ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- Case Laws

MODULE 1

“Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab”

Introduction
The case of Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955) is significant in
understanding the doctrine of separation of powers in India, particularly the extent to which
the executive can operate without explicit legislative backing. This case revolves around the
executive's interference in the publishing and education sector in Punjab, raising questions
about whether such actions infringed upon fundamental rights and violated constitutional
boundaries. The court’s judgment clarified the scope of executive powers under the Indian
Constitution and their interaction with legislative functions.

Facts of the Case

From 1905 to 1950, the Punjab education department approved school textbooks, and schools
were required to choose from a list of elective reading materials prepared by the department.
Authors and publishers submitted their books for approval, and a list of approved books was
provided to schools.
After the partition of Punjab, changes were made. In certain subjects like history and social
studies, the government started preparing textbooks without involving publishers and authors,
while in other subjects, only one textbook was selected for each subject instead of providing a
list.
The government imposed a 5% royalty on the sale price of approved books, and the authors
whose books were selected had to assign copyright to the government.
On August 9, 1952, a notification was issued stating that the government would only accept
proposals from authors and required them to enter agreements with the government. This
arrangement deprived authors and publishers of their copyright and was seen as an
infringement on their rights.
Six petitioners, including authors and publishers, filed a petition against the government,
contending that these actions violated their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) (right to
practise any profession or trade) and were beyond the executive's authority (ultra-vires).

Issues Raised
Violation of Fundamental Rights: Whether the state’s actions infringed on the petitioners'
fundamental right to practise any profession, trade, or business under Article 19(1)(g).
Ultra Vires Executive Action: Whether the executive required specific legislation to take
these actions or if it could act solely through executive power.

Arguments of the Petitioners

The petitioners argued that the executive overstepped its authority by setting up a monopoly
in the publishing industry without legislative backing. They claimed this act deprived them of
their business rights and was an unconstitutional restriction on their right to trade or practise a
profession, as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g).
They contended that without proper legislation and compensation, as required under Article
31, the executive’s actions were illegal. They also claimed the government had violated the
reasonable restriction clause under Article 19(6), making their actions ultra vires.

Arguments of the Respondent (State of Punjab)

The state argued that the executive’s actions were well within its powers to promote social
welfare. It claimed that the executive had followed proper procedures and had the authority to
engage in such activities, even without specific legislative approval.
The government defended its position by asserting that it was acting in the public interest,
and the steps taken could not be deemed ultra vires. It further contended that the petitioners
still had options for conducting business through other vendors, so their rights were not
completely violated.

Judgement
The Supreme Court, while addressing the scope of executive power, examined precedents
from Australia, including Commonwealth and Central Wool Committee v. Colonial Combing,
Spinning, and Weaving Co. Ltd. (1922) and Attorney-General for Victoria v. the
Commonwealth (1935). These cases highlighted how executive power is limited under the
Australian Constitution, but the Indian Constitution does not impose similar restrictions.
Key points from the judgment:
• Nature of Executive Power: The court held that the executive power extends beyond
merely enforcing laws. It includes incidental and ancillary powers, which may allow it
to engage in activities that overlap with legislative functions, as long as they are not
contrary to constitutional provisions or laws.
• Separation of Powers: The court concluded that the Indian Constitution does not
follow a strict doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislature, executive, and
judiciary have distinct functions, there can be overlap in certain areas. The executive
can engage in legislative work, such as subordinate legislation, but it must not conflict
with constitutional principles.
 • Fundamental Rights: The court held that the petitioners' fundamental rights under
Article 19(1)(g) were not violated. The restrictions imposed by the state were not
absolute, and the petitioners still had the freedom to engage in business through other
means. The actions of the state were within the executive's powers, and the petition
was dismissed.

Conclusion
The Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur case is crucial for delineating the boundaries of executive
power in India. The court emphasized that while the separation of powers is an essential
doctrine, it is not applied strictly under the Indian Constitution. The executive has a wide
range of powers, which may overlap with legislative functions, especially when acting in the
interest of social welfare. The court’s decision affirmed the executive’s ability to function
without explicit legislative backing as long as its actions are not unconstitutional or in
violation of existing laws.
The case also underscores that the executive’s actions must be reasonable and follow due
process, but they do not require strict legislative authorization. This decision has important
implications for the balance of power between the three pillars of democracy in India.

“State of Bombay v. K.P. Krishnan”

Introduction
This case revolves around a labor dispute between the Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company
of India and its workmen, concerning issues like slow strikes, bonus payments, and employee
classification. The case primarily focused on whether the government acted correctly in not
referring the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal as per the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), 1947.
The Supreme Court's decision clarified the application of Sections 10 and 12 of the IDA and
the scope of judicial review in such cases.

Facts of the Case

In 1952-53, the workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company went on a slow strike,
causing a reduction in the company’s production. The company’s standing orders defined
slowing down production as misconduct, leading to disciplinary action against 58 workers.
The workers raised demands for gratuity, holidays, bonus, and the classification of some
employees. However, the company refused to recognize the workers' trade union, preventing
negotiations.
The company gave a bonus of 1/4th of the basic earnings to workers for 1952-53, but the
workers felt entitled to a higher bonus. The conciliation officer accepted only two demands
for consideration: the unconditional bonus for 1952-53 and employee classification.
The conciliation proceedings failed, and a failure report was submitted under Section 12(4) of
the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA). Based on this report, the Maharashtra government refused
to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, citing the slow strike by workers in 1952-53 as
a reason.
A worker filed a writ of mandamus in the Bombay High Court challenging the government’s
refusal. The High Court ruled that the government’s decision was not based on relevant facts
and that the procedure under Section 10 of the IDA was not followed. The government was
ordered to reconsider referring the case to the Industrial Tribunal.
The government appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court’s decision.

Issues Raised
Section 12(5) vs. Section 10: Whether cases under Section 12(5) of the IDA can be referred
independently of Section 10.
Reliance on Conciliation Officer’s Report: Whether the government’s decision was based
solely on the conciliation officer’s report under Section 12(4).
Relevance of Slow Strike in Decision-Making: Whether the slow strike by the workers was
a valid reason for the government to refuse a reference to the tribunal.
Judicial Review: Whether the government’s decision to refuse a reference can be subjected
to judicial review.

Arguments
Petitioner (Workers): The workers argued that the government’s refusal to refer the dispute
to the tribunal was arbitrary and based on irrelevant facts, like the slow strike, which had no
bearing on the specific issues of bonus and employee classification.
Respondent (Government): The government defended its refusal to refer the case, claiming
that the slow strike by the workers justified its decision.

Judgement
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision and ruled that Section 12(5) of the IDA
cannot be used independently of Section 10. The reference of disputes must be made under
Section 10(1), and Section 12(5) only supplements this process.
The conciliation officer’s report is not the only material the government can rely on when
deciding whether to refer a dispute. The government can also consider other relevant facts,
but the reasons must be relevant to the dispute.
The Supreme Court held that the government’s decision, which was solely based on the slow
strike, was irrelevant and amounted to an extra punishment on the workers.
Judicial review of administrative decisions, such as a government’s refusal to refer a case, is
permissible. If the government’s decision is arbitrary or based on irrelevant considerations, it
can be overturned by the courts.
Conclusion
The case emphasized that while the government has the power to refer disputes under the
Industrial Disputes Act, this power is subject to judicial review and must be exercised based
on relevant facts. The government cannot refuse to refer a dispute based on irrelevant
circumstances, such as a past slow strike by workers. The decision reinforced the idea that the
Industrial Disputes Act was enacted to facilitate the investigation and settlement of labor
disputes and that arbitrary refusals by the government can be challenged in court.

“Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh”

Introduction:
The case of Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) was a landmark decision in the
protection of tribal rights in India. It addressed the illegal transfer of tribal land to non-tribal
entities for mining in scheduled areas. The Supreme Court's ruling upheld the constitutional
safeguards provided to tribal communities, particularly under the Fifth Schedule, which
protects tribal land and resources.

Facts:
In the 1990s, the government of Andhra Pradesh leased land in the scheduled areas of
Visakhapatnam to non-tribal private entities for mining purposes, including to large
corporations such as Birla Periclase. This violated the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas
Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, which prohibits the transfer of tribal land to non-tribals.
The appellant, Samatha, a non-governmental organization advocating for the rights of
Adivasis, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Andhra Pradesh High Court to
challenge these leases. When the High Court ruled in favor of the State, Samatha appealed to
the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised:
1. Whether the State Government had the authority to lease tribal land in scheduled
areas to non-tribals.
2. Whether these mining leases violated the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and the
Environmental Protection Act, 1986.
3. Whether the term "person" in the Andhra Pradesh Land Transfer Regulation, 1959
includes the State, thus prohibiting the State from leasing land to non-tribals.

Arguments:
• Appellant's Arguments:
 The transfer of tribal land to non-tribals violated both the Forest Conservation Act, 1980
and the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.
Tribal land is protected under the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, and no non-
tribal entity, including the State, has the authority to transfer such land.
The term "person" in Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Transfer Regulation
includes the State, meaning the State's transfer of land was unlawful.

• Respondents' Arguments:
The transfer of land to non-tribals was permissible before the 1970 Amendment to the
Land Transfer Regulation.
The term "person" in the regulation does not include the State, and thus the State was not
restricted from leasing the land to private entities.
The Forest Conservation Act was not violated, as the mining leases were granted legally
by the State Government.

Judgement:
The Supreme Court overturned the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision, ruling in favor of
the appellant. The key points of the judgment were:
• The transfer of tribal land to non-tribal entities for mining was declared void and
invalid.
• The Court held that the term "person" under the regulation does not include the State,
but it directed that any mining leases should be used for the benefit and upliftment of
the tribal community.
• It emphasized the importance of the Fifth Schedule and stated that tribal land and
resources should be preserved for the betterment of tribal people.
• The Supreme Court also noted that mining in these areas must be balanced with
ecological concerns and ordered the government to inspect whether the leased areas
fell under forest land.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's decision in Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh is significant for
protecting the rights of India's tribal population. It reinforced the constitutional protections
for scheduled areas under the Fifth Schedule, ensuring that tribal lands could not be exploited
by non-tribal entities for commercial purposes. The case highlighted the importance of
balancing development with the rights and welfare of indigenous communities.
“Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India”
Facts
The petitioner Maneka Gandhi’s passport was issued on 1st June 1976 as per the Passport Act
of 1967. On 2nd July 1977, the Regional Passport Office (New Delhi) ordered her to surrender
her passport. The petitioner was also not given any reason for this arbitrary and unilateral
decision of the External Affairs Ministry, citing public interest.
The petitioner approached the Supreme Court by invoking its writ jurisdiction and contending
that the State’s act of impounding her passport was a direct assault on her Right of Personal
Liberty as guaranteed by Article 21. It is pertinent to mention that the Supreme Court in
Satwant Singh Sawhney v. Ramarathnam held that right to travel abroad is well within the
ambit of Article 21, although the extent to which the Passport Act diluted this particular right
was unclear.
Issues Before the Court
• Are the provisions under Articles 21, 14 and 19 connected with each other or are they
mutually exclusive?
• Should the procedure established by law be tested for reasonability which in this case
was the procedure laid down by the Passport Act of 1967?
• If the right to travel outside the country is a part of Article 21 or not?
• Is a legislative law that snatches away the right to life reasonable?
Arguments of the petitioners:
• Through the administrative order that seized the passport on 4th July 1977, the State
has infringed upon the Petitioner’s Fundamental Rights of freedom of speech &
expression, right to life & personal liberty, right to travel abroad and the right to
freedom of movement.
• The provisions given in Articles 14, 19 & 21 should be read together and aren’t
mutually exclusive. Only a cumulative reading and subsequent interpretation will lead
to the observance of principles of natural justice and the true spirit of
constitutionalism.
• India might not have adopted the American concept of the “due process of law”,
nevertheless, the procedure established by law should be fair and just, reasonable, and
not be arbitrary.
• Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act violates Article 21 insofar as it violates the right
to life & personal liberty guaranteed by this Article.
• Audi Altrem Partem i.e. the opportunity of being heard is invariably acknowledged as
a vital component of the principles of natural justice. Even if these principles of
natural justice are not expressly mentioned in any of the provisions of the
Constitution, the idea behind the spirit of Fundamental Rights embodies the very crux
of these principles.
Contentions of the respondents:
• The respondent stated before the court that the passport was confiscated since the
petitioner had to appear before a government committee for a hearing.
• The respondent asserted that the word ‘law’ under Article 21 can’t be understood as
reflected in the fundamental rules of natural justice, emphasising the principle laid
down in the A K Gopalan case.
• Article 21 contains the phrase “procedure established by law” & such procedure does
not have to pass the test of reasonability and need not necessarily be in consonance
with the Articles 14 & 19.
• The framers of our Constitution had long debates on the American “due process of
law” versus the British “procedure established by law”. The marked absence of the
due process of law from the provisions of the Indian Constitution clearly indicates the
constitution-makers’ intentions.

Case Judgement
This immensely important judgment was delivered on 25th January 1978 and it altered the
landscape of the Indian Constitution. This judgment widened Article 21’s scope immensely
and it realized the goal of making India a welfare state, as assured in the Preamble. The
unanimous judgement was given by a 7-judge bench.

Conclusion
The judgment’s most important feature was the interlinking it laid down between the
provisions of Articles 19, 14 and 21. Through this link, the supreme court made these
provisions inseparable and into a single entity. Now, any procedure has to meet all the
requirements mentioned under these three articles to be held valid. As a result, this judgement
enlarged the scope of personal liberty significantly and preserved the fundamental &
constitutional right to life.
This judgement, apart from protecting citizens from the unchallenged actions of the
Executive, also preserved the sanctity of parliamentary law, when it refused to strike down
the 1967 Act’s Sections 10(3)(c) and 10(5).
The judgement paved the way for the Apex Court to bring into the ambit of Article 21 other
important rights like Right to Clean Water, Right to clean Air, Right to freedom from Noise
Pollution, Standard Education, Speedy Trial, Fair Trial, Right to Livelihood, Legal Aid, Right
to Food, Right to Clean Environment, Right to Medical Care, etc.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain

FACTS
Mr. Raj Narain filed an election petition in which he alleged misuse of public funds by a
political party that fraudulently used the finances to re-elect the Prime Minister of India.
• The petition was filed before the Allahabad High Court. The petitioner Raj Narain
asked the Government of U.P. to produce the Blue Book, which contained the
guidelines for the safety of the Prime Minister when he/she travels.
• The High Court of Allahabad ruled that the Blue Book did not certify the conditions
underlying Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states that no one can
give any singular evidence which derives from unpublished sensitive official records
which relate to the affairs of the State.
• The High Court of Allahabad ordered that the Blue Book need to be produced, as the
non-production of the document will jeopardize public interest, and gave the verdict
in favor of Mr. Raj Narain.
• After the verdict of the Allahabad High Court, the Uttar Pradesh State Government
appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

LEGAL ISSUES:
• Does the Bluebook record come under the meaning of Section 123 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, which defines a government record that is unpublished?
• Does the non-disclosure of this document affect the public interest in any sense?

CONTENTIONS:
• The petitioner, Mr. Raj Narain contended that the details of this document must be
made public, as the non-disclosure privilege (affidavit as per Section 162 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872) wasn’t raised by the government and the Blue Book had no
relation to the affairs of the state.

RATIO & DECISION:

The opinion of the Supreme Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Raj Narain case was
delivered by Justice Alagiriswami and Justice Untwalia.
• The Supreme Court of India was of the opinion that the meaning of Section 123 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, revolved around the principle of preventing public injury.
The judges stated that for any document which can affect public policy and further
developments, the court should have complete access to the documents involved.
• They stated that if the government doesn’t claim timely privilege in any affidavit, then
they haven’t fulfilled their obligation as per Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872.
 • The decision made sure that when the amount of public interest affected by non-
disclosure outlasts the amount of public interest affected by disclosure; the Court had
every right to demand the production of the documents.
• The Supreme Court of India instructed that, under Section 162 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, any kind of objection to procuring a particular governmental document,
should be put forth and filed on the date of production of the document, as in that
case, the court can decide the extent and validity of the objection.
• The Supreme Court of India held the decision of the Allahabad High court to be valid
and stated that the role of the judiciary is to decide if a document is favorable to the
public interest.

CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court of India allowed the appeal and said that the rule of non-disclosure of
certain records and the principles involved are eminently a part of upholding the public
interest.
But it will not apply the rule beyond its scope, and if it fulfills the objective of sections 123
and 162 of the Indian Evidence Act, then there won’t be any need to further penetrate any
official privileged government records.

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain

Facts of the Case:
• In the 1971 Lok Sabha elections, Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India,
contested from the Rae Bareilly constituency representing the Congress Party, while
her opponent Raj Narain ran under Ram Manohar Lohia’s SSP (Socialist Party).
• Indira Gandhi won the election, but Raj Narain challenged the result in the
Allahabad High Court, accusing her of violating election laws under the
Representation of People’s Act, 1951, by using government resources for her
campaign.
• The Allahabad High Court found Indira Gandhi guilty of corrupt practices under
Section 123(7) of the Representation of People’s Act, voiding her election and
disqualifying her from office for six years.
• Indira Gandhi appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. During this time, a
National Emergency was declared, and the 39th Constitutional Amendment was
passed, placing elections of the Prime Minister and Speaker beyond judicial scrutiny.
• Raj Narain challenged the constitutionality of the amendment, arguing that it violated
the basic structure of the Constitution.
Issues Raised:
 1. Validity of Article 329A(4) introduced by the 39th Constitutional Amendment—
whether it violated the basic structure of the Constitution.
2. Constitutionality of the Representation of People’s (Amendment) Act, 1974 and the
Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975.
3. Whether Indira Gandhi’s election was valid or void due to allegations of misuse of
government resources and exceeding campaign expenditure limits.

Arguments by Petitioner (Raj Narain):

The 39th Amendment violated the basic structure of the Constitution by removing judicial
review over the election of the Prime Minister, a critical check on electoral fairness.
The amendment placed the Prime Minister above the law, undermining the principles of
equality before the law (Article 14) and rule of law.
Indira Gandhi exceeded her campaign expenditure limit, misused government officials
(like Yashpal Kapur, her election agent), and engaged in corrupt practices.
The preventive detention of MPs during the passage of the amendment rendered it
unconstitutional.

Arguments by Respondent (Indira Gandhi):

The 39th Amendment was within the powers of Parliament and did not violate the
Constitution's basic structure.
Yashpal Kapur, Gandhi’s election agent, had resigned from government service before
assisting in her campaign, and thus his involvement did not constitute corrupt practice.
Parliament has the power to regulate elections, and procedural irregularities in
parliamentary proceedings could not invalidate the amendment.

Judgment:
1. Article 329A(4) was declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, applying the
basic structure doctrine from the Kesavananda Bharati case, ruled that Parliament
could not amend the Constitution to undermine free and fair elections, which form
part of the basic structure. The amendment stripped the courts of their power to
review elections, violating judicial independence and the principle of the separation
of powers.
2. The Representation of People’s (Amendment) Act, 1974, and Election Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1975, were upheld as constitutionally valid. Despite the absence
of some detained parliamentarians, the Court found that Parliament had the authority
to enact laws governing elections.
 3. The Court upheld Indira Gandhi’s election as valid, rejecting the allegations of
corrupt practices. It found no substantial proof that Yashpal Kapur was a government
servant at the time of his assistance to Indira Gandhi, nor evidence that she exceeded
her campaign expenditure limits.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court restored Indira Gandhi’s election victory, dismissing Raj Narain’s
accusations. However, it struck down the 39th Amendment as unconstitutional, reaffirming
the power of judicial review and the integrity of the Constitution’s basic structure. This
case remains a landmark decision, reinforcing the principle that Parliament cannot amend
the Constitution in ways that violate fundamental constitutional principles, especially
regarding free and fair elections.

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India

Background:
In 1985, the Janata Party won the Assembly elections in Karnataka and formed the
government with Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde. Hegde was later replaced by SR
Bommai in 1988.
In September 1988 a legislator from the Janata Dal, defected from the party along with 19
other members of the Legislative Assembly, withdrawing support from the Bommai
government.
The state government was dismissed by using Article 356 due to majority loss from
defections. Bommai's request to test the majority was denied by the governor.
Bommai sought relief in the high court, which ruled against him, leading to an appeal to the
Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Judgment:

A nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court emphasised that the Presidential Proclamation
under Article 356 must be exercised with caution, as advocated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and
recommended by the Sarkaria Commission.
Both houses of Parliament must thoroughly analyse the Presidential Proclamation as
per Article 356(3).
If the proclamation is issued without the approval of both houses, it lapses within two
months, and the state assembly resumes its function.
The Supreme Court can subject the proclamation to judicial review and entertain writ
petitions challenging its legality if they raise arguable questions.
Clarified that the President's power to dismiss a state government is not absolute but subject
to limitations.
Recognised that while Article 356 does not explicitly address the dissolution of the
legislature, such powers can be inferred from it.
Noted that Article 174(2), allowing the Governor to dissolve the Legislative Assembly,
and Article 356(1)(a), enabling the President to confer upon himself the powers of the
Governor and the state government, imply the power to dissolve the legislature.

Significance of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India Case:

The S.R. Bommai case gives one of the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court regarding
the basic structure doctrine as well as recording the misuse of article 356.
The judgment provided clarity on the scope and limitations of Article 356, emphasising its
use only in extraordinary circumstances.
The principles laid down by the Supreme Court were consistent with the recommendations of
the Sarkaria Commission.
The case affirmed the principles of federalism, stating that state governments are not
subordinate to the centre and advocating for cooperative federalism.
The judgement asserted the role of the judiciary in scrutinising the President's actions under
Article 356, ensuring adherence to constitutional principles and preventing misuse of power.
It affirmed that the floor of the Assembly is the sole authority to test the government's
majority, not the subjective opinion of the Governor.

“M.P. Mathur & Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) & Others”
Introduction:
The case of M.P. Mathur & Others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) & Others was
decided by the Supreme Court of India on November 24, 2006. This case revolves around the
legal dispute concerning the transfer of tenements to retired employees of DTC under a
housing scheme.

