Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The commonly accepted wisdom is that nationalism replaced religion in

the age of modernity. In the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, the
focus of Selim Deringil’s book, traditional religious structures crumbled
as the empire itself began to fall apart. The state’s answer to schism was
regulation and control, administered in the form of a number of edicts in
the early part of the century. It is against this background that different
religious communities and individuals negotiated survival by converting
to Islam when their political interests or their lives were at stake. As the
century progressed, however, and as this engaging study illustrates with
examples from real-life cases, conversion was no longer sufficient to
guarantee citizenship and property rights as the state became increas-
ingly paranoid about its apostates and what it perceived as their “de-
nationalization.” The book tells the story of the struggle for the bodies
and the souls of people, waged between the Ottoman state, the Great
Powers, and a multitude of evangelical organizations. Many of the
stories shed light on current flash-points in the Arab world and the
Balkans, offering alternative perspectives on national and religious iden-
tity and the interconnections between the two.

Selim Deringil is Professor of History at Bogaziçi University in Istanbul,

Turkey. He is the author of The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and
the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909 (1999).
Conversion and Apostasy in the Late
Ottoman Empire

SELIM DERINGIL
Bogaziçi University
 cambridge university press
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© Selim Deringil 2012

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First published 2012

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Deringil, Selim, 1951
Conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire / Selim Deringil, Bogazici University.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978 1 107 00455 9
1. Religion and state Turkey History 19th century. 2. Islam and state
Turkey History 19th century. 3. Turkey History 19th century.
4. Turkey Religion 19th century. 5. Conversion Islam History 19th century.
6. Apostasy Islam History 19th century. 7. Islam Turkey History
19th century. 8. Christianity Turkey History 19th century. I. Title.
dr557.d47 2012
297.50 74095609034 dc23 2011052381

isbn 978 1 107 00455 9 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or

accuracy of urls for external or third party Internet Web sites referred to
in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such
Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
To Alev
 Contents

Acknowledgements page ix

Introduction 1
1 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache”: Conversion, Apostasy,
and the Tanzimat State 28
2 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 67
3 “Crypto-Christianity” 111
4 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 156
5 Conversion as Survival: Mass Conversions of Armenians in
Anatolia, 1895–1897 197
Conclusion 240

Bibliography 259
Index 275

Plates follow p. xii.

vii
 Acknowledgements

When you set out to remember the people who helped you along the way,
you realize what a long road it has been. Many friends and colleagues have
been kind enough to offer suggestions, material, criticism, and support
along the way. I will try to remember them all and offer thanks where it is
due. I humbly apologize in advance for any I may forget.
Special thanks to Sinan Kuneralp, who provided so many of my refer-
ences that I feel particularly grateful to him. I am also particularly indebted
to Kevork Bardakjian for his generosity with time and sources regarding
providing and translating bibliographical material in Armenian that I
would otherwise have not had access to. Similarly, Yorgos Tzedopoulos
and Eleni Gara shared their insights on the crypto-Christians of Anatolia. I
am also very grateful to Ussama Makdisi for reading the manuscript and
providing insightful detailed comments, as well as to the two anonymous
readers.
As usual, at my intellectual and professional home, Bogaziçi University
in Istanbul, my “alter ego” friend and colleague, Edhem Eldem, provided
material, criticism, and humour. Cem Behar was generous with his time
and expertise, particularly regarding the deciphering of difficult Ottoman
documents and providing invaluable advice on things demographic and
cultural. Faruk Birtek has a special place in friendship and esteem, and I
can never thank him enough for his interest and support. I also owe Nadir
Özbek thanks for his insightful criticism and particularly for his patience
and understanding with a computer illiterate as he set up the databases for
my archival material. Special thanks are also due to my friends and
colleagues in the History Department and to the “driving engine” of our
department, Oya Arıkan.

ix
x Acknowledgements

At the level of international institutional as well as intellectual support, I

am particularly indebted to my dear friend and esteemed colleague
Paschalis Kitromilides and the Asia Minor Institute in Athens. Similarly,
I am indebted to Abdul-Rahim Abu Husayn and the American University
of Beirut for inviting me on three occasions and to all the students and
colleagues there who came to my talks and offered valuable comments. In
the same context, I must fondly remember the late Professor Kamal Salibi
for his gracious hospitality. François Georgeon was kind enough to invite
me to his seminar at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, and
the Ecole was very generous in its support during my stay in Paris. My
thanks also to Anthony Grafton for inviting me to present a preliminary
outline of the work on this book at the Davis Center of Princeton
University and for the very useful comments and critiques of the graduate
students and colleagues. I thank Amy Singer and Ehud Toledano of the
University of Tel Aviv and Dror Ze’evi and the other colleagues at the
University of the Negev at Ber Sheba for their generous invitations to teach
at their institutions and present papers related to my project. At the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, I owe thanks to Müge Göçek, Ron
Suny, and Gerard Libaridian. I also thank the Collegium Budapest for its
generous support and Rector Gabor Klaniczay and Director Fred Girod
for inviting me, for it was at the Collegium that I began this book. At the
Central European University in the same city I owe special thanks to my
friends and colleagues Andras Kovacs, Maria Kovacs, Ayşe Çaglar, Arif
Çaglar, Szabolcs Pogonyi, Michael Miller, Lazslo Kontler, and Constantin
Iordachi. Finally, at the level of institutional support, I am very grateful to
the European University Institute in Florence for offering me the Fernand
Braudel Fellowship, and particularly to Anthony Molho for his friendship
and stimulating conversation. Also at the EUI, I have greatly benefited
from the knowledgeable and erudite conversation of Rainer Baubock and
Antonella Romano. Many thanks also to Clare Tame for her valuable
editorial support.
I also thank the staff of the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, particularly the
director, Mustafa Budak, for their professionalism, as well as the staff of the
Library of Bogaziçi University, particularly the head librarian, Hatice Gür.
My thanks also to the following: Engin Akarlı, Taner Akçam, Ayhan
Aktar, Gülen Aktaş, Dilek Akyalçın-Kaya, Marc Baer, Bahar Başer, Aylin
Beşiryan, Geza David, Ahmet Ersoy, Selçuk Esenbel, Caroline Finkel, Dan
and Carolyn Goffman, Don Handelmann, Milos Jovanovic, Vangelis
Kechriotis, Macit Kenanoglu, Raimond Kevorkian, Cengiz Kırlı, Niyazi
Kızılyürek, Rober Koptaş, Claire Mouradian, Dennis Papazian,
 Acknowledgements xi

Kahraman Şakul, Ariel Salzman, Ara Sarafian, Irvin Cemil Shick, Dejan
Stjepanovic, Yücel Terzibaşoglu, Maria Todorova, Fernando Veliz,
Gültekin Yıldız, and Eric Jan Zürcher.
Last, but by no means least, I offer my greatest thanks to Alev and
Begüm for their patience, love, and support.
Needless to say, all the errors, oversights, exaggerations, bad jokes, and
the like are entirely my own.

Ras Beirut
21 November 2011
 Introduction

A Bosnian or a Herzegovinian Turk is a Turk by law, but as far as language

and kinship are concerned, whatever his grandfathers were so will the last of
his descendants be: Bosnians and Herzegovinians, until God decrees the end
of the world. They are called Turks while the Turks rule the land; and when
the real Turks return to their homeland where they came from, the Bosnians
will remain Bosnians, and will be like their ancestors were.1

the specific nature of conversion and apostasy

in the nineteenth-century ottoman state:
nationalism and de-nationalisation.
Nationalism is like mercury. You put a drop in your palm, it has mass,
weight, and colour; yet when you try to seize it, it seeps out between your
fingers, and you know that it will kill you if you swallow it.
The basic question to be asked in this book is: how were nineteenth-
century cases of conversion and apostasy in the Ottoman Empire different
compared to earlier cases of conversion and apostasy? Why would people
join a faith that was on the retreat? Why was the conversion of a goatherd
in Macedonia in, say, 1657 very different from the conversion of a goat-
herd in the same geographic area in 1876? What makes conversion and
apostasy different in the nineteenth-century Ottoman context is that they
overlap with the rise of ethnic nationalism and the age of National Revival

1
Dositej Obradovic, “Letter to Haralampije”, in Balczs Trencsényi and Michael Kopecek
(eds.), Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe: Texts and
Commentaries (Budapest and New York, 2006), Vol. 1, p. 128. Dositej Obradovic
(ca. 1740 1811), “Orthodox monk, writer, teacher and politician . . . is considered the
most prominent figure of the Enlightenment in Serbia”.

1
2 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

m a p 1 . The Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire, circa 1870. (Map courtesy
of Ömer Emre)

movements that swept across Europe. Everyone felt special; moreover,

everyone felt more special than his or her neighbour. Let us hear the
voice of Joakim Vukic, a Serbian educator, writer, and theatre impresario:
“During my stay in Serbia I also observed some other folk superstitions
and customs which were taken over by the Serbs from the Turkish people,
for they had lived with the Turks continuously for a period of 437 years;
and the Turks are up to their ears in their superstition and nonsense.”2
I believe that nationalism is primarily a product of the last two centuries.
Together with Benedict Anderson, I believe it to be a “cultural construct”.
Like Eric Hobsbawm, I find that it “invents traditions”; and I agree with
John Breuilly that it is “primarily political”.3
Conversion and/or apostasy were seen as particularly dangerous in
the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire because they were perceived as

2
Joakim Vukic, “Characteristics of the Serbian People (1828)”, In Discourses of Collective
Identity, p. 116.
3
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism (London, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention
of Tradition (Cambridge, England, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since
1780 (Cambridge, England, 1990); Selim Deringil, “Invented Tradition as Public Image in
the Ottoman Empire 1808 1908”, CSSH 35 (1993), 3 29; John Breuilly, Nationalism and
the State (Manchester, 1993).
 Introduction 3

de-nationalisation. Although almost all the literature on nationalism, and

on that even more slippery concept, national identity, is focused on how
they are acquired, whether they are “perennial”, “invented”, “imagined”,
or “ancient”, much less attention has been lavished on the implications of
and fear caused by their actual or potential loss. The fear of and hatred for
the apostate in this context is quite important in understanding the process
of a potential loss of national identity or the loss of a member of the flock
or ethnie. The fear that the apostate evokes because “he knows our
secrets” or the hatred of which he or she becomes the object is focused
on the apostate/convert because they establish a precedent; they are poten-
tial unravellers.The nationalist canon usually focuses on the good exam-
ples, the role models for emulative purposes, the hero, the martyr; but
nobody wants to talk about the bad apple, the turncoat, the quisling. When
they do have to be talked about, it is only by way of focusing emotive
hatred that, again, works to bond the healthy apples ever more firmly
together.
What do I mean by “de-nationalisation”? I take this to mean the loss of
a soul and a body from an increasingly “nationally imagined” community.
This loss was also seen as a symbolic rape of the community’s honour if the
convert/apostate was a woman or a child. As such, the negative symbolism
of the convert/apostate can be seen as a transgression of what Smith refers
to as the “symbolic realm” of the community, or, by extension, the
violation of the “inner world” of the ethnic community or nation.4
Benedict Anderson states that it is the power to convert and assimilate
that gives the Old World religions their extraordinary force and validity,
particularly through what he calls “becoming adepts in the truth language”.
He goes on to explain:

And, as truth languages imbued with an impulse largely foreign to nationalism, the
impulse towards conversion. By conversion I mean not so much the acceptance of
particular religious tenets, but alchemic absorption. The barbarian becomes
‘Middle Kingdom’ the Rif Muslim the Ilongo Christian. The whole nature of
man’s being is sacrally malleable. . . . It was after all, this possibility of conversion
through the sacred language that made it possible for an ‘Englishman’ to become
Pope and a ‘Manchu’ Son of Heaven.5

It is at this point that I disagree with Anderson; conversion was by no means

“largely foreign to nationalism”. When one studies religious conversion in

4
Anderson, Imagined Communities; Anthony Smith, Ethno symbolism and Nationalism: A
Cultural Approach (Abingdon and New York, 2009), pp. 55, 64.
5
Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 15.
4 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the Ottoman Empire over time, one finds a very different evolution. Religion
does not fade away with the advance of nationalism, but rather becomes
yoked to it through the process of conversion and apostasy. In the earlier
centuries, the sixteenth, seventeenth, and even the eighteenth, conversion was
seen as an undesirable development. Priests and other members of the com-
munity or congregation saw it as a bad thing because it reduced their numbers
and demoralized them. Yet when we come to the nineteenth century, religious
identity is linked to national identity to such an extent that conversion to
Islam and, after 1844, potential conversion from Islam to Christianity were
seen as a loss of identity, a harbinger of greater catastrophe, that is, potential
de-nationalization. It was perceived not as an individually reprehensible act,
but as an affront to the whole (more or less amorphously imagined) com-
munity, a deadly threat and an insult to a self-conscious group.
In his seminal article on the concept of “imagined communities” in a
Balkan context, Paschalis Kitromilides points to the vital role of national
churches in the process of “nation-building” in the Balkans, a process
begun by the unilateral declaration of autonomy from the Istanbul
Patriarchate of the Greek National Church in 1833, which “spearheaded
all nationalist initiatives in the latter part of the nineteenth and throughout
the twentieth century”.6 Fikret Adanır concurs: “[T]he dominance of
ethnic nationalism should not lead us to underrate the importance of
religion. More often than not religion dominated all other elements in
Balkan nationalism. The wars of liberation during the nineteenth century
were at the same time wars of religion”.7
Similarly, Mark Mazower underlines the fact that with the advent of
nationalism, “Religion became a marker of national identity in ways not
known in the past, and therefore more sharply marked off from neighbor-
ing religions”.8
In such a context, in which religion and nationality were so entangled,
the apostate from a given religious community could be seen as a traitor
(if the apostasy was ostensibly voluntary), as a martyr to the national cause
(if he or she was subsequently killed by the other side), or as national

6
Paschalis Kitromilides, “‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the National Question
in the Balkans”, in Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy:
Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South Eastern Europe (Aldershot, 1994),
pp. 149 152.
7
Fikret Adanır, “The Formation of a ‘Muslim’ Nation in Bosnia Hercegovina: A
Historiographic Discussion”, in Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroghi (eds.), The Ottomans
and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography (London, Boston, and Köln, 2002), p. 303.
8
Mark Mazower, The Balkans (London, 2001) p. 76.
 Introduction 5

symbolic terrain to be re-conquered (in the case of actual or supposed

abduction of women). As put by Irvin Cemil Schick: “As a metaphor,
however, sexual violence also provides a symbolically dense representation
of territorial appropriation and of the inability of men to defend their
territory and their manhood”.9 In a historical conjuncture of almost con-
tinuous tension and upheaval, half-understood nationalist slogans, and
abundant rumour presaging this or that impending disaster, the occur-
rence of something as minor as the conversion of an obscure peasant could
achieve international dimensions.
Fear of de-nationalisation did not have to be articulated as such; very
often it was not. Usually the people who took to the streets or went after
each other with stones and knives had only a hazy awareness of the
broader political implications. Sometimes, by word of mouth, rumour,
or even the occasional newspaper, they had more precise information
about real or imagined dangers.
The extent to which conversion and/or apostasy was seen as
de-nationalisation is admirably examined in an article by Zoran
Milutinovic in which he discusses the works of four writers of Slovene,
Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian literature during the period of National
Revival in the early nineteenth century.10 In all four works, the enemy
“Other” is not a foreign conqueror but an apostate who collaborates with
the conqueror by adopting his faith.11 In Milutinovic’s own words: “[The]
culprit is never the Other, it is always an apostate, a renegade, someone
ambiguously placed between us and them, by being one of us, but siding
with them nevertheless”.12

9
Irvin Cemil Schick, “Christian Maidens, Turkish Ravishers: The Sexualization of National
Conflict in the Late Ottoman Period”, in Amila Baturovic and Irvin Cemil Schick (eds.),
Women in the Ottoman Balkans: Gender, Culture, and History (New York, 2007),
pp. 274 304. Emphasis in original. It is hard to disagree with David Nirenberg when he
claims that “competition for women and competition for converts are related”. David
Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages
(Princeton, 1996), pp. 128, 185.
10
Zoran Milutinovic, “Sword, Priest and Conversion: On Religion and Apostasy in South
Slav Literature in the Period of National Revival”, Central Europe 6 (2008), 17 46. My
thanks to Fernando Veliz for bringing this reference to my attention.
11
Ibid. The works in question are: the poem of the Croat writer, poet, and statesman Ivan
Mazuranic, Smrt Smail agea C  engica (Smail aga Cengic’s death) (1846); the Slovene poet
France Prešern and his epic Krst pri Savici (Baptism on the Savica) (1836); the prince
bishop of Montenegro Petar II Petrovic Njegos’s epic poem Gorski vijenaj (The Mountain
Wreath) (1847); and the Bosnian statesman and president of the Diet of Bosnia Safvet Bey
Basagic and his play Abdullah Pasa (1900).
12
Ibid., p. 41.
6 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

In an insightful recent study of Serbian historiography, Bojan Aleksov

points out that the issue of conversion to Islam by Serbs has always been at
the crux of Serbian nationalism. He mentions the term “religious nation-
alism”, whereby “In the minds of the ordinary people, every neighbour
who professed a different religion belonged to the ‘enemy’ civilization.”13
In the early nineteenth century, religion and nation were so closely linked
in nationalist Serbian history that one historian, Georgije Magaraševic,
actually declared in 1827 that “Islamised Serbs, blinded by fanaticism, are
much worse than the Turks”.14 Another Serbian historian, Jaša Ignjatovic,
writing in the late nineteenth century, very clearly identified conversion
with de-nationalisation: “A Serb without religious rites and customs is not
considered a Serb. A dissident from the faith is considered by the people as
a lost son, as one who has lost the sense of the importance of Serbhood.
Religious ideas are still more important than nation-building ideas”.15
A similar situation prevailed in Bulgaria, where, Maria Todorova tells
us, “Conversion to Islam as a historiographical trope can be interpreted as
serving a particular internal social and political function”. This function
served as the legitimation for the forcible name-changing campaign
enforced on the Bulgarian Muslims in the late 1980s.16 It is interesting
that the basic function of the discipline of history, and within that disci-
pline, the study of conversion, remained virtually the same from the early
nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century. In the case of socialist
Bulgaria, what Carsten Riis observes to be the function of historiography,
“the formation and maintenance of national consciousness”, would also
have held true in the early days of Bulgarian nationalism.17
When religion in the Balkans was parcelled out among various national
churches, questions of the acquisition, loss, or betrayal of nationality
were ultimately played out in the secular national arena even if the struggle
was expressed in religious terms. A paradoxical result of this, as far as
the Ottoman government was concerned, was what I will call the

13
Bojan Aleksov, “Adamant and Treacherous: Serbian Historians on Religious
Conversions”, in Pal Kolstø (ed.), Myths and Boundaries in South Eastern Europe
(London, 2005), pp. 158 190. Aleksov points out that the term “religious nationalism”
itself was coined by Milorad Ekmecic, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790 1818 (Belgrade, 1989).
14
Ibid., p. 164.
15
Ibid., p. 171.
16
Maria Todorova, “Conversion to Islam as a trope in Bulgarian Historiography, Fiction
and Film”, in Maria Todorova (ed.), Balkan Identities (London, 2004), pp. 129 157.
17
Carsten Riis, Religion, Politics, and Historiography in Bulgaria (New York, 2002), p. 22.
 Introduction 7

bureaucratization and ultimate secularization of the conversion process as

part of the Tanzimat reforms.
Another specific aspect of the nineteenth century was the fact that the
non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire who were involved in con-
version and apostasy disputes could claim the protection of one or the
other of the Great Powers, beginning with the Russian claim to protect the
Orthodox subjects of the empire, supposedly granted by the Treaty of
Küçük Kaynarca of 1774.18 For the Muslims, on the other hand, as the
dominant ethnie, the apostasy of a Muslim, already a mortal offence by
religious law, now became a double insult because it flew in the face of
centuries of assumed superiority. If the offender in question was backed by
a foreign power, the representatives of that power could also become the
targets of the Muslims’ vengeance. The social and political tensions caused
by conversion and apostasy cases led ultimately to their being perceived as
an “Imperial Headache”.
The nineteenth century saw what can only be described as the “cracking
of the shell” of the traditional religious structure in the Ottoman Empire as
schism followed schism and the state tried to regularize and regulate. In
many ways the dates speak for themselves. In 1830 the Armenian
Catholics were recognized as a separate community or millet. In 1831
the Armenian Patriarch excommunicated the Armenian Protestants, yet
the Protestants were formally recognized as a separate millet in 1846. In
1833 the Greek kingdom was recognized as an independent state, and in
the same year the National Greek Church was established. In 1839 the
Tanzimat Edict was declared. In 1844 the Sultan Abdülmecid I promised
to ban the legal execution of apostates from Islam, theoretically (or so the
missionaries thought) opening the way for Muslims converting to
Christianity. In 1849 there was an influx of Hungarian and Polish asylum
seekers and their (in most cases) highly dubious conversions to Islam. In
1856 the Reform Edict officially declared the freedom of religion. In 1870
the Bulgarian Exharchate was created, and Bulgarian Orthodoxy broke
away from the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul. In 1876 the
Ottoman Constitution was declared, and religious freedom was guaran-
teed. This is the process that Lucette Valensi traced in Jerusalem,
Damascus, and Aleppo.: “These back and forth movements expressed a
powerful religious agitation. . . . The nineteenth century inaugurated a new

18
J. C Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1535
1914 (Toronto, London, and New York 1956), Vol. 1, p. 54. This claim was based on
“a liberal (and questionable) interpretation of Articles 7 and 14 of the 1774 instrument”.
8 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

competition between diverse religious groups who attempted to reform

their methods and to improve the training of their clergy to better resist the
pressures of missionaries from all orders”.19

comparisons with earlier periods

This historic specificity of nineteenth-century conversion and apostasy is
better understood when contrasted with earlier periods. It is interesting to
compare the conversion process at the time when the Ottoman Empire was
at the apex of its power in the sixteenth century, on the one hand, and the
situation in the nineteenth century when Ottoman power was at its nadir,
on the other. Tijana Kristic’s brilliant study of high-profile converts in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has shown us that the careers of figures
such as the Hungarian convert Murad b. Abdullah (c. 1509–86) unfolded
at a time when Sultan Süleyman was “engaged in an acute struggle with
both the Habsburg Emperor Charles V and the Safavid Shah I_ smail for the
title of the prophesied messianic Last Emperor (sahib-kıran)”.20 It was in
this context that Murad wrote his polemical treatise The Guide for One’s
Turning towards God, attacking Christianity and upholding Islam as the
one true faith. Kristic points out that in the intense political competition
among Ottoman, Austrian, and Persian rulers, the conversion of a learned
Orthodox priest such as Mehmed b. Abdullah constituted a “symbolic
victory”. Such symbolic victories are notably absent in the nineteenth
century. The conversions of General Joseph Bem and General Ladislas
Czartoryski at mid-century were hardly touted as symbolic victories over
the Austrians or Russians. In some ways they were almost an embarrass-
ment, and their usefulness as military experts had to be weighed against the
diplomatic cost of protecting them. Similarly, the conversion of the
Armenian Bishop Harutyun was kept very low-profile, and he was set to
work translating Armenian newspapers.21
In her study of the last Ottoman conquest, that of Crete in 1669, Molly
Greene pointed out that most of the island’s Muslims were Greeks who
had converted during the protracted campaign and joined the Ottoman

19
Lucette Valensi, “Inter Communal Relations and Changes in Religious Affiliation in the
Middle East, Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries”, Comparative Studies in Society and
History 39 (1997), 268, 269.
20
Tijana Kristic, “Illuminated by the Light of Islam and the Glory of the Ottoman Sultanate:
Self Narratives of Conversion to Islam in the Age of Confessionalisation”. Comparative
Studies in Society and History 51 (2009), 35 63. See Chapters 3 and 4 of this volume.
21
See Chapter 4 of this volume.
 Introduction 9

janissary corps: “Conversion in Crete did not automatically create a fierce

and brutal divide between the two communities”.22 It is actually possible
that “conversion was part of the mechanism that maintained connections
between groups and kept the network of intergroup relations well oiled.”23
Mixed marriages were quite common in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Crete. Nuri Adıyeke, working on the basis of the court records
(sicils) of Crete, found that there were many instances of a Muslim father
leaving his children in the care of his still-Christian wife and her family
when he went away on campaign, sometimes never to return. Evidently,
the administrators became concerned that the religious faith of these
children would become perverted as a result of being brought up in a
Christian household. As a result, on two occasions, in 1707 and 1727,
they ordered that these children be registered and brought to Candia and
placed temporarily with pious Muslims. There were also frequent com-
plaints, registered by the court, that a certain person, ostensibly a Muslim,
had been seen going to church. Another issue was circumcision. In 1658, it
was brought to the courts’ attention that most of the men who had
converted were not circumcised. The kadis were ordered to ensure that
all new converts be circumcised. Adıyeke concludes:

In conclusion many people . . . converted to Islam in Crete from the seventeenth to

the nineteenth century. In this context . . . certain problems . . . directly arising from
conversion were experienced. . . . However it should be noted that these complica
tions did not produce a social trauma caused by conversion. . . . Problems arising
from conversion to Islam did not give rise to greater social conflicts in Crete where
social transformation problems were experienced rather as daily problems which
were to be resolved by legal means.24

Considering what a flashpoint of nationalist agitation Crete became in

the nineteenth century, the relative containment of tensions related to
conversion and apostasy is remarkable. In fact, this apparent contain-
ment had to be explained away by Greek nationalist historiography in the
nineteenth century. One way of doing this was to claim that the numer-
ous early converts in the seventeenth century had not been Greeks at all,
but Venetians who had converted in order to save their property. Yet

22
Molly Greene, A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern
Mediterranean (Princeton, 2000), p. 107.
23
Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective
(Cambridge and New York, 2008), p. 128.
24
Nuri Adıyeke, “Multi Dimensional Complications of Conversion to Islam in Ottoman
Crete”, in Antonis Anastosopoulos (ed.), Crete and the Eastern Mediterranean 1645 1840
(Rethymno, 2008), pp. 203 209.
10 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

when it came to those who had ostensibly remained crypto-Christians,

declared their Christianity during the Greek War of Independence of
1820, and been executed, they were declared glorious national martyrs:
“[Thus] while the historiographers do not regard the locals converting to
Islam as Greeks, those who apostatize during the [war] are announced as
martyrs”.25
Marc Baer’s important book on conversion during the reign of Mehmed
IV (r. 1648–87) sheds further light on the specificity of conversions in the
later period. Examining the revival of piety spearheaded by the Kadızadeli
movement and the influence wielded by the charismatic Vani Mehmed
Efendi on the sultan, his mother Turhan Sultan, and his Grand Vizier Fazıl
Ahmed Paşa, Baer notes that this was the high point of Ottoman power,
when “The broadest circle of conversion reached deep into central Europe
and the Mediterranean accompanying the greatest extension of Ottoman
boundaries”. Mehmet IV himself was depicted in the sources of the time
“as a warrior of the faith against the infidels”.26 The sultan actively sought
to convert people during his hunting expeditions, and his mother made a
point of demolishing the Jewish commercial quarter and converting it into
the sacred Muslim space that was to become the massive Yeni Cami
complex in the centre of the old city.27
The glaring contrast between the period depicted as a time of trium-
phant and triumphalist Islam, when the sultan himself was, in Baer’s
words, an active “convert maker”, and the nineteenth century is indeed
striking. In the time frame of this book the Ottoman Empire is very much
on the defensive; it is in fact fighting for survival. When reading the docu-
ments from the Tanzimat State period, it seems unclear whether the
Ottomans even wanted conversions at all.
Johann Strauss, in his textual analysis of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Greek chronicles of the Ottoman period, points out that “the
basic antagonism between ‘Christians’ on the one hand and ‘Turks’ on
the other runs throughout the chronicles”. However, relating to the
controversial issue of conversion, he notes that “The subject plays an
important role. . . . It should be stressed however, that in these texts
conversion is seen mainly as a problem of faith, of apostasy, and not as

25
Nükhet and Nuri Adıyeke, “Myths and Realities on Ottoman Crete”, paper presented at
the conference The Mediterranean of Myths, the Myths of the Mediterranean, 3 4 June
2010, Istanbul. Cited with permission of the authors.
26
Marc Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe
(Oxford, 2008), pp. 10 11.
27
Ibid., pp. 81 104.
 Introduction 11

a method of denationalization”.28 Even in cases of gross transgression, as

in the case of men who actively sought martyrdom in the eighteenth
century, the sword was slow to emerge from its sheath. Take the case of
the monk Damascinos from Mount Athos, who was an apostate from
Islam and was brought before the kadi to allow him the opportunity to
repent: “[The kadi] offered him coffee which he proceeded to throw in the
official’s face and started declaiming against Islam as a false religion. He
seemed to want to attract the worst punishments the Turks could inflict
upon him. But he was taken for a madman and simply given a severe
beating.” Yet he kept trying, and after publicly insulting Islam three times
in front of Turkish soldiers, he was executed.29
A similar case, unearthed from the kadı sicils of Kara Ferye by Eleni
Gara, was recorded in 1627 in Veria in northern Greece. A Janissary
calling himself Ömer Çavuş committed apostasy and declared that he
was an “infidel” named I_ stati. He was asked three times to repent, and
when he refused, he was handed over to the authorities for punishment,
technically becoming material for neo-martyrdom. The interesting thing is,
Ömer/I_ stati does not appear in the vitae of neo-martyrs that became a
standard basis for latter-day Greek nationalism. Eleni Gara’s observation
is quite accurate:

[I]t appears that the Church and its clergymen at that time and place did not feel any
urgent need to keep a record of all neomartyr like deaths nor to compose vitae in
honour of executed Christians. . . . In short, as long as there was no agenda for
which such cases could be of use, there was no need to record every single case of
execution and proclaim the victims neomartyrs.30

Compared to stories like the above, the cases referred to in the subsequent
chapters can be much more minor transgressions, but they acquired explo-
sive symbolic power in a tense historical conjuncture.
Another tendency in Balkan and Turkish historiography has been to
project the prejudices and preconceptions of nationalism back into the
past. Paschalis Kitromilides’s warning is well taken:

28
Johann Strauss, “Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered: Remarks on Some Local
Greek Chronicles of the Tourkokratia”, in Fikret Adanir and Suraiya Faroghi (eds.), The
Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography (Leiden, 2002), p. 206.
29
Michel Balivet, Romano Byzantine et Pays de Rum Turc. Histoire d’une espace d’imbri
cation Greco turque (Istanbul, 1994), p. 187.
30
Eleni Gara, “Neomartyr without a Message”, Archivum Ottomanicum 23 (2005/06),
pp. 155 175.
12 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

