Journal of European Integration

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In every crisis an opportunity? European Union

integration in defence and the War on Ukraine

Daniel Fiott

To cite this article: Daniel Fiott (2023) In every crisis an opportunity? European Union
integration in defence and the War on Ukraine, Journal of European Integration, 45:3, 447-462,
DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2023.2183395

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2183395

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JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
2023, VOL. 45, NO. 3, 447–462
https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2183395

In every crisis an opportunity? European Union integration in

defence and the War on Ukraine
Daniel Fiott
Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussel, Belgium

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Russia’s war on Ukraine has upended the European security order. European Union; Defence;
Ukraine has requested EU membership, unprecedented sanctions Ukraine; Supranationalism;
have been imposed on Russia, European countries have shipped Intergovernmentalism
weapons and munitions to Ukraine and NATO has shored up its
military presence. Despite such action, is it possible to speak of
a transformative moment or ‘Zeitenwende’ for EU security and
defence? This article analyses the state of EU integration in defence
since the war on Ukraine. Drawing on hypotheses developed under
‘new intergovernmentalism’, this article analyses how EU Member
State preferences in defence and intergovernmental-supranational
dynamics are being shaped by the war. In particular, the article
probes how supranational and intergovernmental institutions have
reacted to the war and how domestic preferences have fed into
recent EU defence efforts. In doing so, the article provides
a preliminary assessment of the state of EU integration in defence
since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Introduction
Even though it may be too early to derive lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine, or indeed
to predict how it may end, it is nevertheless true that a number of new European Union
(EU) defence initiatives have emerged during the war. Additionally, there are existing EU
policies that have been re-emphasised or bolstered because of Russia’s belligerent
actions. In fact, since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine the EU has released its
first-ever defence strategy (the ‘Strategic Compass’), accelerated deliveries of military
equipment to the Ukrainian armed forces, ratcheted up sanctions on key sectors of
Russia’s economy, taken in millions of Ukrainian refugees, offered Kyiv a path towards
future membership of the EU, provided Ukraine with billions of euros in macro-financial
assistance, committed to the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine’s economy, opened up
a medical evacuation hub for Ukrainian patients, linked Ukraine’s electricity grid with
Europe’s transmission network, committed to investigating Russian war crimes and more.
Yet the EU’s response to Russia’s war on Ukraine exists in a wider political context in
which citizens, states and institutions are thinking about the future of Europe. In parti­
cular, the Conference on the Future of Europe resulted in communications from the

CONTACT Daniel Fiott [email protected] Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussel,
Belgium
© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
448 D. FIOTT

European Commission and European Parliament to deepen European integration through

amendments to the EU Treaties and enhanced cooperation in areas such as defence,
energy and health policy. Indeed, the Parliament’s own May 2022 final report on the
Conference underlined that EU defence policy should, in addition to being ready to
undertake crisis management tasks, also provide ‘adequate EU protection to any member
state under attack by a third country’ (European Parliament 2022, 66). Despite the
ambitions of EU institutions, however, we should recognise that security and defence
policy still falls under the remit of the EU Member States working through the Council of
the EU. In this sense, it is important to understand how the dynamics for EU defence
integration are playing out in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine.
While it is still too early to comprehensively analyse EU integration in defence and the
war on Ukraine, a number of scholars have attempted to explain the evolution of EU
defence integration over the past few years. In particular, the creation of tools such as the
European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) have led
to the revitalisation of neo-functionalist accounts of defence integration (Haroche 2020;
Håkansson 2021). In particular, such explanations have stressed the importance of the
growth of the European Commission’s role in defence investment and capability devel­
opment. Haroche contends, for example, that the Commission exhibits spillover beha­
viour in the way it has intervened in an area of high politics such as defence,
demonstrated its ability to add value to defence matters and developed its bureaucratic
capabilities for handling the EDF (Haroche 2020). In contrast to all-out neo-functionalist
readings of defence integration, however, other nuanced accounts have emerged that
simultaneously acknowledge the growing role of the European Commission, while stres­
sing the continued relevance of intergovernmental dynamics between EU Member States
(Sabatino 2022).
This article engages with such theoretical discussions by looking at how the war in
Ukraine has affected the pace and nature of defence integration. To this end, it assesses
neo-functionalist accounts of EU defence integration but goes further by drawing on
intergovernmental theories. In particular, the article draws on the logic of the ‘new
intergovernmentalism’ and the work of Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter (2015a and
Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015b). It does so because new intergovernmentalism
pushes back against supranational theories such as neo-functionalism, which argue that
institutions such as the European Commission are driving EU integration in areas such as
defence (Schmidt 2016). If anything, new intergovernmentalism points to how EU
Member States increasingly develop de novo agencies to control the political impulses
of institutions such as the Commission. Additionally, new intergovernmentalism also
contends that traditional intergovernmental theories such as Liberal
Intergovernmentalism overplay the importance of power politics and downplay the
degree to which EU Member States seek consensus on policy issues (Bickerton, Hodson,
and Puetter 2015a; 2015b; Schmidt 2016).
The core task of this article is to therefore compare neo-functionalist and new inter­
governmental approaches to EU defence integration in light of the war on Ukraine. In
doing so, the hope is that the article can shed some light on the state of supranationalism
and intergovernmentalism in EU defence. Accordingly, this article understands intergo­
vernmentalism to mean a form of ‘competition and cooperation among national govern­
ments’ at the EU level where each national government seeks to advance its national
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 449

