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ENA DOC 025-2022

Part 1: Management Principles
Power System Earthing Guide (EG-0)

1
 DISCLAIMER
This document refers to various standards, guidelines, calculations, legal requirements, technical
details and other information.
Over time, changes in Australian Standards, industry standards and legislative requirements, as well as
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technological advances and other factors relevant to the information contained in this document, may
affect the accuracy of the information contained in this document. Accordingly, caution should be
exercised in relation to the use of the information in this document.
Energy Networks Australia accepts no responsibility for the accuracy of any information contained in
this document or the consequences of any person relying on such information.

Correspondence should be addressed to the Industry Standards Officer, Energy Networks Australia, at
[email protected] or Unit 5, Level 12, 385 Bourke Street Melbourne VIC 3000.

COPYRIGHT ©
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

Energy Networks Australia 2022

All rights are reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or copied in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without the written permission of the
Association.

ISBN: 978-1-925871-09-8

Energy Networks Association Limited

Trading as Energy Networks Australia
ABN 75 106 735 406
Unit 5, Level 12, 385 Bourke Street
Melbourne VIC 3000

T: +61 3 9103 0400

E: [email protected]
W: www.energynetworks.com.au

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 Contents
CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................... 3
FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
TABLES......................................................................................................................................................... 5
DOCUMENTS OF ENERGY NETWORKS AUSTRALIA ........................................................................................ 6
HISTORY OF ENERGY NETWORKS AUSTRALIA ................................................................................................................ 6
DOCUMENTS .......................................................................................................................................................... 6
OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................................................... 6
KEY INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................... 7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 8
1 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................. 9
1.1 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 9
2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................... 10
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2.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................................ 10

2.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF INDIRECT ELECTRIC SHOCK RISK ........................................................... 12
3 EARTHING SYSTEM PURPOSE AND OPERATION .................................................................................. 14
3.1 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................................ 14
3.1.1 Safety for Personnel and Public ...................................................................................................... 14
3.1.2 Protection of Electrical Network Equipment ................................................................................... 17
3.1.3 System Reliability ............................................................................................................................ 17
3.2 EARTHING SYSTEM OPERATION ................................................................................................................... 18
3.2.1 Fault Energy Sources ....................................................................................................................... 18
3.2.2 Hazardous Contact Shock Scenarios ............................................................................................... 19
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3.2.3 Transient Hazard Sources ............................................................................................................... 22

4 EARTHING SYSTEM MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK .............................................................................. 23
4.1 EARTHING SYSTEM DESIGN ........................................................................................................................ 23
4.2 DESIGN MANAGEMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW ................................................................................................. 24
4.3 DESIGN PROCESS SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 26
4.4 SYSTEM DEFINITION AND PROJECT INTEGRATION (STEP 1A) ............................................................................. 28
4.4.1 System Definition ............................................................................................................................ 28
4.4.2 Project Management Integration ................................................................................................... 29
4.5 INITIAL DESIGN CONCEPT (STEP 1B) ............................................................................................................ 30
4.5.1 Design Earth Fault Current.............................................................................................................. 30
4.5.2 Earth Fault Duration ....................................................................................................................... 31
4.5.3 Soil Resistivity ................................................................................................................................. 32
4.5.4 Standard Design Templates ............................................................................................................ 32
4.6 EXPECTED DESIGN EARTH POTENTIAL RISE (STEP 1C) ..................................................................................... 32
4.7 FIRST PASS SAFETY CRITERIA (STEP 1D) ....................................................................................................... 32
4.8 GLOBAL EARTHING SYSTEM (STEP 2) ........................................................................................................... 33
4.9 DETAILED EARTHING DESIGN (STEP 3) ......................................................................................................... 34
4.9.1 Earthing Conductor Layout (Step 3a) .............................................................................................. 34
4.9.2 Shock Hazard-Location Identification and Magnitude (Step 3b) .................................................... 37
4.10 STANDARD VOLTAGE/TIME CRITERIA SELECTION (STEP 4)................................................................................ 38
4.11 CHECK IF EPR BELOW LOWEST TOLERABLE PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGE (STEP 5) ............................................... 40
4.12 VOLTAGE GRADIENT, TOUCH AND TRANSFER DESIGN (STEP 6) ......................................................................... 40

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 4.13 TOUCH, STEP AND TRANSFER VOLTAGE CHECK (STEP 7) .................................................................................. 40
4.14 RISK ANALYSIS DECISION CHECK (STEP 8) ..................................................................................................... 40
4.15 MODIFY THE DESIGN USING RISK MITIGATION PRINCIPLES (STEP 9) ................................................................... 41
4.15.1 Option 1:Reduce Presented Voltage or Clearing Time................................................................ 41
4.15.2 Option 2: Reduce the Probability of Coincidence........................................................................ 41
4.16 DIRECT QRA OF INDIRECT SHOCK RISK (STEP 10) .......................................................................................... 41
4.17 ASSESSMENT OF RISK TOLERABILITY (STEP 11) .............................................................................................. 42
4.18 LIGHTNING AND TRANSIENT DESIGN (STEP 12) .............................................................................................. 43
4.19 CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT (STEP 13)............................................................................................................ 43
4.19.1 Physical Implementation Compliance......................................................................................... 43
4.19.2 Construction Safety .................................................................................................................... 43
4.20 COMMISSIONING AND ONGOING SUPERVISION (STEP 14) ............................................................................... 44
4.20.1 Testing, Inspection and Supervision Principles ........................................................................... 44
4.20.2 Commissioning Programme and Safety Compliance Review ..................................................... 45
4.20.3 Ongoing Supervision and Maintenance...................................................................................... 47
4.21 FINAL DOCUMENTATION (STEP 15) ............................................................................................................. 48
5 MANAGEMENT OF SHOCK RISK .......................................................................................................... 49
5.1 SHOCK TYPES ........................................................................................................................................... 49
5.2 HISTORY OF INDIRECT SHOCK SAFETY CRITERIA................................................................................................ 49
5.3 VALUE OF QUANTIFYING THE RISK OF INDIRECT SHOCK ..................................................................................... 53
5.4 RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES ................................................................................................................. 54
5.4.1 Risk management process overview ............................................................................................... 54
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5.4.2 Types of Risk ................................................................................................................................... 55

5.4.3 Risk Assessment .............................................................................................................................. 56
5.4.4 Risk Limit Targets ............................................................................................................................ 57
5.5 QRA METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW (STEP 10) ................................................................................................. 61
5.5.1 Fibrillation Probability Calculation (Step 10A) ................................................................................ 62
5.5.2 Exposure Probability Calculation (Step 10B) ................................................................................... 62
5.5.3 Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis (Step 10 D) ............................................................................. 63
5.5.4 Risk cost benefit analysis to support ALARP/SFAIRP decision (Step 10 D) ...................................... 64
5.6 PROBABILISTIC DERIVATION OF STANDARD V/T CURVES - (STEP 6) ..................................................................... 67
5.6.1 Calculate Fatality Probability and Assess Risk Profile (Step 6C) ...................................................... 68
5.7 SITE SPECIFIC DIRECT QUANTIFIED RISK ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 70
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6 STANDARDS AND CODES OF PRACTICE ............................................................................................... 72

6.1 AUSTRALIAN STANDARDS ........................................................................................................................... 72
6.2 AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND STANDARDS ..................................................................................................... 72
6.3 IEC DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 72
6.4 OTHER DOCUMENTS ................................................................................................................................. 73
7 DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 74
REFERENCES............................................................................................................................................... 81
APPENDIX A DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS (STEP 9) ...................................................................................... 86
APPENDIX B FIBRILLATION RISK ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 93
APPENDIX C FAULT/CONTACT COINCIDENCE PROBABILITY CALCULATION.............................................115
APPENDIX D WORKED EXAMPLES .........................................................................................................131
APPENDIX E STANDARD VOLTAGE/TIME CURVES .................................................................................166
APPENDIX F RISK COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS CASE STUDIES .....................................................................183

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 Figures

Figure 2-1: Risk-cost balance ....................................................................................................................... 10

Figure 2-2: Hierarchy of control ................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 3-1: Touch and step voltages around a substation ........................................................................... 15
Figure 3-2: Examples of Transfer Voltage Hazards ...................................................................................... 15
Figure 3-3: Earth fault energy transfer overview ......................................................................................... 18
Figure 3-4: Interdependent earthing system components ........................................................................... 19
Figure 3-5: Earthing System Risk Profile ...................................................................................................... 21
Figure 4-1: Design Management Process Overview..................................................................................... 25
Figure 4-2: Transmission and Distribution Asset Prospective Touch Voltage Criteria.................................. 39
Figure 5-1: The risk management process (based on AS/ISO 31000) .......................................................... 55
Figure 5-2: Target individual fatality probability limits [42] (Based upon UK HSE R2A [11]) ....................... 58
Figure 5-3: Societal F-N Risk Limits .............................................................................................................. 60
Figure 5-4: Safety Criteria Derivation Methodology (Step 10) ..................................................................... 61
Figure 5-5: ALARP/SFAIRP Design Process ................................................................................................... 65
Figure 5-6: Risk cost benefit analysis process .............................................................................................. 67
Figure 5-7: F-N societal risk curve example.................................................................................................. 69
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Tables

Table 3-1: Possible hazard location listing ................................................................................................... 20

Table 4-1: Design and Management Process ............................................................................................... 26
Table 4-2: Safety Criteria Case Study Summary ........................................................................................... 38
Table 4-3: Primary Mitigation Options ........................................................................................................ 41
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Table 5-1: Physiological effects of 50Hz alternating current ....................................................................... 50

Table 5-2: Comparative fibrillation likelihood .............................................................................................. 54
Table 5-3: Target individual fatality probability limits ................................................................................. 59
Table 5-4: Societal (multiple fatality) F-N Risk Curve Construction Example ............................................... 69

5
 Documents of Energy Networks Australia
History of Energy Networks Australia
Energy Networks Australia is the peak national body representing Australia’s gas distribution and electricity
transmission and distribution companies. Established in its current form in 2004 it has a long history of industry
representation, operating under different names over the years to reflect the sector transformation.
With more than 16 million customer connections across the nation, Australia’s energy networks provide the
final step in the safe, reliable delivery of gas and electricity to virtually every home, business and industry in the
country.

Documents
Part of Energy Networks Australia’s role is the development and management of support material such as
codes, specifications, guidelines and handbooks to support the energy industry and members of the public in
the interpretation and application of legislation and standards. All documents are written in collaboration with
the industry through reference groups and general consultation with Energy Networks Australia’s members.

This Guideline is just one document in a framework of information designed to support the energy sector.
Network Operators and Service Providers should refer to all current Energy Networks Australia Guidelines. A
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full list of documents can be obtained from Energy Networks Australia at

http://www.energynetworks.com.au/industry-guidelines.

Objective
This document addresses the high-level aspects of management policies and strategies associated with power
system earthing. It provides a framework for managing earthing system related risk associated with electrical
power systems to meet societally acceptable and tolerable levels.
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

This document is intended to complement, but not substitute or override, a number of regulations and
Australian Standards. Consistency of approach in the detail will be delivered by way of this document together
with the relevant legislation, codes and standards.

6
 Key Information

Document Category Guideline

Designation ENA DOC 025-2022

Version No 2

Title Power System Earthing Guide (EG-0) Part 1: Management

Principles

Scope of Revision Complete review with a new set of case studies to enhance
consistency with WHS framework and changes to relevant
Standards and Guides (e.g., AS2067, AS7000, AS4853, ENA EG-1,
CIGRE TB749)

Reason for review Triggered by ENA review cycle

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Review Consultant Bill Carman

Revision Working Group Peter Woloszyn (Chair), Ausgrid; Luke Clout, Essential Energy;
Ben Li, AusNet Services; Emma King, Energy Queensland; Blake
Christian, Endeavour Energy.

Supersedes ENA DOC 025-2010 EG-0 Power System Earthing Guide Part 1:
Management Principles, Version 1
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Filing Details SAI Global

Review Period Ten years from publication date

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 Acknowledgements
This is a Reference Group project of Energy Networks Australia Earthing Reference Group.
The Energy Networks Australia Earthing Reference Group has broad national representation from a number of
industry representatives and has access to a large database of industry guidelines, policies, reference standards
and design manuals.
Energy Networks Australia has Members across Australia’s electricity distribution and transmission and gas
distribution companies. For the development of this document the following industry organisations were
represented on the Reference Group:

» Ausgrid
» AusNet Services
» Essential Energy
» Endeavour Energy
» Energy Queensland

The remaining companies represented by Energy Networks Australia, but not on the Reference Group, were
actively engaged throughout the preparation, review and comment stages of the draft document.
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In addition, a number of technical experts and stakeholder groups have also been consulted during the
development of this document.

The Reference Group would like to acknowledge the assistance of all parties who contributed to the
development of this Guideline including ENA member organisations and external industry stakeholders who
provided comments during the industry consultation period.
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8
 1 Scope
This Guideline addresses the high-level aspects of management policies and strategies associated with power
system earthing. It provides a framework for managing earthing system related risk associated with electrical
power systems to meet societally acceptable and tolerable levels. This framework provides principles for the
design, installation, testing, maintenance, and ongoing supervision of earthing systems associated with power
system assets on a.c. and d.c. systems with nominal voltages up to EHV. A central part of this framework is a
probabilistic derivation of tolerable voltage criteria and exposure under fault conditions. It is intended for use
by electrical utilities and HV asset owners, operators, and customers, specifically regarding:

• Major substations
• Distribution networks
• Transmission lines
• Power stations, and
• Large industrial systems.
It does not apply to the design or installation of any of the following which may be covered by other standards
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or codes:

• Customer premises LV earthing (refer AS3000)

• Earthing systems associated with electric railway traction systems
• Earthing systems on ships and offshore installations
• Test sites
• Mining equipment and installations, and
• Electrostatic equipment (e.g. electrostatic precipitators).
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1.1 Definitions and Abbreviations

All Energy Networks Australia documents utilise a single definition list located on the Energy Networks
Australia website. This is to ensure all documents use consistent definitions across Energy Networks Australia
documents. This is not an attempt to define all terms in the energy industry and organisations may use
different definitions. It provides consistency across documents authored by Energy Networks.

All Energy Networks Australia documents utilise a single abbreviations list located on the Energy Networks
Australia website. This is to ensure all documents use consistent abbreviations across Energy Networks
Australia documents.

Specialist definitions and abbreviations are listed in Chapter 7.

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 2 Regulatory Framework
This chapter provides an overview of the legislative and regulatory framework as applicable to implementing
and managing HV earthing systems.

2.1 Regulatory Framework

Electrical utilities and other power system asset owners operate within a regulatory framework implemented
via law, codes and licences, each of which confers rights and obligations on utilities and customers. There are
also requirements and responsibilities incumbent on asset owners to not merely operate and develop their
networks in a safe manner, but also to promote and encourage the safety of persons and property in relation
to that electrical infrastructure. Utilities are constrained by the AER (economic regulator) for funding to
maintain their networks and to meet other legislative or regulatory obligations (e.g.WH&S) [1]. Some
obligations are dependent on operating jurisdiction (e.g. Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management)
Regulation (NSW) [2] or the Bushfire Mitigation Regulation (Vic) [3], and Electricity safety (Management)
regulations 2019 (Vic) [104],[14][15]).
A fundamental principle underpinning WH&S legislation is that those who create hazards are responsible for
protecting workers and the public from the consequences. A new safety paradigm has evolved that
incorporates an explicit requirement to demonstrate due diligence in managing hazards that impose risk upon
workers and the public. This duty of care requires employers and asset owners to demonstrate due diligence
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and undertake a risk management exercise (ISO31000 [4]) to identify hazards, assess risks and then eliminate
or control risks, where operations or installations may affect workers or the public. The risk management
obligations of asset owners are not ‘contracted out’ using consultants and contractors to provide design,
construct and operate services on their behalf. It has been clarified that a duty of care to meet regulatory
requirements is not transferrable and lies with all parties involved to the extent to which each party has the
capacity to influence and control the matter [1].
The primary defence against negligence claims is due diligence. This may be expressed as what a reasonable
person in the same position would have undertaken to ensure whatever it is that did happen, on the balance of
probabilities, wouldn’t have occurred. The ‘balance of probabilities’ involves determining the balance between
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risk and cost as shown in Figure 2-1 [5]:

Figure 2-1: Risk-cost balance

The overall situation facing asset owners and consequently power system design and operational engineers has
been succinctly summarised by Chief Justice Gibbs of the High Court of Australia [6], who stated:

‘Where it is possible to guard against a foreseeable risk which, though perhaps not great, nevertheless cannot
be called remote or fanciful, by adopting a means which involves little difficulty or expense, the failure to adopt
such means will in general be negligent.’

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 The balance between level of risk to tolerate and cost to be spent to mitigate the residual risk is the difficult
part to determine. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of an asset owner or operator to undertake such
analysis. As distinct from private risks, public risks are usually seen as involuntary as they are characterised by
being centrally or mass produced, broadly distributed, and largely outside the risks bearer’s direct
understanding or control [7].

The following statement [16] clearly defines the regulatory requirement for managing involuntary risk: ‘Where
an individual may be exposed to involuntary risk (beyond their control) due to exposure to a hazardous
condition then the appropriate regulatory requirement placed upon the body generating the risk was the need
to manage the imposed risk increase.’ The European Union Framework Directive 89/391/EEC [9] requires all
member countries to enact a similar regulation. The UK has enacted a regulation on the Management of Health
and Safety at Work 1999 [10] which states that ‘Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment
of ... the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in connection with
the conduct by him of his undertaking.’ Within the UK this is clearly embodied in the process described in the
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) document ‘Reducing risks, protecting people’ [11]. Similar processes are
used in most countries.
Within the Australian context WH&S regulations [1] an asset owner or business operator is required to:
a) eliminate risks to health and safety so far as is reasonably practicable; and
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b) if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risks to health and safety, to reduce those risks so far as is
reasonably practicable’.

What may be deemed a ‘reasonably practicable’ risk reduction, in relation to a duty to ensure health and
safety, is defined in [1] as:

That which is, or was at a particular time, reasonably able to be done in relation to ensuring health and safety,
considering and weighing up all relevant matters including:
c) the likelihood of the hazard or the risk concerned occurring; and
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d) the degree of harm that might result from the hazard or the risk; and

e) what the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably to know, about:

(i) the hazard or the risk; and

(ii) ways of eliminating or minimising the risk; and
f) the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or minimise the risk; and
g) after assessing the extent of the risk and the available ways of eliminating or minimising the risk, the cost
associated with available ways of eliminating or minimising the risk, including whether the cost is grossly
disproportionate to the risk.
The Code of Ethics of Engineers Australia [12] clearly articulate an engineer’s responsibility to incorporate
safety as an integral component of the design, installation, commissioning, and operational phases of any
project. Safe Work Australia have developed a Code of Practice entitled ‘Safe design of structures’ [13] that
articulates a ‘Safety in Design’ process that is recognised best practice for a design process to manage safety
aspects over the lifetime of an asset. Safe design is about integrating hazard identification and risk
assessment methods early in the design process, to eliminate or minimise risks of injury throughout the life of
a product. To ensure safety, designers are required to:

• Identify hazards,

11
 • Determine consequences and likelihood if people may be exposed to the identified hazards,

• Assess risks, and

• Determine control measures to eliminate and/or adequately mitigate risks SFAIRP within the design scope.

• Continue to monitor the installation to identify the need for revising the design if changes are made to the
network or environment.
The five principles of safe design as articulated by Safe Work Australia [103] are:

• Principle 1: Persons with control—those who make decisions affecting the design of products, facilities or
processes can promote health and safety at the source.

• Principle 2: Product lifecycle—safe design applies to every stage in the lifecycle from conception through
to disposal. It involves eliminating hazards or minimising risks as early in the lifecycle as possible.

• Principle 3: Systematic risk management—apply hazard identification, risk assessment and risk control
processes to achieve safe design.

• Principle 4: Safe design knowledge and capability—should be either demonstrated or acquired by those
who control design.

• Principle 5: Information transfer—effective communication and documentation of design and risk control
information amongst everyone involved in the phases of the lifecycle is essential for the safe design
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approach.
An asset owner must be able to provide documented justification for the way risks associated with a given
asset (or class of asset) have been assessed, reduced so far as is reasonably practicable and managed for the
life of the asset.

2.2 Implications for the management of indirect electric shock risk

The release of the hazardous substance ‘electricity’ into the environment, such as occurs during an earth fault
event, creates indirect shock risk scenarios to which workers and the public may be exposed. As distinct from a
direct shock that occurs when a person contacts a live conductor, indirect shock occurs when a person contacts
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two points of potential difference during an earth fault event. The points of contact may be with the soil (i.e. a
step voltage) or between the soil and metalwork such as a fence (i.e. touch or transfer voltage), or between
two pieces of metalwork (e.g. across a gate).

While no such thing as absolute safety exists, it is an asset owner’s responsibility to make systems as safe as
reasonably practicable. The hierarchy of controls is a proven framework for the selection and prioritisation of
controls for the treatment of risk [14]. In this context, the safety challenge that earthing systems must meet is
clear:

• Elimination - The societal value of electricity is enormous and not supplying electricity is rarely an option.
Further the reduction of earthing related hazards to negligible levels is rarely possible.

• Substitution - There are no real substitutes for most uses of electricity.

• Engineering Controls - Electricity is delivered directly to where people live, making complete isolation of
people from the hazard difficult to implement in a robust manner over a long period of time.

• Administrative Controls and PPE - Training and PPE can be used effectively with workers but are less
reliably implemented for the public.

12
 Figure 2-2: Hierarchy of control

Elimination of the hazard associated with electricity distribution is rarely an option given the utility involved,
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and minimising the risk is non-trivial with a fundamentally hazardous substance such as electricity. Historically
earthing system shock safety compliance was demonstrated by meeting ohmic or touch voltage/time
characteristic targets or implementing a consistent installation guideline. Unfortunately, without undertaking
an assessment of the risk that considers both the magnitude of the hazard and the likelihood of exposure it is
not possible to claim that a given mitigation option is related directly to the actual level of risk.

As most earthing related indirect shock risks cannot be eliminated, the determination of what may be
considered ‘reasonably practicable’ requires an assessment of the risk profile associated with the hazard
scenario to which a person may be exposed. Once the functional performance requirements are met by a base
earthing system design the assessment of additional measures to reduce the risk profile is the next step.
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Provided the cost/risk reduction is not grossly disproportionate, known and commonly applied precautions
should be applied so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP) or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). What
is reasonably practicable includes a measure of the significance of the risk versus the effort required to reduce
it. This assessment should also be conducted with the awareness that earthing system design is a predictive
process within a framework of foreseeable events. Appropriate supervision is required to respond to changes
in the risk profile due to unforeseeable future events. The risk that is assessed in this process includes the risk
imposed on any individual (commonly determined for the maximally exposed, reasonably behaved individual)
and for the risk imposed on society (commonly determined for multiple fatality risk for a single event). Chapter
5 provides further detail of this process.
The process of quantifying risk presented in this document enables an asset owner to demonstrate that
selected risk mitigation measures meet functional requirements and reduce the risk to as low as is reasonably
practicable. Such an assessment may justify the adoption of simplified approaches (e.g. global earthing
system, fixed ohmic targets, tolerable touch voltage time characteristics, or standard installation guidelines)
provided the designer can demonstrate that the asset situation clearly meets the boundary conditions
governing the risk assessment. Such an assessment may also be undertaken for an individual installation and
be able to justify the most cost efficient specific remedial measures that manage risks associated with specific
hazard exposures and yield a much more cost-efficient design overall.

13
 3 Earthing System Purpose and Operation
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the purpose and operation of HV earthing systems.

3.1 Purpose
Earthing systems are required to manage the transfer of fault energy to limit the risk to people, equipment,
and system operation to tolerable levels. An earthing system is required to perform for the life of the electrical
asset for which it is installed, for the range of configurations of the network and nearby infrastructure that are
foreseeable. The earthing system may need to be augmented over time to continue to fulfil this function.
Safety-critical systems are those systems whose failure could result in loss of life, significant property damage,
or damage to the environment. Therefore, like power network protection systems, earthing systems are safety
critical systems in that they are required to effectively protect the lives of the public and utility workers. While
constant supervision is inherently available for phase conductors and much primary plant, earthing systems do
not actively conduct significant current for most of the time. Therefore, deterioration or damage to an earthing
system can remain latent and only become evident at the time of a test, or during an investigation following a
shock or equipment damage incident. For this reason, the design, installation, and maintenance of an earthing
system is critical. Where an earthing system is inadequately designed, poorly installed, not updated following a
change in the environment and risk level or not supervised through appropriate maintenance it may not
reliably operate to provide safety when required to do so. This risk is not tolerable, as responsible management
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can generally ensure safety for a reasonable cost.

3.1.1 Safety for Personnel and Public

An earthing system is required to manage any hazardous potential differences to which personnel or members
of the public may be exposed under load and fault conditions.

3.1.1.1 Earth Potential Rise (EPR)

Earth potential rise (EPR) is the maximum potential of an earthing installation, with respect to remote earth,
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produced by the portion of fault current that flows through the earthing installation. The resultant EPR on the
earthing system causes electrical potential to transfer to any metal structures and equipment connected to the
earthing system. This can result in significant voltage differences appearing between the local earth and the
equipment connected to the earthing system. The earth potential rise (EPR) can be considered as the driving or
source voltage for many of the following electrical shock descriptions. Consideration should also be given to
independent voltage rise obligations for plant connected to the earthing system covered by other Australian
Standards such as the telecommunications EPR standard [AS3835], the pipeline standard [AS4853] or other
rules that may be in place to limit maximum earth potential rise.

3.1.1.2 Touch Voltage

Touch voltage is a voltage generated during an EPR event which may appear between simultaneously
accessible conductive parts. The open circuit voltage between accessible parts is termed the Prospective Touch
Voltage. When a body impedance is inserted in the same circuit between those locations, the voltage across
the body impedance is termed the effective (loaded) touch voltage.
When comparing calculated or measured touch voltages with touch voltage limits, the touch voltage is taken as
the potential difference between a conductive structure and some point on the ground that a reasonable
person may access the structure from, normally with a 1m reach allowance.

14
 Touch voltages typically appear between a hand and one or both feet of a person touching a temporarily
energised conductive part while standing on the earth surface one metre away from the structure (see Figure
3-1).

3.1.1.3 Hand to hand touch voltage

Hand to hand or reach touch voltages may also occur between two conductive parts that may be
simultaneously touched. An example of a reach touch voltage is shown in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: Touch and step voltages around a substation

3.1.1.4 Step Voltage

The Prospective Step Voltage is the voltage between two points on the earth’s surface that are one metre
distant from each other, which is considered to be the stride length of a person. Examples of a step voltage are
shown in Figure 3-1. When a body impedance is inserted in the same circuit, the voltage across the body
impedance is termed the effective (loaded) Step Voltage.

3.1.1.5 Transferred Voltage

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The transferred potential is the potential rise of an earthing system transferred by a connected conductor (for
example a metallic cable sheath, MEN conductor, pipeline, or rail) into areas with low or no earth potential rise
resulting in a potential difference occurring between the conductor and its surroundings.

Figure 3-2: Examples of Transfer Voltage Hazards

A transferred potential may also appear when the conductor connected to reference earth brings reference
earth into the area of potential rise. The transferred potential may approach the full potential rise of the
earthing system in some cases. Transferred potentials may affect third party plant, equipment and people.

15
 Where potential rises on the earthing system are transferred by metalwork such as neutral conductors of a
MEN system or water pipes to locations remote from the installation, allowance may be made for voltage drop
in these conductors. Otherwise, the transferred potential should be regarded as being equal to the full
potential rise on the earthing system.
Where transferred potential involves a long conductive part such as a fence earthed at regular intervals along
its length, the transferred potential on the conductive part relative to the surrounding earth will vary along its
length. A touch and hand-to-hand voltages will exist when a person contacts the metallic system carrying the
transferred potential and the soil beneath their feet or nearby metalwork (e.g. opening a gate).

3.1.1.6 Magnetic Field Induction

Steady state or earth fault currents flowing through a power line in parallel with metallic conductors (such as
telecommunication conductors, metallic fences) can cause hazardous voltages to be magnetically induced into
these parallel conductors. Standing voltages on structures should be kept to low enough levels to not cause
fibrillation (e.g. in the order of <50 volts).
Induced voltages may be a hazard to telecommunications equipment and personnel and should be limited to
electrically safe values in accordance with applicable standards and guidelines (refer to list of standards in
Section 6).
Induced voltages may also present a hazard in gas, oil or other metallic pipelines where they run parallel to
high voltage transmission or distribution lines. Hazards arise to personnel inspecting and maintaining such
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pipelines or exposed members of the public.

Induced voltages may also be hazardous to the public on fences, conveyors underground mining cables or
other metallic conductors which run parallel to power lines.

3.1.1.7 Electric Field (Capacitive) Coupling

Capacitive voltages can be coupled onto insulated metallic objects influenced by an electric field from an
energised circuit. An example of electric field coupling is the voltage that appears on a de-energised overhead
circuit running alongside an energised circuit.
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When contact is first made with the isolated object, the stored charge in the capacitance will discharge and the
final voltage on the object is likely to be low. As long as the stored energy is not very large the instantaneous
discharge current will be low. However, if the stored energy is large, such as on a relatively long de-energised
circuit in parallel with an energised circuit, the discharge current may be high.

Protection for this hazard is not within the scope of this document and would be covered by low-frequency
induction codes or standards and operating and maintenance (O&M) procedures for a given line (in particular
for transmission lines operating above 100kV).

3.1.1.8 Lightning and Other Transients

Lightning is a source of hazard to electric utility employees and plant. Lightning over-voltages and currents can
travel a long distance over overhead lines and affect personnel working on power system assets (including
earthing systems).
It is impractical to provide adequate protection to personnel in the form of earthing and equipotential bonding
during lightning conditions because lightning surges typically have high current magnitude and rate of rise. All
personnel should stop handling all conductors including those associated with any earthing system until the
lightning hazard has passed. Guidelines exist regarding managing worker risk to lightning for such
circumstances (e.g. stopping work when thunder is heard, or when lightning 10km distant following alert from
personal/group early warning systems).

16
 The foregoing voltages can be present on metallic equipment within substations, associated with substations
or equipment associated with power lines/cables, or even on non-power system plant items nearby but not
associated with the electrical system. For a hazardous situation to arise, a power system earth fault must be
coincident with a person being exposed to a hazardous voltage. For all reasonably foreseeable conditions an
earthing system shall not impose on any person or group of people an unreasonable shock risk. Section 5
provides guidance on how earthing related hazards can be assessed against this requirement.

3.1.2 Protection of Electrical Network Equipment

An earthing system is required to contribute to the limitation of the level of transient voltage and power
frequency voltage impressed on electrical equipment and provide appropriate current paths for fault energy in
such a manner that the fault energy does not damage equipment or impair equipment operation. System
events/disturbances may otherwise cause extensive damage to equipment and associated ancillary equipment
such as insulation breakdown and thermal or mechanical damage from arcing, fires, or explosions.

The earthing system will typically be required to meet the following functional requirements for equipment
protection:

• Be capable of distributing and discharging the fault current without exceeding thermal and mechanical
design limits based on backup protection operating time.
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• Maintain its integrity for the expected installation lifetime with due allowance for corrosion and
mechanical constraints.

• Avoid damage to equipment due to excessive potential rise, potential differences within the earthing
system and due to excessive currents flowing in auxiliary paths not intended for carrying a portion of the
fault current.

• Contribute to ensuring electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) among electrical and electronic apparatus of
the high-voltage system in accordance with IEC/TR 61000-5-2.
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3.1.3 System Reliability

An earthing system is required to achieve the desired level of system reliability through:

• Facilitating the proper and reliable operation of protection systems during earth faults. This entails reliable
detection of earth faults and either clearing the fault or minimising the resulting fault current,

• Limiting equipment damage and the consequent need for repair or replacement, and

• Limiting or reducing substation secondary system equipment (e.g. SCADA) interference.

To meet the foregoing operational requirements earthing systems need to be adequately robust and key
components need to be able to be monitored as follows:

• Robustness - The earthing system, its components and earthing conductors shall be capable of conducting
the expected fault current or portion of the fault current which may be applicable and without exceeding
material or equipment limitations for thermal, mechanical, and chemical/corrosive stresses.

• Ongoing monitoring – The earthing system shall be designed and configured to enable the system to be
tested at the time of commissioning and at regular intervals as required, and to enable cost effective
monitoring of the key performance parameters and/or critical items to ensure they remain in a fit-for-
purpose state.

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 3.2 Earthing System Operation
Energy sources that lead to potential rise on earthing systems and hazardous contact scenarios are discussed in
this chapter.

3.2.1 Fault Energy Sources

The energy which earthing systems must manage comes from a wide range of sources and system events,
including:

• Generating plant (including energy storage and reactive compensation plant),

• Earth fault current conductively coupled through metalwork or the soil,

• Load and earth fault current magnetically coupled to metalwork,

• Voltages capacitively coupled to metalwork

• Lightning discharges,

• Transient discharges (e.g. switching surges)

To manage the foregoing energy sources, it is necessary to identify and understand the interactions between
contributory systems. Figure 3-3 illustrates the power system earth fault process from an energy transfer
perspective, which highlights flow of fault current ‘driving’ the creation of hazardous potentials. It is significant
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that many non-power system plant items, such as fences, pipelines and conveyors, are an active part of the
return current path.

The current distribution between the installed earthing system (fixed plant), the power system plant (e.g.
neutral conductors, cable sheaths, overhead shieldwires), non-power system plant (e.g. pipelines), and the
soil, must be understood if the hazard magnitudes are to be determined for each relevant energy source.

Magnetic and capacitive coupling

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Figure 3-3: Earth fault energy transfer overview

While earthing systems are installed as components of assets within distinct segments of the power system
network (e.g. generation, transmission, distribution, and LV reticulation) the flow of current during normal and
earth fault events does not recognise such notional boundaries but rather follows physical laws regarding the

18
 conservation of energy. It is the duty of asset owners to recognise the interrelated nature of power system
earthing components and other metallic systems such as pipelines, railway lines and telecommunication
systems when determining hazardous exposures, and to manage the risks accordingly. Figure 3-4 illustrates the
range of metallic systems that may be involved in earth fault events associated with the power system
distribution system and the processes and parameters involved. It may be observed that the interaction
between a range of disparate disciplines needs to be understood if earthing system performance is to be
properly understood and effectively managed.
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Figure 3-4: Interdependent earthing system components

3.2.2 Hazardous Contact Shock Scenarios

Consideration of appropriate shock safety criteria (usually a tolerable shock voltage) is required for all fault
conditions associated with electrical assets that form part of the network. To manage the risk to workers and
the public it is necessary to identify locations where people may be in contact with metalwork and/or the
ground and be able to receive an electric shock during an earth fault occurrence. Table 3-1 provides a list of
possible hazard locations associated with major substations. A similar list would apply for other earthed power
system assets including distribution substations, powerline support structures, and cable underground to
overhead (UGOH) transition points and cross bonding earthing points.

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 Table 3-1: Possible hazard location listing

Hazard location category Examples

Utility worker operational Opening gates

movement in and around Operating switches and earth
substation – usually based upon Applying portable earths
higher access frequency staff Testing equipment
unless special PPE changes Grounds maintenance
exposure risk (e.g. HV gloves). Security checks
Incoming and outgoing cables

Utility construction worker Excavating and working on earthing conductors

Working on fences and scaffolding
Working on foundations

Public movement in and around Touching taps in backyard

homes adjacent to substation Opening gates in backyard
Touching tap in shower
Touching washing machine
Movement in and around swimming pool
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Members of public exposed to Fences

transfer hazards (direct metallic Touch voltages on down leads on overhead earth wires
or indirect bond to substation) Water Pipes
Low Voltage supplies into the substation
Gas Pipelines

Frequented locations and Bus stops

vulnerable members of the Shopping centres
public Educational institutions: preschools, schools, TAFE, universities
Hospitals
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Parks
Aquatic centres
Sporting venues
Cattle sale yards
Theme parks

Locations infrequently visited by Assets such as transmission towers located outside normal public
members of the public thoroughfares with low frequency of direct contact by a given person
(e.g. urban interface contact scenario)

Utility and industrial staff outside Power utility and Telco workers accessing mobile base station
substation accessing plant – installations on transmission towers, or splicing OPGW conductors
inductively and conductively Telco workers: accessing cable termination pits and pillars
coupled hazards Pipeline workers (water, gas, industrial slurry, liquid hydrocarbons):
Cathodic protection (CP) system routine inspection, maintenance,
valve inspection and operation, repairs (usually require use of special
safety provisions)
Industrial (including generating plant and mining workers): access to
conveyors, pipelines, pumps, mining machinery

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 Individual locations will represent a different risk profile due to different coincident probabilities of system
events and human contacts and different series impedances (e.g. footwear and surface coverings).

Consideration should be given to factors such as:

• Probability of multiple simultaneous human contacts particularly in public places,

• Susceptible locations (e.g. wet areas),

• Controlled access areas (e.g. fenced easements or remote areas),

• Series impedance (e.g. surface coverings and footwear),

• Future possible encroachments upon the electrical network,

• Conductive and inductive coupling into non power system plant such as communications infrastructure,
telecoms, pipelines, and conveyors.
When considering the risk associated with a given asset, it should be acknowledged that not all risk is imposed
by the earthing system. Figure 3-5 summarises the external factors that may also impact the earthing system
risk profile:
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Figure 3-5: Earthing System Risk Profile

Note: Substation secondary equipment is associated with assets such as SCADA, communications, or protection
systems.

Some external factors that need to be addressed during design and installation are theft, vandalism and
corrosion (e.g. from stray traction current) of earth system components. Consideration should be given to
protecting exposed components and supervising key components to ensure a tolerable risk profile. The
interaction between the substation or power line earthing systems and secondary systems (e.g. SCADA) needs
also to be considered as those systems can adversely affect each other.

21
 3.2.3 Transient Hazard Sources
A range of transient current sources that may cause damage to primary plant or damage or interfere with the
operation of secondary plant, include:

• Atmospheric Events - A lightning stroke to a HV line generates travelling waves on the line. These waves
can be produced by a stroke to the conductor, to the earth shield wire or a tower or the earth nearby. A
flashover of insulation can be caused by a lightning stroke to the line or to the conductors in the
substation, or by insulator contamination. The flash-over will produce electromagnetic waves which affect
the secondary circuits and the lightning current fed directly, or via an arc into the earthing system may
result in high potential differences within the earthing system.

• Switching in High Voltage Circuits - Switching of disconnectors or circuit breakers can be a source of
transient energy ‘noise’ in HV substations. The guided waves are coupled/transferred by the current
transformers (CT) and voltage transformers (VT) to the measuring and protection circuits. Current flow on
cable-screens produced by guided waves, and magnetic fields and currents fed into the earthing system
through CT and VT circuits, generate common mode voltages which may also influence the secondary
circuits.