[T]he fact that since the late 19th century national and ethnic conflicts in the
Balkans were fought out in the religious domain should not be allowed to colour
our understanding of phenomena in a pre nationalist era such as the 18th century.31

The first time the Ottoman Empire confronted full-fledged nationalism

was during the Greek War of Independence (1821–26). Hakan Erdem’s
fascinating (and tantalizingly brief) article is very instructive in this regard.
The Ottomans intercepted and translated correspondence from the Greek
leadership, including a critical letter by Alexander Ypsilantis calling on all
Hellenes to rise to defend the “motherland”. What is most interesting is
that this letter and others like it were translated into Turkish, which meant
that concepts such as “motherland” (vatan), “freedom and independence”
(serbestiyet ve istîklâl), and compatriots (hemvatan) came to be under-
stood for the first time as the new vocabulary of a new creature, and an
extremely dangerous creature at that. As pithily put by Erdem:

The real importance of the Greek War of Independence for the Ottomans was that
it brought nationalism home. . . . The Ottoman administrators could no longer
afford to treat nationalist ideas as distant curiosities of the French Revolution.
Inescapably, they came to realize that nationalism was a potent force to fight
against, usually by the adoption of the same tools used by their opponents.32

As the brushfire of nationalism spread in Ottoman Rumeli, conversion and

apostasy became highly symbolic political issues.
Today, conversion and apostasy are still highly politicized issues in the
Balkans and in Turkey. The very terminology used is politically charged.
Even in what is otherwise a quite moderate scholarly work, it is possible to
come across statements such as: “No doubt many non-Muslims melt into
the Turkish population in time and become Turkified. Yet we should still
remember the ethnic origins of many Muslims who live in Bursa”.33
Similarly, the term dönme (he or she who has been “turned”), meaning
convert, as in “Armenian dönme” (Ermeni dönmesi), has negative
connotations, whereas “muhtedi Ermeni,” simply meaning “Armenian

31
Paschalis Kitromilides, “Orthodox Culture and Collective Identity in the Ottoman Balkans
during the Eighteenth Century”, in An Orthodox Commonwealth: Symbolic Legacies and
Cultural Encounters in SouthEastern Europe (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 131 145.
32
Hakan Erdem, “ ‘Do Not Think of the Greeks as Agricultural Labourers’: Ottoman
Responses to the Greek War of Independence”, in Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas
(eds.), Citizenship and the Nation State in Greece and Turkey (London, 2005), pp. 67 88.
33
Osman Çetin, Sicillere Göre Bursa’da Ihtida Hareketleri ve Sosyal Sonuçları 1472 1909
(Conversion movements in Bursa according to the court records and their social conse
quences) (Ankara, 1994), pp. 3 5.
 Introduction 13

convert”, does not.34 Moreover, even today in parts of Anatolia when one
wishes to express disdain regarding someone who is somewhat “new
money” or parvenu, the saying is “Johnny-come-lately turned from infi-
del” (sonradan görme gâvurdan dönme). Even in modern works on issues
dealing with conversion and apostasy, a remarkably strident tone some-
times creeps into the discourse. In an article that is otherwise a solid piece
of archival research (and will be cited as such in extenso later), regarding
the apostate, Selahittin Özçelik declares:

Because the concepts of Islam and citizenship are considered identical, he who turns
away from this can be said to be committing the crime of treason to state and
fatherland. He who abandoned his faith was also disrupting public order and as
such could not be allowed to circulate freely among Muslims. . . . For this reason the
punishment for this crime had to be extremely severe . . .35

Although ostensibly the author is speaking about Islam in the age of the
Prophet, his tone and vocabulary are entirely modern; “treason to state
and fatherland” are not concepts that can be deduced from works on
classical Islam.
Thus the conversion issue is certainly not yet “history” in that part of
the world. In a sense, this book is the pre-history of these issues.

conversion and apostasy in ottoman islam:

legality and reality
The official position regarding conversion in Islam is that forced conver-
sion is not acceptable. Conversion must be voluntary, an act committed
“of the free will and conscience”, (bit’tav ver’-rızâ) of the convert, and
access to the faith must be freely accorded.36 This was the official position,

34
The term dönme was originally applied to the followers of Sabbatai Zvi, a Jewish mystical
rabbi of the seventeenth century who declared himself the Mesiah, was persecuted by the
authorities, and was forced to convert to Islam. Many of his followers also converted but
continued to remain crypto Jews. I have deliberately omitted any discussion on this topic
as there is a considerable amount of literature on it, and it is not directly germaine to the
period. On the Sabbataist movement, see Leyla Neyzi, “Remembering to Forget:
Sabbateanism, National Identity and Subjectivity in Turkey”, Comparative Studies in
Society and History 44 (2002), 137 158; Marc Baer, “The Double Bind of Race and
Religion: The Conversion of the Dönme to Turkish Secular Nationalism”, Comparative
Studies in Society and History 46 (2004), 682 708.
35
Selahittin Özçelik, “Osmanlı I_ ç Hukukunda Zorunlu bir Tehir (Mürted Maddesi)”, OTAM
11 (2000), 350. Italics in original, “devlete ve vatana ihanet”.
36
The appropriate sura in the Qur’an is II: 256: “There is no compulsion in religion. The
right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And he who rejecteth false deities and
14 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

yet the reality on the ground could be very different. The spectrum of
“voluntary” and “forced” could be very broad, as was any notion of “free
will”. The act of conversion could range from the proverbial “conversion
at the point of the sword” to the sincerely accomplished act of a spiritual
athlete who saw Islam as the one religion ensuring salvation. The grada-
tions of conviction and motivation were almost infinite. They could range
from the conscious act of a Polish aristocrat-cum-revolutionary who took
refuge in the Ottoman Empire in 1848 and converted in order to avoid
being handed over to his enemies who would hang him, to an Armenian
Bishop who converted out of love, to the inveterate French gambler who
converted hoping to escape his gambling debts. People converted to save
their lives, like the Armenians during the pogroms in late nineteenth-
century Anatolia. But there was also that grey area, the small insults of
everyday life – being referred to as mürd (dead, but used only for animals)
rather than merhum (having attained God’s peace) when you die, not being
allowed to wear certain colours or clothes (green was for Muslims only), or
not being allowed to ride certain animals (horses, camels); these little
barbs, endured on a daily basis, must have been the reason for many a
conversion to Islam.37
In this regard what Richard Bulliet has referred to as “social conver-
sion” in the medieval context is still applicable in the modern age:

[L]eaving aside ecstatic converts, no one willingly converts from one religion to
another if by virtue of conversion he markedly lowers his social status. More
starkly put, if an emperor converts to a religion of slaves, he does not become a
slave; the religion becomes a religion of emperors.38

Ottomans were not inquisitional. Nobody particularly cared if Macar

(Hungarian) Ismail Paşa drank wine in private or even if he was never
known to fast during Ramazan. What mattered was that he could beat the
Russians. The ruling class in the Ottoman Empire was not unduly occupied
with the sincerity of the conversion. There were no dark sentinels con-
stantly on the alert to catch someone out in heresy. Their attitude was
distinctly pragmatic, particularly when it came to employing converts with
believeth in Allah hath grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is Hearer,
Knower”.
37
The definition of mürd in the Redhouse Turkish English Lexicon is “dead (not said of
Muslims)”. A more explicit definition is given in Şemseddin Sami, Kamus u Turki:
“croaked, kicked the bucket, used for animals” (Gebermiş. Hayvanat için kullanılır).
Merhum is defined in Redhouse as “deceased and admitted into God’s mercy”.
38
Richard W. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essay in Quantitative
History (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1979), pp. 34, 36, 37, 41.
 Introduction 15

specialist skills, such as shipwrights, gunmakers, and later on, cartogra-

phers and census takers.39 The interesting thing was that in the nineteenth
century, these “foreign experts”, as they would now be called, were not
required to convert, yet many did.
Ottoman pragmatism may be merely another application of the general
Islamic attitude to conversion, which is not based on miraculous experi-
ences; indeed, Islam has little room for miracles.40 Islam was never a
“missionary religion” where the primary objective is to save souls. “It
was not a missionary movement in which the chief objective of the
Muslim warriors was the conversion of men and women to the Islamic
faith”.41
To invite someone to embrace Islam individually was an auspicious act,
and great merit accrued to the person doing it in the event of a successful
conversion: “A convert to Islam is not unnaturally regarded as a person
specially illuminated by God, being thus enabled to see the true faith in
spite of the errors of his upbringing”.42 Yet there were no Muslim equiv-
alents of the Franciscans or Dominicans or Jesuits, or, for that matter, of
the Presbyterians or Congregationalists. Muslim derviş orders were indeed
instrumental in the spread of Islam, particularly during the expansion of
the empire in the Balkans, but they sought to convert more by example
than by overt proselytizing. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, in his classic article on the
“colonizing dervişes” in the Balkans, makes the point that the primary
duty of the dervişes was to provide hospitality and security in remote areas.
Barkan does allow a triumphalist note to creep into his narrative when he
claims that the dervişes prepared the ground for the later arrival of
Ottoman armies and had “already conquered the other side spiritually”

39
This was a canonically endorsed position. See Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, Hukuku I_ slamiyye ve
I_ stilahatı Fıkhhiyye Kamusu (The encyclopedia of Islamic law and Fıkh rulings) (Istanbul,
1969), Vol. 4, pp. 5 6, 8: “ [A Muslim is one who] proclaims the true religion in words and
externally, submits to all its orders, whether or not there is true belief. Therefore by the
pronouncing of the holy formula, abstaining from acts forbidden by the holy law, observ
ing the prescribed external forms the person achieves the legal status of a Muslim, personal
belief in [one’s] conscience is not sought out”. As to questions of apostasy, “ A person is
only declared an apostate if he openly declares his doubts and hesitations, it is not possible
to look into anyone’s heart”.
40
Larry Poston, Islamic Da’wah in the West: Muslim Missionary Activity and the Dynamics
of Conversion to Islam (Oxford, 1992), p. 158.
41
Ibid., p. 13. The one very obvious case of forced Islamization that will be omitted from the
present study is the child levy (devşirme) that was the basis for the recruitment of the elite
Janissary corps. The best source on this is still Halil I_ nalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The
Classical Age.
42
William Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans (Oxford, 1929), Vol. I, p. 44.
16 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

when they arrived. He also notes the zeal of the newly converted; “[i]t is
clear that dervişes who had been Christians would carry out more zealous
and impassionate religious propaganda”. However, the people who con-
verted tended to be the servants in their hospices or others who were
attracted to their exemplary piety. As to mass conversion, Barkan is
quite unequivocal: “In truth in Ottoman history, until the conquest of
Istanbul we cannot speak of mass Islamization or the cosmopoliticization
of the state”.43 Victor Menage also takes note of the “proselytizing zeal” of
the ghazis and the “missionizing zeal” of the babas, yet points out that
once the actual apparatus of state was in place, “In the Balkans the rapid
introduction of an efficient state apparatus ensured the protection of the
new dhimmis against the illegal pressures to embrace Islam”.44
Halil Inalcık’s pioneering work on the spread of Islam in the Balkans
draws attention to the fact that mass immediate forced conversion to Islam
was hardly ever practiced among the Albanian, Serbian, or Bulgarian
aristocracies immediately after the Ottoman conquest. Among these
classes Islamization was a gradual process that lasted from the mid-
fourteenth to the sixteenth century.45
More recent research has also drawn attention to the fact that “even if
zealous local administrators applied pressure [on rea’ya] to convert, mass
Islamization was prevented and those who attempted to practice it were
punished”.46
Conversion, when it did occur, tended to be spread over time: “The
process of Islamization progressed and matured over decades and centu-
ries largely as the result of the creation of an Islamic ambiance and the
development of religious and communal institutions”.47 There was also a

43
Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanlı I_ mparatorlug u’nda bir iskan ve kolonizasyon metodu
olarak Vakıflar ve Temlikler I: Istila Devrinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve
Vakfiyeler” (The Vakif and Temlik as a method of colonization in the Ottoman Empire:
The colonizing Turkish Dervişes and the Vakfiye of the expansion period), Vakiflar Dergisi
2 (1942), 282, 283, 284, 303, 304.
44
Victor Menage, “The Islamization of Anatolia”, in Nehemiah Levtzion (ed.), Conversion
to Islam (New York, 1979), p. 67. This volume still remains the seminal work on this topic.
A ghazi is a warrior in holy war; a baba is a dervish leader, usually of the Bektaşi order;
dhimmis are protected “people of the Book”, that is, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman
state.
45
Halil Inalcik, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica 2 (1954), 103 129.
46
Nükhet Adıyeke, “Osmanlı millet sistemi uygulamasında gelenekçilig in rolü” (The role of
traditionalism in the application of the Ottoman millet system), Düşünen Siyaset, (1999),
161 162.
47
Nehemiah Levtzion, “Toward a Comparative Study of Islamization”, in Levtzion (ed.),
Conversion to Islam, pp. 1 23.
 Introduction 17

solid economic logic behind the lack of a systematic policy of forced

conversion. The dhimmis paid the “head tax” or cizye, which was one of
the major sources of income of the treasury.48 “In the decades following
Ottoman conquest of Cyprus from the Venetians (1571)”, Ronald
Jennings notes, “many of the island’s Christians converted to Islam.
Contemporary observers and modern scholars have usually attributed
that conversion to official compulsion, but no contemporary local sources
substantiate that view”.49 Jennings believes that the Christian population
was “proselytized carefully” by the sufi Mevlevi order; “conversion to
Islam was common in Cyprus between 1580 and 1637. Several instances
of individual conversions occurred but nothing was found involving small
groups.”50
At the level of humbler folk, in remote areas of the Balkans and Anatolia
before the advent of the nation-state, there occurred what Mark Mazower
has referred to as “slippage between religions”. Peasants who were asked
whether they were Christian or Muslim might reply, “We are Muslims but
of the Virgin Mary”. In those areas where religion and supernatural beliefs
met and intertwined, “practice mattered more than dogma”.51 William
Hasluck pointed out all those years ago that

For the illiterate whether Moslem or Christian, doctrine is important mainly as

embodying a series of prohibitions: their vital and positive religion is bound up with
the cult of the saints and demands for concrete objects of worship, especially graves
and relics, and above all miracles, to sustain its faith.

He also traced the ways in which Christian and Muslim “sanctuaries”

could become “ambiguous”, this ambiguity allowing them to be used as
numinous sites by the people of both confessions.52 John Fine has also
remarked that the religion of the peasantry in the Balkans and elsewhere
was “practice oriented” and dealt “primarily with this world. It has little or

48
Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, p. 469. “Under the Ottoman Turks at
least there is very little historical evidence for conversion on a large scale in Asia Minor. So
long as the rayahs [sic] were not dangerous, they could be ‘milked’ better than True
Believers, and conversion en masse was to no one’s interest”. See also Mark Mazower,
The Balkans: A Short History (New York, 2002), p. 48: “If the Balkans did not become
another Islamic land, one reason was that the sultans had no interest in making this
happen. Christians paid higher taxes, and mass conversions would have impoverished
the empire”.
49
Ronald Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean
World 1571 1640 (New York and London, 1993), pp. 137 143.
50
Ibid. Jennings’s sources consist of the kadi court records (sicil).
51
Mazower, The Balkans. A Short History, pp. 58, 59.
52
Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, p. 570.
18 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

no doctrine and its emphasis is chiefly or even entirely upon practices that
aim at worldly goals: at the health and welfare of the family, crops and
animals”.53 H. T. Norris drew attention to the phenomenon of “superficial
conversion” to Islam among Balkan women, many of whom continued to
adore local saints, so much so that a Balkan proverb was coined: “Saint Ilia
up to mid-day and after mid-day Alia”. Once converted, the peasantry
usually would not be exposed to any sound Muslim doctrine, with the
exception of those who joined a local tekke (derviş lodge). There was also a
tacit unspoken agreement among priests, rabbis, and imams to seek some
“religious common ground”.54
While on the subject of common ground, people who were in need of
daily religious guidance could switch from one religion to the other. This
was why conversion to Islam occurred more often in badly churched areas.
People were actually known to tell the religious authorities that if they were
not provided with a priest, they would go over to Islam. The lack of a priest
was often compensated for by the presence of a hoca. This was the case of
the Catholic Albanians in the village of Mat around 1700. The villagers
told a passing missionary that they would convert if the archbishop in
Durrës did not regularly send them a priest. The archbishop managed to
send missionaries twice a year. “The villagers, however, were not satisfied
and threatened to call a hodja if they could not have a regular priest”.55
Similarly, a factor contributing to the conversion of the Hemşin Armenians
in the Pontic mountains of the Black Sea in the eighteenth century may
have been the lack of priests: “The thirty-six villages of Karadere were
served by only one priest. . . . the weakness of the church may have played a
significant role in the conversion process.”56
My intention here is not to contend that the pax ottomana was some
kind of utopia where everyone knew their place and lived in peace and
harmony. Beliefs, syncretic as they may be, are still beliefs, and even the
most “syncretic” of Christians could violently object to any forced
Islamization. Also, one should not nourish any illusions about the oft-
cited phenomenon of “Ottoman tolerance” of the non-Muslim confes-
sions. As elegantly put by Maria Todorova:

53
John Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Sixth to the Twelfth
Century (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1987), p. 171.
54
H. T. Norris, Islam in the Balkans (Columbia, South Carolina, 1993), p. 264.
55
Stavro Skendi, Balkan Cultural Studies (New York, 1980), p. 154.
56
Hovan H. Simonian, “Hemshin from Islamization to the End of the Nineteenth Century”,
in Hovan H. Simonian (ed.), The Hemshin: History, Society and Identity in the Highlands
of North East Turkey (New York, 2007), p. 62.
 Introduction 19

For all the objections to romanticized heartbreaking assessments of Christian plight

under the infidel Turk, a tendency that has been long and rightly criticized, the
Ottoman Empire was, first and foremost, an Islamic state with a strict religious
hierarchy where the non Muslims occupied, without any doubt, the back seats. The
strict division on religious lines prevented integration of the population, except in
cases of conversion.57

There was also an almost traditional folkloric aspect to the assumption

that non-Muslims constitued a lower order: “One of the aspects of
Ottoman traditionalism that was very closely adhered to was the under-
standing that the non-Muslims were second class. This was not just so
because of Islamic law, according to the Ottomans, this was in keeping
with their nature”.58
On two occasions, in 1517 and in 1647, the sultans Selim I (r. 1512–20)
and Ibrahim I (r. 1640–48) seriously considered enforcing Islamization on
the Balkans, but both were dissuaded by the Şeyhülislams of the time on
Qur’anic grounds; “In general there was no Muslim analogue to the wide-
spread Christian impulse to drive out the infidel and the heretic”.59 Nor
was there an Ottoman equivalent to the periodic mass expulsion of non-
Christian populations as seen in the Latin west.60
Mass forced conversion did indeed occur in the western Rhodope
mountains in Bulgaria in the seventeenth century, when during the period
from June 1679 to May 1680 there were altogether 339 converts (193 men
and 146 women).61 The seventeenth century does indeed seem to be an
exceptional period when the pietist movement of the Kadızadeli, led by the
sultan’s preacher, Vani Mehmed Efendi, gained influence and counted not

57
Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans”, in Carl L. Brown (ed.), Imperial
Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York, 1996),
p. 47.
58
Nukhet Adıyeke, “Osmanlı Millet Sistemi uygulamasında gelenekçilig in rolü”, p. 162.
59
Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, p. 48. The office of the Şeyhülislam was an
Ottoman innovation. It was during the period that the famous Ebu’s Su’ud Efendi held the
office (1545 74) that the post would take on the definitive character it would hold until
the nineteenth century. I. H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı I_ mparatorlug u’nun I_ lmiye Teşkilatı
(The scholarly establishment in the Ottoman Empire) (Ankara, 1988).
60
Ariel Salzmann, “Is There a Moral Economy of State Formation? Religious Minorities and
Repertoires of Regime Integration in the Middle East and Western Europe 600 1614”,
Theory and Society 39 (2010), 299 313.
61
Maria Todorova, “Conversion to Islam as a Trope in Bulgarian Historiography, Fiction
and Film”, in Maria Todorova (ed.), Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory (London,
2004), pp. 129 157. I would like to thank Maria Todorova for her many insightful
comments on these issues.
20 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

only the sultan himself but also the Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa among
its supporters. Marc Baer indeed refers to it as a “unique historical
epoch”.62 The perceptions of external threat, such as Russian advances
in the eighteenth century, also provoked outbursts of persecution and
forced conversion, often accompanied by heavy taxation to offset the
ruinous costs of recent wars.63 Stavro Skendi mentions mass conversion
in the seventeenth century, although he concurs that mass forced conver-
sion was not the rule and that mass conversion did not occur before the end
of the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent in 1566.64 Also, force in the form
of extortionate taxation and forced conversion campaigns was used
against the Armenian population of the northeast Black sea region in the
mid-seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in an effort to create a
buffer zone against eventual Russian encroachment.65
As to the matter of apostasy from Islam, the story is more complicated.
It has been firmly believed that the punishment for someone who aban-
doned Islam was death.66 The apostate is called a murtadd in Arabic, a
mürted in Turkish, and he or she is committing the crime of ridda, “a
turning away from Islam”.67 Islamic law has two basic sources, the Qur’an
and the Sunna, the acts and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. On top
of this there are the hadith (Turkish hadis), which are legal interpretations
of the Prophet’s sayings or acts, pronounced over the centuries by famous
scholars.68 The Qur’an deals with the topic of apostasy in seven suras.
None of these specify the death penalty for the apostate, but they all talk of
the apostate in damning terms.69 The death penalty for the apostate is

62
Baer, Honoured by the Glory of Islam, p. 6.
63
Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, p. 471.
64
Stavro Skendi, “Crypto Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans”, Slavic
Review 26 (1967), 227 246.
65
Claire Mouradian, “Aperçus sur l’Islamization des Arméniens dans l’Empire Ottoman: le
cas des Hamchentsi/Hemşinli”, paper presented at the conference Conversion to Islam in
the Mediterranean World, Rome, 4 6 September 1997, p. 11. Cited with permission of the
author.
66
Samuel M. Zwemer, The Law of Apostasy in Islam: Answering the Question Why There
Are So Few Moslem Converts, and Giving Examples of Their Moral Courage and
Martyrdom (London, 1924), pp. 80 81.
67
Heffening, “Murtadd”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, 1965), Vol. 3, pp. 736 738.
68
“Hadith: Being an account of what the Prophet said or did, or of his tacit approval of
something said or done in his presence. Hadith came to be recognized as a foundation for
Islam second only to the Kur’an”, The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, 2004).
69
I_ rfan I_ nce, “Ridde”, I_ slam Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 35 (I_ stanbul, 2008), pp. 88 91. Holy Qur’an.
el Bakara 2/108,217; Âl i Imran3/86, 90 91; el Maide 5/54; et Tevbe 9/66,74; en Nahl 16/
106; el Hac 22/11; Muhammed 47/24 26.
 Introduction 21

based on various hadith.70 Although there has always been some debate
among scholars about the application of the death penalty, until the nine-
teenth century apostasy was seen as a crime in both civil and criminal law.
The doctrine remained valid until 1844, and the death penalty fell into
desuetude but was never formally abolished.71
The highly respected Şeyhülislam of the sixteenth century, Ebu’s Su’ud
Efendi, was unequivocal in his fetva on this matter: “Question: What is the
Şer’i ruling for a dhimmi who reverts to infidelity after having accepted
Islam? Answer: He is recalled to Islam, if he does not return he is killed”.72
A major study on Ebu’s Su’ud has also drawn attention to his strictness in
this regard: “The penalty for the male apostate is death. Before the
execution . . . jurists grant a three day delay. If during this period, the
apostate repents and accepts Islam he is reprieved. . . . An apostate in fact
lives in a legal twilight. If he migrates and a judge rules that he has reached
the realm of war, he becomes legally dead”.73 For women the punishment
was less severe; they were beaten and imprisoned, but very rarely were they
executed.74
Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that the death penalty was
not widely imposed, and even when it was, it was seen as a last resort. One
source goes so far as to say, “[A]s far as we can see there is no certain
evidence that the death penalty was applied to apostates in the classical age
of the Ottoman Empire”.75 Yet the belief remained that the punishment for
apostasy was death. As late as October 1843 we come across the last case
of a formal, official execution of an apostate by beheading in the capital,
Istanbul. The American missionary Cyrus Hamlin noted in his memoirs
that the issue caused severe divisions in Ottoman ruling circles: “The old
Mussulman party had triumphed in the most disgraceful manner. The act

70
Ibid., “Ridde”: Some of these are Buhari, I_ stitatabetü’l mürteddin 2, where it is said that
the Prophet ordained “Kill those who change their religion”; Buhari Diyat 6, “where the
Prophet ordained that a Muslim who abandons his religion and community is committing
one of the three cardinal crimes requiring the death penalty”; and various hadith dealing
with the waging of war against the apostates in the time of the Caliph Ebubekir.
71
Rudolph Peters and Gert J. J. De Vries, “Apostasy in Islam”, Die Welt des Islams 17
(1975 76), pp. 1 25. See Chapter 2 of this volume.
72
Ertug rul Düzdag , Ebussud Efendi Fetvaları Işıg inda 16. Asır Türk Hayatı (Sixteenth
century life in Turkey in the light of the Fetvas of Ebussuud Efendi) (Istanbul, 1972), p. 90.
73
Colin Imber, Ebu’s Su’ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford, 1997), pp. 70 71.
74
Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, Hukuki Islamiyye ve Istilahati Fikhiyye Kamusu (Istanbul, 1969),
p. 10.
75
Selahittin Özçelik, “Osmanlı I_ ç Hukukunda Zorunlu bir Tehir (Mürted Maddesi)”.
22 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

divided Turkish sentiment and feeling; the old Turks commending it, the
young Turkish party, already forming, cursing it as a needless insult to
Europe and a supreme folly of old fools”.76
Yet, as will be seen in the subsequent pages of this book, apostasy was a
quite frequent occurrence in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.
People could move in and out of religions, or indeed, as in the case of the
crypto-Christians to be discussed later, be “a people of two religious
faiths”.
It should also be recalled that one man’s conversion was another man’s
apostasy. Ussama Makdisi’s very perceptive remarks on the stigmatization
of the convert can apply equally to the apostate:

Conversion was a sin, a treachery that far surpassed that of secular betrayal, for
secular betrayal could be justified and rationalized, even forgiven and forgotten.
Conversion marked an absolute break with the past, a rejection of heritage and
history and a new beginning. Moreover, it indicated an intrusion by others into a
private, sacred sphere of life a theft that undermined the very basis of the social
order, which depended on a quiescent and theoretically unchanging religiosity.77

The apostate was therefore seen as the “traitor within the gates”, some-
what akin to the witch in medieval society in Europe; “the witch is the
figure of a person who has turned traitor to his own group. . . . The witch is
the hidden enemy within the gate. He eats away like the maggot in the
apple”.78
At times when Islam was weak, apostates from Islam were considered
particularly dangerous because they could infect others by their example.79
Perceptions of weakness and threat on the part of the Muslims after the
Tanzimat Edict of 1839 and the Reform Edict of 1856 may well have made
them more violent and radical in their reactions to apostasy. It may also be
the case that feelings of insecurity caused people to seek “scapegoats” as
defined by Rene Girard: “A scapegoat is identified, differentiated from the

76
Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks (New York, 1878), pp. 80 81. See Chapter 2 of this
volume.
77
Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism. Community: History and Violence in
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley, 2000), p. 36. Although Lebanon was
the very place where people shifted religious allegiances, or at least where the members of
the ruling classes could profess one religion in public and practice another in private. See
Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861 1920 (Berkeley, 1993), p. 21.
78
Philip Mayer, “Witches”, inaugural lecture, Rhodes University, 1954, in Max Marwick
(ed.), Witchcraft and Sorcery: Selected Readings (Bungay, 1982), pp. 54 70. My thanks to
Gabor Klaniczay for this reference.
79
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mulhidler (Istanbul, 1998), p. 94.
 Introduction 23

group and attacked so that insiders feel united as they never did before. The
alien threat displaces everything else.”80

about the book

This book began some ten years ago with the publication of an article that
represented the first fruits of my research into conversion and apostasy in
the late Ottoman Empire.81 It will examine the politics of conversion and
apostasy at a time when the Ottoman Empire was undergoing critical
changes. It is my belief that the handling of apostasy and conversion
cases follows the political climate and discourse of the time. From 1839
to the end of the century, the Sublime State underwent profound trans-
formations in its conceptions of ruler and subject. The Tanzimat reforms
were a sincere effort to win the hearts and minds of its non-Muslim
subjects to a project of modern state formation, ultimately culminating in
the first constitution of 1876. However, after the loss of the most valuable
Balkan provinces, the Hamidian state found itself obliged to fall back on its
Muslim population. In this context the outbreak of Armenian nationalism
in Anatolia, the last stronghold, was seen as a deadly threat. On the other
hand, the Ottoman decision-makers faced intense pressure from the for-
eign powers. Although the Ottoman governments retained ultimate polit-
ical agency to the very end, foreign pressure was a constant reality in their
political decision-making.
In the first chapter I discuss the beginning of the Tanzimat process,
which was the process of general reforms and profound changes in
Ottoman state and society; this I treat as a discrete period that I call the
Tanzimat State. An important point that must be stressed is that the spirit
of the Tanzimat reforms was internalized by the Ottoman elite themselves.
This was not just some smoke screen or window dressing for the benefit of
foreign observers. The Ottoman ruling classes took the Tanzimat State
seriously. Although the beginning of the Tanzimat is usually dated from
the proclamation of the Edict of the Rose Chamber (Gülhane Hat-ı
Hümayunu) of 1839, and although it is clearly possible to trace the origins
of the reform process to earlier periods, the fact that the Gülhane Edict was
a critical watershed is undeniable. The issuance of decrees guaranteeing the

80
Rene Girard, “Generative Scapegoating”, in R. G. Hammerton Kelly (ed.), Violent
Origins: Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation (Stanford, 1987), pp. 73 148.
81
Selim Deringil, “‘There is No Compulsion in Religion’: On Conversion and Apostasy
in the Late Ottoman Empire”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 42 (2000),
547 575.
24 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

security of life, honour, and property of all of the sultan’s subjects was a
common practice often carried out by newly enthroned sultans.82 What
made the Gülhane different was that it made promises. Sultan Abdülmecid
I (r. 1839–61) swore a solemn oath, in the holiest of sanctuaries, the
Chamber of the Sacred Relics, to uphold the guarantees that were granted
in the edict. Contrary to popular belief, there is no specific declaration of
the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in the actual document;
the edict simply declares that all the sultan’s subjects will benefit from the
Tanzimat. The other important document that is enshrined as a basis of the
Tanzimat is the Reform Edict of 18 February 1856. This was a document
issued shortly before the Treaty of Paris (30 March 1856) ending the
Crimean War that guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire and accepted it as a member of the Concert of Europe. The
Reform Edict is entirely concerned with the rights and privileges of the
non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Although the two docu-
ments are usually lumped together, they are in fact very different. The
Gülhane Edict was mostly “homegrown” and the result of long deliber-
ations among members of the Ottoman secular and religious bureaucracy,
whereas the Reform Edict of 1856 was largely the result of foreign pres-
sure. Another critical development that has gone virtually unnoticed in the
grand narrative was the sultan’s official declaration of a ban on the
execution of apostates from Islam (1844). This is critical because it gives
us an insight into the dilemma facing the Ottoman rulers and their
bureaucracy. On the one hand, the ban was the result of foreign pressure,
but it came to be upheld because the Ottoman elite sincerely believed that
such executions were not in keeping with the spirit of the Tanzimat State.
On the other hand, for the Caliph of All Muslims to be seen to be failing to
defend Islam would have a seriously de-legitimizing effect in the eyes of the
sultan’s Muslim subjects. Therefore, some sort of solution had to be
negotiated. The solution was to send out an imperial order (irade) to the
provinces decreeing that apostates were no longer to be executed, but to
instruct them not to make the order public.
The story of this book unfolds at the time when Great Power imperial-
ism was at its peak and the discourses of the “White Man’s Burden” and
“Mission Civilizatrice” ruled the international agenda. This is the histor-
ical context of the second chapter, which provides the diplomatic dimen-
sion of the story told in the previous one. Although I firmly believe that the
fate of the Ottoman state was ultimately decided by the Ottomans

82
“Adaletname”, Encyclopedia of Islam.
 Introduction 25

themselves, we cannot deny that they operated under severe constraints,

the main constraint being the claim of the Great Powers to be the protec-
tors of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This claim made the repre-
sentatives of the Great Powers major actors in the domestic affairs of the
Ottoman state and was also reflected in the cases of conversion and
apostasy. Very often a convert/apostate would claim foreign power pro-
tection. When that happened, an additional dimension was added to the
conversion procedure: the local consul of the power concerned or his
representative had to be present at the conversion ceremony. In fact, the
ban on the execution of apostates (1844) was the result of an intense
diplomatic crisis involving the Porte, the British ambassador, Stratford
Canning, and the French ambassador, Borkine. The issue was the conver-
sion and subsequent apostasy of an Armenian who was publicly executed
by beheading in 1843. Moreover, the fact that it came so soon after the
declaration of the Tanzimat Edict of 1839, and that the executed person
was dressed in Western clothes, caused a scandal. It also cleared the way
for the ascendancy of the “reform party” at the Porte, who felt that if they
were to join the modern world, such a practice was totally unacceptable. In
fact, the main point of the British and French diplomats was that the
execution of apostates “was not in keeping with civilization”. The word
thus made its way into Ottoman diplomatic parlance as “sivilizasyon”.83
The developments discussed in the previous two chapters, particularly
the declaration of religious freedom after 1856, were to be the cause of the
surfacing of a whole spate of crypto-Christianity throughout the empire,
which is discussed in Chapter 3. These people declared that they had
secretly been Christians all along but had pretended to be Muslims for
various reasons. One reason was the avoidance of the cizye (a poll tax
levied on Christians). Now they were taking the state at its word as it had
officially declared religious freedom, and they were “coming out”.
However, the phenomenon of crypto-Christianity appears to be much
more complicated when subjected to closer scrutiny. The two spectacular
cases dealt with in this volume are those of the Kromlides, a Pontic Greek
community living in a mountainous zone on the Black Sea coast, and an
offshoot of that community called the Stavriotes living in the region of Ak
Dag Maden in the province of Ankara in central Anatolia. Both commun-
ities were crypto-Christian, claiming that they had practiced Christianity
in secret ever since their conversion to Islam in the seventeenth century.

