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Case Laws for Crimes – I

1. McNaughten’s Case [(1843) 4 St Tr (NS) 847] (Insanity)
Point of Law: Insanity as a defence to crime

Facts: The accused, Daniel McNaughten was charged for the murder of Edward Drummond,
who was the Secretary to the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, by shooting him in his back as
he was walking. The accused was suffering from an insane delusion that Sir Robert Peel had
injured him. He mistook Drummond for Sir Robert and so shot and killed him. The accused
pleaded not guilty on the ground of insanity, his obsession with certain morbid (horrible)
delusions.
The jury gave the verdict of ‘not guilty’ on the ground of insanity.
An appeal for the same was filed before the House of Lords.

Held: The matter was debated in the Parliament and it was decided the opinion of the
judges of the House of Lords should be taken with the view to getting the law clarified on
the point. Accordingly, the judges were requested to give their opinion to the five questions
put to them. The famous McNaughten rule, which formulates the law of insanity, is based
on the answers to the second and third questions.
The jurors told that every man is to be presumed as sane and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved to their
satisfaction and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason from the disease of the mind as not to know the nature and the
quality of the act he was doing or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing
was wrong.
The last question posed was, “Can a medical man conversant with the disease if insanity,
who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole
trial and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the
prisoner’s mind at the time of the commission of the crime of the alleged crime, or his
opinion whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act that he was acting
contrary to the law or whether he was labouring under any and if yes then what delusion, at
that time? The answer to the above question stated that the doctor’s opinion cannot be
asked as a matter of right and cannot be relied upon.

Principle: Insanity in law, is a defence to a charge of crime according to the test laid
down in case of McNaughten.
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2. Queen v. Dudley & Stephens [(1884) 14 QBD 273] (Defence of Necessity)

Point of Law: A person may not sacrifice another person’s life to save his own.

Facts: In 1884, the respondents with one Brooks, and t he deceased, a boy, between 17 and
18 years of age, the crew of a registered English vessel, were cast away in a storm on the
high seas. They had no supply of water or food. On the 18th day the prisoners spoke of their
having families and suggested it would be better to kill the boy so that their lives should be
saved.

Stephens agreed to the act, but Brooks dissented from it. Dudley, with the assent of
Stephens, went to the boy, who was extremely weakened by famine put a knife into his
throat and killed him. The three men fed upon the body and blood of the boy for 4 days,
after which the boat was picked by the passing vessel, and the prisoners were rescued still
alive.

Issue: Does the defense of necessity permit the killing of one person to save others?

Held: No. At the time of this case the doctrine of necessity was still largely unexplored.
Much of the prevailing authority at the time spoke of necessity in terms of what is now
called self-defense, i.e. taking another’s life to safeguard one’s own. The Court provided
some authority for the existence of the defense of necessity to lesser crimes. For example, a
hungry man is not guilty of larceny for stealing food. However, the Queen’s Bench
acknowledged that no court has ever accepted necessity as a defense to murder and for
good reason. Permitting such a defense to be asserted raises poignant questions such as
how does one measure the comparative values of lives and who decides such things.

Further, specific to the present case, the Court asks, “Was it more necessary to kill
[Parker] than one of the grown men?” While this murder was arguably not “devilish” and
even though the men probably would not have survived otherwise, Lord Coleridge held that
there is never any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve one’s own life. Once such a
defense is allowed, there is no telling what atrocious crimes may be justified by the excuse
of necessity.

Principle: Necessity is never a defence to murder.

3. Mobarak Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay AIR 1957 SC 857] (Jurisdiction)

Point of Law: Territorial jurisdiction of Indian Penal Code.

Facts: The appellant was convicted for the offence of cheating under S. 420, read with S. 34
of the IPC. The complainant, who was the director of export-import Company in Goa,
contacted an agent Jaswalla acting as the agent between the complainant and the
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appellant, a trader in Karachi for purchasing 2,000 tons of rice to be shipped from Karachi to
Goa and the Complainant paid the Appellant through the agent, Rs. 5,50,000/- in 3
instalments. However, no rice was shipped and the amount was also not returned. The
appellant argued that he was a Pakistani national, and during the period of the offence,
never came to India, and to hold him liable for the same would give extra territorial effect to
the IPC.

