Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes

Author(s): Daniela Donno

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 3 (July 2013), pp. 703-716
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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 Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian
Regimes
Daniela Donno University of Pittsburgh

When do elections in authoritarian regimes lead to democracy? Building from the distinction between competitive and
hegemonic authoritarian regimes, I argue that presence of relatively weaker incumbents renders competitive authori
tarian elections more prone to democratization, but only when domestic and international actors choose to actively
pressure the regime. The effects of two forms of pressure—opposition electoral coalitions and international conditionality—
are theorized. Propositions are tested using a comprehensive dataset of elections in authoritarian regimes from 1990
to 2007. Results support two core claims: that the effect of electoral pressure is conditional on the type of authoritar
ianism and that this greater vulnerability to pressure is the reason why competitive authoritarian elections are more
likely to lead to democracy. In contrast, several alternative explanations—that differences across regime type are ex
plained by alternation in power, better electoral conduct, or ongoing processes of liberalization—are not supported by the
evidence.

The first step toward answering this question is to

consider the differences in electoral context across elec
Since the end of the cold war, dictators around the
globe have adapted to the changed international
environment by adopting the form—though not toral authoritarian (EA) regimes: in hegemonic author
necessarily the substance—of democracy. The result has itarian regimes (HARs), the incumbent or ruling party
been a proliferation of electoral authoritarian regimes in enjoys overwhelming electoral dominance (convention
which political offices are filled through multiparty elec ally understood as winning more than 70 or 75% of the
tions, but the electoral playing field is skewed in favor vote or seat share); whereas in competitive authoritarian
of the ruling party (Schedler 2006, 3). These "hybrid" regimes (CARs), opposition parties pose greater electoral
regimes defy straightforward classification and chal challenges and garner a larger share of votes. Research has
lenge traditional, teleological theories of democratization shown that CARs are more likely to transition to democ
(Diamond 2002). Their proliferation has therefore cre racy than HARs (Brownlee 2009; Roessler and Howard
ated a surge of scholarly interest in explaining when they 2009). Yet, the underlying reasons for this difference—
democratize (Levitsky and Way 2010) and when dictators and the role played by elections—remain unclear. While
can be defeated at the ballot box (Bunce and Wolchik it is clear that stronger opposition challengers in CARs
2010a), as well as whether the repeated holding of elec should translate to a higher probability of alternation in
tions produces democratization (Lindberg 2006, 2009). power, it is not obvious why these regimes should be
However, a central unresolved puzzle about electoral au more likely to democratize—an outcome which entails a
thoritarian regimes is why elections serve to bolster au systematic improvement in the quality of elections. That
thoritarian rule at some times yet undermine it at others. many EA regimes remain durably authoritarian even af
When do elections lead to democracy? ter power changes hands attests to the importance of

Daniela Donno is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 4600 Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 ([email protected]).

For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Despina Alexiadou, Thad Dunning, Steve Finkel, Michael Goodhart, Julia Gray,
Ken Greene, Marc Morjé Howard, Susan Hyde, Judith Kelley, Staffan Lindberg, Scott Morgenstern, Anibal Pérez-Linan, Nita Rudra, Burcu
Savun, Susan Stokes, Leonard Wantchekon, as well as participants at the Duke University Seminar on Global Governance and Democracy;
the Juan March Institute Workshop on Electoral Fraud, Vote Buying and Clientelism; and the University of Pittsburgh Globalization
Workshop. Additional thanks to Jason Brownlee, Marc Howard, Philip Roessler, Judith Kelley, Susan Hyde, and Nikolay Marinov for
generously sharing their data. Shawna Metzger, Daniel Tirone, and Bruno Hoepfers provided excellent research assistance.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 3, July 2013, Pp. 703-716