Brief Facts:
Between 1962-1966, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi constructed 5144 tenements under
the Integrated Subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrial Workers and Economically Weaker
Sections. Out of these, 4844 tenements were transferred to the occupants, but 300 tenements
allocated to DTC employees remained untransferred. The appellants, retired DTC employees,
continued to reside in these quarters and sought their transfer on an ownership basis, as
initially agreed upon by DTC.
Issues:
Scope of Resolutions: Whether the resolutions passed by DTC in 1979 created a legal right
for the workers to claim ownership of the tenements.
Estoppel: Whether DTC was estopped from rescinding its decision to transfer the tenements.
Validity of Subsequent Resolutions: The validity of the subsequent resolutions that reversed
the earlier decision to transfer the houses12.

Arguments Given:
Appellants (Workers): Argued that the resolutions created a legal right in their favor and that
DTC was estopped from recalling its decision. They contended that the financial constraints
cited by DTC were not sufficient grounds to deny the transfer.
Respondents (DTC): Argued that the resolutions were enabling provisions and did not create
an obligation to transfer the houses. They also claimed that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel did not apply as they had to act in the public interest by accommodating in-service
workers.

Judgment:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court,
which had reversed the Single Judge’s decision in favor of the workers. The Court ruled that
the resolutions did not create a binding legal right for the workers to claim ownership of the
tenements. It also held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not applicable in this case
as the DTC had to consider the broader public interest.

Conclusion:
The case highlights the complexities involved in balancing the rights of retired workers with
the operational needs and financial constraints of public sector undertakings. The Supreme
Court’s decision underscores the importance of clear legal provisions and the limitations of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel in cases involving public interest

MODULE 2

S.L. Syndicate v. Union of India

Facts:
The appellants challenged the notification issued by the Central Government on June 28,
1967, under Clause 7 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966, which fixed ex-factory prices of
sugar for various factories. The appellants contended that the method adopted by the
Government in fixing the prices was incorrect. They also argued that the Government failed
to account for an earlier price fixation made on February 1, 1967, and appropriate
adjustments were not made in the final notification dated June 28, 1967. The appellants
claimed this led to unfair pricing.

Issues:
1. Whether the method adopted by the Government to fix sugar prices was correct and
reasonable.
2. Whether the Government failed to account for the initial price fixation in February
1967 and whether adjustments were necessary in the final notification.
3. Whether the Government's price fixation was arbitrary or unreasonable and if it
involved an excess of power.
4. Whether Clause 7(2) of the Sugar Control Order, 1966, obliges the Government to
compensate for losses due to previous erroneous price fixations.

Arguments by the Appellants:

The appellants claimed that the Central Government's method of fixing the prices of sugar in
various states was flawed.
They argued that the Government failed to consider the earlier price fixation from February
1967 and did not make necessary adjustments in the final price fixation in June 1967.
They contended that the Government had exceeded its power under the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955, and that the pricing method was arbitrary.

Arguments by the Respondents (Government):

The Government maintained that price fixation is a legislative measure, even though it is
based on objective criteria, such as the cost of production.
It argued that there was no obligation to provide adjustments or allowances for prior price
fixations.
The Government contended that it acted within the legal framework provided by Clause 7 of
the Sugar Control Order, 1966 and that it followed established practices in price fixation.
The price fixation followed the guidelines of the Sugar Enquiry Commission, which was
intended to ensure fair pricing, not necessarily a mechanical formula based purely on cost
data.

Court’s Decision:
1. Nature of Price Fixation: The court held that price fixation is a legislative measure, not
an administrative one. Therefore, it cannot give rise to a complaint about the violation of
natural justice. However, the criterion used in price fixation must be reasonable, with a
reasonable connection between the factors considered and the purpose of the power.
2. Reasonableness: The court found that the Government did not act arbitrarily or
unreasonably in fixing the prices. The appellants had not proven that they incurred losses
or that the prices were unfair.
3. Adjustment and Compensation: The court rejected the claim that the Government was
obligated to make adjustments based on previous price fixations. There was no legal duty
for the Government to adjust prices to account for earlier fixations.
4. Schedules and Flexibility: The court observed that the schedules mentioned in Clause
7(2) of the Sugar Control Order were broad and allowed the Government flexibility in
determining a fair price. The Government was not bound to fix prices on an all-India
basis or a specific regional basis.
5. Good Faith: Since the appellants did not allege bad faith on the part of the Government
in price fixation, the court found no basis for civil proceedings against the Government
for damages.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Central Government had acted within its
powers under the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966. The method of price fixation was found to
be reasonable and lawful, and there was no requirement for adjustments based on earlier price
fixations. The decision affirmed that the Government's pricing policies were not arbitrary, and
no compensation for past losses was warranted. The appellants' challenge was rejected.

Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd.

The Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1979, issued by the Central Government under Section
3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, empowers the Government to fix the
maximum price for indigenously manufactured bulk drugs. Paragraph 3 outlines the method
for price fixation, requiring the Government to consider the average cost of production by an
efficient manufacturer and allow a reasonable return on net worth. Additionally, paragraphs
12 and 13 give the Government authority to set leader and retail prices for drug formulations
in various categories, while paragraph 27 allows an aggrieved person to appeal the price
fixation for review.
Manufacturers challenged the Government's notifications fixing bulk drug prices, first by
seeking review under paragraph 27 and then by filing writ petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The High Court quashed the notifications due to the Government's failure to
follow principles of natural justice. Since retail prices of formulations depend on bulk drug
prices, the retail price notifications were also quashed.
The Government, on appeal, contended that price fixation under paragraph 3 is a legislative
activity, not subject to natural justice. It argued that paragraph 27 provided an adequate
review mechanism, which, although it involved discussions with relevant parties, did not
require a formal judicial procedure. The manufacturers, on the other hand, argued that the
Order required fairness and a quasi-judicial procedure, especially since the Government
failed to disclose the basis for price fixation.
The Court ruled that price fixation is a legislative function, primarily concerning the public
interest, and not focused on individual manufacturers. As such, it is not bound by principles
of natural justice unless explicitly required by the statute. The review process under
paragraph 27 was likened to a post-decisional hearing, and the Court held that the
Government had followed fair procedures by engaging with manufacturers during the review
process. The Court also emphasized that the Government is not obligated to delay the fixation
of retail prices for formulations pending the outcome of review applications, as it could
impact the availability of essential drugs to the public.
State of UP v. Renusagar and Company
Introduction:
The case of State of UP and Ors. vs Renusagar Power Co. and Ors. revolves around whether
the corporate veil should be lifted to determine if Renusagar Power Co. and Hindalco were so
closely tied that Renusagar was not an independent entity, and thus whether Hindalco should
be treated as generating and consuming its own electricity for duty purposes.

Facts:
Hindalco, a company involved in aluminium production, created Renusagar Power Co. to
supply electricity for its industrial operations. Although Renusagar was incorporated as a
separate legal entity, it was fully controlled by Hindalco, and the shareholders in both
companies were the same.
The State of Uttar Pradesh levied a substantial electricity duty on Renusagar under section 3
of the UP Electrical (Duty) Act, 1952. Renusagar applied for exemption under section 3(4) of
the Act, but the state government repeatedly denied the request. Aggrieved, Renusagar
approached the High Court, which ruled in their favor. The State then filed an appeal in the
Supreme Court.

Issues Raised:
1. Whether Renusagar’s electricity generation for Hindalco constitutes "its own source
of power" under section 3(1)(c) of the UP Electrical (Duty) Act, 1952, making them
liable for the electricity duty.
2. Whether the corporate veil should be pierced to determine if Renusagar and Hindalco
are effectively the same entity for the purpose of duty exemption under section 3(4) of
the Act.
Arguments by the Appellants (State of UP):
Hindalco and Renusagar are separate legal entities with different financial accounts, so there
is no reason to lift the corporate veil.
Even though Hindalco owns Renusagar, both companies must be treated as distinct for tax
purposes, and the corporate veil should only be pierced when the subsidiary is used to evade
legal obligations.

Arguments by the Respondents (Renusagar and Hindalco):

The state government had promised to ensure a steady supply of electricity at a low cost for
Hindalco’s aluminium production, and Hindalco set up Renusagar solely for this purpose.
Renusagar is not an independent entity but a controlled source of electricity for Hindalco.
The provisions of section 3(1)(a) and section 3(1)(c) of the UP Electrical (Duty) Act, 1952,
should be harmonized to prevent a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution (right to
equality).
Renusagar should be treated as an alter ego of Hindalco, with Hindalco generating its own
electricity for consumption.

Judgment:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to lift the corporate veil, finding that
Renusagar was effectively a subsidiary created solely to provide electricity for Hindalco, and
thus Hindalco was consuming its own electricity. The court dismissed the state’s appeal and
ordered that Renusagar and Hindalco be treated as one entity, with the duty being imposed
accordingly.
The judgment affirmed that, in this case, lifting the corporate veil was appropriate due to the
close relationship between the two companies.

Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare and Ors.

Facts:
The primary issue in this case arose from petitions filed in the High Court of Kerala alleging
that political parties in the state continued to call for "bundh" (strikes) under the guise of
"hartal" (shutdown) despite a previous Supreme Court ruling declaring bundh
unconstitutional. The petitioners contended that these political parties were enforcing hartals
through force, intimidation, and coercion, which violated the provisions of the Constitution.
The petitioners argued that the political parties, by enforcing hartals in this manner, had
breached the undertakings they provided to the Election Commission under Section 29A of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, where they agreed to abide by the Constitution.
As a result, they sought de-registration of the political parties that violated their constitutional
obligations.
The High Court had previously issued orders directing the Chief Secretary and Director
General of Police in Kerala to take necessary measures to prevent such unconstitutional
activities. However, these measures were ineffective as the political parties continued to
enforce hartals forcibly. The petitioners also submitted representations to the Election
Commission of India, seeking de-registration of the violating political parties, but no action
was taken by the Election Commission.

Issues Involved:
Power of the Election Commission to De-register a Political Party: The foremost issue
was whether the Election Commission of India, under Section 29A of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951, had the authority to de-register or cancel the registration of a political
party on the grounds that it called for hartal by using force, intimidation, or coercion, thereby
violating the Constitution.
Unconstitutionality of Hartal Enforcement: Whether enforcing a hartal through force,
intimidation, or coercion amounts to an unconstitutional act and violates the provisions of the
Constitution.
Obligation of the State to Prevent Unconstitutional Hartals: Whether the State of Kerala,
through its administrative and law enforcement authorities, was obligated to prevent the
unconstitutional enforcement of hartals and take action against those who called for or
enforced them.
Responsibility of Political Parties for Damages: Whether political parties or individuals
responsible for calling hartals could be held liable for damages caused to public property
during these events.

Petitioner's Arguments:
Limited Power of Election Commission to De-register a Political Party: The learned
Attorney General, representing the Union of India, argued that the Election Commission of
India (ECI) lacks the express power under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, to de-
register a political party. He emphasized that the ECI acts in a quasi-judicial capacity under
Section 29A of the Act and does not possess any authority to review or cancel a party's
registration unless specific conditions are met.
Three Circumstances for De-registration: The petitioners contended that the Election
Commission's power to de-register should be limited to three scenarios:
1. Fraud: When a political party has secured its registration through fraud.
2. Change in Party Constitution: When a party notifies the Commission that it has
altered its constitution, violating Section 29A(5) of the Act, or no longer adheres to
the Constitution of India.
3. Similar Grounds: Situations where no inquiry is needed to de-register a party.
No Power for Inquiry into Constitutional Violations: The Attorney General argued that the
ECI does not have the authority to investigate complaints regarding political parties violating
their undertaking to abide by the Constitution. If a party breaches the Constitution or its
commitment under Section 29A(5), the Election Commission has no express power to inquire
into such matters or de-register the party.

Respondent's Arguments:
Administrative Nature of ECI's Powers: Shri L. Nageshwara Rao, representing the
respondents, argued that the Election Commission’s function under Section 29A is primarily
administrative rather than quasi-judicial. The absence of a "lis" (a dispute between two
contending parties) before the Commission means the Commission is not exercising quasi-
judicial powers in such cases.
No Quasi-Judicial Function in Administrative Acts: The respondent's counsel argued that
unless there is a clear contest between parties, the Election Commission’s powers are
administrative, even when certain attributes of quasi-judicial functions are present. Hence, the
Commission's duties under Section 29A do not inherently include the power to de-register a
political party on the grounds of a constitutional violation.
Legal Precedents: The respondent's counsel cited several cases, including Province of
Bombay vs Kusaldas S. Advani (1950), Shri Radeyshyam Khare vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
(1959), T. N. Seshan vs. Union of India (1995), and State of H.P. vs. Raja Mahendra Pal
(1999), to support the claim that the Election Commission's duties under Section 29A are
administrative and do not extend to de-registration powers unless specifically granted.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court of India focused on whether the Election Commission of India (ECI) had
the power to de-register a political party under Section 29A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, for unconstitutional actions, such as enforcing hartals through force or
intimidation.
1. Absence of Express Power: The Court held that the ECI does not have the express
authority under Section 29A to de-register political parties for violating their undertaking
to abide by the Constitution. The ECI's powers are limited to the act of registration and do
not extend to de-registration except in specific circumstances.
2. Three Circumstances for De-registration: The Court agreed with the petitioners that
the ECI could only de-register a party in certain conditions:
o If the registration was obtained by fraud.
o If the political party itself informs the Commission of changes to its constitution
that conflict with Section 29A(5).
o In exceptional circumstances where no further inquiry is required.
3. No General Power of Inquiry: The Court also stated that the Election Commission
cannot initiate an inquiry into whether a political party is violating the Constitution. The
Court ruled that the High Court’s direction to the Election Commission to consider de-
registration of political parties for unconstitutional activities was beyond the legal powers
conferred by the Representation of the People Act.
Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions regarding the Election
Commission's power to de-register political parties.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court clarified that the Election Commission of India does not possess the
power to de-register political parties for unconstitutional activities unless specific conditions
such as fraud or notification of constitutional changes are met. The Court emphasized that
unless express powers are provided, the ECI cannot exercise de-registration powers beyond
its statutory limits.

A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India

Facts:
A.K. Kraipak and other gazetted officers raised a petition challenging the selection process
for appointments to the Indian Forest Service (IFS) in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Forest
Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulation, 1966, framed under the Indian Forest Service Act,
1951, constituted a special selection board for selecting officers. The acting Chief
Conservator of Forests, who was also a candidate for the IFS selection, participated in the
selection process despite his personal interest in the outcome. His name topped the list, while
other senior officers, including those who superseded him, were excluded. The aggrieved
officers filed a petition in the Supreme Court to quash the appointment notification.

Issues:
1. Were the principles of natural justice violated in the selection process?
2. Do the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings?
3. Is the grievance of the petitioners valid?

Arguments of the Petitioners:

The petitioners argued that the selection process was arbitrary and unconstitutional, not based
on merit, and influenced by personal bias. They contended that the appointment violated
fairness and impartiality, which are essential for merit-based selection and professionalism.
They sought a ruling that would set a precedent for ensuring fair appointments in the future.
Arguments of the Respondents:
The respondents argued that the selection process was administrative in nature, not quasi-
judicial, and hence not subject to the principles of natural justice. They asserted that the
selection board was merely making recommendations, and personal bias did not invalidate
the entire process. The final selection, according to them, should only be judged on its merits,
making the petitioners’ complaints baseless.

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that the selection process violated the principles of natural justice
due to the presence of bias. The court found that even though the selection board's functions
were administrative, they had to act in a manner consistent with natural justice. The court
determined that the presence of the acting Chief Conservator in the decision-making process
could influence the board's decision. The court ruled that the principles of natural justice
extend beyond judicial functions and apply to administrative bodies as well, marking a
significant expansion of natural justice's scope.

Case Analysis:
This case marked a watershed moment in Indian administrative law by extending the
application of natural justice to administrative functions. Previously, natural justice principles
were largely confined to judicial bodies, but this case established their relevance for
administrative decision-making. The judgment emphasized the importance of eliminating
arbitrariness and ensuring fairness in administrative processes. This decision strengthened the
rule of law by subjecting administrative discretion to legal constraints and ensuring that
justice is upheld in all types of proceedings.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court’s decision in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India significantly expanded the
principles of natural justice, ensuring that they apply to both judicial and administrative
proceedings. This case reinforced the need for fairness, transparency, and the exclusion of
bias in administrative functions, making it a landmark case in administrative law.

Ridge v. Baldwin
https://lawbhoomi.com/ridge-v-baldwin/

Board of Education v. Rice

Issue:
Whether the Board of Education is justified in exercising its powers?
Facts:
The teachers in a non-provided school filed a complaint against the managers of the school
regarding their salaries, to the Board of Education. They complained that the teachers of other
funded schools were paid at higher rates. This resulted in ill-feelings between the two parties.
Here, the Board acts as an independent tribunal. The board reported that the managers were
wrong in their actions and also stated that they failed to maintain the school efficiently. This
decision made by the Board of Education was challenged by the managers.

Conclusion:
The court was not able to reach a conclusion regarding whether or not the managers had
efficiently managed the school but asserted that when a decision-making body like the Board
is given such power, they are under an obligation to act in good faith, giving both sides a fair
and equal opportunity to be heard. Any controversial matter between the parties must be
decided only after listening to them carefully and allowing them to contend on those issues.

Local Government Board v. Aldrige

As discussed, in the principles of natural justice that reasonable notice must be given to the
party under Audi alteram partem. But there may be situations where the government is under
no such obligation to issue a notice.
In an English case, the Local Government Board vs. Alridge, the decision of the local
authority to destroy the house of the appellant was challenged in court.
It was held that authority of the Government when adjudicating on a housing appeal is not
required to give notice to the appellant. Additionally, it was stated that when a householder
has been deemed to be unfit for habitation the legal right to be heard orally does not exist.
The court further clarified that the right to be heard does not necessarily mean the right to be
heard orally.

“There are situations where there is an implied duty to listen to both sides such as in Board of
Education v. Rice3, where the Board had been required to determine lis inter partes between a
local educational authority and the managers of a School. But there could be situations
where no duty is cast on the Government to give prior notice or opportunity to be heard. Thus
it was held in Local Government Board v. Arlidge4, that a Government Department
determining a housing appeal was not obliged to divulge one of its inspectors' reports to the
appellant”.

Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India

Facts:
In 1985, the Government of India decided to impose import duties and auxiliary taxes on
newsprint imported from abroad. Prior to this, no such taxes were levied on newspapers. This
increase in taxation forced newspaper publishers to raise the prices of their newspapers,
leading to a decline in circulation and a consequent loss in revenue. As a result, the
employees, shareholders, and other stakeholders of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay)
filed a petition before the Supreme Court. They challenged the constitutionality of these
taxes, claiming that it violated their right to freedom of speech and expression under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Issues Raised:
1. Freedom of Speech and Expression: Whether the imposition of import duties on
newsprint violated the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
2. Right to Equality: Whether the categorization of newspapers based on their size, for
tax purposes, violated the right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Petitioners:

The petitioners argued that the government’s decision to impose taxes on newsprint violated
their right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The increased cost of
newsprint forced them to raise newspaper prices, reducing circulation and inhibiting their
ability to disseminate information.
They also contended that their right to trade under Article 19(1)(g) was violated. Due to the
higher newspaper prices, fewer people purchased the newspapers, leading to a significant loss
of revenue.
Lastly, the petitioners claimed that the government’s real intention behind imposing the tax
was to restrict their freedom of speech and expression, as the increased prices would prevent
the public from accessing information.

Arguments of the Respondents:

The respondents, representing the government, argued that the tax was imposed in the public
interest and was not intended to restrict the freedom of the press.
They maintained that the tax was reasonable and fell within the government’s constitutional
duty to raise revenue. The respondents also argued that the imposition of taxes on newsprint
was not aimed at stifling the press but was a fiscal policy decision.

Judgement:
The Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of taxes on newspapers did not violate the
freedom of speech and expression of the press. The court emphasized that while the
government has the duty to levy taxes, these taxes must be reasonable and must not place an
excessive burden on newspapers, as this could indirectly infringe on the freedom of the press.
The court ordered the government to reconsider the tax policy on newsprint to ensure that the
freedom of the press is not hindered by unreasonable fiscal measures. While the court did not
find the taxes unconstitutional, it stressed that the government must ensure that the power and
freedom of the press are protected.
The court also emphasized the crucial role of free speech and the press in democracy,
highlighting the need for caution when imposing taxes on the media. Newspapers serve as a
vital source of information, particularly for the economically disadvantaged, and their
freedom should be protected from undue interference.
Conclusion:
In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court sought to
strike a balance between the government’s duty to levy taxes and the freedom of the press
under Article 19. The court held that taxation on newsprint is permissible but must be
reasonable to avoid unduly burdening the press and restricting its ability to disseminate
information. The judgment reaffirmed the need to safeguard the media’s freedom while
recognizing the government’s fiscal responsibilities.

Bakul Cashew Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Quilon

Facts:
The appellants, cashew processors, operated factories in Kerala, processing raw cashew nuts,
primarily imported from African countries. These imports were channeled through the
Cashew Corporation of India. Between 1970 and 1974, there was a delay in the assessment of
sales tax under Section 5 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. In October 1973, the
Kerala government issued a notification exempting cashew manufacturers from sales tax for
the period between September 1, 1970, and September 30, 1973. However, this exemption
was revoked three weeks later in November 1973. The appellants, affected by the withdrawal
of the exemption, filed a writ petition challenging the government’s actions.

Issues Raised:
1. Whether the government was precluded from claiming the purchase tax on imported
cashew nuts under the principle of promissory estoppel.
2. Whether the withdrawal of the exemption notification was valid.

Arguments of the Petitioners (Appellants):

Promissory Estoppel:
o The appellants contended that the government’s initial notification granting the tax
exemption created a legitimate expectation that they would not have to pay sales tax.
 They argued that the government's withdrawal of the exemption violated the principle
of promissory estoppel, as they had acted based on the promise of tax relief.
o They also claimed that they altered their position by relying on the government’s
representation of tax exemption.
Withdrawal of Exemption:
o The petitioners argued that the subsequent withdrawal of the tax exemption
notification was invalid and arbitrary, especially after the initial notification had
granted them relief.