Held:The offence of cheating under IPC has 2 essential ingredients:

a. Deceit, that is, dishonest or fraudulent misrepresentation to a person
b. The inducing of that person to deliver the property.

In the present case, the appellant though at Karachi was making representations to the
complainant through letters, telegrams and telephone talks, sometimes directly through the
complainant and sometimes through Jaswalla.

On these facts, it is clear that all the ingredients necessary for cheating u/s 420 have
occurred at Bombay and not merely the consequences, viz. delivery of money which was
one of the ingredients of the offence.

The fastening of criminal liability on a foreigner in respect of culpable acts or omissions

in India which are juridically attributable to him notwithstanding that he is corporeally
present outside India at the time, is not to give any extra-territorial operation to the law for
it is in respect of an offence that falls within the territory of India, that the liability is
fastened on the person and the punishment is awarded by the law, if his presence in India
for the trial can be secured. Hence, this is the part of ordinary jurisdiction of a municipal
court.
The provisions relating to jurisdiction under the IPC states that the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction depends on the exact place where the offence occurred, and not on the
nationality of the alleged criminal.
Even on an assumption that the appellant ceased to be an Indian citizen and was a
Pakistani national, at the time of the commission of the offence, must be held guilty and
punished under the IPC, notwithstanding his not being corporeally present in India at the
time.

Principle: Presence of the accused in India is not necessary for prosecution, if the offence is
committed in India.
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4. Queen v. Tolson [(1889) 23 QBD 168 (HL)]

Point of Law: Mens rea in the offence of Bigamy.

Facts:Martha Tolson married Tolson on 11th September, 1880. Mr. Tolson deserted her on
13th December, 1880 and went away. Mrs. Tolson and her father made inquiries about him
and learned that he had been lost in a vessel bound for America, which went down with all
hands on board. On 10th January 1887, Mrs. Tolson believing herself to be a widow, went
through the ceremony of marriage with another man. All the circumstances were known to
the second husband and the ceremony was in no way concealed. In December 1887, Mr.
Tolson returned from America and prosecuted Mrs. Tolson for Bigamy.

Held: The accused was tried under the S. 57 of the Offences Against the Persons Act, 1861
which stated that whoever, being already married, marries another during the lifetime of
his/her spouse is liable for the offence of Bigamy. However, the proviso to this section
stated that this section is not a bar to a person marrying a second time whose spouse have
been continuously absent from such person for the space of seven years past and shall not
have been known by such person to be living within that time.

In the trial Court, the jury convicted Mrs. Tolson to one day’s imprisonment on the
ground that a good belief and on no reasonable facts about the death of the husband were
no defence to the charge of bigamy. She appealed against the judgment of the Trial Court to
the Court of Appeal Crown cases.

The Court of Crown by majority of nine to five quashed the conviction on the ground
that a bona fide belief about the death of the first husband at the time of the second
marriage was a good defence in the offence of bigamy. It also opined that the statutory
limitation for the second marriage of seven years was completed at the time of her second
marriage and she informed the real facts to the second husband.

The Court further observed that it is , however, undoubtedly a principle of English

Criminal Law, that ordinarily speaking a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
doing the act in question be innocent. Thus, the intent and the act must concur to
constitute the crime.

Principle: Reasonable belief in good faith in the death of the spouse negatives mens rea and
is a good defence to a charge of bigamy.

5. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1957 SC 857]

Facts: Bachan Singh, the appellant in this case, was tried and convicted and sentenced by
the Sessions Judge to death under section 302, Indian Penal Code for the murders of Desa
Singh, Durga Bai and Veeran Bai. The High Court confirmed his death sentence and
dismissed his appeal. He appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. A Bench of the
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Supreme Court consisting of Sarkaria and Kailasam, JJ. heard the appeal and directed the
records of the case to be submitted to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, for constituting a larger
Bench to resolve the question of constitutional validity of death penalty for murder
provided in section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and the sentencing procedure embodied
in sub-section (3) of section 354 of the Cr.P.C., 1973.