• Earth Faults - Earth faults caused by lightning, switching overvoltages, flashover due to contamination of
insulators, conductor galloping, or faulty switching can cause earth faults with power frequency current
components in the substation. The resulting magnetic field may influence susceptible secondary circuits.
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• Switching in Secondary Circuits - De-energising inductive loads (coils, motors) can generate transient high
frequency overvoltages in secondary circuits.

• Radio Transmitter Operation - The high frequency field generated by radio transmitters, including those
which are used by maintenance workers, can influence sensitive electronic equipment.
Earthing systems play a key role in intercepting and dissipating hazardous transient energy:

• The earthing system will form part of the lightning protection system (interception, conduction, and
dissipation).
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• Switching and earth fault transients associated with GIS systems may require special consideration,
including short, low inductance earthing conductors and electromagnetic screening in the path of the
propagating transient to create a very low surge impedance to earth.

• Secondary circuit cable screens in the substation need to be segregated from sources of transients and
consideration given to the screen bonding arrangement (single- or double-point earthing) and screening
with parallel earth grid conductors.

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 4 Earthing System Management Framework
4.1 Earthing System Design
Historically, an earthing system with a low overall earth resistance was considered safe. However, there is no
direct relationship between the resistance of the earthing system (e.g. 1Ω or 10Ω) and the chance that a
fatality could arise in any particular situation.
The goal of earthing system design is to ensure adequate robustness in the design at the same time as finding a
balance between cost, practicality, and management of risk. Multiple hazard scenarios often need to be
analysed for a number of fault scenarios, while considering the impact of the various design configurations on
the overall risk profile for the site and system.
The design goals which need to be met include:

• Compliance with shock risk management requirements,

• Operational requirements,

• Equipment interference constraints,

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• Corrosion interference constraints,

• Cost effectiveness,

• Practical to implement,

• Testable at time of commissioning and beyond,

• Supportive of cost effective monitoring of the key performance parameters or critical items, and be

• Reliable and robust over the whole of life (i.e. resistant to critical failure modes and easily testable for
longer acting deterioration mechanisms).
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The performance criteria identified above should be used within a risk-cost-benefit analysis framework when
resolving competing design configurations to demonstrate due diligence in accordance with WH&S regulations.
The remainder of this section presents the steps in the overall design process, with the quantified risk analysis
and assessment aspects of the design process are covered in Section 5.
The analysis portion of the design process has been placed within the context of a wider asset management
process to facilitate alignment with asset management practicalities. Therefore, the design process is
integrated within the asset management life cycle comprised of building blocks as follows:

• System definition

• Data gathering

• Hazard analysis

• Initial design concept

• Detailed design

• Installation

• Commissioning

• Documentation of performance specification, operation and maintenance (O&M) plan, and training

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 • Supervision and maintenance
The design and management methodology incorporates these components to avoid the shortcomings of more
narrowly focussed structures based predominantly on analytical modelling. The quality assurance, systems
engineering, risk management and configuration management disciplines provide benefit when their
perspectives are incorporated into the asset design and management process through:

• Objectivity: Procedure promotes examination of problem to determine appropriate response, rather than
indiscriminate use of analysis.

• Hazard identification – interference modes: Process for determining the full range of hazards associated
with earthing system operation.

• Threat identification – failure analysis: Identification of and response to threats to system risk profile
compliance.

• Robust design – configuration management: Feed forward from the design decisions to facilitate
consideration of installation and operational constraints.

• Asset design and management process integration: Design and ongoing management of asset coordinated
throughout the design process.

• Standardisation and simplification: Installation to be simplified and wherever possible (with risk-cost-
benefit justification) standard solutions to be implemented.
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4.2 Design Management Process Overview

The following design management procedure (presented in Figure 4-1) is a high-level view of the
recommended process for earthing system design. It has been structured with the aim of providing flexibility
and leading designers to make conscious (and articulated) decisions, to identify hazards, meet appropriate risk
targets and facilitate ongoing compliance. In this way it is intended that the risks associated with earthing
system operation are managed in a cost effective, practical, supportable manner that is clearly documented
and implemented.
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24
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Figure 4-1: Design Management Process Overview

25
 The design steps outlined above are presented and discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

4.3 Design Process Summary

The intent of each step within the preceding design procedure flowchart is summarized within Table 4-1
following, with further detail provided in the pursuing sections of this chapter. It should be observed that this
design process recognizes two complementary methods of safety criteria selection:

• Standard Curves (Case matching): Aligning the design to be undertaken with a published case and using
the specified probabilistically derived voltage/time curves as the design safety criteria (Step 3 - see Section
4.6).

• Direct Probabilistic: Directly calculating contact and fault incidence coincidence and fibrillation probability
to derive a ‘design specific’ risk profile (Step 10 - see Section 4.7).
Table 4-1: Design and Management Process

Step Process Description

BASIC DESIGN

1A. System Definition and Project Integration

The data is collected in a staged manner, as required by the designer.
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1B. Initial Design Concept

Develop an initial earthing system design concept considering fault current

magnitude, auxiliary systems coupling factors, fault current duration, soil resistivity
and earth grid area.
1
1C. Determine Design EPR

Based on soil characteristics and the proportion of fault current flowing into the local
earthing system, determine the expected earth potential rise (EPR) of the earthing
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system. The first pass sets a conservative upper limit for the EPR and enables
assessment of which fault scenarios should be the focus of the detailed design effort.
1D. First Pass Safety Criteria
Determine a value of tolerable prospective touch voltage (Vptt) which relates to a
conservative (e.g. stringent) touch voltage scenario.

Is the installation part of a Global earthing system?

If EPR <Vptt or if it can be shown that all Vt values will be below Vptt then the
2
installation may be considered part of a global earthing system (See Section 4.8), and
a standard design may apply. Move to Step 12 and the Transient Design phase.

DETAILED DESIGN
3A. Detailed Earthing Layout
3 Generate a detailed earthing conductor layout to meet earthing system functional
requirements (see Sections 4.1 and 4.9)

3B. Shock Hazards - Location Identification and Magnitude

26
 Identify locations where workers or the public may be exposed to indirect shock
hazards. Such hazards include touch, step, transfer and hand-to-hand contacts. For
each location calculate the expected shock voltages for each applicable fault
scenario identified in Step 1.

Are Standard V/t Criteria Applicable at Hazard Locations?

4 Are any of the standard voltage/time (V/t) curves from the case studies (see Section
4.10 and Appendix E) applicable in this situation? Conservative assumptions and
comparisons are advisable.

Is EPR < Vptt?

5 Is the EPR less than the minimum prospective touch voltage (Vptt) found in the
selected Vt/time characteristic(s)?
If Yes, move to Step 12 and the Transient Design phase.

Detailed voltage gradient, touch and transfer voltage design.

6
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Calculate or test to determine the expected touch voltages (etc.) as a percentage of

the EPR.

Are values of Vt expected << Tolerable Vptt for each exposure location?
7
If Yes, move to Step 12 and the Transient Design phase.

Will a quantified risk assessment be undertaken? (see Step 10)

8
If not, undertake additional design revision (See Step 9)
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Design Improvement

9 Improve the design and identify and implement appropriate risk treatment
measures. Typical treatment measures might include global and/or local risk
reduction techniques. (See Section 4.15 and Appendix A)

Undertake Direct Probabilistic Design

For each shock risk location and fault case determine shock circuit impedances (e.g.
10 footwear, surface conditioning) and the fibrillation probability followed by exposure
probability to determine the total fatality probability (see Section 4.16 and Section
5.7).

Is the probability of fatality tolerable?

The probability of fatality will fall in one of the three categories (see Section 4.17 and
Section 5):
11
Intolerable region - Unacceptable risk. Mitigate the risk.
ALARP region – Reduce the risk so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP) or to as
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). For risks classified to be in the ALARP or

27
 Intermediate region the cost and practicality of any mitigation measure (see Step 9
and Section 4.15) is assessed against a range of criteria (See Section 5.5.3).
Negligible – If the EPR is sufficiently low it is a simple matter to classify the whole
system as presenting a tolerably low risk.

If the risk level is considered tolerable still check to see if the risk can be further
reduced ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ using commonly used economical
mitigation measures (see Step 9).

Lightning and Transient Design

12 Consider the need to implement any design precautions to manage the impact of
lightning and other transients (See Section 4.18).

Construction Support
13 Provide installation support as necessary to ensure design requirements fulfilled and
construction workers safety risk effectively managed (See Section 4.19).

Commissioning Program and Safety Compliance Review

14 Review the installation for physical and safety compliance following the construction
phase of the project. Ensure that the earthing system performs adequately to meet
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the requirements identified during the design (see Section 4.20).

Documentation

15 Documentation is to include the physical installation description (e.g. drawings) as

well as electrical assumptions, design decisions, commissioning data, and monitoring
and maintenance requirements (see Section 4.21).

4.4 System Definition and Project Integration (Step 1A)

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4.4.1 System Definition

The initial data gathered is intended to enable the designer to prepare a preliminary design from which a
maximum EPR may be deduced. While the available information will differ, depending upon the system under
design (e.g. transmission, distribution, or major substations), the following data would be generally required:

• Fault levels and protection clearing times (for relevant fault scenarios).

• Soil resistivity and geological data

• Site layout (e.g. structure placement)

• Primary and secondary power system conductor details (e.g. cable sheaths, overhead shield
wires/earthwires OHEW’s)

• Existing earthing systems detail (e.g. location, test results)

• Points of exposure (services search and neighbouring infrastructure)

The benefits of investing time up front include:

• Ability to undertake a soil resistivity test program during a range of climatic conditions.

• Locating previously unknown/unexpected hazards (e.g. fences, pipelines).

28
 • Gathering better location specific information resulting in significant cost savings (e.g. special constraints,
lower resistivity locations, additional availability of secondary earthing systems for interconnections).

• Identification of hazard locations. The issues can be addressed earlier rather than once the system is
installed (e.g. retrofitting can be hazardous, and costs are significantly higher than at the initial stage).

• More accurate understanding of interconnected earthing systems.

More detailed data may be gathered gradually during the design process, as each of the identified hazards and
minimum installation requirements are addressed. Testing can sometimes be used to determine key
parameters which are difficult to model (e.g. earth fault current distribution and low voltage multiple earthed
neutral (MEN) input impedances).
Collecting the full set of data required in the design will facilitate mitigation of the hazards using realistic values
for parameters rather than conservative estimates and reduce the risk of ‘unexpected issues’ arising at a later
stage in the design process.

4.4.2 Project Management Integration

From the inception of a project the earthing and lightning protection system design should be integrated
within the overall project management and other design processes as discussed in the following subsections.
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4.4.2.1 Project Management Plan

Points of integration with the project management plan include:

• Siting, feasibility assessment,

• Area requirements,

• Supply cable or transmission line design,

• Civil construction,
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• Interaction with assets ‘external’ to the main contract (e.g. cables, communication lines, pipelines),
• Installation timing and project staging,
• Construction workers safety (e.g. working within or adjacent to areas with energised power systems),
• Inspection hold points,
• Staged commissioning requirements, and
• Training or briefing session timing for project and construction workers.

4.4.2.2 Overall Electrical System Design Process Integration

It is necessary to identify and communicate with the design team any issues requiring coordination with other
parts of the design process (e.g. protection, cable specifications, line design (for earthed structures),
architectural and civil designs). Input requirements to structural and civil specifications, and tender documents,
must be identified at an early stage.

29
 4.4.2.3 Design and Installation Decision Documentation and Communication
What decisions are made and the reasoning for these should be documented within the design system. As built
drawings and key earth system parameters need to be available to the duty holder (refer Section 4.21) at the
conclusion of any project. The system that retains this data must also be auditable.

4.5 Initial Design Concept (Step 1B)

The initial design includes conductor placement and sizing to withstand fault currents and manage voltage
gradients. Current distribution in the earthing components of the primary and auxiliary power networks (e.g.
cable sheaths/screens and overhead earth wires) may be allowed for in the analysis, as these reduce the
current dissipation locally and therefore the EPR, more realistically depicting the system performance. Most
earthing networks depend on these interconnections.

The process and complexity of an earthing system design varies according to the requirements of the
application; however, a number of design considerations are largely universal. These include:

• The area available for installation of the earthing system.

• Soil resistivity, structure, water table and seasonal variation.

• Fault currents and durations.

• Regulation requirements applicable to the locations and the type of site.

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• Site safety of workers and the general public.

• Transferred potential hazards.

• Earthing conductor ratings (minimum earthing conductor size requirements), and redundancy targets
(number of conductors).

The design of an earthing system should consider all relevant parameters. Further installation practicalities to
be considered in the design (e.g. sizing and corrosion) are included in the Detailed Earthing Layout section
(Section 4.9).
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The design parameters critical to the initial design concept include the fault current magnitude and auxiliary
systems coupling factors, fault current duration, soil resistivity and earth grid area. These are briefly discussed
as follows:

4.5.1 Design Earth Fault Current

The worst-case fault scenario for every relevant aspect of the functional requirements shall be determined.
The following points shall be examined at each voltage level present in the installation:

Single phase to earth fault or double phase to earth fault conditions (when close to generation sources or
reactive plant, although probability may be considered for double phase to earth faults given the infrequency
of occurrence).

Faults both within and outside the installation site, shall be examined to determine the worst case earth
potential rise.
The combined effect of the magnitude (including d.c. offset) and duration of the fault in establishing the levels
of stress imposed on a person, equipment or earthing component.

Future fault level increases may be due to:

• Installation of additional transformers or larger transformers.

30
 • Installation of generation equipment.

• Removal of fault limitation devices such as neutral earthing resistors or reactors (NER’s), earthing
transformers or line reactors.

• System reconfiguration (e.g. new power lines which interconnect power systems).

Some allowance may also be made for line and fault impedance if appropriate. It is not usually appropriate to
use the switchgear fault short circuit rating when selecting future fault levels for use in determining risk to a
person.

Often only a small proportion of the prospective earth fault current will return via the general mass of the
earth through the local earth grid. In some cases, fault current is diverted from the mass of the earth via cable
screens, overhead earth wires, LV neutrals (MEN conductors) or other bonded conductors such as pipelines.
Some of the earth fault current may also circulate within an earth grid and not contribute to the earth
potential rise. Before calculating the earthing system potential rise, step voltages and touch voltages, it is
important to first calculate the realistic earth return current which will be a portion of the total earth fault
current.
The expected portion of the maximum earth fault current flowing into the earthing system shall be used to
calculate the size required for the earthing conductors. Where parallel earthing conductors exist such as for an
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earth grid, the rating of the parallel conductors may be based on a design current which is a portion of the
maximum expected earth fault current. The portion depends on the number of parallel conductors.

4.5.2 Earth Fault Duration

A realistic earth fault current clearing time must be considered for the calculation of the earthing conductor
sizes and when assessing step and touch voltage hazards. It is usual to select the most onerous current
magnitude and primary protection clearing time combination.

4.5.2.1 Personal Safety

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The fault clearing time of primary protection relays or first upstream protection device and circuit breakers
shall be used for personal safety (e.g. primary protection time plus circuit breaker operating time, or total fault
clearing time of a fuse)[15]. Refer to Appendix C for typical primary protection clearing times. The initial fault
and auto reclose events should not be aggregated unless High-Speed Single-Phase Auto Reclosing (HSSPAR) is
used for transmission lines, in which case the clearing times for the two or more events should be summated.
Initial fault clearing time is used for distribution lines which typically have much longer no-voltage times
between successive auto reclose attempts.
The assessment of step and touch voltage hazards often requires the consideration of a number of earth fault
scenarios with different fault clearing times. It is then necessary to evaluate which combination of fault current
and clearing time represents the worst case for step and touch voltage hazards assessment. Quite often, it
may be necessary to assess more than one set of fault current and fault duration scenarios.

4.5.2.2 Conductor Sizing

Back-up relay protection operating time, plus circuit breaker operating time shall be used as a minimum when
designing for conductor and connecting joint thermal requirements. Refer to Appendix C for typical backup
protection clearing times.

31
 The total accumulated fault time needs to be considered where auto-reclose is applied as there is very little
cooling during the auto-reclose dead time. Further details on the selection of earth fault duration are included
in the ENA Substation Earthing Guide EG-1 for use when specifying conductor sizes.

4.5.3 Soil Resistivity

The earth potential rise of an earthing system is significantly affected by the soils electrical (resistivity)
structure. Care must be taken to ensure that reliable soil resistivity data is obtained from field testing. It is
preferable that a series of measurements extending to sufficient distance be employed to enable the correct
resistivity lower layer value and layer depths to be identified. An alternative nearby test site, or a driven rod
test, may sometimes be used when space is restricted at the site under investigation.

Testing after recent rainfall should be avoided and rainfall history data can be checked to gain an appreciation
of soil moisture conditions. Data should be evaluated and cross checked whilst in the field. Incorrect readings
and inaccurate or erroneous values should be identified and eliminated. As many sites have been developed
and redeveloped over many years, interference with the test current may be caused by in-ground metallic
services and objects such as underground cables, water supply pipes, drainage pipes, sewerage pipes, and
building and machinery foundation piles. Buried services may also provide an unintended conductive path for
transfer potentials. Geotechnical data identifying soil/rock types and depths also provides a useful cross check
when interpreting test results.
Method specific analysis should be used to convert the test data to a model which represents the soil
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structure. Measured soil resistivity data may need to be adjusted for seasonal variation or test limitations,
based upon additional data gathered and engineering experience, when deciding upon a resistivity model to
use in each part of the earthing system design analysis.

4.5.4 Standard Design Templates

Standard design components or templates may be used to good effect provided the ‘limits of applicability’ or
boundary conditions are well understood and assessed prior to application. See standard minimum earthing
arrangement design described in Section 4.8.
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4.6 Expected Design Earth Potential Rise (Step 1C)

Based upon the soil characteristics and the likely proportion of total earth fault currents flowing into the local
earthing system the expected EPR is calculated for each of the key fault cases identified.
This initial first pass sets a conservative upper limit for the EPR. It enables assessment of which fault scenarios
should be the focus of the detailed design effort. Some fault scenarios may later be shown to exhibit a
maximum EPR that is less than the applicable compliance criteria (e.g. allowable touch voltage) and so achieve
compliance without specific mitigation.
These values are critical in that all other hazard voltages (e.g. step, touch, transfer) are calculated by scaling
based on the relative EPR’s for each key fault case.

4.7 First Pass Safety Criteria (Step 1D)

Determine a conservative value of tolerable prospective touch voltage (Vptt) based upon the fault scenarios
identified in the previous step and the list of standard voltage/time curves generated in the case studies in this
document or other cases developed separately with boundary conditions documented.

32
 4.8 Global Earthing System (Step 2)
Prove or verify that the installation is or is not part of a global earthing system, where there are no hazardous
potential differences [IEC 61936][EN 50522]. This outcome will usually be met where the EPR is less than the
tolerable prospective touch voltage (Vptt).

A global earthing system will best manage risk by limiting the EPR through distributing earth fault current to
interconnected systems or dissipating fault current into a low impedance local earthing system. While the
notion of gradient control through the creation of a ‘quasi equipotential surface’ has popular appeal, it should
not be readily relied upon, as testing experience has shown non-compliant exceptions.

An earthing system whose configuration meets certain criteria that have been previously proven to result in an
acceptable design may also be considered to form a global earthing system.
No simple or stand-alone rule is available, however, in general [EN50522]:

• A low overall resistance is helpful but is not a guarantee. Moreover, in installations with high soil resistivity
and overall resistances, safety requirements may be fulfilled due the increase of the additional resistances
and adequate potential grading.

• A low fault current level is helpful as the total earth potential rise will be limited.
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• A suitable cable sheath reduction factor or earth wire reduction factor distributes the fault current in such
a way that the total earth potential rise is limited.

• A short fault duration will increase the tolerable touch voltages.

Typical cases where a global earthing system could exist include [EN50522]:

• Substation surrounded by buildings with foundation earth electrodes and the earthing systems are
interconnected e.g. by cable sheath or low voltage protective earth conductors.

• Substation feeding city centre or densely built-up areas.

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• Substation feeding suburban area with many distributed earth electrodes interconnected by protective
earth conductors of low voltage system. An example may be a kiosk or padmount substation fed by
underground cables with multiple continuous MV cable sheaths providing continuity back to the source
and additional bonds to a well meshed and dense LV MEN system. The LV (TNCS system) multiple earthed
neutral (MEN) scheme that is common in Australian LV reticulation systems includes a neutral conductor
earthed at each customer premise and the source MV/LV transformer. A CMEN system involves multiple
MV/LV transformer reticulation areas having interconnected MV and LV earthing. This is most common in
urban areas where the MV reticulation is made with buried cable, and the cable sheath and LV MEN
conductor are common bonded throughout. In such situations the resultant EPR at the source substation
for both primary and secondary earth fault conditions is very low and the substation may be shown to be a
part of a Global Earthing System.

• Substation with given number of nearby substations.

• Substation with given number and length of outgoing earth electrodes.

• Substation connected via cables with earth electrode effect.

• Substation is feeding extended industrial area.

• Substations are part of system with multi earthed high voltage neutral conductor.

33
 Within a global earthing system, it may be possible to show that segments of a MV network are sufficiently
interconnected and that a minimum earthing arrangement is all that is required at each substation node,
removing the requirement for a site-specific earthing system design. Note that where a standard minimum
earthing arrangement is to be installed a minimum total local earthing resistance of the combined HV and LV
earthing electrodes may be required to meet insulation coordination performance requirements.

4.9 Detailed Earthing Design (Step 3)

The technical analysis which follows (refer to Section 4.9.2) looks at the system performance, however, it is
only effective if the physical implementation of the design (refer Section 4.9.1) meets robustness and earthing
system interconnection requirements. These detailed requirements are specified either on site/project specific
drawings, or in standard constructions drawings or practices that installation workers use.

4.9.1 Earthing Conductor Layout (Step 3a)

An earthing system bonds the required equipment and structures to earth via some form of local earth grid
(e.g. series of electrodes or embedded earth system). The physical practicalities of the design need to achieve a
level of robustness for the life of the installation. The design should specify conductor sizing, terminations,
acceptable jointing methods, material types, conductor protection, labelling and inspection and testing
requirements as a minimum. Many of the requirements are addressed in some detail in other guides such as
the ENA EG-1 Substation Earthing Guide. The following sections provide some detail regarding these
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requirements.

4.9.1.1 Rating of Earthing Conductors

The cross-sectional area of earthing conductors shall be capable of carrying the maximum earth fault current to
which the conductor is expected to be subjected. The current rating of any conductors forming part of the
earthing system may be determined using appropriate formulae or charts.

• Buried earthing system conductors

Appropriate formulae may be obtained from IEEE Std 80 or the EG-1 ENA Substation Earthing Guide. For the
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

rating of earthing conductors, the fault clearing time achieved by the backup protection (see Table A5 in
Appendix C.3) shall be used. However, when rating all buried earthing conductors, additional factors such as
the long-term service life of the conductors, future growth, and the corrosive nature of the soil in which they
are installed should also be considered. This may justify the selection of a larger sized conductor considering
the cost involved in future reinforcement or replacement of the conductors.

Earthing conductors also need to be sufficiently physically robust to match the intended duty, taking into
consideration factors such as exposure to traffic, corrosion, physical protection, and support.
The range of ambient temperatures of a specific region should be considered when rating earth conductors.
Different values are usually applicable for buried conductors and for above ground conductors.
The design should ensure that the maximum temperature that any earthing conductor is allowed to reach does
not cause deterioration of the conductor. The maximum conductor temperatures are usually limited by
jointing/connection methods. Historically, where bolted or compression joints are used, IEEE Std 80 and ENA
EG-1 have recommended a maximum temperature of 250°C for bare copper earthing conductors. IEEE Std 80
also recommends a maximum temperature of 250°C to prevent annealing of hard drawn copper conductors.
Maximum temperatures of 450°C have been used for bare copper earthing conductors that are welded or
brazed. PVC covered conductors should not exceed a maximum temperature of 160°C to avoid damaging the
insulation. Both IEEE Standard 80 and ENA EG-1 provide further guidance regarding allowable temperature rise
of direct buried earthing conductors.

34
 • Overhead lines and underground cables
Overhead shield wires or underslung earth wires on powerlines and underground cable screens are critical
components in earthing systems. They provide current dissipation at a point of fault and often a direct return
path to the source of the earth fault current, thereby reducing the EPR at both source and fault locations and
reducing inductive interference into parallel metallic systems. Shieldwire ratings should be assessed, especially
close to fault current sources.
HV cable screen ratings should be assessed under both load and earth fault conditions. In HV networks where
single core cables are used the cable screen bonding configuration is an integral part of the system design. If a
single point bonding scheme is to be implemented the magnitude of cable screen voltages induced under
balanced maximum load, and under prospective short circuit fault conditions, shall be calculated [106][107].
The design should consider the impact of the terminating substation EPR on the sheath voltages when
determining sheath voltage limiter ratings. Sheath bonding and earthing arrangements should limit standing
sheath voltages under maximum prospective load conditions (e.g. 65V for system voltages <= 132kV, and 150V
for system voltages >132kV [107]).
If a double point bonding scheme is to be implemented the cable sheath current induced under balanced
maximum load, and under prospective short circuit fault conditions, shall be calculated.
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4.9.1.2 Materials and Corrosion Considerations

The design, selection of materials and construction of the earthing system should consider the possibility of
theft and deterioration due to corrosion over the lifetime of the installation. Typical materials used as earth
conductors include:

Copper is the most common material used for earth electrodes. It has a high conductivity and has the
advantage of being corrosion resistant in most soil conditions. Copper clad or copper bonded high tensile steel
is often used for electrodes. The thickness of the copper coating or sleeve used on the rods shall be substantial
enough to avoid rapid corrosion of the steel rod. A minimum thickness of 250 µm is suggested. Some inferior
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copper clad electrodes can lose the copper cladding on installation.

Stainless Steel may be considered in some soil conditions where copper may suffer from excessive corrosion.
However, in certain soil conditions with limited oxygen the outer layer cannot passivate and will exhibit pitting
corrosion.
Mild Steel is not preferred due to excessive corrosion rates. The use of mild steel or galvanized steel earth
electrodes in conjunction with or near copper earth grids is not recommended. The steel will act as a sacrificial
anode and could corrode away relatively quickly. In areas where a considerable quantity of buried galvanized
steel or structural steel is present near a copper earth electrode, stainless steel may be an attractive
alternative to copper (depending upon presence of certain salts in the soil).

Galvanized steel may be used in cases where there is an extensive buried steel pipe network in proximity such
as a power station, as copper earthing would corrode the steel pipe network. Galvanized steel will give a short
service life in corrosive soils.
Aluminium or solid zinc should not be used as a buried electrode.

4.9.1.3 Corrosion Control

Earthing system components may be subject to corrosion or be the cause of corrosion in other systems. While
standard installation guidelines are sufficient in many instances to handle corrosion risks, it is considered

35
 prudent to include at least a basic Corrosion Risk Assessment in the design process to determine if special
conditions exist.

To enable a secure or robust design to be realised, a review of the parameters affecting corrosion performance
is recommended. The following points are useful to assess:

• Uneven distribution of moisture or soil types in the vicinity of the electrode.

• The acidity and chemical content of the soil, as well as the presence of foreign materials including cinders,
scrap metal or organic material. For instance, the presence of certain salts has been shown to lead to
corrosion of copper conductors.

• The presence of stray electric current – particularly, d.c. from traction system return currents or cathodic
protection systems.

• The interconnection of dissimilar metals in the soil or above ground where moisture is present. This is
among the most common causes of corrosion of earth electrodes. For example, the connection of copper
mounted on galvanised steel structures can lead to corrosion. Special care is also required in selecting the
fixing of conductors to structures.

• Pitting corrosion is an issue to consider with stainless steels or clad conductors.

• The resistivity of the soil, as an electrolyte, is an important factor associated with corrosion. Soils having
resistivity lower than approximately 15 Ω-m are highly conductive and therefore considered to provide a
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highly corrosive environment. Corrosion of conductors at the soil/air interface should be also considered.

The mitigation of corrosion is a complex task, and it is not possible to lay down rigid rules. If corrosion
problems are encountered or are anticipated, these should be investigated on a case-by-case basis.

4.9.1.4 Joints and Terminations

During fault conditions the joints within an earth system are required to maintain electrical integrity while
carrying large currents at increased temperatures. The most common acceptable joints between earth
conductors include welded (exothermic), brazed, compression and wedge type connectors. Compression
fittings or exothermic products used for jointing conductors shall comply with the requirements of an
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acceptable standard such as IEEE Std 837.

It is not considered acceptable for bolted joints to be directly buried, and care should be taken when used in
earth pits to ensure the pit doesn’t fill with soil or water. Corrosion issues associated with joints should be
considered, especially where dissimilar metals are involved. Corrosion of the conductors and connectors may
result in the joint becoming loose or high impedance. The use of joint sealing compounds may also be
considered where appropriate to ensure water does not penetrate the joint.

4.9.1.5 Layout Practicalities

Earthing conductors perform three main functions:

• Dissipating current directly into the soil,

• Collecting and/or carrying current between dissipation points, and

• Providing surface voltage gradient control.

The design layout should always be prepared with a view to:

• Simplifying the installation process,

• Simplifying ongoing supervision needs, and

36
 • Minimising exposure to ‘external risks’ (i.e. damage through vandalism or theft).
The interconnection of equipment to the buried earth system should be undertaken with consideration of loss,
damage and failure of either the bonding/or earth conductor or the terminations. In the event of some
singular failure, it is desirable that the earth system remains functional and that both personnel and equipment
are protected.

The failure of a single component of the earthing system should not jeopardise the system performance in the
event of an earth fault. This ‘single contingency’ approach is quite reasonable, provided there is a mechanism
for identifying the failure before a second contingency occurs. Unfortunately, the failure of a component of the
earthing system is often not identified (or even able to be identified). Therefore, it is good design practise to
consider:

• Identifying the safety critical earthing system components. The performance of some elements are critical
to the safety of the entire system (i.e. if required to carry current in each fault occurrence), whilst other
elements are safety critical only if a fault occurs on an individual item of plant.

• Providing redundancy (i.e. duplication) for earthing system elements that are safety critical and not
supervised, or are susceptible to damage (i.e. ‘exposed’ buried cables outside the controlled environment
of a substation or not adjacent to a power cable).
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• Rating all primary earthing system elements conservatively to withstand backup clearing times and
assuming 70/30% distribution (rather than 50/50%).

• Providing ‘simple’ methods for supervising the integrity of safety critical elements of the earthing system
(i.e. ‘clip-on’ continuity capability).

• Assigning a lower level of reliability to ‘external’ or auxiliary earthing system components.

In some cases, disconnection of an earth can cause a sustained voltage to immediately appear between one
part of the earthing system and another. The potential on the broken conductor may be quite high (kV) and
has been known to result in a fatal touch voltage being experienced by a worker. Such critical bonds and
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connections require adequate redundancy to withstand at least one contingent failure and regular supervision
include:

• Single core, single point bonded power cables,

• Star point to earth connections on transformers,

• Bushing screen to earth connections,

• LV neutral connections.
Providing clear details on drawings is important as any ambiguities may be misinterpreted and buried before
they can be identified. Many incorrect configurations cannot be identified by continuity testing during the
commissioning programme; therefore, visual checks of installed connections are recommended prior to burial.

4.9.2 Shock Hazard-Location Identification and Magnitude (Step 3b)

Identify locations where workers or the public may be exposed to shock hazards. Hazardous step and touch
voltages can appear on the metal structures or equipment associated with high voltage power systems, or may
be transferred via metal structures or equipment located near high voltage power systems due to one or a
combination of the following factors:

• Direct Connections (e.g. fences, conveyors)

37
 • Indirect Coupling (i.e. via soil)

• Electric field (capacitive) coupling

• Electromagnetic induction

The risk profile associated with earthing systems varies greatly for different locations and circumstances.
During the first phase of an earthing system design or redesign it is necessary to identify the hazard scenarios
applicable to the site and power system configuration that could be presented during the period of the project
and life of the installation/asset. The hazard locations are those where workers or members of the public may
be able to experience a hazardous potential between their hand and feet or two hands during normal load or
earth fault conditions, as outlined in Section 3.2.2.

4.10 Standard Voltage/Time Criteria Selection (Step 4)

If the assumptions behind at least one of the standard voltage/time (V/t) criteria apply to the hazard scenarios
associated with the design then the design may progress using the standard curves. Otherwise, a site-specific
risk analysis (see Step 10 in Section 4.16) may be undertaken to either determine an applicable curve or
calculate the risk profile for the site-specific scenario.
During each of the earth fault conditions associated with a power system asset a range of hazard scenarios are
created. The hazard scenarios relate to sites where people may come into contact with a voltage created
during load conditions or an earth fault event and are characterized by contact type (e.g. hand to feet), contact
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frequency and duration as well as fault frequency and duration as identified in the preceding step (Section 4.9
and 3.2.2).

A number of negligible risk standard V/t criteria cases are summarised in Table 4-2 following, and the
additional details of the assumptions and the voltage/time (V/t) curves are included within Appendix E.

Table 4-2: Safety Criteria Case Study Summary

Case Earth fault event Description Acronym

Contact with transmission asset in urban interface

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TU
location.
Contact with distribution asset in urban interface
DU
location.
Contact with metalwork in a backyard effected by either
TDB
Transmission (≥66kV) transmission or distribution asset.
E-1 and distribution Contact with MEN connected metalwork (around house)
assets (< 66kV) where MEN or soil is affected by either transmission or TDMEN
distribution assets.
Contact with metalwork associated with an aquatic
AQ5
centre that operates five months of the year.
Contact with metalwork associated with an aquatic
AQ12
centre that operates twelve 12 months of the year.

Backyard near Major Substation with Primary side fault. MSPB

Transmission
Backyard near Transmission Substation with Secondary
E-2 substations TSSB
side fault
(≥66kV secondary)
MEN Contact near Transmission Substation with
TSSMEN
Secondary side fault

38
 Case Earth fault event Description Acronym

Backyard near Major Substation with Primary side fault MSPB

Zone substations
E-3 Backyard near Zone Substation with Secondary side fault. ZSSBI
(<66kV secondary)
MEN contact near Zone Substation with Secondary side
ZSSMEN
fault.

Inside Transmission Substation TSI

Inside Major
E-4
Substations
Inside Zone Substation ZSI

Note: The above cases are based on touch voltage hazards. Where applicable, the negligible risk step voltage
or hand to hand voltage/time curves (typically much less stringent than the allowable touch voltages) should
also be checked and the stringent voltage/time curve used.
The parameters have been selected with a view to conservatism, nevertheless the designer should check the
assumptions match the circumstances of the hazard scenario being analysed and determine if any additional
mitigation measures may be applicable if the cost is low and/or a normally expected practice.
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The following series of curves (in Figure 4-2) relate to prospective touch voltages posing negligible risk (e.g. 10-6
annual individual risk) associated with earth fault events on transmission and distribution assets (Case F-1) with
fault frequency assumptions given in Table F-2.

100000

TU

DU

TDB
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

10000
TDMEN

AQ5
Prospective Touch Voltage (Volts)

AQ12

1000

100

10
0.1 1 Clearing Time (sec) 10

Figure 4-2: Transmission and Distribution Asset Prospective Touch Voltage Criteria

39
 When the published V/t criteria from the case studies do not fit the hazard scenarios of the design being
undertaken producing direct probabilistic criteria is recommended. Section 4-16 details the process for direct
derivation with reference to a software tool [38][39].
Remote locations: Assets may be considered as ‘remote’ if they do not require a certain touch voltage to
comply with the fatality risk targets. This occurs when the coincidence probability is below the risk target.
Nevertheless, an earthing system may still be required at such assets to meet protection operation and/or
insulation coordination performance requirements (see Sections 5.5.2.2 and D.1.1 for further details).

4.11 Check if EPR below lowest tolerable prospective touch voltage (Step 5)
If the EPR is less than the lowest permissible touch voltage, then the shock safety requirements of the design
are met. If so, move to Step 12 and the Transient Design phase, otherwise check more closely the expected
hazard voltages at the exposed locations identified during Step 3 (see Section 4.9.2).
It is usual that there will be more than one EPR to consider, depending upon the range of fault sources and
locations. Note that induction on parallel services may still require assessment and mitigation.

4.12 Voltage Gradient, Touch and Transfer Design (Step 6)

Calculate or measure soil surface gradients, step and touch voltages and transfer potentials either as an
absolute value or as a percentage of the substation EPR. It is usual to begin the analysis with a conservative
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estimate of the maximum EPR, however, in many cases such an approach yields excessive mitigation
requirements, particularly when managing risk associated with transfer hazards beyond an assets perimeter.
Voltages may be calculated or measured at locations where workers or the public may be in contact with
metalwork both within a substation, and on any metalwork or utility service outside the station or walking in
areas of high voltage gradient (area immediately surrounding a station) and able to receive an electric shock.
Each exposure location is characterized by the following parameters: contact location, contact open circuit
voltage (%EPR), contact configuration (e.g. hand to feet), series impedance (e.g. footwear). Contact frequency
and duration estimates will be required for each site if quantified risk analysis (QRA) is undertaken (Step 10).
Checks should be made for any interference with metalwork associated with third party assets including:
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

• Metallic pipelines (e.g. gas, water and hydrocarbons) – Refer also to AS/NZS4853.

• Telecommunications worker exposure – Refer also to AS3835 for conductive EPR hazards and SA HB 101
for low frequency induction (LFI) hazards.

• Conveyors – Refer also to AS3835 and AS3007.

• Rail lines and signalling systems – Refer to EN50122.

4.13 Touch, Step and Transfer Voltage Check (Step 7)

If the expected contact voltages exceed the negligible risk standard voltage/time (V/t) criteria a designer may
either undertake additional mitigation measures to reduce the hazard magnitude (Step 9) or use QRA to
undertake a direct probabilistic design (Step 10).

4.14 Risk Analysis Decision Check (Step 8)

At this point a designer may choose to modify or redesign the earthing system (Step 9) in order to reduce the
hazard level (e.g. reduce EPR and hence Vptt) and then re-evaluate the resultant risk profile. Alternatively, a
designer may choose to undertake a more specific quantified risk analysis (Step 10).

40
 4.15 Modify the Design using Risk Mitigation Principles (Step 9)
If compliance is not achieved following Step 7 or Step 11 then a review of available risk mitigation strategies is
required. It is likely that some reiteration will be required to determine the appropriate improvements to
make. A range of design improvements that may be considered are discussed in more detail in Appendix A and
ENA EG-1. The principles of the hierarchy of controls should be applied to the mitigation/redesign process in
determining priorities (see Clause 2.2).
The goal of earthing system design optimisation is to ensure adequate robustness in the design at the same
time as finding a balance between cost, practicality and management of risk. While sensitivity and uncertainty
analyses must be applied to individual risk mitigation assessments, the overall picture must also be managed.
Multiple risk scenarios need to be analysed regarding interactions between individual scenarios (e.g. trade-
offs), and the impact of the various design configurations on the overall risk profile for the site and for the
earthing system.
Mitigation options often fall into two categories: either reduce the hazard (the presented voltage or clearing
time) or reduce the probability of coincidence. The reduction in magnitude of the hazard should be considered
first. The design should be evaluated to ensure all reasonable precautions have been included, where the costs
are not ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the risk reduction benefit gained. Assessment of risk mitigation is an
iterative process with an aim to reduce the earthing related shock risk so far as is reasonably practicable
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(SFAIRP) or to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) within a risk-cost-benefit analysis (RCBA) framework.