preferences in a ‘mutually advantageous’ manner (Hooghe and Marks 2019, 1115). By

contrast, supranationalism is seen as a form of cooperation whereby institutions are
entrusted with greater political power in decision-making processes and where they
can act as policy entrepreneurs to steer EU policy (Haroche 2020; Håkansson 2021, 591;
Sabatino 2022). Specifically, this article tests the several hypotheses advanced under new
intergovernmentalism as a way to determine whether supranational institutions have
increased their role and power since the war, how domestic preferences for defence have
evolved, if there has been a blurring of lines between high and low politics and if there is
evidence of disequilibrium in EU defence integration. In focusing on these hypotheses,
the article reverts back to the major claims made under neo-functionalism.
This article is organised in three main parts. First, the article looks at the specific
defence policy initiatives that have been developed or adapted by the EU since Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Here, we look at the cases of the adoption of the
Strategic Compass, the shift in the use of the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the plans
the Union has to develop greater defence-industrial cooperation through joint procure­
ment. Each of these three initiatives are then tested in relation to the hypotheses derived
from new intergovernmentalism. Second, the article looks at how the war on Ukraine has
affected deliberation and delegation within the EU and how institutions have adapted to
the crisis. Third, the article focuses on domestic preferences and the distinction between
high and low politics, as well as probing whether a state of disequilibrium has emerged in
EU defence policy. The article ends with a conclusion offering broader theoretical
observations.
This article draws on semi-structured interviews with mid-ranking EU officials that are
and have been intimately involved in the development of EU security and defence policy
at the European Commission, Council of the EU and European External Action Service
(EEAS). Additionally, the article draws on primary materials such as relevant official
communications published by the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the
European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP).

EU defence efforts since Russia’s invasion

The EU’s efforts since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 can be broadly
classified in three main ways: i) ‘strategic reorientation’: the war started just before the
adoption of the EU’s first-ever dedicated security and defence strategy called the
‘Strategic Compass’; ii) ‘defensive weaponisation’: the war has accelerated how the EU
thinks about and delivers lethal equipment to partners through the EPF; and iii) ‘industrial
rehabilitation’: Russia’s war has led the Union to think about how it can better invest in the
manufacturing of military equipment, especially given the need to supply Ukraine’s
armed forces with ammunition and military hardware. Of course, while this article only
focuses on defence-related matters we should nevertheless acknowledge that the EU has
also imposed heavy sanctions on the Russian economy, it is welcoming millions of
Ukrainian refugees and the EU has offered future membership to Ukraine in addition to
financial resources for post-war reconstruction efforts. Despite these efforts, let us look at
each of the EU’s three major defence initiatives.
450 D. FIOTT

Strategic reorientation: the strategic compass

On 24 March 2022, EU Heads of State and Government endorsed the Union’s Strategic
Compass. While the European Council had previously endorsed numerous conclusions on
security and defence in the past, this is the first time that European leaders have endorsed
a specific (47-page) strategy document in this policy area. Unlike the 2016 EU Global
Strategy (EUGS), which only received an initially timid welcome from the European
Council, the Strategic Compass is endowed with the highest endorsement, which is
important given that the document is supposed to guide EU security and defence policy
for the remainder of this decade to 2030. Importantly, the success of the Strategic
Compass depends upon the EU Member States and EU bodies delivering on over 80
specific actions designed to: 1) boost the robustness and speed of EU military action; 2)
build up the Union’s resilience to internal and external shocks; 3) develop the EU’s military
capabilities; and 4) strengthen the Union’s partnerships. In the way it marries a strategic
vision to concrete action, the Compass is the most complete document on security and
defence the EU has ever produced.1
In terms of the war on Ukraine, the Strategic Compass does not shy away from naming
individual countries as threats or rivals: both Russia and China feature prominently in this
regard. This is somewhat a departure for the EU, which has tended to restrict overt
language to sanctions-linked Council Conclusions. While it is true that the bulk of the
Strategic Compass was drafted before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it would be incorrect
to call the document obsolete with regard to the war on Ukraine (Costa and Barbé 2023).
While an earlier version of the Strategic Compass that was leaked to the press in
November 2021 contained only six references to Russia (Council of the EU 2021b, 8),
the final version released in March 2022 contained eighteen references to Russia and it
stated bluntly that ‘Russia’s war of aggression constitutes a tectonic shift in European
history’ (Council of the EU 2022b, 5). In this respect, while Russia’s invasion led to
a substantial re-writing of the Compass’ threat perception on Russia, the document itself –
much like NATO’s own Strategic Concept that was released in 2022 – is still the main
reference document guiding EU action in security and defence since the war on Ukraine.2
More importantly, the Compass contains over 80 specific policy actions that need to be
delivered as part of the Union’s response to Russian aggression.
The success or failure of the Strategic Compass is almost entirely premised on the idea
that EU Member States will deliver in areas of defence cooperation, where, incidentally,
they have hitherto failed. For two decades, and since the inception of the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), national capitals have collectively presided over the
reduction of military capability and the growth investment gaps (Major and Mölling 2020,
43). A fact doubly concerning given that many EU Member States form part of NATO too.
Implementation is the hardest aspect of EU policy, and some may question how it will be
possible to implement policy actions in the space of a couple of years considering that
two decades of CSDP have not wielded much progress in areas such as military deploy­
ments or capability development. This is why the Compass has a ‘high risk – high return’
pressure at its core: succeed, and by 2030 a huge step forward for European defence
would have been taken, fail, and the EU’s credibility as a nascent defence actor will be
seriously – possibly irretrievably – damaged.
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 451

