. . . . experience had tended
to show that responsibilities of this nature might not be
efficiently discharged without the direction of a single
ead?
The COS unanimously agreed that, in the new cir-
cumstances, the size of COHQ should be reduced and it
was decided to appoint an impartial authority to report on
the whole question without waiting for the appointment
of a new CCO. The COS invited Air Marshal N. J. Bot-
tomley, DCAS, to make the necessary investigation and
report.
Within a fortnight, the Bottomley Committee re-
ported to the COS affirming that the COHQ be maintained
as a central organisation for the study and development
of the technique of combined operations. They recom-
mended substantial reduction of the CTCs. They specifi-
cally advocated that the COHQ be remodeled with the
staff being divided into four functional groups, each group
consisting of acomposite staff from all three Services work-
ing under a Branch Head or Executive.
In submitting the report, Bottomley added a personal
note to his conclusions by way of explaining what he
thought the relationship between the CCO and the COS
should be. He pointed out that, as then constituted, COHQ
was independent of the Service Ministries and that the
Prime Minister, as Minister of Defence, was its ministerial
head. Accordingly, the CCO had on occasion reported
directly to the Prime Minister. Bottomley interjected that
perhaps “the changed responsibilities of COHQ called for
a change in this practice.”*? In view of the reduced re-
sponsibilities, the CCO might now be responsible for his
functions to the Minister of Defence through the COS.
Bottomley recommended that the CCO “sit in with the
COS whenever matters appropriate to his responsibilities
were under discussion.”
The COS approved all of the Bottomley recommen-
181
dations and did not comment on his “personal note” on
the relationship of the CCO with the COS. They instructed
Major-General Wildman-Lushingham, interim CCO, to
submit, in consultation with the Service Ministries, a de-
tailed estimate based on the principles set out in the Bot-
tomley Report.**
By November 1943, Major-General R. E. Laycock RM,
the new CCO, received a new directive from the COS es-
sentially setting forth the functions, as outlined by Admiral
Mountbatten two months before. The CCO would con-
tinue to “study, advise and co-ordinate.” He was to con-
tinue to control the Special Service Group until it was
handed over to a Force Commander for operations. Most
importantly, the CCO was to give advice to the COS on
amphibious matters and was to be “available to attend the
COS Committee when required. In addition, he had direct
access to the Minister of Defence on all matters for which
he was responsible.”**
Thus, the COS at the time saw no need to change the
relationship of the CCO to the Minister of Defence.

Royal Marines and the Future of Amphibious Warfare

What started out as a query in May 1944, by Sir An-

drew Cunningham, the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval
Staff, on the future of the Royal Marines, with particular
reference to their responsibilities for amphibious opera-
tions, during a Chiefs of Staff meeting, evolved into a mild
uproar within the Admiralty, causing concerned expres-
sions on the faces of many from the War Office. It also
produced numerous memoranda within the Admiralty
and two major Committee Reports, one from the Chiefs
of Staff and the other from the Admiralty.
The First Sea Lord submitted a memorandum to the
COS stating that the Royal Marines “should be given a
more definite and important role, and one which is in

182
consonance with its training and traditions. ... The Royal
Marines should assume greater responsibilities than have
hitherto been assigned to it for the assault phase of Com-
bined Operations.”*® Cunningham felt the Royal Marines
should be given a statutory responsibility for the provision,
training and technical development of all special assault
forces which the COS decided to maintain in the future.
The key words in the Cunningham memorandum ap-
pear to be “in the future.” He was not advocating any
immediate change for the Royal Marines and certainly not
anything affecting the present combined operations or-
ganisation. However, if his proposals for future respon-
sibilities for the Royal Marines were approved, “the status
and organisation of COHQ would be affected . . . far from
any destructive implications on CCO’s organisation, the
assumption by the Royal Marines of greater responsibility
for amphibious operations, would entail closer integration
and amalgamation of COHQ with the Royal Marine
Corps.”
The First Sea Lord did not envision the Royal Marines
undertaking responsibility for the organisation and exe-
cution of combined operations on the scale that was being
waged at the time, such as Husky, Torch or Shingle, involving
the employment of large Naval, Army and Air Forces,
planned and controlled by a Supreme Commander with
a large Inter-Service Staff. Rather he envisioned having
the Royal Marines “assume the responsibility for the pro-
vision of units required for those special amphibious tasks
necessary for the assault phase of a combined operation,”
such as the Commandos, Beach Groups, COPPs and oth-
ers.
Admiral Cunningham bolstered his arguments by
quoting some nice things about the United States Marine
Corps:

It should not be overlooked that the United States Marine

Corps has played a momentous part in the noteworthy

183
 amphibious operations which the Americans have con-
ducted in the Pacific. Had not the U.S. Marine Corps been
organised and maintained in sufficient strength in peace-
time, these operations in the Pacific could not, in my view,
have been carried out. I do not advocate the modelling of
the Royal Marines exactly on the lines of the U.S. Marine
Corps, but I think the dividend which the latter Corps, as
being responsible service for experiment and research in
amphibious operations, has paid to the United States in
this war is significant.*®

One can only conclude that the First Sea Lord was a
man of wisdom with firsthand knowledge of American
Marines and amphibious warfare.
The First Sea Lord summed up his memorandum by
requesting the COS to authorise the setting up of an Inter-
Service Committee to work out the means of implementing
the principle that “the Royal Marines should assume the
responsibility for the provision of units required for those
special amphibious tasks necessary for the assault phase of
a combined operation.”
Admiral Cunningham stated that his views on this
matter were supported by the present CCO (Laycock) and
his predecessor, Admiral Mountbatten.
Major-General R. Laycock RM, CCO, did indeed sup-
port the First Sea Lord. He expressed fears, however, that
the study and development of combined operations might
well go by default in the postwar period, because there was
a natural tendency for all three Services to look inward
towards their own interests and organisation. He realised
that restrictions of finance and manpower would tend to
make it difficult for three Services to voluntarily carry out
measures which, though necessary from the point of view
of future combined operations, would often conflict with
purely Service interests. He therefore supported Cun-
ningham’s proposal that an Inter-Service Committee be
appointed. Laycock believed that an organisation should
be required to study combined operations, which would

184 .
have strong Inter-Service representation “and a constitu-
tional position which makes it independent of any one of
the three Service Ministries and representation, when nec-
essary, on the Chiefs of Staff level.”®’
Acting quickly on the First Sea Lord Memorandum
and the CCO Memorandum, the COS urged that an ad
hoc sub-committee be set up with the following composi-
tion and terms of reference: Chairman—Air Marshal N.
H. Bottomley, DCAS, with (members) Vice Admiral G. J.
A. Miles, Admiralty; Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald M.
Weeks, DCIGS, War Office; Major-General R. Laycock,
CCO; and Lieutenant General Sir Thomas L. Hunton,
General Officer Commanding Royal Marines.
The terms of reference for the Committee, in what
was to be called the “Responsibility for Amphibious War-
fare” (RAW) Committee, were to “consider future Inter-
Service responsibility for amphibious warfare with partic-
ular reference to the employment of the Royal Marines;
it being recognised that the retention of a Combined Serv-
ice element on the lines of that already existing in COHQ
be essential to any future amphibious warfare organisa-
tion.”** The COS asked the Committee to report within a
month.
While the Inter-Service Responsibility for Amphibious
Warfare Committee was doing its work, the Admiralty set
up an internal Committee headed by Rear Admiral F. H.
W. Goolden, to consider “future policy in the sphere of
amphibious operations affecting the Royal Marines.”*? Es-
sentially, Goolden and the other four members of his Com-
mittee, were ordered to revise the instructions for the
General Officer Commanding, Royal Marines (GOCRM),
and to bring the Royal Marines Staff closer to the De-
partments and Divisions of the Admiralty concerned with
amphibious tasks. The Admiralty Committee members
kept in close contact with Vice-Admiral Miles and Lieu-
tenant-General Hunton, the Admiralty and Royal Marines
representatives on the RAW Committee. After the RAW

185
Committee made its report, the Admiralty Committee had
six weeks more to work on the details of the recommen-
dations contained in the report, in addition to its original
task of looking at the organisation of the Royal Marines.
This was all timely to the Admiralty Committee, since its
recommendations were directly affected by what was pro-
posed in the RAW Committee report.
In the RAW Committee report, Bottomley and the
other members of the Committee agreed that preparation
for amphibious warfare must become part of the perma-
nent defence system. Responsibility for amphibious war-
fare policy and in particular for training and technique
should be vested in a Central Organisation, independent
of the three Service Ministries, but inter-service in char-
acter. COHQ, as then organised, had both these charac-
teristics and they recommended that it be retained
permanently on broadly the present lines as the central
organisation for this purpose. The members agreed that
the CTCs and Experimental Establishment should logically
be under the permanent control of the CCO and that if
the Office of the Minister of Defence be perpetuated, the
Minister of Defence continue his present responsibility for
the Central Organisation.
There were other recommendations but perhaps the
most important directly affecting the Royal Marines in-
dicated that the RAW Committee members were not will-
ing to give the Royal Marines the primary responsibility
for the conduct of amphibious warfare, nor were they
willing to have the Royal Marines dominate the central
organisation. They stated:

The (Central) Organisation must also continue to be Inter-

Service if it is to be effective. It has been suggested that a
permanent nucleus of the staff of the Central Organisation
should consist of Royal Marines, who, by the nature of their
Service might be the best qualified to study the broad prob-
lems of amphibious warfare. We do not support this pro-
posal. In our view we must retain at the centre an

186 2
 organisation which is not only independent but Inter-
Service. An amphibious operation involves all three Ser-
vices, and each Service has its own contribution to make to
the problem. The personnel of the organisation should
therefore be drawn, as at present, from all three Services,
not only because their Service knowledge is required, but
because in this way we shall ensure that the co-operation
which is so essential between the Central authorities and
the Service Ministries is maintained. In addition, by this
means, knowledge of Combined Operations will be dissem-
inated throughout the Services. . . . The principle that the
staff for the Central Organisation should be found from
the three Services does not preclude the employment of
Royal Marines. Many appointments can suitably be filled
by them, although no firm allotment should be made.°°

The Committee was against having a Specialist Corps, “on

the lines of the U.S. Marines,” in an assault force role.

In our view such a course would be uneconomic and in-

advisable. A specialist assault force has the disadvantage
that after the assault it does not fit into the framework of
the operations which must be undertaken primarily by the
army supported by air forces. After the assault phase such
a specialised force would become redundant. Furthermore,
in any major operation a specialist force of the size we could
afford to maintain would probably not be large enough
even for the assault phase, and army units would have to
be trained to supplement it.... We are therefore con-
vinced that the Assault Force in war must be provided by
the Army, Navy and Air Force proper, so that our policy
in peace should be to keep the three services in a state of
readiness for amphibious warfare.

While the Royal Marines were not recommended for

a specialist assault force role in war or peace, it was sug-
gested that they be employed in “certain specialist units
under control of the CCO and a permanent Naval assault
force under Admiralty control but available to CCO during
the training season.” It was pointed out that certain spe-

187
cialist units required in amphibious operations do not fall
easily within the responsibilities of either the Royal Navy
or the Army, and their personnel require a certain knowl-
edge of both Services. Therefore, the Royal Marines would
be particularly suited to take over complete responsibility
for the provisions of personnel for these units.
It was recommended that the Royal Marines, “provide
the personnel for certain amphibious formations, both in
peace and war.” The “certain amphibious formations” re-
ferred to were Commandos and Small Operations Group
that included COPPs and Special Boat Section, and Beach
Groups. The Committee called the amphibious formations
“Special Service Group.” Thus, the First Sea Lord’s rec-
ommendations on the future of the Royal Marines as con-
tained in his 11 May 1944 memorandum were essentially
adopted by the RAW Committee. While the assault phase
of the combined operation was not given to the Royal
Marines, the “units required for those special amphibious
tasks,” as the First Lord stated, came about with the pro-
posal to form the Special Service Group.
It must be kept in mind that the recommendations by
RAW Committee pertaining to the Royal Marines were
additional responsibilities not substitute responsibilities.
The traditional duties of providing detachments for serv-
ice in H.M. Ships, manning gun armament, and providing
temporary defence of Naval and Fleet Air Arm Bases and
other duties approved by the Admiralty Board in October
1943 were not affected. The additional responsibilities
posed by the RAW Committee, and if approved by the
Admiralty Board, would require three thousand Marines
for the Special Service Group in peacetime. An additional
three thousand Royal Marines would be needed to provide
the major and minor landing craft crews as part of the
permanent Naval Assault Force, also recommended by the
Committee.
The Committee recommended, for peacetime train-
ing of the three Services, a permanent Naval Assault Force,
as part of the Fleet, of a lift for one Division. The Naval
XN
188
Assault Force would require, in addition to the three thou-
sand Royal Marines for landing craft crews, 64 ships, 135
major landing craft and 256 minor landing craft for a total
of about fourteen thousand Royal Navy Officers and
Ranks, which would include assault force Commanders
and Staff. It is interesting that the concept of a ready as-
sault force, advocated by Keyes and Mountbatten four
years earlier, was still a viable proposal, even to the point
of recommending it for after the war.
As was expected, the RAW Committee report got a
good going over from the Service Ministries. Keeping in
mind that the report was not as yet approved by the COS,
the Services circulated it among their Departments for
comments. The Air Ministry and War Office had no spe-
cific criticism nor comment, other than “interesting.” The
bulk of the comments came from the Admiralty in the
person of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Cunningham, who
raised the whole question in the first place. To assist him
in making a decision on the RAW findings, he directed
that a small committee, under the Chairmanship of Rear-
Admiral R. M. Servaes, ACNS (F), be set up to examine
the report. Other members of the Servaes Committee were
Captain G. A. Thistleton-Smith and Pay Captain F. L.
Horsey, both Naval Assistants to the First Sea Lord and
Mr. J. G. M. Allcock, Principal, Military Branch, who also
acted as secretary.
For two weeks, the Servaes Committee solicited com-
ments from most Division and Branch Heads within the
Admiralty. The Committee findings indicated that there
were no disagreements concerning the Royal Marines role
in amphibious warfare as expressed by the RAW Com-
mittee. There were, however, disagreements as to the fu-
ture of the COHQ. There were many in the Admiralty
who silently believed that over the years COHQ had almost
gained the status of a Ministry or, worse, a fourth Service.
They did not like it and they had an opportunity to point
out some facts.
The Servaes Committee marked the point that “alone

189
of the Services, amphibious warfare involves the Navy in
the permanent allocation to it of a large proportion of its
resources and effort. At the same time, nine-tenths of the
life of these naval forces and component units is not spent
in the assault nor even in direct training with the Army,
but in their own upkeep, training, and strategic move-
ments.” The Servaes Committee felt that the Admiralty
must retain undivided control of the government and di-
rection of these naval forces and bases, under their Naval
Commanders who were responsible to the Admiralty
through the ordinary naval chain of command, without
any independent but not superior authority having the
right of interposition or overriding control of policy. They
suggested the following:
To assist the Admiralty in its study of and provision for
amphibious warfare, the Admiralty would welcome the es-
tablishment of a Joint Amphibious Warfare Staff, com-
prising the Directors of the responsible Staffs in the three
Service Ministries expressly concerned in this subject, un-
der the permanent Chairmanship of an “advisor on Com-
bined Operations.” A small secretariat, preferably provided
from the War Cabinet Secretariat, would be needed. This
organisation would replace the existing COHQ organisa-
tion.?!

Cunningham reported to the COS essentially what the

Servaes report recommended. He said that CCO was the
COS adviser on combined operations matters and had no
responsibility for the provision of personnel and material,
nor for the planning and execution of the operations. His
advice and proposals were in fact implemented by inde-
pendent Service Ministries. Cunningham felt that “the
power to advise should be more where the responsibilities
lie, which is in the Ministries.” Cunningham stated that the
CCO position was unsatisfactory, since if there was a clash
of opinion between himself—the advisor—and the Service
Ministry—the provider—the authority of CCO could not

190
be upheld. The first Sea Lord noted that while the “present
system, CCO-COHQ, is not the best, no changes should
be made under existing war conditions. ...as the CCO
and the Service Ministries are making it work in a satis-
factory manner.”*? Cunningham noted that the Admiralty
did not consider it either necessary or desirable to come
to a decision immediately as regards the future organisa-
tion responsible for amphibious warfare. He did, however,
leave the COS with the thought that perhaps, after the
war, an Inter-Service Committee should be charged with
the responsibility of seeing that amphibious technique and
requirements remain up to date and sufficient. He sug-
gested that members of the proposed committee should
belong to the Service Ministries and represent their views.
He further stated that “a comparison be made with the
Joint Planning organisation, which in fact performs similar
functions to the COHQ, but in which members of the Joint
Planning Staff remain a part of their own Ministries and
have the weight of the Ministries’ operational and technical
staffs and departments behind them.”
It may be recalled that about one year before, when
Admiral Mountbatten was leaving COHQ and a re-
organisation of the headquarters by the Bottomley Com-
mittee was to take place, the Admiralty had recommended
the establishment of a Directorate of Combined Opera-
tions within each Service Ministry, to take the place of a
single head, such as the CCO. They felt that the study of
technique and formulation of policy for combined oper-
ations should be the responsibility of a staff formed within
COS organisation. This proposal was turned down by the
COS in preference for the single-head concept. The First
Sea Lord apparently felt it was time to look at a similar
proposal again for after the war.
There were other minor suggestions in the First Sea
Lord’s memorandum. As for the Royal Marines and the
Naval Assault Force, he stated that as “to the part to be
played by the Royal Marines in the inter-service organi-

19)
sation for amphibious warfare, they are considered sound
and satisfactory.” As for the Naval Assault Force, he be-
lieved that the exact size or composition of the postwar
force could not be decided now “since it will depend on
further war experience and the strength of postwar
forces.”
The CCO, Lieutenant-General R. E. Laycock, sub-
mitted amemorandum to the COS on the RAW Committee
report and also noted the comments of the First Sea Lord’s
memorandum. He differed on two main points with Cun-
ningham. He stated that he would recommend an inde-
pendent organisation under one head, who would be
responsible to the Minister of Defence under the general
direction of the COS and would be against an Inter-Service
Committee being responsible for amphibious warfare.
Unlike the Admiralty, which believed that a decision re-
garding the future of an organisation for amphibious war-
fare need not be considered at the time, the CCO believed
there were considerable advantages in reaching a broad
decision immediately regarding the future organisation.
In this way, he stated, the matter could be viewed impar-
tially, rather than at a later date when the need for am-
phibious preparedness is less evident and when, owing to
post-war economies, normal Service requirements were
likely to take precedence.**
The whole matter, including the RAW Committee
Report, First Sea Lord Memorandum and the CCO Mem-
orandum, was considered at a meeting of the COS on 29
July 1944. Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS (in the Chair), started
off by stating that “it would not be possible to accept those
proposals if they entailed an increase in the strength of the
Royal Marines at the expense of the Army manpower ceil-
ing.” Cunningham said he understood that this was not
the intention, and that the Admiralty would not accept a
scheme whereby the Royal Marines would be given in-
creased responsibilities, “but would be debarred from hav-
ing the necessary personnel to discharge them.” Laycock
explained that the report recommended that certain duties

192 :
at present undertaken by the Army (beach group) be trans-
ferred to the responsibility of the Royal Marines. He noted
that the only increase in the strength of the latter would
be the result of transferring the Army personnel employed
in those particular duties, and since the Army would thus
be relieved of various commitments, the manpower ceiling
for that Service would not be affected. Brooke withdrew
his objection on this matter but immediately expressed the
view that he was not in agreement with the First Sea Lord
on the matter of the responsibility for the conduct of am-
phibious warfare and for the control of COHQ. He be-
lieved that the recommendations by the RAW Committee
on this subject were sound. Sir Douglas Evill, VCAS,
agreed with this view.
Cunningham pointed out that he did not recommend
that the post of CCO be discontinued, but rather that the
CCO become the Head of the Inter-Service Committee,
which, in his view, should be made responsible for com-
bined operations. In short, he proposed that a final deci-
sion be deferred until after the end of the war. In any case,
he felt that the report would have to be studied by the
financial authorities in the Service Ministries before a con-
clusion could be reached.
Brooke proposed that the RAW Committee report be
approved in principle, and that COHQ remain as at pres-
ent, at least for the duration of the war. A final decision
on what would be necessary after the war must depend
upon the “nature of the Governmental machine estab-
lished for handling Defence matters in peacetime—e.g.
would a Ministry of Defence be set up, or would the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence be revived?”
The COS invited the Admiralty, in consultation with
the War Office and CCO, to implement the conclusions
and recommendations in the report which dealt with the
employment of the Royal Marines.”
While the COS approved in principle what the RAW
Committee report recommended, particularly concerning
the Royal Marines, the Admiralty still had another Com-
193
mittee to be heard from regarding the Royal Marines, the
Goolden Committee.
Rear-Admiral F. H. W. Goolden and his Committee
were instructed by the Admiralty to “consider future policy
in the sphere of amphibious operations affecting the Royal
Marines.” The Committee had been meeting intermittently
since 24 May 1944 and concurrently with the RAW Com-
mittee. After receiving word of the approval of the RAW
Committee report by the COS, Goolden and his group
submitted their report to the Admiralty Board 3 August
1944. They recommended that the Head of the Royal
Marines, now styled, “General Officer Commanding Royal
Marines,” be changed to “Commandant General Royal
Marines (CGRM).” They did not believe the old title was
appropriate since “General Officer Commanding” con-
notes the command of military forces in operations of war,
“a role which its holder is unlikely to be called upon to
undertake.” The Head of the Corps today is the Com-
mandant General, Royal Marines.
What the Goolden Committee recommended, in a
sense, reaffirmed the Royal Marines traditional as well as
wartime acquired responsibilities. The Royal Marines re-
sponsibilities today, in part, stem from the First Sea Lord’s
Memorandum of May 1944; out of his suggestion for the
Royal Marines “to provide units for those special amphib-
ious tasks necessary for the assault phase of a combined
operation” came the postwar Commando unit. It was true
that the Royal Marines and Army already were operating
as Commandos, but the First Sea Lord’s suggestion and
the subsequent COS approval of the RAW Committee re-
port made it clear that it was the Royal Marines Special
Service Group—the Commandos—that would provide the
postwar Commando with its speciality of amphibious op-
erations.
It would appear that the Goolden Committee report
in 1944 completed the circle begun by the Madden Com-
mittee in 1924, continued by the Watson Memorandum

194 .
in 1936 and advanced by the First Sea Lord’s Memoran-
dum and RAW Committee report in 1944.
With the amphibious operations in Europe at an end,
it is important to look at the amphibious operations in the
Pacific and Southeast Asia. The immediate difference
noted in the Pacific operations was the extensive planning
for such operations by the Americans against their poten-
tial enemy—Japan.

. PM to Ismay and Bridges, 17 Jul 1940, DEFE 2/1782a.