©2013, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/ajps. 12013

703

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 704 DANIELA DONNO

treating imply that competitive authoritarian elections are not

turnover a
nomena. Moreover,
inherently destabilizing. Rather, it is the application of
challengers
specific forms of
in domestic or international
CARs pressure that o
tives to can transform these contests into mechanisms for de
manipulate e
democratization. mocratization. When applied in HARs, the same forms
While existing research has tended to study elec of pressure are ineffective.
toral politics in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian
regimes separately, this article forwards a unified frame
work for understanding elections across EA regimes. It
takes the key difference between CARs and HARs—the Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
degree of incumbent or ruling party dominance—as the
The distinction between electoral authoritarianism and
starting point for theorizing the conditions under which
authoritarian elections lead to democratization. I argue democracy hinges on the quality of electoral competition
that two key forms of electoral pressure are more effective (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006, chap. 1 ). EA regimes allow
in CARs than in HARs. First, the relative weakness of in multiple parties to compete in elections, but they do so
cumbents in competitive authoritarian elections affords under patently unfair conditions. Incumbents may place
opposition parties with greater opportunities to forge barriers on opposition parties' ability to campaign; gener
electorally viable coalitions, which, in turn, decrease the ate a progovernment media bias; stack electoral commis
incumbent's ability to engage in electoral manipulation. sions and courts with their supporters; or resort to stuffing
Coalitions in HARs, in contrast, are unlikely to spur im ballot boxes and manipulating vote tabulations. Among
proved electoral conduct and democratization because EA regimes, a further distinction can be made based on
they are not perceived as a threat. Second, incumbents' the degree to which the incumbent or ruling party is elec
weaker electoral standing in CARs means that their need torally dominant (Brownlee 2009, 518; Diamond 2002).
for external support is greater, increasing their sensitiv In HARs, the ruling party wins elections by wide margins,
ity to international pressure for democracy. By compari while in CARs, elections serve as "arenas through which
son, hegemonic regimes are more insulated from external opposition forces may—and frequently do—pose signif
pressure. Thus, although opposition parties coalesce and icant challenges" (Levitsky and Way 2002, 54), despite
international actors impose conditionality at nearly iden many obstacles to their success. Election results matter be
tical rates in hegemonic and competitive authoritarian cause they signal the regime's level of control over the po
elections, these forms of pressure are only effective in litical arena (Brownlee 2007, 3), as well as (more noisily)
CARs. its level of popular support (Gandhi 2008, 167; Gandhi
To test these propositions, I analyze the full set of elec and Lust-Okar 2009, 405). Overwhelming electoral vic
tions in EA regimes (both competitive and hegemonic) tories therefore contribute to an aura of invincibility that
from 1990 to 2007. Information on opposition coalitions discourages elite defections and deters voters from sup
and international conditionality is originally coded. Byporting the opposition (Simpser 2013). Thus, the use of
focusing on the application of specific tools of internaincumbent vote shares to distinguish between HARs and
tional pressure for democracy, this study also differs fromCARs is not merely a convenient analytical shortcut; elec
previous research on structural, diffuse forms of internation results are a direct measure of authoritarian political
dominance.
tional influence, such as economic linkage or membership
in international organizations. To understand why some authoritarian regimes are
The results of the analysis strongly support the claim hegemonic and others more competitive, one must look
that opposition coalitions and international conditional to a set of deep-rooted institutional and economic con
ity are effective levers for democratization in CARs, but ditions.1 Some regimes that secure political dominance
not in HARs. I then evaluate a number of alternative ex are able to do so because of their resource advantages—
planations for why competitive authoritarian elections arestemming, for example, from a large, politicized pub
more likely to lead to democracy. I find, perhaps surpris lic sector, or natural resource wealth—that are used to
ingly, that CARs are no more likely than HARs to be on a maintain patronage networks and buy mass support
liberalizing path to democracy, nor do they exhibit better (Magaloni 2006, 15-24). These resource advantages,
electoral conduct. Moreover, CARs' greater propensity to in turn, create an incentive structure that induces the
democratize is not explained by their higher frequency
of alternation in power. These facts, which belie con 1 This is different from the question of regime survival. An autocracy
ventional wisdom about electoral authoritarian regimes, may prove highly durable despite an inability to secure hegemony.

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 ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 705

opposition to pursue self-defeating

the probability of a democratic transition is closely relatedel
(Greene 2007). Other accounts
to the regime's focus
prior electoral dominance. But this findingon
as mechanisms for raises
maintaining
further questions about causal mechanisms.
broad Whilesup
(Brownlee 2007; Magaloni
it is straightforward to 2008), on weaker
understand why electorally the
of labor movements
incumbents as a should
in CARs sourcebe more likelyof endu
to lose power
weakness (LeBas 2011, Chap.
(cf. Roessler and Howard 2009, 2),
103), we or on t
lack a satisfy
based communal conflict, which
ing explanation for why CARs should be more can
likely to sp
port the creation of an authoritarian
democratize—which, to reiterate, entails a systematic "Lev
im
2010). In short, a regime's
provement in the quality
degree
of elections. Brownlee
ofsuggests
elect
which determines that thestatus
its reasons stem from
asthe a
"higher
HAR levels of con
or
by path-dependenttestation
factors enjoyed by opposition
with parties" in CARs (2009,
deep inst
The structure of the
521), yeteconomy, colonial
he notes the need for "closer examination of the le
choices made during the
causal processes that early years
propel these trends" of
(530). How ex
cially shape its ability to
actly does the consolidate
existence pow
of greater electoral contestation in
term. CARs translate to democratization? And how do electoral

dynamics differ in HARs?

In a pathbreaking analysis of 50 competitive author
itarian elections, Howard and Roessler (2006) find that
Transitions to Democracy liberalizing electoral outcomes are most likely when op
position parties mobilize and forge coalitions.2 But re
For electoral authoritarian regimes—which hold multi search on hegemonic regimes suggests a fundamentally
different electoral dynamic. Rather than providing op
party elections but rig the playing field—democratization
portunities for genuine political competition, elections
entails an improvement in the quality of elections such
that parties compete on an equal footing, the casting and
in HARs serve primarily as mechanisms to determine ac
counting of ballots is conducted "in the absence of mas
cess to patronage (Lust-Okar 2009), to manage intra-elite
sive voter fraud," and results "are representative of the
competition (Blaydes 2011), or to signal the incumbent's
public will" (Freedom House 2010). It is importantstrength
to (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 407). Under these
conditions, democratization is caused not by proximate
underscore that democratization involves a change in the
quality and conduct—not necessarily the outcome—of electoral strategies but by changes in the underlying dis
elections. Many EA regimes experience changes in leadtribution of resources—for example, in response to an
ership, even an opposition victory, yet exhibit no subse
economic downturn or a shrinking state presence in the
quent improvement in the quality of electoral competi
economy—which, over time, reduces the regime's ability
tion (Levitsky and Way 2010, 21). to maintain popular support and elite unity (Reuter and
Gandhi 2011). Elections themselves rarely pose a threat,
Existing accounts of democratization in EA regimes
leave several questions unanswered. In their studyand
ofwhen they do, they are likely reflecting these deeper
competitive authoritarianism in the post—cold war era,
structural changes.
Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that economic and socialIn what follows, I build from these insights, explain
linkage with the West (which varies by region) is the ing
pri how two forms of pressure—opposition coalitions
and international conditionality—help produce democ
mary cause of democratization. Yet, linkage is a diffuse,
structural form of influence that fails to capture the ratization
ef in CARs but are unlikely to be effective in
HARs.
fects of concrete tools of international pressure targeted
to certain countries at certain times. Indeed, one of the
limitations of Levitsky and Way's theory is that there is no
pathway through which active pressure—which they term Opposition Coalitions
international leverage—can lead to democracy (Slater
To orchestrate electoral misconduct, incumbents re
2011). Moreover, their claims about long-term regime
quire cooperation. Party operatives, election commission
trajectories are unable to explain the particular timing
members, polling station workers, police, and the me
of democratic transitions—which is, in practice, almost
always linked to elections. dia are those most commonly complicit—either actively
Quantitative evidence clearly suggests the impor
2Bunce and Wolchik (2010a) similarly emphasize the importance
tance of electoral politics for democratization. Roessler
of opposition strategies in ousting cheating incumbents (a different
and Howard (2009) and Brownlee (2009) both find that dependent variable) in postcommunist CARs.