Defensive weaponisation: the European peace facility

One policy area that has only increased in importance since the start of Russia’s war on
Ukraine has been how the EU delivers lethal military equipment abroad through the EPF.
Indeed, the Facility was adopted by a decision by the Council of the EU in March 2021. It is
an off-budget financial instrument, meaning that it is comprised of financial resources
provided by the EU Member States – it is not, therefore, financed from the EU budget. The
EPF today is worth some €5.6 billion that is spread over the 2021–2027 period, although in
December 2022 EU Member States agreed to raise the financial ceiling of the Facility by
a further €2 billion. In essence, the EPF was designed to combine two previous financial
vehicles for security and defence called the Athena Mechanism, which was designed to
cover common costs as part of CSDP missions and operations, and the African Peace
Facility, which was used to financially support peace support operations led by African
states and regional bodies (like the African Union). By combining the two instruments in
the EPF, the EU hoped to ensure that its financing of CSDP deployments and the capacity
building of partners could be streamlined.
While EU Member States are still responsible for financing CSDP missions and
operations in line with the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle, the EPF alters this
logic slightly by increasing common costs and allowing greater support for partners
when they call for the strengthening of their military and defence capacities in support
of peace support operations (Ruy and Morcos 2021). What is noteworthy about the EPF
is how it has had to alter its orientation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Hauck 2022).
For example, when the EPF was being created those involved from Member States and
EU bodies such as the Council of the EU believed that it would largely be used to
finance EU training missions in Africa rather than in the Eastern Partnership countries.3
This is supported by the fact that the Council of the EU decided to launch an EU
Training Mission (EUTM) to Mozambique in October 2021 in response to the crisis in
the Cabo Delgado province, and that EUTM Mozambique was one of the first EU
deployments to be partially financed by the EPF.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, the EPF has been quickly adapted to
the needs of the Ukrainian armed forces. The first important issue to note is that the
EPF has already resulted in some €2.9 billion of total assistance measures. The largest
part of this total amount has been made to Ukraine, which has received €2.5 billion or
85.1% since Russia’s February 2022 invasion (European External Action Service 2022).
This is followed by €398 Million to Africa (or 13.7%), €16 million to the Western
Balkans (0.6%), €12.75 million to Georgia (0.4%) and €7 million to Moldova (0.2%)
(European External Action Service 2022). The second noteworthy development in
addition to Ukraine receiving the bulk of EPF support thus far is how the EU has
decided to increase the per annum financial ceilings originally locked into the Council
Decision establishing the Facility. Indeed, Annex I of Council Decision 2021/509 stated
that in 2022 the financial ceiling was set at €540 million (Council of the EU 2021a), but
on five different occasions in 2022 the EU decided to increase the ceilings to the
extent that €2.5 billion (or almost of half of the entire EPF for the 2021–2027 period)
has already been allocated in support of Ukraine’s war effort (Council of the EU
2022a).
452 D. FIOTT