4.15.1 Option 1:Reduce Presented Voltage or Clearing Time

Table 4-3 summarises the primary mitigation options that are typically considered.
Table 4-3: Primary Mitigation Options

Mitigation option Option Category

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• Reduce return impedance (e.g. augment grid, cable screen bonding)

Voltage reduction
• Reassess driving current (e.g. fault impedance)

Clearing time reduction • Protection setting or type changed.

Additional guidance regarding primary mitigation options is provided in Appendix A.

4.15.2 Option 2: Reduce the Probability of Coincidence

Coincidence reduction factors may be applied in Step 10 if measures are taken to eliminate or reduce the
likelihood of a person being situated in an exposed location. Measures could include barrier fencing or worker
access restriction (e.g. via PPE with safe work techniques and possibly signage).
For a more detailed discussion regarding application of the RCBA process in managing earthing related risks
refer to Section 5.5.3.

4.16 Direct QRA of Indirect Shock Risk (Step 10)

The allocation of allowable prospective touch voltages to specific hazard scenarios has been a common
practise for many years. This guide provides a quantified risk-based technique whereby safety criteria may be

41
 derived to reflect the various configurations found in practice. The basis applied for a safe earthing design is a
low probability of electrocution by contact with metalwork during load and earth fault conditions.

The quantified risk analysis methodology utilises as its basis the fact that a fatality due to an earth fault can
only occur if both of the following situations exist:

• A person is present when a fault occurs, and the

• Touch (or step) voltage generated results in a large enough current passing through the body for sufficient
time to cause fibrillation of the heart muscle.

The particular value of applying the probabilistic method to analyse earthing related shock risk lies in being
able to:

• Optimise cost of mitigation through being able to more accurately identify the amount that each fault case
and input parameter contributes to the risk profile.

• Identify hazard scenarios where more traditional approaches are non-conservative and more stringent
criteria may be justified on account of the risk profile to which the public or utility workers may be
exposed.

• Alternatively, the risk-based approach is also able to identify hazard scenarios where the risk profile is very
low and less stringent design targets than previously adopted may be justified.

The probability that the heart will enter ventricular fibrillation due to contact with an external voltage is the
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Probability of Fibrillation (Pfibrillation). The probability that a person will be present and in contact with an item
while the item is affected by a fault is defined as the Probability of Exposure or Coincidence (Pcoincidence). A key
purpose of earthing system design is to reduce the likelihood of a fatality occurring (Pfatality), which can be
described by the following equation:

Pfatality = Pcoincidence × Pfibrillation 4-1

The societally tolerable limits supported by this guide are based upon meeting both individual, and societal (or
multiple) fatality risk limits as covered in Section 5.4.5.
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4.17 Assessment of Risk Tolerability (Step 11)

The risk of fatality for each of the sites at which a contact hazard exists is required to be reduced to as low as
reasonably practicable, or so far as is reasonably practicable. The decision will be made based upon one of two
processes:

• Meeting voltage/time characteristics which have been developed independently and can be shown to
represent a negligible level of risk for each of the exposure locations (see Section 5.6), or

• Demonstrating that the range of risk of fatality for each of the exposures, considering the variability in
contributing parameters, is sufficiently low as may be considered negligible. It must also be shown that
any further reduction in risk cannot be achieved without incurring a cost impost that is ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to the level of risk reduction or installation requirements or operational restrictions that
conflict with functional requirements (e.g. unable to meet redundancy requirements to meet reasonable
operational contingencies or placing unreasonable access restrictions for the site). Section 5.5.3 addresses
ways to undertake such an assessment.

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 4.18 Lightning and Transient Design (Step 12)
Switching surges and lightning strokes impacting directly or indirectly upon a substation may cause damage to
both primary and secondary plant. Collection and dissipation of the incident energy involves components of
the earthing system (see AS1768).
If the interactions between the HV earthing system and secondary systems (i.e. protection, d.c. and a.c.
auxiliary power and control wiring) are not managed appropriately this may result in:

• Equipment damage (e.g. relays damaged).

• Operational reliability reduction (e.g. false or no CB tripping).

• Human safety risk (e.g. fires due to sparking in hazardous areas).

Assessing electromagnetic interference (EMI) sources, coupling mechanisms, interference levels, and resultant
physical damage or operational impact regarding the impact of the earthing system configuration, should be
part of the earthing system design scope, as it is harder to mitigate EMI risks following installation.

4.19 Construction Support (Step 13)

During the site construction phase of the project there are several aspects that need to be addressed:
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• Ensuring that the as-built installation matches the design drawings and is constructed to an appropriate
standard.

• Addressing the electrical shock safety of construction workers.

• Approving earthing design changes or managing construction changes/variations.

4.19.1 Physical Implementation Compliance

Many elements of an installed earthing system are only able to be inspected during construction as it is cost
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prohibitive to inspect many components once buried. During construction suitable hold and witness points are
required to be specified. This also provides several benefits:

• Defects and issues arising during installation can be cost effectively managed, including:

• Quality of workmanship

• Adherence to specification/approved practice

• Equipment risks (e.g. soil contaminant near grid conductors)

• Methods of simplifying or easing the installation process can be incorporated and the system
improvements captured/incorporated for future stages of the project or future designs.

4.19.2 Construction Safety

At brown field sites or sites adjacent to power lines/distribution substations the risk profile presented by the
site will be affected by the increased presence of construction workers. As a minimum the following items
should be considered, and site direction made:

• Power supply to construction areas and site sheds/offices:

• Where substation power supply can be used

43
 • Where LV street supply can be used

• Where appropriate use of portable generators and inverters

• Use of isolation transformers if required

• Specify locations for site sheds (either completely inside the earth grid or some minimum distance from
the buried earth system).

• Specify laydown material storage areas (especially for conductive/metallic construction material), either
completely inside the earth grid or some minimum distance from the buried earth system.

• Specify vehicle earthing requirements for plant such as:

• Cranes near exposed HV

• Concrete pumping vehicles

• Trucks and motor lorry in live yards

• Specify earthing requirements of temporary fencing

• Specify staged earthing requirements for large projects

• Personnel Protective Equipment- for example

• Insulating or riggers gloves

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• Footwear (e.g. use of rubber boots)

• Equipotential bonding leads

• Isolating/insulation mats

• Required remedial works on existing assets, if required (e.g. isolation section(s) in third party fences)

• Defining of work areas and specific controls required in each area.

• Sectionalising bus systems to reduce the prospective fault current and

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• Disabling any auto-reclose functions.

• Construction safety requirements are to be identified and the controls listed in the appropriate safety
documentation.

4.20 Commissioning and Ongoing Supervision (Step 14)

4.20.1 Testing, Inspection and Supervision Principles

Owners or users of electrical installations should take all practicable steps to maintain their earthing systems in
a configuration and condition to meet the requirements of the original design. They should also establish and
operate administrative systems (including records of inspections and tests undertaken) that provide periodic
safety checks at reasonable intervals appropriate to the operating environment and operational risks. A
configuration management system should be in place to ensure the requirements are modified in line with
changes to the asset and neighbouring infrastructure.

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 4.20.1.1 Documentation and Records
All measurements and tests required should be properly recorded and the documentation kept. To enable the
integrity of the earthing installation over a long period of time and its suitability for present fault levels to be
assessed the following records should be maintained:

• Initial design calculations and decisions

• Results of commissioning tests

• Results of periodic inspections and measurements

• Updating of fault level

• Drawings showing the earthing system layout including location and size of all earth conductors and
electrodes, and the location of all grid connections.

• Changes in access classification over time (e.g. TU to TDB).

• Details of mitigation measures implemented and justification therefore.

4.20.2 Commissioning Programme and Safety Compliance Review

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Commissioning of new earthing systems is essential as a validation step for the design and installation process
and for the design inputs. In most cases commissioning should measure the outputs of the earthing system in
terms of produced voltages and current distributions rather than solely resistance or impedance. The
commissioning shall consider the key performance criteria identified in the hazard identification and treatment
analysis phases.
Commissioning will determine the earthing system initial compliance and set a benchmark or baseline for
ongoing supervision. As it is not always possible to foresee all hazard mechanisms at the design stage,
commissioning testing can determine the need for any localised secondary mitigation and any additional
requirements for telecommunication or pipeline interference coordination.
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The earthing system commissioning procedure normally consists of six core activities. In some instances, not all
activities are required.

• Visual inspection

• Continuity testing

• Earth resistivity testing

• Earthing system impedance testing

• Earth potential rise (EPR) measurement

• Current distribution measurement

• Transfer, touch, and step voltage testing

The following sections briefly discuss the foregoing commissioning procedures.

4.20.2.1 Visual Inspection

The visual inspection typically involves checks of:

• Design compliance and as-built drawing accuracy

45
 • Condition of earthing conductors and connections

• Condition of earthing electrodes

• Presence and condition of earthing bonds to equipment

• Condition of surface layer materials if required

• Condition of fence bonding and isolation sections (where installed), and

• Presence of transfer hazards.

4.20.2.2 Continuity Testing

Continuity testing is used to measure the resistance between items of plant within the main earth grid and to
components that should be effectively bonded to the grid, and to identify isolation of components (e.g. water
pipes) This test is important in large earthing systems where visual inspection of all conductors and
connections is problematic and a continuity tester is far better suited to testing the integrity of the Engl an
earthing system

4.20.2.3 Earth Resistivity Testing

Even where resistivity testing was undertaken at the design stage, additional testing may help to define
measurement errors and periodic variations.
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4.20.2.4 Injection Testing

Injection testing simulates a power system line to ground fault by establishing a circuit between the earthing
system under test and a remote injection point. Ideally this circuit should reflect the actual fault return point.
Where this is not possible, post testing analysis is necessary to reflect the actual fault scenario or scenarios.
This may include multiple points of return.

The simulated fault is typically made sustainable by injecting a small current, commonly between 2 and 20
amps. The effects are made measurable, even on live systems, by injecting at a frequency different to the
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power system frequency and using frequency tuneable measuring equipment. The test is referred to as a Low
Current, Off Power Frequency Injection Test.

• Earth Potential Rise (EPR) Measurement

With test current flowing through the simulated fault circuit, voltages will be present in the same locations and
in proportion to those generated during a real earth fault.

The earthing system’s EPR is measured by performing a Fall of Potential test. This test requires a test lead to be
run out from the earthing system to allow a series of voltage measurements to be made between the earthing
system under test and the ground. The route and distance are chosen to minimise measurement errors.

The measurements taken from the Fall of Potential test must be processed for the difference between test and
power system frequency and for distance to remote earth. They can then be used to determine the earth
system impedance and the EPR under actual fault conditions. Adjustments should also be made for mutual
earth resistance and for mutual inductance as required.

Direct remote earth measurements, such as voltage measurements to remotely earthed communications or
pilot wires, can also supply supplementary test data. However, with single point measurement alone it is very
difficult to correctly assess and correct the many error sources that can be part of any measurement taken.

46
 • Current Distribution
In the situation where fault current may leave the earthing system through paths alternate to the earth grid
(such as cable sheaths or overhead earth wires), the current through those alternate paths should also be
measured. This allows analysis of how fault energy is dissipated, its effect on the alternate paths (e.g. cable
sheath capacity) and calculation of the earth grid impedance from the total system impedance. In complex
systems the results are useful for modelling alternate fault scenarios and fault current sources not simulated
during testing.

• Transfer, Touch and Step Voltage Testing

While test current is flowing in the fault circuit, measurements are made of actual transfer, touch and step
voltages. The purpose of such measurements is to directly measure the earthing system’s outputs and the
compliance with the determined safety criteria.
Prospective (open circuit) touch and step voltages are measured using a high impedance voltmeter. The
effective (loaded) touch and step voltages are measured using a resistance representing the human body. The
effective (loaded) touch and step voltage cases are more variable due to variations in contact resistance and is
only used when necessary and precautions taken (e.g. take multiple measurements, use open circuit electrode
contact initially, and only use a weighted plate on moistened soil if necessary).
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• Telecommunications Coordination

Where telecommunications equipment is installed within the area of influence of a high voltage earthing
system consideration is required of the hazards that may be created. In such cases coordination is required
between the power system asset owner/operator and the appropriate telecommunications group.

• Pipeline Interference / Coordination

Where pipelines are installed within the area of influence of a high voltage earthing system consideration is
required of the hazards that may be created. In such cases notification must be given to owner / operator of
the pipeline.
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4.20.3 Ongoing Supervision and Maintenance

The ongoing supervision programme should monitor aspects of the installation critical to maintaining safe
operation of the earthing system, and consider any external risks identified during the design phase (e.g.
monitoring separation distances). The condition of the earthing system components should also be examined
periodically by inspection. Excavating at representative locations and visual inspection are appropriate means.

Measurement of the earthing system performance should be carried out periodically or following major
changes to the installation or power system which affect the fundamental requirements of the earthing
system. Such measurements should generally follow the commissioning programme. Continuity tests should
also be undertaken, and compared with historical records (see Section 4.21).
Configuration management standards (AS/NZS 3907) require owners of assets that can pose a threat to staff
and public to manage changes to their own assets (e.g. earth fault level increases) and surrounding
infrastructure and land use. Ongoing inspections should identify when infrastructure surrounding an earthing
system has changed in configuration and/or use. For instance, a kindergarten set up in a property backing on to
a major substation, or a swimming pool and Colourbond fence installed near a transmission tower.

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 4.20.3.1 Inspection and Test Intervals
The asset owner or user shall determine appropriate inspection and tests intervals based on knowledge of its
own earthing installations and design standards, and on its understanding of environmental conditions (e.g.
corrosion) and assessment of risk.
When work has taken place that may have interfered with the earthing system, the system in that area shall be
inspected and checked. All parts of the earthing system exposed by excavation shall be inspected for damage
or deterioration.

4.21 Final Documentation (Step 15)

Documentation is to include the physical installation description, electrical assumptions, design decisions,
commissioning data, and any site-specific monitoring and maintenance requirements.

To be most effective the documentation process should be an integral part of the overall design process, with
the requirements well understood by designers, field workers and project workers from the inception of the
project. Configuration management requirements (see AS/NZ 3907) appropriate for a safety critical system
would include identifying and including the requirements within the ‘system’.

The final stage of the design process should be a formal sign-off or handover process, whereby the design
engineer is able to collate all the design documentation and ongoing management requirements for inclusion
in the operational support documentation and programmes for the installation.
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48
 5 Management of Shock Risk
5.1 Shock types
Most electric shock incidents occur at power frequency and involve the subject touching or holding onto a
metallic object. A voltage difference exists between the object and the ground on which the subject is standing
(i.e. touch voltage), so that current passes through the subject. Some electric shock incidents can occur when
two separate metallic objects are touched/held so that current passes through the body from one hand to the
other (i.e. hand-to-hand touch voltage). The human body represents a conductive alternate return path for the
flow of electrical current.
Electrocution due to contact with the ground or metalwork at a potential different to another point of contact
(feet or hand) during earth fault events is a low probability, but clearly high consequence, hazard scenario.
Such cases are known as indirect contact, as opposed to direct contact with energised conductors. This guide
focusses upon managing the indirect shock risk to which workers and the public may be exposed during power
system fault and load conditions.

Section 3 describes the range of hazardous potential differences to which personnel or members of the public
may be exposed under load and fault conditions.
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5.2 History of indirect shock safety criteria

The starting point for the derivation of safety criteria is the effect of electric current upon the human body.
Fundamental research has established thresholds for perception, let-go and ventricular fibrillation. Although
asphyxia and cardiac arrest do cause fatalities, ventricular fibrillation (VF) is the most common cause of death
by electrical shock.

The fibrillating current threshold is affected by the type of source (ac vs dc), voltage magnitude, current
magnitude, current path (e.g. hand to feet), duration of time, sensitivity of the individual, frequency, and body
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impedance. Ventricular fibrillation occurs when an external current passes through the heart during the
vulnerable period of the heart cycle being the relative refractory period or the T wave in the ECG. The
vulnerable period is 50-100ms in duration and is repeated approximately every second, as the average heart
rate of an adult human being (at rest) is 60-80 beats per minute. Therefore, at power frequencies (e.g. 50Hz), it
is possible to stimulate the heart up to 10 times during the vulnerable period, if it is assumed that the body is
only concerned with magnitude.
The following table indicates these thresholds for electric shocks involving 50Hz current, as most electric shock
incidents occur at power frequencies. The effects described occur when a subject has a solid connection with
electricity by holding electrodes in their hands with conductive jelly.

49
 Table 5-1: Physiological effects of 50Hz alternating current

Current Magnitude AC (mA) Electric Shock Effects

Perception level – current is perceived as ‘tingles’ or light pins and

1mA
needles.

Let-go level – current is perceived in fingers and forearms as painful but

6-9mA tolerable spasms or pins and needles; voluntary control of forearms is
just possible.

Tetanus and loss of control of forearm muscles – subject is unable to

10-15mA
‘let-go’ of electrodes in hands; pain becomes unbearable.

Tetanus of chest muscles - breathing becomes difficult, if not impossible.

20-50mA

Ventricular fibrillation if current passes through the heart.

100-200mA

Severe burns at points of contact (e.g. hands).

200mA
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Nerve block, partial paralysis. Nerve block prevents signal from brain
1A
reaching lungs, natural breathing ceases.

Although Table 5-1 describes the effects for a current pathway of hand-to-hand, the magnitudes are similar for
other pathways that include the chest area. As most electric shock incidents involve the subject touching or
holding onto a metallic object, the chest area will almost always be involved in all electric shock incidents.
Therefore, the threshold for fibrillation determines the safety criteria for electric shocks of short duration.
The current magnitude and pathway through the body are the main factors that determine which physiological
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effect will result from an electric shock. Significant investigation of the electrical characteristics of the human
populace, primarily by Prof. Gottfried Biegelmeier [17], led to the publication of AS/IEC60479 including
population fibrillation and body impedance data.

In deriving safety criteria, Ohm’s Law can be used to indicate a corresponding voltage level for each
physiological effect. However, the impedance of the human body, particularly the skin, is complex in nature.
The value for the internal impedance of the human body (without the skin) is in the order of 500Ω for the
current pathway of hand-to-foot. The human skin is a good insulator (up to 6kΩ) when it is dry and intact but is
easily compromised by the presence of sweat and surface cuts or abrasions. Furthermore, the human skin
displays non-linear and time-varying properties, and is dependent on voltage, frequency, and environmental
factors. In the power industry, safe work practices may include the use of gloves and good footwear which
provides an additional series resistance to further limit the current through the body during an electric shock.
Appendix B provides an overview of each of the factors which contribute to the susceptibility of a person to the
flow of current through the body.
There are many probabilistic influences involved in assessing indirect shock related safety apart from the
physiological variability in the human population. Other factors include the fault current magnitude and
duration, the probability of the fault occurrence, and the presence probability of a human being. This has led
some countries to introduce a new approach to earthing system design based on the explicit application of
probabilistic methods. The following points identify cases where indirect shock risk has been quantified, either

50
 for use in developing tolerable safety standards (i.e. touch voltage vs protection clearing time withstand
curves), or to assess the risk associated with a specific or class of hazard scenario (i.e. voltage source and
contact exposure mechanism):

• Australia 1960’s

Risk to telecommunications workers was quantified using probabilistic studies in the 1960’s, to determine the
maximum impressed voltages to allow on telecommunications circuits. In a seminal Australian work O’Keefe et
al [18] followed on from probabilistic studies in the 1960’s by Todd [19], and took existing physiological
research data and added their own work based on tests upon dogs to conclude the following regarding risk of
exposure related to telephone lines:
‘..1000V (<0.5secs) and 1500V (<0.35secs) could be accepted as substantially safe values in comparison with
430V which is only acceptable on probability grounds.’

These ‘conservative values’ (their words) were incorporated into the 1971 draft code of practise for
telecommunications power coordination, and the higher targets have been in use in Australia from that point
onwards. The resultant tolerable safety standards (i.e. 430V, 1000V and 1500V) were less stringent than the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) standards of the time (i.e. 430V and 650V) [20].

• Finland in 1970’s
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Finland adopted a set of earthing voltage requirements as part of the Electrical Safety Code [20], based upon a
probabilistic analysis of the contributing factors. Although the Finnish study was designed specifically for their
system configuration and physical constraints (i.e. soil resistivity between 1000 and 10000 Ωm, and being
snowbound during winter months), the following extract is generally applicable.

‘When applying probabilistic calculations to the safety studies of the electric power system or its part, one has
to accept the fact that no absolute safety exists in reality. For example, the problem of the earthing voltage has
to be solved by accepting a certain accident probability that on different earths can be very low. The result
based on probability calculation can, of course, then be expressed deterministically as a categorical
requirement. This is often the most suitable way in practice, however, the determination of the requirement as
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well as the interpretation of its context presumes a probabilistic way of thinking and evaluation’ [21].

• IEC479 (1974)
This document published physiological details of human fibrillation current withstand expressed in probabilistic
terms. The introduction to the document included specific direction to include consideration of actual risks
before using the current withstand data to develop voltage withstand criteria in practise.
‘There are, however, other aspects to be taken into account, such as probability of faults, probability of contact
with live or faulty parts, experience gained, technical feasibilities and economics. These parameters have to be
considered carefully when fixing safety requirements, .... for electrical installations.’

• Australia in 1980’s
In the 1980’s the power industry undertook probabilistic studies to determine tolerable design criteria for
distribution and transmission structures [23]24][25]. This work generated tolerable prospective touch voltages
of up to 8kV (for clearing times less than 0.2 secs) associated with transmission structures based upon an
annual fibrillation fatality risk increase limit of 1: 1,000,000 (10-6).

51
 • Germany VDE 0141
The 1976 edition of DIN VDE 0141 [26] allowed for networks 110kV or higher to consider a design current of
70% of the maximum fault current. This allowance was based upon the low likelihood of the coincidence of
maximum fault current and a person being in the worst-case contact location.

• IEEE papers in 1980’s

Following the Finnish approach the risk associated with the flow of earth fault currents was calculated for
specific assets assessed (e.g. metro system) in a number of North American IEEE papers [27-31]. Also, a
number of the papers at an international symposium in Toronto Canada on the electrical shock safety in 1985
[32] concluded that a need existed for the development of probabilistically based safety criteria.

• IEEE80

IEEE80 clearly acknowledges that a hazardous electric shock incident will only occur given the coincidence of a
number of variable conditions, and then makes the general observation that the ‘relative infrequency of
hazardous incidents is due to the low probability of the coincidence of those necessary conditions’. The design
safety criteria recommended in IEEE80 is based upon the work of Dalziel [33], who based his work upon the
same physiological data as the IEC working group led by Biegelmeier and generated a current versus time
characteristic that was claimed to provide safety against ventricular fibrillation for 99.5% of all persons.

• IEC 61936 (2002)

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The international HV installation standard IEC61936 uses selected physiological data from IEC60479 for body
impedance (50%), body current withstand (5%), and heart current factor (LH to feet) to generate a permissible
prospective touch voltage curve. As was the case for IEEE80, IEC61936 does not overtly incorporate a
probabilistic process, however, it does include the following statement: ‘It must also be recognized that fault
occurrence, fault current magnitude, fault duration and presence of human beings are probabilistic in nature’.

• UK in 2000’s

The UK has adopted an alternative design process in a national annex to the Cenelec earthing standard BS
EN50522. The design flowchart has been augmented to allow designers to undertake a quantified risk analysis
if normal touch voltage criteria are found to be inadequate (i.e. too stringent, or unable to take special
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conditions such as sporting events into consideration). Examples are included based upon the work undertaken
at the Cardiff University [34] [35] that incorporates IEC60479 physiological data with system performance
information and uses Monte Carlo analysis to determine risk profiles associated with transmission system
assets.

• New Zealand 2000’s

The power utility industry within New Zealand produced an earthing guide covering ‘Risk Based Earthing
System Design’ in 2003 [36] and released the ‘Guide to Power System Earthing Practice’ [37] in 2009 containing
application of QRA to a range of case studies.

• Australia/New Zealand in 2000’s

Under the auspices of the Energy Networks Association a team developed a risk quantification process, based
upon the work undertaken in the 1990’s, and embedded the process within an industry guideline, ENA EG-0
released in 2010. In addition, a free software tool Argon [38] was developed to provide users with the ability to
assess risk of fatality for a given hazard scenario. An alternate tool based on the same methods and source
data has been made available at the request of the Cigre Study Committee B3 Chairman. This web-based tool is
called Argonium and can be found at [39]. The ENA working group undertook risk workshops and developed
sample criteria based upon a conservative assessment of commonly expected conditions. The initial work
focussed upon power utility substations, as well as distribution and transmission assets. Subsequently several
Australian and New Zealand standards working groups have used the techniques described in ENA EG-0 to

52
 redevelop a number of safety standards covering distribution and transmission assets AS/NZS 7000, metallic
pipelines AS/NZS 4853, and finally AS2067 (2016) (companion to IEC 61936). The latter standard covers all HV
plant and includes typical criteria covering a wide range of applications including mining and industrial hazard
scenarios.

• CIGRE/CIRED 2018
A joint CIGRE/CIRED international working group B3:35 examined and published a brochure TB749 [40] on the
use of quantified risk analysis to assess risk profiles and thereby optimise substation earthing design.

5.3 Value of quantifying the risk of indirect shock

For a fatality to occur associated with indirect contact under earth fault conditions, the following conditions
are required to be met concurrently, as detailed in IEEE80 (Section 4.2 Conditions for Danger):

The circumstances that make electric shock accidents possible are as follows:

• Relatively high fault current to ground in relation to the area of ground system and its resistance to remote
earth.

• Soil resistivity and distribution of ground currents such that high potential gradients may occur at points at
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the earth’s surface

• Presence of an individual at such a point, time, and position that the body is bridging two points of high
potential difference.

• Absence of sufficient contact resistance or other series resistance to limit current through the body to safe
value if the first three requirements are being met.

• Duration of the fault and body contact, and hence, of the flow of current through a human body for a
sufficient time to cause harm at the given current intensity.

The relative low frequency of accidents is due largely to the low probability of coincidence of all the
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unfavourable conditions listed above. Nevertheless, fatalities due to voltage gradients associated with earthing
systems have occurred. The fact that basic physiological data alone are insufficient in establishing electrical
safety requirements is highlighted in the introduction to the IEC 60479 Standard: ‘The basic criteria are
intended to form part of a synthesis of a number of contributing factors’.
In response to these drivers earthing safety standards have acknowledged the probabilistic nature of the risk of
electrocution and are making the risk-based nature of the decisions overt rather than hidden and have
incorporated the ability to undertake a quantified risk analysis within the earthing design process.

Traditional approaches to managing earthing related risk relied on a combination of recognised controls or
prescribed measures and the reduction of touch and step voltages to below particular levels considered or
deemed safe. However, it is now clearly understood that these traditional criteria do not ensure survival,
should someone be in the touch voltage situation coincident with the earth fault occurring and creating the
touch voltage. The ability to quantify the probability of fibrillation, should a person be exposed to a hazard
voltage, provides designers with the ability to see more directly the impact of hazard reduction on reducing
fibrillation risk.
For instance, if a person in bare feet was exposed to a touch voltage equal to the standard tolerable touch
voltage characteristics tabled in EN50522 and IEEE80, the likelihood of fibrillation occurring when assessed
against the best available physiological withstand criteria (IEC60479) is shown in Table 5-2 [47].

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 Table 5-2: Comparative fibrillation likelihood

Probability of fibrillation (if Pcoincidence = 1)

Earth fault
duration (s) IEC60479/EN50522 IEEE80 ENA EG-0 TDMEN
Ib(5%), Rb(50%) (50kg, 50 Ωm soil) (No footwear, 50 Ωm soil)
0.2 4.3 x 10-3 6.4 x 10-3 2.9 x 10-1

0.5 3.3 x 10-1 3.5 x 10-2 2.1 x 10-1

1.0 1.6 x 10-1 2.7 x 10-1 1.8 x 10-1

Clearly the likelihood of fibrillation in all cases is much larger than typical tolerable individual inadvertent risk
targets (such as 10-6). Therefore, traditional safety criteria can only be considered tolerably safe provided there
is a low likelihood of an earth fault occurring at the same time as a person being in an exposed position
(IEEE80, IEC61936, EN050522). The ENA EG-0 TDMEN voltage/time characteristic, assuming no footwear
impedance, has been included for comparison purposes. The TDMEN characteristic results in a probability of
fatality of 10-6 based upon contact and fault frequency and footwear conditions described in Appendix E-1.

The ability to quantify the risk associated with a hazard provides a designer and asset owner with the ability to
better understand the magnitude (and thereby criticality) of the contribution to the risk profile of each of the
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contributing factors. Furthermore, as each of these parameters may be characterised in probabilistic terms the
final design can also be understood in terms of confidence limits, not simply meeting a single pass/fail point.

5.4 Risk Management Principles

All life activities involve some form of risk. The tolerability of injury or death to a member of the public is
therefore dependent upon several factors including the types of hazards, the control measures implemented,
frequency of occurrence, the likelihood of actions of the individual(s) exposed and the associated
consequences.
The risk associated with a hazard is determined using a risk assessment process in which hazards are identified,
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analysed using quantitative methods and qualitatively assessed against specific criteria. Once the risks are
evaluated the appropriate risk treatment process shall be implemented where appropriate to manage the risks
effectively and efficiently.

5.4.1 Risk management process overview

The risk management process presented in this guide is based on the framework of ISO 31000. Every major
hazard created by an asset or activity must be identified, assessed, and controlled according to the risk
management process shown in Figure 5-1.

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Figure 5-1: The risk management process (based on AS/ISO 31000)

A risk management process is a logical and systematic method to ensure that the risks are effectively and
efficiently managed.
Risk assessments must be conducted by those who create and control the extent of the risk – the asset owners
or those acting on their behalf.

5.4.2 Types of Risk

The tolerance of society to the risk of a human fatality depends on the type of risk.

5.4.2.1 Voluntary and Involuntary Risk

Certain activities in life are considered hazardous, however, despite a high probability of injury or fatality,
society continues to tolerate the consequences of such risks because the exposed individuals usually consider
that the benefits gained outweigh the risks. These are called voluntary risks and include activities such as
smoking, cave diving and riding a motorcycle.

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 Activities that do not allow an individual choice in participation are tolerated to a much lesser extent and must
be analysed and controlled to a higher level. Such risks are called ‘involuntary’ and include terrorist attack, gas
explosion or exposure to carcinogens in consumable products. As there is no choice available to the individual
concerned, there is often no escape or warning associated with involuntary risks. Risks associated with earthing
system electrical hazards are usually categorised as involuntary and the primary responsibility for risk
management lies with the owners of the hazard source.

5.4.2.2 Risks and Non-Random Hazards

The acceptability of injury or fatality to individuals varies significantly according to whether the risk event was
caused by a human error or occurred as an unforeseen event. Injuries or fatalities caused by gross negligence
are not covered within the scope of this guide and are therefore not included in the risk management process.
Asset owners have a responsibility to provide a duty of care for members of the public and employees however
individuals must also act responsibly so as to provide a basic level of personal safety. A central tenet of risk
management is that equity and fairness must be maintained wherever possible. Therefore, it follows that no
person should be exposed to a level of risk above that accepted by society as tolerable. Thus, tolerable safety
levels should be maintained independent of location and power system asset class (i.e. distribution or
transmission). The need to achieve this aim more objectively and intentionally is one of the key drivers behind
the criteria derivation process.

5.4.2.3 Individual and Societal Risk

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The occurrence of a hazard (risk event) which results in simultaneous exposure for multiple people is
considered less tolerable. The difference between individual risk and societal risk is explained in the following
definitions:

• Individual Risk: The annual risk of fatality for an exposed individual.

• Societal Risk: The risk associated with multiple, simultaneous fatalities within an exposed population.
Societal risk may be a determining factor in the acceptability of the risk associated with a hazard for areas
where many individual people may be in a position to be in contact with a hazard voltage (e.g. school) or
where a group of people congregate (e.g. bus stop) and are likely to be simultaneously in an exposed
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position.
Risk limit targets for both individual and societal exposure cases are discussed in Section 5.4.5.

5.4.2.4 Risk of Injury, Equipment Damage or Livestock Fatality

A common practice is to determine the appropriate levels of risk according to the possible harm to humans.
This does not imply that responsibility is absolved for damage to equipment or fatality of livestock. The cost of
replacing equipment or livestock may be accounted for when undertaking a cost benefit analysis to determine
the justifiable cost of risk treatment.

5.4.3 Risk Assessment

Risk assessment, as highlighted in ISO 31000, is the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk
evaluation. Risk analysis is a systematic process to understand the nature of and to deduce the level of risk.
Risk analysis also provides the basis for risk evaluation and decisions about risk treatment.

Risk may be analysed using quantitative, qualitative or a combination of the two methodologies. In this guide
probabilistic risk analysis is used to determine the probability of causing fatality to one or multiple individuals.
The probabilistic model which is a commonly adopted method of risk assessment is:
Risk = f (hazard, coincidence)

56
 Where coincidence represents the frequency of public exposure to a risk event and hazard represents the
consequences of failure. Risk in this context is a function of hazard and exposure. Risk analysis may be carried
out for individual assets or for groups of assets with similar characteristics.

5.4.4 Risk Limit Targets

Any injury to or fatality of a worker or member of the public is not acceptable. However, the inherent danger
of electricity and disproportionate cost of protecting every individual from every conceivable hazard requires
that some level of risk be tolerated. Risk targets set for environmental health and safety cases, while having an
appearance of uniformity, are in fact greatly variable. The main variation concerns how uncertainty and
variability in contributing parameters is managed. As for most decisions of this nature the outcome is
contingent upon a wide range of issues, including size of exposed populations, duty of care and legal
precedence, physical implementation limitations, economic criteria, equity and fairness, stakeholder values
and perceptions, physiological criteria, comparable risks existing.

It is important that designers and engineers analysing a particular risk scenario are consistent in assigning
values to parameters and interpreting the results of the risk quantification. To meet that goal this guide aims to
articulate assumptions and tools, and to provide software based analysis tools. In setting risk criteria, the
underlying principle is that people should not involuntarily be subject to a risk which is significant in relation to
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the background risk associated with what could be realistically expected to be normal movements.
Individual and societal risk should be considered separately, and the more stringent outcome used as the risk
scenario to be managed. While an individual’s concern about their life or safety is largely independent of
whether the risk is from an isolated incident or a major disaster, society’s risk perception is strongly influenced
by events with potential for multiple injuries or fatalities [9].

5.4.4.1 Tolerable Individual Fatality Risk Limits

Given the inherent uncertainty in most of the parameters impacting upon the probability of fatality, it is
generally accepted that a single target criterion is not appropriate. There needs to be some generally agreed
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point at which the controlled risk is so high that the activity should not be allowed, and similarly so low that it
doesn’t warrant further consideration; that is, it is reasonably to accept the remaining risk.
The use of probabilistic ‘bright lines’, defining boundaries between unacceptable and negligible risk limits, is
not a perfect approach by any means. A strict use of the bright line approach to decision making has the
following shortcomings:

• Cannot explicitly reflect uncertainties about population variation in susceptibility, community values, or
economic considerations.

• As magic numbers are inconsistent with the variability and uncertainty inherent in estimates of risk.

• May be misunderstood to imply that an exact boundary exists between safe and unsafe.
Such weaknesses or criticisms are acknowledged, but rather than discounting the bright line approach, the
criticisms should be used to strengthen the approach through provision for incorporating checks and other
considerations in the process. Although susceptible to misuse and misunderstanding, the concept of
probabilistic bright lines is proposed to be more responsible than traditional fixed so-called safety criteria, as it
attempts to enumerate the real issue of the level of risk, which is at the heart of the safety policy setting
problem.

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 Risk ‘bright lines’ are boundaries for what is broadly considered a tolerable level of risk to which either
individuals or groups of people will be exposed. They are generally defined in terms of the annual increase in
fatality likelihood for the maximally exposed reasonably behaved person. The thresholds are widely supported
by policy setting bodies across the world.
The point of negligible or ‘de minimis’ risk at which no further risk reduction is warranted has been defined as
the point where either [41]:

• The cost of further risk reduction becomes imbalanced compared to the small additional increment of
benefit, or

• The risk to the most exposed individuals and the entire population is so small that it becomes
inconsequential and is of no concern to the majority of people when compared to other risks.
In most countries the negligible risk level is set to be one order of magnitude higher than the background noise
risk that is always present and associated with rare events such as direct lightning strikes [42].
The risk increase to which an individual may be inadvertently exposed may be calculated on an annual basis
and assessed against the target fatality probability limits (bright lines) in common use shown in Figure 5-2 and
Table 5-3 following (e.g. NSW Risk Guidelines [43][44][45] or WA EPA Guidelines [46], UK Health and Safety
Executive (2001) [11]).
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Figure 5-2: Target individual fatality probability limits [42] (Based upon UK HSE R2A [11])

The assessment is made considering the risk to a person who represents the maximum exposure that could be
expected of a person acting reasonably. For a distribution of population behaviours from least to most risk
attracting, maximum reasonable exposure is an estimate of the behaviour of 90 to 95% of the exposed
population. Activities which place a person in an exposed location for an unnaturally long time, or which create
a situation where the fault and contact are not independent events (e.g. a vandal causing the fault, or a utility
operator inadvertently energising an earthed line) are not covered within the maximum reasonable exposure
conditions.

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 Table 5-3: Target individual fatality probability limits

Probability of Risk Classification

Resulting Implication for Risk Treatment
Single Fatality for Public Death
High or
≥ 10-4 Must prevent occurrence regardless of costs.
Intolerable risk
Intermediate or Must minimise occurrence unless risk reduction is impractical,
10-4-10-6
ALARP region and costs are grossly disproportionate to safety gained.

Negligible or Risk generally tolerable, however, risk treatment may be

≤10-6
Tolerable risk applied if the cost is low and/or is a normally expected practice.