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 J06 PANIFIA DONNO

or passively—in electo
position factions set aside their differences and formed
these a broad coalition—the
actors depend Democratic Opposition of Ser cr
is likely bia (DOS)—with
to win Vojislav Kostunica
the as their presidential
ele
candidate. The
fragmented andcoalition had a profound
weak— impact on public
little doubt about
perceptions, spurring elec
unprecedented pre-election mobi
chestrate or
lization, campaign
tolerate
activity, and voter turnout (Bunce andm
with little Wolchik 2010b). While Milosevic did everything in his D
hesitation.
that their power
bestto manipulate the contest
optionin his favor, ultimately, i
and Van
de
defections Walle 1997
among key actors in the state (including the
If opposition parties
army, interior ministry, and police), media, and even his
to a dramatic transfor
own party prevented him from consummating outcome
who must changing
choose fraud.5 wheth
conduct, the decision
Similar coalition-building efforts by the opposition
notes in his
in Belarus fell
analysis
flat. Different from Serbia—where oppoof
if the incumbent
sition forces were always politically relevant
is despite
beli
their
will "face disadvantage—President Aleksander Lukashenka in
defection froBe
cluding the "elites
larus enjoys near absolute power. Since his ascent in con
1994,
very elections have
courts thatbeen little more than a farce.
are Presidential ne
fraud" (2005,141). How
contests in 2001 and 2006 were won by overwhelming
that in the
margins, andpresence
by 2004, there was no opposition presence o
police, army,
in the legislature. Under
and these conditions, the
burea
Belarusian
ploy illegal practices
opposition's attempt to mimic the Serbian revolution by
371). uniting behind a single presidential candidate in 2001
An important caveat, however, is that opposition (and again in 2006) failed to gain any traction (Boris
coalitions will only have such an effect when they are 2001; Shargorodsky 2001; Silitski 2010). Without a tip
electorally viable, meaning they are perceived as having a ping point in perceptions about the opposition's chances
real chance of victory. Opposition parties in CARs begin of victory, the regime's grip over electoral management
from a position of relative strength compared to those bodies, the media, and security forces remained firm, and
in hegemonic contexts; they have a better track record of the majority of citizens remained too afraid, or simply
electoral performance, which often translates to greater too passive, to defend their right to vote in free and fair
representation in the legislature. For these reasons, coali elections.

tions in CARs are far more likely to gain enough traction

HI: The effect of opposition coalitions on democ
to be perceived as electorally viable. In contrast, opposi
ratization is greater in competitive authoritar
tion coalitions in HARs are typically composed of weak ian elections than in hegemonic authoritarian
parties with poor organizational cohesion and low levels elections.
of popular support.
To illustrate this point, consider the different ef
fects of coalition building in Serbia and Belarus. Dur
ing the 1990s, Serbia was an archetypical CAR. Freedom International Conditionality
was highly curtailed and elections unfair, but Slobodan
Milosevic was never able to consolidate electoral dom Since the end of the cold war, the international com
inance. Although the ruling party's vote share rangedmunity has become increasingly active in democracy
from just 29-53% during the 1990s,3 a fragmented op promotion. There are many tools in the democracy
position consistently failed to mount a credible elecpromotion "toolkit"—including election monitoring,
toral challenge.4 The situation changed dramatically democracy
in aid, and diplomatic pressure—but the most
direct and immediate way to exert pressure for free
the run-up to the 2000 presidential election when op
and fair elections is through conditionality, understood
as the linking of concrete punishments or rewards to
3These figures increase if one accounts for other parties allied with
improvements
the government, but the total progovernment vote share never in the quality of elections. "Negative"
exceeded two-thirds of the vote.

4See Cohen (2002) on the opposition's repeated electoral failures

5See Pavlakovic (2005, 128), Graham (2000), Glenny (2000), and
in the 1990s. Sandford (2000).