Arguments of the Respondents (State Government):

No Basis for Promissory Estoppel:
o The government denied that there was any clear and unambiguous representation that
could form the basis for a claim of promissory estoppel. The statements made in
meetings with government officials were vague, such as "we shall consider the matter
sympathetically," and could not be relied upon as a promise.
o Additionally, the government argued that there was no evidence to show that the
appellants had suffered detriment based on any alleged promise.
Withdrawal of Exemption:
o The government maintained that it had the power to cancel the earlier notification
under Section 10(3) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, which allowed it to issue
and revoke notifications. The decision to withdraw the exemption was made due to
public outcry and criticism, as it was perceived to have granted undue favors to
cashew processors in a time of financial difficulties for the state.

Court’s Decision:
No Promissory Estoppel: The court rejected the petitioners' argument of promissory
estoppel, stating that there was no clear representation by the government that it would not
levy sales tax. The vague statements made by ministers could not be construed as promises,
and there was no evidence that the appellants had suffered any prejudice as a result of
reliance on such statements.
Validity of Withdrawal of Exemption: The court upheld the state’s authority to revoke the
exemption under Section 10(3) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. It noted that the
government was under public pressure and faced a financial crisis, justifying its decision to
cancel the notification. The court also observed that the exemption was for a past period, and
the government had the right to reconsider such decisions.
Retrospective Notification and Legislative Power: The court ruled that the government did
not have the authority to issue a notification with retrospective effect when the initial
exemption was granted in 1973. The power to issue retrospective exemptions was conferred
later, in 1980, through an amendment to Section 10(1) of the Act.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed. The court ruled that the principle of promissory estoppel did not
apply in this case, as there was no clear representation from the government. Additionally, the
court found that the state government was within its rights to withdraw the tax exemption and
that the exemption could not have been granted retrospectively under the law as it stood in
1973. The decision emphasized that the government’s financial position and public interest
played a crucial role in its decision to cancel the tax relief for cashew processors.

MODULE 3

R v. Burrah / Queen v. Burrah

The authority regarding delegated legislation in the pre-independence period was primarily
held by Queen v. Burrah. In this case, the Act in question (Act XXII of 1869) deals with the
Governor General’s power to bring the Act in effect, determine what laws were to be
applicable and the power to extend application of provisions of the Act. Here an Act was
passed by the Indian legislature to remove Garo Hills from the civil and criminal jurisdiction
of Bengal and vested the powers of civil and criminal administration in an officer appointed
by the Lt. Governor of Bengal. The Lt. Governor was further authorized by S.8 of the Act to
extend any provision of this Act with incidental changes to Khasi and Jaintia Hills. One
Burah was tried for murder by the Commissioner of Khasi and Jaintia Hills and was
sentenced to death.
The question was whether these functions would be categorized as delegated legislation. The
court held that the above-mentioned powers were conferred only on the fulfillment of certain
conditions and hence this was conditional legislation, a concept altogether different from
delegated legislation. The court also stated that “It is a general principle of law in India that
any substantial delegation of legislative authority by the legislature of the country is
void…..”. The case thus lays down that substantive delegation i.e. delegation if the important
functions are void in India and that delegation, if at all possible would have to be conditional.

In re: Delhi Laws Act Case

Facts:
Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912: Allowed the Provincial Government to extend any
enactment in force in British India to the Province of Delhi, with such restrictions and
modifications as deemed fit.
Section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947: Empowered the Central
Government to extend any enactment in force in another Province to Ajmer-Merwara, with
modifications.
Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950: Enabled the Central Government to extend
laws in force in Part A States to Part C States, along with provisions to repeal or amend laws
applicable in Part C States.
Doubts arose about the constitutionality of these provisions after a decision by the Federal
Court. The President of India referred these provisions to the Supreme Court under Article
143(1) for its opinion on whether these sections or any provisions therein were ultra vires
(beyond the powers) of the legislatures that passed them.

Issues Raised:
1. Whether Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and Section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara
(Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, were ultra vires the legislatures that passed them.
2. Whether Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, was ultra vires in whole or
in part, particularly in regard to the power to:
o Extend laws with modifications,
o Repeal or amend laws applicable in Part C States.
3. Whether the delegation of legislative powers to the executive government in these
sections constituted abdication of legislative functions.

Government’s Arguments:
1. Legislative Plenary Powers: The Indian Legislature had plenary powers similar to
the British Parliament. Delegating legislative powers to the executive government was
permissible, provided it was within the framework of legislative policy.
2. Ancillary Delegation: The delegation of powers to extend or modify laws was
considered ancillary to legislation and necessary for practical governance. Such
delegation did not amount to abdication of legislative powers.
3. Conditional Legislation: The provisions were akin to "conditional legislation,"
where the legislature merely set conditions for the application of laws, leaving the
executive to implement them.
Opposition’s Arguments:
1. Unconstitutional Delegation: The provisions, by delegating legislative powers to the
executive without clear guidance or limitations, amounted to abdication of legislative
authority. This was unconstitutional, as legislative functions could not be fully
delegated.
2. Abdication of Power: The legislature, by granting the executive government
authority to extend, modify, and repeal laws, effaced itself and transferred its essential
legislative functions, which is impermissible under the Indian Constitution.
Court’s Decision:
1. Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, and Section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara
(Extension of Laws) Act, 1947:
• Majority Opinion (Fazl Ali, Sastri, Mukherjea, Das, Bose JJ.): These sections
were wholly intra vires. The delegation of power to the executive was valid as long
as the legislature retained its primary legislative function.
• Dissent (Kania C.J., Mahajan J.): The sections were ultra vires to the extent they
allowed the executive to extend laws not made by the Central Legislature. This was
deemed an abdication of legislative functions by the legislature.
2. Section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950:
• First Portion (Extending Laws with Modifications): The majority held that this
portion was intra vires, allowing the Central Government to extend laws to Part C
States with modifications.
• Latter Portion (Repeal or Amendment of Laws): The Court was divided:
o Majority (Fazl Ali, Sastri, Das JJ.): This portion was also intra vires.
o Dissent (Kania C.J., Mahajan J.): This portion was ultra vires, as it
permitted the Central Government to repeal or amend existing laws, which
amounted to legislative abdication.

Key Principles and Observations:

Legislative Function and Delegation:
A legislature’s essential function is determining policy and enacting laws, which it cannot
fully delegate. However, ancillary tasks such as implementation and detailed regulations can
be delegated.
Delegation is permissible as long as it does not lead to abdication or effacement of the
legislature’s powers.
Abdication vs. Delegation:
Abdication occurs when a legislature transfers all its legislative powers to another body or
authority, effectively ceasing to function. Delegation is permissible if the legislature retains
its legislative control and power.
Conditional Legislation:
Delegating power to extend laws from one jurisdiction to another with modifications falls
under conditional legislation and is constitutionally permissible, provided the legislative
policy is clear and the executive acts within its limits.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld most of the provisions in question, affirming the constitutionality
of delegating certain legislative powers to the executive. However, it also emphasized that
legislative bodies must not abdicate their essential law-making functions. While delegation is
permissible, the legislature must ensure that the agency exercising the delegated power
remains subordinate and does not become a parallel legislative body.

[A good article to understand the concept of delegated legislation and this case:
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/delegated-legislation-re-delhi-laws-act-case/ ]

Harishankal Bagla v. State of M.P.

Facts of the Case:
Arrest and Charges:
Harishankar Bagla and his wife, Smt. Gomti Bagla, were arrested on November 29, 1948, by
the Railway Police at Itarsi. They were accused of violating Section 7 of the Essential
Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and Clause (3) of the Cotton Textiles (Control of
Movement) Order, 1948.
The couple was allegedly transporting over six maunds of cotton cloth from Bombay to
Kanpur without the required permit.
Judicial Proceedings:
The case was withdrawn to the Nagpur High Court on September 3, 1951, as it involved
constitutional issues.
On September 15, 1952, the High Court upheld Sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, as constitutional. However, it held Section 6 as inconsistent
with the Railway Act.
The High Court directed that the case proceed in the trial court, and leave to appeal was
granted to both the appellants and the respondent under Articles 132 and 134 of the
Constitution.

Issues Raised:
1. Constitutionality of Sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary
Powers) Act, 1946:
o Did these provisions contravene the appellants' fundamental rights under
Article 19(1)(f) (right to property) and Article 19(1)(g) (right to carry on
trade)?
2. Delegation of Legislative Powers:
o Was the delegation of legislative powers to the Central Government in
Sections 3 and 4 valid, or was it excessive?
 3. Validity of Section 6:
o Whether Section 6 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946,
which allowed the overriding of other laws, was constitutional.
4. Conflict with the Indian Railways Act:
o Did the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948, violate Sections
27, 28, and 41 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890?

Arguments Presented:
Appellants (Harishankar Bagla & Smt. Gomti Bagla):
Violation of Fundamental Rights: The appellants argued that Sections 3 and 4 of the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and the Cotton Cloth Control Order
infringed their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and (g) by imposing unreasonable
restrictions on the transportation of cotton textiles.
Excessive Delegation of Legislative Powers: It was contended that Section 3 of the Act
involved excessive delegation of legislative power, especially the power to issue orders, and
that this delegation was unconstitutional.
Invalidity of Section 6: They further argued that Section 6, being unconstitutional, should
render Section 3 invalid as they were interconnected.
Conflict with Indian Railways Act: The appellants also claimed that the Cotton Cloth
Control Order conflicted with the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, making it void.

Respondent (State of Madhya Pradesh):

Defense of Sections 3 and 4: The respondent contended that the restrictions imposed by the
Act and the Control Order were reasonable and in the public interest, especially during an
emergency, to ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities.
No Excessive Delegation: The respondent argued that the delegation of powers under
Sections 3 and 4 was not excessive, as the Central Government was operating within a
framework of clearly defined legislative policy.
Section 6's Validity: The State defended Section 6, arguing that it was constitutional and did
not result in any repeal of existing laws but only allowed the operation of orders issued under
the Act.
No Conflict with Railways Act: The respondent claimed that the Cotton Cloth Control
Order did not conflict with the Indian Railways Act but supplemented its provisions to ensure
the control of essential commodities' movement.
Court's Decision:
Constitutionality of Sections 3 and 4:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. The Court held that the restrictions on the transport of cotton
textiles were reasonable and did not violate the appellants' rights under Article 19(1)(f) and
(g).
Delegation of Powers:
The Court ruled that the delegation of legislative power in Sections 3 and 4 was not
excessive. The Act provided sufficient legislative policy and guidance, allowing the Central
Government to make necessary orders in the public interest.
Validity of Section 6:
Contrary to the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court found that Section 6 was
constitutional. It clarified that Section 6 did not result in the repeal of other laws but merely
bypassed conflicting provisions for the temporary duration of the control orders.
No Conflict with the Railways Act:
The Court ruled that the Cotton Cloth Control Order did not conflict with the Indian Railways
Act and could coexist, supplementing its provisions to control the transport of essential
goods.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and directed the trial court to proceed with the case.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of Sections 3, 4, and 6 of the Essential Supplies
(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and confirmed the validity of the Cotton Textiles (Control of
Movement) Order, 1948. The restrictions on the transport of essential goods, like cotton
textiles, were deemed necessary and reasonable in the public interest during the emergency
period.

Gwalior Rayon Co. v. Central Sales Tax

Facts of the Case:
This case pertains to the constitutional validity of Section 8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax
Act, 1956. The appellant challenged the provisions that determined the tax payable by dealers
on inter-state sales not falling within Section 8(1). According to this section, for goods other
than declared goods, the tax rate would either be 10% or the local sales tax rate in the
respective state, whichever was higher. The appellant contended that this provision involved
excessive delegation of legislative power to the State Legislatures.

Issues Raised:
 1. Constitutional Validity: Does Section 8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
suffer from excessive delegation of legislative power by adopting the local sales tax
rate applicable in the appropriate state?
2. Legislative Function Abdication: Has Parliament abdicated its essential legislative
function by not fixing the rate itself but instead relying on state-determined rates?

Arguments of the Appellant:

Excessive Delegation: The appellant argued that Parliament, by not determining the tax rate
itself and instead adopting the rate applicable to local sales taxes set by the respective states,
had abdicated its legislative function. This was seen as an excessive delegation of power, as
the legislative policy was not clearly laid down by Parliament.

Arguments of the Respondent (Commissioner of Sales Tax):

Legislative Policy: The respondent argued that Parliament had clearly laid down a legislative
policy in Section 8(2)(b). The intent was to ensure that the rate of Central Sales Tax (CST)
for inter-state sales would not be lower than the local sales tax rate to prevent evasion and
discrimination.
Non-Abdication: It was further contended that there was no abdication of legislative power
because the Parliament retained control over the rate determination process. The section
allowed for flexibility, given the variations in local sales tax rates across states.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the constitutional validity of Section
8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
1. Clear Legislative Policy: The Court held that there was a clear legislative policy in
Section 8(2)(b). The objective of the law was to ensure that the rate of Central Sales
Tax would be at least 10% or equal to the local sales tax rate, whichever was higher.
This was to prevent unregistered dealers in inter-state trade from enjoying lower tax
rates than intra-state dealers.
2. No Excessive Delegation: The Court held that there was no excessive delegation
because Parliament had clearly enunciated the guiding principle that inter-state sales
should not have a lower tax rate than intra-state sales. The delegation of the rate
fixation to the states was necessary given the variations in state tax rates.
3. Parliamentary Control: The Court noted that Parliament retained its power to repeal
or amend the provisions of Section 8(2)(b). As long as Parliament held the ultimate
control, the delegation was valid. This type of delegation was seen as essential in
modern legislative frameworks, allowing flexibility in the implementation of socio-
economic laws.
 4. Practical Necessity: The Court further explained that fixing a maximum rate was not
feasible since state taxes vary, and such a task is better handled by the state
legislatures. Parliament cannot exercise control over state-determined rates, and
delegating this task was essential for preventing tax evasion.

Conclusion:
The Court ruled that Section 8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act did not suffer from the vice
of excessive delegation. The Parliament had clearly laid down a legislative policy and
provided sufficient guidelines to ensure that the Central Sales Tax rates were aligned with
local rates. The delegation of power was seen as a pragmatic necessity, allowing for
flexibility in tax administration. Therefore, the section was held to be constitutionally valid.

Jalan Trading Company v. Mill Mazdoor Union

Facts of the Case
The Payment of Bonus Ordinance 3 of 1965 was promulgated by the President of India on
May 29, 1965. The ordinance was passed while a case was pending before the Industrial
Court, Bombay under Section 73A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, regarding
demands for payment of bonuses for the years 1961 and 1962.
The representatives of the workmen claimed that the establishment's loss, as reflected in its
profit and loss account, did not preclude them from receiving a bonus. The Ordinance
governed the ongoing dispute and mandated that employees were entitled to a minimum
bonus of 4% of their salary or Rs. 40/-, whichever was higher.
The Industrial Court upheld the workmen's plea and directed employers subject to the Bonus
Ordinance, 1965 to pay a bonus equivalent to 15 days of salary or Rs. 40/-, whichever was
higher, for the year 1962. It established a formula for allocating a percentage of the
establishment’s gross profits towards bonuses for workers after accounting for prior charges.
The employers filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court, challenging the validity of
the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, which replaced the Ordinance. The petitioners specifically
objected to the mandatory minimum bonus provisions.

Issues Raised
1. Validity of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965: Whether Sections 10, 32, 33, 34(2), 36,
and 37 of the Act were ultra vires.
2. Excessive delegation of power: Whether Parliament exceeded its authority by
enacting a law relating to bonus payments.
3. Constitutionality: Whether the Act amounted to a fraud on the Constitution or was a
colourable exercise of legislative power.
Arguments Presented
Petitioners (Employers):
Argued that the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 was unconstitutional, alleging that it amounted
to a fraud on the Constitution and was a colourable exercise of legislative power.
Challenged the provisions of the Act which mandated the payment of a minimum bonus, even
in cases where the establishment did not earn profits.

Respondents (Workmen):
Defended the Act, asserting that the provisions, including Section 34(2), were valid and not
unconstitutional.
Argued that the Act aimed to stabilize the previous system of granting bonuses and to protect
the gains achieved by labor through collective bargaining in the base year.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, rejecting the
petitioners' challenge. The Court found that the Act and its provisions, including the
minimum bonus requirement, were designed to ensure an equitable division of distributable
profits between employers and employees.
The formula established under the Act was not based on strict legal rights or obligations but
was intended to distribute a reasonable share of profits to workers after deducting prior
charges. The Court ruled that this did not constitute excessive delegation of power nor was it
a colourable exercise of legislative power.

Conclusion
The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 was deemed constitutional, with the Supreme Court
supporting its provisions for equitable distribution of profits to employees. The Court found
that the Act did not violate the Constitution, and there was no excessive delegation of
legislative power in its enactment. The bonus formula, including a minimum bonus provision,
was upheld as a reasonable method to ensure fair compensation for workers.

Lachmi Narain v. UoI 1976

Facts of the Case:
The case revolves around the power of the Central Government under Section 2 of the Union
Territories (Laws) Act, 1950. This section empowered the Central Government to extend any
enactment in force in a Part A State to a Part C State (now Union Territories), with
modifications and restrictions.
In 1951, the Central Government extended the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, to
Delhi (a Part C State) with modifications. The original Section 6(2) of the Bengal Finance
(Sales Tax) Act, which required a notice of not less than three months to make changes in the
Schedule of exempted goods, was also part of this extension.
Later, in 1957, the Central Government issued another notification amending Section 6(2),
reducing the notice period from three months to "such notice as it considers reasonable." This
was followed by notifications that withdrew exemptions for several goods, giving less than
three months' notice. Aggrieved dealers challenged the validity of this withdrawal of
exemptions.

Issues Raised:
1. Whether the Central Government had the power to amend the Bengal Act after its
extension to Delhi through the 1957 Notification.
2. Whether the withdrawal of exemptions with less than three months' notice was valid.
3. Whether the Parliament, through the Bengal (Sales Tax) (Delhi Amendment) Act,
1959, had validated the reduced notice period introduced by the 1957 Notification.

Arguments by the Petitioners (Dealers):

The 1957 notification was beyond the powers granted to the Central Government under
Section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950.
The Bengal Act's requirement of a mandatory three months’ notice before amending the
Schedule of exempted goods was part of the legislative policy and could only be changed by
Parliament, not the Central Government.
The exemption withdrawal was illegal since it did not comply with the mandatory notice
requirement.

Arguments by the Respondents (Government):

Section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws) Act gave the Central Government the power to
make modifications, including altering the notice period in Section 6(2).
The 1957 Notification was valid as the power to modify an enactment was within the Central
Government’s discretion.
Parliament had validated the 1957 Notification by passing the Bengal (Sales Tax) (Delhi
Amendment) Act, 1959, which made certain amendments to the Bengal Act.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioners and declared the 1957 Notification
invalid. The Court reasoned as follows:
1. Exhaustion of Power: The power under Section 2 of the Union Territories (Laws)
Act could only be exercised once when the Act was extended, and any subsequent
modifications after the extension were not permissible. The power given to the
Central Government for restrictions and modifications was an "integral constituent" of
the extension power, and once the Act was extended to Delhi, the Central Government
had no authority to amend it further.
2. Legislative Policy: Section 6(2) requiring "not less than three months' notice" was
part of the legislative policy that could not be changed by the Central Government.
The requirement for three months' notice was mandatory, not merely directory, as it
provided certainty and protected the interests of the dealers and consumers.
3. Parliamentary Approval: The Court rejected the argument that the 1959 Amendment
Act validated the 1957 Notification. The 1959 Act did not touch upon Section 6(2) or
refer to the 1957 Notification. There was no express or implied validation of the
reduced notice period in the legislation.
4. Natural Justice: The Court also held that allowing the Government to justify its
withdrawal of exemptions without proper notice would be against the principles of
natural justice, as it would allow the Government to benefit from its own illegal
action.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court declared that the 1957 Notification modifying the notice period in
Section 6(2) was beyond the powers conferred on the Central Government by the Union
Territories (Laws) Act, 1950. Therefore, the subsequent notifications withdrawing
exemptions from sales tax with less than three months' notice were invalid and ineffective.
The original requirement of providing at least three months' notice was held to be mandatory,
and any withdrawal of exemptions had to comply with this provision.

Hamdard Dawakhana Wakf v. UoI

Facts of the Case:
The petitioners, Hamdard Dawakhana, challenged the constitutionality of the Drugs and
Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, 1954. The Act regulated
advertisements that promoted drugs and medicines claiming to cure certain specified diseases
or conditions. The primary objective of the Act was to prevent self-medication and self-
treatment by curbing misleading advertisements that advocated remedies for diseases. The
petitioners contended that the Act violated their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a)
and 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantee freedom of speech and the right to
carry on trade or business, respectively.
Issues Raised:
1. Whether the restrictions imposed by the Act violated the freedom of speech and
expression under Article 19(1)(a).
2. Whether the restrictions on advertisements affected the petitioners' right to trade
under Article 19(1)(g).
3. Whether the provisions of the Act, especially Section 3(d) and Section 8, were
unconstitutional on the grounds of uncanalized executive powers.

Arguments of the Petitioners:

The petitioners argued that advertising is a form of speech and thus should fall within the
ambit of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). They contended that the Act prohibited
their right to publish and distribute commercial advertisements, which were an essential part
of their trade and business.
They also contended that the Act's provisions placed unreasonable restrictions on their right
to carry on trade and business, thereby violating Article 19(1)(g).
Additionally, the petitioners argued that Section 3(d) gave arbitrary powers to the
government to specify any disease or condition in the rules, which constituted uncontrolled
delegation of legislative powers.
They challenged Section 8 for granting excessive powers to seize and detain advertisements
without providing adequate safeguards.

Arguments of the Respondents (Union of India):

The respondents argued that the primary objective of the Act was to protect public health by
preventing self-medication through misleading advertisements. Therefore, the restrictions
imposed were reasonable and in the interest of public health.
They contended that commercial advertisements are not equivalent to the freedom of
speech as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) since such advertisements primarily serve
commercial interests and do not involve the propagation of ideas.
They further argued that the Act was in the public interest and placed reasonable restrictions
on trade, which were permissible under Article 19(6).
Regarding the contention of arbitrary power, the respondents maintained that the
government needed flexibility to add diseases or conditions to the list in the public's interest.