5.4.4.2 Tolerable Societal Fatality Risk Limits

The tolerable societal risk limits imposed on different hazardous industries are usually based on the occurrence
of accidents which could result in multiple fatalities. The tolerable limits for societal risk in this guide are
defined according to the number of people ‘N’ simultaneously exposed to hazard.
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Societal risk relates to any person(s) being affected, based on a typical or average expected exposure. The most
common measure of societal risk is the Frequency-Number (F-N) curve representing the total frequency (per
year) of events resulting in N or more fatalities. The F-N curve is usually constructed in a 2-step process:

(i) Calculate the number of fatalities resulting from each incident case.
(ii) Construct the F-N curve showing the results in cumulative frequency form,

where,

FN = Sum (Fi) for all incident outcome cases i for which Ni>=N.
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FN = Frequency of all incident outcome cases affecting N or more people/year

Fi = Frequency of incident outcome case i

The tolerable societal limits vary between countries depending upon the nature of the hazards and exposed
population. A conservative set of limits which have an N-1.5 dependence on the number of fatalities has been
adopted in this guide in line with common Australian and international usage when assessing potentially
harmful effect of hazardous industries [43][44][45]. The societal F-N risk limits are presented in Figure 5-2
following. These risk limits are independent of population size.
For the case of electric shock during earth fault conditions the F-N curve may be built based upon the
likelihood of one or more people being in an exposed position (refer to Appendix C-1).
Three cases of societal exposure have been identified as warranting separate analysis:

• Uniform Exposure (Time Independent): An individual’s movements are largely independent of one another
(e.g. people in separate households), but may share exposure to a common hazard with other people in
the vicinity (e.g. LV neutral rise).

• Gathered Exposure (Time Dependent): Individual movements are governed by an external organising
event or location, which may result in one or more people being exposed to a higher degree than for the
totally random cases. Gathered exposures could include events or situations such as large sporting
complexes, municipal swimming pools or cattle sale yards. People’s exposure may be characterised as

59
 being of higher contact frequency, but over a limited time span. Therefore, the coincidence must be
calculated based upon non-uniform arrival rates, as outlined in Appendix C.4. For the purposes of this
guide, it is understood that while people are ‘gathered’ in a location for a fixed duration they still exhibit
essentially random movements whilst in that location (uniform behaviour). In this case the fault frequency
is considered constant.

• Generalised (Time Dependent): In this scenario the rate at which people make contact and fault events
occur are both non-uniformly distributed. The approach outlined in Appendix C.4 allows for seasonal fault
conditions as well as time of day/week exposure profile.

The points on the F-N curve relate to the Frequency of events occurring with ‘N or more’ fatalities. Therefore, it
is understandable that the greater the number of people possibly exposed the higher the values. The value of
‘F’ on the ‘Y’ axis is therefore the highest value as it relates to ‘1 or more’ fatalities.
The boundary conditions on the ALARP region have been aligned with those in common use within Australia
relating to hazardous industries [43]. The position on the Y axis crossing and slope of the lines defining the
upper and lower limits have been developed based upon the relative utility of the product (i.e. value of
electricity to society), and experience in assessing risk profiles. Nevertheless, the graph is interpreted in a
similar manner to the individual risk assessment (see Table 5-3), where if part of the curve lies within each of
the regions the following steps should be taken:

• Intolerable region – The risk is considered intolerable, and the risk profile must be reduced.
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• ALARP region – Reduce the risk profile whenever possible, and only accept the residual risk based on a risk
cost benefit analysis (RCBA) (See Section 5-5). The use of the ALARP or SFAIRP principle is clearly intended
to form a key part of the Due Diligence process embodied in this guide. The ALARP/SFAIRP principle that
requires a designer and asset owner to reduce the risk profile whenever possible provides a consistent yet
practical means for managing earthing system related risk.

• Low or tolerable region – Risk generally tolerable, however, risk treatment should be considered if the cost
is low and/or a normally expected practice.
Both the individual and societal hazard scenarios should be assessed and the risk profile of both managed
depending upon the region in which the risk is placed (i.e. intolerable, ALARP, or negligible).
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Figure 5-3: Societal F-N Risk Limits

It should be noted that when calculating societal risk, account should be taken of possible future increases in
exposed population, particularly in cases where assets are in areas where there is surrounding residential land
that has not yet been fully developed.

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 5.5 QRA Methodology Overview (Step 10)
The process for quantifying the risk of fatality due to earthing system related indirect shock risk is shown in
Figure 5-4 [47-54].
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Figure 5-4: Safety Criteria Derivation Methodology (Step 10)

Each of the steps is described in more detail in the following sections with supporting information provided in
the appendices.

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 5.5.1 Fibrillation Probability Calculation (Step 10A)
The probability of fibrillation is dependent upon the magnitude of the hazard (i.e. touch, step or transfer
voltage) and the current that is likely to flow through the exposed person.
A series of voltage time curves have been derived that have constant fibrillation probability independent of
fault duration based upon IEC 60479 body withstand current and body resistance probability distributions (see
Section 4.10 and Appendix E). Such constant probability (Pfibrillation) curves are needed to make resolution of
Equation 4-1 possible without additional detailed calculations, as Pcoincidence is also dependent upon fault
duration.

The methodology may be used to derive constant fibrillation curves dependent upon the following parameters:

• Contact configuration – touch, step and hand to hand voltages

• Upper layer soil resistivity
• Surface layer materials – crushed rock, asphalt
• Additional series impedances – footwear, electrical footwear
• Moisture – wet or dry hands

Electric shock QRA software [38][39] may be used to analyse a range of constant probability curves to meet
boundary conditions specified by the user.
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5.5.2 Exposure Probability Calculation (Step 10B)

The second stage in the QRA calculation process is to determine the likelihood of a person being present at the
time of a fault occurrence (i.e. Pcoincidence).

From Equation 4-1, if the maximum tolerable risk of fatality is set to a predetermined value (e.g. 10-6 Pfatality
target), then for a known value of fibrillation probability there is a value of coincidence probability that
determines whether the tolerable risk of fatality has been met. The exposure or fault/contact coincidence
probability, for both individual and societal (multiple) risk exposures, may be calculated using the formulae
given in Appendix C.
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The selection of contact frequency and duration is one for which very little published literature is available.
Nevertheless, contact frequencies are implicit within all previous design methodologies and targets. It is usual
that a conservative value be assumed in the first instance, and only revised downward following review within
the risk cost benefit analysis (RCBA) framework.
Location classifications should simplify the selection process and increase tolerance to local changes in access
profile. It is critical that appropriate attention be given to sensitivity and criticality analysis.
Appendix C provides additional information regarding the calculation of fault/contact coincidence including:

• Derivation of individual and societal risk coincidence probability formulae.

• Fault duration and rate tables and guidance
• Non uniform arrival situations

5.5.2.1 Managing uncertainty in contact frequency

If a touch voltage (say, as a percentage of EPR) is known for a specific exposure site, but the number of
contacts is difficult to estimate, the risk calculation may be done leaving the contact frequency as an unknown.
It is then possible to examine the sensitivity of probability of fatality to the number of contacts. Consequently,
the process can provide a range of contact frequencies according to the range of remedial measures thus
providing a designer with a range of tolerable values of contact frequency to approve rather than create. Care

62
 should be taken to consider the cumulative effect of multiple exposures, as in the case of workers who move
between job sites. A case study is included in Appendix E that considers the exposure risk of a power utility
technician working in a substation.

5.5.2.2 Negligible or Low Coincidence Probability Locations

If the exposure probability is less than the tolerable fatality risk limits in certain circumstances the hazard may
be of a tolerable level independent of the fibrillation probability. This condition is met for some low fault
frequency cases (e.g. some transmission structures without shield wires) or for ‘remote locations’ where
people rarely make contact. In such instances the earthing system specifications are dictated by system
reliability requirements (e.g. insulation coordination and protection operation) or equipment damage
requirements (e.g. telecommunications plant, pipeline insulations, railways signalling equipment). In some
cases, a standard design procedure may still be followed if the cost is low, and the action expected.
If the fault/contact coincidence probability is less than the lower limit for individual and societal risk, then the
risk associated with the hazard scenario is tolerable independent of the fibrillation probability. Nevertheless,
there may be an additional reason for undertaking additional earthing or mitigation measures at the site to
reduce to risk to as low as is reasonably practicable (see Section 5.5.3).

5.5.3 Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis (Step 10 D)

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While earthing system modelling tools have improved in accuracy in recent years, responsible design requires
more than accurate modelling tools. A designer needs to understand which parameters have the most
significant impact on key performance requirements and incorporate uncertainty in input parameters in the
analysis. Unfortunately, the significance of individual parameters is not always easily understood. Earthing
system design not only comprises many input parameters (see Section 3.3), but many of the parameters have a
large natural variability.

A sensitivity analysis is undertaken to identify those input parameters that have greatest impact upon the
outcomes. Using traditional earthing design methods safety is gauged by compliance with a fixed touch
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voltage/time characteristic. Therefore, as touch voltage is directly dependent upon the driving EPR, safety is
also directly dependent upon EPR. This relationship is better understood once the probability of fibrillation is
calculated based upon a full probabilistic model of each of the key parameters (see Section 5.5.1). As an
example, in one case an error in EPR value of 7% corresponded to a 15% error in fibrillation probability on
account of the actual relationship between applied voltage and the body resistance [59]. The use of
probabilistic modelling to determine constant probability voltage/time curves overcomes this limitation (see
Sections 4.13, 5.5.1 and Appendix E). The risk of fatality is highly sensitive to variations in earth fault duration
as the duration impacts both the coincidence probability and likelihood of fibrillation.
Once a sensitivity analysis has identified the most significant variables, the next stage is to ascertain the
required level of accuracy for those parameters.
In the earthing system modelling process, parameters are more-or-less uncertain. Either or both the existing
and future values may be uncertain (e.g. source impedance), or alternatively the parameter may be inherently
uncertain or variable (e.g. fault location). For instance, fault/presence coincidence probability is relatively
insensitive to variations in fault duration in the likely operating region (i.e. 0.1-1 seconds). Unfortunately, the
fibrillation probability is sensitive to fault duration. Therefore, in this instance a single parameter has varying
impact in different parts of the risk modelling process. Sensitivity may be variable across the input parameter
range, and according to the values of other parameters, as in the case of fibrillation sensitivity to series
impedances offered by material such as footwear. It has been shown that while footwear series impedance is

63
 highly uncertain (across the population range) it is also clearly voltage dependent [58][59]. However,
depending upon the fault/presence coincidence frequency and the applied voltage characteristics the footwear
impedance assumes variable significance. In the case of a transmission tower where the applied voltage is very
high, the footwear voltage withstand is likely to be exceeded, rendering the additional series impedance
ineffective, and hence of little value. In contrast, the lower applied voltages found at larger substations allow
the footwear series impedance values to be effective.

5.5.4 Risk cost benefit analysis to support ALARP/SFAIRP decision (Step 10 D)

If compliance is not achieved following Step 10C then a review of available mitigation and improvement
strategies is required. Mitigation options fall into two categories, either:

• Reduce the hazard (the presented voltage or clearing time) or

• Reduce the probability of coincidence.
Section 4.15 summarizes a range of design improvements that may be considered while Appendix A discusses
mitigation options in more detail.

The following questions provide a means for examining the issues from a range of alternative perspectives:

• Is the level of risk above a tolerable value?

• Has the variable nature of the input parameters been assessed?
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• Does a risk cost-benefit analysis (RCBA) yield a positive result considering 'all-of-life' costs? A positive result
is achieved if many people are affected or it is a high exposure location, and the hazard may be mitigated
with reasonable cost. The use of risk cost benefit analysis may provide a mechanism for gauging the relative
value of the risk reduction options, however, it should not be used as the only arbiter in decision making
[62][63].
• Does the remedial action lower the fear level of the public or raise their confidence in the utility (e.g. use of
brick boundary fences)?
• Is there another reason to justify the expense? Examples might include:
• Need to maintain corporate image,
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• More than one person may die at a time,

• Contravention of a legally binding statute,

• Operational imperatives at risk (e.g. continuity of supply)

Where risk has been determined to be in the ALARP region additional risk mitigation measures may be applied
irrespective of the cost, or a risk cost benefit analysis (RCBA) may be undertaken to establish the relative cost
of risk treatment, or the value of the risk reduction options. In the ‘Low risk’ case a RCBA will also help
establish whether any possible risk treatment option is justifiable, whilst in some ‘high risk’ cases, ‘gross
disproportionality’ in the cost of treatment compared to the level of risk reduction may in exceptional cases
need to be investigated. Thus, the RCBA process enables the expenditure of resources to be prioritised to
lower the overall risk presented to the public and subsequently the risk to the utility or asset owner.

Figure 5.5 following summarizes the ALARP/SFAIRP design process, while the following points discuss the key
parameters used within the RCBA process, and Appendix F provides several case studies to illustrate the
process.

64
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Figure 5-5: ALARP/SFAIRP Design Process

Proportionality factor: For business risk decisions a benefit/cost ratio (or proportionality factor) of two or
more is considered reasonable. In the earthing risk context, the benefit is in avoiding an electrocution (e.g.
value of life) while the cost is the cost of a successful mitigation strategy. In particular, the benefit/risk ratio is
the ratio of the benefit (value of life) NPV/cost of mitigation NPV. A proportionality factor of up to 10 has been
used for earthing mitigation RCBA on account of the safety critical nature of the decision [64].

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 Value of Saved Life (VoSL): In the case of human safety, to carry out such an analysis, it is necessary to use a
‘value of life’ figure, normally referred to as the Value of Statistical Life (VSL), as the basis for the analysis.
Various studies of VSL carried out around the world [65-74] show that values varying between approximately
$2 million and $20 million. In 2003 Abelson [65] stated that given research findings as a whole and values
employed in Europe, $3 million to $4 million would appear to be a plausible VSL for a healthy prime age
individual in Australia. Miller [67] proposed an alternative Australian perspective, depending upon nature of
the hazard scenario. One key issue is the lack of studies investigating VSL across varied risk contexts with most
studies investigating the road safety context, which is an activity in which people voluntarily or consciously
chose to engage [69]. The value of saved life (VoSL) is defined as a risk cost benefit calculation based around
the cost of a fatality in terms of VSL and fatality related organisational costs including investigations,
subsequent actions, and reputation impacts.
The selection of a VoSL value for carrying out RCBAs when evaluating earthing system related indirect shock
risks needs to account for the following:

• The public’s expectation that power systems are ‘safe’ provided they are not tampered with.
• The possibility that those at risk may be ‘vulnerable’ (i.e. young, old, infirm).
• The ‘involuntary’ nature of the risk to the public.
• The knowledge of the public and their ability to control/reduce the risk
• The utility’s image and reputation.
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Consideration is given to increasing the base case VSL value used in public policy decision-making in Australia
from A$4.6 million to A$7.46 million (2021A$) by Ananthapavan [69]. An increase is supported by evidence
that after controlling for increased income, VSL increases over time [71][105]. This range of VSL is lower than
that recommended by Viscusi in 2018 [72], who estimated the appropriate VSL for Australia based on USA VSL
estimates as approximately A$12.7 million in 2021 values.

For the examples within this guide (see Appendix F), a VoSL value of $10 million has been used. It would be
considered prudent for an individual utility to develop their own value of saved life (e.g. based on relative risk
profile and professional advice) and discount cash rate.

Cost of capital – Discount rate (D): The choice of discount rate has a significant effect on the PV calculated and
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should be chosen carefully Farber [74]. The discount rate varies over time and depends on the individual
utility’s cost of capital. Therefore, it is prudent to assess the sensitivity of the NPV calculation to variations in
the discount rate.
Figure 5-6 provides an outline of the steps that may be used in undertaking a risk cost benefit analysis.

66
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Figure 5-6: Risk cost benefit analysis process

Consideration should also be given to what is the most appropriate way to apply the VSL to the RCBA. The
examples shown in Appendix F highlight two approaches: the first analysis is based on the cost of a fatality,
while the second considers the per person cost of lowering the risk of fatality.
Even for ‘low risk’ situations where RCBA indicates risk treatment is not required, a continuous monitoring and
review process is still to be carried out to ensure that the overall risk level remains within the ‘low risk’ region.
In the case of high-cost projects, it may be argued that a relatively low-cost risk treatment is always to be
incorporated (based upon the precautionary approach).

5.6 Probabilistic derivation of standard V/t curves - (Step 6)

The allocation of tolerable prospective touch voltages to specific hazard scenarios has been a common practise
for many decades. Various design standards have included a range of tolerable voltages derived by different
means. The result has been that a designer has been faced with the difficult task of making sense of often
conflicting, sometimes ambiguous safety target requirements from the competing standards. Although not
overtly probabilistic in nature the various voltage/time characteristics do embody a range of probabilistic
factors including: percentiles of population current withstand and body resistance, footwear resistance and

67
 voltage withstand, and likelihood of presence at the time of a fault. This guide provides a quantified risk-based
technique whereby voltage/time (V/t) criteria may be derived to reflect the various configurations found in
practice.
The quantified risk analysis methodology utilises as its basis the fact that a fatality due to an earth fault can
only occur if both of the following situations exist: a person is present when a fault occurs, and the touch (or
step) voltage generated is sufficient to allow a large enough current to pass through the body for sufficient
time to cause fibrillation of the heart muscle.
The probability that a person will be present and in contact with an item while the item is affected by a fault is
defined as the Probability of Coincidence Pcoinc. The probability that the heart will enter ventricular fibrillation
due to contact with an external voltage is the Probability of Fibrillation Pfib. A key purpose of earthing system
design is to maintain the likelihood of a fatality occurring Pfatality, which can be described by the following
simple equation, to within societally tolerable limits.

Pfatality = Pcoinc × Pfib 5-1

The societally tolerable limits supported by this guide are based upon meeting both individual risk limits, and
societal (or multiple) risk limits as covered in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.6. The process of assessing a given design
for both risk categories (i.e. individual risk and societal risk), is covered in this design step.
The calculation of the probability of coincidence may be simplified significantly if the following conditions are
met:
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• The occurrence of an earth fault is random

• The occurrence of an earth fault is independent of the presence of a person
• The occurrence of an earth fault is independent of the occurrence of past earth faults
• Earth faults occur one at a time and have an approximately equal probability of occurring at any given
time.

The development of a probabilistic risk approach based on these assumptions restricts the application of the
calculation to persons who will not contribute to or cause risk events to occur, and situations for which a fault
which causes the risk event will not cause the generation of additional faults. For scenarios where occurrence
of an earth fault is not independent of the presence of an individual (e.g. operational switching) it may be
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prudent to consider special precautions. The calculation of the probability of fatality is limited by the accuracy
of the available data and the conditions under which the hazard may occur.

5.6.1 Calculate Fatality Probability and Assess Risk Profile (Step 6C)
Using Equation 5-1 the expected probability of fatality associated with the specified fault/contact and applied
voltage scenario may be calculated. Both individual and societal risk scenarios (defined in Section 5.4.2.3)
should be assessed against targets outlined in Section 4.4.6. Should the outcome lie in the intolerable region
the risk must be mitigated (see Section 5.8) and re-assessed. If it is assessed to lie in the ALARP region then the
process as outlined in Section 5.7.5 and Appendix E should be followed.

5.6.1.1 Individual Fatality Risk Assessment

For assessing individual risk scenarios software may be used as an alternative to the manual calculation
method to determine design compliance.

The output from the process is a design curve that corresponds to the specific probability of fatality relevant to
this design case. If the design is considered compliant (i.e. either has a negligible probability of fatality (e.g.
<10-6), or is in the ALARP region and deemed to be tolerable), then the design curve is valid for designs which
have the same fault/presence profile.

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 A similar process shall be applied for any contact configuration (i.e. touch, transfer, step or hand to hand) and
the lower (i.e. more stringent) voltage curve used for the design of the earthing system.

5.6.1.2 Societal (Multiple) Fatality Risk Assessment

To determine the risk profile of a situation involving a societal presence profile, it is necessary to calculate the
societal probability of coincidence associated with multiple fatalities (see Appendix C) associated with average
exposure characteristics. This is combined with the probability of fibrillation for the design scenario to
determine the societal probability of fatality and the results can be laid over the target F-N curve.
As a demonstration, for a particular situation involving an exposed population of 100 people (i.e. number of
people that could be reasonably expected to come in contact at one time), the following results for societal
coincidence were obtained:
Table 5-4: Societal (multiple fatality) F-N Risk Curve Construction Example

Number of Probability that N will be Probability that >N will be

people (N) coincident with a fault coincident with a fault
1 6.378 x 10-3 2.36 x 10-3
2 9.93 x 10-5 3.67 x 10-5
3 1.04 x 10-6 3.83 x 10-7
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4 8.02 x 10-9 2.97 x 10-9

For a calculated probability of fibrillation of 0.37 (based upon an applied voltage, fault duration, and series
resistance), the following curve is obtained:

Societal Fatality Risk, Population Size = 100 and Worst Case Zone: ALARP Region.
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Figure 5-7: F-N societal risk curve example

Because some of the curve shown in Figure 5-7 example exists in the ALARP region, ALARP principles are to be
used to reduce the risk profile. It is necessary to consider the effectiveness of a range of mitigation options in
the design. Therefore, move on to Step 6D of the procedure (see Section 5.7.5) and consider what options are
appropriate.
The probabilistic safety criteria derivation methodology enables a designer to use touch voltage criteria that
reflect the following requirements:

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 • Series resistances present (e.g. footwear, soil, crushed rock, asphalt)
• Frequency and duration of both earth faults and contact by people
• Tolerable individual risk and societal negligible risk targets/guidelines

A software-based approach [38] has been implemented that provides design workers with the capability to
develop safety criteria to match actual risk profiles. The methodology has been developed to be practical to
implement (i.e. not require inordinate data gathering, or analysis time), transparent (i.e. all embedded
assumptions accessible), consistent in application (e.g. not be susceptible to misinterpretation or misuse), and
be able to clearly document applicable boundary conditions.

5.7 Site specific direct quantified risk analysis

If the exposure case being studied does not correspond to one of the standard voltage/time curves (Step 4 – see
Section 4.10) a site-specific risk analysis and assessment may be made. Section 5.5 as well as Appendices B and
C described in some detail the main steps involved in using quantified risk analysis and assessment process to
examine the risk of fatality associated with indirect shock risk generated by earth fault events. The following
stand-alone six-step process demonstrates how direct QRA may be used to assess site specific shock risk. The
following process focusses on managing the shock risk, yet it is intended that the functional earthing
requirements of Steps 1 and 3 within the design process shown in Figure 4.1 are met in the detailed design of
the earthing system. It is assumed that the base earthing system design upon which the hazard analysis is based
is configured to economically meet the functional requirements as a first pass design. The design is augmented
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to mitigate specific hazards if the RCBA undertaken in Step F demonstrates that the risk reduction is warranted.

• Step A: Power system configuration definition

The information required to define the power system configuration includes earth fault current delivery and
return systems for each voltage level, earthing system configuration, soil resistivity, and protection system
response characteristics (refer to Section 4.5).

• Step B: Human exposure definition

The observation points at which the risk profile will be determined are to be identified. These points are the
locations at which workers or public are in contact with metalwork and able to receive an electric shock during
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earth fault occurrences. Each point is characterised by contact location, contact voltage (%EPR), contact
configuration (e.g. hand to feet), series impedance (e.g. footwear), contact frequency, and duration (refer to
Section 3.2.2).

• Step C: Driving voltage (EPR) definition

The voltage characteristic to which the person(s) will be exposed (magnitude and frequency components) is
based upon the driving EPR generated in response to a range of earth fault events (refer to Section 4.6).

• Step D: Calculate cumulative fatality probability

The risk to which a person is exposed comprises the accumulation of risk associated with each contact scenario
over the course of a year (refer to Section 5.5). The cumulative annual fatality probability for all expected fault
events, for the exposure scenario under consideration.
A method that enables each parameter and step of the process to be easily observed is as follows: for each fault
instance, determine the associated incremental fatality probability for the exposure scenario under
consideration, and then summate each incremental fatality probability to determine the total annual fatality
probability for all expected fault events for the given exposure. Alternatively, the analysis may be undertaken
using probabilistic distributions for each parameter and using Monte Carlo analysis to derive the final
characteristic.

70
 • Step E: Sensitivity and criticality analysis
Assess the sensitivity of output (fatality risk) to changes in the input, and uncertainty in defining critical
parameters (See Appendix D3.6). Once this is done, it is good practice to do a contingency analysis and ask
questions such as ‘what could go wrong?’, and ‘what level of redundancy is used to cover reasonable
operational contingencies?’

• Step F: Risk mitigation assessment and justification

Once the risk profile is defined for each exposure scenario, either as a single number (i.e. maximum) or
probability distribution (say with 90% or 95% confidence limits defined) the decision must be made whether or
not additional mitigation measures should be implemented. As the contribution of each fault event is
calculated it is possible to focus remedial work on the events and assets that contribute most to the
cumulative fatality probability. The use of RCBA as outlined in Section 5.5.3 is helpful in determining if the cost
associated with the risk reduction associated with a given mitigation measure is grossly disproportionate or
not.
While the process requires some additional data to quantify the risk of fatality, the additional information
generated by the risk analysis provides a designer with a greater understanding of the most significant
parameters posing a real threat to life, and the ability to better focus mitigation strategies where they can be
most effective in reducing the shock risk. Several examples of direct QRA are included in the case studies in
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Appendix D.
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71
 6 Standards and Codes of Practice
The following referenced documents are useful and are related to the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
document (including any amendments) applies.

6.1 Australian Standards

AS 2067, Substations and high voltage installations exceeding 1 kV a.c.
AS 5577, Electricity network safety management systems

AS 60038, Standard voltages

AS 1768, Lightning protection

6.2 Australian/New Zealand Standards

AS/NZS 3000, Electrical Installations

AS/NZS 3835 (all parts), Earth potential rise – Protection of telecommunication network users, personnel, and
plant
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AS/NZ 3907, Quality Management – Guidelines for Configuration Management. (Also called ISO10007).
AS/NZS 3931, Risk Analysis of Technological System – Application Guide

AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, Risk management – Principles and guidelines.

AS/NZS 4383 (all parts), Preparation of documents used in electro technology

AS/NZS 4853, Electrical hazards on metallic pipelines

AS/NZS 60479.1, Effects of current on human beings and livestock, Part 1: General aspects.

AS/NZS 7000, Overhead line design

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HB 101-1997 (CJC 5), Coordination of power and telecommunications - Low Frequency Induction (LFI) - Code of
practice for the mitigation of hazardous voltages induced into telecommunications lines; 1997

SAA/SNZ HB 436, Risk management guidelines (companion to AS/NZS 4360)

ENA C(b)1, Guidelines for design and maintenance of overhead distribution and transmission lines
ENA EG1, Substation earthing guide

6.3 IEC Documents

IEC 62305 Lightning protection
IEC 60050, International electrotechnical vocabulary

IEC 60071-1, Insulation co-ordination – Part 1: Definitions, principles, and rules

IEC 60071-2, Insulation co-ordination – Part 2: Application guide
IEC 60479-1, Effects of current on human beings and livestock, Part 1: General aspects
IEC 60479-5, Effects of current on human beings and livestock, Part 5: Touch voltage threshold values for
physiological effects

72
 IEC/TR 61000-5-2, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 5: Installation and mitigation guidelines - Section
2: Earthing and cabling

6.4 Other Documents

EEA New Zealand Electricity Networks ‘Guide to Power System Earthing Practice; Electricity Engineers’
Association of New Zealand.
IEEE Std 80 IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding. The Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers.
IEEE Std 837, IEEE standard for qualifying permanent connections used in substation grounding
National Electricity Rules – AEMC Version

BS 7354, ‘Code of practice for design of high-voltage open-terminal stations’

BS EN50341-1, ‘Overhead lines exceeding AC 45 kV. General requirements. Common specifications’.
CENELEC - EN 50122, ‘Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electrical safety, earthing and the return
circuit’. 2010
ITU-T K.33, ‘Limits for People Safety Related to Coupling into Telecommunications System form A.C. Electric
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Power and A.C. Electrified Railway Installations in Fault Conditions - Series K: Protection Against Interference’.
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

73
 7 Definitions
For the purposes of this guide, the following definitions apply:
1. ALARP – ‘as low as reasonably practicable’

The underlying risk management principle whereby risk is reduced to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ within
a risk cost benefit framework. Sometimes referred to as ALARA (i.e. ‘as low as reasonably achievable’).
2. Asset

A power system asset with an earth. Examples – Timber pole with downlead for earthwire, timber pole with
transformer, steel or concrete pole, transmission tower, major substation.
3. Asset management
Systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which an organization optimally and sustainably
manages its assets and asset systems, their associated performance, risks, and expenditures over their life
cycles for the purpose of achieving its organizational strategic plan

4. Backyard
An area with a contactable metallic structure subject to fault induced voltage gradients. This metallic structure
(e.g. fence) is not a HV asset but becomes live due to earth fault current flow through the soil.
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5. Clearing Time

The time taken for the protective devices to detect and isolate the fault current.

6. Common Multiple Earth Neutral (CMEN)

A CMEN system involves multiple MV/LV transformer reticulation areas having interconnected MV and LV
earthing. This is most common in urban areas where the MV reticulation is made with buried cable, and the
cable sheath and LV MEN conductor are common bonded throughout.

7. Coupling Factor
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Vector that describes the ratio of the current caused to flow in a conductor under the inductive influence of
the current in another conductor. The magnitude of the current returned on a faulted cable's screens and
sheath or on an overhead power line earth wire, expressed as a vector ratio of the fault current. May also be
expressed as '1- shielding factor'.
8. Distribution

HV power system assets such as lines and cables with system voltages of less than 66kV, and distribution
transformers with LV secondaries.
9. Distribution Substation
A small substation from which electricity is supplied via the distribution network to a consumer. The
distribution substation may consist of one or more ring main units (RMUs) or transformers on a pole, on the
ground, underground, or in a building; and includes the enclosure or building surrounding the transformer(s)
and switchgear. Excludes zone substations.
10. Duty holder

The utility that bears responsibility for managing the risk assessments and the safety of both the public and
work personnel.

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 11. Earth Electrode
Uninsulated conductor installed vertically in contact with the earth (or an intermediate material) intended for
the conduction and dissipation of current. One part of the Earthing System.
[IEV 195-02-01, modified]
12. Earth Fault

Fault caused by a conductor or conductors being connected to earth or by the insulation resistance to earth
becoming less than a specified value.
[IEV 151-03-40 (1978), modified]

NOTE: Earth faults of two or several phase conductors of the same system at different locations are designated
as double or multiple earth faults.
13. Earth Fault Current
Current that flows from the main circuit to earth or earthed parts at the fault location (earth fault location) For
single phase and double phase earth faults, this is,

• in systems with isolated neutral, the capacitive earth fault current;

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• in systems with high resistive earthing, the earth fault current;

• in systems with resonant earthing, the earth fault residual current;

• in systems with solid or low impedance neutral earthing, the line-to-earth and two line to earth short-
circuit current.
14. Earth Potential Rise (EPR)
Voltage between an earthing system and Reference Earth.

15. Earth Return Current

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The portion of total earth fault current which returns to source by flowing through the earth grid and into the
surrounding soil.
NOTE: This current determines the EPR of the earthing system.
16. Earth Grid

Interconnected uninsulated conductors installed in contact with the earth (or an intermediate material)
intended for the conduction and dissipation of current and or for the provision of a uniform voltage reference.
One part of the Earthing System.
17. Earth Rod
Earth electrode consisting of a metal rod driven into the ground.

[IEV 604-04-09]
18. Earthing Conductor
Conductor intended to provide a conductive path for the flow of Earth Fault Current for the control of voltage
rise and reliable operation of protection devices. Where a conductor is intended to also carry neutral return
current (under normal load) it is not usually called an earthing conductor.

75
 NOTE: Where the connection between part of the installation and the earthing system is made via a
disconnecting link, disconnecting switch, surge arrester counter, surge arrester control gap, then only that part
of the connection permanently attached to the earthing system is an earthing conductor.
19. Earthing System
Arrangement of Earth Conductors, typically including an Earth Grid, Earth Electrodes and additional Earth
Conductors such as Overhead Earth Wires (OHEWs), Cable Sheaths, Earth Continuity Conductors (ECCs) and
parallel earthing conductors.
[IEV 604-04-02, modified]

20. (Effective) Touch Voltage

Voltage between conductive parts when touched simultaneously
NOTE 1: The value of the effective touch voltage may be appreciably influenced by the impedance of the
person in electric contact with these conductive parts.

[IEV 195-05-11, modified]

NOTE 2: Touch Voltage (Vt) is the voltage across a body, under fault conditions, in a position described as for
the prospective touch voltage but allowing for the voltage drop caused by a current in the body. Thus, the
touch voltage may also be termed a ‘loaded’ voltage which is ‘loaded’ by the human body impedance.
The touch voltage may be reduced by additional impedance in series with the human body. This situation is
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reflected in the safety criteria by varying assumptions concerning the human body resistance and foot contact
resistance. The foot contact is simulated either using a driven rod, or 300cm2 copper disc. The former method
provides a conservative estimate for touch voltages as it negates the current limiting effect of a high
impedance surface layer, if present.

21. (Effective) Step Voltage

Voltage between two points on the earth’s surface that are one metre distant from each other while a person
is making contact with these points.

22. Electrical Equipment

Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

Any item used for such purposes as generation, conduction, conversion, transmission, distribution and
utilization of electrical energy, such as machines, transformers, apparatus, measuring instruments, protective
devices, equipment for wiring systems, appliances.
[IEV 826-07-01]

23. Embedded Earth

The use of steel reinforcing bar in concrete structures to interconnect with, and to augment, the earthing
system. Used to both lower the earth resistance (where the concrete structure/slab/footing is in contact with
the soil) and to create an equipotential plane (around HV equipment in a building or around sensitive
equipment).
24. Equipotential Bond
A bonding conductor applied to maintain continuity of conductive structures with the main earth grid to
prevent voltage hazards. The equipotential bonding conductor may not be designed to carry fault current.

25. Equivalent Probability

A probability value which has been adjusted to account for the simultaneous exposure of multiple individuals.

76
 26. Event
Occurrence of a particular set of circumstances

NOTE: The event can be a single occurrence or a series of occurrences

27. Global earthing system,
Equivalent earthing system (or earthing network) created by the interconnection of local earthing systems that
ensures, by the proximity of the earthing systems, that there are no dangerous touch voltages.
(IEC61936)
NOTE 1: Such systems permit the division of the earth fault current in a way that results in a reduction of the
earth potential rise at the local earthing system. Such a system could be said to form a quasi-equipotential
surface.
NOTE 2: The existence of a global earthing system may be determined by sample measurements or calculation
for typical systems. Typical examples of global earthing systems are in city centres; urban or industrial areas
with distributed low- and high-voltage earthing.
NOTE 3: In a global earthing system the maximum touch voltage is less than the tolerable prospective touch
voltage - Vptt. This outcome will usually be met where the EPR is less than Vptt. A global earthing system will
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best manage risk by limiting the EPR by distributing earth fault current to interconnected systems or dissipating
fault current into a low impedance local earthing system.
NOTE 4: The creation of a ‘quasi equipotential surface’ through gradient control should not be assumed to exist
without validation as testing experience has shown non-compliant exceptions.
28. Hazard

Potential to cause harm.

29. Hazardous material

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Any substance that causes safety, public health or environmental concerns requiring an elevated level of
management effort, due to its chemical, physical or biological nature.
30. Impedance to Earth, Ze
Impedance at a given frequency between a specified point in a system or in an installation or in equipment and
reference earth.

NOTE: The impedance to earth is determined by the directly connected earth electrodes and also by connected
overhead earth wires and wires buried in earth of overhead lines, by connected cables with earth electrode
effect and by other earthing systems that are conductively connected to the relevant earthing system by
conductive cable sheaths, shields, neutral conductors or in another way.
31. Induced Voltage
The voltage on a metallic structure resulting from the electromagnetic or electrostatic effect of a nearby power
line.

32. (Local) Earth

Part of the Earth that is in electric contact with an earth conductor and the electric potential of which is not
necessarily equal to zero.
[IEV 195-01-03, modified]

77
 33. MEN
Multiple earth neutral LV power system. (Equivalent to TN-C-S from IEC 60364)

34. Mesh Voltage

The mesh voltage is the touch voltage within a mesh, and the maximum value is often used as a ‘first pass’
conservative estimate of prospective touch voltage during the design process.

35. Nominal Value

Value of a quantity used to designate and identify a component, device, equipment or system.
[IEV 151-16-09]

36. Nominal Voltage of a System

Suitable approximate value of voltage used to designate or identify a system.
[IEV 601-01-21]
37. Non-Power System Plant

Metallic infrastructure that is nearby Power System Equipment and subject to voltage hazard via some
electrostatic, electromagnetic, or conductive coupling.

38. PEN (Protective Earth Neutral) conductor

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Conductor combining the functions of both protective earth conductor and neutral conductor.
[IEV 826-04-06, modified]
NOTE: In a MEN system, this is the conductor connected to the star point of the transformer which combines
the functions of both protective earth conductor and neutral conductor.
39. Potential

Voltage between an observation point and reference earth.

40. Probability
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A measure of the chance of occurrence expressed as a number between 0 and 1.

41. Prospective Touch Voltage
Voltage between simultaneously accessible conductive parts when those conductive parts are not being
touched.

[IEV 195-05-09, modified]

Note: Prospective touch voltage (Vpt) is defined as an open circuit voltage, measured using a high impedance
voltmeter.

42. Prospective Step Voltage

Voltage between two points on the earth’s surface that are 1 m distant from each other, which is considered to
be the stride length of a person.
[IEV 195-05-12, modified]

43. Reference Earth (Remote Earth)

Part of the Earth considered as conductive, the electric potential of which is conventionally taken as zero, being
outside the zone of influence of the relevant earthing arrangement.

78
 44. Remote
A location where the contact frequency is sufficiently low that the fault/contact coincidence probability is less
than the target fatality probability. Typically, it is a location with few people around such as a rural area. For
this case there is no touch voltage target required, however, other considerations such as insulation
coordination and protection system operation may still place earthing requirements on the asset.

45. Residual Risk

Risk remaining after implementation of risk treatment.
46. Resistance to Earth, Re

Real part of the impedance to earth (ohms).

47. Risk
The chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives. Potential for realisation of
unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health, property or the environment.

NOTE 1: A risk is often specified in terms of the expected value of the conditional probability of the event
occurring times the consequences of the event given that it has occurred.

48. Risk Assessment

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The overall process of identifying, analysing and evaluating the risk.

49. Risk Event
An event that results in the occurrence of a hazard that impacts on the asset, or group of assets, which are
being assessed.

50. Risk Criteria

Terms of reference by which the significance of risk is assessed.
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51. Risk Management

The culture, processes and structures that are directed towards realizing potential opportunities whilst
managing adverse effects.
52. Risk Management Process

The systematic application of management policies, procedures, and practices to the tasks of communicating,
establishing the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk.

53. Risk Treatment

Process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk.
NOTE: The term ‘risk treatment’ is sometimes used for the measures themselves.
54. Safety-critical

A term applied to any condition, event, operation, process, or item whose proper recognition, control,
performance or tolerance is essential to safe system operation and support (e.g. , safety-critical function,
safety-critical path, or safety- critical component).
55. Shielding Factor
Vector quantity that can be expressed as ‘1 – coupling factor’.