83
Selahittin Özçelik, “Osmanlı I_ ç Hukukunda Zorunlu bir Tehir (Mürted Maddesi)”,
p. 375.
26 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The Kromlides openly declared that they were Christians in 1857, after the
declaration of the Reform Edict. Although they trusted the Sublime Porte’s
declaration of religious freedom, it turned out that the Ottoman state was
quite worried that this would be the thin end of the wedge and that the
Kromlides would be followed by other people, ostensibly Muslims, mak-
ing the same claim. The obvious advantage of claiming Christianity was
the avoidance of military service. Although the Ottoman government
instituted universal military service for Muslims and non-Muslims alike
in 1843, this was not actually put into practice until 1910.
An interesting aspect of this crypto, or secret, Christianity is that in
some cases it was not secret at all, or was at best a “public secret”. The
Kromlides and the Stavriotes were not obscure sects hidden away in their
mountain fastness; they were the notables and some of the richest men and
women in the area. Therefore, it is also brought out by the archival
documentation that their so called secret faith was quite well known and
that they were locally called, pejoratively of course, “a people of two
religions”.
A very interesting insight into how the late Ottoman Empire saw
conversion in the late nineteenth century can be gained from the exami-
nation of people who can be called latter-day renegades or “career
converts”, which is the focus of Chapter 4. Also, these conversions forced
the state to consider just who qualified as an Ottoman subject, as sub-
jecthood became something very close to citizenship, as defined by the
Ottoman Citizenship Law of 1869. The nineteenth century was the
century of the professional revolutionary or freedom fighter. Figures
ranging from Lord Byron to General Joseph Bem adopted a cause, usually
national independence, but not necessarily the independence of their own
nation. Byron died fighting for the Greeks, and General Joseph Bem,
originally a Pole, became a leader of the Hungarian Nationalists, com-
manding the Hungarian armies fighting against the Austrians and
Russians in 1848–49. The Hungarians were badly defeated, and thou-
sands of them, including General Bem and many of his close aids, sought
asylum in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had extradition
treaties with Austria and Russia. The only way the Hungarians could
avoid extradition was by converting to Islam. Many of them did. There
were many others like Bem who entered the service of the Ottoman
Empire throughout the nineteenth century. At the other end of the social
spectrum, many of these career converts were of humble origins, techni-
cians, railway workers, even brigands turned policemen in Ottoman
service. Far from being actively encouraged to convert, in the increasingly
 Introduction 27

unstable political milieu of the nineteenth century such people came to be

considered a security risk.
As the relatively more tolerant atmosphere of the Tanzimat State gave
way to the more sternly Muslim rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–
1909), one of the greatest crises of the nineteenth century was to unfold in
eastern Anatolia: the Armenian massacres of 1894–97. The mass conver-
sions of Armenians seeking to save their lives during this crisis is the subject
of Chapter 5. What happened in Anatolia during these critical years
throws into relief much of what was discussed in the previous chapters
regarding conversion and apostasy. None of the meticulous regulations
regarding the “proper procedure” of conversion were applied to the
Armenians. Sometimes entire villages converted in order to save their
lives from the attacks of the Kurdish Hamidiye Regiments and the local
population, who took the occasion to plunder Armenian property. The
“Armenian Question”, as it came to be called in diplomatic parlance, also
highlighted the weakness of the Ottoman state at that time as compared to
earlier centuries, as international public opinion became a major consid-
eration. Abdülhamid II was to gain world opprobrium as the “Red Sultan”
as the result of his Armenian policies.
What determined the attitude of those holding power towards those
who had left the fold? Although the accepted wisdom was that execution
was religiously permitted, indeed ordained, the historical record shows
that this dictum was often deliberately disregarded. Was it simply a matter
of the degree of the state’s coercive power? Was it the presence of the
vigilant foreigners? Or was there an increasingly prevalent notion that
“this was not the done thing anymore”? Most importantly, how does the
study of the politics of conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman
Empire contribute to concepts such as ethnic nationalism, citizenship,
inclusion and exclusion from the imagined community, and the social
politics of identity formation?
 1

“Avoiding the Imperial Headache”

Conversion, Apostasy, and the Tanzimat State

The History of the Tanzimat era is neither dramatic, nor grotesque, nor
splendid. It is a tragedy in the true sense of the term. It was a time of tragic
irresolution which simmered as history moved on. It was a time when a
society; with its institutions, traditions, and statesmen, moved towards its
inevitable end. It was a time of darkness and treason, as well as an epic era,
when legends of virtue and vision were wrought. It was a century during
which progress and decline danced their deadly dance. It was the Longest
Century of the Ottoman Empire.
I_ lber Ortaylı, I_ mparatorlugun En Uzun Yüzyılı (The longest
century of the Empire), p. 13 (my translation)

the “tanzimat state” and “tanzimat man”

The nineteenth century began disastrously for the Ottoman Empire. What
started as a revolt of Serbian knez (chieftains) in 1805 ended as a proto-
nationalist movement backed by Russia.1 The Greek War of Independence
(1821–29) seemed to presage a whole series of similar uprisings through-
out the empire.2 Worst of all, the sultan’s erstwhile vassal, Mehmet Ali
Paşa Kavalalı of Egypt, developed into a regional potentate who was able
to inflict disastrous defeats on the Ottoman armies.3 His son Ibrahim Paşa

1
Selim Aslantaş, Sırp I_ syanları 19. Yüzyılın Şafag ında Balkanlar (The Serbian uprisings: The
Balkans at the dawn of the nineteenth century) (Istanbul, 2007). This very interesting
monograph marks the first time that the issue has been dealt with through a contrapuntal
reading of both Ottoman and Serbian sources.
2
See Hakan Erdem, “Do Not Think of Greeks as Agricultural Labourers”.
3
For a revisionist view of Mehmed Ali as an Egyptian ruler, see Khaled Fahmy, All the
Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, History and the Making of Modern Egypt (New York, 1997).

28
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 29

was poised to strike at Istanbul itself by 1839 and was stopped only by
the intervention of the British, French, and Russians. Ironically, the empire
had been brought to the very brink of collapse not by Russia or by any
Christian power but by a Muslim army commanded by a man who was
himself very much an Ottoman.4 In this context, it became necessary, and
even imperative, for the remaining Christian subjects of the empire, the
reaya, particularly those in Rumeli, to be integrated into a new schema
of governance.5 The Tanzimat State was thus primarily the first, and
last, attempt of the Ottoman ruling class to extend an invitation to its
non-Muslim subjects to become true citizens, as the term reaya (subject)
increasingly came to mean “subject” as in “British subject”, eventually to
be replaced by teba, meaning “citizen”.
There are actually indications that the Tanzimat was a project launched
by Mahmud II (r. 1808–39). Although he was notorious as an iron-fisted
ruler, when Mahmud visited Rumeli in 1837, this was projected as “a
beneficent gesture to show his benevolence towards the reaya”. The sul-
tan’s speech to the population was later published in the official Ottoman
newspaper, the Takvim-i Vekayi:

Our greatest desire is the preservation well being and order of our Muslim and
reaya subjects in all of our Well Protected Domains. We have undertaken this
inconvenience [of the journey] solely to improve the conditions of our domains
and with the munificent aim of assuring the protection of our people and of our
reaya (himayeyi ahali ve reaya).6

In the critical years between the Tanzimat Edict of 3 November 1839,

the Reform Edict of 3 February 1856, and the Constitution of 1876, the
Ottoman state embarked upon a project that was nothing less than the
quest to establish a new mechanism of consent for its rule.7 It is this
time frame that I propose to consider as the “Tanzimat State”. Just what
was the Tanzimat State? How does one justify considering it as a discrete
period? What sets it apart from the periods preceding and following
it? Who were the “Tanzimat Men” responsible for designing and

4
On the Kavalalı dynasty as Ottomans, see Ehud Toledano, State and Society in Mid
nineteeth Century Egypt (New York, 1990).
5
The term reaya actually means “tax paying subject”; after the Tanzimat, it came to mean
exclusively non Muslims, as in “reaya and Muslims” (reaya ve Muslimin).
6
Halil I_ nalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (The Tanzimat and the Bulgarian question)
(Istanbul, 1992), p. 27.
7
On this, see Roderic H. Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim
Equality in the Nineteenth Century”, in his Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History
1774 1923 (Austin, Texas, 1990), pp. 112 31.
30 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

implementing it? It will be the purpose of this chapter to give some spec-
ulative answers to these questions, and particularly to see them through
the prism of the religious politics of the period, more specifically, in the
context of state attitudes towards conversion and apostasy. In these years,
when the old order had been displaced, but the new one that would replace
it was still unclear, conversion and apostasy came to occupy a very strate-
gic location in the relations between the rulers and the ruled. In all the
archival documentation pertaining to conversion, the concern, bordering
on obsession, is that the conversion should not muddy the waters and
risk causing ill-feeling and mistrust between Muslim and Christian, and
above all, between the subjects and the Tanzimat State. The most impor-
tant aspect of the documentation is that it illustrates quite conclusively
that the issues of conversion and/or apostasy were seen as key issues in
domestic politics, and it became a point of honour to “avoid the Imperial
Headache,” which became the catch-all phrase for anything likely to incur
the sultan’s or his government’s displeasure. Indeed, the documentary
evidence shows that the Ottoman authorities did not care very much at
this time about swelling the ranks of the faithful.
To approach the last question first: Who was “Tanzimat Man”? In the
words of I_ lber Ortaylı:

The Tanzimat Man (Tanzimatçı) responds to the cautious conservatism of a tradi

tional society and the impositions of the modern world. He does not believe in
democracy and does not think about it, but he knows that he cannot accomplish
much if he distances himself too far from the masses of the ruled.8

Although the Tanzimat Man may not have been too concerned about
democracy as such, there is no doubt that he was concerned about the
idea of law. Even in the eyes of the conservative Cevdet Paşa, “the primary
duty of the state official should be to act in accordance with the aim of
bringing the rule of law (ikrah-ı hukuk) into execution.”9

the gülhane edict and the promises

of the tanzimat
Although Halil I_ nalcık has tended to see the Gülhane Edict as a continu-
ation of the adaletname genre, whereby each new sultan ascending the

8
I_ lber Ortaylı, I_ mparatorlug un en Uzun Yüzyılı, p. 12.
9
Cristoph K. Neumann, Araç Tarih amaç Tanzîmat. Tarih i Cevdet’in Siyasi Anlamı (History as
a tool, Tanzimat as the aim: The political meaning of Cevdet’s history) (Istanbul, 1999), p. 194.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 31

throne promised to rule justly, the Gülhane Edict is categorically differ-

ent.10 Again, in the words of Ortaylı,

The ‘nation’ (millet) to whom justice and prosperity was being promised was the
entire subject population of the empire. This was the difference between the Edict
and its predecessors. The dominant principles in the Edict were not the direct copies
of the principles of the French Enlightenment. Nor were they the result of the
pressure of a newly arisen class pushing forward their world view. But, this ‘principle
of equality’ [of Muslim and non Muslim] was adopted out of practical consider
ations seeking to find a solution for the crises created by the structural changes in the
empire. These considerations were primarily the nationalist revolts and regional
uprisings which had shaken the empire since the beginning of the century [partic
ularly those] of the Balkan peoples provoked by the foreign powers.11

A major consideration in the aims of the Tanzimat State was the mobilizing
of the population as an efficient productive force, the security of the con-
ditions of production being the first priority. It was in accordance with this
concern that the Tanzimat Men established the local representative councils
(Eyalet Muhhassıl Meclisleri) in the provinces. The Tanzimat reformers
were hardly interested in democracy as such; their aim was more a shift
from sultanic despotism to a legal authoritarian regime, similar to that of the
Habsburg Empire.12 The most significant aspect of these councils was
that they would systematically include non-Muslim members of the com-
munity. Councils in major centres were to have thirteen members. Of these,
six would be appointed government officials. The others would be repre-
sentatives of the local population, Muslim and non-Muslim. The latter
would usually be represented by the leading cleric and the kocabaşı (head-
man).13 These councils will feature prominently in the cases of disputed
conversion to be discussed later.
Despite the good intentions of the Porte, in some places the actual
application of the Tanzimat yielded results opposite to those intended. In
1841, in Niş, the reaya rebelled because their tax burden actually increased
due to the corruption and malpractice of the tax collectors (muhassıl).
When the revolt was put down brutally by the use of Albanian irregulars,
many villages were burnt, and some of the Bulgarian peasantry took refuge

10
Halil I_ nalcık, “Sened i I_ ttifak ve Gülhane Hatt ı Hümayunu”, Belleten 128 (1964), 109
112.
11
I_ lber Ortaylı, Tanzimat’dan Sonra Mahalli I_ dareler (Local government after the Tanzimat)
(Ankara, 1974), p. 1.
12
Ibid., pp. 4 5.
13
Roderic Davison, “The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the
Ottoman Empire”, in Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History 1774 1923, pp. 96 111.
32 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

in autonomous Serbia. This was the last thing the Porte wanted; the
officials responsible were sternly admonished, and the sultan declared an
official amnesty, promising financial compensation to the escaped reaya
if they returned to their villages. The actual wording of the ferman read to
the reaya by the Porte’s envoy, Yakup Paşa, is indicative of the mentality of
the Tanzimat State: “We know that like your homes, your hearts are also
scorched. . . . The Sublime State has sent me here with the sole purpose of
seeking the comfort of the poor”.14
In one of the now-classic works on the application of the Tanzimat,
Halil I_ nalcık has drawn attention to the instructions given to Ali Rıza Paşa,
who was sent to Vidin to quell the 1850 rising. These instructions are
important as they illustrate the attitude of the Tanzimat statesmen towards
peasant rebels:

The first duty of the Paşa is to settle the matter without bloodshed and violence
using firm but gentle language . Only if this does not yield results, the rising is to be
crushed quickly using regular troops. Because if this is not done there is a very real
danger that the rebellion will spread throughout the province. Even if force has to
be used you are to spare innocents who have been duped by trouble makers. You
are to exert the utmost care so that not even a nose bleeds unnecessarily . . .15

Wishing to distance himself from the draconian rule of his father, Mahmud
II, Abdülmecid I (r. 1839–61) sought a new legitimacy for his rule and
found it in the stance of a just and compassionate monarch. Although the
Tanzimat Edict has often been evaluated as an imposition of the foreign
powers – more specifically, of the British Ambassador Stratford Canning
via the intermediary of the Grand Vizier, Mustafa Reşid Paşa – an impor-
tant article by Butrus Abu Manneh has put an entirely new face on the
matter.16 In this article Abu Manneh persuasively argues that much of the
Tanzimat Edict was actually the result of the inner dynamics operating at
the Sublime Porte. He focuses on two memoranda compiled by a commit-
tee including prominent ulema (religious scholars), Reşid Paşa being in
Paris at the time. Abu Manneh particularly draws our attention to an irade

14
Ahmet Uzun, Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler, 1841 Niş I_ syanı Üzerine ayrıntılı bir I_ nceleme
(The Tanzimat and social resistance: A detailed study of the 1841 Niş uprising) (Istanbul,
2002), p. 76.
15
I_ nalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, p. 52. In the event, there were plenty of “nosebleeds”
as the state was unable to avoid bloody reprisals by Albanian irregulars. For a more recent
study of the Niş uprising, see Uzun, Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnisler.
16
Butrus Abu Manneh, “The Islamic Origins of the Tanzimat Edict”, Die Welt des Islams
(1994), 173 203.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 33

(imperial decree) issued on 17 July 1839, some two months before the
actual declaration of the Gülhane Rescript:

This irade of Sultan Abdülmecid was issued to his own ministers meeting in council
and was concerned not with specific abuses but with general principles. This is
what makes it of special interest to us here because it contains basic principles that
were to appear afterwards in the Gülhane, for example, that the shari’a should
be applied, that justice and righteousness should prevail, and that care should be
given to ‘all’ subjects of His Majesty, as well as the required guarantees for their
well being.

What differentiates this from the previous adaletname genre is, again
according to Abu Manneh, that “these decrees differ from Abdülmecid’s
irade in that they were normally addressed to governors, judges or military
commanders in the provinces and concerned with the abuses of authority
committed by them or by their subordinates there.”17
Indeed, in a recent evaluation Caroline Finkel states unequivocally:
“The prominence of Reşid Paşa as a conduit for British influence subse-
quently manifested in Ottoman legislation has tended to overshadow the
home grown aspects of the Edict.”18 The very wording of the Tanzimat
Edict is self-consciously within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence,
the very first article stating, “[A]ny state not ruled by the Şeriat cannot
prevail” (Kavanin-i şer’iyye tahtında idare olunmıyan memalikin payidar
olamıyacagı).19 The edict clearly states that “when a person is in danger
of losing his life, honour and property he has no other recourse than to
rebel”.20 Indeed, we can speculate that the formulators of the edict allowed
a deliberate double entendre to seep into the text, because şeriat, in addition
to meaning şeriat qua Şeriat, “Islamic canon law”, may also mean, generi-
cally, “law or law code”. Indeed, the standard English translation of the
edict begins by stating, “All the world knows that in the first days of the
Ottoman monarchy, the glorious precepts of the Koran and the laws of
the empire were always honoured”, and the paragraph ends with, “[A]n
empire in fact loses all its stability so soon as it ceases to observe its laws”.21

17
Ibid., p. 190.
18
Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300 1923 (London,
2005), p. 449.
19
Düstur (Register of Ottoman Laws) 1. Tertip. Istanbul Matbaa i Amire 1299 (Istanbul
Imperial Press, 1872), vol. 1, pp. 4 7.
20
Ibid.
21
Redhouse Sözlüg ü, Türkçe I_ ngilizce (1979) “şeriat”, and Redhouse Turkish English
Lexicon (Beirut 1974) also includes a secular definition: “A law, a code of law; legislation;
especially the divine laws”. J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. 1
(Princeton, 1956), pp. 113 16.
34 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Another indication that a new era had dawned heralding the rule of
law was the wording of the new Criminal Code of 1840. This forbade
arbitrary punishment, physical abuse, and verbal insults. The law stated
quite unequivocally, “even if a Minister of the state were to kill a shepherd,
he will be punished according to the law”.22
The most striking aspect of the Tanzimat Edict was that it made prom-
ises. It has usually been thought that these promises were made to the
foreign powers with a view to assuaging their pressure to defend the non-
Muslim subjects of the Porte. Although there is no denying the reality of
foreign intervention and pressure, as will be seen in the next chapter, it
will be the purpose of this chapter to stress that those very promises were
meant entirely sincerely and were aimed primarily at the local population.
As elegantly put by Abu Manneh,

Indeed the declaration in the Gülhane Rescript that the decline of the state resulted
from not observing the Shari’a and kanun (temporal law), and that henceforth, the
life honour and property of all subjects would be guaranteed, were not slogans, but
fundamental principles to which the Sultan and the Porte adhered throughout most
of the Tanzimat period.23

The Gülhane Rescript actually spelled it out in so many words:

In testimony of our promises we will, after having deposited these presents in the
hall containing the Glorious Mantle of the Prophet, in the presence of all the ulemas
and the grandees of the empire, make oath thereto in the name of God, and shall
afterwards cause the oath to be taken by the ulemas and grandees of the empire.24

During the early days of the Serbian uprising in the first decade of the nine-
teenth century, the Serbian rebels prepared two petitions to send to Istanbul,
putting forward their demands. The first petition, prepared in April 1805,
was relatively modest, dealing mostly with demands for fair taxation, col-
lected by a chief knez (notable) who would represent all the knez to the sultan.
Belgrade would be under the control not of a military commander but of a
tax emin. The more radical group also prepared a second petition that was
much more extreme in its demands, including an autonomous Serbia similar
to other autonomous areas in the empire like the Ionian Islands or the

22
Cengiz Kırlı, Sultan ve Kamuoyu (The sultan and public opinion) (Istanbul, 2009), p. 74.
23
Butrus Abu Manneh, “The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti Tanzimat Concepts of
Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa”, in Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the
19th Century 1826 1876 (Istanbul, 2001), pp. 161 80.
24
Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. 1, p. 115. The reference to the
Prophet’s Mantle etc. refers to the Chamber of Sacred Relics, where various items attrib
uted to the Prophet are kept.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 35

Romanian Principalities. Ottoman soldiers would leave the Serbian sancaks,

and these would be defended by Serbian troops. Encouraged by Russia, the
knez presented the second petition.25
The first petition had been much more moderate, stressed loyalty to the
sultan, and made requests that boiled down to basic rights and freedoms
that would later be formulated in the Tanzimat Edict of 1839.26 Although
there is no hard evidence, it is quite possible that petitions like these were
remembered in ruling circles in the Porte and had some effect on the
formulators of the actual edict.
I_ nalcık has pointed out that there was every indication that the reaya
took the Tanzimat Men at their word and held them to their promises:

Now let us listen to the reaya themselves. In 1850 the people of Vidin, in a petition
sent to the sultan, state the following: ‘Although we have heard it said that an
Auspicious Tanzimat (Tanzimat ı Hayriyye) has been put into application in the
Well Protected Domains, we have not seen even the slightest application of it to our
humble persons’.27

Declaring their grievances against the exploitation of the local strongmen,

the Bulgarian subjects of the Sultan declared, “And we thought that there
was a Tanzimat”.28
Milen Petrov has recently shown us that during the pilot project of
the Danube Vilayet of Midhat Paşa, in Bulgaria, the reaya would learn to
“speak Tanzimat” and make use of the new secular (nizamiye) courts to
pursue their own aims. Both Christian and Muslim subjects showed that
they fully understood how they could use the Tanzimat State to further
their specific interests.29
Yet it is important to realize that there was nothing in the Tanzimat
Edict that specifically stated the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim.30
Indeed, in the matter of the wearing of the fez by Muslim and non-Muslim
officials alike there was a certain anxiety that the matter of equality might

25
Aslantaş, Sırp I_ syanlari 19, pp. 95 7.
26
Ibid., p. 99.
27
I_ nalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, p. 37.
28
Ibid., p. 99: “Biz zannederiz ki Tanzimat vardır”.
29
Milen V. Petrov, “Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman
Reform, 1864 1868”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 46 (2004), 730 59.
30
Roderic Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the
Nineteenth Century”, Essays in Ottoman Turkish History 1774 1923, pp. 112 131.
See also Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, pp. 113 16: “The Hattı Şerif
of Gülhane”.
36 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

be taken too far. Nearly two years to the day after the proclamation of the
Tanzimat Edict, the minister of war (Serasker) received a ferman:

[It has come to our attention that] lately the non Muslim servants of the Sublime
State have taken to concealing the ribbon on their fezes [indicating non Muslim
status] with the tassel and thus reducing the difference between themselves and the
Muslims. . . . thus the number of reaya who go about in the previous manner has
been much reduced . . .31

Another indication of the spirit of the times was the proposal put forward
by Admiral of the Fleet Halil Rifat Paşa in 1847, that on religious high
days, priests be allowed to board Ottoman naval vessels to perform the
religious services as most of the crews were Christians. He went so far as to
propose that priests be permanently assigned to ships where a special cabin
would be set aside as a chapel and decked out with icons donated by the
Patriarchate. For this the crews had thanked the admiral. On 18 September
1847 Sultan Abdülmecid issued an irade decreeing that priests were to be
permitted to board the ships while they were at anchor, but he had to
consult the Şeyhülislam on the matter of priests being present while the
ship was sailing.32 The matter was referred to the Şeyhülislam Arif Hikmet
Efendi, who ruled that it was out of the question to allow services to take
place aboard ship as “this was tantamount to building a new church on
each ship”. He did allow the crew to go ashore for masses, but only under
escort in order to discourage desertion.33
Istanbul has always suffered from disastrous fires. Cevdet Paşa recounts
that when a great fire broke out in 1850 in the Muslim quarter of Laleli,
there was an attempt to raise money for the victims by public collection:
“The Istanbullus are used to fires and not used to charity so only some eighty
thousand kuruş was raised”, Cevdet commented. The same year another big
fire broke out, this time in the Christian quarter of Samatya. Again, Cevdet’s

31
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry, Ottoman Archives, Istanbul herafter BOA). A.
MKT 5/67, 14 Şevval 1258 / 18 November 1842, the Sublime Porte to the Minister of War.
Order repeated to Imperial Armoury (Tophane), Admiralty (Kapudan Paşa), Imperial
Guard (Asakir i Hassa). The fez had been adopted during the reign of Mahmud II as the
official headgear of all government officials. As a head covering that became the symbol of
“Turkishness”, it was very much an “invented tradition”. For a discussion of the fez as an
invented tradition, see Selim Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the
Late Ottoman Empire”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 35 (1993), 3 29.
32
Ufuk Gülsoy, Osmanli Gayri Müslimlerinin Askerlik Seruveni (The military service adven
ture of Ottoman non Muslims) (Istanbul, 2000), p. 45. It must be borne in mind that the
majority of the crews in naval ships at the time would have been Ottoman Greek Orthodox.
33
Ibid., p. 46. Although we will meet Arif Hikmet Efendi again as a committed advocate of
the Tanzimat, there were evidently some limits to his tolerance.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 37

tongue-in-cheek observation was, “It would not do to omit to start a

collection for the Samatya fire as it would give rise to mutterings of ‘no
one cares about the Christians’ (Hıristiyanlar aranmıyor) but remembering
how hesitant people were to contribute to the previous [Muslim] fire the
matter was dropped”.34
There is little doubt that the Tanzimat was intensely unpopular among
the general Muslim population. Many thought that it was the end of their
privileged status and felt deeply threatened. A fascinating article by Cengiz
Kırlı, based on hitherto unused spy reports, provides us with an insight
into how the Tanzimat was seen in the Istanbul streets in the early 1840s.35
In an atmosphere where news of another uprising in the Balkans arrived
every day and rumour and counter-rumour were rife, many Muslims
feared that the breakup of the empire was imminent. There was also the
feeling that the Tanzimat fostered a general lawlessness. A prominent view
was that the Tanzimat had done away with the death penalty. In Salonica,
according to one such rumour, the Greeks had killed two Jews, but the
Paşa had let them go because their crimes “could not be proved according
to the Tanzimat reforms”. Another Muslim was heard to say, “These
Croats have been plundering our villages, because they have no fear of
death [penalty]. Look at what I am going to do! I am going to fight a reaya,
and I am going to kill him. If anyone asks me why I did it, I will say I did it,
because there is no death penalty in the Tanzimat.” According to another
report a spy had overheard two Muslims discussing the ringing of church
bells, a practice hitherto forbidden:

These infidels are ringing bells and the palace is right here. Oh God! Give us a
chance and we are going to make them sorry to have been born. And look, they
have their kids wear green headscarves. It seems the rule has passed to them.