Court's Decision:
Freedom of Speech (Article 19(1)(a)): The Supreme Court held that advertisement is a
form of speech, but not all advertisements are protected under Article 19(1)(a). It clarified
that commercial advertisements promoting trade and business do not enjoy the same
protection as speech that involves the expression of ideas or opinions.
The Court ruled that the Act was not aimed at restricting freedom of speech but instead
sought to regulate trade and business. Therefore, the provisions of the Act did not violate
Article 19(1)(a).

Right to Trade (Article 19(1)(g)): The Court acknowledged that the Act imposed restrictions
on trade and business, but these restrictions were reasonable and in the public interest. It
held that the provisions of the Act were aimed at protecting public health by preventing the
misuse of drugs and ensuring that medicines are not advertised for diseases for which they
are ineffective.
Therefore, the restrictions were held to be constitutionally valid under Article 19(6).

Delegation of Legislative Power (Section 3(d)): The Court found that the words "or any
other disease or condition which may be specified in the rules" conferred uncanalized and
uncontrolled power on the executive to specify diseases or conditions arbitrarily. This was
found to be unconstitutional as it violated the principle of proper delegation of legislative
powers.
Consequently, the Court struck down this portion of Section 3(d) as unconstitutional but
held that the remaining part of Section 3(d) was severable and valid.

Excessive Power of Seizure (Section 8): The Court ruled that Section 8 provided excessive
and arbitrary powers to seize and detain advertisements without adequate safeguards. The
lack of sufficient checks and balances in exercising this power was deemed unconstitutional.
As a result, Section 8 was declared invalid. However, this did not affect the overall validity
of the Act as the provision was severable.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of most provisions of the Drugs and Magic
Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, 1954, ruling that the restrictions imposed on
advertisements were in the interest of public health and constituted reasonable restrictions
under Article 19. However, it struck down parts of Section 3(d) and Section 8 for being
unconstitutional, while declaring the rest of the Act valid. The Court emphasized the
importance of balancing fundamental rights with public interest.

Employees State Insurance (ESI) v. T. Abdul Razak 1996

Facts:
Statutory Background:
The Employees' State Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') is a
statutory body established under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (the Act).
The Director General (DG) is the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation and has specific
powers under Sections 16, 17, 94-A, 95, and 97 of the Act.
Delegation of Powers:
Under the provisions of the Act and Regulations, the Director General, with the approval of
the Standing Committee, can delegate his powers to subordinate officers.
Various office orders were issued delegating powers to Regional Directors and other officers
for imposing penalties and initiating disciplinary proceedings against employees.
Disciplinary Proceedings:
T. Abdul Razak (respondent) was subjected to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the
Regional Director of Karnataka Region. An order was passed by the Director General
imposing the penalty of reduction in rank.
Similarly, P.K. Philip, another respondent, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings initiated
by the Regional Director.
Challenge before the Tribunal:
The respondents challenged the initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Regional
Director and the competence of the Regional Director to initiate such proceedings, arguing
that the delegation of powers was invalid.

Issues Raised:
1. Was the delegation of powers by the Director General to subordinate officers (e.g.,
Regional Directors) valid under the Employees' State Insurance Corporation Act and
Regulations?
2. Could the Director General further delegate powers conferred upon him, particularly
in relation to initiating disciplinary proceedings and imposing penalties on
employees?
3. Was the principle of sub-delegation, "delegatus non potest delegare," violated by the
Director General’s delegation of powers to Regional Directors and other subordinate
officers?

Respondents' (T. Abdul Razak and Others) Arguments:

They argued that the Regional Director lacked the authority to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against them because such powers could not be further delegated by the Director
General under Section 94-A of the Act.
They contended that the delegation of powers violated the principle of "delegatus non potest
delegare," i.e., a delegate cannot further delegate.

Corporation's Arguments:
The Corporation argued that the Director General had the authority to delegate powers under
the Act and Regulations, and such delegation was valid.
It was contended that the powers conferred upon the Director General were not delegated
under Section 94-A of the Act but were independent statutory powers conferred by the Act
and the Regulations.
Therefore, the delegation to Regional Directors was valid, and the disciplinary proceedings
initiated were legally proper.

Court's Decision:
Delegation of Powers:
The Supreme Court held that the Director General had independent statutory powers under
the Regulations, and these powers could be validly delegated to subordinate officers like the
Regional Directors.
The Court ruled that the provisions of Regulations 12(2) and 13(1), allowing the Director
General to delegate powers, were valid and did not violate the principle of sub-delegation.
Invalidation of Certain Provisions:
However, the Court noted that if powers were conferred upon the Director General under a
resolution of the Corporation or Standing Committee under Section 94-A, further delegation
of such powers was impermissible. This aspect of Rule 16(2) and the Standing Committee's
resolution was held to be invalid.
Tribunal's Error:
The Supreme Court found that the Tribunal had erred in striking down parts of Regulations
12(2) and 13(1) as well as quashing the orders passed by the Director General. The Court
held that the Director General’s orders were validly issued under the Regulations.
Disciplinary Proceedings:
The Court ruled that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Regional Director were
valid, and the penalty imposed by the Director General was lawful. The initiation of
disciplinary proceedings does not require the same authority that imposes the penalty.
Final Decision:
The Court set aside the judgment of the Tribunal, upheld the validity of the Director General's
delegation of powers, and dismissed the applications filed by the respondents.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the delegation of powers by the Director General to subordinate
officers like Regional Directors under the statutory framework of the Employees' State
Insurance Corporation Act and Regulations. The Court clarified that while delegation of
powers conferred under the Act and Regulations is valid, further delegation of powers
conferred through resolutions under Section 94-A is impermissible. The disciplinary actions
initiated against the respondents were deemed lawful, and the Tribunal’s decision was
overturned.

MODULE 4

J. Mohapatra v. State of Orissa

Facts
Selection Process of Books: In the State of Orissa, the selection of textbooks and reading
materials for school and college libraries lacked a statutory framework. Instead, it relied on
administrative instructions from the government, involving the formation of committees such
as the Assessment Sub-Committee, Distribution Sub-Committee, and Purchase Committee.
Committee Composition: The committees included both government officials and non-
official members. The Purchase Committee solicited books from publishers, which were then
assessed by the Assessment Sub-Committee, recommending suitable titles for approval by the
State Government.
Conflict of Interest: Some members of the Assessment Sub-Committee were authors of
books submitted for selection, leading to potential bias in the selection process.
Cyclone and Flood Relief: Following a natural disaster in 1982, the Central Government
allocated funds for book purchases in non-governmental schools and colleges in Orissa. The
State Government expedited the book selection process to utilize the funds effectively.
Legal Challenge: Publishers filed a writ petition challenging the selection process, alleging
bias due to the involvement of author-members in the Assessment Sub-Committee.

Issues Raised
1. Locus Standi: Whether the publishers had the legal standing to file the writ petition
given their submission of books for selection.
2. Bias in Selection: Whether the presence of author-members in the Assessment Sub-
Committee constituted a conflict of interest affecting the impartiality of the book
selection process.
 3. Natural Justice: Whether the procedure followed for book selection adhered to
principles of natural justice and fairness.
Arguments
For the Appellants (Publishers):
Bias and Conflict of Interest: The presence of author-members in the selection committee
posed a significant risk of bias. Their financial interests could influence the outcome of the
selection process.
Locus Standi: Appellants argued that submitting books for selection did not waive their right
to object to the committee’s constitution, and they had a valid interest in the impartial
selection of educational materials.

For the Respondents (State of Orissa):

Legitimacy of Procedure: The State Government had the authority to change the
committee's composition and selection procedures due to the urgency of the situation after the
disaster.
Doctrine of Necessity: The government argued that the selection process needed to proceed
swiftly, and the involvement of author-members was necessary to form a functional
committee.
Finality of Decisions: The decisions regarding the selection and purchase of books had
already been executed, creating a fait accompli situation.

Court's Decision
Locus Standi: The Supreme Court held that the evolution of locus standi in public interest
litigation allowed parties without direct personal interest to challenge administrative actions.
Submitting books did not negate the publishers’ right to contest the committee’s constitution.
Bias Principle: The Court emphasized the principle that “nemo judex in causa sua” (no one
should be a judge in their own cause) applies to administrative proceedings as well. The
involvement of author-members in the Assessment Sub-Committee created an inherent
conflict of interest.
Doctrine of Necessity: The Court rejected the application of the doctrine of necessity in this
context, stating that the government should have replaced the author-members to eliminate
the risk of bias.
Guidelines for Future Selections: While the Court could not annul the already executed
selections due to the situation’s urgency, it provided guidelines for the future selection of
books to ensure fair practices, emphasizing that social consciousness and moral responsibility
are crucial in such committees.
Natural Justice Concerns: The Court found that merely withdrawing from discussions when
their books were considered was inadequate to eliminate bias. A more robust mechanism was
needed to ensure impartiality in the selection process.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and laid down significant guidelines for the selection
of educational materials, focusing on impartiality, the importance of natural justice, and the
need for transparency in decision-making processes. The case underscored the necessity of
ensuring that committee members do not have conflicts of interest that could compromise the
integrity of educational resources.

A.K. Kraipak v. UoI

Already done in Module 2.

Gullapali Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corp

Facts:
The Andhra State Transport Undertaking sought to nationalize road transport services under
Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by Act 100 of 1956. A scheme was
published in the Official Gazette, inviting objections. The Chief Minister received and heard
the objections through the Secretary to the Home Department, who was responsible for
Transport, but the final decision was made by the Chief Minister. The scheme was approved
and published in the Official Gazette. The petitioners, who held permits to operate buses on
various routes in the Krishna District, feared their routes would be taken over by the newly
established State Corporation and sought protection of their fundamental rights to conduct
their business.

Issues Raised:
1. Whether Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act was a colorable piece of legislation
intended to take over the petitioners' business, violating Article 31 of the Constitution.
2. Whether the scheme approved by the State Government was ultra vires the Act due to
the violation of principles of natural justice in the approval process.

Petitioners' Arguments:
Colorable Legislation: The petitioners contended that Chapter IVA was essentially a
legislative scheme aimed at taking over their businesses under the guise of cancelling
permits, thereby contravening their rights under Article 31.
Ultra Vires the Act: They argued that the State Government failed to act judicially while
approving the scheme and violated fundamental principles of natural justice.

Respondent's Arguments
Legislative Competence: The respondents argued that the legislation was within the
competency of the legislature, and any motives behind the enactment were irrelevant to its
validity.
Judicial Procedure: The respondents contended that the procedure followed was
administrative in nature and did not require adherence to strict judicial processes, claiming
that the Home Secretary acted as an administrative officer, not as a party to a dispute.

Court's Decision
The Court, in a per curiam decision, ruled on the following points:
1. Legislative Competence: The Court held that the question of colorable legislation
was ultimately a matter of legislative competence. It determined that Chapter IVA of
the Act was not a colorable piece of legislation, as it fell within the legislative powers
of the State.
2. Natural Justice: The Court found that the approval process violated fundamental
principles of natural justice. The Chief Minister, having made the decision after the
Secretary (who was involved in the dispute) heard the objections, resulted in bias.
Thus, the order of the State Government approving the scheme was quashed.

Conclusion
The Court concluded that while the legislative framework aimed at nationalizing road
transport was valid, the specific implementation of the scheme violated principles of natural
justice due to the procedural irregularities in decision-making. The approval process was
declared invalid, emphasizing the need for impartiality and fair hearing in administrative
decisions that affect the rights of individuals.

Gullapali Nageswara Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh

Facts
The appellants were engaged in motor transport business in the Krishna District of Andhra
Pradesh. The General Manager of the State Transport Undertaking published a scheme for the
nationalization of motor transport, inviting objections. The appellants submitted their
objections. Initially, the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department heard the objections
but was deemed incompetent by the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v.
Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, leading to the scheme's quashing.
Following this, the Chief Minister himself heard the objections from the appellants and the
Road Transport Corporation and approved the original scheme. The appellants then filed a
petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the Government's
approval and subsequent cancellation of their stage carriage permits. The High Court rejected
their petitions, leading to an appeal by the appellants.

Issues Raised
1. Whether the Chief Minister's involvement in hearing the objections violated the
principles of natural justice due to an alleged conflict of interest, similar to the earlier
situation with the Secretary of the Transport Department.
2. Whether the decision made by the Chief Minister was invalid due to an appearance of
bias.

Appellants' Arguments
Bias and Competence: The appellants contended that the same issue of bias that rendered
the Secretary incompetent also applied to the Chief Minister, who was in charge of transport.
They argued that this bias disqualified the Chief Minister from fairly hearing and deciding the
objections.
Natural Justice Violation: They claimed that the principles of natural justice were violated,
as the Chief Minister acted as a judge in a matter where he had an official bias.

Respondent's Arguments
Separation of Roles: The respondents argued that the Chief Minister's role was distinct from
that of the Secretary of the Department. While the Secretary was part of the Department and
its head, the Chief Minister was primarily responsible for overseeing the Department's
operations without being part of the administrative process.
No Prior Challenge: The respondents noted that the appellants had not questioned the Chief
Minister's competence during the previous proceedings and had accepted the judgment based
on that premise, thereby precluding them from raising the issue again.

Court's Decision
The Court ruled in favor of the respondents on the following points:
1. Natural Justice Principles: The Court reaffirmed two well-established principles of
bias: no one should be a judge in their own cause, and justice must not only be done
but also appear to be done. However, it found that the provisions of the relevant Act
did not allow the Government to act as a judge in its own cause or violate principles
of natural justice.
 2. Distinction in Roles: The Court clarified that the Chief Minister's position was
different from that of the Secretary of the Transport Department. The Secretary was
part of the Department and its decision-making, whereas the Chief Minister acted as
an overseer, thus not subject to the same biases attributed to the Secretary.

Conclusion
The Court concluded that the Chief Minister's decision to hear and approve the objections
was not a violation of natural justice principles, as he was not acting in a capacity that
constituted a conflict of interest. The appellants were bound by their previous acceptance of
the Chief Minister's authority in the matter, and the Court affirmed the approval of the
scheme as valid and lawful.

Morgan v. US 1936
Brief Fact Summary
Plaintiffs, representing livestock marketing agencies, filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of
Agriculture regarding an order that set maximum prices for livestock markets. The plaintiffs
contended that they were not afforded a proper hearing before the price-setting order was
issued.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

“To give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determination upon
evidence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence
which justifies them.”

Facts
Fifty consolidated lawsuits were filed to restrain the enforcement of an order from the
Secretary of Agriculture that fixed the maximum rates charged by livestock marketing
agencies. The plaintiffs argued that they did not receive a fair hearing. The Secretary had
announced a hearing on the matter where evidence was collected over three months,
including testimony and exhibits. A subsequent rehearing occurred, where evidence was
resubmitted along with oral arguments. The plaintiffs' requests for a report and findings were
denied until the final order was issued. The plaintiffs also sought an additional hearing, which
was denied. During the trial, several allegations made by the plaintiffs were struck down,
resulting in a ruling against them.

Issues Raised
Whether the allegations made by the plaintiffs should have been stricken from the record,
particularly regarding the assertion that the Secretary issued the rate order without having
properly considered the evidence presented.

Plaintiffs' Arguments
Lack of Proper Hearing: The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary made the rate order
without hearing or reading any of the evidence, without considering oral arguments, and
without reviewing the briefs submitted by the plaintiffs.
Right to a Fair Process: They contended that the absence of the Secretary during the hearing
undermined the fairness and integrity of the process, constituting a violation of their rights to
a proper hearing.

Defendant's Arguments
Evidence Consideration: The Secretary argued that the Acting Secretary, who took over the
hearing process, adequately considered the evidence before issuing the order, fulfilling the
procedural requirements.
Legitimacy of Process: They maintained that the process followed was legitimate, as
evidence had been collected and presented during the hearing.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the allegations should not have been
stricken from the record. The Court emphasized that it was essential for the Secretary, who
assumed responsibility for the order, to be present during the hearing. It noted the quasi-
judicial nature of the proceedings, asserting that due process required the decision-maker to
consider the evidence presented.

Conclusion
The Court ruled that the Secretary’s absence from the hearing and the failure to properly
consider the evidence undermined the legitimacy of the rate-setting order. The allegations
made by the plaintiffs regarding the lack of a fair hearing were valid, and striking them from
the record was inappropriate. Thus, the case reinforced the necessity for decision-makers in
quasi-judicial proceedings to engage with and appraise the evidence thoroughly.

Ridge v. Baldwin
Already done in Module 2.
Abhay Kumar v. K. Srinivasan 1981
Facts
The petitioner was suspended from the Pusa Polytechnic Institute on October 16, 1980, by the
Principal due to his involvement in a stabbing incident that occurred on November 15, 1979.
The incident resulted in the stabbing of another student, Ved Parkash Pippal, and a criminal
case under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against the petitioner and two
other students involved.
The disciplinary action was taken following the recommendation of the Disciplinary
Committee, which had suggested expulsion but the Principal opted for a temporary
suspension pending the criminal proceedings.
The Director of Technical Education had established rules governing student conduct and
disciplinary measures, which included various punishable offenses such as rowdyism,
violence, and any conduct unbecoming of a student.

Issues Raised
1. Lack of Notice: The petitioner argued that he did not receive a show-cause notice
regarding the proceedings of the Disciplinary Committee, which violated the
principles of natural justice.
2. Fundamental Rights: The petitioner contended that the suspension violated his
fundamental right to education as per Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
3. Social Justice: The petitioner claimed that the order was contrary to the principles of
social justice.
4. Mala Fides: The petitioner alleged that the Principal acted in bad faith and collusion
with the victim.

Petitioner's Arguments
Violation of Natural Justice: The petitioner claimed that not receiving a show-cause notice
hindered his ability to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, thus violating natural
justice.
Fundamental Right to Education: He argued that the order infringed on his right to
education, which he considered a fundamental right.
Contrary to Social Justice: The petitioner maintained that the punishment imposed was
excessively harsh and unjust.
Mala Fides: He alleged that the Principal's actions were motivated by bad faith and collusion
with the victim of the stabbing incident.

Respondent's Arguments
Proper Service of Notice: The respondents argued that the show-cause notice was properly
served at the petitioner's permanent address after failing to locate him at the hostel.
Voluntary Absence: They claimed that the petitioner voluntarily chose not to participate in
the proceedings after receiving the notice.
Preventive Action: The Principal's order was framed as a preventive measure to maintain
peace on campus pending the criminal proceedings, which justified the suspension.
Lack of Right to Education: They contended that the petitioner himself had denied his right
to education by avoiding arrest and not attending classes regularly.

Court's Decision
The court ruled against the petitioner, upholding the Principal’s suspension order. The court
concluded that:
1. The service of the show-cause notice was lawful and appropriate.
2. The suspension was a preventive action justified by the need to maintain peace and
order on the campus, particularly given the violent nature of the incident.
3. The petitioner’s argument regarding a violation of his fundamental right to education
was rejected, as he had actively chosen not to attend classes and had a pattern of
irregular attendance.
4. Allegations of mala fides against the Principal were deemed baseless and unfounded.

Conclusion
The court determined that the disciplinary actions taken against the petitioner were justified
and necessary to ensure a safe educational environment. The suspension was viewed as a
reasonable preventive measure, not a final punitive decision, and was in alignment with the
rules established for maintaining discipline within the educational institution. As a result, the
writ petition was dismissed with costs, reinforcing the authority of educational institutions to
act in cases of student misconduct to protect the academic community.

Union Carbide Corporation v. UoI

Facts of the Case
Formation of UCIL: In 1934, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) collaborated with the
Union of India to create Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), with UCC holding a 51%
stake.
Plant Location: A new UCIL plant was established in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, in 1970,
located in a densely populated area, despite the government classifying the area for light
industrial and commercial use, not for hazardous industries.
Gas Leak Incident: On the night of December 2, 1984, methyl isocyanate leaked from the
plant, resulting in approximately 2,600 immediate deaths, with later estimates of total
fatalities reaching around 20,000. An estimated 60,000 people suffered severe injuries.
Legal Actions: The Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of
Claims) Act, 1985, to expedite the trial and ensure liability for the incident. Despite efforts to
litigate in foreign courts, the claims were dismissed due to jurisdictional issues.

Issues Raised
1. Justifiability of Settlement Amount: Was the compensation amount awarded by the
court justified?
2. Dropping of Criminal Proceedings: Was it justified for the court to drop criminal
proceedings against UCC?

Arguments Given by Both Parties

Submissions by the Appellants
Jurisdiction Challenge: The appellants contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to
withdraw or transfer suits related to interlocutory injunctions for final disposal, rendering any
settlement invalid.
Doctrine of Liability: The appellants argued that the retrospective application of the newly
introduced doctrine of absolute liability was improper and that the liability of shareholders
should be assessed under corporate law principles.
Criminal Proceedings: The appellants maintained that the criminal proceedings were
unrelated to the civil suit, and the court had no authority to quash these proceedings.

Submissions by the Respondents

Substantive Law of Torts: The respondents claimed that under the substantive law of torts,
the appellants were liable to compensate the victims due to their involvement in high-risk
activities.
Retrospective Application: They argued that the principles established in the M.C. Mehta
case could still be applied to the Bhopal incident despite being introduced post-incident.
Corporate Veil Lifting: The respondents asserted that the corporate veil should be lifted due
to UCIL’s inability to compensate the victims, as UCC held the majority stake.

Court's Decision
Majority Opinion: Justice Venkatachaliah, along with Justices K.N. Singh and N.D. Ojha,
ruled that the dropping of criminal proceedings against UCC was unjustified, and criminal
proceedings should be initiated. The court held that the compensation amount of 470 million
dollars was adequate, reasonable, and fair. If additional funds were needed for victim
rehabilitation, the government would be responsible for providing them.
Dissenting Opinion: Justice Ahmadi dissented regarding the adequacy of the compensation
amount but concurred with other aspects of the majority opinion.
Compensation Order: UCC was ordered to indemnify 470 million dollars to the Indian
government by March 31, 1989.
Conclusion
The Bhopal Gas Leak case remains one of the worst industrial disasters in history,
highlighting significant failures in industrial safety and accountability. The court’s judgment
has been criticized for inadequacies in both the compensation awarded and the legal handling
of the case. While some legislative measures were enacted post-disaster, they were
insufficient to prevent future tragedies. The ongoing repercussions of the incident underscore
the necessity for sustainable industrial practices and robust legal frameworks to protect public
health and safety.