WO ltr, 24 Oct 1940, DEFE 2/697, (3/1890).
. COS (40) 468, 17 Jun 1940, CAB 80/13.
COS (41) 139, 14 Feb 1941, CAB 80/26.
. COS (40) 889, 20 Oct 1944, CAB 80/21.
COHQ War Diary No. 92, DEFE 2/1.
. COS (41) 166, 14 Mar 1941, CAB 89/26.
. COS (41) 178(0) 23 Aug 1941, CAB 80/59.
He
woNM
WORN DCO Organisation Report, 11 Dec 1940, Unsigned. Admiral Keyes enclosed
a copy of this report in a letter to the First Lord 5 Dec 1941 in which he
stated that Captain L. E. H. Maund, then in the Operations Division of the
Admiralty, was its author. (Adm Keyes Correspondence DEFE 2/698 and
ADM 1/9774.
10. COS (41) 185 (0), 28 Mar 1941 and COS (41) 190 (0), 30 Mar 1941, CAB
80/26.
11. COS (41) 589, 30 Sep 1941, CAB 80/30.
12. Keyes to PM, 6 Sept 1941, Keyes Correspondence, DEFE 2/698 and ADM
1/9774.
13. Mountbatten interview, op. cit., 18 Mar 1976.
14. COS (41) 629, 16 Oct 1941, CAB 80/31.
15. Annex II of Dir to ACO, 16 Oct 1941, CAB 79/15.
16. COS (41) 557, 25 Aug 1941, CAB 80/30.
17. COS (41) 315, 31 Aug 1941, CAB 79/14.
18. COS (JP) (41) 799, 16 Oct 1941, CAB 84/1.
19. COS (41) 605, 3 Oct 1941, CAB 80/31.
20. COS (41) 346, 8 Oct 1941, CAB 79/14.
21. COS (41) 668, 9 Nov 1941, CAB 80/31.
22. COS (41) 388, 14 Nov 1941, CAB 79/15.
23. COS (41) 732, 9 Dec 1941, CAB 80/32.
94, COS (41) 711, revised 4 Dec 1941, CAB 80/32.
25. COS (41) 732, CAB 80/32.
26. COS (42) 118, 18 Feb 1942, CAB 80/34.
97. COS (42) 174, 23 Mar 1942, CAB 80/35.
28. COS (42) 182, 31 Mar 1942, CAB 80/35.

195
 . COS (42) 60 (0) and COS (42) 175, 18 Mar 1942, CAB 79/56 and CAB 80/35.
. COS (41) 630, 16 Oct 1941, CAB 80/31.
. COS (42) 103 (0), CAB 79/57.
2. CCS 94, 24 July 1942, CAB 88/27.
. Mountbatten interview, op. cit., 18 Mar 1976.
. Admiral Mountbatten gave the Writer a copy of an address he made to the
Canadian Dieppe Veterans and Prisoners of War Association in Toronto
on 28 September 1973, from which these figures appear. This address was
later printed in the RUSI Journal in March 1974, Vol. 119/No. 1.
. COS (42) 402, 18 Nov 1942, CAB 80/38.
. JAAN (Washington, 1935).
. Joint Amphib Bd to CMC, 5 Aug 1941, HQMC, HRS.
. RAdm Julius A. Furer, USN (Ret), Administration of the Navy Department in
World War II (Washington, 1959), p. 590.
. Clifford, op. cit., p. 61.
. VAdm George Dyer, USN (Ret), The Amphibians Came To Conquer (Wash-
ington, 1972), Vol. I, p. 209.
. Kent R. Greenfield, et al., The Army Ground Forces: Organization of Ground
Combat.Troops: U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, 1947), p. 27.
. CG, PHIBLANT to GG, Ist JTF, 9 Sept 1941, MCS.
. CG, Ist JTF to CMG, 15 Jan 1942, HQOMC, HRS.
. GHQ Memo, 23 Feb 1942, OCMH (WD 353/25).
. JAAN, op. cit., 18(b) (1).
. WP 46, 8 Jul 1941, NHD.
. JPS Study, Feb 1942, NHD.
. RAdm R. K. Turner to Cominch, 15 Apr 1942, NHD.
. JPS 24, 29 Apr 1942, NHD.
. DEFE 2/697, p. 127, and Mountbatten to writer, 12 Mar 1975, affirming the
accuracy of the statement in the DEFE 2 material.
. Mountbatten to Writer, 12 Mar 1975, op. cit. The Writer asked Admiral
Mountbatten in the first interview 18 March 1976, if he thought Admiral
King would have had a choice refusing to train landing craft crews for
Europe considering the President’s support of a “Europe-first landing.” He
said no, King would have been overridden by the President. The important
thing was to avoid having the President make a choice in support or non-
support of King or Marshall.
BZ. COMINCH—C/S USA Memo, 8 Mar 1943, NHD.
5S. COS (42) 44, 23 Jan 1942, CAB 80/33.
54. COS (42) 402 (0), 16 Nov 1942, CAB 80/38.
55. COS (42) 333, 2 Dec 1942, CAB 79/24.
56. COS (42) 346, (0) 15 Dec 1942, CAB 79/24.
le Ibid.
58. COHQ, 4 Feb 1943, DEFE 2/782a (S.R. 1168/43).
BY: COS (43 464 (0), 15 Aug 1943, CAB 80/73.
60. COHQ, 15 Mar 1943, DEFE 2/782a.
61. COS (43) 464 (0), 12 Aug 1943, CAB 80/73.
62. COS (43) 190 (0), 17 Aug 1943, CAB 79/27.
63. COS (43) 205, 4 Sept 1943, CAB 79/64.
64. COS (43) 769 (0) 17 Dec 1943, CAB 80/77.

196
65. COS (43) 770 (0) 23 Dec 1943, CAB 80/77.
66. COS (44) 127, (0), CAB 79/73.
67. J. D. Ladd, Assault From the Sea 1939-45 (London, 1976), p. 184.
68. Michael Howard, History of the Second World War, Grand Strategy, Vol. 4
(London, 1972), p. 116.
69. COS (42) 290 (0), 2 Oct 1942 and COS (42) 326 (0), 18 Oct 1943, CAB 80/64
and CAB 80/65.
70. COS (42) 448 (0), 12 Dec 1942, CAB 80/66.
ills PM to CCO, | Nov 1942, DEFE 2/898 (M514/2).
W2. CCO to DCT: RALB, COS; VCCO, DXSR, 2 Nov 1942, DEFE 2/898 (CR
1100/42).
UE CNS to CCO, 4 Nov 1942, DEFE 2/898.
74. CCO to PM, 13 Nov 1942, DEFE 2/898 (CRN 99/42).
Thay COS (43) 33 (0), 23 Jan 1943, CAB 79/25.
76. RACO Naval HQ, Largs to CCO, 17 Nov 1942, DEFE 2/898.
tide Mountbatten interview, 18 Mar 1976.
78. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War IT, Vol.
9 (Boston, 1961), p. 222.
19: COS (43) 554 (0), 20 Sept 1943, CAB 80/74.
80. COS (43) 588 (0) 26 Sept 1943, CAB 80/75.
81. COS (43) 230 (0), 29 Sept 1943, CAB 79/65.
82. COS (43) 622 (0), 13 Oct 1943, CAB 80/75.
83. COS (43) 250, (0), 15 Oct 1943, CAB 79/66.
84. COS (43) 737 (0), 28 Nov 1943, CAB 80/76.
85. COS (44) 414 (0), 11 May 1944, CAB 80/83.
86. Tid ple
87. CCO to COS, 16 May 1944, CAB 80/83.
88. COS (44) 94, 19 May 1944, CAB 80/44.
89. Goolden Comm Rpt, 3 Aug 1944, ADM 1/16073 (M.05450/44).
90. RAW (44) 24 and COS (44) 116, 29 June 1944, CAB 81/27.
91. RAdm R. M. Servaes to First Sea Lord, 10 Jul 1944, ADM 1/16336.
O23 First Sea Lord to COS, 22 July 1944 also COS (44) 132, 22 July 1944, CAB
80/44.
93, CCO to COS, 24 July 1944, contained in COS (44) 133, CAB 80/44.
94. COS (44) 252 (0), 29 July 1944, CAB 79/78.

197
 5
The Other War in the Pacific

Background for Strategic Planning

As briefly noted in Chapter I, America’s war planning

against potential enemies was begun in 1904 by the newly
formed Joint Board of the Army and Navy. A series of
colour plans for various possible enemies began with Or-
ange for Japan, which after its victory over the Russians in
1904-1905 became the dominant naval power in the West-
ern Pacific. By 1911, Great Britain—Red—became of in-
terest to the war planners when it renewed the Anglo
—Japanese Alliance (1902, 1905) ahead of schedule. Ger-
many—Black—and Mexico—Green—were added prior to
America’s entry into World War I. Mexico, always the er-
ratic neighbour, had to be looked after. Germany came
under scrutiny because of her interests in Mexico and the
Far East. German interests there could become a threat to
the Philippines.
While America considered the possibility of a
Red—Orange coalition in a war, it was generally thought
highly unlikely. The unlikely aspect increased after World
War I when Britain’s and Japan’s strategic positions and
attitudes toward each other changed. Hence, after World
War I, America’s war planning focused entirely upon Ja-
pan and the Pacific until 1939 and the addition of the
Rainbow Plans.

198
 The Orange plan, thirty-six years after its inception,
went through considerable changes, particularly after
World War I. With all the changes, however, the planners
of the Joint Board correctly analysed in their 1938 edition
of the plan what would likely happen, with one exception.
They believed America, without Allies, would be fighting
Japan, also without Allies. They were sure that an Orange
war would be primarily an offensive naval war. They as-
sumed that Japan would begin the war by a surprise attack
and that American forces in the Pacific would assume a
defensive position along the Alaska—~Hawaii— Panama stra-
tegic triangle. Other American forces would be ready to
meet an unexpected situation, such as an attack upon
America in the Atlantic. If no such special situation de-
veloped, the Navy would then be permitted to take the
offensive against Japan in the Pacific. The Pacific cam-
paign would initially be directed against the Japanese-man-
dated islands which formed along the lines of communica-
tions to Guam and the Philippines.!
America’s concept of fighting Japan alone took on
another aspect when Japan started her undeclared war
against China in 1937. It was not only in America’s inter-
ests, but also Britain’s, to keep the open door policy alive.
Before political decisions were made by Britain and Amer-
ica, naval planners of both countries thought a show of
force by their respective Fleets in Far East waters might
deter further Japanese aggression. If a political decision
was made to enforce an economic blockade, the Fleets
would already have been on-station in the Far East and
Pacific, the British as Singapore and the Americans at
either Honolulu or Manila.
With the approval of the President, Captain Royal
Ingersoll, USN, Director of the Navy’s War Plans Division,
was sent to London to discuss with his counterpart Captain
T. S. V. Phillips, Director of Plans of the Admiralty, for
just such contingencies. The discussions were secret and
unofficial. In addition to Ingersoll, the Naval Attache in
London, Captain Russell Wilsson, USN, was the only other

199
American involved in the conversations. Phillips and four
other members of the Plans Division of the Admiralty were
present. Phillips directed that “no other Department or
other Staff Divisions be notified unless their views be nec-
essary On various points.”
The “staff conversations” lasted three meetings (3, 5,
13 January 1938) and broad strategical plans for co-
operation were reached by the two naval planning staff
representatives. A “record of conversations” was ex-
changed and preparations were made for mutual trade-
off of communications personnel and publications such as
code and signalling books. The talks were important in-
asmuch as they were a first that began between the navies.
The great naval conferences of the 1920s and 1930s were
essentially competitive. On the other hand, the staff con-
versations reflected a genuine desire to co-operate and to
understand each others’ situation. It was long overdue.
The overriding hope of what might be accomplished
was contained in the Minutes of the first meeting. The
Admiralty Plans Division suggested that “the British and
American Fleets be sent to the Far East in order to make
a demonstration in force and that there be no intention
of going to war unless Japan took the initiative in such
action.” They realised that it would never be possible to
be sure whether war might or might not ensue and naval
preparations therefore should be based on the assumption
that hostilities might come at any time. They decided that,
should war come, the “fleets should operate tactically.”
The Plans Division discussed the desirability of dividing
the Pacific and Indian Oceans “so that the British Fleet be
responsible for attack on and defence of trade in one part
and the U.S.A. Fleet in the other part.”
The staff conversations were based on Britain and
America confronting Japan, in spite of the fact that Japan
had signed an anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and
Italy the year before. The British realistically inserted that
“in the event of such a general European war, it would

200 .
almost certainly be necessary to effect a considerable re-
duction in the British strength in the Far East.”
The staff conversations of 1938 came up in the 1946
Congressional Hearings on the Pearl Harbor attack. In-
gersoll, at the time a Vice—Admiral, was testifying about
the circumstances of the attack. In going over the record
of Ingersoll’s naval career, members of the Committee
were quite interested in knowing what commitments the
United States made to Britain during the secret meetings
in 1938. Ingersoll correctly stated that there were no com-
mitments and said that “the conversations became a dead
cat when ABC-1 (American British Conversations in Jan-
uary 1941) was agreed upon, because that superseded
everything that was in the record of conversations.” In
perhaps a lapse of memory, Ingersoll told the Committee
that the discussions went no higher than the “two Directors
of War Plans of the respective Navy departments.’ The
first meeting notes of 3 January 1938, however, indicated
that Ingersoll had lengthy interviews with Admiral Sir A.
Ernle Chatfield, First Sea Lord, and Vice-Admiral William
James, DCNS. The omission was not important to the sub-
ject at hand—the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Other secret conversations were held in Washington
in June 1939 between the Admiralty and Navy Department
concerning strategy in the Pacific. On the initiative of the
Prime Minister (Chamberlain) and unknown to the Direc-
tor of Plans of the Admiralty, Captain V. N. Danckwerts,
a telegram was sent to the President on 19 March 1939,
suggesting a follow-up on the “exchange of views which
were initiated last year in connection with the Far East.”
The Prime Minister wanted the President to know the dif-
ficulties facing Britain with the possibility of war against
Germany, Italy, and Japan combined, and in particular
“the repercussions on our inability to send an adequate
fleet to the Far East.” It was hoped that “some sort of
assurance be sought that the U.S.A. would make naval
movements or preparations under these circumstances

201
that might be calculated to deter Japan either from enter-
ing the war or operating in strength to the southward.”*
The President agreed with the Prime Minister on the
need for talks but twice insisted that “secrecy would be
better maintained if the British sent an officer to Wash-
ington.” No one in the Admiralty, from the First Lord on
down, thought that a representative of the Admiralty
should be sent to Washington. They felt that any repre-
sentative would have to come from the Plans Division and
for security sake, a visit to Washington from a member of
the Staff for a short period at the time, would compromise
the talks. The ordinary naval attache would not have the
background of the most recent staff conversations nor the
authority of a Plans Division representative. .
At the suggestion of Dankwerts, the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse consented to have Com-
mander T. C. Hampton, formerly of the Plans Division
and participant in the staff conversations of January 1938,
be sent to Washington as the Plans Division representative.
Dankwerts noted that Hampton was at the time on leave
and enroute to join the H.M.S. Eagle. He suggested that
Hampton travel unnoticed to Washington, with the for-
tunate coincidence of the King and Queen’s visit there in
June 939.
Talks were held at the Navy Department with Admiral
William Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Rear-
Admiral Robert Ghormley, Director of War Planning in
Naval Operations, during 12 and 13 June 1939.
Hampton reported that nothing was committed to
writing but that Admiral Leahy had stated that he “envi-
sioned a division of strategic responsibility between the
Pacific for the U.S.A. and the Atlantic for Britain.” He said
the “American fleet would use Singapore, as the British
had suggested, for the facilities there.” Dankwerts summed
up Hampton’s report for the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir
Dudley Pound, by stating the visit “has been of value in
keeping before the United States highest naval authorities,

202 %
and probably the President, the difficulties facing us at the
present time, and in obtaining some information as to the
state of thought of the United States naval authorities as
to their own possible actions.”® The DCNS, Rear-Admiral
T. S. V. Phillips, recalling his experiences in the January
1938 conversations, said “the idea that the U.S. Fleet would
go to Singapore itself was a great advance on the 1938
discussions when they were inclined to use a U.S. harbour
without any real facilities.”
The strategy of “Europe first” began not at the ABC-
1 Conferences of January 1941, but rather as early as April
1939 when the American Joint Planning Committee of the
Joint Board made an analysis of the possibility of American
involvement in a two-ocean coalition war: the Japanese in
the Pacific and Germany and Italy in the Atlantic.
The Joint Planning Committee reaffirmed previous
analyses that it was more likely the Japanese would attack
the Philippines first before Germany and Italy would do
anything to violate the Monroe Doctrine. However, if si-
multaneous attacks occurred, action against Germany and
Italy would have to come first as the Caribbean and Pan-
ama Canal were the key to free passage of fleet units from
one ocean to the other. A Pacific response would be de-
fensive since it was unlikely Japan would not move out of
the Western Pacific immediately.° The Joint Board pro-
ceeded to prepare plans for situations involving America
at war alone and against a coalition of powers as well as
America at war with Allies against a coalition of powers.
The new plans, five in all, were called the Rainbow plans
to differentiate them from the colour plans not yet dis-
carded. Strategy for the Pacific, Rainbow Five plan, restated
what the Joint Planning Committee proposed a month ear-
lier, a strategic defensive in the Pacific until the European
Axis was defeated.’
A reiteration of the Pacific defensive strategy and of-
fensive Europe first strategy came a year later in a mem-
orandum from the CNO Admiral H. R. Stark, appended

203
 to a paper by two Joint Board members. Stark’s memo-
randum suggested that “a strong offensive role in the At-
lantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific
should be what the Americans ought to consider in a Pacific
' strategy.” Within the military establishment Stark’s memo
became known as Plan D.* Also within the memo, Stark
advised the President to authorise secret and formal con-
versation with the British. The President approved, with
preliminary talks beginning in London in September 1940.
Formal conversations continued in Washington from the
end of January to the end of March 1941. Before ajoint
report was issued, there were many divergent views on the
methods of holding a defensive position in the Pacific
against Japan, centering principally on the defence of Sin-
gapore. A compromise of sorts was reached but within a
few months, Pearl Harbor changed all of the promises
made by both sides. The important agreement reached,
however, was that the European Theatre was the most
vital. The defeat of Germany and Italy would come first,
and then Japan. American Pacific strategy was set. The
disaster of Pearl Harbor did not change the Europe first
thinking. On the contrary, a defensive posture in the Pa-
cific became automatic. Within six months, however, the
naval battle of Midway changed the mood from defensive
to thoughts of offensive operations on land, culminating
in Guadalcanal in August 1942. Amphibious warfare, the
instrument of strategy in the Pacific, was about to make
its debut.

Organisation

The war in the Pacific was, as predicated in war plans,

a naval war waged by great battle fleets, most of which
were carrier task-forces, and amphibious assaults. The
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet
(COMINCH), Admiral Ernest King, had two of the three

204 .
fleets of the Navy in the Pacific at America’s entry into the
war 7 December 1941, the Pacific Fleet at Honolulu and
the Asiatic Fleet at Manila. Admiral Thomas C. Hart com-
manded the Asiatic Fleet for the last three months of its
existence after the Japanese attacked the Philippines. Hart
took his modest fleet of three cruisers, thirteen World War
I vintage destroyers and twenty-nine submarines to the
Netherlands East Indies after the Philippines were lost. He
joined the hastily formed American-British-Dutch-Aus-
tralia (ABDA) command of General Archibald Wavell,
until the end of it came about February 1942. The rem-
nants of the fleet, four destroyers and a few submarines,
managed to escape to Australia to join the Allies there.
The badly damaged Pacific Fleet was taken over by
Admiral Chester Nimitz, who assumed command at the
end of December 1941. The following April, Nimitz was
also made Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas
(CINCPOA), giving him authority over the entire Pacific
theatre except for General Douglas MacArthur’s South-
west Pacific area and the inactive Southeast Pacific area.
Nimitz’s Pacific Ocean area was further divided into
North, Central and South Pacific areas. The Central Pacific
was to be the main path to Japan but the first amphibious
assault occurred in the South Pacific area in the British
Solomons. The Watchtower Operation (Tulagi-Guadalcanal)
was not on the shelves of the Joint Planners of the JCS
(The Joint Board quietly dissolved into the JCS about April
1942), but rather became a target of opportunity after the
naval victories of the Coral Sea and Midway. The naval
war planners of King’s staff continued to stress that as a
result of the naval victories, the American position in the
Pacific had improved considerably. Why not then plan for
an offensive operation to secretly fasten the precarious
lines of communication to Australia? Such an operation in
the Pacific would not be contrary to the Europe first con-
cept. The return to the Continent (Sledgehammer) was not
realistically feasible in 1942, in spite of the President’s

205
hopes. The Prime Minister freely admitted he was ready
“to bury Sledgehammer, which had been dead for some
time.”
American Army planners, headed by Brigadier-Gen-
eral D. D. Eisenhower along with General G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army, were adamently against any
large-scale Army resources for counter-offensive purposes
in the Pacific. They contended that if Sledgehammer were
dead, then Operation Bolero, the general operation of
transferring American forces to the United Kingdom for
future use in the European theatre, ought to be stepped
up. King pointed out to the JCS that even if Sledgehammer
or Bolero were to be pushed forward, it still would be some
time before actual combat. Why not prepare for an offen-
sive operation against the Lower Solomon Islands using
Marines? King suggested that the Army would not be bur-
dened except for base occupation after securing the Sol-
omons. Existing Army personnel in the South Pacific area
would simply be shifted from rear bases to the Solomons.
He pointed out that “important as the mounting of Bolero
may be, the Pacific problem is no less so, and is certainly
the more urgent. It must be faced now.”? MacArthur
joined King in supporting an offensive in the Pacific par-
ticularly since Port Moresby in Southeast New Guinea was
threatened as well as Northeast Australia, three hundred
miles away. While King was waiting for a JCS reply to his
request, he sent out a preparatory order to Nimitz on 25
June 1942 to “prepare for an offensive against the Lower
Solomons. ... adjacent areas would be seized and occu-
pied by Marines.”!° Nimitz was not entirely surprised at
the target selection; he had sent a message to Vice-Admiral
R. L. Ghormley, Commander: South Pacific Area
(COMSOPAC), two days earlier that as a result of the
Midway tally “carriers now might be made available for
support of an operation against the Solomon Islands.”!!
The President and the JCS approved King’s proposals
along with solving the sticky problem of command by mov-

206 :
ing the boundary of the Solomon Islands into the Pacific
Ocean Area and out of MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific
Area.'* The JCS outlined to Nimitz what objectives were
to be accomplished namely, the seizing of the Santa Cruz
Islands, Tulagi and adjacent islands. Guadalcanal was not
mentioned by name but became important when it was
discovered that the Japanese were building an airfield
there. After JCS provided the objectives, Nimitz’s
CINPOA provided the planning based on what forces
would be available to Ghormley’s COMSOPAC. Ghorm-
ley’s command with headquarters in Auckland, New Zea-
land, and later Noumea, New Caledonia, completed the
operation plan for “seizure, occupation and defence of the
Tulagi—Guadalcanal area and the Santa Cruz Islands.”
The command structure within the South Pacific area
for the Watchtower Operation remained essentially the
same throughout subsequent operations in the Pacific. As
the strength of forces increased in the Pacific so too did
the organisation carrying out the task. The Amphibious
Force responsible for the landing of, say, one division later
on became responsible for a landing force of an Army or
a Corps. The Task Force responsible for “shore base air”
eventually became responsible for a whole air force within
the theatre. So too with the naval forces; entire Fleets
would operate as part of an operation.
The overall commander for Watchtower was Admiral
R. L. Ghormley, COMSOPAC. The tactical commander of
the entire expeditionary force of eighty vessels, mostly
American but some Australian and New Zealand ships,
was Vice-Admiral F. J. Fletcher, Commander, Naval
Forces (COMNAVFOR). Under COMNAVFOR there
were three Task Forces: Carrier Force, with three aircraft
carriers with a supporting force of battleships, cruisers and
destroyers under the command of Rear-Admiral L. Noyes;
Amphibious Force consisting of thirteen attack transports,
six attack cargo ships, four destroyer transports and five
minesweepers under the command of Rear-Admiral R. K.