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 ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 707

conditionality threatens either

H2: The effect of international material
pressure for democracy
sanctions) or political (e.g.,
is greater in competitive suspensi
authoritarian elections
bership in international organizations)
than in hegemonic authoritarian elections.
government for electoral misconduct, w
In sum, pressure for clean elections occurs across
conditionality holds out the promise of
regime types. Indeed, as the next section shows, oppo
duct improves. International condition
sition parties coalesce and international actors impose
have indirect consequences for a regim
conditionality at nearly identical rates in hegemonic and
cratic credentials are now an importan
competitive authoritarian regimes. But it should be more
encing the allocation of foreign aid, in
effective in CARs. This is so not because competitive au
vestment, and multilateral loans (Hyde
thoritarian leaders are closet democrats who willingly for
and Voeten 2009). Moreover, conditional
swear electoral fraud. Rather, the application of pressure
symbolic costs, particularly if a govern
in CARs alters incentives and beliefs, triggers defections,
claims to legitimacy on its internation
and prompts institutional reforms that limit the govern
its electoral credentials. By activating thes
ment's ability to manipulate elections.
symbolic incentives, conditionality can
ments to reduce their reliance on electoral misconduct H3: Elections in CARs are more likely to lead to
or to tie their hands by introducing institutional re democracy than elections in HARs because CARs
forms that make misconduct more difficult and risky are more vulnerable to domestic and international
(Donno 2013). pressure.
Different regimes exhibit different levels of sensitivity
to international pressure, however. For incumbents in an
already tenuous electoral position, a loss of international
Data
support can have serious consequences, particularly in
the short term. Withdrawal of economic benefits in the
To uncover the factors associated with democratization
months leading up to an election is likely to be particularly
costly for CARs, for this is the time when resources are through elections, I constructed a dataset of elections
most needed to help them win, buy, or steal votes. In conin EA regimes from 1990 to 2007. The units of analysis
trast, incumbents in HARs are better insulated from interare national elections, both presidential and legislative.
national pressure. Patronage networks sustained through Creation of the dataset proceeded in several steps. First,
domestic sources—natural resource wealth, a large pubGeddes, Wright, and Franz's (2012; GWF hereafter) data
lic sector, or state-controlled economy (as in Belarus, or were used to identify the set of autocratic regime-years.
Mexico under the PRI)—are unaffected by international These data, which cover all countries in the world from
pressure for democracy. Even when external actors do1946 to 2010, expand and improve upon Geddes' (1999)
wield leverage over a hegemonic regime, the leadershipearlier coding.7 Within this set, I define the sample of
can typically find ways to introduce cosmetic reformselectoral authoritarian regimes as those in which multi
that do not threaten its power base.6 Equally important, ple parties are allowed to contest elections. If the ruling
the symbolic consequences of international criticism are party or candidate won less than 75% of the votes (presi
likely to be less severe for HARs. Where elections are bla dential contests, first round) or seats (legislative elections)
tantly lopsided contests that serve primarily to determine in the last election, the regime is classified as a CAR; oth
access to state resources, citizens do not expect them to erwise, it is classified as a HAR.8 This coding reflects the
be free and fair or evaluate them on this basis (Lust country's status as of January 1 of the year in question,
Okar 2009). If there is no illusion of democracy to begin
with, international efforts to delegitimize the regime on7Data and codebook are available at <http: //dictators.la.psu
these grounds are unlikely to be effective. Many hege.edu/ >. The GWF data are highly correlated with Cheibub, Gandhi,
and Vreeland's (2010) coding of regime type, but GWF has the ad
monic leaders can simply dismiss international criticism
vantage, for my purposes, of explicitly considering electoral quality
altogether, as did Lukashenka in Belarus when he urged in its coding of autocracy.
supporters in 2001 to "take the election monitors by the
8Following Brownlee (2009), using the World Bank's Database of
scruff of the neck and send them packing so they can flyPolitical Institutions (DPI) indexes of executive and legislative elec
off with their heads spinning" (Boris 2001). toral competitiveness (Keefer 2010), a country is coded as CAR if
it received a "7" on either index and as HAR if its highest score
on either index was a "5" or a "6." These scores capture the pres
6See, for example, Blaydes' (2011, chap. 10) account of Mubarak's ence of multiple parties in an election and whether the winner ex
response to U.S. pressure for multicandidate presidential elections.ceeded 75% of the votes (presidential elections) or seats (legislative

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 γθ8 DANIELA DONNO

thus equivalent to
to electoral democracy; 18 of these occurred a
in CARs and on
dataset onseven in HARs.11
National Ele
tocracy (NELDA)The first key independent variable isto an indicator ide
regimes for opposition coalition. Following
(Hyde and Howard and Roessler Ma
of 177 elections
(2006), this measure is coded as "1" if(104
all major opposi in
included elections
tion parties forged a unified platform, coordinated
and their r
appendix. campaigns, or united behind a single presidential candi
The dependent variable of the analysis is a transition date.12