Sub-committee on Judicial Accountability v. UoI

Facts
The case involved a writ petition filed by the Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability
against the Union of India and others. The petition challenged the validity and
implementation of actions taken by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha regarding a notice of
motion. This notice, moved by 108 Members of Parliament under Article 124(5) of the
Constitution, along with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, sought the removal of a sitting Judge
of the Supreme Court due to alleged misconduct during his tenure as Chief Justice of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court. The petition questioned whether the actions of the Speaker
were constitutionally valid and whether the formation of an Inquiry Committee to investigate
these allegations was permissible.

Issues Raised
1. Authority of the Speaker: Did the Speaker of the Lok Sabha possess the authority to
admit the notice of motion for the removal of a sitting Judge under Article 124(5) and
the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968?
2. Formation of Inquiry Committee: Was the establishment of an Inquiry Committee
consisting of a Supreme Court Judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court, and a jurist to
investigate allegations of misconduct legally valid?

Arguments
Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability
 • Validity of Speaker's Actions: The Sub-Committee argued that the Speaker's decision
to admit the notice of motion was necessary to uphold judicial accountability and
integrity within the judiciary.
• Importance of Investigating Misconduct: The petition emphasized the necessity of a
thorough investigation into allegations of misconduct against judges to maintain
public trust in the judicial system.

Union of India and Others

• Constitutional Provisions: The Union of India contended that the Speaker's actions did
not align with constitutional provisions and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
• Judicial Independence: The argument was made that the formation of the Inquiry
Committee was not legally justified and risked undermining the independence of the
judiciary.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court of India ruled that:
• The Speaker of the Lok Sabha did have the authority to admit the notice of motion for
the removal of a sitting Judge under Article 124(5) of the Constitution and the Judges
(Inquiry) Act, 1968.
• The court upheld the establishment of the Inquiry Committee, asserting that it was a
valid and essential measure to investigate the allegations of misconduct effectively.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in this case reinforced the significance of judicial
accountability and the establishment of mechanisms to investigate allegations of misconduct
against judges. The ruling underscored the delicate balance between maintaining judicial
independence and ensuring accountability, aiming to preserve the integrity and transparency
of the judiciary in India.

BALCO Employees Union v. UoI

Facts
M/S Bharat Aluminium Company Ltd. (BALCO) was incorporated in 1965 under the
Companies Act, 1956, as a Government of India undertaking. The company specialized in
aluminium manufacturing and operated plants in Korba (Chhattisgarh) and Bidhanbag (West
Bengal). In the 1990s, the Central Government initiated plans to disinvest in certain Public
Sector Undertakings (PSUs) due to financial difficulties and low returns on investments.
In 1996, the Ministry of Industry (Department of Public Enterprises) established a
commission as an independent advisory body to evaluate government investments and
recommend future initiatives concerning disinvestment. The commission was tasked with
reviewing investments and considering stakeholders' interests, including workers and
consumers.
In 1997, the commission recommended the privatization of BALCO, suggesting that the
government disinvest 40% of its equity to a strategic partner and transfer management
control. Following this recommendation, the government began the strategic sale process,
ultimately approving the highest bidder.
The decision to disinvest was contested by the BALCO Employees Union through a writ
petition in the High Court of Delhi, which was disposed of. As the share transfer process
commenced, several writ petitions were filed in the Chhattisgarh and Delhi High Courts.
These petitions were subsequently transferred to the Supreme Court of India at the Union of
India’s request.

Issues Raised
1. Validity of Disinvestment: Was the Government of India’s decision to disinvest in
BALCO valid?
2. Judicial Review: Is such a decision subject to judicial review, and if so, to what
extent?

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioners

Impact on Workers: The petitioners argued that disinvesting 51% of shares in BALCO
would adversely affect workers, stripping them of rights and protections under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India.
Right to be Heard: They asserted that workers should have been consulted before making
such a crucial decision, citing precedents like Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1980)
and Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) that
emphasized workers' rights and social justice.
Procedural and Substantive Rights: The petitioners claimed that the decision had civil
consequences, including loss of pension rights and other benefits, warranting a right to a
hearing.
Failure of Comprehensive Reforms: They contended that the disinvestment failed to
achieve the intended socio-political reforms and was made without adequately considering
the repercussions on workers.

Arguments on Behalf of the Respondents

Historical Context of Disinvestment: The respondents highlighted that the government had
engaged in disinvestment since the 1990s due to low returns, lack of resources, and inability
to change the work culture in government enterprises.
Judicial Non-Interference: They asserted that the advisability of the government's economic
policies is not subject to judicial review, relying on Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of
India (1970), which stated that courts should not evaluate the merits of economic policies.
Natural Justice: The respondents argued that there was no requirement for prior consultation
with affected workers, as the government, as a shareholder, had the right to make decisions
regarding its shares in the company.
Transparency in Decision-Making: They maintained that the process was transparent, with
decisions made based on the highest bid following widespread publicity and appointment of a
global advisor.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the disinvestment decision, stating:
• Discretion of the Government: The court ruled that it is within the government's
discretion to formulate its policies, which might cause adverse effects but do not
warrant judicial interference unless there is a violation of law or mala fide intent.
• Judicial Review Limitations: The court emphasized that economic policies should
not be scrutinized by the judiciary, as they fall outside judicial review unless they
contravene statutory provisions or constitutional mandates.
• Lack of Grounds for Consultation: The court rejected the notion that workers had a
right to a hearing before such policy decisions, stating that the principles of natural
justice did not apply in this context.
• Rejection of Transparency Claims: The court found no merit in claims regarding the
lack of transparency, affirming that the decision-making process was conducted fairly.
Furthermore, the court dismissed the argument that financial or economic decisions could be
challenged through Public Interest Litigation (PIL), clarifying that PILs are intended to
protect public interest and cannot be used to contest administrative economic decisions.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling validated the government's decision to disinvest in BALCO,
affirming the government's discretion in policy formulation and reinforcing the limitations of
judicial review concerning economic policies. The decision highlighted the balance between
government authority and workers' rights, emphasizing the importance of adhering to
statutory and constitutional frameworks while allowing for necessary changes in public
policy.
Dr. Bonham’s Case (Medical Practitioner’s Case – UK )
Facts
Thomas Bonham, educated at St John's College, Cambridge, had earned a doctorate in
medicine from the University of Oxford. After moving to London, he practiced medicine
without the necessary license from the College of Physicians. In 1606, after being rejected for
membership in the college, Bonham continued his practice and faced fines and threats of
imprisonment. The College of Physicians, empowered by the College of Physicians Act 1553,
claimed authority to imprison unlicensed practitioners. Bonham was imprisoned for
contempt, but he obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the Court of Common Pleas and was
released. Subsequently, the college sought to punish him for practicing medicine without a
license, leading to Bonham suing for wrongful imprisonment.

Issues Raised
1. Was Dr. Bonham wrongfully imprisoned by the College of Physicians for practicing
medicine without a license?
2. Did the College of Physicians have the authority to imprison practitioners for
practicing without a license?
3. Could common law control Acts of Parliament, and if so, to what extent?

Arguments of the Petitioners (Bonham)

Legal Authority: Bonham’s attorneys argued that the Acts of Parliament and the college's
royal charter intended to punish malpractice, not simply practicing without a license.
Common Law Principle: They contended that under common law, a medical practitioner did
not need a license to practice if they were properly educated and qualified.
Judicial Review: Bonham’s lawyers claimed that the college could not act as both judge and
party in the case, asserting that this constituted a conflict of interest.

Arguments of the Respondents (College of Physicians)

Licensing Authority: The college argued that the Acts granted them the authority to imprison
anyone who practiced without a license, interpreting the legislation as a means to ensure
public health and safety.
Public Good: The college maintained that it had a duty to protect the health of the populace
and that imprisonment was a legitimate means to enforce compliance.
Judicial Interpretation: The college's lawyers contended that their interpretation of the Acts
was consistent with the authority given by the Crown and upheld previous judicial decisions.
Court's Decision
The Court of Common Pleas, led by Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke, ruled in favor of Dr.
Bonham. The court found that:
• The College of Physicians did not have the authority to imprison Bonham for merely
practicing without a license, as this did not constitute malpractice.
• Coke further posited that the college’s ability to act as both judge and party in cases
was fundamentally flawed and contrary to legal principles.
• Coke famously declared that "in many cases, the common law will control Acts of
Parliament," establishing a precedent for judicial review of legislation that conflicts
with common law rights.

Conclusion
Dr. Bonham's Case became a landmark decision in English law, establishing a critical
precedent regarding the balance between statutory authority and common law rights.
Although Coke's assertion regarding common law's supremacy over parliamentary statutes
was contested in later years, the case remains significant for its early exploration of judicial
review. It highlighted the potential for courts to scrutinize legislative authority and
emphasized the importance of protecting individual rights against arbitrary actions by
statutory bodies. Despite its initial controversy, Bonham's Case laid groundwork that
influenced later legal principles, particularly regarding judicial review in both the UK and the
United States.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978

Already done in Module 1.

MODULE 5

Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs

Facts
The plaintiffs, Mr. Andrew Schmidt and Mr. Murranti, wished to complete their studies in the
United Kingdom and requested the Secretary of State for Home Affairs to extend their
landing permits. The Secretary of State allowed Mr. Schmidt to enter the country in August
1967 and Mr. Murranti in June 1968. However, before the Secretary of State responded to
their requests for extension, the Minister of Health made a statement in the House of
Commons expressing disapproval of Scientology, which he deemed socially harmful. The
plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on 14th August 1968, claiming that the Secretary of State's refusal to
extend their permits was unlawful.

Issues
• Did the Secretary of State exercise his power for an unauthorised purpose?
• Did the Secretary of State fetter his discretion by laying down a general policy about
Scientology?
• Did the Secretary of State observe the precepts of natural justice?
• Did the plaintiffs have any right to an extension of their landing permits?

Decision
The court held that the Secretary of State did not exercise his power for an unauthorised
purpose and did not fetter his discretion by laying down a general policy about Scientology.
The court also held that the Secretary of State observed the precepts of natural justice. The
court further held that the plaintiffs did not have any right to an extension of their landing
permits. The court dismissed the appeal.

Reasoning
Lord Denning MR held that an alien has no right to enter the United Kingdom except by
leave of the Crown, and the Crown can refuse leave without giving any reason. The Secretary
of State has the power to make a deportation order if he deems it to be conducive to the
public good. The court held that the Secretary of State could exercise his power for any
purpose which he considers to be for the public good or to be in the interests of the people of
the United Kingdom. The court also held that the Secretary of State did not lay down a
general policy about Scientology and did not observe the precepts of natural justice. The
court further held that the plaintiffs did not have any right to an extension of their landing
permits.
Lord Justice Widgery agreed with Lord Denning MR and held that the absence of any kind of
right in the plaintiffs to an extension of their landing permits was the factor that forced him to
conclude that the learned Judge's Order was right in this case.
Lord Justice Cairns agreed with the analysis of Lord Denning MR and Lord Justice Widgery
and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

Food Corporation India v. Kamdhenu Cattlefeed Industries 1948

Facts of the Case
The appellant-Corporation invited tenders for the sale of damaged food grains.
The respondent submitted the highest bid.
Dissatisfied with the adequacy of the price offered by the highest bidder, the appellant invited
all tenderers for negotiations, instead of accepting the highest bid.
During the negotiations, the respondent refused to revise the rates in its offer.
The appellant accepted a higher bid obtained during negotiations and rejected all the original
tenders, including the respondent's.
The respondent challenged this decision in the High Court, claiming that it was arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 (Right to Equality) of the Constitution.

Issues Raised
• Whether the appellant’s decision to reject the highest tender and opt for negotiations
was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
• Whether the highest tenderer (respondent) had a right to have their tender accepted.

Arguments of the Respondent (Highest Bidder)

The respondent contended that no valid or cogent reasons were given by the appellant for
rejecting the highest tender.
It argued that the decision to hold negotiations without accepting the highest tender was
arbitrary.
The respondent emphasized that the procedure of inviting tenders was aimed at ensuring
fairness, and rejecting the highest bid without justification violated this principle.

Arguments of the Appellant (Corporation)

The appellant contended that it had the authority to reject all tenders if the offered price was
inadequate.
It argued that all tenderers were given an equal opportunity to participate in negotiations and
revise their bids.
The appellant emphasized that the purpose of tendering was to secure the highest price in the
public interest, and the final decision was made to maximize public benefit.
The highest tenderer (respondent) had no right to demand acceptance of their tender since the
process was open for revision.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and overturned the decision of the High Court.
Key Observations:
 • The Court held that Article 14 (Right to Equality) requires the State and its
instrumentalities to act fairly and non-arbitrarily.
• There is no absolute right for the highest bidder to have their tender accepted. The
power to reject all tenders exists, but it must be based on cogent reasons.
• The Court emphasized that fairness in the tender process includes ensuring equal
opportunity and transparency. A procedure that involves rejecting tenders only when a
significantly higher offer is obtained during negotiations, while retaining the highest
tender as a backup, is fair.
• The Court found that the appellant acted in public interest by negotiating for a higher
price and giving due consideration to the respondent’s legitimate expectation. This did
not amount to arbitrariness.
• The decision to reject the highest tender was based on valid grounds of inadequacy of
price and was made in accordance with public interest, which satisfied the non-
arbitrariness requirement under Article 14.

Conclusion
The Court concluded that the appellant’s actions were fair, reasonable, and in public interest.
The decision to reject the highest tender and proceed with negotiations for a better price did
not violate Article 14.
The appeal was allowed, and the respondent's writ petition was dismissed. The High Court’s
decision was erroneous in finding the appellant’s actions arbitrary.

Marbury v. Madison
Significance: Established the principle of judicial review, empowering the Supreme Court to
declare laws unconstitutional.

Facts of the Case

In the final weeks of President John Adams' term, the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the Organic
Act created new judgeships, which Adams filled with Federalists (his political party) to retain
influence in the judiciary.
William Marbury, a Federalist, was appointed as a justice of the peace, but his commission
was not delivered before Adams left office.
When Thomas Jefferson became president, he directed his Secretary of State, James
Madison, to withhold the undelivered commissions.
Marbury filed a petition in the Supreme Court requesting a writ of mandamus to compel
Madison to deliver his commission.

Issues Raised
 1. Did Marbury have the right to receive his commission?
2. If Marbury’s right was violated, did the law provide a remedy?
3. Was the appropriate remedy a writ of mandamus issued by the Supreme Court?

Arguments of Marbury (Plaintiff)

Marbury, represented by Charles Lee, argued that once the commission had been signed and
sealed, it was valid. Delivery of the commission was a mere formality.
Marbury claimed that, having been duly appointed, the withholding of the commission by
Madison violated his legal right to the office.

Arguments of Madison (Defendant)

Madison, under the direction of President Jefferson, withheld the commission, effectively
arguing that the new administration had the discretion to appoint or block the appointments
made by the previous administration.
Jefferson and his party opposed the last-minute judicial appointments and viewed them as
political manipulation.

Court's Decision
Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the Court's opinion, which was a significant decision
that shaped U.S. constitutional law. He addressed the following points:
• Did Marbury have the right to the commission?
Yes, the Court held that once a commission is signed by the President and sealed by
the Secretary of State, it is valid. The delivery of the commission was merely a
ministerial duty, and Marbury had a right to the commission.
• Was there a remedy for the violation of Marbury's right?
Yes, the Court held that the law provides Marbury a remedy for the violation of his
legal right. He had a right to the commission, and its withholding was a violation.
• Was a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court the proper remedy?
No, the Court ruled that it could not issue a writ of mandamus because the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which granted the Court the power to issue such writs in original
jurisdiction cases, was unconstitutional.
o Judicial Review: The Court held that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which extended the Court’s original jurisdiction to cases involving writs of
mandamus, was inconsistent with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The Constitution only grants the Court original jurisdiction in cases involving
ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, and disputes between states.
By declaring the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional, Chief Justice Marshall established
the principle of judicial review, whereby the Supreme Court has the authority to invalidate
laws that conflict with the Constitution.

Conclusion
The Court ruled that while Marbury had a legal right to his commission, the Supreme Court
could not enforce that right through a writ of mandamus, as the statute granting such power
was unconstitutional.
The decision was a landmark in American law, as it established the Supreme Court's role as
the ultimate arbiter of constitutional interpretation through judicial review.
This ruling strengthened the system of checks and balances by ensuring that no branch of
government, including Congress, could pass laws that contravene the Constitution.
➢ Marshall’s decision allowed the Court to avoid a direct confrontation with President
Jefferson while simultaneously affirming the power of the judiciary. This case is
foundational in the development of the U.S. legal system and the role of the Supreme
Court.
Ranjit Thakur v. UoI 1987
Facts of the Case
The appellant, a Signal Man in a Signal Regiment of the Armed Services, was serving a
28-day sentence of rigorous imprisonment imposed by his commanding officer for
violating norms related to presenting representations to higher officers.
During his imprisonment, on March 29, 1985, he allegedly refused to eat food when ordered
to do so, leading to a second charge under Section 41(2) of the Army Act, 1950 for
disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer.
A Summary Court-Martial was convened, consisting of the commanding officer
(respondent No. 4) and others. The appellant was sentenced to one year of rigorous
imprisonment and was removed to a civil prison to serve the sentence.
His representation to the confirming authority under Section 164 of the Army Act was
rejected by the General Officer Commanding on May 24, 1985.
The appellant’s writ petition challenging the proceedings of the Summary Court-Martial was
dismissed in limine by the High Court.

Issues Raised
1. Whether the Summary Court-Martial proceedings against the appellant violated
principles of fairness and proportionality.
2. Whether the appellant was denied an opportunity to challenge the constitution of the
Summary Court-Martial under Section 130(1) of the Army Act.
 3. Whether there was bias on the part of respondent No. 4, who participated in and
dominated the proceedings.
4. Whether the punishment imposed was so disproportionate as to be evidence of bias
or vindictiveness.
5. Whether the appellant, while serving a previous sentence, could be considered not to
be in active service, thus not amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction under Section 41 of
the Army Act.

Arguments by the Appellant

The appellant contended that Section 130(1) was violated as he was not afforded an
opportunity to challenge the constitution of the Summary Court-Martial.
He argued that respondent No. 4, the commanding officer, who had imposed the earlier
punishment, was biased and dominated the Court-Martial proceedings.
The appellant also argued that the punishment of one-year imprisonment was
disproportionate to the offense of refusing to eat food, suggesting vindictiveness.
Lastly, the appellant claimed that since he was already serving a sentence of imprisonment at
the time of the alleged offense, he could not be considered to be in active service, and his
refusal to eat did not constitute disobedience under Section 41 of the Army Act.

Arguments by the Respondent

The respondents, including respondent No. 4, maintained that the Summary Court-Martial
was conducted according to the procedure laid down in the Army Act and that the refusal to
eat food amounted to disobedience of a lawful command under Section 41(2).
They contended that even though the appellant was serving a previous sentence, he was still
subject to the disciplinary provisions of the Army Act.
The respondents also denied any bias or vindictiveness in the proceedings, stating that the
punishment was within the discretion of the Court-Martial.

Court's Decision
Non-compliance with Section 130(1): The Supreme Court held that non-compliance with
Section 130(1), which mandates affording an opportunity to challenge the constitution of the
Summary Court-Martial, was a fundamental infirmity that vitiated the proceedings. The
failure to comply with this procedural safeguard undermined the jurisdiction of the Court-
Martial.
Bias and Coram Non Judice: The Court found that the participation of respondent No. 4,
who had earlier punished the appellant and was involved in the present Court-Martial,
created a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court ruled that the proceedings were
rendered coram non judice, meaning the Court-Martial was not properly constituted.
Proportionality of Punishment: The Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of
proportionality and held that the one-year imprisonment for refusing to eat food was
strikingly disproportionate to the offense. The Court emphasized that punishment should
not be vindictive or unduly harsh and must align with the offense. The decision-making
process in sentencing was flawed due to irrationality and perversity.
Appellant’s Active Service Status: The Court rejected the argument that the appellant’s
refusal to eat did not amount to disobedience. It held that the appellant, even while serving a
prior sentence, was still subject to the Army Act’s disciplinary provisions.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the writ petition dismissed by the High
Court. It quashed the Summary Court-Martial proceedings, including the sentence of
one-year rigorous imprisonment.
The Court ordered that the appellant be reinstated to service with all monetary and service
benefits.
This judgment reinforced procedural safeguards in military discipline while emphasizing the
importance of fairness, impartiality, and proportionality in Court-Martial proceedings.

Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister of Civil Services

Facts
In the 1980’s, with the United Kingdom under the Conservative government led by Margaret
Thatcher, it was ruled that any and all employees of the Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) were prohibited from joining any trade union. This decision was
justified based on the potential threat to national security, and enforced using an Order of
Council which is an exercise of the Royal Prerogative Power.

Issues
By limiting access, or completely refusing access to trade unions to employees, certain
individuals affected were not able to rely on certain employment legislative provisions or be
represented by a Union.

History of the case

The court case was raised by the Council of Civil Service Unions, bringing the matter to
court via judicial review. At first instance the case was heard at the High Court of Justice,
where it was ruled that the Order was invalid, however this was overturned on Appeal at the
Court of Appeal. There is was held that the consideration of national security was of
paramount importance, and as such considerations and decisions made on this basis were not
to be considered.
The case was now heard on appeal at the House of Lords: the ruling of the house was that
exercising of the Royal Prerogative were capable of being subject to judicial review. This
ruling marked a massive departure from the law previous, however the Lords did hold that on
issues of national security, this right was exempt.