207
Turner. In addition, Turner had an air support group,
screening group and landing force group. The landing
force was the Ist Marine Division of approximately twenty
thousand men plus a defence battalion similar to the Royal
Marines Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO)
that was used by the British to defend an advanced naval
base. The U.S. Marine Division was commanded by Major-
General A. A. Vandergrift. The screening group under
the command of Rear-Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, RN,
consisted of three Australian cruisers, two American cruis-
ers and nine American destroyers. The group was re-
sponsible for providing anti-aircraft protection and naval
gunfire, preliminary and on-call fire. The Third Task
Force consisted of shore based aircraft from Fii, Tonga,
Samoa and all available Army Air Forces, RAAF and New
Zealand. This force was under the command of Rear-
AdmiralJ. S. McCain.
The Carrier Task Force was peculiar to the Pacific
amphibious operation. Vast ocean areas necessitated long,
perilous voyages to target areas which had no airfields
from which covering flights could operate. This meant that
carriers had to bring the initial—vital—air support to each
island operation. It was the only way the Pacific war could
be fought in those early days. The European Theatre ex-
perienced similar circumstances of a long sea voyage and
the necessity of air support from carriers in the North
African operation Torch and to some degree in the Sicily
operation Husky. By 1943, there were enough fighter and
bomber bases available in North Africa, Sicily and Italy to
support further raids and operations on the Continent
without extensive use of carrier air.

Guadalcanal to Okinawa

The first American amphibious assault of the war at

Guadalcanal ironically became more of a sea battle that

208 ;
lasted four months. To be sure, there were two successful
landings, but the fierce fighting by the Marines came weeks
after the landings. Vandergrift’s Marines fought a series
of three major land battles over a period of five months
with the actual fighting lasting eighteen days. The re-
maining time, the Marines fought to avoid being overrun
by the enemy. Before mentioning the causes of such a
situation, it might be well to look at the amphibious op-
eration itself.
The Navy—Marine Corps experience in amphibious
operations came from peacetime manoeuvers. How it was
theoretically to be done in wartime came from the Marine
Corps 1935 Tentative Landing Operations Manual which was
currently the Fleet Training Publication (FTP) Number 167,
Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938. Landing re-
hearsals were held for two days in the Fiji Islands a week
before the Operation. While Vandergrift observed they
were a “complete bust” because of the necessity of con-
serving landing craft which prevented realistic landings,
the fact was that the men were given additional training
in debarkation and the attack force ships were able to prac-
tice their gunfire support. The transports were properly
combat loaded in New Zealand by the Marines themselves,
since the local stevedores were going through an industrial
action at that time. The landing force of Marines carried
sixty days supplies including ammunition and_ personal
belongings required to live and fight.
The components of the assault force not previously
in New Zealand, converged on the rendezvous point south
of Fiji from Pearl Harbor, Noumea, and San Diego where
the long sea voyage of over one thousand one hundred
miles to the target area had begun. After preliminary naval
bombardment from three to four hours, landings were
made on Guadalcanal, Florida, Gavutu, and Tulagi on 7
August 1942. There was no initial opposition to the land-
ings on the beach. Enemy reaction came after the beach-
head was secured.

209
 The ship-to-shore phase, made in 475 landing craft,
of the most critical aspect of the amphibious assault was
successful.* The Navy accomplished its task of safely sup-
porting the landing force to the target and providing pre-
liminary and supporting fires the first day.
Within a few hours after the landings, Japanese bomb-
ers and fighters from Rabaul six hundred miles away pro-
ceeded with air attacks on the transport and landing areas.
Marines on shore and Fletcher’s naval force off-shore came
through the air attacks reasonably well, losing only 18 car-
rier aircraft, with 83 aircraft still intact. However, on the
evening of 8 August, Fletcher, citing heavy losses of fighter
planes and a need for refueling, requested permission
from Ghormley to withdraw South. A few hours later, an
enemy force was spotted by an Australian pilot on air pa-
trol, heading from the North toward the Solomons.
Turner’s transport division was no more than 25 percent
unloaded when he requested permission to leave the area
and return to Noumea. Ghormley approved both requests,
leaving the landing force without air cover.
The naval action that followed on 9 August between
the remaining screening forces and the Japanese resulted
in the Battle of Savo Island. It was to be the worst American
naval disaster since Pearl Harbor. There is no need to
discuss the Savo Island battle or the other seven major
naval actions connected with the Solomons operation.
Mention must be made that, with the withdrawal of the
Carrier Force, a basic tenet of an amphibious operation,
air superiority and/or air cover for the landing force, was
violated. The withdrawal of air cover denied the Screening
Force of aerial reconnaissance and, more importantly from
the landing force point of view, jeopardised the entire
operation.

*Eight old type 30-foot personnel craft without ramp; 303 Higgins Landing
Craft Personnel, 36-foot without ramp; 116 Higgins 36-foot Landing Craft Per-
sonnel with ramps.

210 .
 Marines captured the uncompleted Japanese landing
field on D+1, named it Henderson Field and proceeded
to complete construction of the runway. By 15 August,
four destroyer transports landed badly needed aviation
petrol and ammunition along with additional Navy con-
struction base personnel (Seabees). While the airfield was
completed for fighters and dive bombers to land on 12
August, it was not until 20 August that aircraft from a
Marine Aircraft Group arrived from the New Hebrides
with nineteen fighters and twelve dive bombers.
The Guadalcanal operation was destined to be the
longest in the entire Pacific war, with ground fighting last-
ing for nearly six months. Two full Marine Divisions (more
than 40,000 men) were used until an Army Division re-
lieved the Ist Marine Division in December 1942. Guad-
alcanal was declared secured 9 February 1943.
Major General Vandergrift, Commander of the Ist
Marine Division (later Commandant of the Marine Corps),
summed up the Guadalcanal Campaign as follows:

We struck at Guadalcanal to halt the advance of the Jap-

anese. We did not know how strong he was, nor did we
know his plans. We knew only that he was moving down
the island chain and that he had to be stopped. We were
as well trained as well armed as time and our peacetime
experience allowed us to be. We needed combat to tell us
how effective our training, our doctrine, and our weapons
had been. We tested them against the enemy, and we found
that they worked. From that moment in 1942, the tide had
turned, and the Japanese never again advanced."

Vandergrift submitted several reports of the Guadalcanal

operation to the Commandant of the Marine Corps during
the course of the fighting. When the Ist Marine Division
was relieved by the Army, and reassigned to Australia in
December 1942, Vandergrift submitted his final report,
which included criticism and proposals for future opera-
tions. Some of the highlights of the report, as it pertained

ae
to the amphibious assault itself, were as follows:

1. Planning the operation—There should be a minimum period

of six weeks to complete planning before embarkation for
combat (a much longer period would be desirable). There
was not sufficient time for the necessary reconnaissance,
study and inter-theatre liaison necessary for sound planning.
The Landing Force Commander had no opportunity to con-
fer with commanders of supporting naval task forces until
the eve of the sortie. As a result, the landing force plan of
operations was formulated without detailed knowledge of the
plans of higher and supporting commanders. Vandergrift
pointed out that he was only mentioning the situation of the
planning process in this operation to re-emphasize its im-
portance and “well understood that in this operation the time
factor was paramount and that to ensure success it had to be
carried out at the earliest possible moment regardless of the
disadvantages incidental to haste and improvisations.”
2. Logistics—Unloading of supplies on the beach was a disaster.
The supplies embarked were in quantities to insure inde-
pendence of action for at least sixty days. If the force is to
be self sustaining for this time, the naval forces must be pre-
pared to remain on the scene for the length of time necessary
to complete unloading. Unloading by the Shore Party of the
Marine Pioneer Battalion (equivalent to Beach Commandos)
was based on D+4 days but because of the enemy naval
surface threat and air attacks, the transports pulled out D— 1.
There was insufficient manpower to unload the transports
to start with and because of the transport pull out, the beaches
became glutted in trying to meet the situation. Combat troops
had to be diverted to help handle supplies, at best a dangerous
precedent. Vandergrift suggested that “the quantity of supply
which can be landed and dispersed within a given period of
time and employing a given amount of labour can be doubled
or trebled if transport crews and shore parties are trained in
their duties.” While there were problems of supply in sub-
sequent operations, this particular situation occurring at
Guadalcanal of insufficient shore party personnel did not
occur again. The Marine shore party and their naval coun-
terpart were expanded in personnel and clearly defined du-

212 ts
 ties were assigned to each. Lessons from Guadalcanal and the
North African landings in November 1942, concerning lo-
gistics handling, were reflected in a change to the FTP 167.
A more efficient Shore Party organisation for future oper-
ations resulted.
3. Organisation and Training of an Amphibious Force —Van-
dergrift suggested that an amphibious force must be organ-
ised and trained as a permanent unit rather than a provisional
grouping of forces for a specific task. Landing force units
should be definitely assigned to specific ships of the transport
group and be embarked for extended periodic training. He
urged that the transport group and the landing force find
a common superior in a force commander provided with a
combined staff capable of finalizing the many problems of
amphibious operations.

Vandergrift’s suggestion of a permanent unit with

assigned ships was an old story to the British. Keyes,
Mountbatten, and Cunningham had advocated such a
force. Vandergrift already had the “permanent assault
force” in the Marines but he wanted the naval transport
force to go with it. It is obvious now, and it should have
been obvious then, that a naval force could not be per-
manently assigned to a landing assault force. The Navy
could not support such a luxury. Vandergrift had many
other recommendations in his report but they had to do
with ground operations.'*
Combined Operations Headquarters received a copy
of Vandergrift’s report and in turn issued a digest of it as
a COHQ Bulletin. Appended to the digest were comments
by various Officers of COHQ who had studied the full
report.'°
COHQ Officers all agreed with Vandergrift that a rich
dividend could be expected from fully training disembar-
kation and beach parties. They noted that the planning
timetable was considerably less than that allowed for by
their own Headquarters as contained in Combined Op-
erations Pamphlet No. 4. COHQ held that “the period

213
from the date that the Force Commander is appointed
until the Force is ready to sail will not be less than 6 to 8
weeks, and that 10-14 days would have to be added if
rehearsals were to be carried out.” The planning timetable
period was ideal but as in any emergency, it was reasonable
to assume that COHQ could get off an operation in half
the time if it became necessary. COHQ noted that there
was a lack of motor transport in the early stages, partly
because a large proportion of it had to be left in New
Zealand, and partly through lack of repair facilities.
Taking into account the air raids and the withdrawal
of the transports, they generally concluded that the stores
which were embarked—in spite of the fact only a small
part of the supplies were actually landed—“were too many
for immediate requirements.” It was recommended that
fewer stores be landed in initial stages and that the arrival
of subsequent store carrying ships be “staggered.”
The most interesting comment by the COHQ Officers
was that “one gets the impression that air operations were
planned and undertaken only as ancillaries to Naval and
Military action... most of the air operations recorded
were in a support role, such as dive-bombing and machine-
gunning of coast defences.” They pointed out that “air
forces might have been better employed in their primary
role of gaining and maintaining air superiority. There is,
however, etao little information on the air aspect of this
operation to enable one to come to any definite conclu-
sion.” The last comment was quite correct. COHQ had not
been given information of the disastrous naval battle of
Savo Island and the tactical withdrawal of the Carrier Task
Force.
It was noteworthy that the British, who had by that
time, November 1943, accomplished two major amphibi-
Ous operations, Torch and Husky, had no criticism of the
Guadalcanal operation as it pertained to the ship-to-shore
phase. This was indicative of the fact that the doctrine was
sound in conducting an amphibious assault. The problems

214
arising from the naval action and withdrawal of air cover
did not lessen the successful landing against an enemy held
island.
Japanese expansion had indeed been stopped, for the
first time in a decade, at Guadalcanal. For the next year,
the war that followed was in the Southwest Pacific Com-
mand of General MacArthur whose Australian and Amer-
ican Army troops fought in some of the worst terrain in
the world, the jungles of New Guinea. It was a land drive
across mountains and through jungles that defeated the
enemy on the Papua peninsula and removed the threat to
the Allied base at Port Moresby. The isolation of the great
Japanese base at Rabaul began with blockade and harass-
ment and it never ended until the last day of the war. With
the exception of New Guinea, the remaining war years
were a continual series of amphibious assaults, conducted
by the Army in the Southwest Pacific area and the Marines
in the Central Pacific area. The Navy provided the Task
Forces needed for both major areas.
There is no need to recount the amphibious opera-
tions in the Central Solomons, New Britain, Marshalls,
Gilberts, Marianas, Philippines, Palau, Iwo Jima and Oki-
nawa. What must be remembered is that the amphibious
doctrine, that body of tactical principles, developed by the
Navy and Marine Corps during the interwar period, stood
the test well in each of these amphibious operations. The
principles did not fundamentally change throughout the
war. What had changed was the means to better carry out
the doctrine with the advances in development and re-
finement in techniques and equipment.

Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Command

(SEAC)

While amphibious operations were only in the plan-

ning stages for a comeback in the Far East during 1942

yi I,
and 1943, the British had an amphibious organisation
structure established as early as January 1942. The COS
approved the formation of a Combined Operations Ad-
visory Committee to be known as Advisors Combined Op-
erations, India. The task of the Committee, later in the
year superseded by a Combined Operations Directorate
at Bombay, was to advise the Commander-in-Chief (India)
and all service commanders on matters concerning com-
bined operations, and to maintain liaison with combined
operations authorities in the United Kingdom, Middle East
or elsewhere. By late 1942, it became obvious that there
would be no major amphibious operations scheduled.
However, at the Casablanca conference in January 1943,
the Allied leaders decided that preparations be made for
operation Anakim, the recapture of Rangoon. The opera-
tion was tentatively scheduled for July 1943 although the
provision of landing ships and craft depended on the sit-
uation existing in the Summer of 1943. A limited but in-
adequate number of craft for training purposes had been
provided partly from those used in the Madagascar (Iron-
clad) operation the previous year.
By May of 1943, at the Trident Conference in Wash-
ington, it was determined that there would be insufficient
resources to carry out Anakim. However, Operation Bull-
frog, the capture of Akyak and Ramree Islands, would take
place in the Autumn of 1943.'° Within three months Bull-
frog was scrapped at the Quebec Conference in August.
Again insufficient resources was the cause. This time the
leaders decided to put off any amphibious operations until
some time in 1944. The few craft and ships that had been
sent to India for an.amphibious operation in the Andaman
Islands were recalled to Europe for Overlord and Anvil.!7
If the leaders in the Far East and Indian Ocean area were
disappointed in postponements of offensive operations,
they were somewhat buoyed up over the appointment of
the new Supreme Commander of Southeast Asia Com-
mand, Vice-Admiral Mountbatten. If large scale amphib-

216
ious Operations were postponed in SEAC until after the
European situation cleared up, Mountbatten did not stay
idle. He ordered the organisation of small and highly spe-
cialised units, such as existed in the United Kingdom. Spe-
cial Boat Sections (SBS) and Combined Operations Pilotage
Party (COPP) groups were formed and organised into one
small operations group under a Royal Marines Colonel.
By the end of the war, the Small Operations Group had
carried out over 170 various operations, ranging from re-
connaissance and deception raids to the landing of agents
and stores for guerillas.
In the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944,
the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOS) ordered Mountbat-
ten to launch operation Capital in mid-November aimed
at the conquest of the central plain of Burma in four
phases. Three of the phases were to be land offensives and
the fourth was to be an amphibious operation. The am-
phibious operation, called Dracula, was aimed at the re-
capture of Rangoon in March 1945. The plan for Dracula
called for six divisions in all, two coming from the com-
pleted phases of Capital and the other four divisions from
Europe. The British COS were prepared to “make two
divisions available from Northwest Europe and two from
the Meditteranean provided that operations in each of
those theatres allowed.”'* Again plans had to be tempo-
rarily scrapped because of the situation in Europe, Ar-
nheim and the stalemate in Italy. Dracula slipped down the
planning ladder to after the 1945 monsoon.
The overland advance in operation Capital continued
with great success in a southward movement towards the
airfields on the Arakan peninsula. To aid the land offen-
sive and to try to cut off retreating enemy, the SACSEA
planned a series of amphibious operations down the
Burma coast. A planned assault against Akyak island in
February 1945 was pushed forward to 3 January when it
was learned that the Japanese might evacuate it. A Com-
mando Brigade consisting of two Royal Marines and two

217
Army Commandos landed on the beaches of Akyab island
but the Japanese had already left. It was determined that
if the retreating enemy was to be cut off, more landings
would have to be made down the coast. Two subsequent
landings by the Commando Brigade were made during
January and met with only mild resistance. The novelty of
these amphibious landings was the intricate maze of water-
ways or “chaungs” adjacent to the ports being assaulted.
Motor launches filled with Commandos moved up the
chaungs and made landings where appropriate.
On 21 January 1945, with sufficient British naval sup-
port and RAF—USAAF aerial support, the 26th Indian
Division landed on Ramree Island encountering only slight
opposition. Five days later, five hundred Royal Marines
landed on the neighbouring island of Cheduba where no
Opposition was encountered. On 13 March, a Brigade
landed at Letpan which was inland and had to be ap-
proached by chaungs. No opposition was encountered ex-
cept when the troops moved inland. By the end of April
1945, the British were in full control of all coastal areas to
the centre of Burma and had gained the use of valuable
forward bases from which new combined operations could
be mounted.
Throughout April, preparations for amphibious op-
erations against Rangoon (Dracula) were taking place. Ran-
goon had all the potential of being the classic amphibious
operation for the British in Southeast Asia, as Okinawa
had been for the Americans in the Pacific. The target was
there, as were a strong British naval force with sufficient
landing craft and RAF air support, which all made the
operation interesting. On 2 May, a battalion of Gurkha
parachutists was dropped at the mouth of the Rangoon
river, fifteen miles from the city, in order to capture the
enemy batteries. Leading troops of two brigades in landing
boats arrived on either bank of the river to move upstream.
They met no opposition and were ready to meet the enemy
inland. Howeyer, it was learned, initially from Common-

218 :
wealth prisoners of war atop of their camp building in
Rangoon, that the Japanese had gone. On 3 May, the re-
maining landing forces were ferried upstream to the city.
Operation Zipper, the reconquest of Malaya, was next
on the agenda for SEAC. Two Indian divisions were ear-
marked for the assault 9 September but the war had ended
by 14 August. Zipper was executed but in the peacetime
atmosphere of an occupation force.
Mention might be made of the last three amphibious
operations of the Southeast Asia area. Military geographic
boundaries put them in MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific
Theatre, Brunei Bay in British North Borneo, Tarakan
Island and the oil port of Balikpapan in Dutch Borneo.
Elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet with the Seventh Am-
phibious Force under Rear-Admiral F. B. Royal, USN,
landed eighteen thousand troops, mostly Australian but
including some American and Dutch, on Tarakan Island
1 May 1945. It was no surprise to the enemy since four
days prior to the landing, a group of minesweepers under
cover of naval and air bombardment engaged in the haz-
ardous job of clearing the area of mines. The Japanese did
not contest the beaches but again fought inland. “The un-
usual features of the operation were the extreme tidal
range encountered and the fact that LSTs beached in mud
instead of sand.... Another unusual feature was the
beach obstacles made of iron rails set upright in the mud
and connected by heavy wire. They were the most for-
midable beach defences that the Southwest Forces en-
countered during the entire war.”!°
Admiral Royal commanded the task force again land-
ing Australian troops comprising the 9th Australian Di-
vision (less the 26th Brigade) under Major General G. F.
Wooten at Brunei Bay harbour in North Borneo. The
attack procedure was similar to that used at Tarakan. For
one week prior to the landing, minesweepers under pro-
tection of naval bombardment had swept the adjacent
waters, with underwater demolition teams available to clear

219
a path through the beach obstacles. North Borneo was
declared secured on | July. Also on | July, the Seventh
Amphibious Force, now under command of Rear-Admiral
A. Noble, USN, landed a reinforced division of Australian
troops ashore near the oil rich port of Balikpapan on Mak-
assar Strait. The landing occurred after sixteen days of
naval bombardment because intelligence reports indicated
that the enemy was going all out to prevent the invasion
with major defence preparations. The extensive use of
mines by the enemy, as well-as Allied mines that were
dropped in previous raids, precluded naval support gun-
fire from going close to the shore.
In spite of the intelligence reports, the Japanese did
not defend the beaches nor attempt to prevent the landing
but, as was their technique at this time of the war, melted
inland toward the site where they chose to make a stand.
Fighting continued until the end of the war.
To return to SEAC, the British amphibious role in
Southeast Asia was by circumstances minimal until the de-
feat of Germany was accomplished and men and landing
craft could be reallocated. The short time between the
collapse of Germany and the end of the general war pre-
cluded the full buildup of forces and the testing of those
forces.
British amphibious doctrine held up in the Southeast
Asia theatre. There was no new doctrine coming out of
the experiences there. There were innovations made to
some of the techniques and equipment that were standard
in the European theatre. Operations in Europe had been
carried out from established shore bases and over com-
paratively short distances. The problem of the mainte-
nance and repair of large numbers of landing ships and
craft, though complex in itself, was simplified by the fact
that bases were reasonably near. In the SEAG, base facil-
ities were limited, and the maintenance and repair of the
naval assault forces engaged in operations many hundreds
of miles away necessitated the provision of an organisation
in the forward area where the buildup group could reform,

220 :
recuperate and refit for preparations for an assault or after
an assault. For this purpose, Mobile Landing Craft Ad-
vance Bases (MOLCAB) were organised. They were staffed
by four hundred personnel, mostly Royal Marines under
a Royal Marines Commanding Officer. One MOLCAB was
used in Europe to assist in the Rhine crossing and two were
located in SEAC. MOLCABs were designed to be set up
ashore to accommodate some two thousand naval person-
nel. At times, several LSI(L) were adapted to substitute as
accommodations for landing craft personnel in the assault
until such time as the MOLCAB could be set up.
Experience in Europe demonstrated that for future
operations in SEAC a Joint Fighter Direction Ship (LSF)
for the control of air defence and tactical air would be
needed. To fill this requirement, an LST, H.M.S. Boxer,
was taken in hand in June 1944 for conversion. This ship
had only just been completed and was enroute to SEAC
when the Japanese surrendered.
The problem of chaungs or creeks in which the enemy
water lines of communication could be disrupted was re-
solved by the use of Commandos and light coastal and
landing craft patrolling as much as thirty to forty miles up
the extensive systems of these chaungs. In the Central
Burma landings, these uncharted inland waterways in the
mangrove swamps were used to carry assault troops to
bridgeheads near the enemy’s land lines of communica-
tions.
It is interesting to note that since 1966 the British and
Americans have been discussing whether such operations
along inland creeks or chaungs, fjords or the like ought
to fall within the scope of the definition of amphibious
operations. The Americans feel that they do not—not be-
cause of the size, source, or composition of the forces in-
volved, but because such operations are “subsequently
initiated” after the main assault. The British feel that such
operations, regardless of initiation, should be included in
the scope of amphibious operations. Whenever these dis-
cussions reach a compromise, they will be included in the
221
common amphibious doctrine used within NATO. For the
present time, operations such as described above are not
considered amphibious operations.
Similar techniques as those used in Burma along the
chaungs were employed by the Americans along the delta
area of South Vietnam but they were termed “riverine
warfare,” not amphibious warfare.
The size of the amphibious operations in SEAC should
not belie the fact that the Allies, in whatever part of the
world, had indeed perfected the techniques of an assault
landing. The fact remained that any time during the war,
in whatever theatre, whenever amphibious assault was
utilised, it was successful.
Simultaneously with the happenings in SEAC, the
CCO had since 1944 been preparing for the amphibious
contributions British forces might make to the war against
Japan. Examination of all current types of landing ships
and craft were made to see if they were suitable for the
conditions likely in the Far East, with special reference to
the production of a satisfactory British LST and ocean
going LCT. It had been suggested within COHQ that fully
amphibianised divisions should be employed for the war
against Japan, but it became apparent that owing to the
limited number of amphibians and assault landing ships,
this would not be possible. The CCO requested that British
observers be sent with American forces in the Pacific “in
order that the lessons learned by the Americans in these
operations could be made full use of.”?° The Americans
quickly approved of British observers and attached them
to major Pacific commands including a Royal Marines
Colonel with CINCPAC and British Army Colonel with
Southwest Pacific Command. There were other Officers
of different ranks with other commands and with several
of the Fleets. This was all in addition to the CCO Repre-
sentative’s staff in Washington. British liaison officers were
attached from the CCOR in Washington and reported
directly to him.?!