to electoral democracy. I employ a dummy variable indi The second key independent variable, which cap
cating whether a country moved from a "0" to a "1" on tures the application of international pressure, is an indi
Freedom House's list of electoral democracies in the year cator for pre-election conditionality, defined as the is
of the election in question. Inclusion on this list requires suance of threats or promises that link punishments
that a country meet four criteria: or rewards to the country's electoral conduct (Donno
2013).13 Incentives can be economic (e.g., sanctions, aid,
1) a competitive, multiparty political system; trade agreements) or political (e.g., suspension of diplo
2) universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with ex matic ties, suspension or granting of membership in
ceptions for restrictions that states may legiti an international organization). While previous research
mately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal on international influences on democracy has focused
offenses); largely on passive forces, such as international linkage
3) regularly contested elections conducted in condi (Levitsky and Way 2010) or membership in democratic
tions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, regional organizations (Pevehouse 2005), these data rep
and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that resent a systematic collection of information on ac
yield results that are representative of the public tive pressure for democracy. The conditionality variable
will; and is coded as "1" if one or more of the following ac
4) significant public access of major political parties tors employed conditionality during the four months
to the electorate through the media and through prior to the election: the United States, United Nations,
generally open political campaigning. European Union (EU), Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe,
The advantages of this measure are twofold. First, un Organization of American States (OAS), Caribbean Com
like the Polity index, which incorporates nonelectoral di munity (CARICOM), Southern African Development
mensions in its coding, inclusion on the electoral democ Community (SADC), Economic Community of West
racy list is driven by electoral quality alone (with criteria 3 African States (ECOWAS), and African Union.14
and 4 representing the main differences between an elec An initial look at the data reveals that the rates
toral authoritarian regime and a democracy). Second, of coalitions and conditionality across regime types ar
unlike other dichotomous measures of regime type, in nearly equal: coalitions occurred in 15% of elections in
clusion on the list is independent of electoral outcomes.10 both HARs and CARs, while international conditionality
Of the 177 elections in the data, 25 marked a transition

"See Appendix Β in the supplementary materials for a list.

12Howard and Roessler's data were used when available. See
elections). Remaining regimes (scoring a 4 or lower on both in Appendix C in the supplementary materials for details on how
dexes) are coded as closed authoritarian. the remaining elections were coded.

9If a country is coded as closed authoritarian as of January 1, that 13Conditionality is only coded if clearly targeted toward the country
country-year is excluded from the dataset. This coding scheme and election in question; regional or ongoing conditionality policies
therefore excludes founding elections in which a country made a not related to that election are not coded.
rapid transition from a closed to a multiparty system and then held
14These actors, which were identified through extensive research of
an election in the same year. Appendix F in the supplementary
materials presents the results of robustness checks that alter this a larger set of international organizations, represent the universe of
regional organizations with a track record of at least once employing
coding scheme by ( 1 ) including all founding multiparty elections
following single-party rule and then (2) excluding all founding conditionality for election-related purposes. The primary sources
multiparty elections in which the regime is coded as a HAR or CAR
of information used were stories in international newspapers and
as of January 1. The results hold in both cases. newswires. To ensure reliability, all elections were coded twice by
different individuals working independently. Intercoder disagree
10Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) and Geddes, Wright, and ment was found in less than 10% of observations and was resolved
Franz (2012) both require that a country experience alternation in by the author. See Appendix C in the supplementary materials for
power in order to move from dictatorship to democracy. more information.

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 ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 709

was applied in 8% Finally,

of hegemonic
Levitsky and Way (2010) demonstrate that elec
competitive authoritarian
democratization is more likely inelections
regions of the world with (this
not statistically significant). There ap
high economic and social linkage with the West—namely,
ground for concern,
Latin America and then,
Central/Eastern Europe.that
Accordingly, oppo
international actors
I include dummy
are variables
systematically
for both these regions in the c
their efforts in models.
the ostensibly easier, m
cases.

Seven control variables capture country- and

Findings
election-specific factors that may influence the proba
bility of a democratic transition. First, it is likely that
To recap, that
democratization occurs primarily in elections two coredeter
implications flow from the argument.
First, opposition
mine who will hold executive power. Because the coalitions
stakesand international condition
ally should
are higher in these contests, they are more likelybe more effective at producing democrati
to elicit
zation
higher levels of domestic mobilization for through elections
democracy. I in CARs than in HARs. Thus,
interaction terms
include a dichotomous variable, main election, betweenas
coded competitive authoritarianism
and these two
a "1" for presidential elections in presidential (orforms of pressure are expected to be positive
mixed)
and statisticallysystems
systems and legislative elections in parliamentary significant. Second, this greater vulner
(Simpser and Donno 2012). Second, ability to pressureaexplains
I include vari why CARs are more likely
able indicating whether the incumbent wasto democratize
running thaninHARs.
the Thus, any significant differ
ence in the probability
election, which is expected to decrease the chances of de of democratization across regime
mocratization (Cheeseman 2010; Maltz types should disappear
2007).15 It is once
also the conditional effects of op
important to account for the country'sposition coalitionsexperi
previous and international conditionality are
modeled.argues
ence with elections. Lindberg (2006, 2009) To put thesethat
predictions to the test, I estimate
probit models
holding elections fosters institutional change and with democratic transition as the depen
greater
respect for civil liberties and that these dent variable. cumulate
changes The sample includes all elections in EA
over time. Relatedly, Bratton and Van de regimes,
Walle excepting
(1997)onlyar
those countries already classified
as electoral democracies by Freedom House,18 as well as
gue that the more elections held under authoritarianism,
countries under
the greater the chances for democratization. I athus
provisional
in government installed after
clude a variable that sums the number of the resignation elections
previous of an authoritarian leader. All models are
held under a continuous authoritarian spell.16 run with robust clustered standard errors to adjust for
Two variables control for economic conditions: first dependence across observations within countries.19
a variable for GDP per capita, lagged one year.17 High The first column of Table 1 presents a baseline model
income is reliably associated with democracy, though its that sheds first light on the conditions under which au
effect on democratic transitions is less clear. Przeworski thoritarian elections lead to democracy. The results reveal
et al. (2000, chap. 2), for example, find that dictatorships that democratization is, as expected, more likely in main
at high (but not the highest) levels of income are more elections that determine who holds executive power, but
likely to democratize. Second, I include a variable for less likely when the incumbent is running for reelection,
GDP growth, measured as the percent change in a coun lending support to the idea that open-seat elections rep
try's GDP from year t-2 to t-1. If it is true that good eco resent particularly opportune moments for democratic
nomic performance bolsters authoritarian regimes, the change (cf. Cheeseman 2010). The results also suggest
coefficient on this variable should be negative. that strong economic performance bolsters authoritar
ian regimes, since high income and economic growth are