Industrial rehabilitation: common EU defence procurement

Since Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU has produced four major strategic documents that
pertain to the need for the Union to invest in its defence capabilities and support the
European defence industry. The war, having highlighted the capability gaps present in
Europe’s armouries, and uncovered the severe constraints facing the European arms
industry to produce replacement ammunition and munitions in time, led Union leaders
to call for a reinvigoration of defence industrial efforts. To this end, in addition to the
publication of the Strategic Compass in March 2022, the EU Heads of State and
Government met at Versailles on 10–11 March 2022 to discuss investment in new defence
capabilities and how to replenish Soviet-era equipment stocks being sent to Ukraine. After
the Versailles Summit, leaders agreed to increase defence spending for the acquisition of
capabilities and strategic enablers such as cyber and space capacities. Interestingly, at
Versailles the European Council called for the Commission to ‘put forward an analysis of
the defence investment gaps’ and ‘propose any further initiative necessary to strengthen
the European defence industrial and technological base’ (European Council 2022, 5).
Building on the Versailles Declaration and the Strategic Compass, the European
Commission and HR/VP jointly published their assessment of defence capability gaps
on 18 May 2022. The assessment underlined that, due to Russia’s war, EU Member States
needed to create economies of scale in the European defence market through collabora­
tive projects and investments. The Joint Communication also specified how the Union
should urgently invest in gaps such as stockpiles of ammunition and air and missile
defence systems, while also calling on EU Member States to ‘phase out existing Soviet
era legacy systems still in use within EU Armed Forces with European solutions’, especially
in areas such as main battle tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and heavy artillery
(European Commission and HR/VP, 2022: 7). Interestingly, the Joint Communication out­
lined that the EU needed to set up a task force to manage joint procurement needs and
that the Commission would provide a VAT exemption for European defence projects, as
well as pursue an overall increase in the budgets of the EDF and military mobility.
The last of the four major documents to be released by the Commission on defence-
industrial matters was the proposed Regulation for the European Defence Industry
Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), which was published on
19 July 2022. The proposed Regulation sets out a new ambition for the European
Commission to invest €500 million over the 2022–2024 period in joint defence projects
that address the capability gaps identified in the 18 May Joint Communication (European
Commission 2022). However, the proposed Regulation goes further in announcing that
the EDIRPA should only be a short-term measure that will lead to the creation of a fully-
fledged European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP). While the level of investment
in the proposed EDIP is unknown today, it is seen as a way for the EU to move into the area
of common defence procurement and to build on the €8 billion EDF for defence research
and capability development. In this sense, through the EDIP and the EDF the Union would
not only invest in defence research and defence prototyping, but also engage in common
procurement and eventually the commercialisation of weapons systems.
To sum up, therefore, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has seen the development of a new
range of strategies and policies in EU defence. Russia’s actions have forced the EU to adapt
existing policies such as the EPF to new circumstances, and it has also given rise to
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 453

initiatives on common EU defence procurement. Despite this policy evolution, however,

there is a need to understand the significance of these developments for EU defence
integration. In particular, by analysing the Strategic Compass, EPF and EU defence
industrial policy in more detail it will be possible to provide a preliminary assessment of
how intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are changing (or not) as a result of
Russia’s war.

Deliberation, delegation and institutions

The first hypothesis advanced under new intergovernmentalism is that deliberation and
consensus has become the guiding norm of day-to-day decision making at all levels of the
EU (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015a, 711). In this sense, new intergovernmentalism
hypothesises that intergovernmental consensus and deliberation has effectively side-
lined supranational institutions. In each of the three cases outlined in this article, there
is evidence to support this claim. Certainly, the Strategic Compass and the EPF are two
initiatives that have been developed without much supranational control or initiative. In
fact, the EPF is run by a committee of Member States and presided over by an official from
the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU, and it is wholly financed by the Member
States and decisions are, by default, taken in a consensual and intergovernmental man­
ner. It is true, of course, that the EPF takes guidance on military-technical matters from the
EU Military Staff, but even this body – located in the EEAS – is composed of seconded
national experts. Furthermore, it was a caucus of Member States that effectively ensured
that the EPF would not only focus more on Ukraine rather than Africa,4 but that its per
annum financial ceilings could be raised. In this respect, this analysis departs from the
notion that the EPF signifies a step towards further supranational integration (Bergmann
and Müller 2021).
The Strategic Compass is another noteworthy area in how policy formation was guided
by the EU Member States rather than EU Institutions. In fact, while the drafting of the
Compass was put in the hands of an EEAS official working on behalf of the HR/VP, the
drafting process, spanning a period spanning from February to October 2021, was closely
scrutinised by the EU Member States. What is more, they co-organised approximately 50
workshops and produced over 25 non-papers on various aspects of EU defence policy
including security of supply, crisis management operations, capability development
planning and outer space to ensure that their collective interests were reflected in the
Compass document (Fiott and Lindstrom 2022, 6). It is true that the Compass included
a range of policy initiatives that fell under the purview of the Commission – especially in
relation to defence industrial policy, space and cybersecurity –, and Commission officials
were involved in the drafting process through coordination via the cabinet of the HR/VP,
other Commissioner cabinets and Directorates General (DGs).5
However, the Compass did not alter the EU Treaties and neither did it lead to the
creation of new supranational bodies or powers. In this sense, we see an interesting
contrast between the drafting process behind the EUGS and the Strategic Compass. For
example, Morillas is correct to surmise that the Global Strategy can be considered an
instance of ‘autonomy in intergovernmentalism’. Here, the HR/VP and EEAS had the
relative autonomy to lead the drafting process and this meant that ‘the centre of political
gravity of the EUGS was established at the EEAS under the leadership of the HR/VP’ (2020:
454 D. FIOTT