Dine .
 The COS had, as early as June 1943, approved the
despatch of an inter-service Mission to the Pacific and In-
dian Ocean theatres for the purpose of investigating at
first hand what types and scales of equipment, and what
organisation of units were required for the most effective
and economic prosecution of the war against Japan. The
mission, known as “220 Military Mission,” was headed by
Major-General J. S. Lethbridge, and included a repre-
sentative of CCO, Lieutenant ColonelJ. Stockley, RM.22
Lethbridge reported back to the COS ten months later
but with the passage of time, just about every recommen-
dation concerned with amphibious operations such as
types of landing craft, training of crews and beach organ-
isation, had already come to pass. The COS turned over
the report to the CCO to examine it and submit comments
and proposals for action.?? The CCO, Major-General R.
Laycock, noted that there was nothing new in the report
but confirmed the programs that COHQ was already work-
ing on, the improvement of beach organisations, training
of landing craft crews and improved landing craft.
Laycock did make a suggestion, which his Chief of
Staff, Brigadier V. D. Thomas, repeated a year later to the
DCO (India): “COHQ should investigate the problems of
air support for an assault after a long sea voyage when no
advanced airfields are available.”**
Actual participation of the British in the war against
Japan came in the form of the British Pacific Fleet and an
offer of aBritish Commonwealth contingent of some three
to five divisions for use in the Honshu assault planned to
take place in March 1946. While the war ended before
troops could be used, the British Pacific Fleet under com-
mand of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser operated with the
Americans in the Pacific from November 1944 to the end
of the war.
1. Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command: The First Two
Years (Washington, 1962), pp. 41-42.
9. Plans Div Min, 17 Dec 1937, ADM 116/3922 (PD.06557/37).

Zao
. Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack, Document 244, 79th Congress, 2d Session (Wash-
ington, 1946).
. Plans Div Min, 24 Mar 1939, ADM 116/3922 (PD07577).
. Dankwerts to Pound, 28 June 1939, ADM 116/3922, (PD07577) ant CNO
Files (Leahy Papers) NHD.
. JPC Studies, JB 325, Ser 634, 21 Apr 1939, NHD.
. Morton, War in the Pacific, pp. 68-72.
. JB No. 325, Ser 670, 21 Dec 1940, NHD.
. COMINCH to JCS, 5 May 1942, NHD.
. COMINCH to CINCPAC and COMSOWESPAC Forces, 25 June, 1942,
NHD.
. COSOPAC War Diary, June 1942, NHD.
. JCS 00581 of 2 Jul 1942, NHD.
. Maj-Gen A. A. Vandergrift to CMC, Dec 1942, HQMC, HRS.
. Ibid.
. COHQ Bulletin Y/13, Dec 1943, WO 106/3466 (CR10,243/43).
. COS (43) 256 (0) 17 May 1943, CAB 80/69.
. COS (43) 791 (0), 22 Nov 1943, CAB 80/77.
. COS (44) 875 (0), 9 Oct 1944, CAB 80/88.
. Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey USN, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy (Annap-
olis, 1969), p. 315.
. COS (44) 10, 22 Jan 1944, CAB 80/43.
. COHQ Memo, 17 Apr 1944, DEFE 2/780 (CR551/44).
. COS (44) 288 (0), 3 Apr 1944, CAB 80/81.
. COS (44) 520 (0), 15 June 1944, CAB 80/84.
. COS (44) 759 (0), 23 Aug 1944, CAB 80/86.

224, .
 6
Comparative Techniques and
Achievements

Naval Gunfire Support

It is essential to keep in mind that in comparisons it does

not follow that one or the other method is the better way
to accomplish the mission. In this case, comparative tech-
niques between the British and Americans refer to simi-
larities with each other’s methods. There was room on both
sides for improvement by taking as far as possible the best
of each.
Naval gunfire support of the amphibious assault in
the European and Pacific theatres had proved most effec-
tive by both nations. Nelson’s dictum that a “ship’s a fool
to fight a fort” was not sustained considering the naval
armament of World War II Fleets, particularly the 16-inch
gun. However, even capital ships had a limited magazine
capacity and the types of ammunition to be carried de-
pended on the mission and the likelihood of meeting the
enemy fleet. From the beginning, the British considered
“pinpoint” fire, or deliberate destructive fire, as primary
in naval bombardment against a target. The American
Navy, with the same limited ammunition allowances, con-
cluded that “area neutralisation” of enemy defences dur-

220
ing the ship-to-shore movement, followed by a limited
amount of support on a “call basis” until artillery could be
landed, was the better method under the circumstances.
Pacific island geography helped shape the decision for
area neutralisation fire. A Japanese-held island was less
likely to have concrete defences or to be reinforced with
heavy guns, as opposed to a Continental port city or citadel.
Unfortunately, as the American Central Pacific drive ad-
vanced past the outer-ring island defences toward Oki-
nawa and the Japanese home islands, massive concrete
bunkers and intricate cave protective dwellings were en-
countered. Bombardment procedure had to be reviewed.
When planning for the Gilbert Islands began it was
known that strong defensive fortifications would be en-
countered. Consequently, the plan of gunfire support on
the assault of Tarawa atoll in the Gilberts called for 75
minutes of the heaviest naval support ever delivered up
to that time (September 1943). Even so, although many
enemy troops were neutralised, the majority of the defen-
sive installations were still effective. The lessons learnt at
Tarawa indicated that in addition to area fire useful for
neutralisation in the pre-assault phase deliberate destruc-
tion of individual targets, or pinpoint fire, was necessary.
Pin-point fire had a distinct disadvantage in that the
battleships or cruisers firing generally required a great
deal of time to be in the target area and involved excessive
risks to valuable ships from enemy air and submarines. To
lessen the risks to the ships, naval gunfire spotter personnel
were either landed surreptiously near the target and ra-
dioed the information to the ships or simply spotted targets
from observation aircraft. This procedure was not the total
answer, and pinpoint fire by heavy ships was generally
restricted, for the ship’s safety, well up until Iwo Jima,
February 1945. However, intensive naval bombardment
was not restricted and area neutralisation continued with
the use of minor and major landing craft. At the request
of the Marine Corps and with the concurrence of the Navy,

226 .
20 LSMs, Landing Ships Medium were converted into
LSM(R)s, Landing Ships Medium (Rocket). The LSM was
developed as a tank carrier and was 303 feet long with a
beam of 34 feet. It could carry either five M-4 medium
tanks or six LVTs. The LSM(R) was equipped in late 1944
and early 1945 with from ten to as many as 105 rocket
launchers and one 5-inch/38 caliber dual-purpose gun.!
The LSM(R) was essentially an area suppressive fire ship
which provided the capability of delivering large volumes
of fire in short periods of time. The Americans converted
the LCI(L) into a Landing Craft Infantry (Mortar) (LCI(M))
using 4.2-inch mortars at Iwo Jima and later in the Oki-
nawa campaign. At Iwo Jima, LCI(M)s provided direct
support on-call and harassing fire to break up enemy
counter-attacks. With their shallow draft the LCI(M)s
worked close in-shore on the flanks and often were in a
position to shoot against enemy targets that were not visible
to the Marines.
As already shown in chapter four, the British problem
of fire support lay not in pinpoint or deliberate destructive
fire but the need for more close support for the assault
forces. After Torch, the concept of surprise was not an
overriding requirement. What was essential was the need
for massive naval bombardment on the target area without
unduly risking ships of the Fleet to enemy submarines. A
step towards the answer came with the conversion of land-
ing craft such as the LCT and LCT(R) for Husky. Later
LSMs were converted into rocket ships by 1945.
To summarise, naval gunfire techniques of the British
and Americans were similar. The problems of ships’ safety
and magazine ammunition capacity were the same. Ge-
ography and enemy fortifications dictated what type of
fire, pinpoint or area neutralisation, was the better method.
In the Pacific, the Americans did not require as much
pinpoint fire as in Europe. Since surprise was not a con-
sideration, prolonged pre-assault bombardment was planned
for and used in all amphibious assaults. Converted landing

227
craft continued a rolling barrage of fire up to troop land-
ings whereupon close air support continued on the beaches
and forward of the troops. Close air support, a technique
developed and used by the Marine Corps, was also adopted
by the Army Air Force units in the Pacific. Close air sup-
port as a technique was virtually non-existent in the Eu-
ropean theatre.

Close Air Support (CAS)

Close air support technique of supporting ground

troops began with Marine aviators, the only one of the
Services, during the 1930s. Marines defined close air sup-
port as:

Attack by aircraft of hostile ground targets which are at

such close range to friendly front lines as to require detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement
of ground forces in order to insure safety, prevent inter-
ference with other elements of the combined arms and
permit prompt exploitation of the shock, casualty, and neu-
tralisation effect of the air attack.*

The initial problem of carrying out the intentions of the

CAS definition was the lack of communication between the
front lines and the support aircraft. CAS at Guadalcanal
was rendered by Navy carrier planes supporting the land-
ing. Later, Army and Marine pilots operating from Hen-
derson Field gave support to the troops. The difficulty was
that the line of communication extended from the front
line to the headquarters at Henderson Field to the aircraft.
Pilots were given the target before takeoff. In many cases,
they walked up to the front lines and visually checked the
target.
Prior to the Bougainville operation, a close air support
school was organised under the direction of the 3rd Marine
Division Air Officer and was attended by Officers from

228
each infantry regiment and battalion headquarters. Based
on Guadalcanal experience, three main objectives were
sought in air support studies conducted by the 3rd Divi-
sion. They were: improved means of target designation,
exploration of the precise effect of bombs and fusings of
various types, and the determination of safety margins
necessary for protection of our own troops. The employ-
ment of varied coloured smoke for target designation was
studied as a means of decreasing the effectiveness of the
enemy's previous attempt to confuse friendly target des-
ignation with white smoke. During the instruction, air li-
aison party personnel were given intensive training in the
use of field communication equipment and in air-ground
communication procedure. When the 3rd Division went
ashore at Bougainville, its subordinate units included
trained air liaison parties that gave advise to the ground
commander in matters of air support, transmitted requests
for such support, and assumed tactical direction of any
aircraft assigned.
The Bougainville operation in November 1943 marked
a long stride in the evolution of the part tactical aircraft
played in the support of the amphibious advance. The
techniques of CAS were perfected throughout the war.
They paid greater dividends as the island hopping pro-
gram went on but there remained the inherent danger of
bombing friendly troops. There were instances of pilot
error which resulted in the strafing and bombing of
friendly troops. Naturally, this did not improve the ground
troops confidence in CAS. However, the decision to em-
ploy CAS, while recognising the calculated risk, rested with
the commander of the troops concerned. The ultimate
doctrine of CAS that the Marine Corps evolved by the end
of the war was based on two major techniques used in two
major campaigns—the Philippines and Okinawa.
In October 1944, Marine pilots were given a mission
to support an Army Corps in the Philippines for the Luzon
operation. Marine pilots would support one division at a

229
time and trained Army personnel from each division as
Air Liaison Parties (ALP). Marines stressed to the Army
that close air support was an additional weapon to be em-
ployed only at the discretion of the ground commander.
The Commander could employ it against targets that could
not be reached by other weapons or in conjunction with
the ground weapons in a co-ordinated attack. The Fifth
Air Force, Southwest Pacific Area, stated that it was not
contemplating using direct communication between its
ALPs and the planes in the direction of a mission. The Air
Force felt that controllers in the rear areas would assign
aircraft for a mission after receiving it from its ALPs in
the front lines. The Marines would not go along with this
arrangement because they felt that it defeated the purpose
of immediate availability of aircraft. They had complete
confidence in trained air liaison parties who were with the
ground troops and could immediately pass along a request
for close air support to the pilots. The Marine pilots there-
fore assigned Marine liaison parties to the Army division
who had control of the aircraft by using direct commu-
nication without going through a distant controller. This
procedure was possible in the Philippines operation be-
cause air units were supporting no more than one division
at a time. This was not the case on Okinawa. Inasmuch as
five divisions were involved on Okinawa, four in line si-
multaneously, a closer, more co-ordinated control of air-
craft was necessary.
On Okinawa, the aerial support of ground operations
was handled through a smoothly functioning system of co-
ordinating agencies. ALPs from the Joint Assault Signal
Companies (JASCO) were attached to each of the four
divisions. Requests for air support by the ALPs were made
to one of the three Landing Force Air Support Control
Units (LAFASCU) located at Tenth Army Headquarters,
II Amphibious Corps and XXIV Corps, respectively. All
requests for air support of the ground troops were
screened by LAFASCU and relayed direct to Tactical Air

230 s
Force (TAF) Tenth Army. Out of its allocation of planes,
TAF responded accordingly.
By the end of the war a system of control evolved that
attempted to incorporate the flexibility of the Philippine
system with the co-ordination of the Okinawa system. The
request for air support went direct to a centre called the
Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC). Intermediate ech-
elons monitored the request, indicating their approval by
silence. When air support was approved, it would be con-
trolled by the Forward Air Controller whenever the tactical
situation permitted. This introduced the flexibility of the
Philippine system without sacrifice of safety to the ground
troops or interference with the overall tactical situation.
Close air support as a technique of fire support for
ground troops was quite successful in the Pacific. Marine
and Navy aviators were trained and had available the nec-
essary aircraft to utilise this technique. Fighter aircraft in
Europe had many more requirements put on it, and there
simply was no time available to begin to test a new tech-
nique.*

Fire Support Co-ordination

Fire support co-ordination was a method whereby

three supporting arms—air, artillery, and naval gunfire
requests—were co-ordinated in one centre. The Fire Sup-
port Co-ordination Centre (FSCC) ashore was first used
at Iwo Jima. It was simply an extension, to a point closer
to the action, of the control that was exercised aboard the
Command Ship (AGC) by the Task Force Commander.
Ashore, the FSCC permitted a more rapid response to the
requests of the ground commanders. The FSCC func-

*It might be interesting to note that at the present time, the RAF provides close
air support for the British Army and Royal Marines using RAF Phantom (F4M)
and V/STOL Harrier aircraft employed in the ground attack role.

251
tioned as a clearing house for requests for close support
coming in from the field. There was a separate officer for
each type of request, artillery, air and naval gunfire. This
arrangement was in effect a safeguard against unwar-
ranted duplication of fires and against impossible demands
being made on any given arm. In practice, it functioned
extremely well.
The essential elements of the FSCC were used in the
Okinawa operation. The Tenth Army referred to its or-
ganisation as a Target Information Center (TIC). At each
staff level down to the battalion, the artillery officer acted
as the target co-ordinator for infantry support. Working
in close conjunction with the naval gunfire and air liaison
officers, the TIC collated intelligence regarding enemy
defenses. It allocated fire missions to the support elements
whose capabilities promised the most effective results. The
system stood the test of combat without major difficulties
and drew unanimous praise from the divisions using it.
There was no single organisation for combined arms
for the British. Air, artillery, and naval gunfire each had
a proper organisation to fill all requests for support. Ar-
tillery and naval gunfire requests sometimes overlapped
and could be handled by the Combined Operations Bom-
bardment Unit (COBU) aboard the Headquarters ship of
the naval expeditionary force. The Manual of Combined
Operations of 1938 provided that the Forward Observation
Officers (FOO) be naval officers assigned to bombardment
ships along with signals personnel. However, in June 1941,
the Director of Combined Operations requested that FOO
parties be made up of Royal Artillery officers along with
naval telegrapher ratings. He suggested that artillery of-
ficers “were preferable because of their value on the tactical
side.” A Forward Observation and Bombardment School
was set up with the CTC Inveraray under command of a
Royal Artillery officer with the CCO retaining operational
control. After training and assignment to a unit, FOO par-
ties landed with the assault forces. FOO controlling naval
gunfire were known as Forward Observers Bombardment

232 ‘
(FOB) to distinguish them from Army FOO controlling
land artillery.
At Overlord, eight to ten FOOs were assigned to each
assault division. Requests for naval gunfire support were
sent to the Commander Naval Bombardment (CNB)
aboard the Headquarters ship. After withdrawal of the
Headquarters ship, bombardment Control Headquarters
was set up shore and naval bombardment was co-ordinated
with Headquarters Royal Artillery, which was also ashore.
As was the case after the landings at Normandy, a Mobile
Bombardment Headquarters moved along the coast and
co-ordinated warships fire with the Flag Officer Com-
manding the Bombarding Force. Within six weeks, less
and less naval support was required as artillery built up its
strength ashore. Geographically, in the Pacific, the oppo-
site was true. The requirement for continuous naval gun-
fire support against enemy islands throught each campaign
was dominant up to the end at Okinawa.
In the Southeast Asia Command, a COBU was formed
in November 1943 under the operational control of the
Director, Combined Operations (India). The Command-
ing Officer of COBU was a Royal Artillery Officer whose
duties included Chief Bombardment Liaison Officer to the
Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet. The unit took part in
its first operation along the Arakan peninsula in December
1944. Plans for other COBU were made for the war against
the Japanese home islands, but became unnecessary after
the war ended.

Troop Transport and the Beach Party Organisation

In the Pacific, all American landings were accom-

panied by the “long sea voyage.” The means to accomplish
moving troops was the attack transport (APA). The need
for this special type of transport affected landing tech-
niques, but not to disadvantage. The APA with a standard
hull of 455 feet by 62 feet was self-contained in that it
233
could carry an assault battalion landing team (BLT) of
some one thousand two hundred men with their stores
and first priority vehicles of about five hundred tons. It
required forty Landing Craft Vehicle (Personnel) (LCVP)
and six to eight Landing Craft Mechanised (LCM), thus
requiring extra craft from the APAs carrying the reserve
BLT to help out. This was often a disadvantage, but not
a critical matter, since the average BLT was landed in forty-
five minutes.
The fact that the APA could be tactically loaded was
a distinct advantage over the British counterpart, the
Landing Ship Infantry (LSI). In Operation Neptune, the
assault battalions were split with half the battalion in sep-
arate LSIs. The battalion transports were usually carried
in LCT. In the Pacific, a long sea passage would not likely
have LCT available and stores and vehicles would have to
be loaded in an LST, if available. If the LST were sailing
in a different convoy from the LSI and was delayed or
sunk, it was more difficult to marry up transport and per-
sonnel of a battalion. There was of course an ingredient
to all of these disadvantages: All the eggs were not in one
basket, and therefore were less vulnerable.
The tactical loading of the APA was more advanta-
geous. It did allow more flexibility in the plan itself, be-
cause planning staff and unit commanders were together.
It was easier to issue last-minute orders. If an APA with
a BLT were sunk or delayed, a reserve BLT aboard an-
other APA could be detailed for the assault because they
were a self-contained unit. The Australians had LSIs in
the Pacific but, like the British Glen Ships, they were usu-
ally converted cargo liners or ferries. The point was that
a “long passage” ship such as the APA, while desirable,
was not necessary in the short distances involved in Europe.

Command and Control

The control and chain of command in a landing ap-

peared to be the same for the Americans and British in all

234 .
theatres of operation. The American Central Control Of-
ficer, who was responsible for the ship-to-shore movement
of the craft in his squadron, was the equivalent of the
British Senior Officer Assault Group (SOAG).
The American Boat Group Commander, who com-
manded the craft landing the BLT, was the equivalent of
the British Squadron or Flotilla Officer. There were the
obvious different name designations within the whole of
the amphibious phase, but the control and chain of com-
mand to accomplish the ship-to-shore phase were remark-
ably similar.