18These ambiguous cases in which GWF and Freedom House dis

15Data come from the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012),
agree on status as an autocracy include, for example, elections in
which defines the incumbent leader according to the individual
Botswana (all years), Haiti (2000), and Russia (1995-2004). I omit
identified in Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).
these cases from the main analysis, but when they are included,
16This count begins in 1946 or at the date of independence. The the results for competitive authoritarianism, opposition coalitions,
count restarts each time a country transitions to autocracy from and international conditionality remain robust.
democracy. Data on authoritarian spells are from Geddes, Wright,
"Because the data form an unbalanced panel, panel-corrected stan
and Franz (2012) and data on elections are from NELDA (Hyde
dard errors are infeasible. In a likelihood ratio test, country random
and Marinov 2012).
effects were not significantly different from zero, indicating that a
17 Data on GDP and GDP growth are taken from the World Bank pooled model is preferred. Fixed effects lead to too many observa
(2010). tions dropping from the analysis.

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 JIO DANIELA DONNO

Table 1 The Determ

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Competitive 0.64+ 0.58+ 0.18

Authoritarian 0.70* 0.21
Regim
(0.05) (0.08) (0.62) (0.03) (0.57)
Opposition Coalition 0.69+ -4.21** -4.12**

(0.09) (0.00) (0.00)

International Conditionality 0.18 -4.88** -4.62**

(0.73) (0.00) (0.00)

CAR x Opp. Coalition 5.15** 5.45**

(0.00) (0.00)
CAR x Conditionality 5.23** 5.34**

(0.00) (0.00)
Main Election 1.60** 1.59** 1.65** 1.61** 1.77**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Incumbent Running -0.79* -0.80* -0.88* -0.84* -0.87*

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)

# Previous Elections -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07+
(0.82) (0.77) (0.74) (0.22) (0.09)
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) -0.42* -0.46* -0.42+ -0.37+ -0.37+
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
GDP growth (lagged 1 year) -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04 -0.03 -0.02

(0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.54)

Central and Eastern Europe 0.32 0.18 0.13 0.56 0.44

(0.49) (0.72) (0.80) (0.36) (0.47)

Americas 1.45** 1.63** 1.58** 1.40** 1.63**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Alternation, Previous Elec. 0.46 1.05+
(0.38) (0.09)
Misconduct Intensity -0.34+ -0.54*

(0.06) (0.02)
Regime Openness 0.03 0.06

(0.90) (0.78)
Prior Liberalization 0.31* 0.37+
(0.03) (0.05)
Constant 0.28 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.58

(0.83) (0.77) (0.75) (0.73) (0.72)

Pseudo R2 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.43
Observations 177 177 177 176 176

Note: Robust p-values in parentheses. +significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; "significant at 1%.

negatively associated with democratization. However, the In line with previous research, Model 1 shows that de
idea that the repeated holding of elections helps producemocratization is more likely in competitive authoritarian
democracy is not supported.20 elections than in hegemonic elections. Even after control
ling for a host of country- and election-specific factors,
there is something different about elections in CARs—
some attribute associated with democratization—that re
20Lindberg (2006) shows that the holding of elections is associ
mains
ated with democratic change in Africa, but this relationship does unexplained. Models 2 and 3 resolve this puzzle.
not appear to hold in Latin America (McCoy and Hartlyn 2009)
The variables for opposition coalition and international
or the Middle East (Lust-Okar 2009); moreover, the effect of re
peated elections is strongest when held in more democratic contextsconditionality are positively signed (Model 2) but are only
(Teorell and Hadenius 2009, 96-98). statistically significant when interacted with the indicator

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 ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION γη

Table 2 Predicted Probability

an average hegemonic authoritarian election with no op of
Democratization position coalition and no international conditionality, the
probability of democratization is 0.21. This probability is
Probability of
Democratic Transition
only slightly higher—at 0.26—in an identical competi
tive authoritarian election. The fates of CARs and HARs
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes diverge, however, with the application of domestic and
No Coalition, No Conditionality .26
international pressure. When opposition parties coalesce
[.09, .50] or international actors impose pre-election condition
Coalition .59
ality in CARs, the chances of democratization increase
[.21, .92] to 60 and 40%, respectively; and in elections with both
Conditionality .39
coalitions and conditionality, the probability of democ
[.05, .84] ratization climbs to 0.69.
Coalition + Conditionality .69
The results also reveal that in hegemonic regimes,
[.22, .97] coalitions and conditionality are negatively associated
Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes with democratization (denoted by the coefficients on the
No Coalition, No Conditionality .21
constituent terms in Model 3). This is consistent with
[.07, .43] the argument forwarded here, that these forms of pres
Coalition .00
sure should not have a positive effect in HARs. Yet it
[.00, .00] suggests the intriguing possibility that they are actually
Conditionality .00
counterproductive when applied in hegemonic contexts,
[.00, .00] perhaps because leaders respond by further tightening
Coalition + Conditionality .00
their grip on power. In Cambodia's hegemonic regime,
[.00, .00] for example, sustained international involvement has ar
Note: The 95% confidence intervals appear in brackets. Other vari guably only spurred Hun Sen to further centralize power
ables held at modal (for dummy variables) or median values. and manipulate electoral rules so that outright vote rig
ging is unnecessary.23 The negative findings for coalitions
and conditionality in hegemonic regimes should be in
for competitive authoritarianism. Thus, opposition coali terpreted with caution, however, since there are relatively
tions and international conditionality greatly increase the few cases of democratization in HARs in the data. Fu