As news of uprisings continued to pour in, two Muslims were heard to

say, “We hear of reaya uprisings all over. Do you think this could have
happened previously? But it is not the fault of the reaya. It is our fault. Since
they invented the Tanzimat, even the fear of the police had vanished. This

34
Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir no. 7, “The Events of the Year 1271” (1855), p. 53. On the Istanbul
fires, see Zeynep Çelik, The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the
Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, 1993).
35
Cengiz Kırlı, “Balkan Nationalisms and the Ottoman Empire: Views from Istanbul
Streets”, in Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (eds.), Ottoman Rule and the
Balkans, 1760 1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation. Proceedings of an interna
tional conference held in Rethymno, Greece, 13 14 December 2003, pp. 249 63.
38 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

is the result”. In such a political milieu rumours were not simply “anxiety-
provoking” but “anxiety-confirming”.36
The Tanzimat also had its enemies among the highest ranks of the
Ottoman elite. The most formidable among them was Mahmud Nedim
Paşa, who would become Grand Vizier after Âli’s death in 1871. Mahmud
Nedim was a virulent critic of the Tanzimat.37

conversion and apostasy as the

“imperial headache”
The issues of conversion and apostasy had been particularly thorny ones,
since the old religiously sanctioned execution of apostates from Islam was
no longer enforced.38 It became a matter of official policy to prevent the
execution of apostates. This was for two reasons. First, after the “apostasy
crisis” of 1844 there was increasing pressure on the part of foreign powers
to prevent the practice because it was “uncivilised”. This will be discussed
in the next chapter.39 Second, and more significantly, there was an increas-
ing awareness among the Ottoman elite that if a new social consensus
between rulers and subjects was to be achieved, anything that was likely
to heighten tension and make the already difficult task of building the
new society even more difficult was extremely undesirable. The Tanzimat
statesmen tried to shift from a system that George Augustinos has called
“coordinated inequality” to a more equitable system:

As matters settled out after the Tanzimat however individual instances of forbidden
actions took place infrequently between the confessional communities. Cases of
conversion or apostasy, depending on one’s viewpoint, were among the most
dramatic if not sensational of such incidents. Because the highest most sacred
laws of a community were involved, these episodes had a great potential to produce
destructive outbursts of fanaticism between confessional groups.40

As will be seen later, conversion and/or apostasy cases were by no means

“individual instances” or “infrequent”, and the “confessional communities”

36
Ibid., pp. 254, 255. In relation to the function of rumour, Kırlı is citing P. Lienhardt, “The
Interpretation of Rumour”, in J. M. H. Beattie and R. G. Lienhardt (eds.), Studies in Social
Anthropology: Essays in Memory of E. E. Evans Pritchard (Oxford, 1975), p. 115. Green
was a colour reserved for Muslims.
37
Butrus Abu Manneh, “The Sultan and the Bureaucracy”, pp. 161 80.
38
See my “There Is No Compulsion in Religion.”
39
On this, see Chapter 2 of this volume, “Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis”.
40
Gerasimos Augustinos, The Greeks of Asia Minor: Confession, Community and Ethnicity
in the Nineteenth Century (Kent, Ohio & London, 1992), p. 203.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 39

that Augustinos mentions were coming to see themselves more and more
as “nationally imagined communities”, making the clashes all the more
“dramatic”. The immediate aftermath of the Tanzimat Edict saw an anxious
Sublime Porte walking a tightrope between the need to establish the “reor-
dering” on a firm footing, neutralize foreign pressure, and, more impor-
tantly, preserve social equilibrium while at the same time safeguarding its
legitimacy in the eyes of its Muslim subjects. The repeated orders to the
provinces reflect this anxiety.
Yet there is a significant additional dimension that seems to have escaped
the attention of historians. The Porte was following a two-tier policy here.
The ambassadors were to be given these assurances, that the execution of
apostates was outlawed forthwith and that no force or coercion was to be
used in the process of conversion, but nowhere in the Ottoman provinces
was this to be proclaimed publicly. Document after document mentions
verbatim that what was desired above all was “avoiding the Imperial
Headache” (tasdî -i Âliyi mucib olmamak).41 The “headache” would prob-
ably have consisted of overbearing diplomats going on about the “promises
of the Turks”, non-Muslim communities anxious about any claim of
forced conversion, clamouring millet clergymen all too ready to cry forced
conversion, and most of all, some elements in the Muslim population that
might take the law into their own hands at any moment. In most of the cases
of apostasy discussed in this chapter, the apostate is a recent convert to
Islam. In this context, conversion to Islam, although an auspicious act
religiously, became politically inconvenient.
The following acknowledgement of an order received by the Kaimakam
of Filibe (Plovdiv) is one of many similar documents:

The Imperial Order (Irade i Seniyye) pertaining to the future treatment of one who
commits apostasy has been received and understood. As ordered, [such persons]
will not be executed and they will not be brought up before the local courts but sent
directly to Istanbul. It has also been understood that it is not necessary to mention
this order here and there and to avoid unnecessary public mention of it. (Bunun
şuna buna beyan ve ifadesine hacet olmadıgı.42

In a similar vein the Vali of Akka (Acre) in Palestine was to write:

The order pertaining to the prevention of forced conversions has been received and
understood. Particularly the forcing or importuning of children in this regard is

41
Sir James Redhouse, A Turkish and English Lexicon (Beirut, 1974): “tasdî: a giving one a
headache figuratively, by a request or importunity”.
42
BOA Sadaret Mektubî (A/MKT) 10/52 1 9 Rebiyulevvel 1260 / 29 March 1844, the
Kaimakam of Filibe, Abdulahad.
40 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

contrary to regulation and berats (privileges) issued to the Metropolitans. The

ferman relating to this has been transmitted secretly (hafiyyen) from predecessor
to successor in this office.43

These two documents furnish some important clues. First, the injunction not
to bring apostates before the local courts indicates a desire to avoid publicity
and possible provocation of local resentment, Muslim and non-Muslim
alike. Second, the aspect of secrecy can be understood as a desire to avoid
offending Muslim sensibilities and possibly a desire to avoid intervention on
the part of meddling foreign consuls, missionaries, and so forth. The need
for secrecy is also stressed in the document pertaining to the undesirability
of the conversion of reaya children, where accusations of forced conversion,
abduction, rape, and abuse could be made. Yet this order too was to be kept
secret, not to be “announced here and there”, because the Muslim popula-
tion would be mortally offended if the officials of the Islamic government
refused a conversion.
The officials are quite plainly being asked to proceed on a “need-to-know
basis”. The Mutasarrıf of Akka, Mehmed Said, actually mentions that the
order was secretly transmitted from predecessor to successor, implying that
this was a general standing order to all provinces. This is also borne out by
the almost standardised replies received from each province. Similarly, a few
days later the kaimakam of Kastamonu was to declare: “According to the
just laws now in force . . . It has been understood that apostates are not to be
executed but are to be sent directly to Istanbul”.44
As in so many of these cases, to issue an order was one thing, to actually
enforce it was another. This is borne out by the fact that some six years
later similar orders were still being sent out. On 9 September 1850, the Vali
of Üsküp (Skopje Macedonia) acknowledged receipt of the irade dated
16 Şevval 1266 (25 August 1850) to the effect that “when people from
other millets want to come to Islam they should be adequately questioned
in the local council to make sure that no sort of force or coercion was being
used”. The Vali informed the Porte that he had issued the appropriate
instructions to all localities in his province.45 The capsule phrase, “no sort
of force or coercion” (bir güna cebr ve ikrah), is repeated verbatim in all of
these acknowledgements.

43
BOA HR. MKT 3/65, 16 Rebiyulahir 1260 / 5 May 1844, Mutasarrıf of Akka Mehmed
Said to the Sublime Porte. My emphasis.
44
BOA A.MKT 10/61, 13 Rebiyülevvel 1260 / 2 April 1844, Kaimakam of Kastamonu,
Esseyid Mehmed Salih to the Sublime Porte.
45
BOA A.MKT. UM 33/46, 2 Zilkade 1266 / 9 September 1850, the Vali of Üsküp I_ smail
Paşa to the Sublime Porte.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 41

In what was clearly the acknowledgement of the order circulated to all

the provinces, the Vali of Salonica replied on 12 September 1850 that the
irade had been “received and understood”. The Vali fully admitted that
“such irregularities are reported from outlying districts, particularly
involving reaya girls and boys, and these are clearly contrary to the Holy
Law and the wishes of our August Master”.46
The acknowledgement received from far-off Crete is interesting in its
detail:

Although it is not permitted to apply force or coercion in bringing non Muslims to

Islam some have been carrying off reaya girls to the mountains, there doing what
they want with them, and then taking them to their home villages, claiming that
they have become Muslims. Others frighten reaya servants who serve in their
homes and bring them before the local courts, claiming that they want to become
Muslims. These latter then repeat the Shahada that they have been made to
memorize without understanding what it is to become honoured with the glory
of Islam. Also some [Christian] children fearing punishment at the hands of their
parents run away and declare that they want to become Muslims. Some irrespon
sible officials, out of ignorance, hastily accept their conversions. [These children]
when questioned later admit that they accepted Islam unknowingly and unwill
ingly. . . . In matters such as these [as ordered in the irade] in order to avoid future
complications, if the convert is young, it is imperative to carry out the conversion in
the presence of the parents and in front of witnesses to dispel all doubt.47

Province after province reported that they had received the order. The
acknowledgments all follow a similar pattern: the admission that such
untoward acts were occurring “in outlying areas”, promises to stop any
recurrence, the required presence of next of kin during the conversion
procedure, and the required presence of the local priest or desbot (lower-
ranking secular head of the non-Muslim community), all of this being
carried out in the presence of the local administrative council.48

46
BOA A.MKT UM 32/71, 4 Zilkade 1266 / 11 September 1850, the Vali of Salonica, Yakub
Abduh Paşa to the Sublime Porte.
47
BOA A.MKT.U M 31/60 9 Zilkade 1266 / 16 September, 1850 Müşir of Crete Mustafa
Naili Paşa to the Sublime Porte.
48
BOA A.MKT UM 34/92, 9 Zilhicce 1266 / 16 October 1850, Vali of Sayda Vamık Paşa to
the Sublime Porte; A.MKT UM 32/39, 29 Zilkade 1266 / 6 October 1850, the Vali of
Ankara Mehmed Vecihi Paşa to the Sublime Porte (my thanks to Edhem Eldem for helping
me decipher the signature seal); A.MKT UM 32/73, 9 Zilkade 1266 / 17 September 1850,
the Vali of Vidin El Seyyid Ali Rıza Paşa to the Sublime Porte; A.MKT UM 32/55, 6
Zilkade 1266 / 13 September 1850, the Müşir of Aydın Halil Mazhar Paşa to the Sublime
Porte; A.MKT UM 33/8, 5 Zilkade 1266 / 12 September 1850, Mutasarrıf of Rumeli
Hasan Hüsnü Paşa to the Sublime Porte. My thanks to Gültekin Yıldız for these references.
42 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

There are repeated references to a “council of advisors made up of

famous ulema” who sat in Istanbul and deliberated on the matter and
determined what course of action was to be followed. It was also determined
by the same council that if the contested conversion case were to occur in
the capital, it should be brought before no lesser a body than the Higher
Council for Judicial Affairs (Meclis-i Valayı Ahkam-ı Adliye).49
Strife caused by conversions between Christian confessions also came
to be considered part of the “Imperial Headache”. On 1 June 1855 the
Armenian Catholic Patriarch wrote to the Porte complaining that
Armenian Catholics in Kütahya, Eyalet of Bursa, were being victimised
by the local Apostolic Armenian Metropolitan and the Kocabaşis (senior
head of non-Muslim community):

It is not necessary to recall to Your Excellency that this sort of thing is entirely against
the principle of the freedom of religion and can cause injury and headache as [acts
of this nature] are entirely contrary to the spirit of justice and mercy of this age.50

The Porte replied in the same spirit: “It is not necessary to remind you that
thanks to the Wellspring of Justice his Imperial Majesty all peoples of the
Sublime State are to be protected and . . . anyone changing religion of their
own free will is not to be interfered with”.51 “Avoiding the Imperial
Headache” and “spirit of the age” had also become by-words in the non-
Muslim communities of the Tanzimat State.

conversion procedure
The conversion cases usually follow a broad pattern. The potential con-
verts declare that they want to be “honoured with the Islamic religion”
(Islam ile müşerref olmak); they are then brought before the religious court
of the judge, the kadi. Each potential convert has a spiritual guide, a sort of

49
BOA A.MKT UM 34/30, 10 Zilkade 1266 / 18 September 1850, the Vali of Sıvas Mehmed
Münir Paşa to the Sublime Porte; A.MKT 31/60 9 Zilkade 1266 / 16 September 1850,
Müşir of Crete, Mustafa Naili Paşa, to the Sublime Porte. On the Meclis i Vala, see I_ lber
Ortaylı, I_ mparatorlug un En Uzun Yüzyılı, p. 148: “The Meclis i Vala i Ahkam Adliye
was the highest ranking advisory body in the empire and also functioned as the council of
appeal”. By the same author, Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli I_ dareler, p. 36: “[After the
Reform Edict of 1856] each non Muslim community was to be represented in the
Meclis i Vala by their religious chiefs and lay members who would be appointed for one
year”. The deliberations of this council will be discussed in the following chapter.
50
BOA HR.MKT 95/24, 15 Ramazan 1271 / 1 June 1855, the Armenian Catholic
Patriarchate to the Sublime Porte.
51
Ibid., 21 Ramazan 1271 / 7 June 1855, the Sublime Porte to vilayet of Hüdavendigar
(Bursa).
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 43

‘sponsor’, who guides him or her through the conversion process. This
person was of critical importance because very often he or she was the
object of accusations of forcible conversion or pressure. They were often
wealthy or powerful Muslims who had been employing the potential
convert as a servant in their household.52 In the presence of the judge
and witnesses, the potential converts declared openly that they were
converting with “free will and conscience” (bil tav ve ul rıza) and that
they had not been pressured in any way (bir gûna ibram ve ilhah
olunmadıgı). The converts had to declare that they were of sound
mind (akîl) and had reached the age of legal responsibility (bülug). The
converts then repeated the sacred formula “There is no God but Allah
and Muhammed is his Prophet” “in their own words” (kelimeteyni
şehadeteyni kendi lisaniyla tekellüm ederek), at which point they were
given an Islamic name. The procedure was then repeated in the secular
local administrative council (meclisi idare) of the province (eyalet/ vilayet),
prefecture (sancak), or district (kaza).53 At this point the parents of the
convert or next of kin were to be present together with the highest local
religious functionary (priest or community leader), who would be given
the opportunity to dissuade the convert.54 There is frequent reference to
conversion being carried out “according to the proper procedure” (usul ve
nizamına tevfiken). The documents testifying to the act of legitimate con-
version were to be signed and sealed by Muslim and Christian officials
alike. The procedure was not to be hurried, and if a few days’ delay was
required for the priest or the next of kin to arrive, the conversion was to
be postponed. Only those children who had reached the age of puberty
were allowed to convert. Also, in the case of girls who came to the

52
Eyal Ginio, “Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion to Islam in the Ottoman State”,
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 25 (2001), 90 119.
53
BOA Dahiliye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirlig i (DH HMŞ) 13/47; 23 Haziran 1320 / 6 July
1904, general no. 244, file no. 62570 (Ministry of the Interior Legal Advisors Bureau). In
the catalogue of the documents of the Ministry of the Interior Legal Advisors Bureau there
is a special category entitled ihtida, “conversion”. Although the regulations cited above
date from 1904, they are the updated formulations of earlier practices.
54
The element of attempted dissuasion seems to be a survival from earlier practices. George
Arnakis claims that it was part of the earlier berats (privileges) accorded to the Orthodox
Church after the Ottoman conquest: “The religious head of his community had the right to
try to dissuade him in the presence of his parents or relatives. During the long Ottoman rule
this stipulation was violated repeatedly in actual practice, but nonetheless its inclusion in
the berats saved thousands of Christians from forceful Islamization”. See George Arnakis,
“The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire”, The Journal of Modern
History 24 (1952), 235 50.
44 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

ceremony veiled, the veil had to be lifted to ascertain identity.55 At the

end of all this, the convert was accepted as a Muslim and registered as
such, being given a “certificate of conversion” (ihtida ilamı).56
What makes this procedure even more significant is that according to
traditional Islamic practice, there is no stipulation that the act of conver-
sion be witnessed by a kadı, let alone by secular authorities. Conversion is
purely personal and can be carried out alone. A recent authoritative source
clearly states: “The only requirement for conversion is the shahada, the
acceptance of the oneness of Allah and of Muhammad as his prophet. This
does not have to be carried out with any ceremony or in the presence of any
religious authority”.57
Marc Baer has cited fetwas from the fetwa collections of seventeenth-
century Şeyhülislams Minkârizade and Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, where “Valid
conversions for men might be as simple as wrapping their head in a Muslim
turban, saying the Muslim credo and declaring themselves to be Muslims
in the presence of other Muslims”.58 Only if the converts wanted to have
an official record for legal purposes did they go to the kadı court – in order
to prove, for instance, that they were Muslims and hence exempt from
the capitation tax (cizye).59 The procedure outlined here was therefore

55
BOA A.MKT 114/35, 7 Ramazan 1264 / 7 August 1848. Account of the conversion
ceremony of a woman, Metka, daughter of Mulacu, from the kaza of Şehrikoy near Niş;
evidently Metka had shown up veiled.
56
Osman Çetin, Sicillere Göre Bursa’da Ihtida Hareketleri ve Sosyal Sonuçları 1472 1909
(Ankara, 1994), pp. 3 5.
57
Ali Köse, “I_ htida”, Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 2000): Türk Diyanet Vakfı, vol. 21, p. 555.
There is actually a website that instructs potential converts, called “How to Convert to
Islam and Become a Muslim”, where the potential convert is told, “One may convert alone
in privacy, or he/she may do so in the presence of others”. There is also a “Live Help” link
that asks: “Have a question or need help about converting? Click here to chat now or to
request a call back”. The site talks the potential convert through the Shahada and gives basic
information on Islam, making sure to stress that when a person converts, “all of a person’s
previous sins are forgiven”. The site ends with: “We welcome you to Islam, congratulate you
on your decision, and will try to help you in any way we can”. See www.islamreligion.com/
articles/204/; click on “How to convert to Islam and become a Muslim”.
58
Marc Baer, “Islamic Conversion Narratives of Women: Social Change and Gendered
Religious Hierarchy in Early Modern Istanbul”, Gender and History 16 (2004), 425 58.
59
Eyal Ginio, “Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion to Islam in the Ottoman State”,
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 25 (2001), 90 119, particularly 97: “[O]ne was not
obliged to have recourse to a court order in order to articulate one’s conversion. Muslim
religious treatises speak of the simple utterance of the confession of faith, known as the
Şehadet, the defining characteristic of Islam. There was no requirement that such a religious
declaration should be pronounced in court”. See also Macit Kenanog lu, Osmanli
Devletinde Fikir ve I_ nanç Hürriyeti (Freedom of thought and religion in the Ottoman
Empire), unpublished paper. Also personal communication from Macit Kenanoglu dated
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 45

an innovation of the Tanzimat State. Later in the nineteenth century it also

became accepted practice to announce the conversions in the press in
special columns marked “conversion” (ihtida), much like an obituary
column. Here is a typical example:

Kevork Efendi, a member of the Armenian millet and a notable of Diyarbakır, has
made it known that he has been honoured by accepting Islam. He has duly
presented a petition to the governorate for the application of the Şeriat procedures.
When questioned according to accepted procedure he firmly said I have presented
this petition with complete freedom of conscience and because my conversion is
the result of divine salvation. The above mentioned is a person of considerable
wealth, of some sixty years of age, sound of mind and body and is in no way needy
or destitute. Therefore his petition was accepted and he was offered the faith.
According to his own wish he took the name of Ali.60

At all points the procedure was in appearance extremely bureaucratic and

straightforward, with the main aim being that the conversion be proven to be
voluntary. Another interesting aspect to the procedure just mentioned is that
at no point does it mention circumcision. This may be because circumcision
is in fact a sunat al-fitra, a practice that is recommended but not obligatory:

there is an expectation in some quarters that males should undergo circumcision,

should this be necessary. . . . although recommended, this is not considered obliga
tory, and older people becoming Muslim may well decide not to go ahead with this
operation.61
25 October 2005. See also Akif Erdog ru, “Osmanlı Kıbrıs’ında I_ htida Meselesi, 1580
1640” (The matter of conversion in Ottoman Cyprus) (I_ zmir, 1999), pp. 164 71.
60
Tercüman I Hakikat no. 3028, 14 Zilkade 1305, p. 3. For similar announcements, see
Tercüman I Hakikat no. 3045, 1 Agustos / 3 Zilhicce 1305, dealing with the conversion of
“Catholic Ibrahim Yusuf Mu’man from Jabal Lubnan” and “Meryem daughter of
Mardiros from the Armenian community” of the vilayet of Aleppo. They converted
“voluntarily and of their own free will” and took the names Ibrahim and Vasfiye. Note
that Ibrahim already had a Muslim name, by no means an uncommon occurrence in
Lebanon. The newspaper announced that both cases had been duly reported to the
Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects. The same newspaper regularly gave news of
conversions from all corners of the empire, ranging from Dedeagaç in Thrace to
Lebanon; see Tercuman ı Hakikat nos. 3025, 15 Zilkade 1305, and 3031, 17 Zilkade
1305 / 26 July 1888. My thanks to Gülçin Tunalı for finding these references.
61
See Yasin Dutton, “Conversion to Islam: The Qur’anic Paradigm”, in Christopher Lamb
and M. Darrol Bryant (eds.), Religious Conversion: Contemporary Practices and
Controversies (London and New York, 1999), pp. 151 66. See also The Encyclopaedia
of Islam (Leiden, 2004), khitan: “Not mentioned in the Kur’an but in old poetry and
hadith. . . . Must have been a common practice in early Arabia . . . It is further recognized in
hadith that circumcision belongs to pre Islamic institutions. . . . In traditions which enu
merate the features of natural religion (al fitra) circumcision is mentioned together with the
clipping of the nails, the use of the toothpick, the cutting of the moustaches, and the more
profuse length of the beard”.
46 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

This is all the more surprising as there was a specific Ottoman law dating
from the seventeenth century clearly setting forth the regulation pertaining
to circumcision. The law is called the “Statute Regarding New Muslims”
(Kanun-u Nev Müslim) and is quite explicit:

If an infidel wants to become a Muslim in the Imperial Council (Divan) in the

presence of the Grand Vizier he must be made to pronounce the Şehadet. The
Treasurer (Defterdar) will then be ordered to give him a purse and a new set of
clothes. Then he will be given into the custody of a poursuivant (çavuş) who will
take him to one of the state surgeons of the court where the surgeon on duty that
day will take him to the place set apart for this and perform his circumcision
forthwith. It is an old law that a surgeon is on duty every day in the Imperial
Divan and in the palace of the Grand Vizier.62

The Statute Regarding New Muslims was formulated in an earlier era and
continued to be used in the nineteenth century.63
There are registers (defters) in the Ottoman archives dating from the
mid-nineteenth century that contain short entries regarding the conversion
records. Here is a typical entry: “One who was originally of the Armenian
millet has presented himself wishing to be honoured with the glory of
Islam. He had the religion presented to him was given the name Ali and
sent to the official hospital (bimarhane) for his circumcision.”64 Another
entry reads as follows:

One who was originally an Austrian subject has been presented by the Foreign
Ministry and wishing to be honoured by the glory of Islam had the religion
presented to him was given the name of Mehmed and sent to the official hospital
for his circumcision.65

Yet another entry concerns a Jew: “One who was originally from the
Jewish millet has presented himself stating that he wished to be honoured
with the glory of Islam he had the religion presented to him and was given

62
Milli Tetebbu`lar Mecmuasi, vol. 1, no. 3, Temmuz Agustos (July August) 1331 (1915).
My thanks to Yasemin Umur for this reference.
63
Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, p. 191. This has indeed been indicated by Marc Baer,
who points out that the statute was the work of Abdi Paşa, who was imperial chancellor
and official chronicler between 1669 and 1678. Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa ordered
him to “codify the statute outlining correct procedure while compiling all known Ottoman
statutes into a single collection of Ottoman Law. . . . This became the Statute of the New
Muslim”. Abdi Paşa finished the statute in 1677.
64
BOA. Bab ı Ali Evrak Odası (BEO) A 592. Sadaret Nezaret ve Devair (ANZD) 634. 27
Safer 1265 / 22 January 1849. There are 341 entries in this defter that runs from 1265 to
1268. My thanks to Dilek Akyalçın Kaya for this reference.
65
Ibid., 22 Safer 1265 / 17 January 1849.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 47

the name Mehmed Hidayetullah, he was then sent to the hospital for his
circumcision”.66
There are several interesting aspects to these entries. We are not given
the original name of the convert, only his original community (millet) or
nationality (tabiyet). Very often these entries will provide information as
to the “channel” the convert came from, as in the case of the Austrian
subject just mentioned who was “presented” by the Foreign Ministry. In
other cases the “sponsor” of the convert is mentioned, and he or she is
returned to them after the ceremony. It is interesting that in all of the cases
of Jewish male converts, despite the fact that they were Jewish and there-
fore supposedly already circumcised, the convert is still sent to the hospital
for circumcision (hitanı icra içün). Presumably this was in order to check
that he was in fact circumcised.
The potential convert would present a petition in standard formulaic
language, of which the following is an example. The petition is addressed
to the Grand Vizier:

May God grant long life to our Glorious merciful and bounteous Sultan, Amen.
I the humble petitioner am originally from the Armenian millet and had hitherto
been in the state of infidelity and ignorance. I have now reached salvation through
being honoured with the glory of Islam and have left the false religion and have
understood that the only true religion is that of Muhammed. I have wholeheartedly
believed this and clearly stated it with my own tongue. I seek the mercy of
pronouncing the shahada in the presence of your Excellency on this auspicious
day and wish to be circumcised and to don the robe of honour (kisve). As in all
things this is for his August Majesty to order.67

As late as 1911, there was a report of a case where a convert “claimed to

have converted years before but his circumcision had not yet been carried
out”. This was the case of the convert Mehmed, originally a Christian from
the village of Kara Göl, sancak of Canik. Mehmet had been serving his time
in prison on a murder charge and had submitted a petition to the Grand
Vizier requesting that his circumcision be carried out. The Ministry of
Interior duly ordered that his circumcision should be carried out as “if this
is not done it will be a bad example”.68

66
Ibid., 7 Safer 1266 / 23 December 1849.
67
BOA Cevdet Tasnifi: Adliye 2083 H1257 M1841. The other examples of petitions in this
source are almost verbatim repetitions, replacing “Armenian” with “Jew” or “Rum”.
68
BOA DH.ID 116/16, 16 Nisan 1327 / 29 April 1911, Mutasarrıf of Canik to the Ministry
of the Interior.
48 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

conversion cases
On 30 January 1846, the Prefect (müdir) of the prefecture of Silistre
(Bulgaria) wrote to the Grand Vizier’s Chancery that a young Armenian
boy had been encouraged to convert to Islam by a certain Hüseyin Aga, a
lieutenant in the local military band. His parents had applied to the author-
ities asking that that their son be removed to Istanbul. The müdir testified
that the boy had sworn in his presence that he “had not been forced or
importuned in any way” and that “his conversion was entirely a result of
his desire for salvation”. The matter was taken extremely seriously at the
highest level, and the commander of the Army of Rumelia in Silistre
reiterated that in keeping with his orders from the Grand Vizier, he was
entrusting the boy to a loyal officer and was sending him to Istanbul. He
requested that the Grand Vizier’s Chancery inform him of the boy’s safe
arrival. In due course he was so informed.69
The document mirrors several themes that will continue to come up in
this context. First, the convert always repeats on these occasions that he or
she has chosen Islam freely and without being subjected to any compulsion
whatsoever. Second, the fact that a matter as ostensibly marginal as the
conversion of a small boy should be taken up to the highest reaches of the
state indicates that conversion had become a critical issue. Third, the convert
was removed from the local setting and almost always sent to Istanbul.
The pattern can be discerned in case after case: the elaborate ceremony of
conversion, in religious and secular councils, with the presence of Christian
clergy and next of kin, leading to an ostentatious show of the sincerity of
the conversion.70 On 22 June 1846, the Vali of Silistre was instructed in no
uncertain terms that conversions were not to be accepted “unless it became
clear that [the person] was entering Islam purely as the result of the prompt-
ings of his conscience”. The Vali, Mehmed Said Paşa, referred to an irade
that he had recently received to that effect and acknowledged that he had
“forwarded the auspicious orders to all the officials of the district”.71 The

69
BOA Bab ‘Ali Evrak Odası Sadaret Evrakı Mektubi Kalemi, Secretariat of the Sublime
Porte Chancery A.MKT 59/24, 2 Safer 1262 / 30 January 1846.
70
BOA A.MKT 59/54. Report of the meeting of the Administrative Council of Silistre, 27
Cemaziyelahir 1262 / 22 June 1846. Signed by Hamparsum, leader of the Armenian millet
of Silistre; Haci Mehmed Emin, keeper of the local community savings chest (emin i
sandik); Haci Mehmed Tahir, attendant of the public bath; El Hac Süleyman Şükrü, the
Kadi’s representative (naib); and Numan the scribe. The document is also interesting as it
gives us a profile of the sort of people who could be on a local council.
71
BOA A.MKT.UM 171/14, 19 Safer 1271 / 11 November 1854, the Vali of Silistre to the
Sublime Porte.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 49

irade that the Vali was referring to was almost certainly the circulating order
mentioned earlier.
On 10 February 1846 the mutasarrıf of Rumeli reported that a boy
from Manastır, “a grocer’s apprentice named Nikola, about nine or ten
years of age”, had declared that he had become Muslim. He had been
duly entrusted to the care of a guardian, Halil Bey, a member of the local
council. The matter had immediately been referred to Istanbul, and the
tone of the communication bears the clear indication of some anxiety as to
the propriety of the conversion:

[Although] he had declared that he was accepting Islam of his own free will, as he
is very young and may not be able to tell right from wrong, this may cause loose
talk among his kin and community. This should be avoided if at all possible. If it
transpires that everything remains calm and there is no lamentation things should
be left as they are. This is the line of action ordered by the August Grand Vezirate in
keeping with the requirements of the times.72

Several important recurrent themes stand out here. First, the concern over
“loose talk” (kîl-u kâl) is constantly at the forefront of the official mind. The
second is that the convert, being underage, could somehow be rumoured to
have been led astray or tricked into accepting Islam. This is a concern
emanting from the Christian community. Third, if there is no “loose talk”,
things should be left as they are. This is a concern emanating from the
Muslim community, which could potentially be offended if the boy were
to become an apostate. Fourth, it is stated that this line of conduct is official
policy, as detemined by the historical conjuncture.
The various instances of dubious conversions, and the Porte’s reactions
to them, show that the Ottoman authorities did not actually want Christians
to convert at this time, but could not openly say so. Any such untoward
event could only have destabilizing consequences.
This historical conjuncture forms the setting for a letter from the Greek
Patriarch in Istanbul dated 9 August 1846, protesting the dubious con-
version of a young Greek boy as the result of the efforts of a certain Halil
Aga, who had “promised him many rewards and blessings” if he should
convert. The Patriarch protested, “[T]his sort of thing is not in keeping
with peace and harmony and may cause the festering of ill will and enmity
between communities” (milleteyn beyninde burudet ve husumeti mucib).