Issue: Constitutional validity of death penalty for murder.

Judgment: Article 21 clearly brings out the implication that the Founding Fathers recognized
the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in accordance with
fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. Entries 1 and 2 in the
Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule specifically refer to the Indian Penal Code. Under
the Constitution, the President and the Governor of a State is invested with power to
suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence, and also
"in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death". Article 134, in terms, gives a right
of appeal to the Supreme Court to a person who, on appeal, is sentenced to death by the
High Court, after reversal of his acquittal by the trial court. In view of the aforesaid
constitutional provisions, by it cannot be said that death penalty under section 302, Indian
Penal Code, either per se or because of its execution by hanging, constitutes, an
unreasonable, cruel or unusual punishment. By reason of the same constitutional
provisions, it cannot be said that the framers of the Constitution considered death sentence
for murder or the prescribed traditional mode of its execution as a degrading punishment
which would defile "the dignity of the individual" within the contemplation of the Preamble
to the Constitution. On parity of reasoning, it cannot be said that death penalty for the
offence of murder violates the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

The only effect is that the application of those principles is now to be guided by the
paramount beacons of legislative policy discernible from sections 354(3) and 235(2) of the
Code of 1973, namely: (1) The extreme penalty can be inflicted only in gravest cases of
extreme culpability; (2) In making choice of the sentence, in addition to the circumstances of
the offence, due regard must be paid to the circumstances of the offender also.

That is why, it is not desirable to consider the circumstances of the crime and the
circumstances of the criminal in two separate water-tight compartments. In a sense, to kill is
to be cruel and therefore all murders are cruel. But such cruelty may vary in its degree of
culpability. And it is only when the culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity
that "special reasons" can legitimately be said to exist.

Judges should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging of murderers has never been too good
for them. Facts and figures albeit incomplete, furnished by the Union of India, show that in
the past Courts have inflicted the extreme penalty with extreme infrequency-a fact which
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attests to the caution and compassion which they have always brought to bear on the
exercise of their sentencing discretion in so grave a matter.

Held: Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as it provides for the death sentence as
also section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is constitutionally valid.

Exercise of discretion under section 354(3), Cr.P.C. should be in exceptional and grave
circumstances and imposition of death sentence should only be in rarest of rare cases.

6. Sherraz v. De Rutzen [(1895) All ER 1167 : (1895) 1 QBD 918]

Points: Mens rea in statutory offences – Mistake of fact

Facts: The appellant, a licensed innkeeper, was convicted by a magistrate under S. 16(2) of
the Licensing Act 1872, for supplying liquor to the constable on duty. The appellant’s
daughter in his presence supplied liquor to the constable without making any inquiry as to
whether he was on duty. It was customary for police officers to wear an armlet whilst on
duty but this constable had removed his prior to entering the public house, which was
nearly opposite to a police station. The appellant therefore believed he was off duty. The
statute was silent as to the question of whether knowledge was required for the offence.
The appellant’s conviction was upheld by the Quarter Sessions on the ground that the
knowledge, htat the police constable, when served with liquor, was on duty, was not an
essential ingredient of the impugned section of the Statute. The case was referred to the
Divisional Court.

Issue: Whether knowledge is required in the commission of any crime.

Held: The appeal was allowed and his conviction was quashed.

There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the

wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is
liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the
subject-matter with which it deals and both must be considered.

There must be guilty knowledge on the part of the defendent, or of someone whom
he has put in his place to act for him in order to constitute an offence. It is plain that if guilty
knowledge is not necessary, no care on the part of the publican could save him from a
conviction under section 16, subsection (2), since it would be as easy for the constable to
deny that he was on duty when asked, or to produce a forged permission from his superior
officer, as to remove his armlet before entering the public house. I am, therefore, of opinion
that this conviction ought to be quashed. The conviction is, therefore, quashed.

Principle: Ignorance of fact as absence of mens rea is a valid excuse in statutory offences.
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