Landing Procedure and Buildup

In American landing procedure, troops were loaded

over scrambling nets of the APA into the LCVPs or LCMs.
Control of the landing waves, always in small numbers,
was exercised by timing the waves through successive check
points such as the rendezvous area or line of departure
(British assault waiting position). The principal check
point, the line of departure, was from two thousand to
four thousand yards from the beach. The first wave only
was led on its course by the Boat Group Commander, with
the succeeding groups merely following the preceding
waves at stated time intervals. The landing procedure was
flexible and waves were changed from one beach to an-
other quickly when necessary. Primarily all American land-
ings were made after first light and the coxswain could see
where he was going. However, since the landing waves
were successive and if the weather was thick, they could
get lost. Another disadvantage was the two thousand to
four thousand yards run from the line of departure. Since
Guadalcanal, the Navy preferred to keep the transports
and support ships a safe distance from the shore, neces-
sitating the long run to the beach. Later on, after decreas-
ing enemy surface and air action, support battleships and
cruisers, such as at Iwo Jima, fired as close in as eight
hundred yards.
235
 The British landing procedure allowed flights of a
large number of landing craft led to within a short distance
(one thousand yards) of the beach by a control craft and
there released for the final dash. Troops were rail-loaded
and there was little waiting in the lowering position, much
quicker troop loading than the scrambling nets used by
the Americans. Navigational leaders led each flight to the
beach because, if given the choice, the British preferred
night or pre-dawn landings. With navigational leaders
there were fewer successive flights getting lost.
Again in the Pacific and the long sea passage require-
ment, there was a disadvantage to the British landing meth-
ods. Landing craft deployed for beaching was made at a
much later stage than that made by the Americans, and
thus were vulnerable at the waiting stage. It was a problem
to deploy earlier due to the large number of craft in each
flight and the difficulty of keeping formations abreast. The
American system of timing successive waves past given
check points was better because the British system of nav-
igational leaders aboard small craft, such as LCFs or motor
launches, were not available after a long sea passage. The
small craft used by the navigational leaders were a separate
entity in themselves and not normally part of the assault
phase. The American buildup using timed flights was
merely a ccontinuation of the assault procedure. With the
British, assault and buildup were two phases.

Beach Parties

Chapter II of the Tentative Landing Operations Manual

of 1935 and Chapter 23 of Manual of Combined Operations
1938 both provided for the organisation and command of
beach parties. Both British and Americans were cognizant
of the fact that the organisation of the beach to handle
supplies and guide troops to forward areas was of the
utmost importance.

236
 In America, the beach party, commanded by a naval
officer called a beachmaster, was accompanied by another
special organisation called the shore party, which was com-
manded by an officer of the landing force. The beach
party was assigned primarily naval functions such as re-
connaissance and marking of beaches, marking of hazards
to navigation, control of boats, evacuation of casualties,
and, in addition, the unloading of material of the landing
force from the boats. The shore party were Marines as-
signed such functions as control of stragglers and _pris-
oners, selecting and marking of routes inland, movement
of supplies and equipment off the beaches, and assigning
of storage and bivouac areas in the vicinity of the beach.
The beach party and the shore party were independent
of each other, but the Tentative Landing Operations Manual
ordered the fullest co-operation between the beachmaster
and the shore part commander, and the personnel of their
respective parties.
It was not indicated in the manual from what source
the labour for the shore party would come, but in practice,
units in reserve were usually assigned the responsibility of
furnishing the labour force. This system, in effect, de-
prived the commander of his reserve, such as was the case
at Guadalcanal.
Changes in a system, even a poor system, came slowly
and the beach party organisation was of two types: naval
transport assault beach party, and the garrison shore party,
usually Marine infantry. Every APA was responsible for
training its own beach party of three officers and forty-
three naval or marine enlisted personnel. The APA car-
rying the assault BLT landed its beach party where it car-
ried out its normal duties on an assigned battalion front,
until relieved by a Marine or Army shore party, which
were generally organised for the operation. The transport
assault beach party then returned to the APA. The inher-
ent weakness in this system was the turnover at the beach.
Aside from duplication of effort of both parties, the turn-

237
over could come at a critical time of the operation. It was
a stop-gap system at best and fortunately changes were on
the way.
Marine General H. M. Smith recommended that
“since the present doctrine of separate commander of
beach party and shore party results in divided authority
... the beach and shore party commanders should be con-
solidated into one unit, a Shore Party, under control of the
landing force.”? The recommendation was accepted and
published as Change 2 to the FTP 167. Thus, shore party
and beach party were joined under the title “shore party,”
as a component of the landing force and transferred the
responsibility for unloading boats at the beach from the
naval element to the landing force element of the shore
arty.
x The Marine Corps solved the labour force problem
by adding a pioneer (shore party) battalion of 34 officers
and 669 other ranks to the Marine Division.
The British beach party organisation had taken four
to five years to evolve into the efficient beach groups that
handled Overlord. From the start, however, the British had
the central authority of the CCO to guide its development.
The Manual of Combined Operations of 1938 intended that
personnel needed to work on the beaches following an
amphibious assault be “drawn from base or Service units
of the landing force to meet the requirements of a partic-
ular operation, being returned to their parent units as soon
as normal maintenance resumed.” The early capture of a
port was considered at the time to be essential in any com-
bined operation, beach maintenance being regarded as an
interim measure of short duration only.
In September 1940, the then. Director of Combined
Operations became responsible for “working out in detail
a beach organisation and for technical development.” The
basic organisation for the control of beaches laid down in
Chapter 23 of the Manual was to remain in force. In Chap-
ter 23, a naval officer was appointed Principal Beach Mas-

238
ter, and he was responsible to the Senior Naval Officer
Landing (SNOL). He controlled all landing craft and per-
sonnel within the naval area. He exercised control over the
beaches, which were subdivided into sections and landing
points, through Beach Masters, Assistant Beach Masters
and Beach Lieutenants, Royal Navy, respectively. He
worked in close conjunction with his Army equivalent, who
was known as the Principal Military Landing Officer
(PMLO). PMLO duties were initially equivalent to the
American shore party commander.
By the Autumn of 1942, Combined Operations Pam-
phlet No. 2, entitled Beach Organisation and Maintenance
laid down for each Service their respective responsibilities
within the beach organisation. By the time of Overlord the
beach group embodied the old beach party/beach brick
responsibilities. The Army, whose Expeditionary Force
was the primary organisation to undertake a return to the
Continent, had formed the largest number of beach
groups with naval and air force elements—the RN Beach
Commandos and RAF Beach Unit.
Within the Army, there were two very definite schools
of thought regarding the use of infantry or pioneers as the
nucleus of a Beach Group. Those who favoured an infan-
try nucleus did so because full advantage could be taken,
within the Beach Group, of the well-proved channels of
command of the infantry battalion and because improved
esprit de corps and morale resulted. The fact that infantry
could fight on the beaches, if required, was also a valuable
asset. The arguments in favour of a pioneer nucleus were
that the use of infantry in a beach maintenance role was
improper and uneconomical; that, if infantry were used
to do pioneers’ work, their morale suffered; that infantry
were more likely than pioneers to become involved in the
land battle, resulting in a vacuum on the beach; that pi-
oneers, providing they were carefully selected and kept
together after an operation, worked well and their morale
was good. However, largely because of the difficulty of

200
keeping Beach Group personnel together after an oper-
ation, it was decided that Beach Groups be formed around
the nucleus of an infantry battalion, and that the infantry
battalion commander command the Beach Group, retain-
ing the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
In July 1944, a Committee on Beach Organisation for
the war against Japan was formed with COHQ. It was
determined by the Committee that the beach organisation
required for the Far East be known as a Beach Brigade
and consist of two Beach Groups within the Brigade. The
Beach Brigade would support one assault division. The
Beach Brigade was started in May 1945 but was discontin-
ued at the termination of hostilities with Japan. There was
no discernable advantage of the British beach organisation
as used in Europe over the American beach organisation
as used in the Pacific.

General Air Support

“Aerial Co-operation” was first mentioned in Chapter

XIII of FSR 1920 (published in 1922). Primary function of
RAF units was to “maintain supremacy in the air.” In the
Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Force Operations,
1922 (Provisional), Air Vice-Marshall J. F. Higgins pre-
pared the “air section” of the Manual. Air supremacy in
combined operations was again primary. There was no
mention of specific tactical use of aircraft. In the Manual
of Combined Operations 1931, Chapter X on Aerial Co-
operation directed that aerial photographs and reconnais-
sance be made by the RAF before and during a combined
operation. In the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations, there
were parts of three chapters dealing with RAF responsi-
bilities such as air bombardment support in day landing,
advanced air stations, aircraft fighters in defence of land-
ings and the usual air photographs and air reconnaissance
missions. Air supremacy was of course foremost in the
RAF mission.

240 ‘
 RAF officers on the staff of the naval and army col-
leges, in addition to RAF guest lecturers, all presented
aerial co-operation and support as part and parcel of the
combined operation. Air Commodore P. B. Joubert, Com-
mandant RAF Staff College, in delivering a lecture at the
RNSC in 1932, closed his talk by stating “air force co-
Operation in combined operations with other Services,
must be real and not perfunctory.”* There was no doubt
Joubert meant what he said but the facts were that while
the RAF met air support requests during the raiding pe-
riod after Dunkirk, it never fully integrated into the inter-
service spirit that was indicative of the COHQ.
From the beginning, the ISTDC, Directorate of Com-
bined Operations and later COHQ all provided assign-
ments for RAF representation including all staff planning
committees. Most, but not all, assignments were filled. At
times an outside inquiry hastened the process of RAF rep-
resentation. One such inquiry came from the Americans
in October 1941, when they asked the Advisor on Com-
bined Operations to the Joint Mission in Washington Com-
mander H. C. A. Woolley, RN, why there were no RAF
officers on the staff of the CTC at Inveraray. Woolley, in
discussing it with the Joint Mission, recalled that “several
U.S. Army and Naval officers had a general view that the
British gave insufficient attention to the air side of com-
bined operations.”® Woolley said the inquiry referred to
all aspects of air force co-operation including parachute
forces and air supremacy in an opposed landing.
Air Commodore F. W. Walker from the staff of
COHQ replied to Woolley’s memorandum by stating that
since the inquiry was made, the following actions had oc-
curred:
An air section is being established under an Air Commo-
dore at CTC Inveraray, with an air staff which includes an
officer of the Fleet Air Arm. At a naval air station nearby,
a development unit is being established and a number of
aircraft fitted with the latest equipment are provided to

241
 study such matters as tactics, reconnaissance, smoke-laying
and communications. The officers of the unit will include
Navy and Army pilots. ... These arrangements are pro-
visional and further progress will be made. A proposal that
selected air squadrons should join in the special courses at
Auchingate CTC is now under consideration in the Air
Ministry.°
Walker further pointed out that in the Air Section of
COHQ there were now a “Group Captain, two other RAF
officers and an Air Advisory and Planning Staff.” He also
reminded Woolley that there was a permanent Air Com-
mittee presided over by the CCO that “examines the air
requirements for combined operations and formulates for
submission to the COS co-ordinated proposals thereon.”
The American inquiry via Woolley apparently stirred
up some dust at the Air Ministry because the Director of
Plans issued a Secret internal letter to the Air Officer,
Commander-in-Chiefs of the Fighter, Bomber, Coastal,
and Army Co-operation Commands “reviewing the ques-
tion of air co-operation in combined operations.” It was
pointed out that the Chief of Air Staff “has directed that
in the case of operations of this description (combined
operations), the Commander-in-Chief concerned and the
Adviser on Combined Operations may deal with the ap-
propriate RAF Commands.”
A month after Woolley received a reply to his inquiry
from Walker, the CCO (Mountbatten) sent an agenda to
the Air Ministry for a meeting to be held at COHQ for
the purpose of discussing “the training of RAF Units in
Combined Operations.”* The meeting was held 16 Feb-
ruary 1942 with Mountbatten in the Chair. Air Commo-
dore E. S. Goodwin, Director of Operational Training and
six other members of the Air Ministry attended. There
were representatives from the War Office and the newly
appointed RAF Staff from the CTC Inveraray was also
present.
The CCO did not mention the inquiry made to his

242 ‘
representative in Washington, Commander Woolley, but
opened the meeting by stating that “the findings of the
first monthly Military and Air Force meeting held at
COHQ on 3 February 1942 reflected the concern of GHQ
Home Forces at the loss of contact with RAF Squadrons
after completing combined manoeuvres with them.”
Mountbatten went on to explain that there was a Flight of
thirty men and three pilots now assembled at Abbotsinch
which was to become expert in all air aspects of combined
operations and to evolve the best techniques and to develop
equipment. He informed the meeting that the aerodrome
at Dundonald (near Auchingate) had been allocated as the
Combined Operations air station, and that the Com-
mander, Expeditionary Force, had agreed to lend Royal
Engineers under his command to do aerodrome improve-
ments.
The meeting moved along the lines of discussion
points submitted in the Mountbatten agenda to the Air
Ministry on 5 February. There were no arguments of any
substance and if questions arose that could not be resolved
at the meeting, they were to be referred to the Air Ministry
for determination. It is reasonable to assume that in meet-
ings on the level of CCO and high ranking representatives
of the Air Ministry, much of the ground work in resolving
problems was done outside the meeting room. Mountbat-
ten and Air Ministry representatives were aware that the
Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal,
had made a statement to the COS three weeks before the
meeting that “the RAF will make available in turn six
fighter squadrons for training with the Expeditionary
Force and that four light bomber squadrons will similarly
be made available as far as their other duties permit. The
appropriate number of RAF Servicing Commandos will be
established and trained both in servicing aircraft and in
the techniques of combined operations.” Thus, at the for-
mal meeting of 16 February, it became a matter of working
out the details for what was already committed by the CAS

243
for training RAF personnel and use of aircraft.
The CCO summarised the points brought out at the
meeting of 16 February by stating the “personnel of this
flight should be trained in all aspects of air co-operation
relating to combined operations and include fighter sup-
port and control; smoke laying; close support, bombing
and front gun; recognition of assault ships, landing craft
and H.M. Ships.”'°
By the Summer of 1942, training commenced. In ad-
dition an RAF Section within Combined Signals School was
established. By November 1942, Operation Torch was ac-
complished but it was too early to ascertain the results, if
any, of RAF training in combined operations. The exten-
sive use of carrier air support for ground operations filled
the need for the moment.
The American system of integrating air force support
from all Services toward the operation at hand whereby
the ground commander had authority over “his directly
supporting air units” was not accepted by the RAF and
their relationship with the British Army. In essence, the
RAF believed that its technique of gaining air supremacy
and blasting enemy airfields and communications—that is,
Strategic Bombing—would obviate the necessity of close
tactical support that may be on-call from ground observers
on ships or shore.
At Operation Husky in July 1943, elements of tactical
air were assigned to support the assault landings. The pi-
lots were forbidden, however, to answer calls for support
from ship-based or ground stations other than those pre-
arranged missions approved in the air plan of the opera-
tion or approved at Air Force headquarters in North Af-
rica.
By June 1944 and Operation Overlord, the difficulties
of the past were put aside and an air programme was issued
for the “co-ordination of all air operations—tactical and
strategic under the Supreme Allied Commander.” Geog-
raphy and the short distances involved for air support
made Overlord a classic example of what could be done in

244 ,
support of the amphibious operation. Air support in-
cluded, before landings, massive bombings by over one
thousand bombers from Strategic Air Forces between mid-
night and 0500 on coastal batteries and enemy commu-
nications near the assault area on D-Day. The last twenty
minutes before arrival of the assault waves, fighter bomb-
ers and medium bombers attacked the actual beach de-
fences. After the landings, nearly two thousand aircraft,
provided from fifteen squadrons, patrolled the invasion
routes continuously and kept the beaches clear. “Control
of these aircraft was exercised firstly from ground stations
in Britain and then from LSTs, which had been specially
equipped and converted to serve as fighter direction tend-
ers...after the assault had succeeded ground stations
were established in France for the same purpose.” There
were on-call aircraft available for the entire operation and
seaborne and ground fighter direction stations, properly
co-ordinated by the RAF that directed aircraft to assist the
ground commanders when requested.
Overlord was not in Southeast Asia command and as
late as July 1945, Brigadier V. D. Thomas, RM, Chief of
Staff to the CCO, wrote to the Director of CO (India),
Brigadier B. W. Leicester, RM, to remind him that “unlike
the strategic and tactical air support given the landing
forces at Overlord, there will not be large air forces based
and available to saturate an assault area.” Thomas noted
that provision be made to operate (in SEAC) normal tac-
tical air support during the early stages of an assault. Tac-
tical air support could come from the RAF or naval arm,
or both. Thomas advised Leicester that the CCO was taking
action with approval of the Service Ministries on such sub-
jects as command and control of air forces in long-range
assault and RAF buildup including ashore parties for air-
strip construction. He said that it was not necessary to alter
published directives of the CCO but whenever “amphibi-
ous operations” occur in a Directive, it means “amphibious
operations and associated air support.”
It would appear that it was unnecessary In 1945 for
245
the Chief of Staff of the CCO in London to advise his
representative in India that he “encourage a sense of the
importance of the air element amongst Naval and Army
Officers during training.”'! However, that was the case,
and it appeared that it was 1942 all over again.

1. History of U.S. Naval Research and Development in World War II, MS, Historical
Staff Study, ONR, Univ of Pittsburgh, 1946.
2. CMC to Senior Member of Board to Re-examine the Adequacy of the Present
Concept of Missions and Functions of the Marine Corps, 11 Oct 1945,
HQMCG, HRS.
3. CG, LantPhibFor Prelim Rpt to C-in-CLant on New River Exercise 4-12
Aug 1941, USMC, RG 127.
4. Air Comd P. B. Joubert lecture to RNSC, 20 Oct 1932, “Air Aspects of
Combined Operations,” NMM.
5. ACO to JSM, 28 Oct 1941, DEFE 2/847.
6. Air Comdr at COHQ to Paymaster H. C. A. Woolley, JSM, 28 Dec 1941,
DEFE 2/847.
. Air Min (Plans 3164) to Air Off, C-in-C, 21 Dec 1941, DEFE 2/847.
. COHQ Agenda Memo, 5 Feb 1942, DEFE 2/847.
. COS (42) 29, 25 Jan 1942, CAB 79/56.
. COHQ Min of Mtg, RAF Units in CO, 16 Feb 1942, DEFE 2/812.
- . CCO to DCO (India), 21 July 1945, DEFE 2/780 (CR 4223/44).
ao
O~T
OO

246 .
 Summary

On the British side, there were two notions passed along

in lectures and books after 1946 when describing the de-
velopment or lack of development of combined operations
during the interwar period. The first notion was that the
experience of Gallipoli had so convinced the naval and
military that large scale amphibious assaults against a de-
fended shore, especially if conducted in daylight, were im-
possible, particularly in view of the advances in aviation.
The second notion, stemming from the first, was that ac-
cordingly, there was no interest in combined operations
and therefore the subject was flat-out neglected. Britain,
therefore, had to start from the beginning after Dunkirk.
As in most propositions, such as the two above, there were
degrees of truth in putting forth the proposals. The Gal-
lipoli experience was traumatic and indelibly etched in the
minds of the participants. Others from a new generation
saw Gallipoli as imaginative with the reasons for its failure
easily discernable.
Indicators of non-neglect of the subject focused on
the first postwar classes at the Staff Colleges that included
in their curricula the problems involved in defending
and/or seizing cities such as Singapore and Hong Kong
against an enemy, keeping in mind the lessons learnt at
Gallipoli. With every passing year, new syndicates wrestled
with similar schemes taking into consideration new tech-
nology in aviation, communications, armament, and the
like.

247
 The paper problems were considered by the Staff
College syndicates four or five days per year and involved
two hundred or more student Officers, a handful in re-
lation to the whole Officer Corps but nevertheless a start.
Service Officers involved became aware of combined op-
erations with all its difficulties and potential. Ministries of
government became involved when they allotted time and
effort to judge the validity of “assumptions” made by the
student inquiries. War Office and Admiralty staffs from
intelligence and map-surveyors, to planning staffs were all
made to contribute to possible solutions to the problems.
General Officers and Admirals of the Fleet contributed
troops and ships in order to support or debunk an as-
sumption.
The Staff Colleges were directly responsible for the
revision of or need for a written doctrine that would be
the guide for the future conduct of combined operations.
Their questions and discussion prompted the War Office
to revise the FSR XIII and the Admiralty to get on with
the production of a manual starting with the Manual of
Combined Naval, Military and Air Force Operations, 1922, Pro-
visional, up to the Manual of Combined Operations, 1938.
The Madden Committee in 1924 supported the role
of Royal Marines as the striking force necessary in the
conduct of combined operations. By 1936, the Director of
RNSC supported a similar role and suggested to the Ad-
miralty that solving combined operations problems on pa-
per was not enough. He suggested that there was a
necessity for developing combined operations in peacetime
through organisation, training, and material necessary for
the task. As a direct result, in 1938 Britain established the
first ISTDC with a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff
on Inter-Service Training.
Conclusion: Britain had not neglected the develop-
ment of combined operations during the interwar period.
The interest in combined operations was small but grow-
ing. Notwithstanding the economic situation during the

248 .
period and the probability of the need for such operations
at the outset of a war, the fact is that there existed a doc-
trine, known only to a handful but nevertheless something
on paper, a training and development centre with insuf-
ficient personnel and funds but in-being, and a sub-
committee of government to put existing doctrine into ef-
fect, if needed.
In America, amphibious development was a primary
task of the United States Marine Corps during the interwar
period and an integral part of war plans for a naval war
in the Pacific. The Naval War College and the Marine
Corps Schools participated in paper problems of the “Ad-
vanced Base” series that involved the defence and seizure
of the Philippines and various Pacific islands. The Marine
Corps provided the landing force whose primary mission
was the seizure and defence of advanced naval bases. After
much testing, the Marines settled on the Fleet Marine
Force as the best tactical landing organisation centered
primarily on the Marine Division. The Marine Corps
Equipment Board established in 1933, a similar if not mod-
est equivalent of the ISTDC, was directly responsible for
testing and having the Navy purchase landing craft such
as the Higgins Eureka boat and tank lighter, forerunners
of the LCVP and LCM, and the Robeling Alligator, pre-
cursor of the LVT.
The development of amphibious doctrine was not an
inter-service effort in America. The Army and Army Air
Force did not contribute anything to development pri-
marily because it was the task of the Navy/Marine Corps
acting as a single Service. The Navy deferred to the Marine
Corps to produce the doctrine and in 1935, the Tentative
Landing Operations Manual was published. The theory con-
tained therein was tested during the succeeding seven an-
nual Fleet Exercises.
Conclusion: in America, amphibious development
during the interwar period was a component part of the
Marine Corps mission, and war plans for a naval war in

249
the Pacific included amphibious assault. When America
entered the war in December 1941, there existed a doc-
trine, the Fleet Marine Force to carry out the doctrine and
war plans that required amphibious operations. In addi-
tion, production of landing craft and amphibious shipping
was well underway.
A comparison of landing techniques between the
Americans in the Pacific Theatre and the British/Americans
in the European Theatre indicated little or no difference
in the “ship-to-shore phase” of the amphibious operation.
The obvious differences between theatres were geography
and long distances to target areas. Hence, the overriding
factor involved in Pacific operations, not present in Eu-
rope, was that of the “long sea voyage” that preceded all
amphibious assaults. To overcome this problem, a great
supply and maintenance facilities buildup was necessary
before each operation. Long distances from established
airfields presented difficulties of air support for the land-
ing forces but the Navy’s carrier task forces bridged the
gap.
The level of proficiency reached by the British and
Americans to conduct successful amphibious assaults in
any theatre were by no means a lucky wartime coincidence.
What was remarkable was the fact that quite apart from
one another, Britain and America, for different reasons,
each developed an amphibious doctrine that fundamen-
tally was identical to the other. The exchange of infor-
mation on amphibious matters had taken place only after
Dunkirk and before Pearl Harbor. It was after these dis-
asters that parallel courses in amphibious development
became one and that re-entry to the Continent and the
defeat of Japan became a reality. Within one year of part-
nership, the first combined amphibious operation had suc-
cessfully taken place in North Africa.
Aside from the doctrine, Allied tactics, techniques,
and equipment were far superior to the enemy’s. The Ger-
mans, primarily interested in continental warfare, used

250 :
airborne landings in seizing Mediterranean islands. Their
lack of amphibious development precluded any success of
invading Britain from the sea.
Japan, an island nation with great seapower, made its
initial territorial gains overland and by port occupation,
such as in China. Landings in the Philippines and Malaya
were made on many fronts against small resistance. This
is not to detract from their success and good fortune but
they were never tested in conducting an amphibiousassault
against a well fortified Allied island or base.
The Japanese were given a great deal of credit, per-
haps unearned, in their knowledge of amphibious oper-
ations before World War II. Their Landing and Landings
Defence Operations Manual of 1924 and 1928 and the later
Reference Manual on Landing Operations, 1941 indicated
nothing new in landing techniques. The Japanese manuals
were guides as to what might occur in a landing but re-
flected no specific tactics to overcome enemy resistance.
The Japanese were aware of the necessity of naval gunfire
support and air support in a landing and believed in the
use of tanks in the initial wave.
The Japanese surprised the British and Americans
with the arrival of their Landing Craft Carrier in Shanghai
in 1938. (See Chapter III and Appendix A, Plates 8 and
9.) The Carrier was a specially built ship that could debark
twenty fully loaded landing craft from the stern doors, a
notable feat for the time. While it was the only such ship
built by the Japanese, it did suggest to the Americans and
British that their potential enemy was far ahead of them
in landing craft development.
In the final analysis, Britain and America produced
an amphibious doctrine, along with the necessary tactics,
techniques, and material that were successful in all oper-
ations attempted, a most extraordinary accomplishment of
the war.