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 56. Soil Resistivity
Specific resistivity of a material is used to define the resistance of a material to current flow and is defined as
the electric field strength (V/m) divided by the current density (A/m2). Values tabled are normalised to 1 amp
flowing into a one metre cube of material yielding units of ohmmetre (Ωm).

57. Structural Earth Electrode

Metal part, which is in conductive contact with the earth or with water directly or via concrete, whose original
purpose is not earthing, but which fulfils all requirements of an earth electrode without impairment of the
original purpose.
NOTE: Examples of structural earth electrodes are pipelines, sheet piling, concrete reinforcement bars in
foundations, the steel structure of buildings.
58. Major Substation

Part of a power system, concentrated in one place, including mainly the terminations of transmission or
distribution lines, switchgear, and housing and which may also include transformers. It generally includes
facilities necessary for system security and control (e.g. the protective devices). For the purposes of this guide
the term ‘major substation’ may refer to either a transmission substation or a zone substation.
Examples: transmission substation (66kV and above), zone or distribution substation.
[IEV 605-01-01]
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59. Transmission
HV power system assets such as lines and cables and associated infrastructure (e.g. poles, earth pits) with
system voltages of 66kV and above.

60. Transmission Substation

Major Substation with secondary side voltage of 66kV or above.

61. Transferred Potential

Potential rise of an earthing system caused by a current to earth transferred by means of a connected
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conductor (for example a metallic cable sheath, protective earth neutral (PEN) conductor, pipeline, rail) into
areas with low or no potential rise relative to reference earth resulting in a potential difference occurring
between the conductor and its surroundings.
NOTE: The definition also applies where a conductor, which is connected to reference earth, leads into the area
of the potential rise.

62. Urban Interface

A location outside normal public thoroughfare with a low frequency of direct contact by a given person.

63. Value of Statistical Life (VSL)

The cost of a human death used in statistical studies and insurance.
NOTE: According to the nature of the system within which the substation is included, a prefix may qualify it.

64. Value of Saved Life

A risk cost benefit calculation based around the cost of a fatality in terms of VSL and fatality related
organisational costs including investigations, subsequent actions, and reputation impacts.
65. Zone Substation
A major substation with secondary voltages less than 66kV. Excludes distribution substations.

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 References
[1] Work Health and Safety Act 2011, Australian legislation
[2] Electricity Supply (Safety and Network Management) Regulation (NSW) 2014.
[3] Electricity Safety (Bushfire Mitigation Duties) Regulations (Victoria) 2017.
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85
 Appendix A Design Improvements (Step 9)
Further to the discussion provided in Section 4-15, this Appendix discusses a range of design improvements
that may be implemented to further mitigate shock risk. When designing earthing systems, the following
primary and secondary risk treatment methods may be considered when assessing how best to manage the
risk associated with step, touch and transferred voltage hazards:

• Reduction of the impedance of the earthing system

• Reduction of earth fault current

• Reduction of the fault clearing times

• Surface insulating layer

• Installation of gradient control conductors

• Separation of HV and LV earth electrodes

• Isolation

• Coincidence reduction (e.g. Barriers, signs)

• Relocation of non-compliance infrastructure (e.g. Telco pits)

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Often a combination of risk treatments will be required to control EPR hazards. Each of these methods is briefly
discussed in the following points.

A.1 Reducing Earth System Impedance

Reduction in the impedance of an earthing system can be effective in reducing the EPR hazards. However,
since the fault current usually increases as the earth grid impedance decreases, the effectiveness of the
reduction depends on the impedance of the earth grid relative to the total earth fault circuit impedance. For
the reduction to be effective, the reduced impedance needs to be low compared to the other impedances in
the faulted circuit. Typically, the earth grid impedance must be less than the power system source impedance
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before the EPR starts decreasing significantly.

If the earthing system earth impedance is reduced by enlarging the earthing system, then even though the EPR
on the earthing system will reduce, the resultant EPR contours may cover a larger area. In some circumstances,
the increase in the size of the EPR contours may be significant for a small reduction in the EPR of the system. As
a result, the size of any transferred EPR hazard zones will increase which represents an increase in risk
exposure presented to the surrounding area. Whether or not this will represent a desirable outcome
considering all hazard scenarios will depend on the situation.
Note that if the earthing system impedance is reduced by bonding remotely earthed conductors to the initial
earthing system, the resultant reduced EPR will also spread to the remote earths. This also introduces new
transferred EPRs onto the earthing system when there are earth faults at any of these remote earths. Examples
of this include bonding the earthing system to extensive LV network systems. Nevertheless, this risk treatment
measure can be very effective in significant urban areas where an extensive earthing system can be obtained
by bonding together MEN conductors from adjacent LV networks. The resultant EPRs for earth fault events at
distribution assets as well as the source substation can be dramatically reduced, as a significant percentage of
the earth fault current does not flow through the soil.

A.1.1 Earth Electrode Enhancement

If the soil resistivity is high and the available area for the grounding system is restricted, methods of enhancing
the earth electrode may be required. Such methods include the encasement of the electrode in conducting

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 compounds, chemical treatment of the soil surrounding the electrode and the use of buried metal strips, wires
or cables.

These methods may be considered as a possible solution to the problem of high electrode resistance to earth.
They may also be applied in areas where considerable variation of electrode resistance is experienced due to
seasonal climatic changes.

Chemical treatment of the soil surrounding an electrode should only be considered in exceptional
circumstances where no other practical solution exists, as the treatment requires regular maintenance. Since
there is a tendency for the applied salts to be washed away by rain, it is necessary to reapply the treatment at
regular intervals. The salts can also accelerate corrosion on systems that are subject to the treatment.

A.2 Reduction of Earth Fault Current

A.2.1 Neutral Earthing Impedances and Resonant Earthing
Earth fault currents flowing through earthing systems may be reduced by the installations of neutral earthing
impedances such as neutral earthing resistors (NER) or neutral earthing reactors (NEX). Alternatively, resonant
earthing such as Petersen Coils, arc suppression coils, earth fault neutraliser earthing may be effective.
NERs are typically employed in distribution networks to limit the current that would flow through the neutral
star point of a transformer or generator in the event of an earth fault. The effect on protection clearing must
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be investigated when considering NERs at zone substations, especially where there are long rural feeders. The
earth fault level is very low towards the end of these feeders. In the event of an earth fault the NERs could
further reduce earth fault current preventing the fault from being cleared by the protection device. Care
should also be exercised when retrofitting NERs if equipment is not sufficiently rated to withstand the
additional phase voltage offset on the healthy phases during earth fault conditions. Insulation levels of
transformer neutral end and arresters, if not fully rated, will be stressed during earth fault conditions.

NERs may be an effective way of reducing the EPR at faulted sites and thereby controlling step, touch and
transferred voltages especially in urban areas where distribution system earth electrodes are bonded to a
significant MEN system. However, the reduction in EPR may not always be significant if the impedance of the
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

earthing system is relatively high. The use of NERs for the control of EPR hazards should be investigated on a
case-by-case basis. NERs can be very effective in reducing induction into parallel services such as
telecommunication circuits or pipelines.

Resonant earthing (Petersen Coils) are also effective in controlling step, touch and transferred voltages. A
Petersen Coil is an inductance that is connected between the neutral point of the system and earth. The
inductance of the coil is adjusted so that on the occurrence of a single phase to earth fault, the capacitive
current in the unfaulted phases is compensated by the inductive current passed by the Petersen coil. Resonant
earthing can reduce MEN EPR to a safe level even in systems with high MEN resistance.

Studies show that fault restriction may be useful in limiting risk at the point of fault (i.e. pole top substation),
but may not be necessary if the first number of kilometres of feeder are underground cables. When examining
major substation EPR magnitude it has been found that the actual fault levels can be expected to be much less
than the conservative ‘bus fault impedance plus one ohm’, calculated value in common use.

A.2.2 Overhead Shield Wires

Shield wires are typically used on transmission lines at or above 66 kV, and sometimes for only a short section
of line out from the substation. Shield wires are also sometimes used on distribution lines (11 kV and above)
for the first kilometre out from the substation but this is not as common.

87
 While the primary purpose of the shield wires is to provide lightning shielding for the substation or line,
bonding of the shield wires to the substation earth grid can significantly reduce earth fault currents flowing
through the local earth grid into the soil for faults at the station, or at conductive poles, or towers bonded to
the shield wires.
Inductive coupling between the shield wire(s) and the faulted phase conductor can significantly reduce the
earth return current flowing into the ground at conductive poles or towers bonded to the shield wire(s) during
fault conditions. This, in turn, reduces the EPR levels at both the substation and at the conductive pole or
tower. However, the incidence of (transferred) EPR events at the conductive poles or towers will become more
frequent since each station or line fault EPR will be transferred to the nearby towers/poles. For a busbar earth
fault at a substation, the shield wires can divert significant current away from the substation earth grid. The
net effect of the shield wires is to reduce the earth return current, thereby reducing the EPR. Underslung earth
wires installed below the phase conductors may also provide benefit in EPR reduction and shielding of third-
party metalwork against inductive interference (e.g. pipelines, railway lines, telecommunications lines).
Consideration must be given to the shield wire size (fault rating), particularly for the first few spans from the
substation.

A.2.3 Cable Screen

Bonded cable screens provide return fault current paths for both faults on the cable and faults downstream at
destination substations. Bonding of cable screens to the earthing systems at both ends is advantageous to
earthing systems in most situations. However, the transfer of EPR hazards through the cable screens to remote
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sites should be considered as part of the earthing safety design.

The bonding of single core cable screens at both ends may affect the rating of the cables due to heating caused
by induced load currents in the cable screens. Care should be taken to ensure the rating of the cable screen is
adequate for the application. Alternative screen bonding methods may be required if there are heat dissipation
limitations (especially for voltages greater than 33 kV). The rating of the cable screens should be adequate for
the expected earth fault current and fault current duration and for the current induced in the screen during
normal operation.
Cable screen bonding needs to be considered, especially on long cable sections, so induced voltages do not
cause damage to cable insulation, serving and sheath voltage limiters. Note that cable sheath bonding
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

calculations need to consider the network surrounding the cable, especially the EPR of each of the terminal
stations.
An earth continuity conductor is usually run as a surrogate cable screen, to provide a direct earth return path
when single core cables are single point bonded. As the earth continuity conductor does not encompass the
phase conductors the magnetic coupling is less efficient than for a concentric cable sheath.

A.3 Reduction of Fault Clearing Times

EPR hazards can be mitigated by the reduction of the fault clearing time. This may be easy to implement and
may be very effective.
However, reduction of the fault clearing time may require significant protection review and upgrade and may
prove impracticable. The need for adequate protection grading may also limit the effectiveness of this
measure. Where sectionalisers and reclosers are used, the sections of feeder with slow clearing times (for
grading purposes) often correlate with much lower fault levels due to line impedance.

A.4 Surface Insulating Layer

To limit the current flowing through a person contacting a temporarily energised earthed structure, a thin layer
of high resistivity material, such as crushed rock or asphalt, is often used on top of the ground surface. This thin

88
 layer of surface material helps in limiting the body current by adding resistance to touch and step voltage
circuits (see also Appendix B).

A.4.1 Crushed Rock

Crushed rock is used mainly, but not exclusively, in zone substations and transmission substations to increase
tolerable levels of touch and step voltages during a power system earth fault, and to provide a weed-free, self-
draining surface.
For design purposes the following characteristics are typical for a crushed rock specification.

• A resistivity of 3,000 Ω-m, and

• A minimum thickness of 100 mm.

• Wet or dampened condition

The insulating property of crushed rock can be easily compromised by pollution (e.g. with soil). Therefore,
regular inspection and maintenance of a crushed rock layer is required to ensure that the layer stays clean and
maintains its minimum required thickness.
Close attention is required to the preparation of the ground prior to the application of crushed rock or asphalt.
Suitable base course shall be prepared before laying the crushed rock or asphalt.
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Chip seal or scoria (i.e. light, porous, volcanic rock) should not be used since the resistivity of the chip seal
surface is not typically very high and its breakdown voltage is usually low.

A.4.2 Asphalt
Asphalt may also be used in zone substations and transmission substations but is likely to be more expensive
than crushed rock. Asphalt has the advantage of providing easier vehicle access. Vehicle access over crushed
rock may sometimes be problematic especially if the base course is not prepared correctly.

Asphalt can also be used to control touch and step voltages around towers and poles and is often justifiable in
areas with pedestrian traffic.
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Limited data is available on the flashover withstand of asphalt, which may be as low as 2 kV for a 50 mm thick
sample in relatively poor condition. Therefore, where asphalt is used for mitigation, touch voltage should
typically not exceed 3 kV and step voltage should not exceed 5 kV. For some cold mix asphalt formulations
even these levels may not be met. For applications where these limits are exceeded, the withstand voltage
should be determined based on the type of asphalt that is being considered.
The insulating property of asphalt can be compromised by cracks and excessive water penetration. The
integrity of the asphalt layer used for surface treatment must be maintained.

A.4.3 Concrete
Exposed concrete should not normally be relied upon to provide a series impedance to control body current
flow due to its low resistivity if moist. However, the reinforcing in the concrete can be used to provide an
equipotential zone where it is prepared and bonded appropriately. A layer of asphalt may be used within 1m of
the edge of the slab if a step voltage requires hazard mitigation.
A house slab with PVC underlay will remain reasonably dry and tests have shown an impedance of at least 1500
ohms, between a ‘foot’ electrode on the moistened slab and the MEN conductor [60]. This may be considered
as a part of a design solution for a particular case (if appropriate).

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 Many new installations will have ‘wet area’ reinforcing metalwork bonded to the MEN conductor to provide
equipotential bonding, and thereby reducing the shock risk. The use of non-conductive water pipes within
houses will almost eliminate the shock risk associated with impressed voltages from the MEN network or soil
due to neighbouring earthing installations.

A.5 Gradient Control Conductors

Touch voltages on a structure can be mitigated to some extent by using gradient control conductors buried at
various distances from the structure. Typically, gradient control conductors are buried at one metre from the
structure. Additional gradient control conductors are also buried further out from structures as required.
In zone and transmission substations, gradient control conductors are typically used for the control of touch
voltages outside the station security fence. These conductors are more effective when used in conjunction with
a metre wide strip of crushed rock or asphalt installed around the outside of the fence.
Gradient control conductors can also be used to control touch voltages on distribution substations and
equipment if the HV and LV earthing is segregated. For substations with common bonded HV and LV earthing a
grading ring around the substation is difficult to justify as the most exposed locations are associated with the
LV MEN conductor in houses nearby. In such cases the overall EPR must be reduced to a tolerable voltage.
Grading rings will be of limited value when installed around large transmission concrete or steel pole footings
as the footing dissipates most of the fault current leaving little current by which the grading ring may lift the
nearby soil voltage.
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Step voltages can also be controlled with the use of gradient control conductors. One or more gradient control
conductors may be positioned in a concentric configuration at increasing distances from the structure (i.e. 1m,
2m), and the buried depth of each gradient control conductor is increased as the distance increases. However,
this measure will push the EPR contours further out from the structure and the resulting effects on third party
equipment should be considered.

Bonding of reinforcement in slabs/pathways/driveways can also prove useful in reducing step voltages.

A.6 Configuration of HV and LV Earth Electrodes

For the earthing of the HV and LV systems in a distribution network the two earthing systems may be
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combined or separated.
In either case, the risk associated with step, touch, transferred and stress voltages within both the HV and the
LV installation shall be managed.

A.6.1 Combined HV/LV Earth Systems

For major substations such as zone and transmission substations a single combined (common) earthing system
is typically used. Under special circumstances such as those involving underground mining installations or
where the LV supply for the substation is fed from an external street LV supply a design departing from this
principal may be necessary.
Furthermore, the HV and LV earthing systems shall be interconnected if the LV system is totally confined within
the area covered by the HV earthing system.

For distribution substations (e.g. 11kV/400V or 22kV/400V) a combined earthing system is the preferred
configuration. However, a segregated earthing system, as detailed below in Section A.6.2, may be necessary in
certain circumstances where adequate control of the risks associated with step, touch and transferred voltages
cannot be achieved with a combined earthing system.
Adequate control of the risks associated with step, touch and transferred voltage may be achieved where there
is a significant density of HV and LV earth electrodes through the interconnection of local earthing systems.

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 Large earth electrode densities are typically achieved in large urban distribution networks which are
interconnected via cable screens or overhead shield wires and/or via interconnected neutral conductors.
Overhead shield wires and interconnected LV neutral conductors that are part of a common multiple earthed
neutral system and HV cable sheaths may also provide a path back to source substations for HV earth fault
currents. A significant portion of the earth fault currents may return to source via these paths thereby resulting
in low risks from step, touch and transferred voltages.

A.6.2 Separated HV/LV Earth Systems

Separation of HV and LV earthing systems is done to limit the portion of the EPR on the HV earthing system
being transferred onto the LV earthing system. Touch and step voltages, and voltages which are transferred to
third party equipment such as telecommunication equipment are controlled in this way.
When an earth fault takes place at the HV side of a distribution centre, the EPR on the HV earth electrode is
transferred to the LV MEN system via the local LV earth and PEN conductor. By physically separating the HV
and LV earth electrodes, the transfer of EPR from the HV system to the LV system can be controlled.
The minimum separation distance required between the HV and LV earthing systems is dependent on:

• The size of the HV earthing system,

• Soil resistivity,
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• The maximum EPR on the HV earthing system, and

• The distances to the earths bonded to the LV system.

A minimum separation distance of 4 m is suggested between the HV and LV earthing systems. In some
instances, the required separation may be much larger (i.e. low/high soil resistivity layering and a LV network
with limited number of customers).

The integrity of the separated HV and LV earthing systems may be difficult to maintain into the future since
other earthed or conductive structures may be installed at later stages within the area between the earth
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systems. These new structures may compromise the electrical separation.

Separated HV and LV earthing systems may not be effective in controlling hazardous step and touch voltages in
the event of a HV line to LV line contact at the distribution transformer, or on a conjoint HV/LV line section.
The following options may be considered for protecting against HV to LV contacts:

• Ensuring the configuration of LV lines at the distribution transformer poles is such that a HV line to LV line
contact is unlikely.

• Replacing the LV lines over conjoint HV/LV spans with:

• LV buried cable,

• LV lines on separate poles, or

• LV aerial bundled conductor cable that is insulated to withstand the full HV conductor voltage.
The transformer shall be rated to withstand the maximum EPR on the HV earthing system, without breaking
down to the LV side of the transformer (e.g. via HV/LV winding breakdown, or transformer tank to LV winding
breakdown).
When the LV earthing system is segregated from the HV earthing system at a distribution substation, the total
earth impedance of the LV earthing system plus associated MEN earths, must be sufficiently low to ensure the

91
 HV feeder protection will operate in the event of a HV winding to LV winding fault. A safety factor should be
considered when calculating this maximum earth impedance value.

Separation is often preferred in rural areas where low values of combined HV and LV resistance are difficult to
achieve as there are few LV customers.
If high voltage and low voltage earthing systems are separated, the method of separating earth electrodes shall
be chosen such that the risk to persons or equipment in the low voltage installation is minimised. This means
that the potential rise of the neutral of the LV installation caused by a HV fault shall transfer a low risk to
interconnected customer facilities.

There is a risk of a sustained voltage on each of the earthing systems in the event of a LV phase contacting the
HV earth (ie tank) and there being insufficient current to cause a fuse to clear the fault. In this case the
240volts are divided between each of the earthing systems and the intervening soil. As the HV earth usually
has far greater resistance than the LV/MEN combined earthing system, the majority of the 240volts appears on
the HV earth. Animals are sensitive to the voltage gradient between the two electrodes, and utility staff must
always test for dead before contacting either earthing system.

A.7 Isolation
Access to structures where hazardous touch voltages may be present can be restricted by the installation of
safety barriers or fences. These barriers or fences would typically be non-conductive such as wood, plastic or
rubber. For example, a tower could be surrounded by a wooden fence to restrict access to the tower base, or a
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sheet of rubber could be wrapped around the base of a steel or concrete pole. The installation of isolation
barriers usually requires ongoing maintenance but can be effective in reducing the risk.
Third party fences should be isolated from the substation security fence using non-conductive section of
fences. Non-conductive sections may also be required at additional locations along third-party fences.
Mitigation of step and touch voltages of metallic pipelines (e.g. water pipes connected to a HV or LV network
earthing system) can be effectively achieved by the installation of non-conductive pipes.
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 Appendix B Fibrillation Risk Analysis
This appendix provides the following background to the fibrillation risk component of the overall risk analysis
process:
B1 – Voltage Limits for Ventricular Fibrillation
B2 - Development Constant Fibrillation characteristics

B.1 Voltage Limits for Ventricular Fibrillation

Voltage limits for ventricular fibrillation of humans are based on the probabilistic physiological data provided
in IEC 60479-1:2005 (similar to AS/NZS 60479.1-2002 but with updated data). The fibrillation current limit is
converted into voltage limits for comparison with the calculated step and touch voltages. The voltage limits
shall consider the following factors:

• Proportion of current flowing through the region of the heart,

• Body impedance along the current path,
• Resistance between the body contact points and return paths (e.g. footwear, or crushed rock), and
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• Duration of body current flow.

As highlighted in the introduction to IEC 60479 probabilistic aspects such as probability of faults, probability of
contact with live or faulty parts, and the probability distribution of physiological parameters across society are
to be considered when determining the safety requirements for electrical installations. The sequence to be
followed to determine the voltage limits is shown in Figure B-1.
and Z2) which may be used for the contact scenarios as described.
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Figure B-1 – Procedure for calculating Voltage Limits

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 NOTE 1: Body impedance depends on voltage across body.

NOTE 2: If additional resistance between bare hands and/or feet is considered in the formulation, then the
voltage is a prospective touch voltage and tested accordingly (refer to Section 4.20.2.4 regarding measurements)

The following sections detail the calculation of tolerable prospective touch and step voltage limits. These
calculations are based on the procedure from Figure B-1.

B.1.1 Fibrillation Currents

The IEC 60479-1 standard contains several body current withstand curves. The origin of these current/time
curves are described in the following section.

B.1.1.1 Historical development of body current withstand curves

Biegelmeier and Lee [76] took the same data (as Dalziel) from Kouwenhoven [78] [79] and Kiselev [80] to form
the basis of their analysis. The Kouwenhoven and Kiselev work is based on ascertaining the ventricular
fibrillation probability distribution for dogs. This data is combined into the series of Figure B-2 following. The ‘Z’
shaped curves result from the increased ability of the heart to withstand shocks with duration less than one
third of the heart cycle.
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Figure B-2 Fibrillation current characteristics

Biegelmeier and Lee [76] took the work of Dalziel and Lee [81-83] and set the long-term current (i.e. >3 secs) to
67 mA. Then using the same slope found in Figure B-2 the short-term current level is found to be 1960 mA. The
upper knee of the curve was set to 200 msecs (i.e. 1/3 heart cycle of 100 beat/second man). For ‘safety

94
 purposes’ these values were then further reduced by Biegelmeier and Lee to 50 mA and 500 mA. Notice also
that the ‘difference’ between the two ‘stable’ currents has also been reduced from 30 to 10 (see Figure B-3).
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Figure B-3: Biegelmeier and Lee’s fibrillation curves [76]

A number of ‘safety factors’ have been introduced at various stages in the development of safety criteria
applicable for the protection of human life. The reduction from 80 mA to 50 mA for the long-term current level
relates to less than 5% of the population, making the criteria quite conservative.
The IEC-TC 64 [84] sub working group based their recommendation to the host committee primarily based on
data from Biegelmeier and Lee’s work. The conservative smoothing of the values seen in Figure B-4 to achieve
the characteristic recommended for inclusion in IEC60479 given in Figure B-5 should be noted.
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It is also of interest to note the introduction of an ‘S’ or safety curve in the IEC60479 [14] document. This curve
is intended to represent a ‘very conservative’ limit below which safety may be always assumed. It is also
understood that this curve was selected based on being that which is easily met using earth leakage circuit
breakers (ELCB’s) (mandatory in most European countries).

95
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Figure B-4: IEC (TC64) threshold of ventricular fibrillation, normal condition of health, longitudinal current flow [84]

The published IEC60479 standard contained three curves of interest regarding body current fibrillation
withstand currents (see Figure B-5). These are curve c1 which corresponds to a negligible probability of
fibrillation, curve c2 which corresponds to a 5% probability of fibrillation and curve c3 which corresponds to a
50% probability of fibrillation.
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Figure B-5 Time/current zones of effects of a.c. currents (15 Hz to 100 Hz) on persons (IEC60479 original curves)

Figure B-6 shows the percentage variation between the TC64 working group 0.5%, 5% and 50% curves (shown
in Figure B-4) [50] and the published IEC60479 curves (shown in Figure B-5). A 95% curve is shown in Figure B-4
[84] and this data has been used as the basis for developing a 95% curve consistent with the published

96
 IEC60479 document. As the working group document criteria were reduced by up to nearly 30% for inclusion
in the IEC60479 document, it would be consistent to determine similar reduction factors for the 95% curve.
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Figure B-6: Comparison of TC64 working graph with IEC60479 final form

While the 95% body current curve did not come directly from IEC60479 a sensitivity analysis indicates that the
final fibrillation results for a particular applied voltage and clearing time are not highly sensitive to the 95%
current curve. From this it seems reasonable to use the 95% curve as given. For a voltage and clearing time
which causes higher fibrillation probabilities and then applying a 10% change to the 95% current curve, the
final fibrillation probability varies by as little as 3% (for example the chance of fibrillation may go from 6.8x10-1
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to 7x10-1). This sensitivity is minimal compared to other sensitivities.

Fitting a probability function across the 5, 50 and 95% curves enables the probabilistic analysis outlined in this
appendix to be undertaken. As the IEC 60479 -1 standard does not define the probability of fibrillation for
curve c1 it is not usually included in the construction of probability density functions.

B.1.1.2 Contemporary body current withstand curves

The body current withstand curves within AS/IEC60479-1 for both ac and dc currents are included in Figures B-
7 and B-8 respectively.

97
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[IEC60479-1]
Figure B-7: Time/current zones of effects of a.c. currents (15Hz to 100Hz) on persons for a current path left hand to feet

98
 The short term d.c. body current withstand thresholds shown in Figure B-7 are less stringent than the
equivalent a.c. body current withstand thresholds shown in Figure B-8.
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Figure B-8: Time/current zones of effects of d.c. currents on persons for a longitudinal upward current path [IEC60479-1]

While exposure to a dc related earth fault is usually less hazardous than an equivalent ac contact voltage, dc
earth fault return currents are not constrained by magnetic coupling increasing the possible area of exposure.
ENA EG-1 and Cigre TB675 [93] provide further guidance regarding management of d.c. earthing system
related risk.

99
 The curves c1, c2 (5%) and c3 (50%) from Figure B-7 and the additional c4 (95%) curve are shown in Figure B-9.
These curves apply to a current path of left hand to both feet.
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Figure B-9: Allowable body current curves c1, c2 and c3 and c4

Table B-2: Body Current Curve Boundary Descriptions

Boundaries Physiological Effects

Patho-physiological effects may occur such as cardiac arrest,
Above curve c1 breathing arrest, and burns or other cellular damage. Probability of
ventricular fibrillation increasing with current magnitude and time
c1-c2 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to about 5%
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c2 – c3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation up to about 50%

c3 – c4 Probability of ventricular fibrillation up to 95%
Beyond curve c4 Probability of ventricular fibrillation above 95%

Table B-2 (from IEC60479-1) provides details of heart current factor (HCF) or relative current density for a
range of contact configurations. The HCF may be used to scale allowable body current criteria shown in Figure
B-9 according to the contact configuration. For example, when considering the current path hand to hand the
allowable body current values which are normalised for LH to foot content are divided by 0.4 (i.e. increased by
250%).
Table B-3 Relative Current Densities (or HCF) in the vicinity of the heart for different conditions

Current Path Heart Current Factor

LH to LFT, RF or Feet; both hands to both feet. 1.0
LH to RH 0.4
RH to LF, RF or both feet 0.8
Back to RH 0.3

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 Back to LH 0.7
Chest to RH 1.3
Chest to LH 1.5
Seat to LH, RH or both hands 0.7
Foot to Foot 0.04

B.1.2 Shock Circuit Impedances

For step and touch voltage shock situations, parameters which are significant for the step and touch voltage
circuits are shown in Figure B-10. The parameters are further detailed in the following sections.
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Figure B-10 – Step and touch voltage circuits parameters

For step and touch voltages, the relevant circuit parameters are:

• The body impedance, Zb.

• The resistance of shoes, Zss or Zst.
• The contact resistance of feet-to-soil, Zc.
• Hand contact resistance.
The hand contact resistance is zero (i.e. assume bare-hands in all situations unless HV gloves worn).

B.1.2.1 The Body Impedance

The body impedance depends on the voltage across the human body. The body impedance also depends on
the current path through the body. For example, the hand to feet impedance (Calculated as 1.5 Zip from Figure

101
 B-11 from IEC 60479-1) is lower than the hand-to-hand impedance or the foot-to-foot impedance (both
represented by 2 Zip). Where Zip = internal partial impedance of one extremity (arm or leg).
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Figure B-11 – Simplified schematic diagram for the internal impedances of the human body – IEC60479-1

Since body impedances values in IEC 60479-1 are for the hand-to-hand path (or foot to foot), it follows that the
hand to feet impedance (i.e. for touch voltage) is 75% of the quoted values and the foot to foot impedance (for
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step voltages) are the same as the quoted values. Table B-4 summarises the resistance path factors (RPF’s) and
Figure B-12 shows the resistance characteristics from IEC60479 for hand to hand or foot to foot contact paths
(for large area dry and water wet contact).
Table B-4: Body Resistance Path Factors (RPF’s) from IEC60479

Current Path Resistance Path Factor

Hand to hand, foot to foot 1.0
Hand to both feet 0.75
Both hands to both feet 0.5
Hand to trunk 0.5
Both hands to trunk 0.7

102
 7000

5% Dry skin
6000
50% Dry skin

95% Dry skin

5000
Total body impedance (ohms)

5% Wet skin

4000
50% Wet skin

95% Wet skin

3000

2000

1000

0
10 100 1000
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Touch voltage (volts)

Figure B-12: Body resistance large contact areas dry and water wet conditions

IEC 60479-1:2005 contains body impedance data for dry, water-wet and saltwater-wet conditions and also for
three contact areas. For the purposes of this document, the body impedances for dry and water-wet conditions
and for the large contact surface area are considered appropriate. However, it should be noted that the data
for dry and water-wet conditions are very similar especially for fault durations below 1.5 s and touch voltages
above 125 volts (see Figure B-12).
The calculation of step and touch voltage limits uses body impedances which depend on the voltage across the
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body and considers the current path through the body. The probability distribution of the body impedance is
also considered.

B.1.2.2 Resistance of Footwear

Footwear provides additional series resistance in the shock circuit. Resistance of shoes vary greatly depending
on the type of shoe and on whether the shoe is dry or wet. In addition to having a resistance, a shoe will also
exhibit a flashover or breakdown voltage. The ability of a shoe to withstand voltage depends on the type of
shoe, on the amount of wear and on whether the shoe is dry or wet. Resistance of shoe may vary from 500 Ω
to 3,000 kΩ while the withstand voltage may vary between 500 V up to 20 kV. Low withstand voltage is
typically associated with wet shoes.

Various publications allow for a range of shoe resistances as follows:

• BS 7354:1990 allows a shoe resistance of 4,000 Ω to be used for substation earthing design. BS 7354
acknowledges that the withstand voltage of worn footwear has not been well researched. This standard
also recommends a limiting value of 5 kV for touch and step voltages.
• BS EN 50341-1 uses a shoe resistance of 2,000 Ω for calculating touch voltage limits for locations where
people are expected to be wearing shoes.
• ITU K.33 standard allows the use of the following shoe resistances (see Table B4) for calculating the voltage
limits.

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 Table B-5: ITU K.33 Footwear Resistance

Shoe Resistance (kΩ)

Type and state of shoes
Leather sole Elastomer sole

Dry shoes 3000 2000

Wet or damp shoes, hard soil 5 30

Wet or damp shoes, loose soil 0.25 3

• Typical Public Footwear – A range of footwear resistances were used in the probabilistic analysis behind the
derivation of EC5 [23] (NSW Electricity Council precursor to ENA(C(b)-1[24]) criteria in the late 1980’s). More
recently published data based upon HV testing of shoes [60] led to the addition of voltage withstand
characteristics to the data shown in Table B-6 following. These values will be referred to as ‘typical public
footwear’ and used throughout this guide when appropriate.
Table B-6: Typical Public Footwear Characteristics

Voltage
Resistance Population
Case Description withstand
(Ω ) percentage
(volts)
1 Bare feet 0 0 10
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2 Dry new leather 5000000 7000 4

3 Dry new black rubber 5000 5000 4
4 Dry new elastomer 30000000 20000 4
5 Dry used leather 1000000 5000 16
6 Dry used black rubber 1000 2500 16
7 Dry used elastomer 6000000 15000 16
8 Wet new leather 10000 1000 3
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9 Wet new black rubber 500 1000 2

10 Wet new elastomer 100000 8000 3
11 Wet used leather 5000 500 8
12 Wet used black rubber 500 750 6
13 Wet used elastomer 50000 4000 8

In the absence of any new data the typical public footwear distribution cited in Table B-6 has been used in
probabilistic analysis. If additional conservation is required then, a single value of 2,000 Ω can be used.
For specific cases involving electrical workers in and around substation/transmission assets, electrical footwear
as outlined in Table B-7 may be used in the analysis.

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 Table B-7: Electrical Worker Footwear Characteristics

Voltage
Resistance Population
Case Description withstand
(ohms) percentage
(volts)
1 Dry Used Black Rubber 1,000 2,500 35
2 Dry Used Elastomer 6,000,000 15,000 35
3 Wet Used Black Rubber 500 750 15
4 Wet Used Elastomer 50,000 4,000 15

In EHV substation capacitive coupling may lead to staff receiving low level, though uncomfortable, shocks
whilst walking or working at heights near energised outdoor busbars. If conductive footwear is be worn in such
situations a conservative position would be to assess the shock safety for the site without assuming any
footwear impedance.
Additional work has been undertaken regarding the effectiveness of ‘safety gumboots’ in limiting body current
flow, particularly in industrial situations where such footwear is commonly worn [61]. The study investigated
the electrical withstand properties of both new and used gumboots and generated the probability distribution
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shown in Table B-8. The focus of the study was construction workers within live (brownfield) substations.
However, the use of safety gumboots as PPE can be equally applied to other areas within the electrical
industry as well as other industries where personnel are exposed to touch voltage hazards.
Where safety gumboots are being used as a risk mitigation measure for workers subject to touch voltage
hazards it is required that gumboots be cleaned and inspected prior to use and replaced if worn and damaged.
The wearing of anti-static or conductive footwear is not acceptable as PPE for workers exposed to touch
voltage hazards.
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Table B-8: Electrical Safety Gumboot Characteristics

Voltage
Resistance Population
Case withstand
(Mohms) percentage
(volts)
1 0 5 5
2 0.15 3500 2
3 0.803 5000 2
4 1.00 4500 10
5 2.00 5000 34
6 3.00 7500 19
7 4.00 2000 11
8 5.00 14500 5
9 6.00 4700 2
10 7.00 1500 2
11 8.00 13000 6
12 11.0 17500 2

When considering the effect of shoe resistances, the touch voltage circuit will include the resistance of two
shoes in parallel while the step voltage circuit will include the resistance of two shoes in series.

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 B.1.2.3 Contact Resistance of Feet-to-Soil
The contact resistances between the feet and the soil may appreciably increase the resistance of the shock
circuit, especially if a thin layer of high resistivity material is used on the surface.

For soil with a surface resistivity, ρE, the contact resistance maybe calculated as follows from ENA EG(1) and
IEEE80:
For step voltages,
Z cs = 6 ρ E B-1
For touch voltages,
Z ct = 1.5 ρ E B-2

As described in Appendix A, thin layers of high resistivity material can be used to reduce the current flowing
through the human body. For a thin layer of high resistivity material on top of the soil, a de-rating factor, Cs is
required to account for the difference in magnitude between the resistivity of the thin layer (ρl) and the
resistivity of the underlying soil (ρE), and also to account for the thickness of the layer (hs).

 ρ 
0.091 - E 
Cs = 1 -  ρl  B-3
2 h s + 0.09
The contact resistance is then calculated as follows:
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For step voltages,

Z cs = 6 C s ρ l B-4
For touch voltages,
Z ct = 1.5 C s ρ l B-5

B.1.2.4 Contact Resistance of Surface Layers

The two main surface layer materials in common usage are crushed rock and asphalt. The same series
resistance formulations used for the soil top layer (see previous Section B.1.2.3) may be applied to these
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materials. These materials exhibit a wide range of electrical properties both initially and over time and any
design requiring their use for safety reasons should take care to ensure the installation matches the required
specification. The following points outline some experience to date in the application of these materials:

B.1.2.4.1 Crushed Rock

Crushed rock is only considered appropriate for use within a secured area, and commonly serves multiple roles
of series resistance, vehicle driveway and walkway, and weed control layer. Therefore, the specification must
consider electrical properties and trafficability. It is insufficient to leave the specification open as quarries may
provide material that has too large a range of gravel size (i.e. too many fines (poor electrical quality), and too
large size (poor trafficability)), and poor electrical resistivity performance.

A typical specification would include figures such as:

• Aggregate size: 30 – 50 mm
• Electrical properties: 3000 Ωm
• Aggregate with at least three cracked faces
Prior to accepting delivery of the full consignment of material some utilities carry out a brief testing process
(see IEEE81)[60].

106
 B.1.2.4.2 Asphalt
Asphalt may also be used to limit body current flow and allow trafficability of vehicles and people.
Unfortunately, asphalt exhibits highly variable electrical properties as shown in HV testing research [60].
Therefore, care must be taken in the specification of asphalt for body current limiting purposes. Key aspects to
be considered include:

• Preparation: Use of compacted road base (and possibly plastic underlay for weed control).
• Material: Well compacted hot mix at least 50mm thickness compacted (as cold mix electrical properties are
compromised in wet condition).
Electrical properties: As it is difficult to type test a batch of hot asphalt, conservative values of resistance and
voltage withstand are often used. In the attached fibrillation tables (see Section B.3) the following values are
assumed:
• Asphalt Resistivity – 10,000Ωm
• Asphalt Voltage withstand – 3kV

B.1.3 Touch Voltage Circuit

A typical touch voltage shock circuit for the situation depicted in Figure B-10 is shown in Figure B-13.
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Figure B-13 – Touch voltage shock circuit

The prospective touch voltage, VTP, for a fault duration, t, may be determined by the acceptable body current,
Ib/HCF multiplied by the sum of the various impedances considered in the shock circuit. The factor, HCF, is the
heart-current factor as detailed in Table B-3 (from Section 5.9 of IEC 60479-1:2005). The heart-current factor
permits the calculation of currents through paths other than left hand to feet which represent the same danger
of ventricular fibrillation as that corresponding to Ib left hand to feet shown in Figure B-10.