likelihood of democratization, but only in CARs, where ture qualitative research will need to probe whether these
governments are more vulnerable to electoral pressure.21 effects hold in particular cases over time.
This resonates with Wright's (2009) finding that foreign
aid conditionality is more effective in regimes with larger
winning coalitions (measured in part by the competitive
ness of executive selection). Notably, once the interaction
Alternative Explanations
terms are included in the models, the constituent term
for CARs becomes statistically insignificant, lending sup This article's core hypothesis, that CARs are more vulner
port to the claim that vulnerability to pressure is the able to opposition and international electoral pressure
reason why elections in CARs are more likely to lead to than HARs, is not the only possible explanation for why
democracy (Hypothesis 3). Absent an opposition coali competitive authoritarian elections are more likely to lead
tion or international conditionality, democratization in a to democracy. Elections in CARs and HARs may differ in
competitive authoritarian context is no more likely than other ways that are causally relevant for democratization.
democratization in a hegemonic context. First, as previous research has noted, CARs are more likely

To illustrate the core findings, Table 2 presents the than HARs or closed regimes to experience transfers of
predicted probability of democratization through elec executive power to the opposition (Roessler and Howard
tions in CARs and HARs, all other factors held equal.22 In 2009). Because alternation in power is an electoral out
come that temporally follows (rather than precedes) any
improvement in electoral conduct, it cannot be said to
21 Results are robust when the conditionality variable is recoded to exert a causal effect on democratization in the current
include U.S. and EU conditionality only.

22Table 2 is based on simulations performed using Clarify (Tomz,

Wittenberg, and King 2001). Unless otherwise specified, all vari 23Brinkley (2011) gives an in-depth account of the international
ables are held at their median values. community's role in Cambodia.

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 γΐ2 DANIELA DONNO

election; but it
Figure 1 Intensity may
of Electoral Misconduct, by in
zation in the Authoritarian
next Type elec
hibits greater respect f
this possibility, I emplo
in executive power in th
systems, alternation is
didate (including, if ap
lost a presidential elect
the ruling party lost a l
A second set of alterna
the idea that CARs may
with. Elections in CARs
by relatively better con
required to cross the
would be smaller and, p
uate this, I construct a m
misconduct. Ranging fr
number of areas in whi
election, one point is gi
on the opposition's free
next election (33% versus 10% in contests not following
expression; one
alternation), point
but this difference is not statistically signif fo
icant.27 that
institutions Elections in CARs are more likely to occur in a
govern
fraud. These forms
more open context, with an average civil libertiesof
score in
variety of sources,
the two inc
years prior to an election of 3.28 in CARs, com
servationreports,
pared to 2.94 in HARs.28 However, elections news
in CARs are
Additionally, elections
not more likely to occur during periods of ongoing politi
culmination of
cal liberalization. an
The average ongo
change in Freedom House's
competitive
political rightsauthoritar
index in the four years prior to elections is
some countries, for
negative in both regime types oth
(—0.06 in HARs and —0.20
point on the road
in CARs), and this difference is not significant.fro
to democracy.Turning to the quality of Follow
elections, Figure 1 shows
the extantthe level
percent of elections in eachof regi
regime type marked by
country's Freedom
different levels of misconduct intensity. It reveals, Ho
strik
as the running average
ingly, that elections in CARs are actually marked by
tion).26 Prior liberalizat
more widespread misconduct—in terms of the scope and
in the Freedom House
range of tools employed—than elections in HARs. This
four-year lends support to the idea that CARs
period rely to a greater
preced
An initial extent
lookon outright electoralat the
manipulation, while HARs d
port for these argumen
are typically able to sustain themselves without resorting
ventional toassumptions
these tactics (Lust-Okar 2009; Magaloni 2006). Elec
regimes. Alternation
tions in HARs are, however, more likely to exhibit prob i
CARs: 18% of executive elections in CARs led to alter
lems in their legal framework, such as barriers on who
nation, compared to 13% in HARs. And alternation can
is run for office, high thresholds for party registration,
associated with a higher chance of democratization in the
and flaws in procedures for lodging electoral complaints
(Kelley 2009, 2010).29 In sum, elections in CARs are, by

24This variable is taken from NELDA (question 24; Hyde and Mari
nov 2012). Missing data were filled in using Goemens, Gleditsch,
27 A chi2 test yields a p-value of .44; the null hypothesis of indepen
and Chiozza's (2009) coding of regular alternation in power. dence cannot be rejected.

25 See Appendix C in the supplementary materials for a more de

28A difference of means test was significant at ρ = .00.
tailed description of this variable.
29In Kelley's (2010) quality of elections (QED) data, 66% of elec
tions in HARs are marked by moderate or major problems in their
26Scores are inverted so that higher values represent greater free
dom. structural/legal environment, compared to 51% in CARs.