72
BOA A MKT 37/61 13 Safer 1262 / 10 February 1846, the Mutasarrif of the eyalet
(province) of Rumeli to the Grand Vezirate. Manastir is present day Bitola, the capital of
the Republic of Macedonia. A/MKT 34/24, 19 Muharrem 1262 / 17 January 1846,
memorandum of the meeting of the Council of Manastir.
50 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The authorities were duly instructed to release the boy and to entrust him
to a guardian, who would bring him to Istanbul. Here again, we catch a
further whiff of the spirit of the times as the Patriarch actually warns the
Grand Vizier that such untoward events may cause “ill will and enmity
between the communities”.73 Although not involving any sort of conver-
sion, another case evoking the new spirit of the era occured in Bandırma
on the coast of the Marmara Sea. The Greek Patriarch in Istanbul reported
on 18 August 1850 that a twelve-year-old Greek boy had been set upon
by two Muslims, raped, and very badly beaten. The culprits had been
apprehended, but the naib (representative) of the kadı court in Erdek
had released them and had “uttered words that would encourage such
rabble”. The Greek community had sent a petition of protest to the
Patriarchate. The Patriarch stated that “as honour is as precious as life if
the culprits are not punished this will be extremely damaging to the trust
and confidence of the people (emniyet-i ahali ez her cihet meslub olub).”74
Similar cases appeared all over Anatolia. On 20 June 1846 the Vali of
Diyarbekir reported that an Armenian girl, “approximately ten-years-
old”, had converted to Islam in the kaza of Divrik. The Vali outlined his
options as either giving the girl back to her father, “in keeping with the
delicacy of the times and conditions (nezaket-i vakt ve hal icabınca)”, or, if
she persisted, sending her to Istanbul under escort. The Vali’s assesment of
the situation makes clear just what he meant by the “delicacy of the times”:

“Since the Auspicious Tanzimat, in all the posts in which I served, when matters
like this came up, in order to avoid causing headache for our August Benefactor
[the sultan], I sought to avoid exaggerating the issue and tried, in keeping with
the times and conditions to quietly put the matter to rest (sessizce hüsn ü
indifa’ına)”.75

“Avoiding the Imperial Headache” becomes something of a recurring motif

in these matters. On 28 July 1846, the Vali of Silistre was to apologize to the
Grand Vizier that he had been unable to avoid “causing headache to His
Excellency” over a case that had come up in his province. The Vali felt

73
BOA A.MKT 50/3, 18 Ramazan 1262 / 9 August 1846, letter from the Greek Patriarch to
the Grand Vezirate. Encloses a petition signed and sealed by thirteen leading Greeks of
Inebolu. The Greek Patriarch at this time was Anthimos VI, who served twice as Patriarch,
1846 52; see www.patriarchate.org.
74
BOA HR.MKT 35/72, 9 Sevval 1266 / 18 August 1850, memorandum from the Greek
Patriarch of Istanbul.
75
BOA A.MKT 44/30, 25 Cemaziyelahir1262 / 20 June 1846, the Vali of Diyarbekir, Ahmed
Izzed, to the Grand Vezirate.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 51

duty-bound to make his apologies: “Your strict instructions that this sort of
thing which would cause headache is to be avoided and settled without
undue hubub are being dutifully obeyed”.76
We must also bear in mind that all of these cases of dubious conversions
of reaya were occurring against a background of a Rumeli in turmoil. The
1841 rising in Niş was fresh in mind, and the region was far from being
tranquil.77 The reaya involved were mostly children, giving rise to the
suspicion of untoward persuasion at the very least. Even though the docu-
ments talk about the conversions eventually being carried out according
to due process, there is a very real danger that they could have caused some
sort of conflagration or at least embarrassment, hence the constant refer-
ence to “the delicacy of the times and circumstances”.
A case definitely involving official embarrassment was reflected in a
report by the kaimakam of Köstendil, a kaza of Niş. The official reported
that while he had been absent in Niş, a ten-year-old girl, Istinyo, daughter
of Çuka, had converted to Islam. Subsequently, under pressure from her
mother, she had apostatised and had been brought before the local council.
The mother was claiming that as she was under the age of legal responsi-
bility, she should be allowed to go back to her former religion. It is at this
point that the kaimakam’s report becomes interesting:

Although I am fully aware of the secret order (irade i hafiyye) whereby measures
should be taken to ensure that young Christians do not come to Islam, this case is a
difficult one. As the girl is technically of legal age and she has declared that she has
become a Muslim before a Şeriat court, to openly allow her to commit apostasy
would be religiously reprehensible. Also, as I was away in Niş when the matter
came up, no one knew about the secret order.

The kaimakam therefore had to let the matter rest and ask for instructions.78
What is striking here is a direct reference to an order emanating from
Istanbul that “secretly” instructed local officials to discourage conversion
to Islam by young children. The obvious discrepancy lies between the
“secret order” and the very numerous references to the conversion (and
often subsequent apostasy) of such children. The order is, however, in

76
BOA A.MKT 49/41, 6 Ramazan 1262 / 28 July 1846, the Vali of Silistre, Mahmud Said
Izzed, to the Grand Vezirate.
77
Davidson, “The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the
Ottoman Empire”.
78
BOA A/MKT 40/1, 19 Rebiyulahir 1262 / 16 April 1846, the Kaimakam of Köstendil to
the Grand Vezirate.
52 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

keeping with the order referred to earlier instructing provincial officials to

avoid the execution of apostates, but not to announce this publicly.79
As in all the instances where officials were instructed to assuage local
sectarian passions and thus avoid the “official headache”, here too it appears
that there were official instructions that had to be kept secret because the
Caliph of Islam could not openly discourage conversion to the One True
Religion.
Another reference to such a secret order is found in a communication
dated 5 May 1844, from the kaza of Akka (Acre) in Palestine. The müdür
of the kaza, Mehmed Said, declared: “[T]he order pertaining to the pre-
vention of the importuning of young children to accept Islam has been
secretly handed on from predecessor to successor of this office in accord-
ance with the ferman.” The issue came up in connection with a young
Christian girl who purportedly had converted to Islam, but whose con-
version was being challenged by her parents and relatives. When sum-
moned before the Şeriat court, she recanted, saying that she had been
forced into the act. The court duly ordered that because she was a minor,
she should be given back to her parents.80 The orders state in no uncertain
terms that “No subject of the Sublime State shall be forced by anyone
to convert to Islam against their wishes”. It had come to the Foreign
Ministry’s attention that “There are many cases reported where the said
person is a child who has been importuned by an insistence to accept
Islam. . . . In no way is this to be admitted as it is entirely in contravention
of current laws and regulations as set down in the letters of patent (berat)
given to the various Archbishoprics”.81
A similar case was reported in Salonica on 18 June 1844. A ten-year-old
Armenian girl, having secured her father’s permission, was taken to the local
bathhouse by a Muslim woman, their neighbour. When she did not return
home at the appointed hour, her parents went to the Muslim home, only to
be told that their daughter had converted to Islam and that they should
go away. The girl’s parents, after failing to secure justice locally, had arrived
in Istanbul to lodge a formal complaint with the Patriarchate stating that
the girl was underage and that she had converted under duress. The Porte,
using the formula quoted earlier, “although nothing can be said, etc.”,

79
BOA HR.MKT 3/65, 16 Rebiyülahir 1260 / 5 May 1844, the Müdür of Acre, Mehmed
Said, to the Grand Vezirate.
80
BOA HR.MKT 3/65, 16 Rebiyülahir 1260 / 15 May 1844, Foreign Ministry to the
Commanders of Akka and Sayda. The fact that the Foreign Ministry was involved suggests
that she may have been a foreign subject.
81
Ibid. The phrase used is “arz ˝ Islamiyet’le ibram ve ilhah”.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 53

ordered that the local authorities determine the sincerity of the conversion
and the age of the girl, and stated very clearly that “if the illegal use of
force has occurred, this is very damaging for the confidence of the Christian
subjects and can cause disruption of the order of the state” (insilab-ı
emniyet-i reayayı mucib ve ihlal-i nizam-i memleketi müstevcib).82
Ottoman Rumeli seems to have been rife with cases of disputed con-
versions at this time. In early summer 1847, again in Niş, a certain Sefrika,
daughter of Nikola, converted in dubious circumstances. Her parents
contested the conversion, protesting that “she had been bewitched (musah-
har edilmiş) and was not responsible for her actions”. Sefrika died soon
after under very suspicious circumstances, and foul play was suspected.
What is interesting about this case is that it was commented on by the
highest religious authority in the empire, the Şeyhülislam, Arif Hikmet
Efendi, who, addressing the Grand Vezirate, gave his personal opinion on
the case:

I have had the honour to receive the memorandum from Your Exalted Person
enclosing the memorandum from the kaza council of Şehriköy in the eyalet of Niş.
Because this is a strange affair I have referred it to the office of the Şeyhülislam. The
Şeriat answer (fetva) has been returned and enclosed in my answer to your Exalted
Office. The naïb of the kaza of Şehriköy has been immediately dismissed, and the
remainder of the measures to be taken are entirely up to your Exalted Personage.
[Yet] some thoughts have lately occurred to me. If it is ascertained how or why the
aforementioned deceased died, or who was responsible for her death, and if you order
an investigation and inquest to this end, this will save the honour of the Sublime
Sultanate (tekmil i namus u Saltanat ı Seniyye) and Your August Personage will
acquire much merit and praise, as I am sure you know, but I wanted to remind you
just the same.83

82
BOA HR.MKT 4/10, Gurre i Cemaziyelahir 1260 / 18 June 1844, the Sublime Porte to the
Muşir of Salonica.
83
BOA A.MKT 86/42, 21 Cemaziyelahir 1263/6 June 1847; 26 Receb 1263 / 11 July 1847,
memorandum from Şeyhülislam Arif Hikmet Efendi to the Sublime Porte. Arif Hikmet
Efendi was one of the leading lights of the early Tanzimat and stands out as one of the most
distinguished representatives of the ulema. He served as Şeyhülislam from 21 November
1846 to 11 March 1854. He had a reputation as an accomplished scholar and poet “who
was famous for speaking well”. He also founded a library in Mecca. See Sicil i Osmani, vol.
1, p. 311. See also Mahir Aydın, “Arif Hikmet Beyefendinin Rumeli Tanzimat Müfettişlig i
ve teftiş defteri” (The ledger of the Tanzimat inspectorate of Arif Hikmet Beyefendi, inspec
tor of Rumeli), Belleten 48 (1992), 102 21. He had also composed a Divan in which he had
written laudatory verses concerning the Gülhane Rescript and Sultan Abdülmecid. See Bilal
Kemikli, Şair Şeyhülislam Arif Hikmet Beyefendi. Hayatı Eserleri ve Şiirleri (The poet
Şeyhülislam, Arif Hikmet Efendi: His life works and poetry) (Ankara, 2003). My thanks
to Osman Koyunog lu for these two references.
54 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

It is important to note that Arif Hikmet Efendi was one of the two ulema
inspectors sent to the provinces to examine the implementation of the
Tanzimat. He was appointed inspector for Rumeli. As put by Abu
Manneh, “Thus on the occasion of sending the aforementioned two senior
ulema to Rumeli and Anatolia, it was stated that, ‘the basic purpose of
the Tanzimat was the application of the foundations of justice . . . and the
guaranteeing of the good order of land and people’.”84 It must also be
recalled that this issue arose very soon after the uprisings at nearby Vidin
and that the area was still unsettled. The document refers to “loose talk
among the reaya”, which may well have been an oblique reference to the
affair being followed in the Serbian press, many of the Ottoman Serbs
having relatives in autonomous Serbia.85
Although the Porte had made its point regarding forced conversion and
had particularly stressed that forced conversion of minors was forbidden,
it was one thing to issue an order and quite another to enforce it. Three
years after the proclamation of the Reform Edict, the Ministry of Justice
and Religious Sects felt obliged to issue another circulating order stating
that “although the necessary orders have been sent to all officials regarding
the regulations for the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam, some mal-
practices have been reported from certain places”.86 The order stated in
quite stringent language that “some misguided and ignorant people who
know nothing of their religion have been forcing Christians to come to
Islam through force and fear.” This was causing “wagging of tongues” and
was to be stopped. The order then repeated the stages of the conversion
procedure, that is, that the highest religious functionary of the convert
and their parents or next of kin had to be present. They were to be closely
questioned by the local administrative council. There was also a provision
that had not appeared before: the convert and his or her next of kin should
be put in a separate room where the next of kin would be given the

84
Butrus Abu Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript”.
85
My thanks to Milos Jovanovic, who pointed out to me that the Serbian official newspaper,
the Srpska Novina, which had began publication in 1841, closely followed developments
among Ottoman Serbs. Developments in the Ottoman Empire were followed by the press
across the Balkans. Events such as the Battle of Grahovo (August 1836), where the Bosnian
commander Ali Paşa burned and razed the town of Grahovo in Herzegovina, received
“immediate and loud publicity. Newspapers across Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia and
Serbia published extensive reports of the event.” See Zoran Milutinovic, “Sword, Priest
and Conversion: On Religion and Apostasy in South Slav Literature in the Period of
National Revival”.
86
BOA YEE 31/18, 7 Muharrem 1276 / 6 July 1859, the Ministry of Justice and Religious
Sects, Circulating order.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 55

opportunity to dissuade the convert. Only after all this, and only if the
convert still declared that the conversion was of his or her own free will and
conscience, would the procedure be carried out. The entire process was to
be duly put in a report (mazbata), which was to be signed and sealed by the
Muslim and non-Muslim members of the council. If any converts were
determined to be underage, even if they insisted on their conversion, they
were to be handed over to their next of kin. The order made it quite clear
that the whole aim of the process was “to banish the doubts and suspicions
of all parties”.87
Nearly all of these cases of conversion involve children or adolescents.
There is a marked contrast between the way the Ottoman state dealt with
the conversion of minors in the previous century and its attitude toward
the converts here. Eyal Ginio has shown on the basis of the study of the
eighteenth-century kadi sicils (court records) of Salonica that the conver-
sion of children over the age of ten was usually uncontested by the religious
authorities: “Generally speaking, when considering the conversion of
adolescents above the age of ten, the kadi apparently assumed that they
had fully understood the meaning of their religious act. The discerning
minors could adopt Islam, their conversion was acknowledged without
further questioning”.88 Furthermore, there was no question in the eight-
eenth century of the involvement of any outside parties as conversion
“can be performed without the permission of the child’s custodian as
conversion to Islam benefits the child and the process must therefore be
regarded as receiving a gift or alms-both of which are legally permissible
for a minor.”89 The historical context of the Tanzimat State had strength-
ened the legal position of non-Muslims to a degree unimaginable in the
previous century. Nonetheless, the fact that such legal safeguards were
deemed necessary, linked to the repeated secret orders that children not be
brought to Islam, strongly implies that serious social tensions were at issue
here and that forced conversion was quite widespread.
The age of puberty was essential to the legitimacy of the conversion.
Although traditional practice specified only “puberty” (bülug), this was a
matter that could be contested.90 In the years before the obligatory

87
Ibid., “asıl maksad her tarafin eşkal ve şübhatını def’ etmek”.
88
Ginio, “Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion to Islam in the Ottoman State”, p. 110.
89
Ibid., p. 104. Ginio is referring here to a treatise by Ibrahim al Halabi (d. 1549), Majma al
anhar bi sharh multaqa al abhar, vol. 2, pp. 11 19.
90
Ibid. Ginio points out that the essential for Muslim jurists was “the age of discernment”,
p. 99: “While puberty (bulug ) is recognized following physical changes, mental capacity
(rüşd) is harder to distinguish as objective criteria do not exist.”
56 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

registration of births, it was often the visual testimony of the local council or
the kadı that determined whether a particular convert was mature. Despite
official papers proving minority, the official on the spot could sometimes allow
a conversion to take place. Accordingly, on 6 April 1906 the Kaymakam of
Biga decided in the case of a certain Arpina: “Although according to her
identity papers she is underage, she seems strong in body”.91 For parties
contesting the conversion, such as the family of the convert, the age of
maturity was the make-or-break criterion because there was very little they
could do legally if the convert insisted on remaining in Islam.
The age of the convert keeps cropping up as the critical issue. In one such
case it had been reported from Yanya (Ioannina, Greece) that a notable of
the region, a certain Süleyman ibn Ibrahim, had “lured a ten-year-old Greek
boy with certain promises and forced him to become a Muslim”. The boy,
Nikola, was brought before the kadı, where he declared that he was “leav-
ing the false faith and embracing Islam”. An enquiry was then held by the
local council, where, in the presence of the kocabaşıs and the local desbot,
Nikola declared that he was converting “purely because of his love of the
purity and brilliance (nezafet ve revnak) of the Islamic religion”. Although
the council declared that “it was clear to us that he was at least fourteen
years of age”, the despot still demanded that Nikola be sent to Istanbul,
where a proper investigation could be carried out to determine his age. The
council agreed, but stated that because he had denied any pressure or
coercion he should be released into the custody of Süleyman Aga, “who
returned two days later bearing the news that the boy had escaped”.92
The case raises several questions. First, how does a fifteen- (or ten)-year-
old boy, who was more than likely an uneducated peasant, become aware
of the “purity and brilliance” of a religion? As in other cases, the presen-
tation of formulaic answers such as “I was struck by the purity of Islam” or
“I had been attracted by the Islamic faith for some two (or more) years”
or “I want to convert purely to save my soul ( mücerred hidayete ermek
saikasiyla)” suggests that these were capsule phrases that would give a
veneer of legality to a very dubious conversion. In this particular case, the
fact that the boy is said to have “escaped” is also suspect.93

91
BOA DH.ID 63/38, 24 Mart 1332 / 6 April 1906, the Kaymakam of Biga to the Mutasarrif
of Kil’a I Sultani.
92
BOA A/MKT 113/8, 26 Receb 1264 / 28 June 1848, report of the meeting of the
Administrative Council of Yanya signed by all the members present.
93
For another sample of a similar case, see BOA Irade Dahiliye 4627, 17 Şevval 1260 / 30
October 1844. The kaimakam of Yanina was to write to the Vali of Üsküp (Skopje
Macedonia) that the report that two underage Greek boys had been pressured into
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 57

The question of minimum age was to be a continuing bone of conten-

tion between the Christian Patriarchates and the Ministry of Justice and
Religious Sects. In May 1879 the issue came up once again as the Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate was now asking for a definite minimum age for
conversions. The matter had come before the Council of State, and it had
been decided that “the request of the Patriarchate is out of order because
the establishment of a definite age contravenes the right of freedom [of
religion].” The Patriarchate had countered by refusing to send the priests
who had to be present to ensure that the conversion was legitimate. The
Armenian Patriarchate had sent a similar memorandum insisting that
the minimum age be twenty.94 The interesting thing about this exchange
is that the council was actually turning the tables on the Patriarchates,
who would usually be the ones to insist on the principle of religious free-
dom; by claiming that fixing a definite age would curtail the religious
freedom of the potential convert, the council was leaving the entire issue
up to the visual confirmation of puberty. After the establishment of birth
certificates, the Greek Patriarchate insisted that baptism certificates be
the definitive document for determining whether the convert was of age,
whereas the Ottoman authorities maintained that the legal basis for all
such matters was the Ottoman birth certificate.95 By 1913 the minimum
age for conversion for both genders was increased from fifteen to twenty.96

Conversion of Women as a Test of the Tanzimat State

There is also a gender aspect to the conversion stories and the way they
apply to the Tanzimat State. Conversion was also about negotiating the
practice of quotidian survival for women. How do I get rid of this husband
who gets drunk all the time and beats me? How do I marry Ali, whom
I love, but who happens to be of a different faith? What will happen to
my children if I do? How can I get out of an arranged marriage to a man
whom I do not love and who is old enough to be my father? According to
Islamic law, a Muslim woman may not be married to a non-Muslim man,
accepting Islam was unfounded. They were “fifteen and eighteen years of age, in possession
of their mental faculties (akil) and at the age of legal responsibility (balig ).”
94
BOA YEE 31/18, memorandum of the Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects. The
memorandum is undated, but the response of the Greek Patriarchate is dated 7
Cemaziyelahir 1296 / 30 May 1879.
95
BOA DH.HMŞ 13/47, 30 Tesrin I Sani 1327 / 12 November 1911, general directives of the
Ministry of the Interior relating to the verification of the age of converts, no. 503, file 3.
96
BOA DH.HMŞ 13/49, 25 Mayis 1329 / 7 June 1913. Ministry of the Interior no. 79107;
DH.HMS 13/50, 3 Agustos 1329 / 16 August 1913.
58 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

although the reverse is possible, the lineage of religion passing down the
male line.97 As divorce was very difficult if not impossible for Christian or
Jewish women, particularly if the husband was not prepared to grant it,
sometimes they converted to Islam as a way of procuring an “automatic
divorce”. Marc Baer’s very useful study illustrates that in the case of Jews,
“only a husband could grant a divorce”, and if he did not, there was not
much the wife could do about it. Also, obtaining a divorce in order to
marry someone else was not permitted. In these conditions, “Conversion
to Islam would free these women from forced, arranged or failed mar-
riages, and abusive and undesirable husbands”. The husband would be
asked three times if he also wanted to convert, if he refused, the marriage
was declared null and void.98 This was seen as a “trick” by some jurists
who disapproved of it, and more often than not the female partner had to
have a ready Muslim husband-to-be waiting in the wings.99
An added incentive for a woman to take such a step was the Islamic
injunction that in the case of a divorce where one of the parties becomes
a Muslim, that party acquires custody of the children, as “the child is
dependent on the auspicious parent”.100 Later in the century this was
changed, and the documents tell us time and again that the official position
was that the children should be able to choose which religion they wanted
to belong to upon reaching maturity.101
In 1860, Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Paşa was sent on a tour of
inspection in Rumeli. This was in response to continuing complaints that

97
Reuben Lewy, “The Social Structure of Islam”, in Orientalism: Early Sources (London &
New York, 2004), p. 123.
98
Marc Baer, “Islamic Conversion Narratives of Women: Social Change and Gendered Religious
Hierarchy in Early Modern Ottoman Istanbul”, Gender and History 16 (2004), 425 58 . See
also Ahmed Shukri, Mohammedan Law of Marriage and Divorce (New York, 1966).
99
Rudolph Peters and Gert J. J. De Vries, “Apostasy in Islam”, Die Welt des Islams 17 (1975),
1 4, 1 25, particularly 9: “Only the Malikite and the Hanafite schools give provisions for
the case of a woman apostatizing in order to free herself from the bonds of matrimony, a
legal trick still resorted to in countries where there is hardly any social stigma and no penal
consequences attached to apostasy.” For a fascinating study of Coptic Christian men
converting to Islam in order to divorce their Christian wives, because, according to Coptic
law a Coptic woman may not be married to a Muslim man, see Mohamed Afifi, “Reflections
on the Personal Laws of Egyptian Copts”, in Amira El Azhary Sonbol (ed.), Women, the
Family and Divorce Laws in Islamic History (Syracuse, NY, 1996), pp. 202 15.
100
Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, Hukukı I_ slamiyye ve Istitlaat i Fikhiyye Kamusu, vol. 4 (Istanbul,
1969), p. 22 .
101
BOA DH.MKT 431/68, 28 Rebiyülevvel 1313 / 19 September 1895, the Ministry of
Justice and Religious Sects to the Ministry of the Interior; BOA DH.MKT 571/68, 16
Ag ustos 1901 / 29 August 1901, the Sublime Porte. Ministry of the Interior to Ministry of
Justice and Religious Sects.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 59

non-Muslims were being forcibly converted and otherwise mistreated.

This tour of inspection by the highest authority in the land after the sultan
was another manifestation of how seriously the Tanzimat State took the
complaints of the reaya.102 The tribunal sat as the Grand Administrative
Council of the eyalet of Niş (Meclis-i Kebir-i Eyalet). Fourteen women and
related witnesses were summoned to the court. All of the women except
one declared that she had converted “of her own free will and desire” and
had married a Muslim man. The dates of conversion ranged from one to
sixteen years previous to the date of the inquest.103 Some of the women
seem to have been particularly forthright in their declarations of sincerity.
One actually declared, “[W]ho can force me to become a Muslim, of course
I converted of my own free will”. Another declared, “[O]f course we all
became Muslims of our own free will, who can force anyone to change their
religion? You are disturbing us.” The vehemence in her tone was put down
to the fact that “she was heavily pregnant and that it was actully difficult for
her to attend the court, therefore no umbrage was taken”.104 One woman,
Istanka, declared that she had been forced. Istanka had been converted in
the administrative court of kaza of Leskofça. She stated that the Leskofça
court had first turned her away, and only after several trips had she been
able to convert. The members of the kaza court of Leskofça were summoned
before the Court of Inquiry at Niş. There the delegate of the Metropolitan
and chief religious authority in Leskofça, the priest Mito, declared that “all
of the Christian girls who came before us declared that they were converting
of their own free will and desire. I have never heard of force being applied
in any case”.105 In the end, Istanka admitted that she had made up the
story that she had been forced, “because she had tired of her husband and
wanted to go back to her family”, and that she was determined to go back to
her original (Christian) faith. This part of Mehmed Emin Paşa’s proceedings
concluded by declaring that all thirteen of the women had been questioned
in the presence of their husbands and relatives as well as separately and
had actually declared, “[W]ho can force anyone to leave their religion?”
Accordingly, the court declared that the various reports of forced conver-
sion were baseless. The “most highly respected and eldest of the members of

102
Yonca Köksal and Davut Erkan, Sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Paşa’nın Rumeli Teftişi
(The tour of inspection of Grand Vezier Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Paşa in Rumeli.) (Istanbul,
2007). This is a very useful volume that consists of archival documents dealing with the
proceedings of the various commissions of enquiry presided over by the Grand Vezier.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid., p. 436.
105
Ibid., p. 435.
60 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the Grand Council”, a Jew by the name of Eşer Efendi, declared “in a totally
neutral manner that he had never heard of anyone in the environs being
forced to change their religion, all the other members unanimously agreed
with him”.106

apostasy ( irtidad )
Many of the conversion cases are also cases of subsequent apostasy. The
commonly held belief was that apostasy from Islam was punishable by
death. This is not in the Qur’an, but it had become a recognized and
accepted part of Islamic jurisprudence. Even in a standard modern reference
work published in 1969, authored by Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, one of Turkey’s
leading fıkh experts, the death penalty is seen as a standard procedure:

[A man] who commits apostasy has adopted a belligerent position towards the
Islamic community. . . . To kill such a belligerent is always legitimate. For the
general good such a punishment is necessary.