241). However, it has also been noted that the Member States were less than pleased with
this approach, even if they subsequently agreed to the Strategy (Morillas 2020). What is
intriguing about the Strategic Compass process, however, is that Member States insisted
upon not fully repeating the EUGS process. In practice, this meant that the HR/VP and
EEAS remained as de novo bodies in the process, but the political centre of gravity in
agreeing to the text and its contents shifted back to the Council of the EU.
The second hypothesis advanced by new intergovernmentalism is that supranational
institutions are not hard-wired to seek ever-closer union. Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter
argue that ‘[t]he post-Maastricht period has been notable for the absence of a big push by
the Commission for the centralization of decision-making in new areas of EU activity’
(2015a: 712). To support this argument, they argue that supranational institutions are
more cautious about deepening EU integration when in hostile political climates, and in
certain cases a quest for more power ranks as a more important objective than integra­
tion. In advancing this hypothesis, new intergovernmentalism not only pushes back
against functionalist accounts of EU integration, but it dislocates the automaticity with
which we equate deeper EU integration with increased supranational power.
Schimmelfennig (2015) has criticised this assumption because new intergovernmentalism
fails to show under which specific ‘conditions supranational institutions prefer more or
less integration’ (Schimmelfennig 2015, 727).
This is an important point of contention raised in criticisms of new intergovernment­
alism. In fact, by insisting on a contested notion such as ‘integration’ it becomes harder to
understand the more nuanced ways in which governments and institutions interact with
each other. For example, Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier (2021) have shown how develop­
ments in EU defence cooperation since 2016 have been pushed along by close collabora­
tion between large Member States such as France and Germany and the European
Commission. In this sense, it is argued that larger Member States can use more suprana­
tional decision-making methods, in partnership with the Commission, to break political
deadlock in the European Council and Council of the EU and push forward bolder policy
initiatives. While evidence has been provided for how this relationship functioned during
the creation of the EDF (Béraud-Sudreau and Pannier 2021), there is reason to believe that
this same logic is prevailing with regard to common defence procurement in the wake of
the war on Ukraine. In this respect, it is no coincidence that there was a clear alignment of
preferences between France, Germany and the European Commission at the 2022
Versailles Summit to promote common defence acquisition, especially in a context were
EU Member States were procuring arms from the United States, South Korea, Turkey and
other non-EU suppliers.6
Nevertheless, since Russia’s war on Ukraine we have seen how the European
Commission has sought to advance common EU defence procurement through EDIRPA
and the planned EDIP. One could interpret the creation of these policy tools as a form of
policy entrepreneurship on the part of the Commission. However, a closer reading of the
European Commission’s ‘Joint Communication on the Defence Investment Gaps’ reveals
the limits to deeper supranational integration. First, the Commission calls for Member
States to make use of EU-level capability planning and development frameworks such as
PESCO and CARD, but in doing so they are making reference to overtly intergovernmental
tools and frameworks. Second, while it is true that the Joint Communication calls for the
establishment of a Joint Defence Task Force to study further common procurement
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 455

needs, the Commission is clear that this Task Force should be largely compromised of the
Member States and intergovernmental bodies like the EEAS and the European Defence
Agency (EDA).
Where there is perhaps a shift towards greater supranationalism is when the Joint
Communication refers to how the Commission could support joint defence procurement.
Accordingly, the Commission uses the governance logic already embedded in the EDF of
using financial inducements for closer cooperation to call for European common defence
procurement and a re-configuration of defence planning at the Union level. Thus far, and
to the extent that genuine defence planning occurs at the EU level, it does so in an
intergovernmental setting through the EDA, EU Military Staff and EU Military Committee.
Despite this, the 2022 Joint Communication calls for ‘a joint EU defence programming and
procurement function’ that could ‘act as a central purchasing body for EU joint procure­
ment and support Member States in their joint procurements, including downstream
from the EDF-funded projects’ (European Commission and HR/VP, 2022: 11).
Understanding any call for a ‘central purchasing body’ in relation to new intergovern­
mentalism’s third hypothesis that de novo bodies can only be created by agreement
between governments raises questions (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015a, 713).
One could, for example, argue that even the creation of a defence planning and
procurement function at the EU level would not necessarily enhance supranationalism
in defence. This is due to the fact that Member States would still own and use defence
capabilities. Furthermore, in its proposal for a Regulation for the EDIRPA on 19 July, the
Commission did not put itself forward as the ‘special procurement agent’ to lead the work
under EDIRPA. Even though the Commission is home to a dedicated DG for defence and
space (DG DEFIS), Recital 22 of the proposed Regulation calls on Member States to
‘appoint a procurement agent to conduct’ common procurement ‘on their behalf’. Here,
even though the proposed Regulation states that Union bodies can be used for this
purpose, it lists non-EU bodies such as the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en
matière d’Armament (OCCAR) as a suitable agent. Accordingly, at present it seems unclear
whether de novo bodies will be established to manage EDIRPA or the future EDIP. If the
Commission follows the governance logic already embedded in the EDF for the EDIRPA
and EDIP, this will imply close coordination between the Commission and a committee
comprised of the Member States rather than the creation of a new EU-level procurement
body.
What does the empirical investigation so far reveal in relation to some of the hypoth­
eses advanced under new intergovernmentalism? What should be relatively clear is that
the Commission has seized on the opportunity of advancing EU policy in the area of
common defence procurement. Yet it has only done so with the express consent and
direct tasking of the European Council. Clearly, Member State leaders believed that the
Commission was the most suitable EU institution to deal with a collective challenge such
as common defence procurement, and that no single EU Member State could solve this
challenge it on its own. In this sense, Russia’s war on Ukraine has not only exposed the
costs of fragmentation in Europe’s defence market, but it has provided a political impetus
to organise defence procurement at the Union level. In relation to the EPF, which has
become an important expression of the Union’s support Ukraine, the role for suprana­
tional bodies is severely constrained. Likewise, the Strategic Compass only embeds the
456 D. FIOTT