Ib
VTP
= ( Zb + Zst + Zct ) B-6
HCF
For touch voltages, a current path of left hand to feet is assumed. According to Table B-3 from IEC 60479-
1:2005, HCF=1 for touch voltages.

Z ct = 1.5 ρ E B-7

If Z1s is the resistance of one shoe, then:

107
 Z1s
Zst = B-8
2
VTP = Ib (Zb + Zst + Zct ) B-9

Prospective touch voltage limits can be calculated by substituting the relevant body impedance, soil resistivity
and the IEC 60479-1 body current limits. Equation B-9 can be re-written as follows:

VTP = I b Z b + I b (Z st + Z ct ) or
VTP = VTE + I b (Zst + Z ct ) B-10

The term Ib Zb is the effective (or loaded) touch voltage, VTE.

To calculate the prospective touch voltage limit for particular fault duration, Equation B-10 can be used. The
following Section B2 outlines how probabilistic analysis may be applied to derive fibrillation characteristic
curves.

B.1.4 Step Voltage Circuit

A typical step voltage shock circuit for the situation depicted in Figure B-10 is shown in Figure B-14.
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Figure B-14 – Step voltage shock circuit

The prospective step voltage, VSP, for a fault duration, t, may be determined by the acceptable body current,
Ib/HCF, multiplied by the sum of the various resistances considered in the shock circuit. The factor, HCF, is the
heart-current factor as detailed in Table B-3 (from Section 5.9 of IEC 60479-1:2005).

Ib
VSP
= ( Zb + Zss + Zcs ) B-11
HCF
Z cs = 6 ρ s B-12

If Z1s is the resistance of one shoe, then:

Ib/HCF
Zss = 2 Z1s B-13

Ib
VSP = (Zb + Zss + Zcs ) B-14
HCF
I I
VSP = b Z b + b ( Zss + Zcs ) or
HCF HCF

108
 Ib
VSP = VSE + ( Zss + Zcs ) B-15
HCF
For a foot-to-foot path, the heart-current factor of 0.04 is given in Table B-3 (from of IEC 60479-1:2005). This
implies that 25 times more current flowing through the foot-to-foot path is required to create the same risk of
ventricular fibrillation compared to the current flowing in the left hand to feet path. The current is lowered
further still by the added effect of having two sets of footwear and/or foot-to-ground resistances in series.

B.2 Developing Constant Fibrillation Voltage/time Characteristics

Most tolerable voltage curves used in standards have a probability of fibrillation that is non-linear and
dependent upon distribution of clearing times [47][52]. This adds an extra undesired variable when assessing a
particular installation and does not provide equity across power systems.
The aim of this section is to describe a method for creating a tolerable voltage curve that will have a specific
and constant probability of fibrillation with respect to clearing time, if that voltage vs clearing time
characteristic were applied to a body. Two methods are outlined, one based on a Monte Carlo sampling
approach and the second based upon direct convolution of cumulative probability functions.

B.2.1 Monte Carlo Sampling Approach

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Figure B-15 shows the first stages of the process being the selection of a single voltage value and a specific
time for which to apply the current. The selection of these parameters then allows the creation of probability
distributions for body impedance and body current.
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Figure B-15: Process for generating body impedance and body current distributions

109
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Figure B-16 – Finding the probability of fibrillation for an applied voltage and time
Figure B-17 demonstrates the process of calculating a probability of fibrillation for a particular applied voltage
and time pair. This process can now be adjusted to find the voltage that corresponds to a particular fibrillation

110
 probability for a specific duration that the voltage is applied to a body, this revised process is shown in Figure
B-16.
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Figure B-17 – Finding the voltage corresponding to a particular fibrillation probability

Figure B-18 outlines the process of calculating a voltage vs time characteristic for a particular target
probability.

111
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Figure B-18 – Generating a voltage vs time characteristic for a particular fibrillation probability
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B.2.2 Cumulative Probability Distribution Function Convolution

To calculate the probability of a particular touch or step voltage hazard causing fibrillation the strength of the
hazard must be compared with the ability of a person to withstand the hazard. This is done by comparing the
allowable current cumulative distribution function (CDF) (i.e. withstand strength) with the applied or possible
current CDF (i.e. hazard strength). A CDF is another representation of a probability distribution function (PDF)
where the change in height between two points on the CDF ‘x’ axis is equal to the area between the same two
points on the ‘x’ axis of the PDF.

The possible current CDFs are calculated based on the body impedance CDFs. The following considerations
besides body impedance must be included in the calculation of possible currents:

• Current pathway through the body

• Contact impedance
• Additional series impedance such as shoes and flashover characteristics
• Ground resistance and presence of crushed rock layer
• Wet or dry conditions
Using Ohm’s Law:

112
 V Applied
I possible = B-16
Z Path Im pedance
The probability of fibrillation may then be calculated for a given applied voltage and clearing time by
comparing the two CDFs:

 n m 
n =100 m =100  × ( I possible (Vapp ) > I allowable (tc) 
Pfibrillation (Vapp , t c ) = ∑ ∑  100 100  B-17
 n m 
n =1 m =1
 × 
 100 100 
Equation B17 is the sum of all the possible combinations of probabilities for when Ipossible > Itolerable divided by
the total number of possible combinations of probabilities. This calculation is essentially the same as the
convolution of the Ipossible and Itolerable probability distribution functions (PDF)s.

B.2.2.1 Body current withstand probability distributions

The fibrillation body current withstand data is given as current/time curves in the IEC document AS/IEC60479
described in Section B.1.1.2. Equations were fitted to the 5% and 50% points, and to the 95% curve (based on
the Biegelmeier, etz-Report [84]) as shown in Equations B-18 to B-20.
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1.5
929.857 - 87.698t c 0.5 +3.33096t c −0.066177t c +0.00073641t c 2
i 5% = 1.5
1 - 0.13244t c 0.5 +0.012013t c −0.00058515t c +0.0000113595t c 2 B-18

1.5
1399.7 - 116.078t c 0.5 +4.097775t c −0.08132t c +0.0009314t c 2
i 50% = 1.5
1 - 0.1157538t c 0.5 +0.01039125t c −0.00049416t c +0.0000093319t c 2 B-19
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3546.9 - 154.29t c 0.5 +2.2329t c

i 95% = 1.5
1 - 0.033567t c 0.5 +0.001072t c +0.000059836t c B-20
A probability distribution was constructed curves fitted to the three known data points set by the specified
probability curves (Equations B-18 to B-20) with the end points truncated to better reflect the response of the
human population. The allowable current '0' percentile is conservatively set at 35mA which is below the
IEC60479 ‘c1’ curve asymptote (See Figure B-10). The '100' percentile for allowable current has been chosen
such that the trailing tail is symmetrical with the leading tail. More recent research has examined the case for
relaxing the lower probability truncation and using a different probability distribution (e.g. log-normal) to fit to
the known data pints [54][55]. The conservative result of the truncation included in the Argon software tends
to affect the lower risk scenarios more so than the higher risk scenarios.

B.2.2.2 Body impedance probability distribution

The dry body impedance characteristics provided in AS/IES60479 (see Figure B-12) are reproduced in Equations
B-21 to B-23. In order to extrapolate between the body impedance values given in the IEC tables, curves were
fitted for each percentile with respect to applied voltage. The body impedance ‘0’ percentile is fixed at 2/3 of
the ‘50’ percentile, to match the 50volt tolerable ‘extra low’ voltage level set in many standards [e.g. AS3000].

113
 The 100 percentile for body impedance was chosen such that the trailing tail is symmetrical with the leading
tail.

Z b5%= 651.4 + 1113e − 0.0307Vt + 623.1e − 0.002617Vt B-21

Z b50%= 750 + 2909e − 0.01569Vt + 553.3e − 0.000624Vt B-21

Z b95%= 864.5 + 6131.4e − 0.02273Vt + 1758.3e − 0.00118698Vt B-21

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114
 Appendix C Fault/Contact Coincidence
Probability Calculation
This appendix provides additional detail regarding fault/contact coincidence probability (Pcoinc) in the following
sections:
C1 Coincidence probability equation derivation
C2 Coincidence lookup table
C3 Fault duration and rate data
C4 Calculation of the coincidence probability for variations in fault and exposure rate
C5 Calculation of the coincidence probability for multiple hazard sources
C6 Calculation of the coincidence probability for combined hazards

C.1 Coincidence Probability Equation Derivation

Coincidence probability formulae for both individual and multiple fault/contact event scenarios are required to
assess individual and societal risk exposure. The following two sections outline the derivation of the formulae
used within the guide and associated software [89-92].

C.1.1 Individual Fault/Contact Coincidence Probability Calculation

The coincidence probability Pcoinc is the probability that one or more risk events will occur during time period
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[0,T]. This could be a result of Event A and/or Event B:

• Event A – a person is in contact with an earthed asset when a fault occurs.

• Event B – a person contacts an earthed asset during a fault.

Events A and B have been approximated as Poisson processes. The homogeneous Poisson process describes
the arrival of random, independent events that are equally likely to occur at any time and has been used to
derive Pcoinc.
The Poisson distribution is used to describe Event A as follows:
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(λΤ) x e− λT
P( X A= x=) C-1
x!
Where: λ is the arrival rate of events.
Τ is the time period in which the risk events could occur.
ΧA represents the number of risk events occurring as a result of a person being in contact
with an earthed asset.
x is the number of risk events for which the probability is being calculated.
P ( ΧA =x ) is the probability that a total of x risk events occurred as a result of event A
during time [0, T].

The probability that no risk events will occur (x = 0) in [0, T] is:

P( X A= 0)= e − λT C-2
A standard conditional probability result allows us to break down a probability, P(D) say, in terms of the
conditional probability P(D|F). The result states that:

P(D) = E{P(D|F)} C-3

Where: E{c} is the expectation of c.
115
 This result is applied below. It is not possible to have a risk event when an individual is not in the hazard area.
Hence, the time for which an individual is not in the hazard area can be ignored. If there are M exposures
during [0, T] then the probability that a risk event does not occur (X = 0) during any of those exposures is:
P( X=
A = 0) {P( X A 0 | A1 , A2 ,.... AM )}
E= C-4

{P( X A1 0 | A1=
= E= ) P( X A2 O | A2 )...=
P( X AM 0 | AM )}
Where: A1, A2, …AM are the exposure events 1, 2, ….., M.
P(XA1= 0|A1) is the probability that no risk event will occur during exposure one.

Note that the probabilities in (C-4) can be multiplied together since we are assuming a Poisson process.

The period of consideration is restricted to times for which an individual is present in the hazard area. In this
case a fault must occur for a risk event to occur. The rate of arrival of risk events (λ) will be equal to the rate at
which faults occur (λF).
λF = λ C-5
If faults are equally likely to occur at any time and the length of each of the exposures is T1, T2,…TM, then the
probability that no fault will occur during any of the exposures is:
P( X A =
= 0) {P( X A1 0 | A=
E= 1 ) P ( X A 2 0 | A2 )...
= P( X AM 0 AM )}
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= E{(e− λF 1T2 )(e− λF 2T2 )...(e− λFM TM )}

∑ i =1
M
λF1Ti
= E{e } (λ=
F λ=
F 1 λ=
F 2 λFM )

= E{e− λF TETot } C-6

Where: ΤΕΤot is the cumulative exposure time that occurs during [0, T].

λF is the fault rate (assumed constant).

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λF has been approximated as being constant (faults are equally likely to occur at any time), but a time varying

fault rate may be applied by using different known values of λF (i.e. λF 1, λF 2,.... ) and calculating directly from
the above expression. Alternatively, T may be divided into periods for which λF is constant.

Equation (C-6) can be simplified by making the conservative approximation:

e − λF TETot ≈1 − λF TETot C-7

This approximation is valid as long as λF TETot is small (λF TETot =10−2 gives an error of 5 x 10-3%). The
expression for P(XA = 0) simplifies to:
0) E{1 − λF TETot } =
P( X A =≈ 1 − λF µ E C-8

Where: µ E is the mean cumulative time spent in the hazard area during [0, T].
The period [0, T] can be defined arbitrarily. If fn is expressed as the average number of faults in one year and is
µ E is defined as the average cumulative exposure in one year, then the probability of one or more risk events
for Y years is:
P( X A = 0) ≈1 − f n µ EY C-9

116
 Where: P(XA = 0) is the probability that no risk events will occur due to exposure events A.

The same process can be repeated for P(XB = 0) by applying the same process used for P(XA = 0). The
probability that no risk event will occur due to B faults is:
P( X B = 0) ≈1 − pn µ F Y C-10
Where: pn is arrival rate of exposures in 1 year.
µF is the mean cumulative fault time per year.
XB represents the process of a risk event occurring as a result of a person contacting an
earthed asset during a fault.
Y is the number of years in [0, T].
P(XB = 0) is the probability that a total of x risk events occurred as a result or process XB
during time [0, T].

The coincidence probability can be determined by:

Pcoinc= P(XA + XB ≥ 1)
= 1 – P(XA + XB = 0)
= 1 – P(XA = 0)P(XB = 0)
≈ 1 – (1-fnµEY)(1-pnµFY)
≈ 1 – 1+ fnµEY + pnµFY - fnpnµEµFY
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≈ fnµEY + pnµFY C-11

The average cumulative exposure time (µE) and the average cumulative fault duration (µF) can be expanded:
Pcoinc ≈ fnµEY + pnµFY
≈ fn (pntE)Y + pn (fntF)Y
≈ fnpn (tF + te)Y C-12
Where: tE is the average duration of the average exposure (in years).
tF is the average duration of the average fault (in years).
pn is the rate at which exposures occur (exposures or presences/year)
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fn is the rate at which faults occur (faults per year).

If the unit of time for tE and tF is converted into seconds (rather than years), and the period of time over which
the calculation is made is in years then:
f n × pn × ( f d + pd ) × T
Pcoinc= x CRF C-13
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
Where: pd is the average duration of the average exposure (in seconds).
fd is the average duration of the average fault (in seconds).
pn is the rate at which exposures occur (exposures or presences/year).
fn is the rate at which faults occur (faults per year).
T is the number of years (exposure duration) = 1 year.
CRF is Coincidence reduction factor (see Section 5.6.9.2) (set to 1 normally).

C.1.2 Group Coincidence Probability Calculation

(A) Single Event Coincidence Probability

This section provides an alternative (equivalent) expression for coincidence probability that is used in the
pursuant group coincidence probability calculation.

117
 Presence and fault coincidence may initially be viewed as two independent processes. The dependencies and
time and seasonal correlations will be addressed in a later section. Figure C-1 and the following analysis
assumes:
fd = mean fault duration.
pd = mean presence duration.

fd < pd
T = duration under consideration.
At least one each of fault and presence events occurs during the time T. As time T is usually set to one year, this
assumption is usually valid for most substations. The value of T may be increased to allow for those
locations/installations whose fault frequency is less than 1 per year (e.g. transmission and distribution assets).
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Figure C-1: Coincidence probability scenarios

Case (c) covers direct coincidence probability (i.e. total overlap) which is only a subset of all five cases. The
range for Case (a) through to Case (e) covers all instances of coincidence (including partial overlap).

f p f ×p
P ( presence ) × P ( fault ) = × =
For Case (c) T T T2
C-14

To determine the total coincidence probability the situation may be represented by a Borel field diagram as
shown in Figure C-2 following (see Papoulis [92], and Ross [91]). The P axis represents Presence occurrence
(units of time), while the F axis represents fault occurrence (units of time).

118
 Figure C-2: Borel field representation of coincidence probability of two independent time events

For coincidence to occur it is required that:

P ≤ F + pd
F ≤ P + fd
Area B = {coincidence times}
Area B = {-pd ≤ F - P ≤ fd}
Area B
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Probability of coincidence =
Total Area

{− pd ≤ F − P ≤ f d }
Pc =
T2
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Non-coincidence probability = Area A + Area C

Total Area ( A + B + C )

Area A + Area C
=
PNC T2

(T − f d ) (T − pd )
2 2

= +
2T 2 2T 2
T 2 − 2T f d + f d 2 T 2 − 2Tpd + pd 2
= +
2T 2 2T 2
1 fd f 2 1 p p2
= − + d 2 + − d + d2
2 T 2T 2 T 2T
f d + pd f d 2 + p 2 d
=1− +
T 2T 2 C-15

119
 Coincidence probability = Area ' B ' Total Area

Pc = 1 − ( non − coincidence probability )

f d + pd f 2d + p 2d
= −
T 2T 2 C-16

This derivation is valid for short duration contacts and fault events. It is not appropriate to be used for
continuous exposure or fault conditions.

This basic form is then taken in the following section and revised to manage a desired failure or arrival rate,
multiple incidents, as the well as non-stationary nature of the fault/presence process (i.e. a non-homogenous
Poisson process).

(B) Multiple Event/Multiple Contact/Multiple People Coincidence Probability

To extend the derived formulae which are applicable for an individual for one presence and one fault in time T,
Equation C-16 is rewritten using the definitions below.

1 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 +𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 2 +𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 2

𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 = � − � C-17
𝛫𝛫 𝑇𝑇 2𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 2
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Where
fd = fault duration (in seconds)
pd = presence duration (in seconds)
T = time period for calculation (years)
Κ = constant to convert seconds into year time base
= 365 × 24 × 60 × 60 C-18

Thus the probability that an individual will not be in contact with an earth fault generated voltage at the same
time as a fault occurs can be written as:
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PNC1= 1 − Pc C-19

When the individual has a pattern of behaviour which equates to multiple contacts with items associated with
a fault in time T, the probability of non-coincidence with a single fault can be written as:

p nT
PNCmulti − presences = PNC
= (1 − Pc ) pnT C-20
Where
pnT = number of contacts over time T
pn = number of contacts/ year

Hence the probability of coincidence for an individual with multiple presences and a single fault in time T can
be written as:
PC multi − presences = 1 − PNC multi − presences C-21

=1 − (1 − Pc ) pnT

For a population of N people, the probability that exactly i will be coincident with a fault occurring in time T is:
𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁−𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = � � 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 × �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � C-22
𝑖𝑖

120
 Where the number of N distinct outcomes taken i at a time is:
𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁!
� � = 𝑖𝑖!(𝑁𝑁−𝑖𝑖)!
𝑖𝑖

For a population of N people, the probability that anything other than i people will be coincident with a fault
occurring in time T is:
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁2 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁−𝑖𝑖
= 1 − � � 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 × �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � C-23
𝑖𝑖

If there is a known average fault rate, rather than a single fault occurrence in time T, the probability that from
N people, anything other than i people will be coincident during ANY fault is:
𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁−𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁2𝑓𝑓 = �1 − � � 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 × �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � � C-24
𝑖𝑖
Where
fn T = average number of faults in time T

fn = average number of faults/year.

Taking the complement of this value gives the probability that from a population of size N, exactly i people will
be coincident with ANY fault in time T:
𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁−𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 1 − �1 − � � 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 × �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � � C-25
𝑖𝑖
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Finally, in order to present group probabilities in a form consistent with the F-N curves, the expected number
of times that from a population of size N, at least i people are coincident with any fault in time T is:
𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁−𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 𝑇𝑇
𝑁𝑁
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = ∑𝑖𝑖=𝑗𝑗 1 − �1 − � � 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 × �1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � � C-26
𝑖𝑖
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121
 C.2 Coincidence Lookup Table
A range of standard exposure scenarios have been incorporated within the following lookup Table C-1. The
table provides a coincidence multiplier for an individual fault duration which may be used to calculate Pcoinc (as
per Equation C-13).

Pcoinc = Coincidence multiplier x fault frequency/year

x Exposure duration (years) × CRF C-27
Where
Pcoinc = Probability of coincidence of a fault and simultaneous contact
occurring.

Coincidence
Location Factor = Factor in lookup table (see Table C-1 in Appendix C)

(multiplier)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓+𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)
=
365×24×60×60
Fault Frequency = Number of fault occurrences expected to yield a hazard event in
the period of 1 year. Table C-2 in Appendix C gives typical fault
rates.

Exposure duration = Number of years over which an individual is likely to be exposed to

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a given hazard scenario.

= 1 year

CRF = Coincidence reduction factor

= An empirical factor by which coincidence is expected to be

reduced as a result of a specific mitigation strategy (e.g. warning
signs, barbed wire). See Section 5.7.5 for more detail of the use of
a CRF.

= 1 initially unless specific mitigation strategies applied.

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While the access assumptions have been specified to be reasonably conservative, a designer should confirm
that they accept that the values quoted are reasonable. In other cases, the user must state and document
their own access assumptions.
The contact duration estimating process is necessarily quite imprecise, as very little or no actual data is
available. While tables pertaining to ‘what people do’ all day are available they usually relate to general
movement and are insufficiently accurate for the purpose of assessing duration contact. Therefore, it is
important that the sensitivity of the response to contact frequency and duration be understood when making
decisions regarding exposure rates.

122
 Table C-1: Coincidence Location Factor (multiplier) Lookup Table
Access Coincidence multiplier (x10-4) for fault duration (sec)
Location
Assumptions 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 2 3 4
Inside backyard
with regular
contact of up
to 8 times/wk
Backyard 0.541 0.554 0567 0.58 0.594 0.620 0.633 0.646 0.660 0.791 0.923 1.06
(contact
duration 4 sec)
416
contacts/year
Within 100m of
houses, where
people visit
Urban occasionally,
0.130 0.133 0.136 0.14 0.143 0.149 0.152 0.155 0.159 0.190 0.222 0.254
Interface up to 100
contacts/year
(contact
duration 4 sec.)
Remote
location where
a person may
Remote contact up to 0.013 0.0133 0.0136 0.014 0.014 0.0149 0.0152 0.0155 0.0159 0.019 0.0222 0.0254
10 times per
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year for up to 4
sec.
Regular contact
of between 5
and 6/day with
items
connected to
MEN 2.60 2.66 2.73 2.79 2.85 2.98 3.04 3.11 3.17 3.81 4.44 5.07
the MEN
(contact
duration 4 sec)
2000
contacts/year
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C.3 Fault Duration and Rate Data

C.3.1 Faults on Towers and Cables
To assist with calculations, where more accurate data is not available, some typical data for overhead line
fault rates and protection fault clearing times can be found in Table C2 and Table C3, respectively. Table
C4 listing backup protection clearing times has been included for use when considering conductor and
connection thermal requirements.
When considering faults on overhead lines, if the line length of interest is known, the average number of
faults per unit time on overhead lines in Table C1 can be used to estimate the rate at which hazardous
voltages will occur on a particular tower.
The rate at which risk events occur for a given structure fn can be calculated as follows, where the number
of hazardous structures per fault refers to the number of interconnected structures which could be
considered to contribute to a ‘hazardous’ condition on the structure being examined.
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 = × C-28
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙

123
 The fault rates for underground cables are much lower than for overhead lines. Typical underground cable
fault rates are 2 to 3 per 100 km for 11 to 33kV and less than 1 for higher voltages. The average fault
duration fd, can be estimated from values given in Table A2. Note that for close in faults, earth fault
current is high and the protection operates quickly. However, for faults further out along the feeder,
additional line impedance limits the fault current which takes longer to be cleared by the protection
system. Consequently, different fault locations need to be considered to determine the worst case EPR
and clearing time combination.
Table C-2: Typical overhead line fault rates

System Voltage Overhead Line Fault Rate

( line ) ( faults/100km/year )
<1000V 20-150
11kV-33kV 5-10 shielded, 10-40 unshielded
66kV 2-5
100kV-132kV 1-4
220kV-275kV <1.0
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330kV <0.5
400kV <0.5
500kV <0.5

NOTE 1: The higher outage rates occur in northern Australia where there is more frequent high wind and
lightning storm activity.

NOTE 2: The lower outage rates occur in southern Australia and New Zealand where there is less frequent
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high wind and lower lightning activity.

NOTE 3: Consider the effect of earth fault events on interconnected assets (eg structures and cables) when
setting EPR frequency and fault clearing time for a given asset.

124
 Table C-3: Typical primary protection clearing times

System Voltage Primary Protection

( line ) Clearing Time
<1000V 2sec
11kV-33kV 1sec
66kV 0.5sec
100kV-250kV 220msec
251kV-275kV 120msec
330kV 120msec
400kV 120msec
500kV 100msec

NOTE: The primary protection clearing times for >100kV are based on National Electricity Rules fault
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clearing time requirements for remote end.

Table C-4:: Typical backup protection clearing times

System Voltage Backup Protection

( line ) Clearing Time
<1000V 1-2sec
11kV-33kV 1-2sec
66kV 1sec
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100kV-<250kV 430msec
250kV-275kV 250msec
330kV 250msec
400kV 175msec
500kV 175msec

NOTE: The backup protection fault clearing times for >100kV are based on National Electricity Rules CB Fail
clearing time requirements.

C.3.2 Faults associated with Major Substations

The hazard scenarios associated with a given substation are driven by faults on both the primary and
secondary networks terminating at the substation.
Primary Faults – events associated with faults on the incoming power lines or within the HV equipment or
yard.
Secondary Faults – events associated with faults on the downstream power network, typically sourced
via a transformer(s) in the substation.

125
 The resultant fault frequency is based upon:

• A summation of available feeder fault rates.

• Wherever possible the line fault rates should reflect data sourced over an extended period.
• Although a fault may be tripped and (possibly) reclosed by a pole mounted recloser and not the
feeder breaker, all secondary faults are seen by the substation. In some cases over 200 faults per year
are seen by some rural substations.
• While fault frequency must reflect all fault occurrences, the resultant EPR is often quite low due to
the high impedance nature of many faults (e.g. line falling on tree or cross arm) ([94]). See Appendix
D for an example of direct QRA modelling of these effects.

C.3.3 Seasonal and time of day effects

Both earth fault and contact frequency may vary through the course of a year, and the use of long term
averages may not adequately represent realistic risk profiles.

Seasonal effects: Summer and winter fault statistics often exhibit seasonal effects of weather. The periods
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with high weather dependency display skewing of the fault occurrences. Similarly contact exposure rates
vary dramatically between seasons in some locations. Examination of Australian and international fault
statistics [96-99] reveals that most permanent faults are caused by lightning, tree contact or equipment
failure. Such weather-related storms typically account for at least 30 percent of all faults.

Time of Day Effects: Fault statistics also indicate a skewing of the probability density function, probably
due to the influence of several of the significant failure mechanisms, such as weather and vehicle accidents,
which often exhibit non-random properties. In one case the average hourly fault frequency during the daily
peak period for 2pm to 10pm was 34% higher than for any hour during the remainder of the day.

Combining Time of Day and Seasonal Effects: In one case the time of day and seasonal effects yielded an
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average hourly fault rate during the summer peak period of between 80% and 300% higher than the quieter
winter fault period. Thus, combined analysis of the operational fault statistics and climate characteristics
of the region (particularly wind and lightning storm activity) may reveal significant non-linearities in average
hourly fault frequency. High seasonal fault frequency may align with high exposure rates (e.g. beachside
holiday locations in summer when storms and lightning occur regularly with little forward notice)). When
the impact of high seasonal correlation is compared to the use of the same values averaged over the whole
year the fault/exposure coincidence probability the latter result can be non-conservative. The year may be
broken down into seasonal classes (not necessarily of equal length) with each week broken down into
categories (e.g. weekday and weekend) and then as many fault/presence classifications used as is justified
on an hourly basis. Note that the analysis is more robust if confidence limits of 90% or 95% value of the
resultant P(coinc) probability density function (pdf) is used rather than a mean value. QRA analysis tools
(e.g. Argonium [39] provide provision for such modelling. While such a process is necessarily time
consuming, it can be of significant value where required for certain exposure cases. Note that it is still
possible that a design approach using standard voltage/time curves will satisfy the design requirements for
some of the hazard scenarios identified. Section C.4 and Example C2 provide additional discussion.

126
 EXAMPLE C1: Jogger

Problem: A jogger goes for a run every day of the week. At the halfway point of each run the jogger
touches a metal gate next to a 275 kV tower for 1 s. Risk events occur at the pole once every 120 years
(i.e. fault rate 0.83/100 km/year, with average tower spacing of 100 m and say 5 towers each side
contribute to ‘significant’ EPR of the structure near the gate), and create a touch voltage hazard on the
gate for 1 s.

Solution: The risk associated with this scenario may be calculated directly using Equation 1 as shown. The
average length of an exposure Pd is approximately 1 s, the average length of a fault fd is 1s, and the

number of exposures per year that occur pn is 365. The rate at which risk events occur is:
1 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 = = 8.33 × 10−3 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
120 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
The coincidence probability per year is therefore:
T x CRF
Pcoinc
= fn pn (fd + Pd )
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
1
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-3
(8.33 × 10 )(365)(1 + 1)
=
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 -8
= 8.33 × 10 × 365 × 6.34 × 10
−7
= 1.93 × 10
This individual risk level is below the negligible risk level of 10-6 defined in Section 5.4.4. Consequently, no
further risk treatment action is necessary.

C.4 PC - Calculation of the Coincidence Probability for Variations

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in Fault and Exposure Rate

The fault rate may vary with the time of day (e.g. during daylight hours) or season (e.g. winter), and the
exposure factor often varies significantly according to the time of day or season. In order to adjust for
such variations, rather than use the conservative highest rate, the probability of coincidence may be
calculated separately for each period of time over which the fault or exposure rate is constant.
The risk calculation may therefore be divided into regions of the lowest common length of time for which
both the fault and exposure rates are approximately constant. The coincidence probability for a single
year is the sum of the coincidence probabilities for each of the individual periods over each year.

127
 EXAMPLE C2: Tourist Attraction Near River

Problem: A conductive (or earthed) power pole is located next to a popular tourist attraction near a river.
Tourists visit the attraction most regularly during the warmer holiday months between late spring and
early autumn. Risk events also occur most frequently during this period as a result of insulation failure.
The average length of exposures and faults are 1 s and 0.2 s respectively. The average number of hazards
and exposures per season are shown in Figure C-3.
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Figure C-3: Variations in fault rate and exposure rate over the year

Solution: The coincidence probability may therefore be determined for each season independently and
the final value calculated as the sum of the coincidence probabilities from each of the individual periods. If
the average fault and exposure lengths are 0.2 s and 1 s then the probability of coincidence for each
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season is:
Spring

Exposures occur approximately 12 times per day (Pn = 1,050 per ¼) and last ~1 s on average. Risk events
are estimated to occur in spring once in every 377 years on average (Pn = 2.7 × 10-3 per ¼) and last
approximately 1 s. The coincidence probability occurring in spring is therefore:

4
Pc,Sprg
= fn Pn (f + P )
d d 365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 4
(2.7 × 10 )(1,050)(1 + 1)
=
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 -7
=2.7 × 10 × 1,050 × 2.53 × 10
−7
= 7.2 × 10
Summer
Exposures occur approximately 18 times per day (Pn = 1,600 per ¼) and last ~1 s on average. Risk events
are estimated to occur in spring once every 364 years and last approximately 1 s. The coincidence
probability occurring in spring is therefore:

128
 4
Pc,Sumr
= fnPn fd (fd + Pn )
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 4
(2.8 × 10 )(1,600)(1 + 1)
=
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 -7
=2.8 × 10 × 1,600 × 2.53 × 10
−6
= 1.1 × 10
Autumn
Exposures occur approximately 15 times per day (Pn = 1,350 per ¼) and last ~1 s on average. Risk events
are estimated to occur in spring once every 364 years on average (fn = 2.8×10-3 per ¼) and last
approximately 1 s. The coincidence probability occurring in autumn is therefore:

4
Pc,Autm
= fnPn (fd + Pd )
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 4
(1.3 × 10 )(1,350)(1 + 1)
=
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 -7
= 1.3 × 10 × 1,350 × 2.5 × 10
−7
= 4.5 × 10
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Winter
Exposures occur approximately 5 times per day (Pn = 450 per ¼) and last ~1 s on average. Risk events are
estimated to occur in spring once every 1,333 years (fn = 7.5×10-4 per ¼) and last approximately 1 s. The
coincidence probability occurring in winter is therefore:
4
Pc,wntr
= fnPn (fd + Pd )
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-4 4
= (8 × 10 )(450)(1 + 1)
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-4 -7
= 8 × 10 × 450 × 2.53 × 10
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−8
= 9.1 × 10

The total probability of fatality for the year is therefore:

Pcoinc = Pc,Sprg + Pc,Sumr + Pc,Autm + Pc,wntr
−7 −6 −7 −8
= 7.2 × 10 + 1.1 × 10 + 4.5 × 10 + 9.1 × 10
−6
= 2.4 × 10

This does not differ significantly from the probability of coincidence obtained for the average values over
the entire year. Exposures occur (on average over the whole year) 12 times per day (Pn = 4,450 per year)
and last ~1 s on average. Risk events are estimated to occur once every 132 years (Pn = 7.6×10-3 per
year) and last approximately 1 s. The coincidence probability calculated from these average values is
therefore:

1
Pcoinc, avg = (7.6 × 10 -3 )(4,450)(1 + 1)
365 × 24 × 60 × 60
-3 -8
= 7.6 × 10 × 4,450 × 6.34 × 10
−6
= 2.1 × 10

129
 Only small variations in fault and exposure rates are apparent in this example. As a result little difference
exists between the seasonally adjusted coincidence probability (Pcoincidence = 2.4×10-6) and the
coincidence probability calculated from average fault and exposure characteristics (Pcoincidence = 2.1×10-6).
This risk level is above the tolerable level of 10-6 and falls in the Intermediate Risk category defined in
Section 5.4.4. Consequently, risk treatment measures must be investigated to reduce the risk to as low as
reasonably practicable.

C.5 Calculation of the Coincidence Probability for Multiple Hazard

Sources
Independent faults may cause overlapping hazard zones to exist. In such cases the risk associated with
asset must be calculated independently to determine the overall risk for each region according to the
fault rate. The risk associated with a hazard zone is only independent if the areas do not overlap,
otherwise the hazard regions must be divided according to the amount of overlap which exists between
the areas.
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H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7

(a) (b) (c)

Separate Overlapping Enclosed
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Figure C-4: Multiple hazard zones resulting from independent substation faults

If hazard zones overlap as shown in (b), the overlapped region (H4) will contain fault rate contributions
from both sources, resulting in a higher coincidence probability in that region. In such cases the
coincidence probability should be calculated separately for each region with a different fault rate. The
occurrence of overlapping hazard zones is restricted to risk events which occur independently.
Overlapping hazard zones are therefore a rare occurrence usually restricted to risk events arising from
step voltage hazards.

The methods presented in the preceding sections illustrate the methods for calculating the coincidence
probability for specific cases. However, hazards are rarely simple and the risk analysis may require a
combination of these approaches to be undertaken. In such cases the coincidence probability must be
calculated separately for each case. For example, two hazards with overlapping hazard regions for which
the exposure and fault rates vary separately should first be separated and then each region should be
analysed separately according to Appendix C-3.

130
 Appendix D Worked Examples
To illustrate the principles of quantified risk-based earthing design a number of worked examples are
presented in this section.

D.1 Substation technician

D.2 33kV Concrete Pole Case Study
D.3 Major substation QRA with secondary fault analysis

D.4 New transmission line earthing system design

D.5 Individual and societal risk analysis for a ‘gathering’ type event

D.1 Substation technician

It may be conservatively assumed that the worst-case touch scenario will equate to the largest mesh
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voltage inside the fence line (i.e. the voltage between metalwork and the soil in the middle of the largest
earth grid mesh). This exposure could occur if a technician was working from a vehicle parked clear of the
switchgear and a bond was made to the metalwork (e.g. CB timing check). With a maximum EPR of 1500
volts the maximum expected touch voltage is 430 volts. This EPR occurs for earth faults associated with
the primary volage of the substation. For earth faults associated with the secondary system (i.e., network
supplied by the substation) the maximum EPR is only 250 volts yielding a maximum touch voltage of 72
volts. The secondary fault contribution is negligible in this case.

The following analysis uses earthing safety software [39][39] to assess the risk associated with the
foregoing touch scenario. The following assumptions are made:
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• Prospective touch voltage = 430 volts

• Crushed aggregate layer – not used to limit body current in this instance

• Footwear = Electrical worker range of footwear

• Protection clearing time = 200 msecs (a conservative margin > 120msecs)

• Fault frequency = 1 in 10 years (conservative assumption)

• Average contact duration = 4 seconds

Pfibrillation = 5.8 x 10-3 >> 10-6

Therefore, as the touch voltage alone is non-compliant the coincidence probability will also be assessed
using the following relationship:

Pfatality = Pfibrillation x Pcoincidence

To ensure that Pfatality < 10-6 the following maximum value of Pcoincidence value is required:

Pcoincidence < 1.72 x 10-4

For the given fault frequency and duration, the number of contacts must be less than:

131
 Contact number < 13k/year (approx. 52/day)
This number of contacts is higher than any expected exposure frequency for a worker in a year, the grid
layout is compliant without the need for crushed rock to limit body current. This assumes that the worker
is exposed to a similar touch voltage magnitude or less at each of the sites visited over a year.

The addition of a 100mm layer of crushed aggregate of 3000 Ωm resistivity reduces the Pfibrillation value
from 5.8 x 10-3 to 9.99 x 10-4. Therefore, a value of Pcoincidence < 9.98x10-4 or lower will maintain Pfatality less
than a negligible annual incremental risk increase (e.g. 10-6). For the given fault frequency and duration,
the number of contacts must be less than 75k/year (approx. 300/day).

D.2 33kV Concrete Pole Case Study

To illustrate the principles of case specific direct QRA based earthing design (see section 5.7) a simple case
study is detailed below. The case study involves an existing 33 kV concrete pole located close to a bus
stop. This pole was identified as a risk for people using the bus stop. The bus stop is typically used by
people travelling to work and it can therefore be assumed that footwear is worn around the pole.

D.2.1 Gathering Data (Step A)

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• The prospective earth fault current at the source substation is 7 kA.

• The resistance to earth of the 33 kV pole was measured as 20 Ω.
• The resistivity of the topsoil layer was measured as 50 Ω-m.
• The earth fault clearing time is 0.5 s.
• The earth fault frequency for the line is 5 per year.
• The line consists of 200 poles with no shieldwire.
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D.2.2 Hazard assessment (Step B)

Exposure scenarios associated with a conductive pole adjacent to a bus stop could be expected to include
direct contact (e.g. leaning against the pole) or standing adjacent to the pole (e.g. step potential).

D.2.3 Maximum EPR and step and touch voltages (Step C)

Using parameters associated with the earth fault current path for an earth fault at the pole, the EPR on
the pole was calculated as 6 kV.
The maximum step voltage was calculated as approximately 2,000 V.