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 ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 713

definition, more competitive in

tarian electoral dominance.30 terms
This variable capturesof
the th
and tend to be vote/seat share
governed by of the winning candidate/party
relatively in the
better
works, but they are last election.
not more While this measure contains
free and some missing
fair in t
conduct. data, and measurement error is more problematic than
Models 4 and 5 with the1)
(Table dichotomous
exploreclassification of
theCARs and HARs,
effect
variables in the multivariate analysis.
the results again prove robust (Table Ε and Figure ΕThe
in
that elections the supplementary
marked by more materials).intense
As dominance increases,
misco
expected, less likely the
to odds of democratization decline. Most
democratize, notably,
while pr
tion is positively coalitions and conditionality
associated with exhibit significant in
democratiza
nation in power teractive effects:
exhibits the at low to mid-levels of electoral
expected positiv
in Model 5, and it dominance—analogous
is only marginally to competitive authoritarian
sign
importantly, the regimes—coalitions and
coefficient onconditionality
CARs are statistically
remai
identical levels of statistical
significant, but theirsignificance
positive effect on democratization
aft
sion of these variables
disappears (Model 4 skewed
in systems with highly versus Mo
electoral results.
means that the four alternative explanations
As a last check for sensitivity to different electoral
very small amount of theI ensured
thresholds, variance across
that the findings CAR
are not driven by
The interactive differences
effects ofin coalitions
electoral system. The vote and seat cond
and shares
also unaffected. of winning parties are typically smaller in proportional
representation (PR) systems (in which larger numbers of
parties compete and gain representation) than in majori
tarian systems. However, inclusion of an indicator for PR
Robustness does not alter the results: competitive authoritarianism
retains a positive, significant coefficient in the baseline
model, and the conditional effects of coalitions and con
The robustness of this article's core findings is probed
ditionality remain.
in several ways. I first investigate whether the results hold
under an entirely different coding scheme for regime type Finally, I explored the possibility of selection bias.
and democratization. Roessler and Howard (2009) codeAs discussed, a large body of research has identified the
EA regimes as those that hold multiparty elections and
sources of authoritarian hegemony as being rooted in do
mestic institutional legacies, economic endowments, and
that receive a Freedom House political rights score of 3 or
higher and a Polity score of 5 or lower. (Democratization
the structure of the economy. Nevertheless, to investigate
occurs if the country moves to an FH score of 2 or bet
statistically whether status as a CAR is driven by an un
ter or a Polity score of 6 or higher.) Within EA regimes,
derlying, unobserved propensity for democratization, I
they employ an electoral threshold of 70% (rather thanemploy a Heckman selection model that predicts both
(a) selection into competitive authoritarianism and (b)
7 5%) of votes/seats to the winner for classifying a country
democratization. The method, model specification, and
as a CAR or HAR. When this alternative coding scheme
is employed, the key results remain nearly unchanged
results are discussed in the supplementary appendix. In
short, the findings lend no support to the idea that se
(supplementary Appendix D), the only difference being
that the effect of opposition coalitions in CARs reduceslection bias is driving the results, further supporting the
conclusion that opposition coalitions and international
to marginal levels of statistical significance. Upon closer
examination, this appears to be driven by a subset conditionality
of indeed exert a causal effect in CARs.
cases where executive elections are won by large margins,
but legislative elections are more competitive (coded as
hegemonic by Roessler/Howard but coded as competi
Conclusion
tive in the main analyses). This suggests that opposition
coalitions are particularly effective in settings where the
Democratization through elections has become an in
executive is electorally dominant but the opposition gains
a greater foothold in the legislature. creasingly prominent mode of regime change (Lindberg
2009). Yet, puzzlingly, the study of democratization in
To further probe the sensitivity of the results to dif
hybrid
ferent electoral thresholds, I run a set of analyses that regimes has remained largely disconnected from
dispense with the dichotomous classification of CARs
and HARs altogether and instead employ a continu
30This measure is taken from electoral results reported in Keefer
ous measure of vote/seat shares, which I label authori
(2010).

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 γΐ4 DANIELA DONNO

the cess, particularly the literatur

growing quality of elections. The electoral
The few revolution
studies in Kyrgyzstan is a stark example tha
of alter
politics nation in power unaccompanied
have been by any real improve
lim
elections ment
in in democratic
competit
performance, but the revolutions in
and Wolchik 2010a;
Georgia (2004) and Ukraine (2005) exhibit a similar dy
study hasnamic.helped
Eight years on, both countries continue to
brid
strug
prehensive
gle with electoral sample
irregularities, declining media freedom, o
end of the
and, in Ukraine, acoldtroubling upswing in oppositionwar in
some commonly hel
timidation. In contrast, alternation in power in Slovakia
tra those(1998) who
was accompanied by rapid institutional
tout reform,
of competitive
facilitated by conditionality and assistanceauth
from the Eu
derscore ropean Union.
that there i
this type Variation
of across these postcommunist
hybrid cases may
curately prove instructive for the recent revolutions in the Arab
characterize
mocratization
world, where euphoria over regime change is must now con
give way to more practical consideration
international actors of the chal
sent pressure,
lenges associated with ensuring free and fair elect
elections and,
lead to in the longer term, achieving wholesale political trans
democracy th
Nor are elections
formation. Elections will surely play an integral role in in C
to begin these countries' transitions, but the findings
with, at presentedleas
hegemonic authoritar
here underscore the importance of the political context
an inferior legal
in which these contests are held. In long-standing fram
hege
is more widespread
monic regimes, where citizens have lived through decades
these regimes have
of lopsided electoral charades, the creation of a compet
ensure victory. Yet,
itive political system with a robust opposition will be es
manipulate can
sential for altering be
public perceptions about the purpose, of
fied front and
authenticity, intern
and legitimacy of elections.
regime for violations
to the conclusion tha
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