Even the language used is emotional and provocative:

For those who commit the sin of apostasy, thereby depriving themselves of the
eternal happiness of Islam, such a severe punishment as the death penalty is needed
in order to prevent the spread of such harmful tendencies. . . . The Islamic com
munity will hate anyone who becomes an apostate, even his own family and
relatives will hate him.107

The apostate is very much the enemy within; according to Bilmen, “The
person who has fallen into the crime of apostasy is most likely to harm the
Islamic community. He is a very dangerous (muzir) person who will try to
damage the Islamic community he comes from. Because he will have
knowledge as to the ways and mysteries of Islam it is highly likely that he
will serve other powers as a spy”.108
Compared to such stringent language found in a modern reference work,
official practice in the nineteenth century was considerably more lenient. As
we have seen, the official policy was that the old religiously sanctioned
execution of apostates from Islam was no longer enforced. Yet in the days
before the Reform Edict of 1856, there was considerable uncertainty as to
what the actual procedure should be. Despite official assurances of religious

106
Ibid., pp. 436 7.
107
Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, Hukukı I_ slamiyye ve Istitlaat i Fikhiyye Kamusu, p. 14.
108
Ibid., p. 15.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 61

freedom, apostasy was still very much a matter that raised social hackles
among the population at large.
Some of the cases of conversion and apostasy could also become the
occasion for the settling of private scores between officials, as one side
blamed the other for not carrying out the proper procedure. Such a case
occurred in the province of Tekfurdagı (Tekirdag) in the kaza of Gelibolu
(Gallipoli) on 19 June 1848.109 A twelve-year-old Greek boy, Fratendi, son
of Ashdrenuz, declared that he wanted to convert. He was duly brought
before the kadı court by his patron, Hafız Mahmud, and there, in the
presence of numerous witnesses, he declared that he had not been forced
and “that for some two years he had been driven by a desire for salvation”.
His father, who was a sharecropper on Hafız Mahmud’s land, claimed
that Mahmud had forced his son, and appealed to the local Greek
Metropolitan to put the case before the authorities. The boy became a
bone of contention between the kadi’s representative (the naib) and the
mudir, Ahmed Münih Bey. Each side accused the other of incorrect behav-
iour, and at one point the mudir openly declared that the boy, as far as he
was concerned, was not a Muslim; he refused to give him up to his patron,
Hafız Mahmud, and kept him in his own dwelling. The interesting thing
about this case is that the local Christian (Greek and Armenian) and Jewish
community leaders drew up a petition, signed and sealed by over one
hundred of their number, declaring to the governor of Tekfurdagı that
Ahmed Münih Bey was very popular in their communities:

Ahmed Münih Bey has always upheld the letter and the spirit of the Auspicious
Tanzimat and has never offended any of us in any way. Thanks to his selfless efforts
we are at peace here and the affairs of the poor subjects prosper and we pray
constantly for the long life and health of our August Master the Sultan.110

The important aspect of this statement is the fact that Ahmed Münih Bey
is being praised by non-Muslims according to the criteria of a new order
claiming to protect Muslims and non-Muslims equally.
What was involved in most cases seems to have been a mutual saving
of face. On the one hand, the non-Muslim community of the convert was
pacified to some extent by the bodily removal of the offending party to
Istanbul. On the other, particularly in contested cases where there was

109
BOA A.MKT 113/39, 17 Receb 1264 / 19 June 1848, the Muhassıl of the Liva of
Tekfurdag ı, Şakir Bey, to the Sublıme Porte. Letter from Naib Hüseyin Efendi to the
Office of the Şeyhülislam. Petition signed by 120 members of the Greek, Armenian, and
Jewish communities.
110
Ibid.
62 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the possibility that the convert might become an apostate or had already
become an apostate, the same solution pacified the Muslim community,
which no longer had to tolerate the presence of a person who flagrantly
flouted its religious rules.
In at least one instance, the official policy of the state was stated very
clearly in terms that can only be described as, “You are instructed to look
the other way”. On 30 October 1844 the Muşir of the Army of Rumeli,
Reşid Paşa, was given instructions regarding his request for guidance
about what to do with the apostates in the region of Noveberde. He was
told in no uncertain terms that “In offensive matters (madde-i mekruhe)
such as these, [the offenders] should be sent to Istanbul, without being
officially referred to the local kadı court”. It was deemed essential that
the apostates be removed from their locality with a minimum of fanfare,
for, “if the case is announced in the court, then they are shipped off to
Istanbul, the matter will still come to the attention of the foreign embassies
and cause useless loose talk”. Therefore, “the abovementioned [apostates]
should be put in prison, and then after some time, when the affair had
quietened down, they should be made to appear to have escaped from
jail and speedily sent on their way (habishaneden firar edmişcesine haki-
mane def’lerine)”. As a second option they were to set out on their exile to
Istanbul under escort but “be made to appear to have escaped during the
journey” (esnayı rahda bir tarafa savuşturulmak).111
Apostates seem to have become a public embarassement for all con-
cerned. On 12 March 1845 the vilayet of Bursa reported that an Armenian
woman had converted “of her own will”, and subsequently “as the result
of the deceptions of her mother and the community” she had reneged on
her word and declared herself a Christian. The matter was resolved after
the local authorities decided that “she was not quite in command of her
faculties” and had her shipped off to Istanbul.112
A typical case was reported on 10 February 1853 from Tekirdag, where
a Greek woman was said to have converted to Islam and then declared for
Christianity before the local council. She had been kept in the dwelling of
the local kocabaşı until she was abducted by a Muslim mob who claimed

111
BOA Irade Dahiliye 4627, 17 Şevval 1260 / 30 October 1844, the Sublime Porte to the
Müşir of Rumeli, Reşid Paşa. It is highly unlikely that what was meant here was that the
apostates in question were to be killed en route. As will be seen in the subsequent chapter,
the state, foreign powers, and the apostates’ community kept close tabs on what happened
to the person(s).
112
BOA A.MKT 37/51, 14 Rebiyülevvel 1262 / 12 March 1845, Vilayet of Bursa to the
Sublime Porte.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 63

she was a Muslim. The Patriarchate had remonstrated with the Porte,
demanding the removal of the woman to Istanbul “for questioning”.113
By the twentieth century the official position of the Ottoman state
regarding the matter of apostasy had become clear. Not only was the official
execution of apostates a thing of the past, but cases of apostasy had become
a matter of bureaucratic routine. On 30 March 1910 an Armenian Catholic
woman from the vilayet of Ankara, Lisa, daughter of Agop, declared that
she had converted to Islam some six years previously, but now wanted to
go back to her old faith. She was brought to Istanbul for questioning at the
Ministry of Police. In the presence of the chief scribe (Kapıkethüdası) of
the Patriarchate, the priest Andon, she declared: “ I want to go back to my
old faith. I say this with a free will and conscience. I have not been brought
under pressure from any quarter. My real name is Elizabet. My father’s
name is Agob.” The vilayet of Ankara was told:

[If] a member of a non Muslim community appears to have lived for some time as a
Muslim but later wants to return to their old faith, the current procedure is, if there
is a serious objection to their remaining in their original location, that they simply
be moved to another location.

In the event, Elizabet was set free of police custody and walked away a
Catholic. The deposition signed by the police official and the representative
of the Patriarchate ends rather pitifully: “[S]he could not sign as she is
illiterate”.114

conclusion
Even someone like the Rev. Edwin Munsell Bliss, every inch the devoted
missionary, and no friend of the Ottomans, had to admit that

During the remainder of the reign of Abd ul Medjid and that of Abd ul Aziz
(1861 1876) the conditions of the Christians throughout the empire generally
improved. For the most part the situation was far better than it had been at any
time . . . On the whole, the situation of the Christians was far better when Abd ul
Hamid II came to the throne in 1876, than it had been at any time since the
establishment of the Ottoman dynasty.115

113
BOA HR.MKT 56/65, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1269 / 8 March 1853, Greek Orthodox Patriarch
to the Sublime Porte.
114
BOA DH.EUM.THR 30/78, 17 Mart 1326 / 30 March 1910, the Ministry of Justice and
Religious Sects to the Department of Police; written deposition signed by police official
Zakreb Macit and the priest Andon.
115
Edward Munsell Bliss, Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities, The Reign of Terror: From
Tatar Huts to Constantinople Palaces (Philadelphia, 1896), p. 279.
64 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

In the spring of 1863, Sultan Abdülaziz paid a visit to Izmir, where, contrary
to all precedent, he dined in the houses of some leading Christians. The
British consul was to comment: “His Imperial Majesty having visited and
dined in Christian houses, [this] is I believe, an event never before heard of as
having been done by any former sultan”. But because he did not visit the
leading Muslims first, the consul reported, “the Mahometan inhabitants feel
they have been neglected”.116
The culmination of the Tanzimat State was the Constitution of 1876,
which is seen as the work of Midhat Paşa, one of the giants of the Tanzimat
period.117 For our purposes the most important article is Article 11, which
reads:
The religion of the Ottoman State is Islam. Given the preservation of that founda
tion the practice of all recognized religions in Ottoman dominions is free on the
condition that they do not disturb public order and general propriety. The rights
granted to various creeds are all under the guarantee of the state.118

The Tanzimat State came to an end with the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. This
treaty, ending the 1877–78 war with Russia, was a disaster for the Ottoman
Empire as it truncated the major part of its Balkan possesions. In eastern
Anatolia the provinces of Kars and Ardahan were lost to the Russian
Empire. The Sublime Porte lost two-fifths of its entire territory and one-
fifth of its population.119 It can be said that the Ottoman Empire became a
majority Muslim empire, possibly for the first time since its foundation.
The jury is still out on the success or failure of the Tanzimat State. In a
remarkable essay, Şükrü Hanioglu observes that the Tanzimat was not
an unmitigated failure in terms of responses to the demands of non-
Muslims:“[T]heir position improved from a situation at the beginning of

116
Gerasimos Augustinos, The Greeks of Asia Minor (London, 1992), p. 197.
117
Together with Reşid, Ali, Fuad, and Cevdet, Midhat Paşa can be seen as one of the main
masterminds behind the Tanzimat State. On him, see I_ bnülemin Mahmut Kemal I_ nal, Son
Sadrazamlar (Istanbul, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 315 415. Mithat was born in Ruscuk (present
day Bulgaria) in 1822. He is famous for his provincial reforms during his tenure of the
Danube Vilayet (1863), a pilot project combining the eyalets of Vidin, Silistre, and Niş
that was intended to be a demonstration of the efficiency of relative de centralization. In a
similar way, his tenure as the Vali of the Vilayet of Bagdad was to serve as a model of
modern administration. He served twice as Grand Vizier, in 1872 and 1876. He is seen as
the driving force behind the Constitution of 1876. Mithat Paşa eventually fell afoul of
Sultan Abdülhamid, who saw him as a threat to his authority, and eventually fell from
power. To this day Midhat Paşa is one of the few late Ottoman statesmen looked upon
favourably by republican historiography.
118
Kanun u Esasi 1876. Düstur 1. tertip cilt 4.
119
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezer Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey (Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne, 1977), vol. 2, p. 191.
 “Avoiding the Imperial Headache” 65

the 19th century where a non-Muslim needed a ferman to be able to wear

yellow shoes, [to a situation where] after the Reform Edict . . . they could
become ambassadors and governors”. Yet, Hanioglu adds, the state’s
failiure to come up with timely solutions led to a radicalization of nation-
alist separatist movements.120
A recent article by Frederick Anscombe takes a view diametrically
opposed to the view I have defended here regarding the “proper recognition
of the audience” of the Tanzimat. Anscombe declares, “Tanzimat measures,
later labelled as westernization, were not designed primarily to appease
Christian subjects or foreign powers by promoting Europeanization,
let alone secularization. Reform was fundamentally shaped by, and for,
Muslims”.121 If this is correct, some Muslims were certainly missing the
point, certainly those who saw the Tanzimat as a threat to their dominant
position. Then again, Anscombe’s position ignores the grey areas where
history is made; the Tanzimat was made by “Muslims”, certainly, but for
whom? And who were these Muslims ? A conservative Islamic jurist like
Cevdet Paşa could support the “Auspicious Tanzimat”, whereas the man
in the street could see it as the beginning of the end. The Şeyhülislam (or
the “Chief Mufti”, as Anscombe quaintly calls him), Arif Hikmet Efendi,
could make the discovery of the murderer of an unknown Christian girl a
matter of the “honour of the Sublime State”.
I contend that open and unequivocal declarations of guarantees on the
part of the highest power in the land, sometimes occasioned by what were
after all incidences of minor sectarian conflict or resolvable tax issues,
provide interesting clues to the political climate of the Tanzimat State.
Yet I also firmly believe that the spirit of the times cannot be explained
solely by the bland and ubiquitous catch-all category of “foreign pres-
sure”. Even given the fact that the Ottoman Empire was closely bound to
France and Britain during the Crimean War, and subseqently through
loans to finance a bankrupt treasury and the continuous need for support
against Russia, the Ottoman elite, pushed around and bullied as they were,
always retained ultimate political agency.
Foreign intervention was a fact, but a close reading of the documents
also leads in another direction, one indicating that a sense of the rule of law

120
Şükrü Haniog lu, “Osmanlı çöküşü ve günümüz Kürt sorunu” (The collapse of the
Ottoman Empire and the present Kurdish problem), Zaman, 22 3 November 2007. In
this very thoughtful op ed piece, Hanioglu gives an excellent thumb nail sketch of the last
century of Ottoman history.
121
Frederick F. Anscombe, “Islam and the Age of Ottoman Reform”, Past and Present 211
(2010) 160 89.
66 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

as the right and proper thing had taken root among the decision-makers
and implementers in Ottoman lands. The stock phrases, “to act according
to the requirements of the times” (icabat-ı asriyyeyye göre hareket) and
“avoiding acts damaging to the trust and security of the reaya” (insilab-ı
emniyet-i reaya), became something more like slogans. Statements such as
those of Arif Hikmet Efendi are all the more striking as they are not meant
for the eyes of any foreign ambassador, but for those of the Grand Vizier
alone. Many values and principles, all too often seen as foreign interven-
tion, were in fact homegrown and had been internalised by the ruling elite,
if not by the population at large. The Ottoman centre certainly knew that
the measures they were implementing were far from popular with the
Muslim population, who felt that their position as the dominant element
was threatened. This was the reasoning behind the order that apostates
were not to be executed but that this was not to to be proclaimed omni
et orbi. There was mention of “secret instructions” to discourage young
children from converting. Another characeristic of the Tanzimat State,
compared to earlier periods, was that each case of conversion and/or
apostasy, no matter how humble, went to the very top echelons of the
state and could come before the Grand Vizier or even the sultan, whereas
before they would have been handled locally. In the time frame stretching
from the Tanzimat Edict to the Reform Edict, and ending with the decla-
ration of the Constitution of 1876, we witness a critical shifting of the
balance in which nothing less than the idea of the rule of law became
established forever in Ottoman dominions. In this context the issues of
conversion and apostasy became the battleground of the struggle of the
Ottoman state to retain its sovereignty and to remain a political player in
an arena of world politics that was becoming increasingly inhospitable.
The following chapter will discuss the crisis provoked by the conversion
to Islam, subsequent apostasy, and eventual execution of an Armenian
Ottoman subject in 1843, and the outbreak of the diplomatic crisis con-
cerning him. The whole issue became a major bone of contention in the
public domain. Although the long-accepted punishment for apostasy from
Islam was death, this traditional practice now directly contravened the new
freedoms apparently guaranteed by the Tanzimat. This “apostacy crisis”
was a prime example of the overlap of domestic and foreign policy during
the late Ottoman period, as the Porte came under severe pressure from the
ambassadors of foreign powers, particularly from Stratford Canning, the
overbearing and arrogant British ambassador, who made the issue a cause
celèbre and used it to increase his leverage at the Sublime Porte.
 2

Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis

Light is the enemy of barbarism. The Turks enlightened, awakened to the

principles of Christian civilization would no longer be Turks, and the
‘Eastern Question’ would be solved. But of all the solutions, that will be
the most difficult.
Alexander Rangavis, Greece: Her Progress and Present Position1

conversion and apostasy as a diplomatic issue

In the late nineteenth century perhaps no issue was as politically charged as
that of conversion and apostasy. In the geographical area spanning much
of what is now the Balkans and the Middle East, on one side stood the
“Club of Great Powers”, imbued with the ideas of the “White Man’s
Burden” and the “mission civilizatrice”, and on the other the Ottoman
Empire, the only non-Christian Great Power in the region. There is no
doubt that in this confrontation the Ottoman Empire was very much the
weaker side. The familiar nineteenth-century theme of “spheres of influ-
ence” was being played out over the bodies of non-Muslim subjects of the
Ottoman Empire: the Austrians dominated the Balkans; the British pro-
tected the Greeks, the Armenians, and the tiny new Protestant community;
the Russians claimed a say over anyone from the Caucasus; and the French
protected the Catholics in the empire as a whole, and particularly the
Maronites of Lebanon.

1
As cited in Gerasimos Augustinos, The Greeks of Asia Minor: Confession, Community, and
Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century (Kent, Ohio & London, 1992), p. 197. Alexander
Rangavis was the American ambassador to Greece in the 1860s.

67
68 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The ultimate paragon of the triumphalist attitude of the Western

powers was of course someone like Lord Cromer, who was never one to
mince his words: “Although there are many highly educated gentlemen
who profess the Moslem religion, it has yet to be proved that Islam can
assimilate civilization without succumbing in the process”.2 These words
are highly symbolic of the apogee of imperialism and colonialism, the time
of the “scramble for Africa” and the “opening up” of China and Japan. In
all of the empires of the world the dominant powers were Christians, who
ruled over millions of non-Christians. Only in the case of the Ottoman
state was this power relationship reversed; the Caliph of all Muslims was
also the Padişah of millions of Christians, something that increasingly
came to be seen as an anomalous situation.3 The Ottoman Empire was
seen as an “obsolescent empire . . . whose . . . days were clearly num-
bered”.4 Although colonial violence against colonized peoples had come
to be an accepted part of imperialism, “Muslim violence, by contrast, was
supposedly deliberate, inherent and typical, it reflected an age old fanati-
cism”. 5 This is the attitude that is reflected in the cover illustration for this
volume. The deliberately over-the-top depiction of a hapless Christian
being forced to bow down over an ostentatiously large copy of the
‘Koran’ while his wailing women (one of whom wears a prominent cross
in her hair, just so we get the point) attempt to tear him away, while
mounted bashi bozouks mill about in the background, this was a typical
Christian depiction of the world of Islam.6
In this context it was difficult to imagine why anyone would convert to
the religion of a power that was seen as being on its last legs. One of the
major actors in this book, Sir Stratford Canning, the British ambassador at
the Sublime Porte, had no qualms about stating his position. For Canning,
the issue was a matter of civilization; now that Christian Europe was

2
The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt (London, 1911), p. 584.
3
Sir G. Campbell MP, “The Races, Religions and Institutions of Turkey”, The Eastern
Question Association: Papers on the Eastern Question, no. 4 (London, 1877), p. 20: “An
inferior race, on an inferior religion, inferior in numbers, inferior in intellect, inferior in all
economic arts, rules over great provinces . . . with the aid of a great army and navy furnished
by European money; a Mahomedan police, and a Mahomedan population armed by the
government . . . who form a garrison to keep down the Christians”.
4
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire (London, 1987), pp. 17, 23.
5
Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of
the Middle East (Ithaca and London, 2008), p. 68.
6
The illustration is from Charles Sumner, White Slavery in the Barbary States 1853 (Boston,
1853). My thanks to Irvin Cemil Schick for this image.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 69

strong and the Ottoman Empire was weak, Europe was obliged to take a
stronger hand in the issue of conversion and apostasy:

The pretension of the Sublime Porte with respect to foreigners adopting the
Mahometan religion was not resisted in former times by the leading powers of
Christendom. But a mere conjectural inference will hardly suffice to decide the
question at once against humanity and against the weighty political considerations
which come in aid of that principle. The power of late acquired by Christian Europe
may be said to carry with it a duty and a moral responsibility.7

In his memoirs Canning was even more candid in his triumphalism:

[T]he despotism of the Koran is evidently yielding to the influences of Christianity,

the religion of civilization. . . . The Turkish Empire is evidently hastening to its
dissolution, and an approach to the civilization of Christendom affords the only
chance of keeping it together for any length of time.8

the opening shots: the apostasy crisis of 1843

What had provoked the so-called apostasy crisis was the affair of an
Istanbul Armenian, Avakim, who had converted to Islam on 11 March
1842 and taken the name of Mehmet. He had then travelled on business to
Syria, where he had reverted to Christianity. Arriving back in Istanbul in
1843 under his Armenian persona, he had been recognized and denounced
to the authorities as an apostate. His trial had become something of a test
of strength between the old guard and the newer, younger, reform-minded
cadres led by the foreign minister, Mustafa Reşid Paşa. The old guard won
out, and on 23 August 1843 Avakim, otherwise Mehmet, was publicly
executed by beheading and his severed head put on public display, all this a
mere three years after the announcement of the dawn of a new age heralded
by the Hat-ı Şerif of Gülhane.9 The execution had been followed by a
posting of placards (yafta) in Istanbul stating:

The Armenian shoemaker, Hovagim, son of Yoghia, who last year at the beginning
of the month of Mouharrem accepted Islam and was given the name of Mehmet,

7
Turgut Subaşı, “The Apostasy Question in the Context of Anglo Ottoman Relations”,
Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2002), 234.
8
Stanley Lane Poole, The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount
Stratford de Redcliffe, From His Memoirs and Private and Official Papers (London,
1888), vol. 2, p. 78.
9
For details of the “mürted meselesi” (the Apostasy Affair), as it came to be called, see
Selahittin Özçelik, “Osmanlı I_ ç Hukukunda Zorunlu bir Tehir (Mürted Maddesi) (An
obligatory postponement in Ottoman domestic law: The Apostasy Matter)”, OTAM 11
(2000), 347 438.
70 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

having denied his faith, and having obstinately refused the offer made to him of
becoming Muslim, had the sentence of execution inflicted upon him by fetva.10

A better opportunity to embarrass the Ottoman government could not

have been wished for, and Canning rose to the occasion. His original
intention was to have the sultan officially abolish the law decreeing the
execution of apostates, but the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, backed
down and instructed Canning not to push for abolition, but to be content
with a promise of non-application. A council of ulema was held and
regarded the issue as a totally inadmissible intervention in the Ottoman
Empire’s internal affairs. At this point the Ottomans had to endure the
humiliation of the British Ambassador lecturing to them on their own
religion.
Canning had a sudden revelation one morning, as he states in his
memoirs:

It so happened that on leaving my bed one morning I remembered that some one
had given me a French translation of the Koran. Where to find it was the question.
My search was amply rewarded, not only by finding the book, but on opening it to
fall at once on the passage which made me think that Mohammed in condemning
renegades to punishment had in view their suffering in a future state and not their
decapitation here.11

According to the Austrian Internuncio, Sturmer, “everyone, Ottoman and

European alike, began to study the Qur’an in order to find in it what each,
according to his point of view, wished to find.”12
The Porte decided that a committee of ulema would be appointed to
“discuss the matter confidentially taking into account both the demands of
the law and its relevance to the delicacy of the times” (nezaket-i asriye).13
On 3 November 1843, Foreign Minister Rıfat Paşa was to tell Pisani, the
Dragoman of the British embassy, that if any case of apostasy were to come
up in the future, if it occurred in Istanbul, it would be dealt with at the
Porte, and if the case came up in the provinces, it would be dealt with by the

10
George Young, Corps de Droit Ottoman, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1905), p. 11, n. 4. My
translation.
11
Lane Poole, The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, vol. 2, p. 92. One
wonders if His Excellency was familiar with the superstitious practice of letting the
Qur’an fall open at random and seeing the page that fell open as an omen.
12
Subaşı, “The Apostasy Question”, p. 13.
13
As quoted in ibid., p. 31, n. 106. Mesail i Muhimme Iradeleri MM I 1827. A modern
source does in fact confirm that on the issue of capital punishment, “the doctrine was
usually formulated in keeping with the social conditions at the time and international
relations”. See I_ rfan I_ nce, “Ridde”, I_ slam Ansiklopedisi. p. 91.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 71

local Vali. In either case the death penalty would not be applied, and the
affair would not receive any publicity.14
During the years leading up to the Reform Edict, there was a rising tide
of documentation implying ever-increasing sensitivity to this issue.
Sensitivity to outside pressure, as well as to domestic reaction, meant
that Istanbul had to walk a tightrope of reiterated orders to the provinces,
as well as repeated assurances to the foreign envoys, that it was keeping its
house in order and, by clear implication, that it did not need their help.
This was precisely the gist of a conversation between the Ottoman
ambassador to London, Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, and Canning, who was on
leave in London. In a conversation over dinner at the Ottoman embassy,
which the Ottoman ambassador reported on 31 January 1844, the matter
of conversion and apostasy came up. Canning brought up the matter of
“the recent events where an apostate was executed, this causing very
strong feelings among the Powers”.15 Canning then went on at some
length about the promises made by the Sublime Porte in this regard. At
this point Ahmed Muhtar Paşa replied:

I explained to His Excellency in the calmest manner the religious obligations

incumbent on all Muslims in these cases (bir mecburiyet i diniyye keyfiyeti).
I also pointed out that the fact that commitments had been made in Istanbul did
not mean that such events would not take place in some locality. All we could hope
to accomplish would be to try to prevent the occurence of conditions which would
bring into force such obligations.16

The Ottoman ambassador further pointed out to Canning that “our

religious obligations like our nationally established laws are very clear
on this matter”. He went on, “Like Britain and France, the Sublime State
and its subjects are most desirous of being quit of this vexing question”.17
The message behind the diplomatic wording was very clear: do not push us
too far in a direction that we intend to take in any case. This was to be
the dominant policy stance of the Ottoman government on this issue
throughout. Nonetheless, the Ottoman ambassador made a point of telling
Canning that there were “religious obligations” to execute apostates that
the Porte was doing its best to circumvent. Caught between pressure from
the Powers and the sensitivity of their own Muslim population, “The

14
Subaşı, “The Apostasy Question”, p. 16.
15
BOA HR.MKT 1/53, 10 Muharrem 1260 / 31 January 1844, Muhtar Paşa to the Sublime
Porte.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
72 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

[Ottoman] ministers asked for a period of seven years in which to intro-

duce the idea gradually.”18
The Ottoman documents are very interesting in this regard. In partic-
ular, the memoranda dealing with the proceedings of the various commis-
sions, made up of high-ranking religious and secular officials of the Porte,
with a brief to find a solution, abound in the details of how the officials in
question agonised over what appeared to be an insoluble problem. The
matter was discussed in the High Council of the Tanzimat (Meclis-i Valayı
Tanzimat), where its members pointed out that their brief was to somehow
“confidentially discuss the balancing of Şer’i obligations with the delicacy
of the times and various other requirements”.19 The commission made it
very clear that they fully understood that the foreign powers would not
back down on this issue, which meant

that their feelings of friendship and support for the Sublime State may be exchanged
with coldness and even enmity . . . which will be very dangerous for the [Ottoman
lands] many of which are in Europe.20

Given that,

the religious difficulties on the one hand and the damage that [this matter] can cause
internally [and foreign pressure on the other], means that this is verily a delicate and
difficult issue from both angles, in fact we can say that it is a collection of all evils.21

It was stated that if an apostate (mürted):

were to surface tomorrow there is no way we can enforce the penalty because the
Christian states will see this as an insult to themselves, and this could mean that
they would confront the Sublime State with all manner of new claims, as is their
wont and as we have seen before.22

The commission therefore suggested that in cases of apostasy no exe-

cution be carried out “without a specific order bearing the Imperial
monogram (tugra)”. It was also suggested that any apostasy case that
emerged from that time on “not be dealt with locally but sent here [to] the
Sublime Porte”. This was to be “secretly written to all the Müşirs of the

18
Subaşı, “The Apostasy Question”, p. 7.
19
BOA, Irade Mesail i Mühimme (IMM), 1828, enclosure 1. Although no date is given, the
meetings probably took place just before the Porte’s answer to the embassies on 21 March
1844.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 73

provinces”.23 This meeting was evidently the source of the “secret

decree” (irade-i hafiyye) discussed in the previous chapter. Finally, it
was stated that a formal, written, binding declaration to the foreign
embassies was to be avoided at all costs, giving them instead “some
sort of note”.24
Shortly before the sultan’s declaration, Canning had an audience with
him:

Abdu l Mejid performed his promise to the letter. He added that he was the first
Sultan who had ever made such a concession, and was glad that the lot of receiving
it had fallen on me. I replied that I hoped he would allow me to be the first Christian
ambassador to kiss a Sultan’s hand. ‘No! No!’ he exclaimed, and at the same time
shook me by the hand quite cordially. Thus ended this redoubtable negotiation.25

Abdülmecid was probably quite horrified at the idea of a Christian kissing

his hand, and it is a measure of Canning’s vanity and arrogance that he saw
this as a victory.26 Furthermore, the statement “that he was the first Sultan
who had ever made such a concession” was almost certainly uttered in
lamentation. It must be recalled that as a young prince Abdülmecid had
been exposed to Naqshbandi beliefs and that he had been brought up as a
pious youth by his mother, Bezm-i Alem Sultan.27
Soon after the audience, on 21 March, the British and French embassies
extracted what they thought was a promise from the sultan that he would
ban all executions of apostates from Islam in the future.28

23
Ibid. “Bu tarafa gönderilmeleri hususunun Müşiran bendelerine mahremane yazılması”.
24
Ibid. “Şöylece pusula gibi bir varakaya terkim birle mezkur sefaretlere verilmesi”.
25
Lane Poole, The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, pp. 96 7. The
Dragoman of the British embassy, Pisani, was more realistic: “The Audience set the seal
to the whole, and a revolution in Islam was thus peacefully accomplished, though it must
be admitted that in later years the Turks endevoured to minimize the concession”.
26
Canning does not seem to be aware of the fact that he was in serious breach of protocol as
physical contact with the royal personage was quite out of the question. See Hakan
Karateke, Padişahım Çok Yaşa! Osmanlı Devletinin Son Yüz Yılında Merasimler (‘Long
live the sultan!’ Ceremonial in the last century of the Ottoman Empire) (Istanbul, 2004),
pp. 34 5.
27
See Butrus Abu Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript”, p. 85.
28
Baron I. de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangeres,
t. III (Paris, 1868), p. 226: “Note: De la Sublime Porte aux ambassadeurs de France et de la
Grande Bretagne en date du 21 Mars 1844 (20 Safer 1200).” Note that Baron de Testa’s
calender conversion is wrong. It is also interesting to note that the “Note” specifically
mentioned “l’execution d’un Chretien apostat”, not a Muslim. My thanks to Edhem
Eldem for providing this reference and drawing my attention to the matter of the wording
“Chretien apostat”.
74 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

In fact, for domestic consumption the Porte made it clear that it had
merely “postponed” (tehir) the execution of apostates, as a Şeriat ruling
could only be postponed, it could never be changed. As always, a face-
saving solution, one that would allow all parties room to manoeuvre, was
being sought in order to achieve an objective that was also the objective of
the Porte, as seen in the previous chapter.29 This was what the Ottoman
ambassador in London meant when he told Canning that the execution of
apostates was “a religious obligation”.
Canning was not prepared to grant that manoeuvring space; he pro-
claimed omni et urbi that he had achieved his objectives and that he had
procured the actual abolition of the law of apostasy. On the other hand,
the Porte felt that the declaration it had made was not officially binding,
and that it guaranteed not to abolish the actual law, but merely to prevent
executions in the future.30 The British Foreign Office seemed content for
the time being to interpret the Porte’s assurance to mean that the sultan’s
promise covered both the cases of execution of newly converted Muslims
and the cases of established Muslims embracing Christianity.31
Once the promise was extracted from the sultan, the British embassy
made sure that it was circulated to its consular representatives in the
provinces. Consul Stevens from Trabzon acknowledged the “circular of
the 26th ultimo” on 13 April 1844 informing him that
Your Excellency had received a formal engagement from the Sublime Porte that no
Christian shall, in future, be executed or otherwise made to suffer death in Turkey,
for having apostatized from Islamism.