Decision/Outcome
The importance of the case is found in the departure from the unwillingness of the courts to
judicially review prerogative powers. Lord Diplock found that where a person’s ‘private
rights or legitimate expectations’ are effected by the execution of the prerogative power, then
that execution of power should be amenable to review. Lord Fraser and Lord Brightman came
to the same conclusion based on the view that where the prerogative power was delegated
from the monarch, the exercise of that power could be reviewed via judicial review. Lord
Roskill stated:
“If the executive instead of acting under a statutory power acts under a prerogative power and
in particular a prerogative power delegated to the respondent under article 4 of the Order in
Council of 1982, so as to affect the rights of the citizen, I am unable to see, subject to what I
shall say later, that there is any logical reason why the fact that the source of the power is the
prerogative and not statute should today deprive the citizen of that right of challenge to the
manner of its exercise which he would possess were the source of the power statutory.”
Following the GCHQ case, it was found that prerogative powers (bar for national
security reasons) can be judicially reviewed for legality

State of WB v. Anwar Ali Sarkar

Facts of the Case:
The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was enacted for the purpose of speedier trials for
certain offences, with Section 3 of the Act giving the State Government the power to
constitute Special Courts. Under Section 5 of the Act, the State Government could assign
specific cases or classes of cases to these Special Courts. The Act established a procedure
different from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Anwar Ali Sarkar, along with 49 others, was charged with several offences as part of an
armed gang raid on a factory. Their case was referred to a Special Court by a notification
issued by the Governor of West Bengal. The Special Court convicted the accused and
sentenced them to varying terms of imprisonment. The respondents then approached the
Calcutta High Court, contending that the Special Court lacked jurisdiction and that Section 5
of the Act violated Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to
equality. The High Court quashed the convictions, ordering a retrial according to normal legal
procedures.
The State of West Bengal appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised:
• Whether Section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, and the notifications
issued under it are violative of Article 14 (right to equality) of the Indian
Constitution?
• Whether the special trial procedures prescribed under the Act are valid?
• Whether the classification made under the Act for the purpose of speedier trials is
reasonable?

Arguments by the Appellant (State of West Bengal):

The classification of cases that require speedier trials, as specified in Section 5, was justified
for the purpose of expediting justice.
The State Government had the responsibility to ensure the effective administration of justice,
including controlling procedures for criminal matters.
The procedural changes under the Act were minor and necessary for expedient trials; thus,
they could not be termed discriminatory or violative of Article 14.
The appellant also contended that mere discretion given to the State to refer cases to Special
Courts did not make the Act discriminatory or unconstitutional, as such powers were
necessary for efficient governance.

Arguments by the Respondent (Anwar Ali Sarkar):

The Act granted unfettered and arbitrary discretionary power to the State Government
without any guidelines, making it unconstitutional under Article 14.
The Act substantially curtailed the rights of the accused, including the right to apply for bail
in the High Court, which created inequality and discrimination.
There was no reasonable classification or criteria for determining which cases should be
referred to Special Courts, leading to potential arbitrary application of the law.
The respondent pointed out that offences of similar nature could be treated differently under
the Act, highlighting the arbitrariness of the classification.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, violated
Article 14 of the Constitution because it allowed arbitrary discretion to the State to refer "any
case" to the Special Courts without proper guidelines. This unfettered power lacked any
reasonable basis for classification, leading to possible discriminatory treatment of cases.
The Court reasoned that while the need for speedier trials could form the basis of
classification, it should be based on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the
objective of the legislation. The classification under the Act, however, was vague and left to
arbitrary discretion.
The Court noted that the procedures under the Act differed significantly from those under the
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and imposed additional liabilities on the accused, such as
the deprivation of committal proceedings, jury trials, and the right to appeal, thus creating
substantial inequality.
The Court concluded that Section 5 was void and that the entire Act was unconstitutional as
its key provision (Section 5) could not be severed from the rest of the legislation.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court struck down the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, declaring it
unconstitutional for violating the right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
The Court ruled that while speedier trials could be justified, the Act failed to provide a
reasonable basis for classifying which cases should be tried in Special Courts. The Act’s
procedural deviations from the CrPC were also found to disproportionately infringe upon the
rights of the accused. Thus, the unregulated discretion given to the State led to arbitrary
application of law, resulting in the Act's invalidation.

Sampat Kumar v. UoI

Facts:
The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, was enacted under Article 323-A of the
Constitution (added by the 42nd Amendment). The Act sought to establish Administrative
Tribunals for adjudicating disputes related to recruitment and service conditions of public
servants.
Article 323-A(2)(d) allowed Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts under
Articles 226 and 227 for matters falling within the scope of the Administrative Tribunals.
Section 28 of the Act originally excluded even the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Article 32 for service-related matters, but was later amended to restore the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 136.
Section 6 of the Act outlined qualifications for appointing the Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Judicial Members, and Administrative Members of the Tribunal, including bureaucrats with
no judicial experience.
Several petitions, including one by S.P. Sampath Kumar, challenged the constitutionality
of the Act on the grounds that it excluded the jurisdiction of High Courts and allowed non-
judicial officers to hold judicial positions in the Tribunals.
Issues Raised:
1. Constitutionality of the exclusion of High Court jurisdiction in service matters, as
per Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
2. Validity of the appointment process for the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and
Members of the Tribunal, especially allowing bureaucrats to serve in judicial roles.

Arguments by the Petitioners:

Exclusion of High Courts' Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that denying High Court
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 violated the basic structure of the Constitution,
which included judicial review as a fundamental feature.
Composition of the Tribunal: The petitioners contended that the Tribunal’s composition,
particularly the eligibility of bureaucrats without judicial experience to serve as Chairman
and Members, undermined the independence of the judiciary and the quality of justice
dispensed.

Arguments by the Respondents (Union of India):

Parliament's Power under Article 323-A: The government argued that the exclusion of
High Court jurisdiction was constitutionally valid, as Article 323-A explicitly authorized
Parliament to set up Administrative Tribunals and exclude High Court jurisdiction in such
matters.
Adequacy of Tribunal: The government asserted that the Administrative Tribunals were
competent bodies to handle service matters, and bureaucrats could effectively serve as
members of these Tribunals, bringing necessary administrative experience.

Court's Decision:
Exclusion of High Court Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that judicial review is a
basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be abrogated. However, Parliament could create
alternative institutions like the Administrative Tribunals, provided they offer an effective
substitute for the High Courts. The court upheld the exclusion of High Court jurisdiction but
emphasized that the Administrative Tribunals must be equally effective in providing
judicial review.
Qualifications of Tribunal Members: The court found Section 6(1)(c), which allowed the
appointment of bureaucrats as Chairman without judicial experience, unconstitutional. The
Chairman of the Tribunal, being equivalent to a High Court Chief Justice, must have judicial
experience. Therefore, the provision allowing a Secretary to the Government of India to be
appointed as Chairman was struck down.
Appointment Process: The court mandated that appointments to the Tribunal must be made
after consultation with the Chief Justice of India or through a High Powered Selection
Committee headed by a Supreme Court judge for Central Tribunals and a High Court
judge for State Tribunals.
Prospective Operation: The court ordered that the judgment would operate prospectively,
and appointments already made to the Tribunal would not be invalidated.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Administrative Tribunals Act with
certain modifications:
• High Courts’ jurisdiction could be excluded in service matters, but effective
alternatives like Tribunals must ensure judicial review.
• Judicial experience is essential for the Tribunal's Chairman, and bureaucrats
without judicial training cannot hold the position.
• The Tribunal's appointment process must involve the judiciary to ensure
independence from the executive branch.
This judgment reinforced the importance of judicial independence and effective judicial
review, even in specialized tribunals like the Administrative Tribunals.
L. Chandra Kumar v. UoI
Facts:
Several applications for special leave, civil appeals, and writ petitions were filed, challenging
the constitutional validity of certain provisions related to judicial review and the role of
tribunals. These cases arose from different decisions of various High Courts, and the primary
issue revolved around the constitutionality of Articles 323A and 323B of the Indian
Constitution, which established administrative tribunals. The Parliament had enacted the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, under Article 323A, creating the Central Administrative
Tribunal (CAT) to deal with disputes related to public service matters.
The main contention was whether the establishment of tribunals under Articles 323A and
323B could exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and of the
Supreme Court under Article 32.

Issues Raised:
1. Exclusion of Judicial Review: Whether the power vested in the Parliament under
sub-clause (d) of Clause 2 of Article 323A and in state legislatures under sub-clause
(d) of Clause 3 of Article 323B completely excludes the jurisdiction of all courts
except the Supreme Court under Article 136, specifically regarding judicial review
powers of High Courts under Articles 226/227 and of the Supreme Court under
Article 32.
 2. Tribunal’s Authority over Constitutional Validity: Whether tribunals established
under Articles 323A or 323B have the authority to check the constitutional validity of
statutory provisions or rules.
3. Effectiveness of Tribunals as Substitutes for High Courts: Whether tribunals, as
currently constituted, can be considered an effective substitute for the High Courts in
exercising judicial oversight, and if not, what changes are needed to align them with
their intended goals.

Arguments by the Petitioners:

The petitioners argued that the provisions of Articles 323A and 323B, as well as the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, infringe on the power of judicial review granted to High
Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and to the Supreme Court under Article 32.
They claimed that these provisions undermined the constitutional principle of separation of
powers and the independence of the judiciary by excluding the jurisdiction of High Courts
and allowing tribunals to act as substitutes.
It was contended that tribunals lacked the independence and expertise required to serve as a
viable alternative to constitutional courts.

Arguments by the Respondents:

The government argued that the establishment of tribunals was necessary to reduce the
burden on the judiciary and provide quicker justice in specialized matters like service
disputes.
They claimed that tribunals, composed of both judicial and administrative members, could
provide expert and efficient adjudication on matters within their jurisdiction.
They also argued that the exclusion of High Court jurisdiction was constitutionally valid, as
tribunals served as an adequate substitute mechanism for judicial review.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court, in its landmark judgment, held the following:
Judicial Review as Part of the Basic Structure: The Court reaffirmed that judicial review is
an integral and fundamental feature of the Constitution and forms part of its basic structure.
The jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and of the Supreme Court under
Article 32, cannot be excluded or ousted by legislative action, including Articles 323A and
323B.
Tribunals as Supplementary to High Courts: The Court held that tribunals, including the
Central Administrative Tribunal, can function as supplemental institutions to the High Courts,
not as substitutes. The decisions of the tribunals will be subject to judicial review by a
Division Bench of the High Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction the tribunal falls.
Thus, tribunals do not have exclusive jurisdiction, and their decisions are open to scrutiny by
the High Courts.
Tribunal’s Limited Powers on Constitutional Matters: The Court ruled that while
tribunals can adjudicate service and administrative matters, they do not have the authority to
decide questions regarding the constitutional validity of statutes or rules. Such powers remain
vested in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
Changes to Tribunal Structure: The Court also called for reforms to enhance the
independence and functioning of tribunals, recommending a more robust structure to
supervise their operations. The Court suggested that the Law Commission should conduct a
detailed investigation into the functioning of tribunals to ensure their independence and
improve public confidence in their effectiveness.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India concluded that while
administrative tribunals serve an important function in reducing the burden on constitutional
courts, their role is supplementary to that of the High Courts and Supreme Court. Judicial
review under Articles 226/227 and Article 32 remains a fundamental feature of the
Constitution and cannot be ousted. The Court also stressed the need for reforms in the
tribunal system to ensure its effectiveness and independence.
This decision reaffirmed the principle laid down in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
(1973), which emphasized that certain aspects of the Constitution, including judicial review,
are part of its basic structure and cannot be amended or undermined.

Fehmeeda Akhter Vs UT of J& K & Ors. Writ Petition (C) No. 47-A/2020
Not Found.

Prabhat Ranjan Deo Vs Union Public Service Commission & Ors W. P (C) 3334/2019
Facts:
The petitioner qualified for the Civil Services Examination in 1986 and joined the Indian
Police Service (IPS), Haryana Cadre.
On 01.10.2018, a vacancy arose for the post of Director General of Police (DGP), Haryana.
On 25.01.2019, the State of Haryana sent a list of 11 eligible officers to the Union Public
Service Commission (UPSC) for empanelment.
UPSC, on 18.02.2019, empanelled three officers, excluding the petitioner. Subsequently,
Respondent No. 4 was appointed as the DGP, Haryana, on 18.02.2019.
The petitioner challenged both the UPSC empanelment and the appointment of Respondent
No. 4 as DGP in this petition.
Initially, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court with a writ petition (W.P. 247/2019)
under Article 32. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition on 25.03.2019,
directing the petitioner to approach the jurisdictional High Court if advised.

Issues Raised:
1. Whether the Delhi High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, given that the petitioner is a member of the All India Service
and the matter pertains to service disputes?
2. Whether the petition should have been filed before the Central Administrative
Tribunal (CAT), as per the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985?

Arguments:
For UPSC (Respondents):
Raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition under Article 226.
Argued that the IPS, being an All India Service, falls within the jurisdiction of CAT under
Section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
Cited L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) and Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v.
Subhas Sharma (2002) to support their argument that service matters concerning All India
Services are exclusively under CAT's jurisdiction.

For the Petitioner:

Contended that the petition was filed based on the liberty granted by the Supreme Court,
which permitted the petitioner to approach the jurisdictional High Court.
Argued that the principle of an alternate remedy is a rule of prudence and not a strict bar to
the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Cited cases such as Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks (1998),
Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India (2019), and Balkrishna Ram v. Union
of India (2020) to assert that writ petitions can be entertained despite alternative remedies
being available.

Court’s Decision:
The Court held that the petitioner, being a member of the IPS, falls under the purview of
Section 14(1)(b)(i) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which vests jurisdiction with
CAT for service matters.
Referring to the L. Chandra Kumar ruling, the Court noted that CAT is the court of "first
instance" for service-related disputes and that High Courts cannot be directly approached
unless the vires of the parent statute are challenged.
The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Supreme Court had conferred
jurisdiction on the High Court. It clarified that the Supreme Court's liberty to approach the
High Court must be interpreted within the boundaries of the law, which mandates that service
matters should first be brought before CAT.
The Court found that the petition was not maintainable in the High Court and dismissed it,
directing the petitioner to approach CAT for redress.

Conclusion:
The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that service matters related to All India
Services must be first brought before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Court
emphasized that this jurisdictional limitation is based on the authoritative ruling in L.
Chandra Kumar, and it is not discretionary for the High Court to entertain such petitions.
However, the Court clarified that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the petitioner's
claims and left the petitioner free to pursue remedies before CAT.

Roger Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd (November 2019)

Facts:
The case concerns the constitutional validity of Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017, and the
rules framed under Section 184 of the same Act. Part XIV of the Finance Act empowered the
Union Government to make significant changes regarding the administration of Tribunals in
India, particularly the conditions of service, mode of appointment, security of tenure, and
qualifications of the members and presiding officers of various Tribunals. These Tribunals
were originally governed by laws enacted under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the
Constitution.
A five-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court was tasked with reviewing the
constitutionality of these changes, especially whether the Finance Act, 2017 could be
classified as a 'money bill' under Article 110 of the Constitution. Additionally, they examined
whether the government’s power to frame rules related to Tribunals constituted excessive
delegation and whether these rules violated the principles governing the functioning of
Tribunals.

Issues Raised:
1. Money Bill Classification: Whether the Finance Act, 2017, which altered the service
conditions of Tribunal members, could be classified as a 'money bill' under Article
110 of the Constitution and, therefore, be validly enacted.
 2. Excessive Delegation: Whether Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017, which
empowered the Central Government to frame rules regarding the qualifications,
appointment, and service conditions of Tribunal members, constituted excessive
delegation of legislative authority.
3. Constitutionality of the 2017 Rules: Whether the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal, and
other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience, and other Conditions of Service of
Members) Rules, 2017, were consistent with the parent legislation and constitutional
principles governing Tribunals.
4. Single Nodal Agency: Whether a single nodal agency should be created to administer
all Tribunals in India.
5. Judicial Impact Assessment: Whether there is a need to conduct a Judicial Impact
Assessment of the Tribunals in India to assess the effect of the changes introduced by
the Finance Act, 2017.
6. Equating Tribunal Judges with Constitutional Judges: Whether the members of
Tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution should be
equated in rank and status with constitutional functionaries, such as judges of the
High Courts and Supreme Court.
7. Direct Appeals to the Supreme Court: Whether the practice of allowing direct
statutory appeals from Tribunals to the Supreme Court should be reconsidered.
8. Amalgamation of Tribunals: Whether there is a need for amalgamating existing
Tribunals and establishing new benches to manage the workload.
Arguments of the Petitioners:
Unconstitutionality of Part XIV: The petitioners argued that Part XIV of the Finance Act,
2017, was unconstitutional as it was arbitrary, in violation of the basic structure doctrine, and
amounted to a colorable exercise of legislative power. Specifically, they contended that
amendments related to the Tribunals could not be classified as a 'money bill' under Article
110 of the Constitution.
Tribunal Laws Cannot Be Part of Money Bill: They asserted that Tribunals, governed by
Articles 323-A and 323-B, could not be included in a money bill as these are judicial
institutions, not financial entities. The Parliament’s competence to legislate on Tribunals
should be traced to Entry 11-A of List III (Concurrent List), which relates to the
administration of justice.
Excessive Delegation: Section 184(1) of the Finance Act, 2017, which empowered the
government to make rules regarding the qualifications, appointments, and service conditions
of Tribunal members, was argued to be an excessive delegation of legislative power without
sufficient guidelines.
Independence of the Judiciary: The petitioners also contended that the Act and rules
compromised the independence of the judiciary by terminating the services of existing
Tribunal members.
Judicial Impact Assessment: The petitioners urged the court to mandate a Judicial Impact
Assessment to evaluate the ramifications of changes introduced in the Tribunal system by the
Finance Act.

Arguments of the Respondents (Union Government):

Inconsistencies in Tribunal Administration: The government argued that there were
inconsistencies in the service conditions, appointments, and tenure of members across various
Tribunals, necessitating harmonization through a single enactment.
Money Bill Validity: The respondents claimed that the provisions of the Finance Act, 2017,
fell within the scope of a money bill under Article 110 of the Constitution. They argued that
the bill’s primary purpose was financial, and any incidental provisions, such as those
concerning Tribunals, would also qualify as part of a money bill.
Need for Uniform Rules: The respondents argued that introducing individual amendments
for each Tribunal would be impractical and inconsistent. Thus, a comprehensive approach
was adopted through the Finance Act, 2017, to bring uniformity to the administration of
Tribunals.
Judicial Impact Assessment: The government acknowledged the need for a Judicial Impact
Assessment but argued that it should be carried out gradually and not be a mandatory
requirement at this stage.

Court's Decision:
Money Bill Issue Referred to Larger Bench: The court did not make a final determination
on whether Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017, could be classified as a 'money bill.' Instead, it
referred this issue to a larger bench for consideration.
Section 184 Does Not Suffer from Excessive Delegation: The court held that Section 184 of
the Finance Act, 2017, does not suffer from excessive delegation. The Act provides sufficient
guiding principles for the government to frame rules, subject to the binding judicial principles
laid down in previous decisions.
Rules of 2017 Struck Down: The Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal, and other Authorities
(Qualifications, Experience, and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017, were
struck down in their entirety for being inconsistent with the parent legislation and the
Constitution.
Reformulation of Rules: The Central Government was directed to re-formulate the Tribunal
Rules in accordance with the principles laid down in earlier judgments, ensuring non-
discriminatory and uniform service conditions for Tribunal members.
Need for Judicial Impact Assessment: The court issued a writ of mandamus to the Ministry
of Law and Justice, directing them to conduct a Judicial Impact Assessment of all Tribunals
and submit the findings to the competent legislative authority.
Amalgamation of Tribunals and New Benches: The government was directed to review the
possibility of amalgamating existing Tribunals based on the homogeneity of subject matters
and to establish sufficient benches to manage the workload.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's decision highlighted the need for a detailed review of the classification
of the Finance Act, 2017, as a 'money bill' and emphasized that the rules governing Tribunals
must align with constitutional principles and prior court decisions. The ruling directed the
government to reformulate the rules related to the appointment and service conditions of
Tribunal members and to conduct a Judicial Impact Assessment. Additionally, it called for
amalgamation of Tribunals and reconsideration of the system of direct appeals to the
Supreme Court from Tribunals.

Odisha Administrative Tribunal Bar Association v. Union of India (June, 2021)

Background
This appeal concerns the judgment of the Orissa High Court dated June 7, 2021, which
dismissed a batch of writ petitions challenging the abolition of the Odisha Administrative
Tribunal (OAT). The appellants argue that the abolition of the OAT violates constitutional
provisions and adversely affects litigants seeking speedy justice.

Facts
The OAT was established to address service matters, alleviating the burden on regular courts
and providing expedited relief to litigants.
On August 2, 2019, the Government of Odisha issued a notification abolishing the OAT,
which was challenged in writ petitions by the appellants in the Orissa High Court.
The appellants included the OAT Bar Association and the Odisha Retired Police Officers’
Welfare Association, which claimed that their rights were infringed by the abolition.
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions, prompting the current appeal.

Issues Raised
The following issues arise from the parties' submissions:
a. Maintainability of the writ petitions before the Orissa High Court.
b. Mandatory nature of Article 323-A regarding the establishment of State Administrative
Tribunals (SATs).
c. Applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for rescinding the OAT notification.
d. Arbitrary nature of the abolition and its violation of Article 14.
e. Violation of the fundamental right of access to justice.
f. Breach of natural justice principles by not allowing the OAT Bar Association to be heard.
g. Validity of the notification not expressed in the President's name.
h. Jurisdictional enlargement of the Orissa High Court due to transferred cases.
i. Allegation of the State Government taking advantage of its own wrong by failing to fill
OAT vacancies.
j. Impact of failing to conduct a judicial impact assessment before abolition.
k. Question of whether the Union Government became functus officio after establishing the
OAT.