logic of intergovernmentalism and it does not seek any transfers of power to suprana­
tional institutions in the area of defence policy.

Preferences, politics and disequilibrium

Another of the core hypotheses advanced by new intergovernmentalism is that ‘problems
in domestic preference formation have become standalone inputs into the European
integration process’ (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015a, 714). Here, it is argued that
Liberal Intergovernmentalism offers a narrow interpretation of domestic preferences and
that it gives precedence to economic interests that are bargained for by governments at
the EU level. New intergovernmentalism urges a broader understanding of preferences to
include popular political movements and room for distrust in governments. However, in
many respects Liberal Intergovernmentalism has never argued that economic preferences
are the only set of important interests (Schimmelfennig 2015, 727; Fiott 2017 and 2019).
There have already been attempts to reposition the notion of domestic preferences under
Liberal Intergovernmentalism in relation to the defence sector. In this respect, it is argued
that governments bargain at the EU level in defence policy to advance a diversity of
preferences including industrial and commercial interests, considerations about military
strategy or whether the development of EU-level policy could lead to the further empow­
erment of the European Commission in the area of defence (Fiott 2019; Calcara 2019).
The fifth hypothesis forwarded under new intergovernmentalism is that the ‘differ­
ences between high and low politics have become blurred’ (Bickerton, Hodson, and
Puetter 2015a, 715). Of course, the original idea behind such a distinction was to highlight
those policy areas where Member States would be more vigilant about protecting their
sovereignty. By arguing that domestic preference formation is contested and not as
simple as assumed by a Liberal Intergovernmental reading of preferences, new intergo­
vernmentalism posits that high and low politics have become blurred ‘because of the
difficulties in forging any single and coherent narrative about the national interest’
(Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015a, 716). In relation to EU defence policy, however,
it is questionable whether the distinction between high and low politics has truly become
blurred. This is not only supported by the fact that the EU Treaties are particularly clear
that matters pertaining to security and defence are a matter for Member States, but also
because the Strategic Compass and EPF are instances where national governments
continue to exert significant political control. For example the EPF shows that any
decisions pertaining to the transfer of weapons to Ukraine is a matter for sovereign states
to manage in common and with a limited role for supranational institutions.
In terms of EU defence industrial policy, one could make the argument that even the
audacity of proposing joint EU defence procurement is tantamount to a blurring of lines
between high and low politics. After all, it was the European Council that first asked the
European Commission to explore the idea. Naturally, decisions about how to spend
defence budgets and which military capabilities to acquire is one of the quintessential
hallmarks of national sovereignty. It is for this reason that the proposal for EDIRPA is
carefully crafted to maintain national sovereign control over capabilities, even when
jointly developed. In fact, the proposed Regulation does not stray from the logic that
Member States ultimately have to develop, own and use military capabilities – regardless
of whether they have been financed at the EU level or agreed to through a Commission-
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 457