The consul also acknowledged the “instructions as to the mode of conduct

that I am to follow, in the event of the local authorities showing, at any
future period, a disposition to renew the practice.”32
One of the most shocking aspects of the execution of Avakim was
that he had been beheaded wearing Western garb. Avakim’s execution in
Western dress drew the ire of no less a personage than Prince Metternich,
who “expressed his distress over the event”. The aspect of Western cloth-
ing was taken as a particular insult by the Western press, and the Ottoman

29
Macit Kenanog lu, Osmanlı Devleti’inde Fikir ve I_ nanç Hürriyeti (Freedom of faith and
thought in the Ottoman Empire), unpublished paper, cited with the permission of the
author.
30
Subaşı, “The Apostasy Question”, p. 26.
31
Kenanog lu, Osmanlı Devletinde Fikir ve I_ nanç Hürriyeti, p. 4.
32
The National Archives, Public Record Office, Kew (TNA) Foreign Office (hereinafter FO)
195/225, Vice Consul Stevens, Trebizond to Stratford Canning. My thanks to Mehmet
Beşikçi for providing the photograph of this document from TNA.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 75

diplomats were instructed to tell their foreign counterparts that the “cloth-
ing affair” was not a deliberate provocation but “an oversight” on the part
of the Ottoman officials carrying out the execution.33 According to
another source, the body of the hapless Avakim had been dressed in
European garb after his execution: “The mutilated body was clothed in
European costume, and the head carefully covered with a European hat
in deliberate and symbolic insult to the European community”.34 Yet it
was also this gruesome scene that was to launch the entire debate about the
“matter of civilization” (sivilizasyon meselesi) that became the central
theme around which the foreign ambassadors bent the ears of the Turks.

the second phase: the reform edict of 1856

Even though Canning and his colleagues thought they had procured bind-
ing commitments from the Porte, the wording of the actual declaration had
deliberately been left vague, as put by a missionary of a later generation:
“The wording was, unfortunately dubious. ‘Christian renegade’ might
denote merely one born a Christian, who had temporarily become a
Muhammedan”.35 In 1856 the British and French ambassadors renewed
their pressure to have the apostasy law officially and publicly cancelled. At
this point the Porte gave a second promise, but resisted appending the
promise to the Reform Edict (Hat-ı Hümayun) that was pending at the
time. The Porte argued that as the matter concerned Islamic law, a general
announcement could not be made. It declared that “although a Şeriat
ruling may fall into disuse it is not possible to change it”.36 In the event,
the Porte ceded on this point, and the following statement was appended to
the Hat-ı Hümayun that was read on 18 February 1856:

The Sublime Porte renews and confirms the assurances that it had previously given
to the Governments of Britain and France regarding the question of the renegades.
The Sublime Porte declares in addition that the decision taken at that time will
nevertheless be applied to all renegades in general.37

33
Özçelik, “Osmanlı Iç Hukukunda”, pp. 371 2.
34
H. W. Temperley, England and the Near East (London, 1936), p. 225. My thanks to Sinan
Kuneralp for this reference.
35
Julius Richter, A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East (Edinburgh and London,
1910), p. 172.
36
Kenanoglu, Osmanlı Devletinde Fikir ve I_ nanç Hürriyeti, p. 13.
37
Young, Corps de Droit Ottoman, vol. 2, p. 12. Note that this assurance does not appear in
the actual text of the edict. Compare J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East, vol 1, pp. 149 53.
76 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Although these formulations were a far cry from an open and explicit
cancellation of the apostasy clause, it suited all parties at the time to believe
that they were. It was simply a matter of allowing the practice to fall into
disuse. The Porte could downplay the issue to conservative circles by claim-
ing that it had not actually revoked a Şeriat ruling, and the British and French
could congratulate themselves on yet another victory for “civilisation”.
Finally, in a cabinet meeting in 1857, at the suggestion of no less a
personage than the famous jurist and statesman Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, the
decision was taken that the punishment for apostasy was to be exile. The
Şeyhülislam, Arif Hikmet Efendi, stated that “matters relating to the Şeriat
cannot be changed but the punishment can be postponed”.38 This cabinet
meeting seems to have been the basis of much of the policy that was
discussed in the previous chapter.
The Reform Edict of 1856 was meant to carry out the promises made in
the Tanzimat Edict. The Reform Edict is much more detailed and much
longer, as well as more specific about religious freedom, stating that
As all forms of religion are free and shall be freely professed in my dominions, no
subject of my empire shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion that he
professes, nor shall he be in any way annoyed on this account. No one shall be
compelled to change their religion.39

Another very clear indication that the Sublime State wanted to make it
known that it did not need outside interference in matters relating to the
religious freedom of its subjects, is the official declaration made in 1851
that the privileges granted to non-Muslim subjects in 1453 by Mehmet the
Conqueror, the conqueror of Istanbul, were still in force. It was clearly
stated in the declaration that such a confirmation was going to be officially
issued as an imperial edict (Hat-ı Hümayun) to the Greek and Armenian
Patriarchates as well as to the Chief Rabbi and the head of the Protestant
community: “The full application of such privileges is a manifestation of
the Sublime State’s great affection for its subjects, and its determination
not to admit any interference or meddling by any other party”.40 It is
interesting that the Porte should have hit upon the strategem of using a
four-hundred-year-old historical precedent to ward off outside pressure,
and indeed the Hat of 1856 specifically mentioned Fatih Sultan Mehmed
by name: “The powers conceded to the Christian patriarchs and bishops
by the Sultan Mahomet II and his successors shall be made to harmonize

38
Kenanog lu, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Fikir ve I_ nanç Hürriyeti, p. 5.
39
Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. 1, p. 151.
40
BOA HR.MKT 49/95; the only date is 1268 (1851).
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 77

with the new position which my generous and beneficient intentions insure
to these communities”.41
It is interesting that the “privileges” granted to the non-Muslim commun-
ities by Mehmet II should come up in this context, particularly given that
there is now a consensus in the modern literature that these “privileges”,
which came to be known as the much-cited “millet system”, were latter-day
accretions that had been retropectively projected into the past as some sort
of “foundation myth”. It is all the more significant that the Tanzimat State
should feel it necessary to re-evoke its own mythology at this time.42
Despite all of the Porte’s efforts to ward off foreign pressure and to
appear to be taking the initiative, the Reform Edict of 1856, unlike the
Tanzimat Edict of 1839, was indeed largely the result of foreign pressure.
The historical conjuncture has to be recalled at this point. In the year
leading up to the Reform Edict (Hat-ı Hümayun, 18 February 1856), the
Ottoman Empire was fighting the Crimean War against Russia as the ally
of Britain and France. The desire to be included in the Concert of Europe
that was taking shape after the Treaty of Paris (30 March 1856) ending the
Crimean War, which would guarantee Ottoman territorial integrity, must
have been instrumental in the concessions the Ottoman side was prepared
to make. The contradictions between the edict and the treaty, which
usually go unnoticed, have been accurately noted by Caroline Finkel:
“The right of the foreign powers to intervene in Ottoman domestic matters
was specifically rejected in the Treaty of Paris, but its possibility was
implicit in every phrase of the Reform Edict”.43 This factor and the desire
to be a member of the club of “civilised powers” (düvel i medeniye)
certainly pushed the Porte, led by the brilliant twosome, Âli Paşa and
Fuad Paşa, to yield perhaps more than was absolutely necessary.44 Their

41
Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. 1, p. 150.
42
The seminal article on the “millet system” is Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myth of the
Millet System”, in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in
the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society (New York, 1982), pp. 69 71.
The other authors in the two volume work also debunk the received wisdom of the
“privileges”. Most of the revisionist authors are of the opinion that the berats (privileges)
granted to the Greek Patriarch were granted to him personally, not to the church in
perpetuity as an institution. In this context, see also Halil I_ nalcık, “The Status of the
Greek Patriarch under the Ottomans”, Turcica, 21 2 (1991), 411. For a more recent
comprehensive critical revision of the millet system, see Macit Kenanog lu, Osmanlı Millet
Sistemi. Mit ve Gerçek (The Ottoman millet system: Myth and reality) (Istanbul, 2004).
43
Finkel, Osman’s Dream, p. 459.
44
The rise of Âli and his close associate Fuad Paşa was seen as the eclipse of Reşid Paşa and
the arrival of a new Tanzimat cadre. Âli was to serve six times as Grand Vizier until his
death in 1871. See I_ bnülemin Mahmud Kemal I_ nal, Son Sadrazamlar (The last Grand
78 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

onetime mentor and later rival, Reşid Paşa, was to bemoan the fact that his
successors (for he was no longer in the inner circle when the edict was
proclaimed) had given away too much at the Paris conference. Nor was he
enamored by the possibility of “emancipation parfaite” or “égalité par-
faite” for non-Muslim subjects. The Ottoman statesman, who is seen as
one of the founders of the Tanzimat, was to declare:

Regarding the content and means of application of the Ferman, it is impossible to

deny the requirements of the times and circumstances, nor is it possible to handle
our Christian subjects the way we did even twenty years ago, leave alone one
hundred. The periodic privileges granted to them by Our August Master and his
predecessor sprung from this fact. Nor is it possible to deny that it is necessary to
add some suitable measures in the same vein. Yet these things should be done
gradually and particularly without the official intervention of foreign states. It is
also necessary to accustom the minds of the Muslims and to avoid increasing the
privileges of the Christians to a degree that even they could not imagine and thus
spoil them. [If this is not done] this will be entirely contrary to and against the six
hundred year tradition of the Sublime State and lead to, God forbid, great blood
shed between Muslim and Christian.45

In the same memo, Reşid Paşa points out that he was not against reform
measures per se, but the fact was that this ferman “was unlike other
measures that the Sublime State took of it own accord . . . and was very
damaging to its sovereignty and independence”. History was to prove
him right.

the recognition of the protestant

millet and the crisis of 1864
When Stratford Canning talked about “civilisation” he meant essentially
Protestant civilisation. The ban on the execution of apostates was intended
to clear the ground for the eventual conversion of Muslims to
Protestantism. In the event, the success of Protestant missionaries among
the Muslims was minimal, and the missionaries were to claim subsequently
that they had never intended to “work” among the Muslims, but wanted to
concentrate on the Eastern Christians. Yet, as seen in the As’ad Shidyaq
affair, there is evidence that they had to make a virtue of necessity. Ussama
Makdisi’s fascinating study of early American missionary efforts in the
Ottoman Empire shows that the early missionaries were completely out of
Viziers) (Istanbul, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 4 29. Fuad Paşa served five times as foreign minister;
see I_ bnülemin Kemal I_ nal, Son Sadrazamlar, pp. 149 78.
45
Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir (Ankara, 1986), vol. 1, pp. 78 9.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 79

their depth in a Middle Eastern environment, and that their previous

experiences among the native Americans had not prepared them in any
way for work in a society where they did not hold the whip hand.46 A book
published by a missionary in the mid-twentieth century actually lamented
that the main handicap facing missionary work among Muslims was that
“the missionary has to strive against Muslim solidarity and it is Islamic
‘Brotherhood’ which is the greatest barrier for the would-be convert.
Enquirers risk ostracism and loneliness”.47
The Ottoman Protestant millet was officially recognized in an imperial
decree dated 15 November 1847. In 1850, “British intercession won full
official recognition for the Armenian Evangelical Union, and the
Protestants were to be a completely separate civil community in the
Ottoman Empire”.48

the crisis of 1864

Canning’s zeal knew no bounds, and he stated in his memoirs that once the
apostasy law was abolished, “the main barrier between Turkey and
Christendom would be removed”, presumably leaving the way clear for
the conversion of Muslims to Christianity.49 The seeds sown by Canning
bore their first fruit some twenty years later. Puny fruit though it was, some
twelve “Turkish Protestants”, they caused a disproportionate amount of
noise.50 Julius Richter, himself a missionary, was to bemoan the “foolish
exaggerated reports such as the report that 25,000 or even 40,000 Turks
had been converted to Protestantism.”51 The arrival in Istanbul in 1858 of
Dr. Gotlieb Karl Phander, who was infamous for his militant anti-Islamic
preaching in India, and Dr. Koelle, a German Protestant missionary, set the

46
Ussama Makdisi, The Artillery of Heaven, sometime in March 1826. As’Ad Shidyaq, a
Maronite Christian from a prominent Lebanese family, announced that he had converted
to Protestantism as the result of the influence of the first American evangelists who arrived
in Ottoman Lebanon in the beginning of the 1820s. Shidyaq was first cajoled to give up his
heresy, then incarcerated, and ultimately tortured on the orders of the Maronite Patriarch,
Yusuf Hubaysh. He died in captivity, becoming the first Protestant martyr in Lebanon.
47
James Thayer Addison, The Christian Approach to the Moslem (New York, 1942), p. 300.
48
Frank Andrews Stone, Academies for Anatolia, p. 70: “Protestant Milleti Nizamnamesi”
(Regulations of the Protestant millet), Düstur, I. Tertib, vol. 1 (I_ stanbul, 1856), pp. 652 4.
49
Lane Poole, The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, p. 95.
50
Correspondence Respecting Protestant Missionaries and Converts in Turkey, Presented to
both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty 1865. House of Commons
Parliamentary Papers Online 2005, www.parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk. My thanks to
Sinan Kuneralp for generously sharing this source as hard copy.
51
Julius Richter, A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East, p. 172.
80 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

scene for what was to follow. Phander was to start work by “forging the
spiritual weapons for the mission in the form of apologetic and polemical
tracts [in Turkish]”. By 1864 the energetic efforts of Phander and Koelle had
indeed produced a handful of Turkish converts.52 The Turkish converts, or
rather their minders, had come up with the harebrained idea of preaching
against Islam in public inns, or “hans”, in Eminönü, the commercial centre
of Istanbul. The British chargé d’affaires, Sir H. Bulwer, reported:

For some time past this sort of public attack on their faith by persons who have
deserted from it, has been getting up a strong sentiment of indignation among the
Mussulman population of this capital. The renegade Turk is looked upon by them
with horror; and his public revilings against the religion he has abjured, and which
they profess is considered a public insult.53

As a result, the Turkish converts were arrested, the self-styled “prayer

houses” were closed down, and the books and papers of the missionaries
were seized: “The storm burst suddenly and destructively. Ten or thirteen
Protestant Turks in Constantinople were seized without previous warning
on 17 July 1864 and thrown into prison. . . . Even the missionaries were
forcibly driven from their homes”.54 For an experienced “Turkey hand”,
Bulwer seemed somewhat surprised at this outcome and slow on the
uptake. He was certainly mistaken in his assessment of the Ottoman
government’s attitude: “I do not believe that the Government itself cares
about the attempts at conversion from any religious apprehension on the
subject; but it is fearful of the public mind”.55 Bulwer went on to report
that Turkish Protestant converts had taken to distributing the Turkish
Bible openly, pressing it on people in steamships and other public places
as well as preaching about the folly of Islam. All this, he said, was causing
“a certain effervescence” in public opinion. The minister of police had told
him that the “language of the multitude” was as follows:

Do these people want to pray to God in their own way? Let them do so in their
churches. . . . But if they want . . . to make public war in our own country against
our faith, and to encourage other people to join them in this war then they are
abusing our hospitality and protection, and under the mask of friendship, acting as
our bitterest foes.56

52
Ibid., p. 173.
53
Correspondence Respecting Protestant Missionaries and Converts in Turkey, p. 2. Sir
H. Bulwer to Earl Russel, Constantinople, 18 July 1864.
54
Richter, A History of Protestant Missions, p. 174.
55
Correspondence Respecting Protestant Missionaries and Converts in Turkey, p. 2. Sir
H. Bulwer to Earl Russel, Constantinople, 18 July 1864.
56
Ibid.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 81

What Bulwer did not seem to understand was that this was the attitude not
just of the faceless “multitude” but of the very men he was dealing with, the
Grand Vizier, Âli Paşa, and the foreign minister, Fuad Paşa. What Bulwer
was right about was that Âli and Fuad did face a serious conservative
opposition that could influence the sultan. Âli and Fuad’s argument to
Bulwer was, not surprisingly, that the lives of the Turkish converts were in
danger and that they should be removed from the capital. Two, in partic-
ular, were drawing the ire of the masses because one had been an Islamic
cleric (imam) and the other an officer in the security forces (zaptiye).
Bulwer did note, “Fuad and Aali Pashas consider that we have no right
to regard these men as Englishmen simply because they have become
Protestants: in this I agree”.57
Indeed, Bulwer was no Canning, and he did not have any particular
sympathy for the missionaries; “they consider that religious liberty con-
sists, not in every one being allowed to follow his own religion, but in every
one being allowed to attack the religion of his neighbour.”58 Yet the ghost
of Canning was evidently in attendance: “Turks should not be punished
for becoming Christians, Lord Stratford procured a promise to that
effect”, wrote Foreign Secretary Lord Russel.59 A memorandum from
the British and Foreign Bible Society also evoked Canning’s name.
Indeed, the Protestant missionaries “had welcomed the Reform Edict of
1856, as part of their effort to ‘enlighten the people’, and disseminated
knowledge of the Hat-ı Hümayun (1856) by publishing and circulating
copies of the edict”.60
The missionaries saw the Hat-ı Hümayun of 1856 as the direct result of
Canning’s “noble efforts”.61 In other words, as far as the missionaries
were concerned, the Reform Edict was simply a license to convert
Muslims.62
How the same document can be interpreted in two diametrically oppo-
site ways comes out very clearly in Âli Paşa’s assessment of the situation as
reflected in the letter he wrote to the Ottoman ambassador in London,
Alexander Musurus. Âli told his ambassador that the missionaries were
wilfully misinterpreting the Hat-ı Hümayun: “Can it be supposed that

57
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, p. 4.
58
Ibid., p. 5.
59
Ibid., Foreign Office, 11 August 1864, Foreign Secretary Earl Russel to H. Bulwer.
60
Gerasimos Augustinos, The Greeks of Asia Minor, p. 77.
61
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, p. 6.
62
Richter, A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East, p. 173: “This decree seemed to
open the way for extensive work among the Mohammedans of Turkey”.
82 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

whilst condemning religious persecutions, the Sublime Porte has consented

to permit offence and insult to any creed whatever? That at the same time
she was proclaiming liberty to all non-Mussulman creeds, she had given
them arms against Islamism?”63 Âli had also done his homework on
comparative religious liberties: “No European government . . . has sanc-
tioned the principle of religious propagandism. In England, in Prussia, in
Austria, everywhere propagandism is subjected to the supervision of the
authorities.”64 Âli had evidently done serious research on the topic; he
argued that “even in England . . . one of the most liberal nations . . . and the
head of civilization” there were laws on the statute books that dated from
the time of William III that ordained severe punishments for “speaking,
teaching, or denying the truth of the Christian religion and the Divine
authority of the Holy Scriptures”.65 Here we observe the very clever syn-
thesis of the “do not push us in a direction we want to take anyway”
attitude and a certain cynical pandering to the British self-image. The
pandering was all the more cynical as Âli Paşa hated Canning, and was
known to have said that he was so vain that “he would not allow the sultan
to reign with him. . . . Years after Stratford had left Constantinople, Âli still
spoke of him with real hatred”.66 Canning had in fact been instrumental in
Âli Paşa’s dismissal from the Grand Vezirate in 1856.67
There the matter rested. The Turkish Protestant Church was a non-
starter. Years later, J. T. Addison, a writer sympathetic to the missionary
effort, was to regret the fact that the twelve “Turkish Christians” had been
imprisoned: “This sharp reaction was confirmed by the continued hostility
of the government, which resented the slightest extension of work beyond
the Christian groups. Indeed the Grand Vizier openly declared that,
regardless of all firmans, conversion from Islam must be made
impossible”.68

63
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, p. 88. Aali Pasha to Musurus Pasha, the
Sublime Porte, 30 November 1864. The instruction of Musurus was to give the letter to
Lord Russel.
64
Ibid., p. 86.
65
Ibid., p. 87. The Grand Vizier had a firm grounding in comparative theology; “He could
discuss theology with ease with bishops, rabbis, and ulema”. See Fuat Andic and Stephen
Andic, The Last of the Ottoman Grandees: The Life and Political Testament of Âli Paşa
(Istanbul, 1996), p. 31.
66
Roderic Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the
Nineteenth Century”, American Historical Review 59 (1954), 844 64.
67
I_ bnülemin M. Kemal I_ nal, Son Sadrazamlar, vol. 1 , p. 28.
68
James Thayer Addison, The Christian Approach to the Moslem (New York, 1942),
pp. 93 5.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 83

Although, as we have seen, Âli Paşa had declared nothing of the kind,
openly or on paper, unfolding events would prove Addison’s point.

the ahmed tevfik affair

After Pfander left Istanbul in 1865, Dr. Koelle was left alone. In the wake
of the outcry of the previous year, he changed tactics; rather than out-and-
out preaching, he switched to the publication of evangelical propagandist
tracts in Turkish. In this effort he engaged the services of Ahmet Tevfik
Efendi, a teacher at the Emirgan Rüşdiye school.69 On 23 September 1879,
Ahmet Tevfik and Dr. Koelle were arrested in possession of incriminating
documents. These were tracts in Turkish attacking the Muslim faith,
designed to weaken the resolve of the believer. The entire affair was to
show just how much the political climate had changed with the coming of
the more sternly Islamic rule of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909). The
learned judges to whom the case was referred were scathing in their judge-
ment. Ahmet Tevfik should be executed, and even if he were to repent, his
repentance was not to be accepted. His crime was greater than simply
becoming an apostate himself. He had “actively worked towards the alien-
ation from the faith of his brothers in religion”.70 Of course, Dr. Koelle
appealed to the British ambassador, Sir Henry Layard, to have him put
pressure on the Porte to free Ahmet Tevfik, return his papers, and to secure
the dismissal of Hafız Paşa, the minister of police. The subsequent develop-
ment of events was to show just how much the political climate had
changed since Canning’s heyday. Despite pressure from the British,
German (for Koelle was a German citizen), and Austrian ambassadors,
the Porte stood firm. Abdülhamid II himself granted Layard an audience
on 1 January 1880, when he explained that as Caliph of All Muslims, he
could not condone the behaviour of Ahmet Tevfik. The Sultan pointed out
that Ahmet Tevfik had not been arrested because he had been suspected of
apostasy; anyone was free to choose whatever religion they wanted to
belong to in Ottoman domains. He had been arrested and condemned
precisely because he was a Muslim cleric, and as a Muslim cleric he had
been instrumental in the production of literature damaging to Islam. The
Caliph of All Muslims then proceeded to produce the pages of the

69
Azmi Özcan, Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, “Church Missionary Society I_ stanbul’da. Tanzimat,
I_ slahat, Misyonerlik” (The Church Missionary Society in Istanbul: The Tanzimat, reform
and missionaries), I_ stanbul Araştırmaları 1 (1997), 63 79.
70
Ibid., p. 71.
84 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

literature seized from Ahmet Tevfik upon which he had underlined the
passages he saw as blasphemy (küfür).71 This audience was a far cry indeed
from the audience granted to Canning thirty-six years earlier by his father,
Abdülmecid I, who had been browbeaten by the arrogant Canning. The
entire affair was defused very diplomatically by the sultan, who commuted
Ahmet Tevfik’s punishment to exile on the island of Chios, agreed to return
the papers to Dr. Koelle after he had made the alterations required, but
firmly refused to dismiss Hafız Paşa. It was, after all, not worth falling out
with the ambassador of the greatest power in the world over the fate of a
minor miscreant who would soon be forgotten. And forgotten he was. It
appears that he escaped from Chios to London, where “his baptism in
1881 caused a great sensation. . . . But he did not turn out well; in fact he
seems to have returned to Islam”.72

foreign intervention in local

religious politics
Despite the failure of the missionary effort to actively convert Muslims,
foreign intervention on religious grounds continued right up to the end of
the empire. In the case of a Christian or Jewish convert to Islam who
claimed the protection of a foreign power, another level was added to the
conversion process described in Chapter 1. The additional dimension was
the requirement that the local representative of the foreign power should
also be in attendance to witness that the conversion was legitimate.73
Many of the conversion cases involved situations where the Ottoman
authorities would become embroiled in confrontations with the represen-
tative of foreign powers, who would make it their business to “protect”
this or that non-Muslim whom they claimed (rightly or wrongly) had been
pressured into accepting Islam. This situation was exacerbated by the fact
that foreign passports had become very easy to come by. An Austrian
procurer of passports boasted,

If a non Muslim approaches to ask me for citizenship, I can get the passport of the
state he chooses, whatever that may be. Lately an Armenian came and asked me for
a Wallachian passport. . . . He gave me three hundred guruş in return. I can do the
same for anybody.74

71
Ibid., p. 75.
72
Richter, A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East, p. 176.
73
Young, Corps de Droit Ottoman. Titre XXXI b Changement de Religion, pp. 9 10.
74
Kırlı, “Balkan Nationalisms and the Ottoman Empire”, p. 254.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 85

On 20 September 1847 the Vali of Damascus reported a case where a local

Greek man had converted to Islam, but his wife had refused to accept this
and had taken refuge in the house of the Austrian vice consul. Her husband
demanded her return as he was going to take her to court to divorce her.
The local judge had told the consul that she would be returned after the
court case. The consul, “becoming rough and rude”, had refused to hand
over the woman, imprisoning her on the consulate grounds. The judge had
again asked the consul to hand over the woman, but “becoming even more
obstinate he refused”. The local authorities had then forcibly removed the
woman from the consulate. The case was heard, and the woman was
divorced from her husband and was about to be returned to the consul
when the latter declared that as she had been forcibly removed while under
his protection, he would no longer shelter her. Finding herself abandoned
by both consul and husband, the woman agreed to become a Muslim and
be re-married to her ex-husband. What would be nothing more than an
obscure marital tiff makes its way into history because the document bears
a marginal note by the Sultan Abdülmecid himself, which reads as follows:

The intervention of these foreign consuls in the provinces in matters that are not
part of their duties is injurious to affairs of state. The Reis Efendi should intercede
with the ambassadors to get them to order their consuls not to interfere in matters
that are beyond treaty obligations.75

Yet the archives are full of cases involving the intervention of foreign
consuls, some direct, some indirect. In some cases the local consul figures
only marginally in local conversion/apostasy cases, and in others he is a
central figure. In major centres like Salonica, Bursa, and Adana the consuls
would be expected to have quite a bit of clout; in small provincial towns
they often wielded disproportionate power.
On 21 October 1847, the Vali of Salonica, Mustafa Paşa, wrote to the
Grand Vizier refuting the accusations that Christian girls were being
pressured into accepting Islam and were seeking refuge with the foreign
consuls.76 He gave detailed accounts of two cases. The first involved a
Bulgarian girl from the kaza of Siroz who had eloped with a vineyard-
keeper, a certain Hüseyin. Protesting that he had been unjustly accused of

75
BOA Hat ı Hümayun 20667, 9 Şevval 1263 / 20 September 1847, the Vali of Damascus to
the imperial palace. The Reis Efendi was the Reis ul Kuttab or chief scribe, the office that
later became the foreign minister.
76
BOA A/MKT 99/66, 11 Zilkade 1263 / 21 October 1847, the Vali of Selanik, El Seyyid
Hafiz Mustafa Paşa, to the Grand Vezirate. The girl’s name is not given; she is simply
referred to as “daughter of Üstuban son of Boçu”.
86 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

negligence and laxity in this matter, the Vali took pains to point out that he
had given strict instructions that they be found, issuing the girl’s father a
document that would secure him the full co-operation of all the officials in
the province. The runaway couple had travelled to Rodosto, another kaza
in the same eyalet, where the girl had converted to Islam of her own free
will, and the couple were married. After having lived in Rodosto “for one
or two months as husband and wife”, they then moved to the kaza of
Ustruca, where they were arrested by the authorities. There, upon being
questioned, and “as the result of having been led astray by certain parties”,
the woman “gave answers which were not in keeping with her former
[conviction in Islam]”.77 The couple were duly sent to Salonica for ques-
tioning. There, Hüseyin, who was questioned first, stated that his wife had
become Muslim of her own free will and had decided to marry him. He was
now “revolted and extremely distraught by her unacceptable behaviour”,
which led him to “divorce her on the spot”. The woman was then put in the
house of an official to be brought before the local council the next day. On
that day, as she was being taken to the council, a crowd of her relatives
descended upon her, and she was spirited off to the dwelling of a certain
Babi Abud, a local merchant and an agent of the British consul. Although
proper protests were made through the British consul, “it was clear that he
[the consul] had a hand in this matter and that such [representations]
would be of no use”.78
The next case reported by Mustafa Paşa was that of Salih Aga and Litu,
the daughter of Yanca, both from the village of Dortuh in the kaza of
Yenice Vardar. The couple eloped to the neighbouring kaza of Sarı Gül,
where Litu converted to Islam “of her own free will”, and the couple were
married. Brought to Salonica, the couple held firm; questioned in the
council and entreated by priests and tearful parents, Litu’s “conviction in
her faith was beyond doubt”. At this point, the Vali’s report becomes
somewhat less than neutral in tone:

Her firmness in her conviction despite all the pressure [was truly commendable]. As
she was almost past marriageable age (biraz geçkince olup), young and strong, and
Salih Aga was a rich and prominent man in the village, strong and handsome
(yakışıklı ve tuvana) and it was clear from the circumstances that they had great
love and fondness for each other . . .79

77
Ibid. It is not stated openly that she became an apostate, but that is the clear implication.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 87

What the Vali was not saying in so many words was, “Leave them alone”.
He protested that the case had, above all else, been presented by ill-wishers
as that of a Muslim man abducting an underage Christian girl, and her
parents appealed to the British consul for her return. He entreated his
superiors to see the difference between rumour and fact. He did not omit to
add that “in keeping with the delicacy of the times and with the rules of
proper conduct, I continue to maintain correct relations with the foreign
consuls”.80 The documentation on these cases ends here. What is striking,
however, is that twenty-nine years later an almost identical incident in the
same city would have much more dire consequences, as will be seen later in
the “grievous Salonica incident”.
Intervention in the fate of converts by foreign consuls could take on
dramatic proportions, as shown in the following case. In early 1846, a
merchant from Trabzon by the name of Mehmed Aga arrived in Adana on
business, accompanied by “a Georgian concubine (cariye) approximately
some twenty years of age and a young Abhaz girl of some sixteen years of
age”.81 Mehmed Aga and his companions settled down at an inn. Falling
into conversation with other guests, the women were questioned about
their ethnic origins:

The older one admitted that she was of Georgian origin and had voluntarily come
to the kaza of Acara in Trabzon some six years previously and had then converted
to Islam. The other one stated that she was Abhaz by origin and had come some ten
years ago and had then converted to Islam. At this point their master hit the older
girl without any reason and some perfidious influence was brought to bear by some
of the Christians present, leading the girl to cry out and deny that she ever became a
Muslim and that she was Georgian.