Arguments Presented by the Appellants

The appellants, represented by Mr. Ashok Panigrahi, Dr. Aman Hingorani, and Mr. C
Ravichandran Iyer, made the following arguments:
Constitutional Mandate: Article 323-A mandates the establishment of SATs, and the Union
Government lacks the power to abolish them once established.
General Clauses Act: Section 21 of the General Clauses Act does not provide a basis for
abolishing the OAT since such powers must originate from the legislation establishing it.
Legislative Intent: The Administrative Tribunal (Amendment) Bill 2006 aimed to provide
mechanisms for abolishing SATs but was never enacted, implying that the power to abolish
does not exist.
Access to Justice: The abolition hinders access to justice, as the OAT had multiple benches,
while the High Court operates with fewer resources.
Natural Justice: The failure to consult the OAT Bar Association violates natural justice and
Article 14 of the Constitution.
Constitutional Validity: The abolition notification is invalid as it was not issued in the
President's name, violating Article 77 of the Constitution.
Judicial Impact Assessment: A proper assessment should have been conducted before the
abolition, which was neglected.

Arguments Presented by the Respondents

The respondents, represented by Mr. Balbir Singh (Union of India) and Mr. Ashok Kr Parija
(State of Odisha), countered with the following:
State Authority: The State Government has the prerogative to establish, continue, or abolish
the OAT under the Administrative Tribunals Act.
Applicability of Section 21: They argue that the provisions of the General Clauses Act can
be invoked for the abolition without requiring amendments to the Constitution or existing
laws.
Transfer of Cases: The transfer of cases from the OAT to the High Court does not infringe
upon fundamental rights, as litigants still have recourse to the judiciary.
Policy Decision: The State Government's decision to abolish the OAT was based on policy
considerations, including low case disposal rates, and does not constitute a violation of rights.
Natural Justice: They claim that principles of natural justice were not violated, asserting that
litigants could still pursue their cases in the High Court.
Judicial Efficiency: Abolishing the OAT streamlines the process of adjudication and does not
adversely affect litigants’ rights to access justice.

Court's Decision
The court affirmed the constitutional validity of the notification dated August 2, 2019, which
abolished the Orissa Administrative Tribunal (OAT). Key points of the judgment include:
1. Maintainability of Writ Petitions: The petitions were maintainable as they claimed
violations of constitutional rights, allowing access to the High Court under Article
226.
2. Union Government's Power: The court held that Article 323-A does not prevent the
Union Government from abolishing State Administrative Tribunals (SATs). It clarified
that this article is an enabling provision, granting the government discretion regarding
establishing administrative tribunals.
3. Valid Administrative Action: The Union Government's decision to abolish the OAT
was deemed a valid exercise of its administrative powers, utilizing Section 21 of the
General Clauses Act in conjunction with the Administrative Tribunals Act.
4. Reasonableness and Natural Justice: The court found the abolition decision
reasonable and noted that principles of natural justice were not violated, as the
affected individuals did not have a right to a hearing prior to the policy decision.
5. Functionality and Jurisdiction: The argument that the Union Government was
functus officio post-establishment of the OAT was dismissed; the government retains
the authority to revisit policy decisions.
6. Validity of Notification: The notification was valid even though it was not expressed
in the name of the President, as non-compliance with Article 77 of the Constitution
does not invalidate such notifications.
7. Access to Justice: The court concluded that the abolition of the OAT does not
infringe on the fundamental right of access to justice, as cases previously under the
OAT would continue to be heard by the Orissa High Court.
8. Judicial Impact Assessment: While the Union Government's failure to conduct a
judicial impact assessment was noted, it did not invalidate the decision to abolish the
OAT.
Conclusion
The court upheld the decision to abolish the OAT, emphasizing the Union Government's
discretion in administrative matters and affirming that the abolition did not violate any
constitutional rights. The judgment reinforces the idea that policy decisions, even those
affecting the public, do not require individual hearings, maintaining the government's ability
to manage administrative structures effectively.

Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (II, III and IV)

Facts of the Case
On April 4, 2021, the President of India promulgated the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation
and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 under Article 123 of the Indian Constitution.
This ordinance, issued on the recommendation of the Central Government, was introduced as
a bill during the Budget Session of 2021 but could not be debated. The Ordinance sought to
amend nine statutes, including the Copyright Act, 1957, Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Patents
Act, 1970. It aimed to replace tribunals with High Courts for dispute resolution, citing delays
and concerns about the judicial independence of the tribunals, which were believed to operate
under executive influence.
Additionally, the Ordinance amended the Finance Act, 2017, making the Central Government
responsible for framing rules regarding tribunal appointments, salaries, and tenures. It
introduced a Search-Selection Committee for appointments, headed by the Chief Justice of
India (or a Supreme Court judge nominated by him), and set the maximum age for tribunal
appointments at 50. It also limited members' tenure to four years or until the chairperson
reached 70 years of age and other members reached 67.
The Madras Bar Association challenged Sections 12 and 13 of the Ordinance before the
Supreme Court, arguing they violated Articles 14, 21, 50, and the principle of judicial
independence and separation of powers.

The Law in Question

• Article 14 – Equality before the law.
• Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty.
• Article 50 – Separation of judiciary from the executive.
• Article 123 – President's power to promulgate ordinances.
• Article 323A & 323B – Related to the creation of tribunals by the Parliament.

Arguments by the Petitioner

Senior Advocate Arvind Datar, representing the Madras Bar Association, argued that the
Ordinance violated the principle of separation of powers, a part of the Constitution's basic
structure. The provisions, especially those setting a four-year term and a maximum age limit
of 50 for tribunal members, were contrary to previous Supreme Court rulings. The Bar
Association also called for the creation of a National Tribunals Commission to oversee
tribunal appointments and functioning.

Arguments by the Respondent

The respondents, represented by the Attorney General and Additional Solicitor General,
defended the Ordinance, stating that the regulation of service conditions for tribunal members
was a policy decision within Parliament’s power. They argued that the Parliament had the
authority to override judicial pronouncements through legislation, and the court could not
issue binding directions to the legislature. The age limit of 50 was defended as a means to
maintain equality across tribunal tenures.

Findings of the Court

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (Justices L Nageswara Rao, S Ravindra Bhat, and
Hemant Gupta) ruled by a 2:1 majority that the provisions fixing tribunal members’ terms at
four years were unconstitutional, as they contradicted previous Supreme Court rulings that set
tribunal members' terms at five years. Justice Hemant Gupta dissented, arguing that laws
should not be struck down merely because they do not align with judicial precedents.
The court also directed that appointments to tribunals must be made within three months of
receiving the Search-Selection Committee's recommendation. Instead of suggesting two
names for each position, only one name was to be recommended for every post.

Precedents Relied Upon

1. Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd. – A five-judge Constitution Bench upheld
the constitutional validity of Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017, emphasizing that
tribunal appointments impact judicial independence.
2. Madras Bar Association v Union of India – The court had earlier directed the
formation of a National Tribunal Commission to oversee tribunal appointments and
service conditions and fixed the term of tribunal members at five years.

Conclusion
The case highlighted the conflict between the judiciary and legislature over tribunal reforms.
The separation of powers, essential to the functioning of India's three branches of
government, was central to this dispute. The judiciary questioned legislative attempts to
override its rulings, emphasizing the need for a National Tribunals Commission to regulate
tribunal appointments and functioning.
Though the Supreme Court struck down parts of the Ordinance, Parliament later passed the
Tribunal Reforms Bill, 2021, which included many of the provisions invalidated by the court,
leading to further debate on the concept of "legislative overruling."

Jairam Ramesh v. Union of India 2021

Facts
This writ petition was filed by P. Chidambaram, a Member of Rajya Sabha, seeking to declare
several sections of the Finance Acts of 2015, 2016, and 2018 as ultra vires the Constitution of
India. The petitioner contended that amendments to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 (PML Act), enacted via these Finance Acts as "Money Bills," were unconstitutional.
The petitioner noted that before 2015, amendments to the PML Act had been made through
ordinary bills. However, starting in 2015, subsequent amendments were introduced as Money
Bills, which he argued was improper under Article 110 of the Constitution, which defines the
scope of a Money Bill.
Issues Raised
1. Justiciability of Money Bill Classification: Whether the classification of certain
amendments as Money Bills is justiciable under the Constitution.
2. Locus Standi: Whether the petitioner, not being directly affected by the amendments,
had the standing to challenge them.
3. Delay and Laches: Whether the delay in filing the petition constituted a bar to the
challenge of the amendments.

Arguments by the Petitioner

Unconstitutionality of Amendments: Mr. Chidambaram argued that the amendments to the
PML Act were unconstitutional as they were passed as Money Bills, violating the provisions
of Article 110(1) concerning what constitutes a Money Bill.
Justiciability: He cited the Supreme Court's judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v.
Union of India, asserting that the Speaker's decision on whether a bill is a Money Bill is
justiciable.
Awareness of Amendments: The petitioner claimed he was unaware of the amendments
being passed as Money Bills until informed through an RTI request, which he argued justified
the timing of the challenge.
Discretionary Jurisdiction: He urged the court to exercise its discretionary powers in favor
of the petitioner due to the amendments’ alleged unconstitutionality.

Arguments by the Respondent

Lack of Standing: Ms. Maninder Acharya, representing the Union of India, argued that the
petitioner had no locus standi as he was not directly affected by the amendments.
Delay in Filing: She contended that the challenge was barred by delay, as the amendments
were enacted in 2015, 2016, and 2018, and the petition was filed only in 2019.
Precedent of Kusum Ingots Case: The respondent relied on the Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.
v. Union of India case, emphasizing that a writ petition questioning legislative
constitutionality should arise from a specific cause of action, which the petitioner lacked.

Court's Decision
The court dismissed the writ petition, concluding that:
• The petitioner failed to provide a sufficient justification for the delay in challenging the
amendments, especially for those made in 2015 and 2016.
• The claim of unawareness about the amendments being passed as Money Bills did not
constitute a valid reason to overcome the issue of delay.
• The petitioner was found not to have the requisite locus standi to challenge the
amendments, as he had not demonstrated being directly aggrieved by them.
• The court referenced the Kusum Ingots judgment, reiterating that a constitutional question
would not be determined in a vacuum and that the petitioner lacked a cause of action
since he was not personally affected by the amendments.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition, reiterating the principles of standing and
timeliness in challenging legislative actions. The ruling underscored that a mere
parliamentary enactment does not give rise to a cause of action unless it directly impacts the
petitioner, thereby upholding the validity of the amendments to the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act as enacted via the Finance Acts.

Om Kumar v. Union of India 2000

Facts
Skipper Construction obtained possession of flats from the Delhi Development Authority
(DDA) but only partially paid the required consideration. The company had collected
significant sums from prospective buyers, leading to challenges regarding the legitimacy of
these transactions. Consequently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against five officers
involved, with specific cases referred to the Department of Personnel due to differing
opinions between the competent authority and the advice of the Union Public Service
Commission (UPSC).
The final order imposed varying penalties on the officers, leading counsel for two officers,
Sri Om Kumar and Sri Virendra Nath, to question the disparity in punishment.

Issues Raised
1. Applicability of the Doctrine of Proportionality: Whether the doctrine applies with
respect to Article 14 of the Constitution of India, particularly in differentiating
between discriminatory and arbitrary actions.
2. Judicial Review Scope: The examination of the court's role in reviewing
administrative actions—whether it should be primary or secondary in nature.
3. Different Standards of Review: The appropriateness of applying the Wednesbury
principle for arbitrary actions versus the proportionality principle for discriminatory
actions under the same Article.

Arguments by the Petitioner

Proportionality and Discrimination: The petitioners argued that the differing penalties
imposed on the officers were disproportionate and discriminatory, challenging the application
of the Wednesbury principle.
Judicial Review: They contended that the court should apply a stricter standard of review
(proportionality) rather than the more lenient Wednesbury unreasonableness when assessing
administrative actions that affect fundamental rights.
Arbitrary Actions: The petitioners argued that arbitrary actions could also be discriminatory
and should not be subjected to a lesser standard of review.

Arguments by the Respondent

Wednesbury Principle Justification: The respondent maintained that the Wednesbury
principle is appropriate for reviewing arbitrary administrative actions, asserting that the court
should limit its intervention to instances where actions are irrational or unreasonable.
Disciplinary Actions: They argued that the imposition of penalties was within the discretion
of the administrative authority and that judicial review should respect this discretion unless it
was blatantly unreasonable.

Court's Decision
The court refused to interfere with the imposed punishments, emphasizing that:
• Judicial review of administrative actions is inherently limited, and the Wednesbury
principle was applicable.
 • The doctrine of proportionality, while acknowledged, was primarily relevant to cases
alleging discrimination rather than arbitrary treatment.
• The court established a distinction between two dimensions of Article 14: one
concerning discriminatory treatment and the other concerning arbitrary actions, with
differing standards of scrutiny applied.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Om Kumar v. Union of India affirmed the applicability of the
Wednesbury principle for cases of unreasonableness and restricted the application of the
doctrine of proportionality to instances of discrimination under Article 14. This decision
sparked a critical analysis regarding the use of different standards for reviewing
administrative actions stemming from the same constitutional provision. The court's approach
raises questions about the treatment of arbitrary versus discriminatory actions and the overall
effectiveness of judicial review in administrative matters.
While the judgment recognized the doctrine of proportionality as an important aspect of
administrative law in India, its application remained cautious and limited. Critics argue that
this may inhibit a more robust judicial review process and potentially perpetuate capricious
administrative decisions, calling for an active and adaptable application of the doctrine of
proportionality to enhance judicial oversight and public confidence in administrative justice.

MODULE 6

P&O Navigation v. Secretary of State 1868

Summary:
The point as to how far the State was liable in tort first directly arose in this case. This was
the first case in which the Sovereign immunity of the state was debated. The facts of the case
were that a servant of the plaintiff’s company was proceeding on a highway in Calcutta,
driving a carriage which was drawn by a pair of horses belonging to the plaintiff. There was a
piece of a funnel made up of iron which was being carried by some workers on a
government’s steamer, which in its way hit plaintiff’s horse-driven carriage. Plaintiff sued the
Govt. (the Secretary of State for India) for damages due to negligence on the part of the
servants employed by the govt. Sir Barnes Peacock C. J. (of the Supreme Court) observed
that the doctrine that the “King can done wrong”, had not application to the East India
Company. The company would have been liable in such cases and the Secretary of State was
thereafter also liable. The Court also drew the distinction between sovereign and non-
sovereign functions, i.e. if a tort were committed by a public servant in the discharge of
sovereign functions, no action would lie against the Government – e.g. if the tort was
committed while carrying on hostilities or seizing enemy property as prize. The liability
could arise only in case of “non-sovereign functions” i.e. acts done in the conduct of
undertakings which might be carried on by private person-individuals without having such
power.

The aforesaid judgment laid down that the East India Company had a two fold character:

(a) As a sovereign power and

(b) As a trading company.

The liability of the company could only extend to in respect of its commercial dealings and
not to the acts done by it in exercise of delegated sovereign power. As the damage was done
to the plaintiff in the exercise of non-sovereign function, i.e. the maintenance of Dockyard
which could be done by any private party without any delegation of sovereign power and
hence the government cannot escape liability and was held liable for the torts committed by
its employees.

State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati

Facts
Incident Overview: Lokumal, a temporary motor driver employed by the State of Rajasthan,
was driving a government jeep assigned to the Collector of Udaipur on February 11, 1952.
While returning from a workshop after repairs, he negligently struck Jagdishlal, who was
walking on the footpath. Jagdishlal suffered severe injuries, including fractures to his skull
and backbone, and died three days later in the hospital.
Plaintiffs: The plaintiffs, representing Jagdishlal's widow and their three-year-old daughter,
filed a suit for damages against Lokumal (Defendant No. 1) and the State of Rajasthan
(Defendant No. 2), seeking compensation of Rs. 25,000.
Defendant's Response: Lokumal did not contest the suit and remained ex-parte, while the
State of Rajasthan contested the claim.

Legal Proceedings and Decisions

Trial Court Decision
• The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs against Lokumal, attributing the
accident and subsequent death of Jagdishlal to his rash and negligent driving.
However, the court dismissed the suit against the State of Rajasthan, reasoning that
the jeep was maintained for the Collector's official duties, thereby excluding the state
from vicarious liability.

High Court Decision

 • The plaintiffs appealed to the Rajasthan High Court, which reversed the Trial Court's
decision regarding the State of Rajasthan, holding it liable for compensation of Rs.
15,000. The High Court maintained that the state is accountable for the actions of its
civil service drivers, differentiating between vehicles used for civil services and those
used for military or public service.

Issues Raised
1. Is the State of Rajasthan vicariously liable for the tortious act committed by its
servant?
2. Can driving the jeep from the workshop back to the Collector’s office be considered
an exercise of a sovereign function?

Arguments Given by Both Parties

Defendant-Appellants (State of Rajasthan)
The State argued that its liability should be assessed under Article 300(1) of the Constitution
of India, asserting that it could not be held liable because, prior to the Constitution, the
corresponding Indian State would not have been liable. They contended that the jeep was
maintained for sovereign functions and not commercial activities, exempting the state from
liability.
Plaintiff-Respondents
The plaintiffs countered that Article 300 merely governs the form of suits against the state
and does not limit the extent of liability. They emphasized that the state's liability should be
assessed based on the nature of the act, irrespective of the capacity in which the state
functions.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, affirming that the State of Rajasthan is
vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, just like any other employer regarding the
provision and maintenance of vehicles and drivers for civil services.

Key Principles Established

1. Scope of Employment: The state is liable for torts committed by its servants within the
scope of their employment.
2. Common Law Immunity: The principle that "the king can do no wrong" does not apply
in India. Since the East India Company’s time, the Sovereign has been liable to be sued in
tort and contract.
3. Republican Government: In a republican form of government, the state is expected to
engage in various activities requiring the employment of servants, justifying vicarious
liability for their tortious acts.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati emphasizes the
accountability of the state for the actions of its employees, rejecting claims of sovereign
immunity. The judgment aligns with the Indian Constitution's objectives of promoting justice
and equity, establishing a precedent that upholds the principle of state liability in tort cases.

Kasturilal v. State of UP
Facts
Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain, a businessman, was arrested on September 20, 1947, while
traveling in Meerut to sell bullion. The police seized his valuables, including 103 tolas of
gold and 2 maunds and 6.5 seers of silver, and took him to the police station without clear
justification. After being released on bail, Kasturilal received only his silver back and made
several demands for the return of his gold, which went unheeded. Consequently, he filed a
lawsuit seeking the recovery of his gold or compensation amounting to Rs. 11,075, including
interest.
The State, as the respondent, contended that the gold was under the custody of Head
Constable Mohammad Amir, who had fled to Pakistan with the valuables. The State asserted
that they had initiated legal action against Amir and claimed that even if police negligence
were established, the State could not be held liable for the actions of its officers.

Issues Raised
1. Negligence of Police Officers: Were the police officers negligent in taking care of
Kasturilal's gold while it was in their custody?
2. State Liability: Is the State liable to pay monetary compensation to Kasturilal for the
negligence of its officers?

Appellant's Arguments
Negligence: The appellant argued that the High Court erred in its decision regarding both
issues and emphasized that the officers’ negligence was clear since the gold was not returned
despite repeated requests.
Vicarious Liability: Kasturilal's attorney cited the precedent from State of Rajasthan v. Mst.
Vidhyawati (1962), which established that the State is liable for tortious acts committed by its
employees in the course of their duties. The argument was made that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity should not protect the State in this case.
Respondent's Arguments
Justification for Arrest: The State asserted that the police officers had acted under the
impression that Kasturilal possessed stolen goods and that they had adhered to proper
procedures in transferring the items to the Head Constable.
Absconding Officer: The State argued that since Amir had fled with the valuables, they had
no way of recovering the gold, and despite efforts to locate him, they were unsuccessful.
Thus, they contended that any negligence on the part of the police did not equate to State
liability.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court, after analyzing the arguments and evidence, ruled that:
• The police officers were indeed negligent in the custody of Kasturilal's gold, as they
failed to adhere to proper procedures and did not keep a record of the seized items.
• However, applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity and relying on the precedent
set in Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v. Secretary of State for
India (1861), the Court held that the State could not be held liable for the actions of its
employees while performing their duties.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court concluded that while there was clear negligence on the part of the police
officers regarding the custody of Kasturilal's gold, the State was not liable to pay
compensation due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This case highlights the
complexities surrounding State liability and the limitations imposed by the sovereign
immunity doctrine in the context of tort law in India.

Mohd. Moideen Sait v. Madras Corporation (burial ground)

Not Found.

Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill (Small pox hospital)

In Metropolitan Asylum District v. Hill the appellants- a local Municipal Corporation had
authority to set up a smallpox hospital. The construction of the hospital started in a residential
area which created the danger of disease to the residents of the area. It was held that to
establish a smallpox hospital in a residential area was a nuisance and the appellants were
prevented from constructing the hospital by issuing an injunction. In such cases, the statutory
authority is conditional. The appellants could construct the hospital provided that could be
done without creating a nuisance. It does not mean that a person should be prevented to do an
act on the ground of the possibility of a nuisance. Whether there had been a nuisance or not
will be determined on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case.
State of UP v. Tulsi Ram (Issuing of warrant for wrong person)
Facts
The plaintiffs-respondents, Tulsi Ram and Sri Prakash, were initially prosecuted in 1955 for
serious offences under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Tulsi Ram was acquitted, while Sri Prakash and three others were convicted and sentenced to
three years of rigorous imprisonment and fined.
Sri Prakash was later acquitted on appeal, while the convictions of the others were affirmed.
A Judicial Officer, Sri Nem Chand Jain, was responsible for executing warrants of arrest
based on a court order.
Due to negligence, the Ahalmad (a court official) issued arrest warrants for five individuals,
including the acquitted plaintiffs.
On March 6, 1958, the plaintiffs were wrongfully arrested, causing them humiliation and
mental suffering, leading them to seek damages of Rs. 2000.

Issues Raised
• Whether the Judicial Officer is protected under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act of
1850.
• Whether the State of U.P. can be held vicariously liable for the wrongful actions of the
Judicial Officer and the Ahalmad.
• Whether the plaintiffs could claim damages for wrongful arrest and detention.

Arguments for the State of U.P.:

The Judicial Officer was executing a lawful order under Section 425 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), thus claiming immunity from liability.
Cited previous cases (Mohd. Murad v. Govt. of U.P. and Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram v. State of
U.P.) to support the argument that a government servant acting in accordance with law cannot
make the State liable.