led committee. Thus, this evidence would lead one to disagree with new intergovern­
mentalism because there are still areas in defence policy that Member States seek to
safeguard.
The Strategic Compass offers insights into the relationship between high and low
politics in EU defence policy, too. As we has seen, the Compass is a document but it is also
the first-ever EU security and defence strategy. In this respect, it imparts important
political signals about how EU defence policy should be directed. As a document initiated,
agreed and endorsed by Member States it should be no surprise to learn that the
Compass reinforces an intergovernmental logic and it underlines how the HR/VP ‘will
provide an annual report on the progress made as a basis for a European Council meeting
to provide political guidance for our efforts’ (Council of the EU 2022b, 47). It should be
stated that, in underlining the European Council’s central role, the Compass goes beyond
the traditional focus on the Council of the EU as the main arbiter of the direction of EU
security and defence policy. Yet the Strategic Compass goes further in bringing together
policies under both the CSDP and wider defence initiatives that fall under the
Commission’s purview. While the EU Treaty provisions on maintaining defence as an
area of high politics are maintained in the Compass, the first-ever EU defence strategy
interestingly brings together communitarian and intergovernmental policy initiatives in
one document, and places them under the political guidance of the European Council. For
example, one can find provisions on space and cyber policy alongside military operations
planning and the EPF. This increased role for the European Council in defence policy is in
keeping with the idea that the body is vital ‘for governing within policy areas that are at
the heart of national sovereignty and domestic politics’ (Puetter 2014, 69).
The final hypothesis offered by Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter (2015a) is that the post-
Maastricht order is marked by a greater degree of political disequilibrium. By disequili­
brium they mean that there is a question about the durability of intergovernmentalism
and how it relates to the legitimacy of EU policy. Indirect democratic authority through
the Council of the EU, they argue, covers the fact that citizens can be at odds with the
governments that represent them and the EU policy that they formulate. Schimmelfennig
even tends to agree with the notion that mass politics, as opposed to domestic prefer­
ences, may mark an innovative departure from Liberal Intergovernmentalism (2015: 727).
How the voice of the people is articulated in relation to EU defence integration and
Russia’s war on Ukraine – as opposed to just governments and domestic preferences – is
a salient point. However, even a cursory look at polling data on the Union’s response to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and how the EU should develop its defence policy provides
evidence that citizens may be more interested in defence integration than their govern­
ments. This would not necessarily contradict the idea that there is a gap between
governments and popular sentiment, but it does question the notion that somehow
governments are more in favour of defence integration than citizens.
Indeed, in April 2022 Eurobarometer conducted a flash survey on what EU citizens
thought about the Union’s response to the war on Ukraine – approximately 76% of people
interviewed not only agreed that the EU had put up a united front in response to the war
on Ukraine, but that the war also served as a reason for greater military cooperation within
the EU (Eurobarometer 2022, 21). What is even more startling with these results is that
while 69% of those polled believed that the EU27 had reacted satisfactorily to the war on
Ukraine, 75% of those same people surveyed stated that more military cooperation within
458 D. FIOTT

the EU is necessary (Eurobarometer 2022, 19 and 23). Such polling results can, perhaps, be
explained away as a form of permissive consensus but there is evidence to suggest that
the slow progress in EU defence integration is due to the reluctance of EU Member States
and not citizens, which have historically been polled to express a consistently positive
attitude towards greater EU defence integration (Schilde, Anderson, and Garner 2019).
Interestingly, in the way new intergovernmentalism flags how Eurosceptic parties are
moving closer to the mainstream, and thus raising ‘popular concerns about the merits of
EU membership’ (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015a, 717), it is suggested that such
parties may readily rebel against EU defence integration efforts – especially if they
contradict political or electoral programmes to enhance national sovereignty. The
assumption at play here is that elites that were pushing for EU defence integration in
the past did so without the consent of people, even if this is contested given sustained
polling to show otherwise. Such an assumption can be questioned. Indeed, even if the
specific political context in the UK led to media and popular calls against an ‘EU army’
during the Brexit campaign, continental Eurosceptic parties have been less virulent about
EU defence integration. For example, recently the right-wing Brothers of Italy party have
been very careful to underline their commitment to the transatlantic partnership and they
even promised in their electoral manifesto to pursue the strengthening of common EU
defence and to bolster the European pillar in NATO (Sondel-Cedarmas 2022; Castaldi
2022; Varvelli 2022). In this sense, the challenge is not so much how Eurosceptic parties
turn away from EU defence integration, but how certain elements of EU policy – such as
defence – are seen as an important element of their political programmes.

Conclusion
This article began by seeking to assess to what extent EU defence integration has been
affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine. The article drew on three EU defence policy devel­
opments that have become even more salient since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine
by Russia. First, we detailed the relevance of the Union’s first official strategy for security
and defence, the Strategic Compass. Second, the paper analysed how the EPF had been
amended to be able to focus on providing military support to Ukraine and to increase its
per annum levels of financial support. Third, we also focused on developments in EU
defence industrial policy such as the plans for common defence procurement. Combined
with all of the EU’s other – non-defence – support for Ukraine, the Union has recognised
its existing defence capability shortfalls and taken steps to reposition itself as a defence
actor. Despite these developments, however, this article drew on hypotheses generated
by new intergovernmentalism to show that there remains little evidence to suggest that
there has been a substantial drive towards more supranational forms of EU integration in
defence.
In fact, even though bodies such as the European Commission have seized on the
opportunity to push for common defence procurement at the EU level, this can best be
described as a form of policy entrepreneurship rather than a substantial shift to suprana­
tionalism or deeper EU defence integration. Indeed, the article supports the hypothesis
under new intergovernmentalism that increased Commission powers do not automati­
cally equate to deeper integration. This differs to the argument advanced by neo-
functionalism and its emphasis on cultivated spillover (Håkansson 2021; Haroche 2020).
 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 459