The touch voltage on the pole was calculated as approximately 3,000 V

D.2.4 Calculate Probability of fatality (Step D)

The first step is to calculate the probability of fibrillation associated with the touch and step voltages
associated with the identified exposure.
For Step Voltage:
The expected fibrillation probability for a step voltage hazard of 2000V (for 0.5 secs) for a person wearing
typical ‘public footwear’ a dry body and surface soil resistivity of 50 Ωm is:

132
 Pfibrillation <= 6.107 × 10−4 ≈ 1 × 10−3
Calculate target coincidence range:
10−6 10−4
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤ D-1
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

10−6 10−4
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤
1×10−3 1×10−3

𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ 1 × 10−3 < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤ 0.1

For the risk of fatality to be contained within the negligible risk zone for step voltage hazards the number
and duration of contacts may be assessed in a number of ways. If a maximally exposed person could be
expected to visit the bus stop once per working day (conservatively say 52 weeks by 5 days) for say 10
minutes per visit the probability of coincidence is:

Pcoincidence = 1.24 × 10−4 << 1 × 10−3

Thus, the step voltage is unlikely to be an intolerable safety risk for this situation.
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For Touch Voltage:

The expected fibrillation probability for a touch voltage hazard of 3000V (for 0.5 secs) for a person
wearing typical ‘public footwear’ a dry body and surface soil resistivity of 50 Ωm is:
Pfibrillition <= 0.4895
Calculate target coincidence range:
10−6 10−4
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
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10−6 10−4
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤
0.4895 0.4895
−6
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≤ 2.043 × 10 < 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤ 2.043 × 10−4

For the risk of fatality to be contained within the negligible risk zone for touch voltage hazards the
number and duration of contacts may be assessed in a number of ways. Firstly, it is usually the case that
the duration of touch voltage contact is less than step voltage exposure time.
The frequency of earth faults for the line with 200 poles is 5 faults per year. Therefore, the fault frequency
for a single pole (if not interconnected by shieldwire or MEN conductor) is in the order of:
5
𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 = = 0.025 faults per year
200

A maximally exposed person could be expected to visit the bus stop once per working day (conservatively
say 52 weeks by 5 days). For the purpose of this case study, it is assumed that the pole is touched for 5
minutes for five days of the week (i.e. for 260 days per year),
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 = 260 days
𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 = 5 minutes × 60 seconds = 300 seconds

133
 1 (0.025)(260)(0.5 + 300)
Pcoinc = 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛 (𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 + 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 ) = = 6 × 10−5
365 × 24 × 60 × 60 (365 × 24 × 60 × 60)

Pcoincidence = 6 × 10−5 >> 2.043 × 10−6

Thus, the touch voltage hazard scenario may be assessed as being in the ALARP region or Intermediate
Risk and should be minimised unless the risk reduction is impractical, or the costs are grossly
disproportionate to the level of safety gained.

D.2.5 Sensitivity Analysis (Step E)

It is often useful to change the input parameters to determine the level of sensitivity of the compliance
outcome to these inputs. This can be achieved simply when using safety analysis software [38][39]. It is
thus possible to determine upper and lower bounds on the contact frequency and duration corresponding
to the ALARP region.

For a contact duration of 9 seconds per visit the Pcoincidence value is calculated to be less than the target
coincidence value and the probability of fatality is less than the negligible risk increment of 10-6.

Pcoincidence = 1.96 × 10−6 < 2.043 × 10−6

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Pfatality = 9.6 × 10−7 < 1 × 10−6

However, the target contact duration of less than 9 seconds is short if a person is inclined to contact the
pole while waiting for the bus (e.g. leaning and reading or talking with a friend) as total time waiting is
likely to be greater than 5 minutes on average. Therefore, it is considered that the risk is likely to be
within the ALARP region and a RCBA should be undertaken considering a revised contact duration.

D.2.6 Risk Cost Benefit Analysis (Step F)

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A risk cost benefit analysis should be carried out to provide input to the mitigation justification process.
The following values provide an illustration of the net present value (NPV) process (see Section 5.5.3 and
Appendix F) assuming a longer contact duration. The various input parameters should be validated within
the context of the duty holding utility or corporation. The NPV calculation provides one input to the risk
cost benefit analysis process.
Calculate the present value (PV) of the liability:

VoSL = $10,000,000

Liability per year = 10,000,000 x 3 x 10-5 = $300

NPV = $6,230 (if asset life is 50 years and discount rate is 4%)

D.2.7 Risk Treatment Option Assessment (Step F)

Examples of risk treatment options are:

• Installing an underslung earth wire on the line.

• Installing a gradient control conductor and an asphalt layer around the pole.
• Installing an insulating barrier around the pole to prevent people from touching the pole.
• Moving the pole.

134
 • Moving the bus stop.
A few of the above risk treatment options are discussed below to illustrate the principles. The selection of
one or more risk mitigation measures would be determined following a RCBA of assessment of
implementing both singular and multiple measures.

• Installing an underslung earth wire on the line

A study has shown that an underslung earth wire would reduce the EPR on the pole to 600 V. The
resulting touch voltage on the pole would then reduce to 300 V which is below the tolerable touch voltage
limit. The cost of this risk treatment option has been determined to be approximately $200k. Comparing
the cost of risk treatment to the present value of the liability indicates that the cost of this risk treatment
option is grossly disproportionate to the safety gained (e.g. proportionality factor = 15 > typical limit of
10).
As an additional benefit, the earth wire may also reduce the risks associated with the terminating
substations which could be factored into the process. In addition, future changes in land use along the line
may indicate additional value for this option.

• Installing a gradient control conductor and an asphalt layer around the pole
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With a gradient control conductor installed at one metre around the pole, the touch voltage still exceeds
the touch voltage limit. Note that the benefit of a gradient control conductor may be limited if the current
dissipated by the conductor is negligible compared to what the conductive structure dissipates. However,
if asphalt is installed around the pole, the touch voltage limit increases to 2,500 V with the result that the
touch voltage is lower than the limit. The cost of this risk treatment option is $10 k and is below the
present value of the liability. There may be some additional ongoing costs associated with maintenance of
the asphalt.

• Installing an insulating barrier around the pole to prevent people from touching the pole

An insulating barrier could be installed around the pole such as a wooden enclosure or a nonconductive
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(e.g. fibreglass) jacket. The cost of this risk treatment option is $5 k and is significantly below the present
value of the liability. There may be some additional ongoing costs associated with maintenance of the
insulating barrier.
Clearly, economically viable risk treatment options exist for this case and one of the options should be
implemented. The cheapest risk treatment option may not be the best option. For example, an
underslung earth wire may be the best option if several other EPR issues exist along the line.

135
 D.3 Major substation QRA with secondary fault analysis
This case study illustrates how stepwise refinement of the fault case detail may be undertaken using a
simple rural substation as a case study (refer to Section 5.7).

D.3.1 Power system configuration definition (Step A)

A rural substation earthing system configuration is often simple, with only phase conductors terminating
at the station (i.e. no shield wires)(see Figure D-1). In rural situations this configuration is often considered
reasonable even though the EPR can be high. It is implicitly understood that there is often no need to
control touch voltages due to the lack of public and utility staff access. Traditional safety criteria are not
able to reflect low access likelihood, and would require touch voltage control, despite the cost. The
system data is summarised in Table D-1 following.
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Figure D-1: Rural network overview

Table D-1: Rural substation system configuration

Incoming system definition

Incoming lines/cables 3 wire 66kV overhead line (no OPGW or multi grounded neutral)

Fault level (primary) 2000 Amp earth fault level at 66kV bus

Protection clearing time 0.5 secs for 66kV bus fault - primary unit protection

Transformer configuration Delta/star 66/11kV

136
 Earth fault frequency 1 per 10 years within substation

Station earthing details

Buried grid configuration 50m x 50m grid with 10m mesh size

Fence location/config 1m inside perimeter grid conductor, bonded to grid

75mm of 3000 Ωm crushed rock within fence perimeter, natural surface

Surface layer
outside fence line.

Soil resistivity model 100 Ωm soil homogenous

Secondary or outgoing system definition

Outgoing lines/cables 3 wire 11kV overhead distribution network

Protection clearing time(s) IDMT relay: 50A pickup, 0.1 time lever, no hi-set
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Transformer neutral earthing Solidly earthed

100 substations located along the 4 by 25km long lines, individually fused
Loads
primary delta windings, 15ohm HV earthing

10 earth fault events per year associated with transformers (assuming line
Earth fault frequency
drop yielding EPR and Vt with negligible risk – i.e. Vt < 50volts)
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D.3.2 Exposure definition (Step 2)

General hazard location classes are identified for design consideration include:

• Touch voltages (Vt) and step voltages (Vs) within the substation, as well as in areas surrounding the
substation.

• Transfer voltage (Vtransfer) for telecommunications staff or people associated with

telecommunications (e.g. phone, protection pilots), ‘near’ the substation.

• Vtransfer to staff working on pipelines near the substation, or ‘interconnected’ public.

• Vtransfer to/from LV MEN in homes ‘near’ the substation.

• Vtransfer to/from radiating fences.

• Induced voltages on pipelines, LV MEN or telecommunications equipment.

For this case study the risk profile associated with a power utility worker accessing front gate of
substation is examined [50]. The exposure characteristics are assumed to be as shown in the Table D-2
following:

137
 Table D-2: Utility worker exposure characteristics

Contact location description e.g. opening front gate of substation

Contact voltage 20%EPR

Contact configuration Touch voltage

Electrical footwear - (impedance, voltage

Series impedance
withstand), no crushed rock

Contact frequency/duration 1000 (4 second) contacts per year

Note: Utility workers operate in many switchyards in a year. It is considered that the responsibility of the
utility is to manage the cumulative risk to which the operator is exposed during a given year.

D.3.3 Driving voltage definition (Step 3)

The magnitude of a hazard scenario such as a touch voltage opening the gate of a substation is a
percentage of the earth potential rise (EPR) generated by earth fault current flowing into or out of the
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conductive impedance of the substation earth grid and any directly or indirectly interconnected metallic
systems. This step in the process may be undertaken using a staged approach, with conservative
assumptions being used initially and moving to more detailed analysis if required. It should be noted that:
Directly interconnected metallic systems usually have a large impact upon the final risk profile of an
installation. They are significant in that they are also usually under the direct control of a power utility.
Therefore, they should be more easily managed to ensure that the risk profile does not increase with time
due to deterioration of a circuit element (e.g. cable sheath bond).

Unfortunately, the disaggregation of vertically integrated utilities, and departmentalization can cause
interruptions in management of assets due to the interfaces that are created (e.g. design and operation of
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major substations being separated from the distribution network). This is a risk that must be addressed as
each part of the earthing system is co-dependent upon the upstream and downstream systems.
Directly interconnected metallic systems include:

• overhead shieldwires,

• cable sheaths, or

• bonds to a distribution network with multiple earth points interconnected by a neutral conductor.
Indirectly connected systems are bonded through the soil, and usually have a smaller impact on the
driving voltage (EPR). Nevertheless, they should be considered in the analysis, as they usually have a
significant impact upon the hazard scenario locations and hazard magnitude. For example, a distribution
network adjacent to a major transmission substation or transmission structure is not normally
interconnected to the transmission asset. The shock risk is certainly increased due to the introduction of
people to the situation as well as the effect of the large interconnected multiply earthed neutral network
providing a remote voltage reference.

138
 Rural substation case study: For the given grid with no interconnecting paths to remote earth in 100 Ωm
soil the grid resistance is 0.971 Ω. The soil profiles (3D area and a traverse across the middle of the
‘outside’ mesh) are shown in Figures D-2 and D-3 following.
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Figure D-2: Surface soil voltage gradient – 3D plot

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Figure D-3: Surface soil voltage gradient – 2D plot

From this modelling it is possible to determine the touch voltage created by a given EPR event.

139
 D.3.4 Determine Cumulative Fatality Probability (Step 4)
The touch voltage/duration characteristic associated with a given system and exposure location
developed in the Step 3 is limited in its ability to characterize risk, as it is not able to consider the effect of
different fault/contact coincidence probabilities. The fatality probability calculated as the product of the
fibrillation probability and the fault/contact coincidence probability is a more realistic characterization of
the real risk profile to which a person may be exposed.

The cumulative fatality probability for a person may be calculated in several ways. A straightforward
method is as follows:
1. For each fault instance, determine the associated incremental fatality probability for the
exposure scenario under consideration.
2. Summate each incremental fatality probability to determine the total annual fatality probability
for all expected fault events for the exposure scenario under consideration.
The worker is assumed to be wearing normal work boots, and contacts of extra low voltage (less than 50
volts) may be discounted (i.e. standing on operator mats). A possible process that may be used is as
follows for an electrical worker accessing the front gate of the substation. For this case study it is assumed
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that the operator contacts the main gate 1000 times per year (4 seconds per contact). The coincidence
probability for the primary earth fault case (e.g. one fault per 10 years inside substation, of 0.5 second
duration) is equivalent to 1.43 x 10-5. A similar calculation is undertaken for each secondary earth fault
case identified.

D.3.5 Stepwise refinement

The risk quantification process is usually undertaken in a staged manner, beginning with very conservative
assumptions and the model gradually refined if required. In this analysis of a simple rural zone substation,
the analysis is staged in 4 steps of refinement as follows:
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• First pass: Bus fault levels

• Second pass: Bus plus 1Ω secondary system earth fault levels

• Third pass: Earth fault levels include line and fault resistance

• Fourth pass: Pole top dropout fuses clear faults

In each instance the fatality probability contributions from the primary and secondary earth fault
conditions are quantified and summated to yield an estimate of the expected cumulative risk of fatality
for the exposure scenario. At each of the four stages the cumulative risk is also assessed against the
‘tolerable risk’ guidelines.

D.3.5.1 First pass: Bus fault levels

Conservatively assume that the magnitudes of all secondary earth fault currents that flow are equal to the
bus fault level magnitude. This assumption is true for primary side earth fault events and is used
throughout the case study.

While this case yields the highest earth fault current for earth fault events within the station, in those
instances the current returns directly to the local star point of the source transformers through the earth
grid conductors without entering the soil. Where there is no resultant leakage of current into the soil
there is no voltage rise created on the earth grid conductor (beyond simple resistive longitudinal current

140
 driven voltage drop). This case also assumes that all earth fault events associated with the secondary
system (e.g. rural 11kV lines and plant) have a magnitude equal to the bus earth fault level.

The following Table D-3 summarises the results of each step of the risk quantification process for each
fault location class, with the summated total representing the total annual fibrillation fatality probability
for the substation and power system network.

Table D-3: Quantified risk analysis results- Pass I

Fault Fault Touch Annual fibrillation

Current magnitude EPR
Fault location duration frequency voltage fatality probability
(Amps) (volts)
(secs) (faults/year) (volts) (x10-6)

Primary within
2000 0.5 0.1 1948 390 2.15
station

Primary
N/A - no earth wire N/A N/A N/A N/A 0
upstream

Secondary 6000A - solid earthed

N/A N/A N/A N/A 0
within station star point
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Secondary Assumed equal to

0.7 10 5844 1169 744.6
downstream - bus fault

Total annual fibrillation fatality probability for given exposure (x1e-6) 746.2

The resultant fatality probability is unacceptably high as expected.

Clearly the assumption that the bus earth fault level may be used to represent all secondary system fault
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cases is unrealistic in that any line impedance to the point of fault and fault resistance will reduce the
prospective earth fault level significantly.

D.3.5.2 Second pass: Bus plus 1Ω secondary system earth fault levels
Assume all secondary earth fault currents are equal to the bus fault level plus one ohm fault resistance (to
represent either line impedance and/or fault resistance). The prospective earth fault current is calculated
assuming a source transformer impedance required to give a bolted fault level of 6kA. By including the
impact of the 0.974 ohms source substation grid resistance and 1Ω fault resistance the resultant earth
fault level is calculated to be 2.094 kA.

141
 Table D-4: Quantified risk analysis results- Pass II

Fault Fault Touch Annual fibrillation

Current magnitude EPR
Fault location duration frequency voltage fatality probability
(Amps) (volts)
(secs) (faults/year) (volts) (x1E-6)

Primary within
2000 0.5 0.1 1948 390 2.15
station

Secondary Assumed equal to

0.7 10 2040 408 473.5
downstream bus fault plus 1 Ω

Total annual fibrillation fatality probability for given exposure 475.1

Again, the resultant fatality probability is unacceptably high (see Table D-4). This result is of interest as
the ‘bus plus 1Ω’ fault current assumption has been used for many years in several countries in
conjunction with traditional site independent safety criteria. This calculation gives rise to an interesting
discussion regarding actual risk versus safety criteria:
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• Suffice to say at this point that the actual earth fault level is rarely this high, and therefore the EPR
driving the risk is much attenuated.

• The effect of smaller earth fault currents is that many resultant EPR values are sufficiently low that
the touch voltages create a negligible fibrillation risk, independent of coincidence probability.

• Therefore, both the hazard magnitude and frequency characteristics are overstated by this
assumption.

D.3.5.3 Third pass: Earth fault levels include line and fault impedance
As the risk contribution from the primary side earth fault condition looks to be minimal in comparison to
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that from the secondary side, it is reasonable to spend time undertaking more detailed analysis of the
secondary side risk drivers.

A reasonable next step would be to calculate earth fault currents using actual line and fault impedances at
locations where faults are expected to occur. Actual earth fault conditions vary from substation to
substation (i.e. line structure types, rural tree contacts, lightning prone areas) and some examination and
quantification work has been undertaken in this area for transmission lines as well as 11kV systems [94-
98]. It has been seen that when distribution lines fall to the ground, the current that flows is sufficient to
be cleared by the protection system but does not usually contribute to significant EPR. The majority of
earth fault events are associated with HV assets such as overhead to underground cable transitions, pole
mounted transformers or kiosk transformers, or cable faults. It is possible to calculate the prospective
earth fault level at these discrete locations.
To undertake this analysis adequately, a model of the network is usually used, and faults simulated at
locations such as substations (pole top and ground mounted), arrestor locations (i.e. overhead to
underground cable transition points). Alternatively, a ‘typical’ feeder for the source substation type (i.e
cable type and length, and fault contributing plant density) could be used.

The fault frequency may be determined using actual fault statistics (taken over many years), or using
typical values used upon line types (e.g. underground cable fed system fault rates are much lower than

142
 overhead fed systems, typically 5 times lower). A distribution may be generated or assumed, and a Monte
Carlo sampling analysis undertaken, or as shown in this example cumulative risk determined directly
based upon a summation of the risk calculated for individual fault locations. The direct method has the
additional benefit of highlighting those assets that contribute the greatest risk, thereby facilitating
targeted mitigation strategies.

When determining the fault frequency to apportion across the asset population it should be noted that
several fault events that are included in outage statistics do not yield significant EPR events. These
include:

• Some operator errors,

• Phase to phase faults (e.g. line clashes due to birds or car impact), and

• Some earth fault cases such as ‘line drop’ conditions that result in very low earth fault currents and
may be discounted in the frequency analysis.
For this case study option, the 100 substations are located along the four 25km long overhead rural lines,
each with 15Ω HV earthing systems installed. The range of EPR and touch voltages are shown in the
following chart. It can be seen in Figure D-4 following that out of the 100 assets, earth faults at only 62
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percent of locations yield touch voltages in excess of 50 volts. Therefore, of the 10 faults per year only 62
percent should be counted towards the fault frequency tally, and used to determine the applicable fault
frequency for each asset item (or row) in the attached table (i.e. if all equipment deemed to have same
earth fault rate). The fault rate per asset item is therefore 0.062 faults per year that is equivalent to an
earth fault every 16 years on assets that create a significant touch voltage (e.g. the pole top substations).
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Figure D-4: Individual substation contribution to EPR and Vt

It is assumed that the earth fault duration is defined by the feeder circuit breaker operating time. The
feeder protection relay is assumed to be a standard inverse characteristic (see Figure D-5). This is a
conservative assumption, as a HV winding to tank fault is most likely to be cleared by a dropout fuse
mounted on the pole.

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Figure D-5: Protection clearing time – inverse time relay

Each data point is calculated based upon a single calculation of probability of fatality, and then summated
to form the cumulative risk associated with all secondary earth fault events. The spreadsheet that was
used has the key parameters shown in the following excerpt of six fault cases (e.g. 6 rows out of 100) in
the final analysis (see Table D-5). Note that touch and fault duration units are seconds.
Table D-5: Risk analysis spreadsheet excerpt
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The incremental fatality probability contributed by an earth fault event at an individual asset (i.e. each of
the 100 pole top transformers) is shown in the following graph (see Figure D-6). This level of granularity in
the analysis may appear to be overly time consuming. However, once processes are set up to undertake
the system studies the EPR resulting from an earth fault anywhere in the network may be determined.
This provides the designer with the ability to identify remedial measures that contribute a higher level of
incremental risk compared to other assets (e.g. segregating common bonded MV/LV earthing systems to
limit earth fault current flow, or bonding LV MEN networks to the source substation to provide a direct
return path for fault current).

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Figure D-6: Fatality probability contribution of each distribution asset

The total fatality probability is again the sum of both primary and secondary system contributions (see
Table D-6).

Table D-6: Quantified risk analysis results- Pass III

Annual
Current Fault fibrillation
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Fault Fault duration EPR Touch voltage fatality

magnitude frequency
location (secs) (volts) (volts) probability
(Amps) (faults/year)
(x10-6)

Primary
within 2000 0.5 0.1 1948 390 2.15
station

Based upon
Calculated at Distribution Distribution
Secondary earth fault 10 spread over
asset or individual or individual 2.23
downstream level & feeder asset base
locations results results
protection

Total annual fibrillation fatality probability for given exposure 4.38

Once the actual fault circuit is modelled, the earth fault current and therefore the EPR driving the risk are
much attenuated. With the current magnitude and frequency reflecting realistic conditions in this case the
calculated fatality risk contribution from the secondary system is much reduced. Note that in this simple
example of a rural substation the lack of interconnected systems means that the modelling of the fault

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 network yields greatly reduced earth fault currents driving directly into the local earth grid at the source
substation.

As this analysis shows that the cumulative risk lies in the ALARP region between 1 in one million and 1 in
ten thousand, it is incumbent upon the asset owner to determine if there are any further cost-effective
means for reducing the risk. If not, the risk may be tolerated and managed into the future.

High earth fault current: For many other systems with directly interconnected metallic earthing systems
the calculated earth fault currents may still be quite high, only attenuated by the line impedance, as the
impedance at the point of fault is very low. This high current distribution may not be reflected in a high
EPR distribution, for example the current returning directly through the cable sheath does not contribute
to the EPR.
One outcome of quantifying the risk associated with individual earth fault events across a network is to
demonstrate that high currents that do not always contribute to high EPRs. In this case high fault currents
are beneficial because they reduce protection system clearing times and hence have the double effect of
reducing coincidence probability as well as fibrillation probability. Fast protection clearing times can often
be shown to be a more effect risk mitigation measure than some of the traditional measures such as
voltage reduction.
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D.3.5.4 Fourth pass: Pole top transformer dropout fuses clear faults
An additional step of refinement of the model would be to recognize that pole top transformers will most
likely trip on the pole mounted dropout fuses rather than the upstream feeder breaker. As this is a
substation supplying rural feeders this is a reasonable assumption (i.e. not overly conservative), and
would be considered prior to authorizing any other expenditure to reduce the risk level from the ALARP
region to the negligible/tolerable. Figure D-7 shows the reduction in incremental probability contributed
by each asset compared to Figure D-6.
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Figure D-7: Fatality risk contribution per asset

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 Note: Local fuse protection may operate for a padmount or chamber substation before the upstream
protection for a fault within the switchboard or transformer. Low likelihood upstream cable faults are
likely to be cleared by the upstream or feeder protection.
The resultant annual fibrillation fatality risk contributions from primary and secondary earth fault events
are shown in Table D-7 following.

Table D-7: Quantified risk analysis results- Pass IV

Annual
Current Fault fibrillation
Fault duration EPR Touch voltage fatality
Fault location magnitude frequency
(secs) (volts) (volts) probability
(Amps) (faults/year)
(x10-6)

Primary within
2000 0.5 0.1 1948 390 2.15
station

Based upon
Calculated 10 spread Distribution Distribution
Secondary dropout fuse
at asset over asset or individual or individual 0.247
downstream and earth fault
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locations base results results

level

Total annual fibrillation fatality probability for given exposure 2.39

Table D-8 following summarises the results of each of the four analysis passes.

Table D-8: Quantified risk analysis results – results summary

Annual fibrillation fatality probability (x10-6)

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Analysis Fault location(s)

Analysis description
pass Secondary Total
Primary upstream
downstream
contribution
contribution

Bus fault levels, upstream feeder

I 2.15 744.6 746.2
protection

Primary bus + secondary ‘bus + 1Ω’,

II 2.15 473.5 475.1
upstream feeder protection

Primary bus + secondary ‘bus +line’

III and fault impedance, upstream 2.15 2.23 4.38
IDMT feeder protection

Primary bus + secondary ‘bus +line’

IV and fault impedance, local dropout 2.15 0.247 2.39
fuse protection

147
 Some observations that may be made in addition to those previously included are:

Primary side risk contribution: It may be seen that the primary fault contribution of 2.15x10-6 would
appear to be negligible compared to the secondary fault case contributions. However, the real
significance of the primary fault events becomes evident when the more detailed modelling of the
secondary fault contribution is made.

If the primary current increased clearly the contribution from the primary side fault events would
increase. However, the assumption of a single earth fault event every 10 years on the primary of the
substation is still quite conservative.

Secondary side risk contribution: The case studied clearly demonstrates the value in a closer analysis of
earth fault events in order to demonstrate compliance with societally accepted risk profiles, and to relate
analysis to more realistic shock statistics (i.e. earth fault related shocks are rare events).

D.3.6 Sensitivity and Criticality Analysis (Step 5)

Sensitivity and criticality analysis is a key component in any study. For this case study a simple analysis has
been included to examine the impact of changes in primary earth fault current upon the probability of
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fatality for a given exposure.

The following three graphs (Figures D-8 to D-10) examine the changes in fatality probability for a range of
primary earth fault currents. The fixed protection operating time of 0.5s is also compared with an IDMT
relaying characteristic.
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148
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Figure D-8: Sensitivity: Pfatality with respect to primary current magnitude and relay characteristic

The foregoing graph clearly demonstrates how the Pfatality value is strongly dependent upon the earth
fault current as expected. While the touch voltage would be linearly dependent upon the earth fault
current the risk of fatality increases logarithmically with current. The magnitude of the responses shown
in the preceding graph are dependent upon many factors, therefore the absolute values should only be
used in an indicative manner.

The following two graphs examine the relative strength of the dependence of Pfatality on fault current by
firstly looking at the % change from one current value to the next increment (i.e. 1500Amps to
2000Amps).

149
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Figure D-9: Sensitivity: Pfatality percentage change wrt primary current magnitude and relay characteristic
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It may be seen that the greater Pfatality increase is exhibited by the IDMT relay. This is due to the double
value reduction in fault duration provides i.e. Vt vs tc dependence as well as Pcoincidence reduction due to
the heart’s increased ability to withstand current, the shorter the Pfatality values. With touch voltage
withstand inversely dependent upon contact duration, due to the heart’s increased ability to withstand
current for shorter exposure times.

To reduce the effect, the absolute current steps have upon the response, the following graph shows the
Pfatality characteristic normalized to % current step change.

150
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Figure D-10: Sensitivity: Pfatality percentage change wrt primary current magnitude and relay characteristic,
normalized to current increment (not magnitude)

The foregoing analysis enables the effectiveness of a range of risk mitigation measures to be quantified
and relative cost benefit analysis undertaken and illustrates how individual assets can contribute a high
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component of the risk, and how mitigation can be better targeted than previous approaches.

The final step of RCBA and mitigation option determination is not carried through in this example.

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 D.4 New transmission line
A new 132kV transmission line is be installed to provide a radial connection to a new 132kV substation.
Indirect shock risk safety compliance may be demonstrated in two broad ways:

• Predetermined curves: Demonstrating that touch voltages lie beneath one of the predetermined
touch voltage time curves included in ENA EG-0 and AS2067 and AS7000. This requires the designer
to prove that the installation and exposure condition meets the boundary conditions applicable for a
given curve. This approach is very similar to the traditional approach (Refer to Section 5.6 and
Appendix E).

• Calculation of risk exposure: This approach requires the designer to calculate the risk to which a
person is exposed and then demonstrate that the risk is as low as reasonably practicable using the
ALARP principle.
It is this latter approach that is used for this case study following the steps outlined in Section 5.7.
The following data is relevant to the analysis:

D.4.1 Line electrical details (Step A)

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• 13km radial 132kV line comprising 35 spun concrete poles

• Shieldwire: Single OPGW shieldwire with pole top construction as per drawing supplied.

• Soil resistivity varying between 1000 Ωm and 5000 Ωm.

• Expected pole footing resistance range (ohms): 30-50 ohms due to high soil resistivity

• Earth fault level: 5000 amps at the source substation (including X/R adjustment)

• Protection clearing times – 100 msecs primary with 400 msec secondary/backup expected clearing
time.
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• Source and destination substation impedances are 0.2 ohms

• Earth fault frequency has been calculated to range from 0.5 to 2.5 faults/100km/yr for average pole
footing resistances of between 20 Ω and 50 Ω respectively. Taking the upper end of this range yields 1
fault every 4 years for the line or an outage rate of 0.007 outages/year per structure.

D.4.2 Line hazard scenarios (Step B)

Access to the structures or nearby metalwork leads to several hazard scenarios:
Power utility staff: Staff who access the poles for maintenance purposes only visit a given structure once
every few years yielding a negligible risk increase for a given structure. However, depending on the work
undertaken the cumulative annual risk may exceed tolerable limits without some form of risk mitigation.
Given that structure EPR and direct touch voltage is difficult/expensive to reduce it is most likely that
secondary mitigation measures will be required.
Public exposure: Exposure by the public may be observed to fall into three categories, depending upon
the location of the structures:

• Most of the line traverses land with no significant human interaction (i.e. remote locations).

152
 • The line is to run along a suburban street for some distance, where most poles will only be subject to
irregular contact.

• One pole is planned to be positioned within 5m of a bus stop shelter that is used each school day
morning by school children.

D.4.3 Interference with other infrastructure (Step B)

During any 132kV earth fault or lightning strike event that creates a back flashover EPR on a powerline
structure any nearby metallic services may be impacted by the transfer of voltage coupled through the
soil in addition to any voltages magnetically induced from the power line carrying fault current. A designer
should check utility plans (e.g. Dial before you dig) and inspect the proposed corridor to determine the
distances from the powerline structures to a range of metallic services that may or may not be found in
the vicinity:

• Visible metallic water pipes/taps/meters

• Telco pit, pillar or exchange (with conductive cabling)

• Metallic fence (e.g. guardrail)

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• Railway tracks

• Visible metallic gas pipes/meters

• Metallic pipes for non-public access (e.g. high pressure gas)

• Building

• Swimming pool

• Utilities cathodic protection system

• Conveyors
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• Mine infrastructure – e.g. power cables in underground workings

• Other metallic structures

This case study will not focus on interference with other utilities.

D.4.4 Earth potential rise calculations (Step C)

Analysis was undertaken to determine the EPR at each structure for an earth fault at each structure and
substation. This analysis includes both conductive and inductive coupling between the phase conductor
and the return paths of the overhead shieldwire and the soil.

The maximum EPR for a fault on any structure is calculated to be:

EPR maximum at Pole 15 = 5400 volts
Figure D-11 summarises the maximum EPR (MEPR) for each structure and the contribution by a fault at
each pole to an EPR event at the structure with the maximum EPR (i.e. Pole 15). Note: Pole 15 is listed as
Structure 16 when the terminating substation is included.

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 Figure D-11: Maximum EPR per structure and the contribution of each pole EPR to Pole 15.
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D.4.5 Calculate probability of fatality and assess compliance (Steps D to F)

The risk to which a person is exposed comprises the accumulation of risk associated with each contact
scenario over the course of a year. The cumulative annual fatality probability is calculated for all expected
fault events, for the exposure scenario under consideration.

Three hazard scenarios will be discussed:

• Structures in remote locations

• Structures in suburban roadside locations

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• Structure near bus stop

D.4.5.1 Structures in remote locations

While no safety threat to the public is posed by a pole in a remote location a maximum resistance limit
will be set to enable passing sufficient current to trip protection. In addition, high values of pole footing
resistance will lead to back flashover under certain lightning strike conditions leading to unreasonably
poor line reliability. In this case, the high soil resistivity is resulting in a typical pole footing resistance as
high as 50 Ω. This value is higher than targets typically set for a 132kV line. Therefore, a trade-off will need
to be met between the cost of additional earthing or insulation against impact of more likely line outages
due to back flashover in the event of a lightning strike.

D.4.5.2 Structures in suburban roadside locations

In normal circumstances structures located along a suburban roadway would only be contacted irregularly
by any given person.

D.4.5.2.1 Standard voltage/time curve applicability check

A first pass assessment would normally be done to check to see if a standard voltage/time curve could be
applied (Section 4.10 - Step 4). Of the standard cases listed in Table F-2 the Transmission Urban (TU) case
(see excerpt in Table D-9) is the closest to the situation for 132kV poles lining a suburban street.

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 Table D-9: Transmission Urban Standard Voltage/Time Curve

Can a standard voltage/time curve be applied?

• Earth fault frequency: Earth fault frequency has been calculated for the proposed line to be up to 1
fault every 4 years for the line or an outage rate of 0.007 outages/year per structure. While the
individual structure fault frequency is much lower than the 0.1/yr listed in Table D-9, the fault
frequency for the rest of the poles interconnected by the overhead shieldwire of 0.25/yr is higher.
The designer must decide how to assess the impact of faults on the neighbouring poles transferring to
the pole of interest via the overhead shieldwire.
Examining Figure D-11 shows that faults associated with structures 8 poles away still yield 50% of the
maximum EPR on Pole 15. The high soil resistivity and high pole footing resistance contribute to this high
level of voltage being transferred between poles. A more conservative lower soil resistivity has been
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assumed when calculating foot to ground contact resistance.

• Contact scenario: The Urban Interface contact profile of up to 100 contacts per year could be
considered high for a member of the public (i.e. contact less than twice per week seems reasonable),
unless a gate was connected or closely coupled to the structure. If more frequent exposure is
expected closer consideration as done for the bus stop case in this example may be undertaken.

• Footwear: Yes – standard range of footwear is expected

Therefore, the situation doesn’t meet the standard TU case boundary conditions, and a more detailed site
specific QRA is recommended.
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D.4.5.2.2 Site specific QRA

A staged approach may be undertaken as follows:
First pass: The EPR seen at a given pole for a fault at any pole is the same as that of the highest maximum
earth potential rise (MEPR) pole (i.e. Pole 15). The expected touch voltage at a pole (ignoring the effect of
concrete cover) is calculated to be 60%EPR. The touch voltages appearing at Pole 15 for an earth fault on
any pole (or substation) along the line are shown in Figure D-12. If all earth fault events yielded a touch
voltage of 60 percent of the maximum possible then the touch voltage at the pole of interest would be
3240 volts. A

Probability of coincidence (TU) = 9.02848 x 10-8

Probability of fatality = 0.455881705

Total fibrillation probability = 35 x 0.455881705 x 9.02848 x 10-8

= 1.44057 x 10-6 > 10-6

This result is in the ALARP region. Rather than looking to justify more expenditure by RCBA a less
conservative, more realistic QRA can be undertaken.

155
 Second pass: Use actual EPR values transferred to Pole 15 to generate a more realistic risk profile. Figure
D-12 also shows the probability of fatality at Pole 15 for an earth fault at each pole along the line. This
assumes that there is a uniform distribution of earth fault location along the line. Once the individual
values of EPR have been calculated the QRA calculations for each structure may be done using the batch
mode with the QRA calculation tool [38].
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Figure D-12: Quantified risk analysis results – Pole 15 with Vt of 60% EPR results summary

Probability of coincidence (TU) = 9.02848 x 10-8

Total fibrillation probability = 8.09047 x 10-7 < 10-6

Thus, the additional analysis has shown that a more realistic assessment of the touch voltages likely to be
present yields a total probability of fatality in the negligible risk region (i.e. <10-6). Given that the TU
contact frequency is rather conservative for this site no additional analysis or remedial work is
recommended.

D.4.5.3 Structure adjacent to bus stop

One of the structures is within 5m of a bus stop that school children frequent each school day (i.e.
conservatively 250 days of the year).

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 The expected touch voltage at the bus stop is calculated to be 20%EPR. The touch voltages appearing at
Pole 15 for an earth fault on any pole (or substation) along the line are shown in Figure D-13, along with
the incremental Pfatality contribution for earth faults at other poles along the line assuming 10-minute
touch contact exposure per day.
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Figure D-13: Maximum touch voltage per structure and the contribution of each pole Vt and Pfat to Pole 15.

The length of contact exposure is a parameter that is difficult to estimate with confidence. However, the
value can be set as an unknown variable and the fatality probability calculated for a range of values. Two
stages of analysis are also illustrated:

• First pass: The EPR seen at a given pole for a fault at any pole is the same as that of the highest MEPR
pole (i.e. Pole 15).

• Second pass: Use actual EPR values transferred to Pole 15 to generate a more realistic risk profile.

Figure D-14 illustrates the range of expected probability of fatality for contact duration varying from 5
minutes to 30 minutes per day for both EPR calculations.

157
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Figure E-15: Probability of fatality vs daily contact minutes

It may be seen that the simple analysis requires a contact duration of 8 minutes or less, while the more
realistic model indicates that a person can have up to 25 minutes per day of exposure and have a
negligible risk increase over the course of a year. Clearly such a length of exposure is unlikely on a regular
basis, while an 8-minute exposure may be possible.
The foregoing studies indicate that no additional earthing is required to manage the exposure of members
of the public moving near the structures located in the suburban street. Provided the protection
operation and reliability targets are met, the 50Ω structure earthing (maximum) has been shown to meet
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the indirect shock safety requirements.

Fault frequency for structures near the end of a line. For structures located near each of the terminal
stations the low impedance of the substation reduces the EPR for an earth fault at the structure. In
addition to the other structure EPR events contributing to the risk profile at the structure, the substation
EPR will also be transferred conductively via the shieldwire(s) to the structure of interest. While not as
large as the tower fault case, the station EPR will be a far more frequent event dependent upon the
number of fault events where current is supplied by the substation.