Arguments for the Plaintiffs-Respondents:

The Judicial Officer was not acting in a judicial capacity but performing a ministerial
function, thus he was not entitled to protection under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act.
The negligence of the Judicial Officer led to wrongful arrest; therefore, he should be held
liable.
Cited State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati to argue that the State can be held liable for
wrongful acts of its servants, especially when they are non-sovereign functions.
Court's Decision
The lower appellate court ruled that while the Judicial Officer was protected under the
Judicial Officers' Protection Act, the State of U.P. was vicariously liable for the negligence of
the Ahalmad, awarding Rs. 500 in damages to the plaintiffs.
The appellate court found that the Judicial Officer had failed to apply his mind and
negligently signed arrest warrants for the acquitted plaintiffs.

Conclusion
The court allowed the appeal to the extent that it set aside the decree against the State of U.P.
but passed a decree for Rs. 500 in favor of the plaintiffs against the Judicial Officer, Sri Nem
Chand Jain.
The Judicial Officer was deemed liable due to his negligence in issuing arrest warrants,
despite being unrepresented in the proceedings.
The court directed that costs of the plaintiffs in the lower courts be paid by the Judicial
Officer.

Saheli v. Police Commissioner

Facts
The writ petitions were filed by SAHELI, a Women’s Resources Centre, on behalf of
Kamlesh Kumari and Maya Devi, who were tenants in a house in Anand Parbat, New Delhi.
Kamlesh Kumari and her husband Inder Singh moved into the house in 1974. They had three
children, and Maya Devi lived nearby with her husband and children. Both women’s
husbands were truck drivers and frequently absent.
A dispute arose over the ownership of the property, leading to allegations of illegal eviction
attempts by the new landlords (Puran Chand and his sons) after the original landlord, Tajinder
Singh, vacated the premises.
Kamlesh Kumari obtained a stay order against eviction, but the landlords cut off water and
electricity in October 1987.
On November 2, 1987, S.H.O. Lal Singh allegedly pressured Kamlesh to vacate her room.
Subsequent threats and violence followed, including the involvement of local police.
On November 13, 1987, police allegedly abducted Kamlesh’s children and assaulted her,
leading to her son Naresh sustaining injuries. Despite medical attention, Naresh died on
November 26, 1987.
Kamlesh Kumari and others protested and demanded a judicial inquiry into her son’s death.
The police were implicated in the incident, and the investigation was perceived as lacking
impartiality.
Issues Raised
1. Liability of the State: Whether the Delhi Administration is liable for the actions of its
police officers that led to the assault and eventual death of Naresh.
2. Compensation for Damages: The appropriate compensation for Kamlesh Kumari for
the death of her son resulting from police brutality.

Arguments
Petitioners (Kamlesh Kumari and Maya Devi)
The police, particularly S.H.O. Lal Singh, colluded with the landlords to evict them and
subjected them to physical violence and intimidation.
Kamlesh Kumari’s son Naresh died due to the injuries inflicted by police and landlords, and
there was a conspiracy involving local police to cover up the violence.
The State is responsible for the actions of its employees in the course of their duties, and thus,
the Delhi Administration should be held liable for the damages caused by police actions.

Respondents (Delhi Administration and Police Officers)

The police’s actions were not unlawful and were in response to complaints made regarding
the tenants’ possession of the property.
The report submitted indicated that the injuries to Naresh were not caused by the police
directly but were due to pre-existing conditions exacerbated by the circumstances after the
assault.
They argued that any criminal prosecution against the involved police officers should be
handled independently, and thus, the State should not be held liable.

Court's Decision
The Court found that the evidence indicated a clear violation of rights and that the actions of
the police and landlords resulted in the assault and death of Naresh.
The Court held that the Delhi Administration is liable for the tortious acts of its employees,
specifically stating that Kamlesh Kumari was entitled to compensation for the death of her
son.
The Court directed the Delhi Administration to pay Kamlesh Kumari a compensation of
₹75,000 within four weeks.

Conclusion
The case underscored the principle that the State is liable for the tortious acts of its employees
when acting in their official capacity. The judgment affirmed the need for accountability of
law enforcement agencies in cases involving violence and infringement of rights, particularly
towards vulnerable groups. The awarded compensation serves as a recognition of the
damages suffered by Kamlesh Kumari due to the wrongful actions of police officers,
reinforcing the legal doctrine of state liability in tort.

Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar

Facts:
Rudul Sah, the petitioner, was acquitted by the Court of Sessions, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, on
June 3, 1968.
Despite his acquittal, he was unlawfully detained and released from jail only on October 16,
1982, more than 14 years after his acquittal.
Rudul Sah filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court seeking his release, reimbursement
of expenses for medical treatment, rehabilitation, and compensation for his illegal
incarceration.
The State of Bihar, after several delays, did not provide any clear explanation for the
petitioner’s continued imprisonment or his alleged insanity, which was used as a justification
for his prolonged detention.

Issues Raised:
1. Was Rudul Sah’s continued detention after his acquittal lawful?
2. Is the petitioner entitled to compensation for his illegal imprisonment and violation of
his fundamental rights?
3. Can the Supreme Court order monetary compensation under its writ jurisdiction for
the violation of fundamental rights?

Petitioner's Arguments:
The petitioner claimed that his detention was illegal as he was acquitted 14 years prior to his
release.
He argued that the State’s claims of his insanity were an afterthought and that no medical
records were produced to substantiate the claim.
He sought compensation for the violation of his fundamental rights under Article 21 (Right to
Life and Liberty) of the Constitution.

State of Bihar's Response:

The State acknowledged that the petitioner had been released but claimed that he had been
kept in prison due to his alleged insanity.
The State cited an affidavit by the Jailor of Muzaffarpur Central Jail, which mentioned that
Rudul Sah was acquitted but kept in detention until further orders from the State Government
due to his mental condition.
The Civil Surgeon declared Sah normal in 1977, but the State still delayed his release until
1982.
The State failed to provide substantial evidence to prove Sah’s insanity or why his release
was delayed for over 5 years after he was deemed normal.

Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that Rudul Sah's continued detention after his acquittal was wholly
illegal and unjustified.
The Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the State of Bihar's lack of responsibility and
failure to provide a clear explanation for the petitioner’s prolonged imprisonment.
The Court held that Sah's alleged insanity was either an afterthought or a result of his
unlawful detention.
The Court recognized that Article 32 allows it to pass orders for compensation for violations
of fundamental rights, stating that compensation for the violation of Article 21 (Right to Life
and Liberty) is a necessary remedy.
The Court ordered the State of Bihar to pay Rudul Sah an interim compensation of ₹30,000 in
addition to ₹5,000 already paid.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court emphasized that illegal detention is a grave violation of personal liberty,
and compensation is a necessary remedy for the infringement of fundamental rights. The
Court further noted that the petitioner could pursue further damages through a civil suit. The
judgment serves as a strong message about the responsibility of the State to protect the
fundamental rights of its citizens, urging for greater oversight in prison administration to
avoid such unlawful detentions.

E R Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1973

Facts of the Case:
E.P. Royappa, a senior officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in the Tamil Nadu
cadre, was appointed as the Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu on 13th
November, 1969. However, his career trajectory took a turn when various orders and
notifications downgraded his position or transferred him to other posts, such as Deputy
Chairman of the State Planning Commission and Officer on Special Duty. Royappa objected
to these transfers and argued that they were done with mala fide intentions and in violation of
his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution. After refusing to
accept his new appointments and being placed on leave, he filed a writ petition under Article
32, challenging these orders as unconstitutional.

Issues Raised:
• Whether Royappa’s appointment to the post of Officer on Special Duty, which was
not a legally established post, violated the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre)
Rules, 1954.
• Whether the appointment of the petitioner to a non-cadre post required a declaration
of equivalence under Rule 9(1) of the IAS (Pay) Rules, 1954.
• Whether the petitioner’s transfer and appointments violated Articles 14 and 16,
constituting discrimination and arbitrariness.
• Whether the creation of the post and the petitioner's transfer to it were done with mala
fide intentions.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

The petitioner, E.P. Royappa, contended:
His transfer to inferior posts, such as Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission
and Officer on Special Duty, violated the IAS (Cadre) Rules, 1954, and Rule 9(1) of the IAS
(Pay) Rules, 1954.
His demotion from the position of Chief Secretary to these lower-ranking posts was arbitrary
and discriminatory, violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The transfer was done with mala fide intentions by the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, who
was displeased with him due to personal reasons.

Arguments of the Respondent:

The State of Tamil Nadu and the Chief Minister argued:
The petitioner had only been appointed as Chief Secretary in an officiating capacity, and his
transfer to the new posts was based on administrative exigencies.
The petitioner’s appointments to new positions were equivalent in status and rank to that of
the Chief Secretary, and there was no violation of his rights under the IAS (Pay) and Cadre
Rules.
There was no evidence to support the allegation of mala fide intent on the part of the Chief
Minister.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court of India, while delivering its judgment, made significant observations
about the principles of equality and the scope of Article 14:
• Rule 4(2) of the IAS (Cadre) Rules, 1954: The Court held that the appointment of the
petitioner to the post of Officer on Special Duty was not illegal under Rule 4(2), as the
State Government had the power to create temporary posts. However, these posts should
have duties and responsibilities equivalent to cadre posts. In this case, the post of Officer
on Special Duty was not comparable to the position of Chief Secretary.
• Rule 9(1) of the IAS (Pay) Rules, 1954: The Court found that the Government had failed
to make a proper assessment of the equivalence between the post of Chief Secretary and
the newly created posts, violating Rule 9(1). However, since the petitioner had accepted
the post of Deputy Chairman, he could not later challenge it.
• Articles 14 and 16: The Court expanded the interpretation of Article 14 by introducing
the doctrine of non-arbitrariness. It held that any arbitrary state action would violate
Article 14, as the right to equality inherently opposes arbitrariness. In this case, however,
the Court did not find enough evidence to support the claim that the petitioner’s transfer
was discriminatory or arbitrary under Articles 14 and 16.
• Mala Fide Intent: The Court dismissed the petitioner’s allegation of mala fide intention,
as the burden of proof for such a claim was not met by the petitioner. The Court
emphasized that serious accusations against public officials require concrete evidence,
which was lacking in this case.

Conclusion:
In the E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another (1973) case, the Supreme Court’s
landmark judgment established the principle that arbitrary state action violates the right to
equality under Article 14. Although the Court dismissed Royappa’s claims due to a lack of
sufficient evidence, it expanded the interpretation of equality by including executive
discretion under the ambit of Article 14, thus strengthening the doctrine of non-
arbitrariness. This case stands as a cornerstone in Indian constitutional law, highlighting the
judiciary's role in preventing arbitrary state actions and ensuring that public employment
decisions remain fair and equitable.

MODULE 7

PUCL v. UoI, 2003

Facts
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), a voluntary organization, filed a public interest
petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.
This section allowed the Central or State Governments to intercept messages during public
emergencies or in the interest of public safety. The petition raised concerns about this
provision being used to violate individuals' right to privacy, particularly in light of the Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) report on the “Tapping of Politicians’ Phones.”
The petitioner argued that the government could misuse this section, leading to arbitrary
phone tapping without sufficient safeguards to protect individuals' privacy. PUCL's argument
was grounded in the belief that such practices would violate fundamental rights under
Articles 19(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Issues Raised
• Whether Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, violates the right to privacy.
• Whether there is a need to modify Section 5(2) to include specific safeguards against
arbitrary and excessive phone tapping.

Petitioner's Arguments:
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined in Articles 19(1) and 21 of the Indian
Constitution.
Section 5(2) should be modified to prevent its misuse for purposes beyond national security,
and prior judicial approval should be made mandatory for phone tapping to protect privacy
rights.
The absence of clear procedures could lead to the arbitrary exercise of power, thus violating
constitutional rights.

Respondent's Arguments:
Striking down Section 5(2) would be detrimental to national security and public safety.
The provision has sufficient safeguards, as phone tapping is only authorised by specific
officers appointed by the government.
The necessity of secrecy in phone tapping precludes notifying the person being tapped, as it
could compromise national security or criminal investigations.
Records of all tapping activities were kept, and affected individuals could seek redress for
misuse.

Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court in PUCL vs Union of India emphasized the balance between individual
privacy and the necessity of phone tapping for national security. The court examined the
constitutional principles related to privacy, noting that while the Constitution did not
explicitly mention the right to privacy, it was implicit in Article 21 (right to life and personal
liberty). The court reaffirmed that telephone tapping infringes on this right unless it is done
according to legal procedures.
The court held that telephone tapping, without sufficient safeguards, violates the right to
privacy and freedom of speech and expression under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the
Constitution. However, the court stopped short of declaring Section 5(2) unconstitutional,
given its importance in ensuring national security.
Instead of striking down the section, the court issued guidelines to regulate phone tapping
and prevent arbitrary action:
• Interception orders can only be issued by the Home Secretary of the Central
Government or the State Government. Delegation of this power is allowed only in
urgent situations.
• The issuing authority must assess whether the interception is necessary to gather
essential information.
• The interception order will cease after two months unless renewed, and the total
period of interception cannot exceed six months.
• A record must be kept of all intercepted communications, and these should be
destroyed once no longer needed.
• Review committees at the Central and State levels must oversee the compliance with
these orders.

Conclusion
In PUCL vs Union of India, the Supreme Court recognised the fundamental right to privacy,
particularly concerning telephone conversations. The court refrained from striking down
Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act but stressed the need for procedural safeguards to
prevent misuse. The guidelines issued by the court were aimed at balancing the necessity of
phone tapping for national security with protecting citizens’ right to privacy. This case
significantly contributed to the development of privacy jurisprudence in India and reinforced
the concept that government actions must be reasonable and justifiable to withstand scrutiny
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

UoI v. ADR 2002

Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of India upheld a High Court order mandating the Election Commission
to obtain and disclose to the public background information relating to candidates running for
office, including information on their assets, criminal records, and educational background.
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to know about public officials is derived from the
constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Facts
The Association for Democratic Reforms filed a petition with the High Court of Delhi to
compel implementation of certain recommendations regarding how to make the electoral
process in India more fair, transparent and equitable. As requested by the Government of
India, these recommendations had been produced by the Law Commission and provided that
the Election Commission should require all candidates to disclose personal background
information to the public, including criminal history, educational qualifications, personal
financial details and other information necessary for judging a candidate’s capacity and
capability.
Ruling that a candidate’s background should not be kept in the dark as it is not in the interest
of democracy, the High Court of Delhi ordered the Election Commission to obtain such
information for the benefit of the voters. The Union of India challenged the decision through
an appeal to the Supreme Court of India, arguing that the Election Commission and the High
Court did not have such powers and that voters did not have a right to such information.

Decision Overview
The Court issued two main rulings: (1) When the legislature is silent on a particular subject
and an entity (in this case, the Election Commission) has been granted implementation
authority with respect to such subject, the Court assumes that the entity has the power to issue
directions or orders to fill such a void until a suitable law on the subject is enacted; and (2)
Citizens have a right to know about public functionaries, which is derived from the concept
of freedom of speech and expression and which includes the right to know about the
backgrounds of candidates for public office.
With regard to the first ruling, the Court confirmed that Article 324 “operates in areas
unoccupied by legislation” and that “[t]he silence of a statute has no exclusionary effect
except where it flows from necessary implication”. [p. 10-11] In other words, the Court’s
power to issue directions pursuant to Article 324 is plenary. [p. 19] By extension, the Election
Commission, as ordered by the Court, can issue suitable directions to maintain the purity and
transparency of the “entire process of election”.
With regard to the second ruling, the Court characterized the right to know as a right derived
from the right to freedom of speech and expression. The public has a right to know about
candidates contesting elections because such rights include the right to hold opinions and
acquire information so as to be sufficiently informed in forming and disseminating those
opinions throughout the election process. The Court advanced this point by observing that a
successful democracy strives toward an “aware citizenry” and misinformation or non-
information of any kind will create an “uniformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce”.
With the above decided, the Court directed the Election Commission to issue the necessary
orders to obtain from each candidate for election to Parliament or a State Legislature
information on the following aspects of their background: any criminal charges and
convictions in the candidate’s past, any pending cases in which the candidate is an accused,
all assets of a candidate including those of his or her spouse, all liabilities of a candidate, and
all educational qualifications of a candidate.
The decision establishes a binding or persuasive precedent within its jurisdiction.
In December 2002, in response to the judgment, Parliament amended Representation of the
People Act. The Amended Act required a candidate for office to provide information “as to
whether he is accused [or convicted] of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two
years or more in a pending case” (Section 33A). No candidate could be compelled to disclose
any additional information, including educational qualifications and assets and liabilities,
“notwithstanding anything contained in the judgment of any court or directions issued by the
Election Commission” (Section 33B). The Supreme Court examined the constitutional
validity of Section 33 in the case Union for Civil Liberties and Another (PUCL) v. Union of
India and Another.

R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay

Facts:
The appellant, R.S. Nayak, filed a complaint against the respondent, A.R. Antulay, the Chief
Minister of Maharashtra, under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and
section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, alleging abuse of office. Initially, the
complaint was dismissed due to the absence of necessary sanction from the Governor of
Maharashtra under section 6 of the 1947 Act. After the Governor issued the required sanction,
Nayak filed a fresh complaint. However, by the time of this filing, Antulay had resigned from
his position as Chief Minister.
Antulay argued that the Special Judge lacked jurisdiction to try him under section 7 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, and contended that a private complaint could not be
maintained. The Special Judge rejected these contentions. Subsequently, the case was
transferred to another Special Judge following a government notification.
In a revision application filed by Antulay, the High Court ruled that the Special Judge had
jurisdiction to hear the case and that the private complaint was maintainable. However, when
the new Special Judge proceeded with the case, Antulay applied for discharge, asserting that
the charges were baseless and that, as a Member of the Legislative Assembly (M.L.A),
sanction under section 6 of the 1947 Act was necessary. The Special Judge granted his
discharge, ruling that as an M.L.A., he was a public servant under section 21(12)(a) of the
IPC and that absence of sanction from the Legislative Assembly precluded the court from
taking cognizance of the offense.
The appellant challenged this decision in an appeal.

Questions for Consideration:

(a) What is the relevant date concerning a valid sanction required for prosecuting a public
servant for offenses listed in section 6 of the 1947 Act?
(b) If the accused holds multiple offices that classify him as a public servant, is the sanction
from each competent authority necessary for prosecution? If one authority declines to grant
sanction, is the court prohibited from taking cognizance of the offense?
(c) Is an M.L.A. classified as a public servant under clauses (12)(a), (3), and (7) of section 21
IPC?
(d) Is sanction under section 6 of the 1947 Act required for prosecuting an M.L.A., and if so,
who is the competent authority to sanction the prosecution?

Judgment:
The appeal was allowed.
The court noted that the provisions of the Act must be construed in a manner that advances
the object and purpose of the Act and does not defeat it. A clear meaning of the statute should
be adhered to. If ambiguity exists, the court must ascertain the intention of the legislature
while keeping in mind the mischief the legislation aimed to address.
It is established that under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, courts cannot
take cognizance of offenses alleged to have been committed by a public servant without prior
sanction from the competent authority. The relevant date for determining the requirement of
valid sanction is the date when the court is asked to take cognizance. If the accused was a
public servant at the time the offense was committed but has ceased to be one by the time
cognizance is sought, sanction under section 6 is not required. This interpretation serves to
protect public servants from unwarranted prosecution.
In this case, since Antulay had resigned before the date the Special Judge took cognizance of
the complaint, he had ceased to be a public servant in his capacity as Chief Minister.
Therefore, no sanction was needed to proceed against him for alleged offenses committed
during his term.
Regarding the necessity of sanction from multiple authorities if the accused holds multiple
public offices, the court rejected the argument. Such an interpretation could allow
unscrupulous public servants to evade prosecution. The sanction required is that of the
authority competent to remove the public servant from the specific office that is alleged to
have been abused.
Lastly, the court found that an M.L.A. does not fall within the definition of a public servant
under section 21(12)(a) of the IPC. An M.L.A. does not fit any of the specified categories
under the clause that defines public servants. Thus, the findings of the Special Judge
regarding the necessity of Legislative Assembly sanction were incorrect.

Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, affirming that no sanction was required for prosecution in this
instance due to the respondent's resignation and that the interpretation of the law must align
with its intended purpose. The court clarified the definition of public servant and the
necessary procedures for prosecuting public officials.

R.S. Nayak v. State of Maharashtra

Facts
The case involves the prosecution of the Chief Minister of Maharashtra under Section 6 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Governor's role in granting sanction for such
prosecution came into question. The legal proceedings escalated, leading to a Special Leave
Petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues Raised
1. Should the Governor act in his discretion or based on the advice of the Council of
Ministers when deciding on sanction for prosecuting the Chief Minister?
2. Can the Supreme Court question the authenticity of the judicial record maintained by
the High Court?
3. Is it permissible for a party to resile from a concession made in a lower court?

Appellant's Arguments
The appellant contended that the Governor must act in his discretion regarding the sanction
for prosecution, as the matter concerns the Chief Minister's conduct.
They argued that public policy and judicial decorum necessitate that the Supreme Court
respects the judicial record and cannot reopen the findings of the High Court.

Respondent's Arguments
The respondent argued that the High Court's record contained errors, and they should have
the opportunity to correct these errors.
They claimed that the concession made before the High Court was made under a
misapprehension of the law.

Court's Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding the following points:
1. The Court emphasized that it must accept the statements recorded by judges in their
judgments, as they are conclusive and cannot be contradicted by statements made at the
Bar or through affidavits.
2. The Court ruled that the Governor, while determining whether to grant sanction for
prosecution under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, must act in his
discretion as a matter of propriety.
3. The Court noted that allowing the state of Maharashtra to resile from the concession made
before the High Court would not serve the cause of justice.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that judicial records are binding and cannot be
questioned. It clarified that the Governor should act in his discretion regarding the
prosecution of the Chief Minister. Additionally, it concluded that the state of Maharashtra's
prior concession was appropriate and should not be retracted, as doing so would hinder
justice rather than promote it.