251
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 Appendix A: Photo Plates

Plate 1. British Motor Landing Craft (1), 6 ton, ramp, water-jet propelled
craft, 1926. (Imperial War Museum)

Plate 2. 6th Commando, Special Service Brigade conducting tests from

Sunderland aircraft by means of rubber inflatable dinghies, August 1942.
(Imperial War Museum)

259
 Plate 3. (Imperial War Museum)

"e
Plate 4. Higgins Eureka Boat, without ramp, U.S. Marines at New River,
North Carolina, July 1941. (Department of Defense, USMC)

204
 > =
eae
St en tinny il woe

Plate 5. Higgins Eureka Boat with ramp, designated Landing Craft Per-
sonnel (Ramp) LCP (R), March 1942. (Department of Defense, USMC)

2 = lll, er

Plate 6. Japanese Landing Boat. Photograph taken by British and called

“C” Class, at Tientsin, 1937. (Public Record Office)

200
 saa “AR

Plate 7. Japanese Landing Boat. Photograph taken by Americans and

called “TYPE A,” at Shanghai, 1937. (Department of Defense, USMC)

Plate 8. Port-side view of Japanese Landing Craft Carrier (1938). (Imperial

War Museum)

256
 «¢ = gt &
* . > te ‘ ae?
om sag ro Se
Plate 9. Stern-view of Japanese Landing Craft Carrier. Landing craft de-
barked from stern. (Imperial War Museum)

257
Appendix B: Watson Memorandum
From: The Director, Royal Naval Staff College, Green-
wich.
To: The President, Royal Naval College, Greenwich.
S.C.3.
23 February, 1936

The attached memorandum on the naval side of Com-

bined Operations is submitted for your approval and re-
marks.
It has resulted from the experience gained in exercises
with the Army and Air Staff Colleges when Combined
Operations were studied for periods of several weeks.
(Signed) B. C.WATSON
Captain, R.N.

Rd.930/15
Forwarded for Their Lordships’ favourable consid-
eration.
1. Iam in complete agreement with Captain Watson’s
remarks on the importance of the subject of Combined
Operations and on the comparative lack of progress made
since the war. Experience at the War College bears out
both these contentions.
2. I am also in agreement that some form of per-
manent committee and, still more important, a small train-

258
ing and development force of the three Services combined
would be of incalculable benefit and should lead to real
and rapid progress.
(Signed) R. M. COLVIN,
President.

Memorandum on
the Naval Side of Combined Operations and the Necessity
for
Its Development in Peace

1. The object of this memorandum is to suggest im-

provements in the organisation and development of the
naval side of Combined Operations; and to record the
experience gained in exercises with the Army and Air Staff
Colleges, when a special opportunity for studying the sub-
ject was afforded.
Navy's Interest Greater
2. In the first place, it is desired to emphasise the fact
that the Navy is more directly interested in the question
of Combined Operations than either of the other Services;
and that consequently, any progress in their organisation
and development must depend largely on the initiative
taken by the Navy.
3. In any war in which the British Empire may be
engaged, the seizure of enemy bases will be of great im-
portance in order to ensure the safety of our trade routes;
and of this, our past wars provide many instances. But
unlike the past, a future war may urgently require seizure
of an advanced base in enemy territory—or even the re-
capture of one of our own bases—without which our main
fleet or air forces will be unable to operate effectively.
Navy’s Responsibility Greater
4. But the Navy is not only more directly interested
in Combined Operations than the other Services; it also
bears, under present conditions, the greater responsibility

250)
for their success. In general, a Combined Operation con-
sists of four separate steps:—
(i) The planning and preparation.
(ii) The transport to the scene of action.
(iii)‘The landing.
(iv) The subsequent operations to secure the ob-
jective.
5. With all these steps, the Navy is intimately con-
cerned, and in particular with the transport and the land-
ing. But, in past wars, neither of these presented any
special difficulty, and the normal means available were
sufficient even for landing troops in face of opposition.
The success or failure of the operation depended then
mainly on what happened after the landing, and for this,
the chief responsibility belonged to the Army.
The Landing—A Vital Problem
6. But of recent years, this situation has changed.
Owing to the development in the power of the defence,
the landing has now become the keynote on which success
or failure depends. However carefully the expedition may
be planned, and however competent the military forces
may be to secure their objective, the whole expedition will
collapse and may suffer destruction unless a landing can
be effected. And, therefore, it may be said that to-day, the
Navy’s responsibility is relatively greater than that of the
other Services.
7. In this matter of the landing, the Navy’s respon-
sibility comes under three headings:—
(a) ‘The transport of troops to the beaches.
(b) ‘The destruction or neutralisation of beach def-
ences and the support of the troops after land-
ing.
(c) ‘The exploitation of the principle of surprise.
In the past, the Navy required few, if any, special means
to carry these out, beyond those which it employed in the
ordinary course of its duties. But to-day, owing to the in-
creased power of the defence, the ordinary means will be

260 .
quite inadequate if there is to be any certainty of success.
Need for Special Training and Development
8. In fact, it must be admitted that the problem of
landing a force to-day in face of opposition has become
one of extreme difficulty, which can only be solved by
means of highly specialised training and material. And, if
this is so, the training and development of material must
be carried out in peace, and cannot be relegated, as for-
merly, until after the outbreak of war.
9. If Combined Operations were the sole responsi-
bility and interest of the Navy, there can be little doubt
that this change in their nature would have been recog-
nised long ago, and steps taken to ensure the necessary
training and development. But, belonging as they do to all
three Services, they can claim the concentrated attention
of none, with the inevitable result that no real progress has
been made.
The Present Situation
10. Nothing that has been said above is intended to
imply that the study and training in Combined Operations
has been neglected since the war. On the contrary, great
interest has been taken in the subject; but this interest has
been of a general nature, with no definite aim, which has
naturally resulted in vague and unpractical conceptions.
11. At present, schemes are worked out every year by
the three Staff Colleges working together; practical exer-
cises are carried out by the fleets, and bombardment prac-
tices are carried out by most of H.M. ships. But, as there
is no expert Authority on Combined Operations to whom
all questions can be referred, and whose function it is to
supervise these activities and to record the results, little
progress can be made.
12. But the chief handicap to progress is the fact that
no real effort has been made to solve the vital problem of
the landing; and until this has been done, and a practical
knowledge gained of its requirements, planning and train-
ing is likely to be misdirected and on wrong lines.

261
Planning Unsuited to Modern Conditions
13. At present, our planning and training are mostly
on the lines laid down in the Manual of Combined Op-
erations, which embodies the experience of the late war
and particularly of the Dardanelles. But as far as can be
foreseen, modern conditions of war will require a simpler
and swifter type of operation if success is to be achieved;
or even if the attempt is to be considered a practical prop-
osition.
14. Interesting though the experience of the late war
may be, its value lies more in principles than in details;
and surprise, with its essential elements of speed and sim-
plicity, has been proved time and again to be the basic
principle of Combined Operations. If, for instance, using
only a brigade we can surprise the enemy in the early stages
of a war, and find him unprepared, it will have greater
chances of success than several divisions a few months later.
Principles Submerged
15. To-day, however, though this principle is recog-
nised in theory, the methods contemplated would make
its achievement impossible. In fact, delay is to be found at
every turn—in the planning or the operations; in taking
up and fitting out ships; in the training, not only of the
troops, but of the ships providing the supporting fire. And
finally, there is delay and complication in meeting the end-
less requirements of the military and air forces, which de-
mand the employment of large numbers of slow ships. As
a result, in practice the principle would be submerged, not
only by delay, but by the large number of ships required
and by the impossibly complicated arrangements for land-
ing, bombarding and communication.
Summary
16. ‘To sum up, it is suggested that the Navy’s outlook
on Combined Operations requires alteration, and that they
should be recognised to be what they are—our special in-
terest and responsibility. At present, they are regarded as
requiring only a general consideration and training in time

262
of peace; but, if this view is maintained, we will start the
next war worse prepared for Combined Operations than
ever before.
17. This is solely due to the greatly increased power
of the defence which it will be impossible to overcome in
the future with the normal means available. Intensive
training and development of material will alone supply the
answer and these cannot be left until after the outbreak
of war without sacrificing the fundamental principle of
success—surprise.
Proposals for Reorganisation
18. The means required to effect this change are nei-
ther elaborate nor expensive. It is largely a question of
providing supervision to record experience gained, and
ensure development on the right lines; and also of con-
centration of effort instead of dissipation. To effect this,
the following are considered to be essential:—
(a) A permanent Committee on Combined Op-
erations.
(b) A Training and Development Centre.
Permanent Committee
19. (a) A Permanent Committee.—To consist of rep-
resentatives of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry
to whom all questions could be referred, and whose func-
tions would be as follows:—
(i) ‘To recommend practical exercises and paper
schemes to the three Services. To study and
record the results of these, and try out any
suggestion received.
(ii) To supervise the training and development of
landing operations carried out by the Training
and Development Centre.
(ili) To study the development of Service and com-
mercial material suitable for Combined Op-
erations; and to conduct trials of such material.
(iv) To consider plans for possible Combined Op-
erations in any future war.

263
 (v) To rewrite and keep up to date the Manual of
Combined Operations.
Training and Development Centre
20. (b) Training and Development Centre.—To con-
sist of a military force and certain of H.M. ships, Army
units and aircraft attached as requisite. Its functions to be
as follows:—
(i) To train in all methods for the seizure of de-
fended beaches.
(ii) To develop the material necessary for such
methods, with special regard to protection of
troops, to speed of landing, and to the attain-
ment of surprise.
(i) To develop methods and material for the de-
struction or neutralisation of enemy defences,
including bombardment and aircraft co-
operation.
(iv) In time of war, the whole force to be employed
for carrying out minor operations by itself; or
in conjunction with military forces, as the cov-
ering force to seize and hold beaches for the
main landing.
21. The adoption of these proposals should ensure
speedy progress in the development and organisation of
Combined Operations in time of peace and the practical
experience gained would be invaluable for our planning
schemes which, at present, are based only on theoretical
considerations, and which suffer greatly from a lack of
practical knowledge. In time of war, the possession of a
highly trained force would be of a great value either for
independent action or to form a nucleus, capable of rapid
expansion, for an expedition of any size.
22. As regards the military force for the Training and
Development Centre, there can be little doubt that, if fi-
nancial conditions allow, a force of Royal Marines would
be the ideal. As in their normal life afloat, they naturally
acquire considerable experience of the methods employed

264 .
in landing operations, they would require less training than
a military force; and further the training required will
involve the handling of special material for which a knowl-
edge of the sea will be of value. On the other hand, the
co-operation of military forces in this training is most de-
sirable in order to keep in touch with the latest develop-
ments of land warfare.
Admiral Madden’s Recommendations
23. The above proposals were made solely from a re-
view of present conditions and with no knowledge that
similar recommendations had been made by Admiral Mad-
den’s Committee which reported in 1924. In this Report,
the establishment of a Marine Striking Force and a Train-
ing Centre for landing operations were strongly recom-
mended; but no suggestion was made of the development
of methods and material for the seizure of beaches, which
are an essential part of the above proposals.
24. Though the Report was approved by the Board
it was finally shelved for want of money. In relation to the
present proposals, however, the Report should still be of
great value, as it contains all details of cost involved, etc.,
and many other useful matters. Its arguments for the es-
tablishment of a Marine Striking Force and Training
Centre may be summarised as follows:—
(i) That, in wars of the past, one of the main
functions of the Royal Marine Corps had been
to act offensively in seizing bases for the fleet;
in the future, due to change of strategical con-
ditions, this function would be more than ever
required, as would be the function of acting
as a covering force for military landings.
(ii) That the U.S.A. had fully realised the value
of these functions and should make provision
for them.
(iii) That the Admiralty should recognise and lay
down these functions and should make pro-
vision for them.

265
 (iv) That these functions should be met by the pro-
vision of not less than a brigade of our battal-
ions made up of 1,800 fully trained Active
Service and 1,600 Reservists called upon mob-
ilisation.
(v) That this would require an increase in Vote
A of 1,900 men (1924-25).
(vi) That a separate Training Centre, should be
established at some place near the coast to
carry on continuous training of the above
force.
Principles of Success
25. Finally, the Report makes two remarks which are
applicable to the present proposals. In emphasising the
necessity to be prepared beforehand for the seizure of
bases, it states:—
For their success, the operations would depend not on
the employment of large masses of troops organised and
trained for service in the field, and encumbered with equip-
ment necessary for a land campaign, but rather on the
use of a relatively small lightly armed force, moving
with the mobility and secrecy of the fleet and accus-
tomed to work in co-operation with it.
And, in recognising the then obvious difficulty in ob-
taining the necessary increase in Vote “A” it states:—
It is possible that in the next decade or so, improvements
in the financial situation may enable, and changes in the
international situation require, further steps in the same
direction to be taken.
Conclusion
26. It is suggested that the situation foretold in the
Report has now arrived; and that if any doubt exists as to
the value to the Navy of such a force, the recent experience
of the Mobile Naval Base organisation should assist to re-
move it. As the Report truly says, “Unless a corps of the
strength indicated is maintained, the Navy will be inade-
quately equipped for the operations which it is likely to be
called upon to undertake in future wars.”

266 i
 Appendix C: Glossary of
Abbreviations

Amphibious
Assistant Chief Naval Staff
Admiralty
Adjutant-General Royal Marines
Air Ministry
Air Vice-Marshal
Atlantic Tank Landing Craft
British Admiralty Supply Mission
British Admiralty Technical Mis-
sion
BEF British Expeditionary Force
Buships Bureau of Ships
CAB War Cabinet, Cabinet
CAS Chief of Air Staff
CID Committee of Imperial Defence
CINCANT Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
(Fleet)
CE Commanding General
CMC Commandant of Marine Corps
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
GLES Chief of Imperial General Staff
GTC Combined Training Centre
CCS)
CCOS) Combined Chiefs of Staff
CCOR Chief of Combined Operations
Representatives

267
COXE Combined Operations Experi-
mental Establishment
CCO Chief of Combined Operations
CO Combined Operations, Com-
manding Officer
COHQ Combined Operations Headquar-
ters
COLO Combined Operations Liaison Of-
ficer
COMINCH Commander-in-Chief (U.S. Fleet)
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
COMSOWESPAC Commander South-West Pacific
COMNAVFOR Commander Naval Forces
COS Chiefs of Staff
Comm Committee
COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme. Al-
lied Commander
COJP Combined Operations Joint Plan-
ning
DCAS Deputy Chief of Air Staff
DCIGS Deputy Chief Imperial General
Staff
DCOS Deputy Chiefs of Staff
DCOS (IT) Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Inter-
Service Committee)
DCO Director of Combined Operations
DEFE Defence (Ministry of Defence Rec-
ords)

DTSD Director of Training & Staff Du-

ties Division
Div Division
DUKW 2¥2 ton amphibian lorry
DNI Director of Naval Intelligence
Encl Enclosure
BEEP Fleet Training Publication

268 .
 Forward Observing Officer
General Board
General Officer Commanding
General Officer Commanding
Royal Marines
Historical Amphibious File
Headquarters
Headquarters Marine Corps
His/Her Majesty’s Stationery Of-
fice
His/Her Majesty’s Ship
Historical Reference Branch
Historical Reference Section
Inter-Service Training and De-
velopment Centre
yes Joint Planning Staff
LANTPHIBFOR Atlantic Amphibious Force
LGA Landing Craft Assault
LCB Landing Craft Barge
LCF Landing Craft Flak
Landing Craft Gun
Landing Craft Infantry
Landing Craft Mechanised
Landing Craft Personnel
Landing Craft Personnel (Ramp)
Landing Craft Support
Landing Craft Support (Rocket)
Landing Craft Tank
Landing Craft Tank (Rocket)
Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel
Light Support Craft
Landing Ship Dock
Landing Ship (Fighter Direction)
Landing Ship Headquarters
Landing Ship Infantry
Landing Ship Medium
Landing Ship Tank

269
Landing Vehicle Tracked
Landing Vehicle Tracked (Ar-
moured)
Letter
Lieutenant-General
Marine Aircraft Experimental Es-
tablishment
Manuscript
Major-General

Manual
Marine Corps Expeditionary
Marine Corps Schools
Marine Corps Development & Ed-
ucational Command

Memorandum
Minute
Meeting
Motor Landing Craft
Mobile Landing Craft Advance
Base
National Maritime Museum
Naval History Division
Operational
Office of Naval Research
Public Record Office
Rear-Admiral
Responsibility for Amphibious
Warfare (Committee)
Royal Air Force
Royal Marines
Royal Navy
Royal Naval College
Royal Naval Staff College
Record Group

270 :
 Report
Regiment
Staff College(s) Report
SACSEA Supreme Allied Commander
Southeast Asia
SEAC Southeast Asia Command
Sec Secretary
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy
Summary
Southwest Pacific Area
Tactical Air Force
Task Force
United States of America, United
States Army
United States Marine Corps
United States Navy
United States Ship
V Amphibious Corps
VCNS Vice Chief of Naval Staff
United States Strategic Bombing
Survey (Pacific)
Vice-Admiral
Volume
War Office
War Plans
 Appendix D: Chronology of
Amphibious (Combined) Operations
Development

Britain

1913 Existing publication, Manual of Combined Naval

and Military Operations, continued to 1920.
aS) Staff Colleges annual syndicates considered
combined operations problems beginning in
1919 and continued for subsequent eighteen
years.
1920 Staff College report became “draft” copy of
Chapter XIII, FSR, Vol Il, Combined Oper-
ations.
1920 As a result of “draft” copy, an inter-depart-
mental committee on combined operations
convened with Major General G. F. Dawney
presiding. New chapter resulted to include sec-
tion on “aerial co-operation” and the RAF.
“Precis of Proposed Manual of Combined Op-
erations,” submitted by naval members of
Dawney’s Committee, was not included in
Chapter XIII report. Admiralty proposed new
committee.
1921 New committee, chaired by Capt. E. Altham,
RN, author of “Precis.”

272 k
 1922 Altham’s Committee issued the Manual of Com-
bined Naval, Military and Air Force
Operations—P rovisional.
1924 Madden Committee Report.
1925 Provisional Manual of 1922 superseded by the
1925 edition.
1920s Actual landing exercises with the Fleet were
conducted at Rattray Head and Shandwick
Bay, both in Scotland and Kasid, India.
1926 Motor Landing Craft (1) delivered and tested.
1931 Manual of Combined Operations issued,
superseding 1925 edition.
1934 Inter-Service Conference held concerning
landing of main body of overseas expedition.
1936 Watson Memorandum.
1937, DCOS Inter-Service Sub-Committee estab-
lished.
1938 Manual of Combined Operations issued,
superseding 1931 edition.
This edition, along with changes, was used
during the war.
1938 Inter-Service Training and Development
Centre (ISTDC) opened.
1939 COS approve £150,000 for construction of
landing boats and equipment.
1930s Actual landing exercises with the Fleet were
conducted at Malta, Singapore, Dartmouth/
Slapton Sands and the Yorkshire coast.

America
1919 Existing publications, issued by Joint
Army-Navy Board from 1919 to 1933, pre-
scribed methods for Army and Navy co-
operation in joint overseas expeditions.
1920 Marine Corps Advanced Base Force estab-
lished.

293
1925 Advanced Base Force renamed Marine Corps
Expeditionary Force with emphasis on orga-
nized units available for overseas service with
the Fleet.
1925 Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars manual issued
by Marine Corps Schools.
1927 Marine Corps Schools revised and consider-
ably expanded instruction on landing opera-
tions.
1920s Four major landing exercises within the Fleet
Exercises were conducted. Various landing
boats tested in all exercises.
1931 Work commenced on tentative text Marine
Corps Landing Operations, by board of MCS of-
ficers. This board renamed Landing Opera-
tions Text Board.
Experimental Lighter Board and Curriculum
Board established.
Advanced Base Problem series began in 1931
and continued for ten years. Marine Corps
Schools officers and Naval War College offi-
cers worked on problems of defence and sei-
zure of advanced bases with emphasis on
proper fleet landing units.
1955 Marine Corps Expeditionary Force renamed
Fleet Marine Force (FMF). The FMF became an
integral part of the Fleet organization to be
used for tactical employment.
Marine Corps Equipment Board established.
1934 Board of Officers met at Quantico to begin
writing manual for landing operations.
In June, Tentative Manual for Landing Opera-
tions issued for Marine Corps Schools use.
1935 New revision board issued the Tentative Land-
ing Operations Manual. Widely distributed, this
edition became the basis for all subsequent
editions.