While it should be acknowledged that supranational bodies such as the Commission have
sought to innovate with new financial tools, legislation and policy frameworks they may
not amount to an irreversible or head-long rush into supranationalism. As has been
argued, most of the evidence in this article would appear to contradict the neo-
functionalist assumption that, even with crises and the rise of Euroscepticism, the EU is
becoming ever more integrated. In this sense, we return to the genesis of intergovern­
mental theories in countering neo-functionalism’s inherent positive bias towards more EU
integration.
Of course, the central points raised in this article may be criticised for stating the
obvious about EU defence policy. Given that EU security and defence policy in the EU
treaties is strictly governed by EU Member States, there may be little theoretical ingenuity
in claiming that EU defence policy remains intergovernmental after Russia’s war on
Ukraine. This is a fair criticism but it misses at least two finer points about theoretical
discussions about EU defence integration. First, recently a number of scholars have sought
to rehabilitate neo-functionalism by claiming that policy tools developed before Russia’s
invasion point to a greater role for the European Commission and growing supranation­
alism (Haroche 2020; Håkansson 2021; Sabatino 2022). By employing hypotheses derived
from new intergovernmentalism, the assumptions inherent in neo-functionalism have
been challenged. Second, focusing on new intergovernmentalism in relation to EU
defence has allowed us to test the limits of this theoretical approach in new policy
areas. Thus, while EU defence policy is largely intergovernmental in nature there are key
differences between established intergovernmental theories such as Liberal
Intergovernmentalism and new intergovernmentalism.
On the one hand, developments in EU defence policy since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
have not yet led to the creation of new supranational bodies or agencies to handle
questions related to the transfer of lethal equipment or common defence procurement.
In this sense, we are closer to new intergovernmentalism’s claim that intergovernmental
consensus is preferred to the creation of new EU institutions. Liberal
Intergovernmentalism would assume that bodies such as the Commission would be
used to embedded political bargains on common procurement and lethal equipment
transfers (Fiott 2017), but this has so far not occurred and EU Member States have thus far
insisted upon tightly controlled special committees – of which they are a part – to govern
these developing areas of defence cooperation. We have also seen how supranational
institutions such as the Commission have adapted to this intergovernmental logic, by
stressing the coordinating and expert role they can play rather than as a centralising
location for decision-making and political power. If anything, the Commission has been
somewhat cautious about positioning itself as the future common defence procurement
or purchasing agency.
On the other hand, this article has highlighted some of the explanatory limits of new
intergovernmentalism in relation to EU defence policy. For example, the article has ques­
tioned the idea that Liberal Intergovernmentalism cannot handle domestic preferences that
go beyond economic interests. If anything, EU defence policy since Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine has been driven by strategic and military preferences, as well as economic ones. Any
criticism of Liberal Intergovernmentalism’s handling of domestic preferences by new inter­
governmentalism seems to be unwarranted. What is more, this article has questioned
whether there has been any blurring of lines between high and low politics. While it is
460 D. FIOTT

noteworthy that the Commission has recently played a role in developing the EDF and new
tools such as EDIRPA/EDIP, the war on Ukraine has allowed EU Member States to reinforce
the notion that defence policy remains a sensitive area of sovereignty. Cooperation between
governments remains possible though, even with an insistence on national sovereignty –
the EPF is a prime example. This is also the reason why the Strategic Compass asserts the
importance of defence cooperation under an intergovernmental umbrella such as the
European Council. Finally, the article pushed back against new intergovernmentalism’s
claim about political disequilibrium by showing how citizens and Eurosceptic parties have
far more nuanced views about the need and direction of EU defence integration.

Notes
1. Semi-structured interview with an official from the European External Action Service, Brussels,
6 April 2022.
2. Semi-structured interview with an official from the European External Action Service, Brussels,
5 July 2022.
3. Semi-structured interview with an official at the Council of the EU, Brussels, 17 May 2022.
4. Semi-structured interview with an official from the European External Action Service, Brussels,
16 May 2022.
5. Semi-structured interview with an official from the European External Action Service, Brussels,
17 May 2022 and semi-structured interview with an official from the European Commission,
Brussels, 19 May 2022.
6. Semi-structured interview with an official from the European Commission, Brussels,
19 May 2022.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID
Daniel Fiott http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2378-3568

List of semi-structured interviews

Official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 6 April 2022.
Official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 16 May 2022.
Official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 17 May 2022.
Official, Council of the EU, Brussels, 17 May 2022.
Official, European Commission, Brussels, 19 May 2022.
Official, European External Action Service, Brussels, 5 July 2022.

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