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 D.5 Societal Gathering Case Study
The case study involves an existing 132kV steel lattice tower 10m from a metallic fence surrounding a
sporting ground. Events are held at the ground 30 times/year for a duration of three hours. There are
potentially 100 people exposed to fault situations at each event. As there is an increased likelihood of
more than one person being in an exposed position the assessment will not be able to simply match to an
existing standard voltage/time curve.
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Figure D-15: Societal Gathering Example

Firstly, the location and magnitude of the EPR voltage that drives the touch voltage hazard scenarios will
be assessed. Faults occur at the tower at the rate of 0.045/year with a clearing time of 200msec. The fault
rate includes the effect of neighbouring towers, with the EPR for each fault event assumed to be equal to
that of the tower under investigation being 10kV (i.e. conservative first pass assessment). Appendix D-4
examined in more detail the impact of a closer assessment of faults associated with a transmission line.
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Three main hazard exposure scenarios/locations are identified:

Exposure case 1: Leaning against the fence while watching a football game exposed to a touch voltage. A
touch voltage of 600volts is expected. As a conservative assessment of individual exposure, 90% of the
population may contact the fence adjacent to the tower more than 12 times/ hour while for the societal
exposure the average person will contact 4 times/ hour. The duration of each contact is conservatively
estimated as 30 seconds. Out of a large total number of people who are in the vicinity of the tower, it is
assume that 100 people could be in an exposed position at any one time. This value is governed by how
people are expected to move during the event.
Exposure case 2: Children playing under the legs of the tower exposed to a touch voltage. This latter case
has an increased touch voltage in the range of 40-60% of EPR (say 5kV) but is expected that fewer children
will be exposed at one time (say 4) with an average contact frequency of say 20 contacts per hour
(societal case), and 90% exposure frequency of say 40 contacts per hour (individual contact case), each
with shorter contact periods (say 10 seconds). Note that fibrillation probability is the same for children
and adults in IEC60479.
Exposure case 3: Step voltages: As people sit and stand in the area surrounding the tower many will be
subject to some form of step voltage during a fault event. The hazard voltage will vary in magnitude
widely across the area, therefore a conservative first pass voltage of 2kV is assumed. It is expected that

159
 more people will be exposed at one time (say 20) with an average contact frequency of say 20 contacts
per hour (societal case), and 90% exposure frequency of say 40 contacts per hour (individual contact
case), each with longer contact periods (say 10 minutes).
This information can be entered into an analysis tool [38][39], using a ‘Time dependent – gathering’ Time
Base option (selected under the ‘Tool’ menu). Table D-10 following shows the parameter inputs and
results for the societal gathering risk assessment.
Table D-10: Societal Gathering Risk Assessment

Parameter Value selected

Probability of fibrillation calculation inputs

Current path Touch voltage

Footwear type Standard footwear

Wet or dry? Dry

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Surface layer (Y/N) No

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3

Applied voltage (volts) 600 5000 2000

Fault duration (secs) 0.2

Probability of fibrillation calculation result 0.058 0.5773 2.52x10-4

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Probability of coincidence calculation inputs

Fault assumptions:
0.045
Fault frequency/Year

Fault duration (secs) 0.2

Access assumption: Other (e.g. user defined)

Exposure type Societal gathering

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3

Ave. gathering duration (hrs) 3 3 3

Ave. no of gatherings per year 30 30 30

No. of people possibly exposed simultaneously 100 4 20

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 Ave. contacts/hour/person 4 20 20

Ave. contact duration (sec) 30 5 600

Societal fatality risk FN curve result Negligible risk region (see figures below)

Case 1: Leaning on fence – Multiple fatality likelihood FN curve

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Case 1: Leaning on fence – Negligible risk of fatality touch voltage/time curve

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Case 2: Children playing around tower legs – Multiple fatality likelihood FN curve

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 Case 2: Children playing around tower legs – Negligible risk of fatality touch voltage/time curve
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Case 3: People sitting and standing nearby – Multiple fatality likelihood FN curve

Case 3: People sitting and standing nearby – Negligible risk of fatality step voltage/time curve

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 From the analysis tool output [38] for the touch and step voltage cases illustrated, all points on the F-N
curve sit below the ALARP region in the Negligible risk increase region. The negligible risk of fatality
voltage/time curves are also shown, illustrating the amount of ‘headroom’ available in all three cases.
To ensure that no individual is exposed to a greater risk than that tolerable under the individual risk
exposure targets, it is also necessary to consider the above information for the individual case. See Table
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D-11 following for the analysis input data and results.

Table D-11: Individual Gathering Risk Assessment

Parameter Value selected

Probability of fibrillation calculation inputs – as per Table D-1

Probability of coincidence calculation inputs

Fault assumptions: Fault frequency/Year 0.045

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Fault duration (secs) 0.2

Access assumption: Other (e.g. user defined)

Exposure type Individual gathering

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3

Attendance duration (hrs) 3 3 3

Ave. no of gatherings per year 30 30 30

Ave. contacts/hour/person 12 40 40

Ave. contact duration (sec) 30 5 600

Probability of coincidence calculation result 1.55 x 10-5 2.67 x 10-5 3.04 x 10-4

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 8.99 x 10-7 1.539 x 10-5 7.668 x 10-8
Probability of fatality calculation result
<10 x 10-6 >10 x 10-6 <10 x 10-6

Negligible risk constant probability voltage/time curve See figures below

Case 1: Leaning on fence – Negligible risk of fatality voltage/time curve

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Case 2: Children playing around tower legs – 1.539e-5 individual risk of fatality voltage/time curve
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Case 3: People sitting and standing nearby – Negligible risk of fatality voltage/time curve

164
 The Probability of Fatality for the individual touch and step voltage cases are not all in the negligible risk
category. The probability of fatality associated with the case of children playing around the legs of the
tower is well within the ALARP region.
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A sensitivity analysis should be undertaken to gain an understanding of the key parameters driving each
of the risk profiles and then an assessment made regarding the ability of a range of mitigation measures
to reduce the probability of fatality. While it is relatively easy to remove the immediate tower touch
voltage risk using secondary measures (e.g. gradient control, series impedance) the additional hazard
exposure cases still remain. The remaining steps in the direct QRA analysis are not included in this case
study.
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

165
 Appendix E Standard Voltage/Time Curves
A series of standard prospective touch voltage/clearing time curves have been developed. This is aimed at
providing engineers with design curves complete with their boundary conditions well identified. For each
case study the curve details (figure and equation) and assumptions governing the range of applicability
have been included. If the boundary conditions do not meet the case under investigation Argon [38]
software may be used to generate appropriate design curves. The following comments provide
background to the curves:
Conservatism: Wherever possible a conservative approach has been followed to widen the range of
applicable conditions for a given curve type.
Touch duration: Contact duration of four (4) seconds has been taken as a general case, except where
otherwise mentioned.
Surface soil resistivity: A low soil resistivity value of 50 Ωm has been used.
Standard public footwear: A typical distribution of footwear resistance (see Appendix B.1.2.2 Table B5)
has been selected in all cases except that of bare feet at swimming pools, and electrical worker footwear
(see Appendix B.1.2.2 Table B6) inside substations.
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Surface layer materials: Crushed rock with a resistivity of 3000 Ωm and thickness of 100mm has been
used within substations.
Contact Configuration: The curves relate to prospective touch voltages; however, they can be applied
very conservatively to prospective step voltages.
Wet?: Wet body impedance scenario, with no footwear. (5 and 50 Ωm soil cases given).
Risk targets: All curves relate to a ‘negligible risk’ level as defined for individual and societal risk as
appropriate (see Section 4.4.6). An exception is ‘backyard’ and ‘MEN’ access under zone substation
secondary fault conditions, where a curve corresponding to an individual risk limit of 1 in 100,000 has also
been shown.
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Contact scenarios: The representative contact scenarios selected are:

• Remote – A location where the contact frequency is sufficiently low that the fault/contact
coincidence probability is less than the target fatality probability. In that case there is no touch
voltage target required.
• Urban interface – Asset outside normal public thoroughfare with low frequency of direct contact by a
given person.
• Backyard – An area with a contactable metallic structure (e.g. fence, gate) subject to fault induced
voltage gradients. This metallic structure is not a HV asset but becomes live due to earth fault current
flow through the soil.
• MEN contact – Contact with LV MEN interconnected metalwork (e.g. household taps) under the
influence of either LV MEN voltage rise and/or soil potential rise.

166
 Power System Asset Categories – The power system assets are divided as follows:

• Transmission Assets – overhead lines and cables and associated infrastructure (e.g. poles, earth pits)
with system voltages of 66kV and above.
• Distribution Assets – Overhead lines and cables with system voltages less than 66kV, and distribution
transformers with LV secondary.
• Transmission Substations – Major substations with secondary voltages of 66kV and above.
• Zone Substations – Major substations with secondary voltages less than 66kV.
Fault frequencies and durations: The fault frequencies and durations used are listed with each curve.
They are conservatively based upon the fault data given in Appendix C-3.
Curve shape selected: A conservative curve match has been selected based upon Argon [38] generated
curves corresponding to the cases under consideration. For clearing time conditions outside those
tabulated (i.e. < 0.1 secs and > 10 secs) the curve match equations are not valid. For times less than 100m
secs use the value tabulated for 100 m secs. For times greater than 10 secs apply a tangent to extrapolate
the curve.

The following table summarises the cases provided. Each case is characterised by a particular
combination of fault rate, contact probability and series resistance. The aquatic cases are for wet body, all
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other cases are dry.

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167
 Table E-1: Case Study Descriptions

Case Description Acronym

Contact with transmission asset in urban interface

TU
location.
Contact with distribution asset in urban interface
DU
location.
Contact with metalwork in a backyard effected by either
TDB
Transmission (≥66kV) transmission or distribution asset.
E-1 and distribution Contact with MEN connected metalwork (around house)
assets (< 66kV) where MEN or soil is effected by either transmission or TDMEN
distribution assets.
Contact with metalwork associated with an aquatic
AQ5
centre that operates five months of the year.
Contact with metalwork associated with an aquatic
AQ12
centre that operates twelve 12 months of the year.
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Backyard near Major Substation with Primary side fault. MSPB

Transmission
Backyard near Transmission Substation with Secondary
E-2 substations TSSB
side fault
(≥66kV secondary)
MEN Contact near Transmission Substation with
TSSMEN
Secondary side fault

Backyard near Major Substation with Primary side fault MSPB

Zone substations Backyard near Zone Substation with Secondary side

E-3 ZSSBI
(< 66kV secondary) fault.
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

MEN contact near Zone Substation with Secondary side

ZSSMEN
fault.

Inside Transmission Substation TSI

Inside Major
E-4
Substations
Inside Zone Substation ZSI

E.1 Transmission and Distribution Assets

The following series of curves (in Figure E-1) relate to acceptable prospective touch voltages associated
with earth fault events on transmission and distribution assets. The transmission cases relate to lines and
cables with system voltages of 66kV and above, and distribution lines and substations, with fault
frequency assumptions given in Table E-2.

168
 100000

TU

DU

TDB
10000
TDMEN

AQ5
Prospective Touch Voltage (Volts)

AQ12

1000

100
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10
0.1 1 Clearing Time (sec) 10

Figure E-1: Transmission and Distribution Asset Prospective Touch Voltage Criteria

The following two tables describe the basis of the prospective touch voltage curves shown above.

Table E-2 Curve Generation Data

Curve Fault freq/yr Contact Scenario Footwear

Urban-100 contacts/yr for 4 sec for clearing
Transmission times to 0.7sec (≥66kV)
TU 0.1 Standard
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

Urban 135 contacts/yr for 4 sec clearing times

above 0.7 sec (<66kV)
Distribution Urban DU 0.1 135 contacts/yr for 4 sec Standard
Transmission
Distribution TDB 0.1 Backyard-416 contacts/yr for 4 sec Standard
Backyard
Transmission
TDMEN 0.1 MEN-2000 contacts/yr for 4 sec Standard
Distribution MEN
Aquatic Centre Aquatic societal based gathering with a
AQ5 0.1 None/wet
5 months/yr population size of 50
Aquatic Centre Aquatic societal based gathering with a
AQ12 0.1 None/wet
all year population size of 50
Less than 60 off (4 sec) contacts for 1 sec
Remote N/A 0.1 fault duration, or less than 75 off (4 sec) N/A
contacts for 0.2 sec fault duration

Note that individual risk contact frequency and durations are based upon a ‘typical maximally’ exposed
individual.
The following assumptions are behind the fault rates used in Table E-2.
• Transmission assets: 2 km long transmission section (e.g. asset interconnected by 10 spans each up
to 200m in length with an overhead earthwire) contributing at a fault rate of 5 faults/100km/year
yielding 1 fault per 10 years.

169
 • Distribution assets: A fault rate of 1 fault per 10 years relates to a range of distribution assets including
• 1km of isolated underground cable @ 10 faults/100km/yr
• 2 by 500m of underground cable feeding a substation @ 10 faults/100km/yr
• 1 km line section (e.g. 10 by 100m) with an earthwire shielded @ 10 faults/100km/yr
• 2 by 100m spans without an earthwire @ 40 faults/100km/yr
• 2 by 100m spans without an earthwire and pole mounted substation @ 40 faults/100km/yr
• Aquatic centres: A fault rate of 1 fault per 10 years relates to 500m of underground cable and
associated substation.
• Remote assets: Assets may be considered as ‘remote’ if they do not require a certain touch voltage to
comply with the risk targets (i.e. coincidence probability below risk target).
The following table details the voltage/time points used in the generation of the allowable curves.

Table E-3 Data Points used in Generation of Curves

Curve Voltage Clearing Time (sec)

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Transmission Urban <1 sec TU 8000 0.2

Transmission Urban >1 sec TU 800 1
Distribution Urban DU 800 1
Transmission Distribution Backyard TDB 181 1
Transmission Distribution MEN TDMEN 121 1
Aquatic Centre - 5 months/yr AQ5 60 1
Aquatic Centre all year AQ12 52 1
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

The following table provides the equations that may be used to generate the curves. For time increments
less than 0.1sec, the curve fitting is not valid (e.g. for a clearing time of 0.15 sec, 0.2 sec should be used in
the equation). Discontinuities in the fitted curves may exist outside the 0.1sec granularity.

Table E-4 Curve Generation Equations

Prospective touch voltage characteristic equation

(A+B × Ln(t)+C ×(Ln(t))2+D × (Ln(t))3+E ×(Ln(t))4+F × (Ln(t))5)/
TU
(1+G × Ln(t)+H × (Ln(t))2+I × (Ln(t))3+J ×(Ln(t))4+K ×(Ln(t))5)
DU (A+B ×t+C × t2+D × t3+E × t4+F × t5)/(1+G × t+H × t2+I × t3+J × t4+K × t5)

TDB (A+B × t0.5+C × t+D × t1.5+E × t2)/(1+F × t0.5+G × t+H × t1.5+I × t2)

TDMEN (A+B × t+C × t2+D × t3+E × t4)/(1+F × t+G × t2+H × t3+I × t4+J × t5)

AQ5 (A+B × t0.5+C × t+D × t1.5+E × t2)/(1+F × t0.5+G × t+H × t1.5+I × t2+J × t2.5)

AQ12 (A+B ×t+C × t2+D × t3+E × t4+F × t5)/(1+G × t-+H × t2+I × t3+J × t4+K × t5)

170
 TU DU TDB TDMEN AQ5 AQ12
A 799.42725 8220.3651 97.645156 -649.67186 698.77353 495.31069
B -151.06911 -16049.118 -795.84933 16189.957 -2119.495 -924.04026
C 2134.7725 -3233.5941 2480.8153 -20833.832 2500.9396 799.79951
D -2465.5817 22189.669 -3353.6563 -7164.2576 -1252.7575 1923.7987
E 957.22069 -17347.089 1882.7004 50476.952 227.96264 -910.51476
0.06771926
F -54.963953 8373.5787 -8.6985271 -16.765657 102.10042
4
G 2.439744 6.8997717 27.772071 255.8065 -7.9995184 5.7831848
H 2.1390046 -48.174695 -38.682025 -743.73193 15.571508 -34.926711
I -0.37795247 109.8737 20.292411 852.87544 -9.7021929 85.548089
J -0.062680222 -118.88136 -12.438076 1.9941212 -32.281391
K 0.072177248 51.807561 3.3629346

Societal Risk Assessment

Copyrighted material distributed by SAI Global and licensed to Horizon Power. Accessed on 2022-07-08.

The societal risk associated with each of the assets has also to be assessed for each hazard scenario with
the assumptions and conclusions shown in Table E-5. Note that the exposure conditions are based upon
average exposure frequency and duration estimates for the susceptible group of people, and the number
of exposed people is based upon the number who could reasonably be expected to be able to make
simultaneous contact with affected metalwork.
Table E-5 Societal Risk Assessment Assumptions

Av Av Max. no.
Av. no.
Av. contacts/ contacts gathering people for
Curve gatherings/y
person/yr duration duration < 10e-6
r
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(secs) (hrs) risk

Transmission
Urban <1 sec TU 75 Year 4 N/A N/A 41

Transmission
Urban >1 sec TU 75 Year 4 N/A N/A 41

Distribution
DU 75 Year 4 N/A N/A 43
Urban
Transmission
Distribution TDB 312 Year 4 N/A N/A 42
Backyard
Transmission
Distribution TDMEN 1500 Year 4 N/A N/A 42
MEN
Aquatic
Centre AQ5 7/gathering 4 10 150 43
5 months/yr
Aquatic
Centre AQ12 7/gathering 4 10 365 43
all year

171
 Assumptions
• Contacts are based on the expected behaviour of an average person. This has been
approximated as 75% of the number of contacts for a worst-case single individual.
• Aquatic contacts are 7 per person per gathering. This is 7 contacts per person over a 10-hour
gathering duration.
Application notes
• Assets directly connected to major substations need to comply with the criteria listed in the
section for faults associated with the asset, as well as the appropriate major substation criteria
for voltages transferred to the asset under substation EPR conditions.
• The fault rates chosen are above average for higher transmission voltage assets to simplify the
criteria generated. This does not preclude a utility from reassessing its own asset class and
deriving less stringent criteria if necessary.
• Whenever safety criteria are selected (either standard curves or using Argon [38] software) it is
important that appropriate technical review be undertaken (e.g. peer and/or manager review
and signoff). For alternative curves generated within Argon it is also important that adequate
sensitivity analysis be undertaken, and assumptions and decisions documented in a generated
report.
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• A surface soil resistivity of 50 Ωm has been used for all contact cases outside a major substation
fence. This is quite a conservative value as in many instances the higher surface soil resistivity
would add series impedance allowing higher perspective touch voltages. Figure E-2 provides,
and example of the Transmission/Distribution MEN contact criteria for a range of soil
resistivities.

10000

TDMEN - 50 ohmm

TDMEN - 100 ohmm

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TDMEN - 500 ohmm

Prospective touch voltage (volts)

1000 TDMEN - 1000 ohmm

TDMEN - 2000 ohmm

100

10
0.1 1 Clearing time (secs) 10

Figure E-2 Surface soil resistivity effect on TDMEN prospective touch voltage contact case

172
 E.2 Transmission substations
The following series of curves relate to acceptable prospective touch voltages associated with earth fault
events on transmission substations, and hazard scenarios beyond the fence. The transmission cases relate
to system voltages of 66kV and above, with fault frequency assumptions given in Table E-6. The hazard
scenarios to be managed within the transmission substation perimeter fence are handled separately in
Appendix E-4.

10000

MSPB

TSSB

1000
TSSMEN
Prospective touch voltage (volts)
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100

10
Clearing time (secs)
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

0.1 1 10

Figure E-3: Transmission Asset Prospective Touch Voltage Criteria

The following two tables describe the basis of each prospective touch voltage curve shown above. Note
that individual risk contact frequency and durations are based upon a ‘typical maximally’ exposed
individual (i.e. 90-95% confidence limit).
Table E-6 Curve Generation Data

Fault
Curve Contact Scenario Footwear
frequency/yr
Major Substation Primary Backyard-416
MSPB 0.1 Standard
Backyard contacts/yr for 4 sec
Transmission Substation Backyard-416
TSSB 5 Standard
Secondary Backyard contacts/yr for 4 sec
Transmission Substation TSS MEN-2000
5 Standard
Secondary MEN MEN contacts/yr for 4 sec

173
 The following points provide the assumptions behind the fault rates listed in Table E-7.
• Major substation primary (transmission or zone substation): 1 fault per 10 years.
• Transmission substation secondary: A fault rate of 5 faults per year conservatively relates to
100km of 66kV (or above) lines allowing for up to 5 faults/100km/yr.
The following table details the voltage/time points used in the generation of the allowable curves.

Table E-7 Data Points used in Generation of Curves

Clearing
Curve Voltage
Time (sec)
Major Substation Primary Backyard MSPB 817 0.2

Transmission Substation Secondary Backyard TSSB 353 0.2

Transmission Substation Secondary MEN TSSMEN 167 0.2

The following table provides the equations that may be used to generate the curves.
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Table E-8: Curve Generation Equations

Curve Prospective touch voltage characteristic equation

MSPB (A+B × t2+C × t4+D × t6+E × t8)/(1+F × t2+G× t4+H × t6+I × t8)
(A+B × Ln(t)+C × Ln(t)2+D × Ln(t)3+E × Ln(t)4+F × Ln(t)5)/(1+G × Ln(t)+H × Ln(t)2+I ×
TSSB
Ln(t)3+J × Ln(t)4+K × Ln(t)5)
TSSMEN (A+B × t+C × t2+D × t3+E × t4)/(1+F × t+G × t2+H× t3+I× t4+J× t5)
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

MSPB TSSB TSSMEN

A 1241.258 75.68182 201.3427
B -4848.43 -43.9751 -1199.97
C 28118.07 19.48004 2566.167
D 50914.76 -66.1741 -3298.33
E -1488.67 40.51125 3434.546
F 11.65353 -4.42428 -6.04267
G -95.9901 -0.04563 18.8067
H 496.1288 -0.48785 -47.4951
I -13.7814 -0.35768 58.25748
J 0.209505 2.793045
K 0.045215

Societal Risk Assessment

The societal risk associated with each of the assets has also to be assessed for each hazard scenario
with the assumptions and conclusions shown in Table E-9. Note that the exposure conditions are
based upon average exposure frequency and duration estimates for the susceptible group of

174
 people, and the number of exposed people is based upon the number who could reasonably be
expected to be able to make simultaneous contact with affected metalwork.

Table E-9 Data Points used in Generation of Curves

Av contacts Max. no.

Av. contacts/
Curve duration people for <
person/year
(secs) 10e-6 risk
Major Substation Primary
MSPB 75/Year 4 41
Backyard
Transmission Substation
TSSB 75/Year 4 41
Secondary Backyard
Transmission Substation
TSSMEN 1500/Year 4 43
Secondary MEN

Assumption
Contacts are based on the expected behaviour of an average person. This has been approximated
as 75% of the number of contacts for a worst-case single individual.
As the number of exposed people is expected to be less than the societal 10-6 criteria (see Table E-
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9), the governing case is that of the individual risk criteria.

Application notes
Whenever safety criteria are selected (either standard curves or using QRA [38][39] software) it is
important that appropriate technical review be undertaken (e.g. peer and/or manager review and
signoff). For alternative curves generated within Argon it is also important that adequate sensitivity
analysis be undertaken, and assumptions and decisions documented in a generated report.

E.3 Zone substations

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The following series of curves (see Figure E-4) relate to acceptable prospective touch voltages associated
with earth fault events on zone substations, and hazard scenarios beyond the fence. The primary fault
cases are common with the transmission substations, while the secondary fault cases relate to system
voltages of below 66kV. The hazard scenarios to be managed within the substation perimeter fence are
handled separately in Appendix E-4.

175
 10000

MSPB

ZSSB 1e-5

ZSSB 1e-6
Prospective Touch Voltage (Volts)

1000
ZSSMEN 1e-5

ZSSMEN 1e-6

100

10
0.1 1 10
Clearing Time (sec)

Figure E-4: Zone Substation Prospective Touch Voltage Criteria

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The following two tables describe the basis of each prospective touch voltage curve shown above. Note
that individual risk contact frequency and durations are based upon a ‘typical maximally’ exposed
individual (i.e. 90-95% confidence limit).

Table E-10 Curve Generation Data

Fault Contact
Curve Footwear
frequency/yr Scenario
Major Substation Primary Backyard-416
MSPB 0.1 Standard
Backyard contacts/yr for 4 sec
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Zone Substation Secondary ZSSB Backyard-416

40 Standard
Backyard (P fatality = 1e-5) 1e-5 contacts/yr for 4 sec
Zone Substation Secondary ZSSB Backyard-416
40 Standard
Backyard (P fatality = 1e-6) 1e-6 contacts/yr for 4 sec
Zone Substation Secondary ZSSMEN MEN-2000 contacts/yr
40 Standard
MEN (P fatality = 1e-5) 1e-5 for 4 sec
Zone Substation Secondary ZSSMEN MEN-2000 contacts/yr
40 Standard
MEN (P fatality = 1e-6) 1e-6 for 4 sec

The following points provide the assumptions behind the fault rates listed in Table E-10.
• Major substation primary (transmission or zone substation): 1 fault per 10 years
• Zone substation secondary: A fault rate of 40 faults per year conservatively relates to 100km of <66kV
lines allowing for up to 40 faults/100km/yr. This value is higher than that experienced at many urban
cable networks, but lower than that experienced at some rural substations with long overhead lines.
Refer to Application notes at the end of this section for more discussion.
The following table details the voltage/time points used in the generation of the allowable curves.

176
 Table E-11 Data Points used in Generation of Curves

Clearing
Curve Voltage
Time (sec)
Major Substation Primary Backyard MSPB 817 0.2
Zone Substation Secondary Backyard (P fatality = 1e-5) ZSSB 1e-5 162 0.5
Zone Substation Secondary Backyard (P fatality = 1e-6) ZSSB 1e-6 82 0.5
Zone Substation Secondary MEN (P fatality = 1e-5) ZSSMEN 1e-5 105 0.5
Zone Substation Secondary MEN (P fatality = 1e-6) ZSSMEN 1e-6 58 0.5

The following table provides the equations that may be used to generate the curves.
Table E-12: Curve Generation Equations

Prospective touch voltage characteristic equation

MSPB (A+B × t2+C × t4+D × t6+E × t8)/(1+F × t2+G × t4+H × t6+I × t8)
ZSSB 1e-5 (A+B × t+C × t2+D × t3+E× t4)/(1+F × t+G × t2+H × t3+I × t4+J × t5)
(A+B × Ln(t)+C × Ln(t)2+D × Ln(t)3+E × Ln(t)4)/
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ZSSB 1e-6
(1+F × Ln(t)+G× Ln(t)2+H × Ln(t)3+I × Ln(t)4+J × Ln(t)5)
ZSSMEN 1e-5 (A+B × t+C× t2+D × t3+E × t4+F × t5)/(1+G × t+H × t2+I × t3+J × t4+K × t5)
ZSSMEN 1e-6 (A+B × t2+C× t4+D × t6+E × t8)/(1+F × t2+G × t4+H × t6+I × t8)

MSPB ZSSB 1e-5 ZSSB 1e-6 ZSSMEN 1e-5 ZSSMEN 1e-6

A 1241.2581 414.47239 58.704212 241.82759 60.120211
B -4848.4271 -1624.8778 -64.790797 -561.29412 275.67652
C 28118.067 4370.8166 9.3195529 854.39356 415.81948
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

D 50914.762 -7009.3324 -14.235582 -85.405692 -123.54387

E -1488.6715 8665.1363 17.744609 -204.28229 12.860762
F 11.65353 -6.4730161 -0.75856407 55.953719 4.0397975
G -95.990136 38.73057 -0.37320234 -2.0399516 10.805298
H 496.1288 -109.23281 -0.03023277 3.7776532 -3.0940403
I -13.781359 132.21093 0.27792391 7.436951 0.32026358
J 4.9045266 0.02769612 -6.8814069
K 1.4292578

Societal Risk Assessment

The societal risk associated with each of the assets has also to be assessed for each hazard scenario with
the assumptions and conclusions shown in Table E-8. Note that the exposure conditions are based upon
average exposure frequency and duration estimates for the susceptible group of people, and the number
of exposed people is based upon the number who could reasonably be expected to be able to make
simultaneous contact with affected metalwork.

177
 Table E-13 Data Points used in Generation of Curves

Av
Av.
contacts Max. no.
Curve contacts/
duration people for risk
person/yr
(secs)

Major Substation Primary Backyard MSPB 312 4 43 (<10e-6)

Zone Substation Secondary Backyard (P ZSSB

312 4 43 (<10e-5)
fatality = 1e-5) 1e-5
Zone Substation Secondary Backyard (P ZSSB
312 4 45 (<10e-6)
fatality = 1e-6) 1e-6
Zone Substation Secondary MEN ZSSMEN
1500 4 53(<10e-5)
(P fatality = 1e-5) 1e-5
Zone Substation Secondary MEN ZSSMEN
1500 4 56 (<10e-6)
(P fatality = 1e-6) 1e-6

As the number of exposed people is expected to be less than the societal 10-6 criteria (see Table E-13),
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the governing case is that of the individual risk criteria.

Application notes
The two curves delineating the risk range of 10-6 to 10-5 are used in this instance on account of the
relatively low allowable voltages resulting from a combination of higher fault and contact frequencies found
in the vicinity of a zone substation.
It is expected that the risk profile for many substations will lie in this part of the ALARP region and require
the designer to undertake either:
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• Some form of risk cost benefit analysis to justify the level of mitigation considered ‘reasonable’ for a
given substation, or
• Deriving their own set of curves based upon a different fault frequency, or
• Evaluate the fault current levels more closely to take into consideration a more ‘reasonable’ expected
EPR value. It would be seen to be reasonable to take the current corresponding to the 90%
confidence limit. Studies have shown that it is not unusual to reduce the ‘bus plus 1Ω’ fault
impedance by 60-70% when more realistic line and fault impedances are incorporated.
It is expected that for some maintenance or construction activities a special assessment of the risk exposure
may be warranted (e.g. replacing fences, extending an operating yard). It may be appropriate that training
and work methods put in place to protect workers in these instances (see Section 4.19.2).

Whenever safety criteria are selected (either standard curves or using safety QRA [38[[39] software) it is
important that appropriate technical review be undertaken (e.g. peer and/or manager review and signoff).
For alternative curves generated within the software it is also important that adequate sensitivity analysis
be undertaken, and assumptions and decisions documented in a generated report.

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 E.4 Inside major substations
The following series of curves (see Figure E-5) relate to acceptable prospective touch voltages associated
with earth fault events on major transmission and zone substations, for hazard scenarios within the
fence. The contact scenarios are associated with utility workers (e.g. operators, technicians) involved in
carrying out their normal duties, and therefore it is considered reasonable that the risk associated with
their aggregated exposure across all substations be kept within acceptable limits. The primary fault cases
have been evaluated and considered to contribute very little to the risk profile, therefore the secondary
fault cases are considered as the defining cases.

10000

TSI 1e-5

TSI 1e-6

ZSI 1e-5
Prospective Touch Voltage (Volts)

1000
ZSI 1e-6
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100

10
0.1 1 Clearing Time (sec) 10

Figure E-5 Allowable prospective touch voltages

within substation perimeter fence
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The following two tables describe the basis of each prospective touch voltage curve shown above.
Contact scenarios: 1000 contacts with metalwork per year, with no equipotential earth mat or gloves. This
is only a percentage of the full number of contacts. It is the number of contacts that occur without
mitigation measures such as operator equipotential earthmats. However, it was decided that the risk levels
were such that:
• Equipotential operating mats be installed, and
• Gates have asphalt under foot, and/or open inwards.
Underfoot series impedance: 50Ωm topsoil with 100mm of 3000Ωm crushed rock
Footwear: Electrical footwear (see Appendix B.1.2.2)
Individual risk contact frequency and durations: Based upon a ‘typical maximally’ exposed individual (i.e.
90-95% confidence limit).

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 Table E-14 Curve Generation Data

Curve Fault frequency/yr

Transmission Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-5) TSI 1e-5 5

Transmission Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-6) TSI 1e-6 5

Zone Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-5) ZSI 1e-5 40

Zone Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-6) ZSI 1e-6 40

The following points provide an outline of the assumptions behind the fault rates listed in Table E-14.

• Transmission substation secondary: A fault rate of 5 faults per year conservatively relates to 100km
of 66kV (or above) lines allowing for up to 5 faults/100km/yr.
• Zone substation secondary: A fault rate of 40 faults per year conservatively relates to 100km of
<66kV lines allowing for up to 40 faults/100km/yr. This value is higher than that experienced at many
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urban cable networks, but lower than that experienced at some rural substations with long overhead
lines. Refer to Application notes at the end of this section for more discussion.

The following table details the voltage/time points used in the generation of the allowable prospective
touch voltage curves.

Table E-15 Data Points used in Generation of Curves

Clearing Time
Curve Voltage
(sec)
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Transmission Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-5) TSI 1e-5 1710 0.2

Transmission Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-6) TSI 1e-6 650 0.2

Zone Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-5) ZSI 1e-5 298 0.5

Zone Substation Inside (P fatality = 1e-6) ZSI 1e-6 133 0.5

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 The following table provides the equations that may be used to generate the curves.

Table E-16: Curve Generation Equations

Prospective touch voltage characteristic equation

TSI 1e-5 (A+B × t2 + C × t4+D× t6+E × t8+F × t10)/(1+G × t2+H × t4+I × t6+J × t8+K × t10)

TSI 1e-6 (A+B ×t+C× t2+D × t3+E × t4)/(1+F × t+G × t2+H × t3+ I × t4)

ZSI 1e-5 (A+B × t+ C × t2+ D × t3+E × t4+ F × t5)/(1+G × t+H × t2+I × t3+J × t4+ K × t5)

ZSI 1e-6 A+B × t+C/t+D× t2+E/t2+F × t3

TSI 1e-5 TSI 1e-6 ZSI 1e-5 ZSI 1e-6

A 2569.545 637.94153 1110.8979 141.67741
B 1197.681 -572.49703 -3007.2425 -14.724067
C 17499.51 2714.9907 3480.5229 -1.9700353
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D 79372.2 -10805.961 -1447.8536 3.6573951

E 3154.154 13995.845 2727.496 0.15442975
F 92.91638 -7.1746418 -478.7441 -0.32081732
G 15.05919 51.04948 -1.7566906
H -50.4536 -121.8715 3.7172855
I 440.98 114.44089 -5.7402292
J 26.95798 20.567474
K 0.450135 -3.6778086
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Societal Risk Assessment

The societal risk associated with each of the assets has also to be assessed for each hazard scenario with
the assumptions and conclusions shown in Table E-17. Note that the exposure conditions are based upon
average exposure frequency and duration estimates for the susceptible group of people, and the number
of exposed people is based upon the number who could reasonably be expected to be able to make
simultaneous contact with affected metalwork.

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 Table E-17: Data Points used in Generation of Curves

Av contact
Av. contacts/ Max. no. people
Curve duration
person/year for risk
(secs)
Transmission Substation Inside (P
TSI 1e-5 750 4 5 (<10e-5)
fatality = 1e-5)
Transmission Substation Inside (P
TSI 1e-6 750 4 64 (<10e-6)
fatality = 1e-6)
Zone Substation Inside
ZSI 1e-5 750 4 3 (<10e-5)
(P fatality = 1e-5)
Zone Substation Inside
ZSI 1e-6 750 4 45(<10e-6)
(P fatality = 1e-6)

Assumption
Contacts are based on the expected behaviour of an average person. This has been approximated as 75%
of the number of contacts for a worst-case single individual.
As the number of exposed people is expected to be less than the societal 10-6 criteria (see Table E-9), the
governing case is that of the individual risk criteria.
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Application notes
Whenever safety criteria are selected (either standard curves or using safety QRA [38][39] software) it is
important that appropriate technical review be undertaken (e.g. peer and/or manager review and
signoff). For alternative curves generated within QRA software it is also important that adequate
sensitivity analysis be undertaken, and assumptions and decisions documented in a generated report.
Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

182
 Appendix F Risk Cost Benefit Analysis
Case Studies

F.1 Example 1 – Cost of Fatality

For example, if the equivalent probability Pe has been calculated as 10-5, then the risk level is in the ALARP
or Intermediate region. This means that either the risk be reduced to the ‘tolerable’ or negligible level, or
that a risk cost benefit analysis should be done to determine if it is cost effective to implement available
risk treatment measures.

The calculated equivalent probability of 10-5 means that value determined has been deemed equivalent
to one individual fatality per 100,000 years (= Pe-1) and since the VoSL is $10,000,000, over a period of
100,000 years the asset owners liability per year is:

L = Asset owners liability per year (dollars),

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VoSL
L = = VoSL × Pe
Pe−1 F-1
-5
= $10,000,00 0 × 1 × 10 = $100 per year
The present value of risk treatment can be calculated using the remaining lifespan of the asset, the
liability per year and the expected rate of interest on an alternative investment (discount rate). The
present value (PV) figure calculated is considered a positive return as the investment into the elimination
of hazards will result in a reduction of the liability equal to the PV.

Y 1 L(1+D)
1−(1+1D )Y  F-2
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L ∑ =
=PV
i=1 i
(1 + D)
D
 
Where
PV = Present value (dollars),
L = Asset owner’s liability per year (dollars),
D = Discount rate (fractional rate of interest),
Y = Time over which the asset will remain potentially hazardous (years).

If a discount rate of 0.04 (4%) is used, then the present value of the reduction in liability can be calculated
as approximately $2,234 for a remaining asset lifetime of 50 years. A discount rate of 4% is used in this
context as a representation of the interest on the opportunity cost investment. A sensitivity analysis
would examine the impact of a range of possible values of cost of capital.

The PV is used to provide a guide as to the appropriate level of expenditure that should be used when
determining whether risk treatment is a cost-effective option. The PV is compared to risk treatment costs
to ensure that costs are not grossly disproportionate to the reduction in liability.
In this case, comparing this figure to the costs of risk treatment (say $5,000), it appears that the
implementation of treatment is not cost effective. However, as this Pe equates to an ‘intermediate risk’

183
 and the cost of mitigation is only 2.3 times the NPV calculation. Therefore, the cost is clearly not ‘grossly
disproportionate’ and so risk treatment should be fitted.

F.2 Example 2 – Per Person Cost of Lowering Pfatality

In most situations the implementation of a risk treatment option may not eliminate the probability of
fatality, but merely reduce the probability to a lower value. A risk cost benefit analysis may be applied
using the amount by which the probability has been reduced to determine whether the risk treatment
option is worthwhile.

F.3 Example 3 – Multiple people impacted by single risk mitigation

measure
Figure F-1 illustrates the positive effect of a mitigation measure that reduces the fatality risk for greater
than a single person using the process demonstrated in Example F-1. In this case the risk mitigation
measure is designed to reduce the risk to a negligible level for 20 people who could be in an exposed
position simultaneously.
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Figure F-1: RCBA proportionality assessment

For the Disproportionality Factor of 10 used in the example, the risk mitigation measure only needs to
reduce the risk to a negligible level for 3 or more people for the cost to not be grossly disproportionate.

184
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185
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Reproduction,distribution,storage or use on a network is prohibited.

This has been prepared by Energy Networks Australia for the benefit of its members. A full list of
member businesses is available at www.energynetworks.com.au/ena-members
Energy Networks Association Limited
Trading as Energy Networks Australia
ABN 75 106 735 406

Unit 5, Level 12, 385 Bourke Street

Melbourne VIC 3000
T: +61 3 9103 0400
E: [email protected]
W: www.energynetworks.com.au

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