274 .
1937 Landing Operations Doctrine issued by U.S.
Navy. New name for 1935 edition.
1938 Fleet Training Publication (FTP) No. 167 issued.
This edition, along with changes, was used
during the war.
1930s Seven major Fleet Exercises were held during
this period ending in the Summer of 1941.
Prototypes of what were to become LCVPs,
LCMs and LVTs were thoroughly tested dur-
ing these Exercises.

275
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 Bibliography

Primary Material—United Kingdom

Unpublished

1. Chiefs of Staff Committee Papers. The Chiefs of Staff

(COS), formed in 1923 as a sub-committee of the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence (CID), was the major military
committee of the peacetime cabinet. In September 1939,
the War Cabinet superseded both the peacetime Cabinet
and the CID, with no change in the functions of the COS
Committee.
The wartime COS Committee was served by two inter-
service bodies, the Joint Planning Staff and the Joint In-
telligence sub-committee. By April 1940, three Vice-Chiefs
of Staff were appointed to act as substitutes for their Chiefs
and whose meetings counted equally as meeting of the
COS.
Peacetime minutes of meetings of the COS and Dep-
uty Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) are generally contained in CAB
53 with memoranda contained in CAB 54. Wartime min-
utes of COS meetings are contained in CAB 79 with mem-
oranda contained in CAB 80. Minutes and memoranda
marked “Operational” (0), were all Most Secret (Top Se-
cret).
Any major decision affecting combined operations

20)
became an agenda item in the COS meetings. While the
COS minutes of meetings were condensed, oftentimes sup-
port or opposition papers to certain proposals were at-
tached to the minutes of meetings. These papers generally
provided definitive views and background information.
2. Ministry of Defence Papers, Number 2, (DEFE 2) are
the records of the Combined Operations Headquarters
and miscellaneous papers relating to the subject of com-
bined operations. There are 1,427 files within the DEFE
2 records ranging from a single piece of personal corre-
spondence to the complete Overlord/Neptune report. DEFE
2 records are organised generally as follows:

DEFE 2/1 through 60B—War Diaries of Combined

Operations Headquarters; all Commando and Royal
Marine Commando Units; Special Service Brigades;
Special Units; and miscellaneous reports in the form
of Diaries.
61 through 650B—Contains minutes of meetings,
plans, administration, reports and summaries per-
taining to all British combined operations.
651 through 780—Contains operational reports on
combined operations from American sources, His-
tories of Commandos, COHQ, personal correspond-
ence of Sir Roger Keyes, special reports of British
operations in the Mediterranean, Africa and Middle
Fast.
781 through 1373—Miscellaneous files ranging from
lectures given by naval officers in 1925 to a report on
landing armour in the assault prepared in 1945.
1374 through 1427—Charts, maps, drawings and pho-
tographs pertaining to various combined operations.

3. Admiralty Papers (ADM). ADM 1 papers are largely

miscellaneous minutes and reports that did not fit into a
complete file or case such as the Madden Report, ADM
1/8664. Those subjects that are complete “cases” are gen-

278 ‘
erally found in ADM 116, 178 or 199. An example of a
complete case is the early Staff Colleges landing exercise
problems. The case contains the Staff Colleges Reports
and in addition all of the War Office, Air Ministry and
Admiralty notes and comments of criticism of the exer-
cises.
4. Miscellaneous. War Office and Air Ministry records
cited in this study were contained in the Admiralty and
Defence 2 records.
For an unusual glance at high level considerations that
were given to possible combined operations, early CID
papers were of interest:

CID Paper 92B—The “Possibility of a Joint Naval and

Military Attack Upon the Dardanelles” Memorandum
by the General Staff and Note by the Director of Naval
Intelligence, 20 November 1906 (CAB 38/12/60).
CID Paper 111-C—Expedition against German East
Africa, Memorandum by Sir E. G. Barrow, Military
Secretary, India Office, 18 September 1914 (CAB
38/28).
CID Paper 112-C—Expedition against German East
Africa, Memorandum by Sir E. G. Barrow, Military
Secretary, India Office, in consultation with the Co-
lonial Office, 28 September 1914 (CAB 38/28).
CID Paper 113-C—Proceedings of a Joint Naval and
Military Sub-Committee for the consideration of com-
bined operations in foreign territory, 6 October 1914
(CAB 38/28).

5. Correspondence. Writer initiated correspondence

and received the following replies from the Admiral of the
Fleet, the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, 12 March 1975; 28
April 1976; 17 May 1976; 7 January 1977; 23 February
1977 and 22 June 1977.
6. Interviews. All of the following persons were asked
specific questions to clarify a point and some reviewed

279
portions of the chapters. The ranks, locations and affili-
ations specified are those which were valid at the time of
the interview:
Mr. John Barratt, Director, The Mountbatten Memorial
Trust, London
Colonel Jerry T. Bowlin, USMC, Joint Warfare Establish-
ment, Salisbury
Major Alfred G. Brown, RM (Retd), Curator Royal Ma-
rines Museum, Eastney, Southsea
Mr. David Brown, Librarian, Breckinridge Library, Am-
phibious Warfare Research Facility, Education Center,
Quantico, Virginia
Major Robert A. Browning, USMC, Marine Barracks, US
Naval Activity, London
Rear Admiral P. N. Buckley (Retd), Head of Naval His-
torical Branch and Naval Historical Library
Major A. J. Donald, RM (Retd), Corps Historian, Royal
Marines Barracks, Eastney, Southsea
Colonel James J. Fowler, USMCR, Headquarters, US Ma-
rine Corps, Washington
Rear Admiral Edward F. Gueritz, Commandant, Joint
Warfare Establishment, Salisbury
Miss M. Hill, Staff College, Camberley, Surrey
Major General Robert B. Loudoun, Training Group, Royal
Marines, Eastney, Southsea
Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl Mountbatten of Burma,
Broadlands, Romsey
Major Antony J. Parker, RM, Amphibious Training Unit,
Royal Marines, Poole
Lieutenant Colonel William D. Parker, USMCR, Com-
mand and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia
Professor Bryan McL. Ranft, King’s College, University of
London
Colonel Thomas P. Redden, USMCR, Amphibious War-
fare School, Quantico, Virginia
Major Kenneth B. Robson, RM, Amphibious Training
Unit, Royal Marines, Poole

280
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick H. Scarf, RM, Headquarters,
Training Group, Royal Marines, Eastney, Southsea
Mr. M. G. Sims, Librarian, Staff College, Camberley, Sur-
rey
Mr. Donald G. Smith, Don Smith Consultants, Inc., New
York
Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Thomas, RM, Director of
Naval Warfare, Ministry of Defence, London
Major General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC, Director, Ed-
ucation Center, Marine Corps Development and Edu-
cation Command, Quantico, Virginia
Mr. James Walford, Ministry of Defence Records, Public
Record Office, London
Major James W. Walmsley, RM, Headquarters, Training
Group, Royal Marines, Eastney, Southsea

7. Unpublished Monographs and Reports.

“History of the British Admiralty Delegation, March 1941 to

September 1945” (ADM 199/1236).

“Committee on the Corps of Royal Marines Report,” 6 August

1924 (ADM 1/8664) (Madden Report).

“German Operations Against Oesel Island Report,” Septem-

ber 1941, British Naval Mission, Knibipher, Russia,
20 November 1941 (DEFE 2/806).

“The Capture of the Baltic Islands, Oesel, Moon and Dago,”

October 1917. Brigadier-General J.E. Edmonds, R.E.
(Retd) (DEFE 2/806).

“Record of the Small Operations Group SEAC,” Lieutenant-

Colonel H.G. Hasler, RM, 4 March 1946 (DEFE
2/780). This Group provided small parties of uni-

281
formed troops which were trained and equipped to
operate against enemy coastal or lake areas.

“History of Combined Operations of Headquarters 1939-1945.”

Believed to be the manuscript format for the pub-
lished History of COHQ listed below. (DEFE 2/697).

Extracts of Correspondence from Prime Minister to the

President beginning 25 July 1941 concerning “Tank-
Landing Vessels and Craft.” It appears that the Prime
Minister was the first, on the highest level, to suggest
a craft that would land tanks directly on the beaches,
a forerunner of the LST. (War Cabinet Document
W..P>(42) 259, 16 June 1942).

Summary of naval experiences and recommendations

arising from “Operation Neptune,” signed by Sir
Henry R. Markham, Permanent Secretary of the Ad-
miralty (DEFE 2/426).

Four lectures given at the ISTDC in February 1941,

Naval, Army, Military and Air Aspects of Combined Op-
erations (DEFE 2/867).

Captain A.W. Willis, RN, lecture delivered at Royal

Naval Staff College, 26 November 1930 (DEFE
2/781).

Manuscript for the presentation of the Evolution of Am-

phibious Assault, by Commander D.D. Miller RN,
Royal Naval Staff College, 19 October 1966.

Manuscript of Evolution of Amphibious Warefare given by

the staff at Joint Warfare Establishment 1971-1972
(Writer’s Copy).

Japanese Combined Naval and Military Landing Operations,

282
 Report on Miltary Landing Craft Carrier and Special
Miltary Landing Craft Employed, submitted by Lieu-
tenant Commander A.S.D. Ryder, RN, to
Commander-in-Chief, China Station, Shanghai, 12
October 1938 (DEFE 2/782B).

Disembarkation of Japanese Division at Shanghai and Woo-

sung, 14-16 February 1932, submitted by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, China, H.M.S. Kent at Shanghai,
10 March 1932 (ADM 1/9551).

Reference Manual on Landing Operations, September

1941, Inspector General, Military Education (Allied
Translator and Interpreter Section, South West Pa-
cific Area) 13 July 1943 (ADM 1/14770).

Published

Manual of Combined Operations, C.B., 3022, Naval Staff,

Training and Staff Duties Division, 1931.

Manual of Combined Operations, C.B. 3042, Naval Staff,

Training and Staff Duties Division, 1938.

List of Papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence to 1914,

Public Record Office, 1964.

Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied

Commander South-East Asia, 1943-1945, 1951.

Instructions for Royal Maries, Fourth Edition, 1922,

Royal Marines Museum, Eastney.

History of the Combined Operations Organisation, 1940-1945,

Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, 1956.

283
 Combined Operations 1940-1942, H.M.S.O. 1943.

The Royal Marines, The Admiralty Account of Their Achieve-

ment 1939-1943, H.M.S.O. 1944.

Combined Operations, The Official Story of the Commandos,

H.M.S.O. 1943.

Later Works

Books

The usual memoirs and bibliographies of the leading

politicians, Admirals, and Generals of the interwar period
and war period were not listed because they are so familiar
and in most instances, they were not at all pertinent to the
subject. The fine United Kingdom military histories, such
as the six volumes of Grand Strategy and Roskill’s three
volumes in four parts, of the War at Sea series, were also
not listed. Again, both series are familiar and while they
give a total picture of the naval and diplomatic side of the
war, they make short shrift of the development of British
combined operations in the interwar period. To be sure,
there are a few books dealing directly with the subject and
a few books whose subjects overlap, such as the Royal
Marines.
Fergusson, Bernard. The Watery Maze—The Story of Com-
bined Operations. Collins, 1961.
Hartcup, Guy. The Challenge of War: Scientific and Engi-
neering Contributions to World War Two. David and
Charles, 1970.
Higham, Robin. Armed Forces in Peacetime, Britain, 1918-1940,
a case study. G. 'T. Foulis, 1962.
The Military Intellectuals in Britain: 1918-1939. Rut-
gers, ULF. 1066:

284
Keyes, Admiral of the Fleet. Amphibious Warfare and Com-
bined Operations. Cambridge U.P., 1943.
Ladd, J. D. Assault From the Sea 1939-1945. David and
Charles, 1976.
Lund, Paul and Ludlam, Harry. The War of the Landing
Craft. W. Foulsham, 1976.
Maund, L. E. H. Assault From the Sea. Methuen, 1949.
Roskill, Stephen. Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. I. Col-
lins, 1968.
Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II. Naval Institute
Press -1976.
Smith, Peter C. Per Mare Per Terram, A History of the Royal
Marines. Photo Precision, 1974.
Winton, John. The Forgotten Fleet, The British Navy in the
Pacific 1944-1945. New York: Coward—McCann, 1970.

Articles

Aston, G. G. Colonel, “Combined Strategy for Fleets

and Armies: or Amphibious Strategy.” Journal of the
Royal United Service Institution 51 (Aug 1907).
Maund, L. E. H. “The Development of Landing
Craft.” Journal RUSI 90; 558 (May 1945).
Rose, John M. Captain, R.M.A., “Lessons to be de-
rived from the Operations of landing an Expedition-
ary Force on an enemy’s coast in past wars, with special
references to similar operations on the part of our
Army in the future.” Journal RUSI 39; 209 (July 1895).

Primary Material—The United States

Unpublished

The National Archives in Washington generally con-

tain all pre-World War II records of the military and naval
285
services. However, the Services had the option to maintain
their own military records and correspondence that they
considered necessary in research and writing histories. As
a result, the primary research unpublished material con-
cerning amphibious development for the Navy and Marine
Corps are found in the Naval History Division Operational
Archives of the Department of Navy and the Historical
Amphibious File (HAF) at the Marine Corps Base, Quan-
tico, Virginia.
The Naval History Division (NHD) contains the com-
plete records of the correspondence of the General Board
of the Navy along with records pertaining to the Marine
Corps’ association with the General Board (RG 432) and
advanced Naval bases (RG 408).
The Historical Amphibious File (HAF) in Breckin-
ridge Library at Quantico contains nearly one thousand
documents pertaining to the 1920s and 1930s landing ex-
ercises, reports, observations and material for the doctrine
of landing in the assault.
In addition to the files at NHD and HAF, the National
Archives contains general correspondence records of the
Marine Corps (RG 127); Joint Army and Navy Board cor-
respondence (RG 225); General records of the Department
of the Navy (RG 80); and records of the Chief of Naval
Operations (RG 38).

I. Monographs, Memoranda and Letters.

Major Dion Williams, Office of Naval Investigation Re-

port, Men, Material and Drills Required for Establishing
a Naval Advance Base, 2 Nov 1909 (RG 408).

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, USS Arkansas, Flagship, Report on

Operations of Advanced Base Expedition, Culebra, W.1.,
Jan—Feb 1914, (RG 432).

286 .
 Proceedings of Conference concerning Tentative Land-
ing Operations Manual, Jan 1935 (HAF).

Krulak, Lieutenant General Victor H. USMG, to Writer,

3 August 1970 and 4 April 1975, concerning Japa-
nese Landing Boat at Shanghai, 1937.

Special Joint Chiefs of Staff, Monographs on Amphibious

Warfare, (HAF).

Staff Study, History of U.S. Naval Research and Develop-

ment in World War IT, Manuscript, University of Pitts-
burgh Historical Staff at ONR, 1946 (NHD).

Commandant of the Marine Corps report to the As-

sistant Secretary of the Navy, “The Evolution of Mod-
ern Amphibious Warfare,” 7 April 1959 (HQMC,
HRB).

Published

Report, Research, Investigation and Experimentation in the

Field of Amphibian Vehicles for United States Marine
Corps, Borg-Warner Corporation, December 1957.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 1, Dictionary of U.S.

Military Terms for Joint Usage, August 1968.

Joint Action of the Army and Navy, Joint Board, 1927.

Landing Force Manual 01, Doctrine for Landing Amphib-

ious Operations, 1968.

Small Wars Manual, U.S. Marine Corps, 1940.

287
 Tentative Landing Operations M anual, Headquarters U.S.
Marine Corps, 9 July 1935.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Mil-

itary Analysis Division, Air Campaigns of the Pacific
War, July 1946.

Anthony A. Frances, History of the Marine Corps Schools,

Quantico, 1945.

Later Works

Books

In a similar situation with the books in the United

Kingdom list, the usual memoirs and bibliographies of
politicians, Generals and Admirals are not listed, primarily
because there was little or no mention made of the devel-
opment of amphibious warfare during the interwar pe-
riod.
For a definitive treatment of the naval war, the fifteen-
volume History of United States Naval Operations in World
War II by Samuel Eliot Morison will certainly do. However,
Commodore Dudley W. Knox, who wrote the introduction
to Volume I of the series, devotes two pages to “Devel-
opment of Amphibious Warfare” between the World
Wars. Similarly, the five volume History of United States
Marine Corps Operations in World War II, written by ten
different authors, does a bit better with twenty-five pages
in Volume I devoted to the “Evolution of Modern Am-
phibious Warfare 1920-1941.” In all events, both Navy
and Marine Corps series are excellent.
Generally, books about the Navy and Marine Corps
before World War II did not reflect an understanding of
the subject of amphibious operations primarily because so

288
little was written about it by others. It is only in Service
magazines that an occasional article appears concerning
the subject. Most of the books are post World War II.
Selected books:

Abbott, Willis J. Soldiers of the Sea: The Story of the United

States Marine Corps. New York, 1918.

Barbey, Daniel E., Vice-Admiral. MacArthur’s Amphibi-

ous Navy, Seventh Amphibious Force Operations
1943-1945. Annapolis, 1969.

Braisted, William R. The United States Navy in the Pacific,

1897-1909. Austin, Texas, 1958.

Clifford, Kenneth J. Progress and Purpose: A Develop-

mental History of the U.S. Marine Corps 1900-1970.
Washington, 1973.

Davis, Richard E., Lt., USN. Research and Development

of Assault Ships and Craft. Coronado, California, 1966.

Dyer, George C., Vice-Admiral. The Amphibians Came to

Conquer, The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner.
2 Volumes. Washington, 1972.

Fukui, Shizuo., Lt. Cmdr. The Japanese Navy at the End

of World War II. Old Greenwich, Conn., 1947.

Furer, Julius A., Rear-Admiral. Administration of the

Navy Department in World War IT. Washington, 1959.

Isely, Jeter A. and Philip A. Crowl. The United States

Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton, 1951.

McClellan, Edwin N., Major. The United States Marine

Corps in the World War. Washington, 1920.

289
 Mitchell, Donald W. History of theModern American Navy,
from 1883 through Pearl Harbor. New York, 1946.

Potter, E. G., ed. Seapower: A Naval History. Englewood

Cliffs, New Jersey, 1960.

Stewart, Irvin. Organizing Scientific Research for War.

Boston, 1948.

Articles.

Broadbent, W. E., LCdr. “The Fleet and the Marines,”

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 57; 3 (Mar 1931).

Butler, Jarvis. “The General Board of the Navy.”

USNIP, 56; 8 (Aug 1930).

Cunningham, Alfred A., Major. “Value of Aviation to

the Marine Corps.” Marine Corps Gazette 5; 3 (Sep
1920).

Harrington, Samuel, Major. “The Strategy and Tactics

of Small Wars.” Marine Corps Gazette 6; 4 (Dec 1921)
and 7; 1 (Mar 1922).

Lane, Rufus H., BGen. “The Mission and Doctrine of

the Marine Corps.” Marine Corps Gazette 8; 1 (Mar
LO23)i

Pye, W. S., Capt., USN. “Joint Army and Navy Oper-

ations—Part I.” USNIP 50, 12 (Dec 1924).

Russell, John H., MajGen. “A Plea for a Mission and

Doctrine.” Marine Corps Gazette 1; 6 (June 1916).

290
Russell, John H., MajGen. “The Birth of the Fleet Ma-
rine Force.” USNIP 72 (Jan 1946).

Smith, Holland M., Gen. “Development of Amphibious

Tactics in the U.S. Navy.” Marine Corps Gazette 32,
6—10 (June—Oct 1948).

Williams, Dion, Capt., USMC. “The Defense of Our

New Naval Stations.” USNIP 28; 2 (June 1902).

aah
 ayes | 7 hy “~ ocr, i

ie N92 0.” AEA

PET ©) 9 HOM
~~ a »
 Index
ABC-1 Conference, 203 Arakan Peninsula, 217
ACNS S10; 14-16 Anderson, Maj. Gen. W. H., 32
Adam, Lt. Gen. Ronald F., 68, 70, Ansel, Lt. Walter C., 97
Te 74595 Anzio, 117
Adams, Charles F., 96 Armitage, Maj. Gen. C. C., 50
Admiralty, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49 Army Council, 46
59, 65, 71 Army, United States
Advanced Base, 92, 249 air force, 166, 230
force, 24, 25, 85 Camp Edwards, 157
problem, 99 Field Manual 31-5, 107
school, 23 Ist Infantry Division, 152
Adviser on Combined Operations, Tenth Army, 230, 232
133 3rd Infantry Division, 152
Adviser on Combined Operations, XXIV Corps, 230
India, 216 War College, 98
AGRM, 10 Aspinall-Oglander, Brig. Gen.
Aerial co-operation, 36 CeGen99
Air Council, 46 Assault Force, 187
Air Ministry, 43, 48, 59, 65 Assault mission, 21
Air Liaison Parties (ALP), 230 Assault Warfare Committe, 164
Akyak Island, 217, 218 Assistant Chief Naval Staff
Altham, Capt. Edward, 38 (ACNS), 10, 162
Alexander, General, 132 Assistant Chief Naval Staff
Alexandria, Egypt, 44 (Weapons), 135
Amery Leopold, 10 Australia, 211, 215, 234
Amphibians, 117 RAAF, 208
Amphibious Command Ship 29th Division, 219
(AGC). See Landing Craft
and transports Backhouse, Adm. Roger, 202
Amphibious force, Atlantic, 152 Baker; R., 137,139, 162
Amphibious operations, 17 Balfour, Arthur James, 27
Anakim, 216 Balikpapan, 220
Andaman Islands, 216 Barbey, Vice-Adm. Daniel E., 220

293
Barratt, Maj. Charles B., 97, 103 Canal Zone, 87
104, 113, 114, 159 Canary Island, 132
Battalion Landing Team, 234, 235, Cape Henry, Virginia, 154
237 Carden-Lloyd Light Amphibian
Beach groups, parties, 183, 188, Tank Wl7
212, 239 Caroline Islands, 4
Beadon, Col. L. R., 34 Carribbean, 153
Beatty (Admiral of the Fleet), 10 Carrier Task Force, 208, 214
“Beetle,” 88 Casablanca Conference, 143, 175,
Berkeley, Brig. Gen. Randolph C., 216
97, 98 Castle Toward, 132
Bernal, Prof. J. R., 167 CGGOR; 222
Bevin, Ernest, 175 — Centaur Tanks, 168
Board of Trade, 48 Central Pacific drive, 226
Bomber Command, 166 Chatfield, Adm. Ernle, 61,64, 201
Borg-Warner Corp., 118 chaungs, 218, 221, 222
Borneo, 219 Cheduba, 218
Bottomley, Air Marshal, N.J., 181, Chief of Combined Operations
185, 186 (GCO), 143; 1607 162; 165:
report, 182 174, 186, 192, 244, 246
Bouganville, 228, 229 Chief of Imperial General Staff
Bourne, Lt. Gen. Alan, 83, 126 (CIGS), 49, 50
Breaky, Air Vice Marshal, 166 Chiefof Naval Operations (CNO),
Breckinridge, Brig. Gen. James 3, 96, 97, 104, 144
C., 98 Chief of Naval Staff, 173, 223
Bridgeman, William, 16 China, 21, 25, 69, 90, 251
British Christie tank, 88, 117
admiralty delegation, 136 Christie, Walter, 88, 89
Army, 166 Churchill, Lt. Col. A. B. N., 38
Expeditionary Force (BEF), 81 Churchill, Prime Minister, W. S.,
Pacific fleet, 233 134, 135, 139, 173, 202, 206
Senior Officer Assault Group, CINCPACFLT, 148, 222
235 CINCPOA, 205
Broadbent, Lt. Cmdr. E. W., 100 Clarke, Lt. Col. Dudley, 126, 128
Brooke, Sir Alan, 192, 193 Clifford, Lt. Col. Kenneth
J., 102,
Brueval, 140 106, 151
Bureau of Construction and Close Air Support (CAS), 106.
Repair, 108 228, 229
Bureau of Ships, 116, 120 Coast Defence Manual, 50
Butler, Brig. Gen. Smedley D., 88, Cole, Brig. Gen. Eli K., 87, 88
89 Collins, Adm. Edward, 72
Colvin, Rear Adm. R. M., 58
Camberley, 99 Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOS),
Campbell, Capt. Harold D., 103 Lo7n 179; 217
Canadian Division, 176 Combined operations

N
294
 bombardment unit (COBU), Cunningham, Adm. A.B.,75, 170,
233 182, 183, 190, 192, 193, 213
development centre (CODC), Curriculum Board, 97
163 Cutts, Col. R. M., 86, 90, 100
exercises, 46, 47
headquarters (COHQ), 159, 165,
EG, V/5L 79181, 213; 214: Daggart, Cmdr. R. B., 116
240, 241 Dakar, 171
liaison officer (COLO), 139 Danckwerts, Capt. V. N., 201, 202
Combined Operations Dardanelles, 43, 99
Directorate, Bombay, 216 Dartmouth, 72
Combined Operations Pilotage Dawnay, Maj. Gen. G. F., 33, 34,
Parties (COPP), 183, 188, 217 36, 37
Combined Signals School, 244 Deal, 14
Combined Training Centre del Valle, Maj. P. A., 97
(GIG), 129,176 Department of Continuing Board
Commander-in-Chief India, 216, for Developing of Landing
233 Boats for Training
Commander Naval Bombardment Operations, 109
(CNB), 233 Deputy Chief Air Staff (DCAS), 49
Command Ship (AGC), 231 Deputy Chief Naval Staff
Commandos, 128, 183, 188 (DCNS), 10
beach, 239 Deputy Chief of Staff (IT), 65,
6th Commando, 76 68, 78
Committee of Imperial Defence Deputy Chief of Staff
(GID);:2 Sub-Committee (DCOS), 2,
Committee on Construction of 50, 55, 61, 63
Special Craft for Combined Deputy Director of Experiments
Operations, 137 and Operational
Commodore Combined Requirements (DDXSR), 165
Operations, 139 Deverell, Gen. Sir Cyril, 49, 50, 64
COMSOPAG, 206 Dieppe, 141, 143, 144, 160, 161
Connette, Lt. Charles, 90, 91 Director of Mobilisation
Coontz, Adm. Richard E., 86, 90 Department (DMD), 9
Cork and Orrery, Adm. Lord, 48, Director of Plans Division (DPD), 9
49, 50 Director of Training and Staff
Coryton, Maj. Gen. W. J. Eldridge, Duties (DTSD), 8, 38, 42, 48
166 Directorate of Combined
Courtney, Air Marshal, C. L., 49 Operations, 127
Cromarty, Scotland, 8 Domville, Capt. Barry E., 33
Crutchley, Rear Adm. V. A. C., Donald, Air Commodore, 74
208 Douglas, Air Vice Marshal, W.S.,
Cuba, 95 68, 70
Culebra, Puerto Rico, 85, 86, 108, Douglas-Pennant, Capt. C. E.,
WZ 56

200
Drafting Committee, 50, 51, 54, Forward Observation Officers
55, 61 (FOO), 160, 232
Drax Captaie B30) 32 Fraser Adm. Sir Bruce, 137, 223
Dreyer, Capt. F., 38 Fraser, Maj. Gen. T., 42
Dumandquilas, 99 Freeport, Maine, 110
Dundonald, 243 Furer, Rear Adm. Julius A., 150
Dunkirk, 81 Fuller, Maj. Gen. Ben H., 94, 96
Dunlap, Col. Robert M., 89, Fuller, Lt. M. E., 90
90, 94
Dyer, Vice Adm. George, 151 Gallipoli, 31, 43, 44, 45, 88, 99,
105, 168, 247
Eastney, 71 Gallky, Lt. Col. B. W., 112
Eisenhower, Lt. Gen. D. D., 170, Garnons-Williams, Capt., 126
175, 206 Gavutu, 209
Eldridge, Ma. Gen. W. J., 166 General Board of the Navy (U.S.),
Ellerton, Rear Adm. W. M., 39 Cd ered, Ay hy Sor ely LE
“Europe First,” 203, 204, 205 Germany, 198
Evetts, Maj Gen. J. E., 162 Ghormley, Rear Adm. Robert,
Evill, Sir Douglas, 193 202, 205, 207
Experimental Landing Lighter’s Gilbert Islands, 215, 226
Board, 97 Globe and Laurel, 9
Goodwin, Air Commodore, E. S.,
242
Falkland Islands, 8
Goolden, Rear Adm. F. H., 186,
Fergusson, Bernard, 80, 111
194
Field Service Regulations (FSR), 1,
committee, 194
32, 33, 37, 240
Graham, Air Vice Marshal R., 166
Fighter Command, 166
report, 166, 167
Fiji, 208, 209
Great Britain, 198
Fire Support Co-ordination, 231,
Greenfield, Kent R., 154
DB
Guadalcanal, 207, 208, 209, 211,
Fleet Base Defence Force, 152
215, 235
Fleet Exercises (FLEXS), 85, 86,
Guam, 4, 99
SOMO po, P20 eae 125s
Guantanamo, Cuba, 98
249
Fleet Training Division (OP-22),
149, 150 Haining, Maj. Gen. R. H., 61, 63,
Fleming Boat Builder, 76, 79 Hait, James M., 122
Fletcher, Adm. F. J., 208 Haiti, 90, 95
Florida Island, 208 Hallett, Vice Adm, T. J., 129
Food Machinery Corporation Hamilton, Rear Adm. L., 132
(FMC), 122, 123 Hampton, Cmdr. T. C., 202
“Force J,” 143, 164 Hampton Roads, Virginia, 110,
Fort Leavenworth School of the (MUils wake!
Line, 98 Hankey, Maurice, 27

296
Harrington, Maj. Samuel H., 94 Inveraray, 129, 132, 241, 242
Hart, Adm. Thomas C., 205 Ismay, Maj. Gen. H. L., 62, 76
Hawaii, 89, 148 Iwo Jima, 215, 226, 227, 235
Haydon, Maj. Gen. J. C., 162
Henderson Air Field, 211 James, Vice Adm. Sir William, 61,
Hewitt, Rear Adm. Henry K., 152, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 201
169 Japan, 4, 69, 195, 204, 250, 251
Heywood, Brig. Gen. Charles, 23 Landing Defence Operations
Higgins, Andrew, 111, 112, 116, Manual (1924, 1928), 215
Lier 138 Reference Manual on Landing
Higgins, Air Vice Marshal J. F., Operations (1941), 251
39, 240 Johore, Malaya, 41
HMS Boxer, 221 Joint Action of the Army and
HMS Dorlin, 129 Navy (JAAN), 95
HMS Eagle, 202 Joint Army and Navy Board, 144,
HMS Kent, 47 199, 205
HMS Nelson, 48 Joint Assault Signal Company
HMS Northney, 128 (JASCO), 355
HMS Quebec, 129 Joint Chiefs ofStaff (JCS), 3, 144,
HMS Tormentor, 128 148, 169
Holcomb, Maj. Gen. Thomas, 116 Joint Command, 55
Holland, Rear Adm. L. E., 70,71 Joint Planning Committee, 49,
Home Forces, 243 13 lol 203
Hong Kong, 68, 247 Joint Planning Staff, 136, 137,171
Honolulu, 199 Joint Technical Warfare
Horsey, Capt. F. L., 189 Committee, 167
Howard, Michael, 170 Joubert, Air Comodore, P. B., 241
Huddleston, Lt. Col. J. S., 33
Hunter-Weston, Maj. Gen., 44 Kabrit, Egypt, 129
Hunton, Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas L., Kalbfus, Rear Adm. Edward C.,
185 120
Hussey, Capt. T. A., 187 Kaluf, Col. John, 115, 120
Hutchinson, Gen. Alexander, 10 Keyes, Adm. Sir Roger, 10, 127,
123) 130) 132) 133,.1345 135,
Imperial Defence College, 56 136, 158, 189, 213
India, 26th Division, 218, 246 King, Adm. Ernest J., 121, 156,
Ingersoll, Vice Adm. Royal, 199, 157, 204, 205, 206
201 Knocker, Wing Cmdr. G., 72
Inter-Service Committee on Fire Knox, Capt. J. N., 140
Support, 165 Krulak, Lt. Gen. Victor H., 113,
Inter-Service Training and i IPAS IA SS)
Development Centre
(ISTDC), 2, 56, 60, 70, 72, 73,
ae (511 OU, Laue ba, Labour Corps, 8
241, 248 Lake Commacchio, Italy, 123

297
Landing Force Air Support Leicester, Brig. B. W., 245
Control Units (FAFASCU), Lejeune, Maj. Gen. John A., 11,25
230 Lend-Lease Act, 153
Lake Ponchartrain, Louisiana, 113 Lethbridge, Maj. Gen. J. S., 223
Landing Craft “220 Military Mission,” 223
ALG. V3.7 Life Magazine, 120
alligator, 121, 122 Linsert, Maj. Ernest E., 113, 120
artillery lighter, 91 Little, Maj. Gen. Louis McCarty,
bureau boats, 110, 111 120
carrier, 73, 390 Longmore, Air Marshal, Sir
Dai-Hatsu, 14M type, 113 Arthur, 74
Eureka, 111, 112, 249
Glen ships, 234 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 205,
LCA, 73, 79, 81, 142, 143 207, 215
LCF, 236 McCain, Rear Adm. J. S., 208
LGG, 163, 164, 167 McClintock, Rear Adm. John, 9
LG ash? 7 McCully, Adm. Newton A., 89
REM e/SESOLsleti72lz2s; 138, McDowell, Capt. R. S., 112 i
142, 227, 234, 235, 249 McGrigor, Rear Adm. P. R., 162
LCS, 80, 143 MacLeod, Col. M. W. M., 81, 129
LCT, 136, 137, 138, 143, 158; McNair, Lt. Col. J. K., 51, 64
163, 164, 165, 167, 222, 227, Madden, Adm. Sir Charles, 10, 15,
234 19
EGP3 1)t47150. 15k. 210 committee, 2, 3, 19, 93, 248
LCVP, 114, 234, 235, 249 report, \145,13..16
LSD; 137 Malta, 68
LSF, 221 Manila Bay, 4
LSI, 73, 128, 142, 143, 221, 234 Malaya, 219, 251
LSM (R), 227 Manila, 199
ES sors 7 toss lyb. 22n. Manual of Combined Naval and
222, 234 Military Operations 1913, 31,
TVE 225 U2oe220e 249 32539
MLC, 72, 80 Manual of Combined Naval,
MLC-10, 49 Military and Air Force
tank lighters, 150 Operations 1922, Provisional,
Landing Operations Doctrine, 39, 40, 41, 43, 240, 248
USN, 1937/1938 (FTP67), Manual of Combined Operations,
104, 105, 209, 213, 238 1931, 1,41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50,
Landing Operations and Small 54, 160, 240
Wars Manual, 97 Manual of Combined Operations
Landing Operations Text, 98 1938, 1, 46, 48, 52, 55, 57,
board, 97 58, 62, 64, 107, 108, 160, 232,
Laycock, Maj. Gen. R. E., 182, 184, 236, 238, 240, 248
185, 192, 223 Manual for Naval Overseas
Leahy, Adm. William, 202 Operations, 103

298
Mare Island, California, 24 Medium D Tank, 117
Mariana Islands, 4, 215 Mersing, Malaya, 42
Marine Aircraft Experimental Mexico, 24, 198
Establishment (MAEE), 76 Midway, 204, 206
Marine Corps, United States, 183, Miles, Vice Adm. G. dh es USS
187 Millter, Maj. Lyle H., 97, 100
the Basic School, 92 Minister of Defence, 186
Camp Lejeune, 154 Mobile Landing Craft Advance
Camp Pendleton, 152, 153 Base (MOLCAB), 221
Cherry Point, 152 Mobile Support Towers
Commandant of the Marine (Maunsell), 163
Corps (CMC), 85, 86, 89, 101, Morison, Samuel Eliot, 177
104, 116, 152 Morton, Louis, 199, 204
Enabling Act of 1798, 20 Moses, Brig. Gen. Emile P., 113
Equipment Board, 111, 113, Mountbatten, Adm. Lord Louis,
RAs W202 2259249 130, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140,
Expeditionary Forces (MCEF), 142 SieGleelaiee Labs 1e79;
24, 85, 86 180, 184, 189, 191, 213, 216,
Field Officers School, 96 242, 243
5th Marine Division, 87 Mulberries, 178, 179
Ist Marine Brigade, 121
Ist Marine Division, 211
Fleet Marine Brigade, 112 Naval Assault Force, 191
Fleet Marine Defense Force, 100 Naval Gunfire Support, 225
Fleet Marine Force (FMF), 100, Naval War College, 3, 11, 98, 99,
101, 124, 145, 250 249
Gazette, 94 Navy Department Continuing
Headquarters, 149 Board, 116, 150
marine barracks, Pearl New Britain, 215
Harbor, 89 New Guinea, 215
pioneer battalions, 212 New London, Connecticut, 23
Quantico Marine Base, 89, 91, New River, North Carolina, 108,
92° 102,41) 114 116, 152. See also Camp
San Diego Marine Base, 152 Lejeune
Schools, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 101, New Zealand, 207, 208, 209, 214
124, 249 Newfoundland, 153
2nd Marine Division, 153 Newall, Air Chief Marshal,
III Amphibious Force, 230 Sir Cyril, 64
3rd Marine Division, 228 Nicarauga, 90
Marmon-Herrington Tank, 115 Nimitz, Adm. Chester, 205, 206
Marshall, Gen. George C., 206 Noble, Rear Adm. A., 120
N
Marshall Islands, 4, 215 Norfolk, Virginia, 88, 116
N
Maund, Capt. L. E. H., 72, 73, 80, Normandy, 233
N
133 North Africa, 116
Mawai, Malaya, 41, 42 Norton, Capt. F. A., 76

299
Noumea, New Caledonia, 207, 209 Palau Islands, 99, 215
Noyes, Rear Adm. L., 208 Panama Canal Zone, 87, 148
Pantelleria Island, 176, 177
Papua, 215
Parris Island, South Carolina, 152
Okinawa, 208, 215, 218, 226, 227,
Patterson, Rear Adm. W., 166
229, 232 Patton, Maj. Gen. George S., 169
Oliver, Vice Adm. Sir Henry F., 10
Pearl Harbour, 4, 108, 115, 148,
Olongapo, Philippines, 24
201, 204, 209, 210
Operation Anvil, 179, 216
Peirse, Air Vice Marshal, R. E. D.,
Operation Bolero, 206
61, 69, 70, 75, 76
Operation Bullfrog, 216
Pembroke Dock, Wales, 71
Operation Capital, 217
PHIBLANT, 154
Operation Cordite, 129
Philippines, 4, 21, 25, 99, 146,
Operation Dracula, 217, 218. See
148, 198, 205, 215, 229; 251
also Rangoon
Phillips, Rear Adm. T.S. V., 136,
Operation Dragoon, 178
199, 200, 203
Operation Husky, 144, 174, 175,
Picton-Phillips, Capt., 72
A, GEE tse ACES eae eae
“Pin point fire,” 225
244. See also Sicily
Place? Lty Gol? G., 34
Operation Infatuate I and II, 178
Port Moresby, 215
Operation Ironclad, 216. See also
Portal, Sir Charles, 243
Madagascar
Pound, Adm. Sir A. Dudley, 161,
Operation Jubilee, 141, 142
L621 732-202
Operation Leapfrog, 132, 133. See
Pount, Capt. Alfred, 9
also Scapa Flow
Price, Col. Charles F. B., 96, 97
Operation Neptune, 234
Operation Overlord, 138, 160,
Principal Military Landing Officer
(PMLO), 239
16351 Gilda S.2Oe 2 oR,
244, 245
Operation Pilgrim, 132, 143. See Quadrant Conference (Quebec) I
also Canary Islands and II, 179, 217
Operation Roundup, 140, 141, Quebec, 31
ite
Operation Rutter, 141 Rabaul, 215
Operation Shingle, 183 Rainbow Five Plan, 203
Operation Sledgehammer, 206 Reid, Col. George C., 21, 23
Operation Switchback, 178 Responsibility for Amphibious
Operation Torch, 141, 144, 168, Warfare Committee (RAW),
1695 D7 Ole 764 183).208. 185, 188,189, 192
214, 227, 244 Richmond, Rear Adm. H., 39
Operation Watchtower, 205, 207 Red Bank, New Jersey, 110
Operation Zipper, 219 Rockey, Capt. K. E., 91, 104
Orange Plan, 145, 146, 147, 198, Roebling, Donald, 118, 119, 120,
199 Regs Abas

300
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., Servaes, Rear Adm. R. M., 189
202, 206 committee, 189
Royal Air Force, 36, 231, 243, Seventh Amphibious Force, 220
244 Shanghai Defence Force, 17, 47
beach unit, 239 Shore Party, 238
staff college, 52 Sicily, 177
Royal Artillery, 232, 233 Singapore, 41, 68, 199, 203, 247
Royal Engineers, 243 Slapton Sands, 72
Royal Marines, (RM), 4, 5, 8, 12, Small Operations Group, 188
1514 S17. VOs60NMIG 935182. Small Wars Operations, 94
184, 191, 192, 231 Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., 115,
armoured support group, 168 152, 1595238
brigades, 132 South East Asia Command
CGRM, 194 (SEAC), 215, 216,218, 220,
GOCRM, 185 Panagd, eS Ne
instructions for Royal Marines Special Boat Sections, 188, 217
Divisions, 17 Special Services Brigade, 76, 128
MNBDO, 208 Special Service Group, 188
12th Battalion, 17 Staff Colleges, 35, 36, 40, 41, 50,
Royal, Rear Adm. F. B., 219 56, 70, 99, 248
Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, military, 36
153 Royal Naval, 35, 39, 44, 58, 64
Russell, Maj. Gen. John H., 100 Staff conversations, 200
Ruston, Rear Adm. E., 39 Stark, Adm. H. R., 203
Ryder Lt. Cmdr., 113 Plan D, 204
Strategic Air Forces, 245
Strategy and Tactics of Small
Saint Nazaire, 140
Wars, 94
Saipan, 99
Stockley, Lt. Col. J., 223
Salerno, 177
Striking Force, 2, 4, 17
Samoa, 208 r
San Clemente, California, 108
Studland Bay, 168
San Diego, California, 209
Sun Shipbuilding Company, 88
Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Sanders, Air Commodore A. P.
53, 148
M., 170
Swanson, Claude, A., 100
Santa Cruz, 207
Syfret, Adm. Sir E., 180
Savo Island, Battle of, 210
Scapa Flow, 8
Second Joint Force, 152, 153 Tactical Air Direction Center
Secretary of Navy (U.S.), 22 (TADC), 231
Sedali Besar River, 41 Tactical Air Force (TAF), 166, 230
Senior Naval Officer Landing Tanga, East Africa, 75
(SNOL), 239 Tarakan Island, 219
Senior Officer Assault Ships and Tarawa, 123, 226
Gratt) 138 Technical Sub-Committee, 162

301
Tentative Landing Operations Vandergrift, Gen. A. A., 208,
Manual 1935, 3,97, 101, 103, 209, 211; 213
104, 105, 113, 118, 124, 149, Vera Cruz, 24
209, 236, 237, 249 Vice Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS),
Thistleton-Smith, Capt. G. A., 189 180
Thomas, Brig. V. D. 223, 245 Vichy, 169
Thorneycroft Boat Building, 76, Vieques Islands, 108
79,20 Vogel, Maj. Gen. C. B., 152
Thursfield, Cmdr., H. G., 33
Todhunter, Cmdr:, R. C., 137; Waistell, Rear Adm. Charles K.,
139 10, 16
Tonga, 208 Walcheren, 123
Transport Walker, Air Commodore F. W.,
attack, 233 241, 242
cargo, 151 War Office, 34, 41, 48, 58, 65
troop, 151, 233,'234, 235,237 Watson, Capt. B. C.
Trident, 216 memorandum, 3, 57, 58, 60, 68
Truk, 99 Wavell, Gen Archibald, 205
Tulagi, 207, 209 Weeks, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald M..,
Turner, Adm. Richmond Kelley, 185
156, 208 Whitaker, Maj. Gen.J.A. C., 166
Wildman-Lushington, Maj. Gen.
Unified Command, 55, 149 E. G., 182
Unity of Command, 148, 149 Williams, Col. Dion, 87
Unwin, Cmdr. J. H., 167 Williams, Brig. Gen. F. P., 112
USS Augusta, 171 Wilsson, Capt. Russell, 199
USS Henderson, 88 Woolley, Paymaster Cmdr. H. G.
Ws Susus, 8.7 A., 108, 155, 241, 2492
Wooten, Maj. Gen. G. F., 219
Vaasago Island, 140 World War I, 13

302
 About the Author

Col. Kenneth J. Clifford has been as-

sociated with the U.S. Marine Corps for over
thirty-five years. He was an infantry platoon
leader in Korea and a staff officer at the III
Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters in
Vietnam. He has taken short courses at
SEATO in Bangkok and at NATO at the Joint
Warfare Establishment in England. In his
civilian life, he was a special agent of the
FBI for seven years and a history professor
for fifteen years. He has written one book
and edited three monographs, all of them
having to do with his favorite subject, the
Marine Corps. He is currently at work com-
pleting a book about the Rapid Deployment
Force.