The Russian deputy consul at Tarsus, a certain William Barker, came to

hear of the incident and demanded an investigation, claiming that, as a
Georgian, the woman was a Russian subject.82 The local council was duly
convened, and in the presence of Consul Barker the woman once again
declared that she had never voluntarily become a Muslim. In these circum-
stances the council placed her in the custody of one of their members, Hacı

80
Ibid.
81
BOA A/MKT 35/45, report of the Administrative Council of Adana (undated). This is
based on the context and the date of the instructions sent to the Vali of Adana (11 February
1846); the events mentioned probably occurred in January 1846.
82
William Barker was an American from a well established missionary family and was acting
as honorary consul for Russia. His missionary background would account for his zealous
and overbearing intervention in this case. I owe thanks to Professor Roger Owen of
Harvard University for this information.
88 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Sıdkı Efendi, while they awaited instructions from Istanbul. The younger
girl insisted that she was a Muslim and was handed back to Mehmed Aga.
At this point dramatic events unfolded:

[The night after the council ruling] at around six in the morning, the Russian
Consul broke into the inn with fifteen of his men and forced his way into the
merchant’s room. He grabbed the Abhaz girl by the collar, and attempted to drag
her away shouting all the while ‘you are a Georgian’ while the girl cried out, ‘I am a
Muslim elhamdullilah’. A crowd gathered to the girl’s cries and intervened saying,
‘it is against the law to seize a Muslim woman by the collar’. They then threw the
Consul and his men out of the inn.83

The next day the council met again in the presence of the Russian and British
consuls, their dragomans and their staff. At this session Mehmed Aga
produced witnesses from the inn who testified that the Georgian had indeed
told them that she had converted of her own free will. He also produced two
receipts from the customs authorities in Trabzon, duly certifying that he had
paid import duty on the girls, and thus that they were his legal property.84
The matter did not rest here, however; the Russian embassy in Istanbul
intervened, claiming that the women in question were “stolen slaves” and
Russian subjects. The embassy further contended that “they had been sub-
jected to force and pain in order to make them convert. One of them had
been unable to resist the pressure and had converted while the other
remained true to her faith”. The Vali of Adana was told by Istanbul that
“If subjects of a friendly state express the desire to become Muslim and an
Ottoman subject, in order to avoid all future contestation, according to the
present treaties, they are to be questioned in front of their consular repre-
sentatives”. If in the course of this questioning it becomes clear that they
have indeed been forced to convert, “no pressure of any sort is to be applied,
and they are to be sent to Istanbul.”85 The outcome of the case is not clear,
but it is unlikely that the women were set free.
The status of concubines (cariye) often resulted in diplomatic confron-
tation in matters of conversion and apostasy. On 27 November 1851, the

83
BOA A/MKT 35/45.
84
Ibid. Enclosures 3 4, declarations of customs duty, one for each woman, 4 Şevval 1261 / 6
October 1845. Mehmet Ag a may well have been rather disturbed by the religious injunc
tion that forbids a master from having sexual intercourse with a concubine who has
become an apostate. See Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, Hukuku Islamiyye, p. 11: “According to
Hanefi fikh a concubine who becomes apostate is to be imprisoned by her master until she
recants. But her master may not approach her [during this time]. Because it is strictly
forbidden to have sexual relations with a female apostate”.
85
Ibid., instructions from the Sublime Porte to the Vali of Adana, 14 Safer 1262 / 11
February 1846.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 89

Muhafiz (commander) of the Paşalik of Belgrade wrote to Istanbul about a

case involving the alleged abduction of a young Serbian convert girl who
had been in the harem of a Bosnian notable, Fazlı Paşa.86 The summary of
the correspondence describes what happened. Sometime in late summer
1850, Fazlı Paşa and his family arrived at the port of Zemun, a port on the
Danube in Habsburg territory directly across the river from Belgrade,
where they were to board a steamer bound for Istanbul.87 While they
were staying at a local inn the commander of Zemun (Zomon Cenerali)
sent armed guards to the inn, claiming that the young girl, Mariya, had
been taken into Paşa’s household against her will and converted by force.
Her older brother had reported the matter to the Austrian consul at
Belgrade, who in turn had alerted the Austrian authorities in Zemun.88
There are two diametrically opposed versions of the story. The Muhafiz
claimed that while the Fazlı Paşa family had been put under armed guard
and were being kept under house arrest at the inn, armed men had burst
into their rooms, seized the girl, and dragged her screaming to confinement
in the town. The reason for this, according to the Austrian side, was that
the girl had been questioned and had stated that she had been forced to
convert and that she had been given into service of the Fazlı Paşa family
against her will. The Austrian authorities stated that slavery was forbidden
in Habsburg domains and that according to their law, any slave that set
foot in Habsburg dominions and wished to be set free was emancipated.
Therefore, Mariya had been taken from Fazlı Paşa’s harem, and they had
been allowed to leave for Istanbul leaving Mariya behind.89 The Ottoman
side claimed that this was a lie and that Mariya was not a slave but a free

86
BOA HR.SYS 204/17, 2 Safer 1268 / 27 November 1851, the Muhafız of Belgrade to the
Sublime Porte. On the legal status of concubines and slavery in general in the Ottoman
Empire, see Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise 1800 1909
(London, 1996), especially pp. 102 7: “Measures against the White Slave Trade in the
Black Sea”.
87
Zomon, as it was called in the Ottoman documents, was officially known as Semlin in
German, Zimony in Hungarian, and Taurunum in Latin. It lies diagonally across from
Belgrade and was once a separate port town known as the “last Habsburg border post
before the Orient”. I owe thanks to Milos Jovanovic for these geographical details.
88
BOA HR.SYS 204/17. The fortress town of Belgrade was part of the rump of what had
been Ottoman Serbia until Serbian autonomy in 1878. So there is a somewhat complicated
diplomatic structure involved here. As an autonomous state, Serbia had diplomatic repre
sentatives in both Ottoman and Habsburg domains. The Austrians kept a consulate in
Belgrade which remained officially Ottoman until it was awarded to Serbia by the Treaty
of Berlin (1878).
89
BOA HR.SYS 204/17, 22 Safer 1268 / 17 December 1851, the Ottoman ambassador in
Vienna to the Sublime Porte.
90 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

person receiving payment for her services. She had converted of her own
free will in a kadı court and had been given a document (hüccet) from the
Şeriat court of Bosnia.
The issue continued well into the next year as the Ottoman side continued
to press for the girl’s release. On 25 August 1852 the Porte received a letter
from the Austrian consulate in Belgrade containing the written statements of
the commander of Zemun and Milan, son of Ilya, the older brother of
Maria.90 Milan wrote: “[S]ix years ago in the eyalet of Bosnia some
Muslims captured me and my sister and sent us to Fazlı Paşa who ordered
that we be made Muslims.” They had refused and had been imprisoned.
After one year in prison Maria relented, became a Muslim, and was released.
Milan persisted in his refusal and remained in prison for four years. He had
been released one year before the date of writing. Milan concluded that “my
sister is still a concubine and a slave in the harem [of Fazlı Paşa].”
The commander of Zemun claimed that nobody had forced his way into
the harem; two guards armed only with swords had waited at the door but
“only to prevent the girl’s escape”. When Fazlı Paşa had been offered the
option of leaving and abandoning the girl, he had taken it and boarded
ship. The girl had then been questioned and had confirmed her brother’s
story. The Austrian official asked, “How can a seven-year-old girl of her
own will and desire accept Islam? At such a young age how could she
[understand] and negotiate a service contract? She is now eleven years old
and even now this is beyond her.” The Austrian official then presumed to
lecture the Porte on how it should conduct its politics: “If the officials of the
Sublime Porte [in Belgrade] write to their superiors giving the facts as they
occured they would be doing their country a great service. Maybe these
two unfortunate children can be the occasion for the lifting of all oppres-
sion from the Christian subjects of the Sultan.”91
On 19 October 1852 the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna reported that
he had once again seen the Austrian foreign minister and requested that the
girl be returned. The minister had told him that, since both Milan and his
sister were Ottoman subjects, and since there were not actually any legal
procedure pending as Milan had only asked for the freedom of his sister
and had not taken the matter to any court, “if she managed to cross into
Ottoman territory there would be no objection”.92

90
Ibid., 25 August 1852, the Ottoman Embassy in Vienna to the Sublime Porte, enclosing
translation of a letter from the Austrian consul in Belgrade.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid., 5 Muharrem 1269 / 19 October 1852, the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna to the
Sublime Porte.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 91

The minister’s suggestion was clearly disingenuous as an eleven-year-

old girl was hardly likely to take it upon herself to cross into Ottoman
territory even if she wanted to. We will probably never know which side
was telling the truth, although on balance, the Austrian explanation
appears more plausible.
In situations such as this one the Ottomans found themselves squeezed
into that uncomfortable position between the frying pan and the fire. On
the one hand, they desperately wanted to join the club of “civilized
powers”; on the other, they felt that they must maintain their dignity. As
in the “concubine case” of Fazlı Paşa, they were not necessarily interested
in the fate of some poor and unfortunate eleven-year-old girl. What
mattered was that Fazlı Paşa’s harem had been violated; armed men had
marched in and removed one of his women, and this was a gross insult. On
the other hand, to the outside world (in this case, the Austrians) to keep
concubines was seen as barbarism.
In an ironic twist of history the Austrians would find themselves in
exactly the same situation but in reverse when they acquired control of
Bosnia after the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. Robert Donia has shown that this
time it was the Bosnian Muslims who would be accusing the Habsburgs of
forcibly converting Muslim girls to Catholicism.93 On 22 August 1890,
Uzeifa Delahmatovic, a sixteen-year-old Muslim girl working as a servant
in the household of Esad Kulovic, a Muslim city council member, left his
house never to return. It was discovered that she had converted to
Catholicism. She was taken to the residence of Archbishop Stadler in
Sarajevo, where a hearing was held. In the presence of Kulovic and her
brother, she declared that “no force had been employed to persuade her to
convert” and that she had not been pressured in any way; “she expressed
her unequivocal desire to remain a Catholic”.94 Kulovic asked the
Austrian authorities to do something about the situation, protesting that
Stadler and his men had hid Uzeifa from her fellow Muslims. Here the twist
becomes even more poignant: “He and other Muslims cited Ottoman
practices in which any potential convert was required to consult with the
spiritual advisor from each faith before the conversion was officially
recognized. They urged the Austrians to follow the Ottoman precedent

93
Robert J. Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina
1878 1914 (New York, 1981), p. 55.
94
On Archbishop Josip Stadler (1843 1918), see Srecko M. Džaja, “Bosnian Historical
Reality and Its Reflection in Myth”, in Pal Kolsto (ed.), Myths and Boundaries in South
Eastern Europe, pp. 106 29, particularly p. 120: “Archbishop Stadler was inclined to
proselytize but the Austro Hungarian administration in Bosnia averted this danger”.
92 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

in dealing with future conversions”.95 The Austrian Conversion

Ordinance of 1891 clearly echoed Ottoman practices. The converting
person had to prove that he or she was mentally sound and of the age of
discernment. If any of the parties disputed the conversion, the state was to
intervene; if force or trickery was suspected, the convert would be moved
to a “neutral location” for up to fourteen days. A commission would be
established that would decide whether to recognize the conversion “only
after hearing from the convert, the appropriate spiritual guardians and
other witnesses”. Situations very similar to those seen in Ottoman domin-
ions arose: “Strong emotional involvement by all parties often precluded
willing acceptance of any government decisions. When the government
removed a convert to a ‘neutral location’ the gendarmes often had to use
force to remove an individual from friends and relatives at a time of great
emotional crisis”. Muslim women converting to Catholicism continued to
be a point of confrontation between the Austrians and their new Muslim
subjects. Donia mentions some “dozen or more” such cases, which became
symbolic events uniting secular and religious Bosnians in their opposition
to the Austrians.96
Back in the Ottoman domains, the potential converts could find them-
selves involved in a three-way conflict of sovereignty. Such was the case of
a nine-year-old boy, Salomon Bikri, a Jewish subject of Tuscany. On 20
June 1849 the chargé d’affaires of Tuscany in Istanbul complained that the
boy, who was in Damascus, had been pressured into accepting Islam and
had been spirited off by the inhabitants of that city, who had “claimed that
he had an inclination to convert to Islam”. The chargé d’affaires for
Tuscany was not the only one laying claim to him. The Sardinian consulate
also claimed the boy, declaring that because of the recent political changes
in Italy, Tuscan subjects who had previously been under Austrian protec-
tion were now under the protection of the Kingdom of Naples and
Sardinia. The Ottoman authorities were quite unequivocal: “[I]t is highly
irregular to seize a child who has not yet converted on the basis of an
inclination”. In the end, Salomon was handed back to his father, who had
become a Sardinian subject.97
Even the dead did not escape scrutiny. On 13 September 1852 the
governor of Yanya (Ioannina in Epirus, Greece) was ordered to look into

95
Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle, p. 56.
96
Ibid., pp. 59, 114.
97
BOA A.MKT 210/91, 29 Şaban 1265 / 20 June 1849, the chargé d’affaires for Tuscany,
Chevalier Sarafini, to the Sublime Porte.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 93

the death of the servant of a high-ranking Ottoman official. The official

had reported that his servant had died soon after converting to Islam.
However, the death had occured in somewhat suspicious circumstances,
and the Austrian embassy had intervened, claiming that the deceased had
been an Austrian subject who had been beaten to death while being pressed
to accept Islam. Furthermore, no Austrian official had been present to
testify that the conversion was voluntary. It was therefore duly arranged
that a team of doctors from the Ottoman and Austrian sides be present as
the body was exhumed and an autopsy performed.98
A striking case that illustrates very evocatively the problems involving
foreign interference comes up on 27 January 1852, in the sancak of
Lazistan, on the eastern Black Sea coast bordering Russia, where four
Georgian boys turned up professing that they had converted to Islam “of
their own free will”. The Russian consul claimed them as Russian sub-
jects, demanding that his representative verify that their conversion had
indeed been voluntary. The sancak officials pointed out that the usual
procedure in these matters called for the presence of a consular official
only if the converts were Russian subjects. If they were Ottoman subjects,
they said, procedure simply called for the presence of the local
Metropolitan or his representative, the kocabaşı. It had also been deter-
mined by international agreement that to-and-fro movement of people
across the border was to be regulated by passport, but the Georgian
children had no passports. Thus, it was implied, the Russian consul
could not claim them.99
The thread running through the documentation is that the Ottomans
felt that the consulates and embassies were constantly looking over their
shoulder in matters relating to conversion. Such was the story of Katerina,
a Greek woman who was orphaned and left in the care of a certain Talip
Aga in Yanya, who “virtually imprisoned her and applied all manner of
threats and promises for her to convert.” The British consul in Preveza then
became involved, claiming Katerina as a British subject and therefore
demanding that a British official be present at the moment of conversion.

98
BOA HR.MKT 49/36, 28 Zilkade 1268 / 13 September 1852, the Ministry of the Interior
to the Vali of Yanya.
99
HR.MKT 42/7, 27 January 1852. In fact, the Ottoman Russian border was extremely
porous. The Ottoman official made reference to an incident in the past when some one
hundred people from the town of Arhavi had crossed over to Russia and not returned. On
just how porous the borders in the region were, see Thomas M. Barret, “Lines of
Uncertainty: The Frontiers of the Northern Caucasus”, in Jane Burbank and David
Ransel (eds.), Imperial Russia (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1998), pp. 48 173.
94 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman government instructed the governor of Yanya to ascertain

whether Katerina had converted voluntarily and whether she was in fact a
British subject. It was clearly stated that no consular representative was
needed if she was not.100
The critical sticking point in most of the cases was the age of the
potential convert. Such was the case of the Greek girl Vasilaki, a resident
of a modest quarter in Istanbul, who claimed that she was an Austrian
subject. Vasilaki, the daughter of a deceased stonemason and Austrian
subject, Istefanaki, had decided to convert and marry Kadri, a Muslim
Ottoman subject, also a stonemason. She had been sent by Kadri to the
Directorate of Religious Sects (Mezahip Müdüriyeti) for her conversion
formalities. On 3 July 1911 the Austrian embassy claimed that her mother
had lodged a complaint that she was being kept there against her will and
that she was underage. The Austrian consulate demanded that an Austrian
interpreter be present at the proceedings. The minimum legal age of con-
version for girls at the time was fifteen; Vasilaki was claiming to be twenty-
one. The Ottoman authorities pointed out that “as the Austrian law even
permits conversions at fourteen years of age, they should have nothing to
say on this matter”.101 It appears that the Ottomans had done their
research as the minimum age of conversion in the Habsburg domains at
the time was indeed fourteen.102 As in the case of the Bosnian Muslims
mentioned earlier, who some years previously had advised the Austrians to
take a leaf out of the Ottoman book regarding matters of conversion, here
too it seems that the Ottomans were well informed about legal statutes on
the “other side”.
The question of the age of majority is also at issue in the case of Vasilya,
a Greek girl and citizen who eloped with her Muslim lover in the Vilayet of
Aydın. It was reported on 2 December 1911 that she had been taken into
the custody of the police while her official procedure was pending. A crowd
of Greeks had protested to the French consul in Aydın, who protected
Greek interests. Although the Vilayet of Aydın reported that she was over

100
BOA HR.MKT 47/81, 26 Sevval 1268 / 13 August 1852, the Sublime Porte to the Vali of
Yanina.
101
BOA DH.ID 116/22, 20 Haziran 1327 / 3 July 1911, the Ministry of Justice and Religious
Sects to the Foreign Ministry. It is unclear why the parties in question did not produce
birth or baptism certificates.
102
My thanks to Professor Peter Urbanitsch from the University of Vienna for this informa
tion. E mail from Prof. Urbanitsch dated 10 November 2008: “In 1868 this age limit was
lowered to 14 (Law No. 49 of 25 May 1868 on interdenominational relations, Article 4),
and it referred not only to Christian denominations, but to Jews as well.”
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 95

the legal age of fifteen, the French consul claimed that she could not be
considered an adult until she was twenty-one.103
Although the French were self-consciously secular at home, they did not
flinch from using religion – that is, Catholicism – as a tool of leverage in the
Ottoman Empire. Their particular protegées were the Maronites of
Lebanon, who provide our next case. On 14 January 1895 the Vali of
Beirut wrote that two young Maronite girls who were employed as ser-
vants in Tripoli had applied to become Muslims. The girls were sisters
named Sa’adi and Mes’ude, the daughters of one Cerbis Fazıl. The older of
the two had been duly converted according to the formal procedure, but
just as the procedure was about to be repeated for the younger girl, the
Maronite Patriarch had intervened, claiming that the girls were under-
age.104 The church registers of the girls’ village, Tenvirin, had been con-
sulted, and the Maronite Patriarch was claiming that according to the
registers, both girls were underage. The affair had come before the local
council as tension was mounting between the Muslims and the
Patriarchate. The Vali of Beirut also noted that “the affair is sure to
draw the attention of the French Consulate”, suggesting that in order to
avoid the “wagging of tongues” the girls should be removed to Istanbul.105
The next day the Mutasarrıf of Lebanon, Naum Paşa, wrote that the
Maronite Patriarch was increasing his pressure on the issue and that it was
necessary to “let this issue pass over without taking on the colour of a crisis
leading to the involvement of foreigners”.106 Yet this was exactly what was
happening. The Patriarchate claimed that the girls were twelve and ten
years old, respectively, and therefore underage. Yet the elder, Sa’ida, had
presented a petition to the authorities stating that she had not been pres-
sured in any way but was accepting Islam of her own free will. The
administrative council of Tripoli had questioned her and found that “she

103
BOA DH ID. 11/52, 29 Tesrin I Sani 1327 / 2 December 1911, cipher telegramme from
the Vilayet of Aydin to the Ministry of the Interior.
104
BOA A.MTZ.CL 2/97, 1 Kanun u Sani 1311 / 14 January 1895, the Vali of Beirut,
Nasuhi Paşa, to the Mutasarrıf of Lebanon. My thanks to Engin Akarlı for this reference.
The Mutasarrıf was the Ottoman governor general for the Lebanon. He had to be chosen
from among the Christian officials of the empire. The Mutasarrifate regime had been
established in 1861 as a compromise between foreign pressure for the protection of
Christians in the Lebanon and Ottoman sovereignty in the province. On the subject of
the Mutasarrifate, see Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861 1920
(Berkeley and London, 1993). See also Kamal Salibi, The House of Many Mansions: The
History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Los Angeles, 1988).
105
BOA A.MTZ.CL 2/97.
106
Ibid., 2 Kanun u Sani 1311 / 15 January 1895, the Mutasarrif of Lebanon, Naum Paşa, to
the Sublime Porte.
96 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

appeared to be some seventeen or eighteen years of age”. Her conversion

had duly been carried out, and the Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects
had been informed. Ten days later the matter had indeed reached the
dimensions feared. Naum Paşa was told that the girls were “squeezed in
between the Patriarchate, the Muslim population, and the French
Consulate”. He was duly instructed to send the girls to Istanbul.107 On 6
February the Vali of Beirut reported that the girls had been embarked on
the ship Taif, accompanied by an official, and sent to Istanbul, where they
would be put in the care of the Ministry of Police.108 The girls arrived
safely in Istanbul, and one year later we find them “put up as guests in the
home of a police officer”.109 One year after that, the Ministry of Police
is instructed to “to find suitable husbands for them and marry them off”.
The girls evidently had their own plans and made it known that “they were
not interested in marriage” but wanted to be given into the care of one
Shaikh Abu Mohammad Tabha of Tripoli, with whom they planned to go
on the haj.110
This curious little episode bears important clues regarding the relation-
ship of the convert to the state, and about the sheer power of foreign
intervention. In a sense, Sa’adi and Mes’ude as converts are taken into
the foster care of the state. They are sent to the capital and put up as guests.
The “foster parent” – in this case, the Sublime Porte – attempts to arrange
marriages for them. All this because there is only a hint of foreign inter-
vention; nowhere in the documents do we actually find a protest from the
French consulate or others.
This case also invites comparison to that of As’ad Shidyaq, a Maronite
who had been converted to Protestantism by American missionaries early
in the century. In that case, Isaac Bird, one of the missionaries, had
bemoaned the fact that there was not enough “English and American
influence” in the Ottoman Empire enabling them to protect him.111
Of course, conversion and apostasy were also about money.
Traditionally, new converts received a symbollic sum of money, the kisve
bahası, which was meant to launch them into their new lives as

107
BOA A.MTZ.CL 2/97, 26 January 1895, Naum Paşa to the Sublime Porte.
108
Ibid., 24 Kanun u Sani 1311 / 6 February 1895, the Vali of Beirut, Nasuhi Paşa, to the
Sublime Porte.
109
Ibid., 11 Mart 1312 / 24 March 1896, the minister of police to the Sublime Porte.
110
Ibid., 14 Şevval 1313 / 29 March 1896, the Sublime Porte to the Ministry of Police; 17
Zilkade 1313, the Sublime Porte to the Vilayet of Beirut.
111
Makdisi, The Artillery of Heaven, p. 147.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 97

Muslims.112 As the nineteenth century rolled on, however, more effective

measures were considered. A memorandum dated 28 July 1889 prepared
by the Director of Sects (Mezahib Müdürü), Ziver Bey, discussed various
options. Ziver Bey began by saying that

It is well known that the Embassies and the Patriarchates place great difficulties in
the way of anyone who wants to convert [to Islam] sometimes focusing on a
particular case and making a big fuss. The matter of conversion also draws the
attention of many Muslim subjects.113

It was also well known that no matter how firm the resolve of a potential
convert may have been, if they were poor, the promise of money from the
Christians was something that they found difficult to resist. Ziver Bey went
on to broach an even more delicate topic:

What is even worse is that cases of apostasy have begun occuring among new
converts who find themselves poor and destitute after their conversions. This is a
matter touching upon the honour of Islam that is upheld as the greatest of require
ments by the Sublime State and is causing much sadness and despair.

Ziver Bey then discussed several options. One was the formation of a sort
of community coffer whereby people would contribute money for the
upkeep of new Muslims. However, Ziver Bey was not too sanguine
about this option, commenting; “Muslim folk are not used to such organ-
ized matters”. What was even more of a problem was that “it would be
very difficult to keep such a [coffer] secret and this would bring down the
disasters of the wrath of Christian bigots, so terrifying in our present
times”.114 The next option was the creation of a fund in the official
treasury for the support of needy converts, but this option was also not
without danger as “it would show up in the state budget and could not be
kept secret”. Ziver Bey finally concluded that the only viable option was
the charity of the sultan, “which the August Person has never witheld in the
matter of the defence of the honour of Islam”.115
Several things are remarkable about this document. First and foremost,
the Ottomans felt they were on the defensive on their own home ground.
To feel that they had to keep secret what was, after all, a perfectly legit-
imate exercise such as a community coffer, for fear of “Christian bigots”, is

112
Anton Minkof, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahası Petitions and Ottoman
Social Life 1670 1730 (Leiden, 2004).
113
BOA Yildiz Esas Evraki (YEE) 35/27, 15 Temmuz 1305 / 28 July 1889, the director of
sects, Ziver Bey, to the ministry of justice and religious sects.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
98 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the clearest indication that they felt cornered on their own turf. In much the
same way, to feel that the budget would be scrutinized by hostile eyes and
that any expenditure for the support of needy converts had to be kept off
the books is a further manifestation of extreme insecurity. In fact, the offer
of sultanic charity was indeed accepted, and the needy converts did receive
“a little something”, albeit on a highly irregular basis.116

the “grievous salonica affair”

In early May 1876 a young Bulgarian girl in a village near Salonica decided
to convert to Islam. Little did she know that she was about to make history.
By the end of that week a major diplomatic crisis had broken out, and two
foreign consuls, the French and the German, had been killed by a rioting
mob. Given the sacrosanct position of foreign consuls in Ottoman terri-
tory, this was a scandal of unprecedented proportions. The incident was all
the more serious because it occurred not in some remote Anatolian town
but in the empire’s second-largest city.
The girl was Stephana, daughter of the late Delyo Goya, from the village
of Avrathisar. Apparently she converted in order to elope with her Muslim
lover.117 However, it seems that “both the girl and her mother had a
notorious reputation that went beyond the boundaries of the village.”118
Whatever Stephana’s morals, we have definite information that she
boarded a train bound for Salonica on that fateful day, 7 May 1876,
with the intention of going to the Konak of the Paşa to have her formal
conversion procedure carried out, and to briefly take her place in history.
As Gradeva and Kuneralp point out, there are many missing pieces in this
tale. Did Stephana elope, or was she abducted by order of Emin Efendi, a
powerful local notable who had his eye on her? Given the fact that it was
highly unlikely that a peasant girl would have been able to organize a train
journey to appear before the local administrative court on her own,
Gradeva and Kuneralp come up with the following working hypothesis:

116
See, the discussion on the language of officialdom in the Conclusion. The term used in
such matters is “bir mikdar şey” as it was considered rude to mention the word “money”
in such a context.
117
Rossitsa Gradeva and Sinan Kuneralp, On Love, Religion, and Politics: Salonica (1876)
and Ruse (1910). Unpublished paper cited with the specific permission of the authors. I
wish to thank both authors for sharing this fascinating piece with me.
118
Ibid., p. 3. Roderic Davison, one of the few historians to take note of the incident, also
noted that it concerned “a Bulgarian girl of dubious morals”. See R. Davison, “Turkish
Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century”, American
Historical Review 59 (1954), 844 64.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 99

“that she was manipulated and things went off the course which the
planners set”.119 She was accompanied by “two black women and the
imam of the village”.120 Unknown to Stephana, her mother had boarded
the same train but was sitting in a different carriage. It was upon the train’s
arrival at the station of Salonica that the “grievous Salonica affair”
(Selanik vak’a-i müellimesi), as the Turks called it, began in earnest.
As they descended from the train, Stephana’s mother appealed to the
Christians at the station that her daughter was being taken off to be
converted by force. At this point, Yanko Abott, the German consul,
“publicly tore off the yaşmak (veil) that Stephana was wearing, knowing
most certainly that such a gesture of provocation would incense watching
Muslims”121 Stephana’s mother again appealed to the Greeks on the
platform that her daughter was being taken off to be forcibly converted
to Islam. Some Greeks then seized her from the police and spirited her off
to an unknown destination in the carriage of the American consul, Hadji
Lazaros. The fact that the Muslims believed a foreign consul to be involved
was to have dire consequences.
The following morning a group of Muslims called on the Vali, Mehmet
Refet Paşa, demanding that the girl be brought to the Konak for the formal
procedure of conversion. Meanwhile, a crowd that was about to become a
mob was gathering outside. The American consul was away, and his
brother, who was acting for him, claimed that he did not know where
the girl was, which was a lie, as he knew that she was being kept in the
house of another Greek notable.122 The crowd, its numbers had swollen by
the arrival of some five hundred armed Albanians, now became a mob and
threatened to storm the American consulate.123 The Vali told the

119
Gradeva and Kuneralp, On Love, Religion and Politics, p. 4.
120
Ibid., n. 16. The source cited by the authors here is the account of Pericles Hadji Lazaro,
a Bulgarian notable of Salonica and the consul of the United States, in
(Andonis Vakalopoulos, A. Ta dramatika gegonota tis Thessalonikis kata to Maio
1876 ke i epidrasis tous sto Anatoliko zitima Makedonika, t.2 (Thessaloniki, 1953),
pp. 193 262.
121
Gradeva and Kunerlap, On Love, Religion and Politics, pp. 4, 7. The authors point out
that the actual national identity of the consuls was a slippery concept: “The event drew
attention to the in bred, endogamous consular world in provincial Ottoman towns.
Henry Abbot, the murdered German consul was a Greek speaking Levantine who had
become a British subject only in 1872, Jules Moulin, the murdered French Consul had
married his sister. The US consul, Perikles Hadji Lazaro, was a Bulgarian of Russian
nationality, whose brother in law was the physician of the Russian Embassy in Istanbul
and an uncle of the Russian consular agent in Larissa”.
122
Mark Mazower, Salonica: City of Ghosts (London, 2004), p. 172.
123
Ibid.
100 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

deputation that “this was an affair for the authorities and that they should
disperse”, promising the delivery of the girl.124 The mob then repaired to
the nearby mosque, the Saatli Cami (the Clocktower Mosque). At this
point the French and German consuls appeared on the scene. Although
Mazower maintains that the “French and German consuls happened by ill
luck to walk by the mosque”, the Ottoman documentation contradicts this
and shows that the consuls deliberately came to the mosque.125 Salim Bey,
the chief of police, saw them approaching the mosque in the company of
Captain Hasan Efendi; “he called out to him, scolding him, saying ‘why do
you bring the consuls here at a time like this?’” Evidently the consuls had
asked the Ottoman officer to accompany them to the mosque.126
The character of Jules Moulin, the French consul, played a fatal role in
the story. Gradeva and Kuneralp characterize him as a “Gallic Firebrand”
who “tended to behave more like a colonial administrator than a consular
agent”. Moulin, together with the German consul, Yanko Abbot, turned
up at the mosque and proceeded to revile the already very angry and
dangerous mob; “it was Moulin’s impetuousness and hot-headedness
that cost him his own life and that of the German consul”.127 Hearing
that the consuls were then taken hostage by the mob, the Vali immediately
went to the mosque and was shut up in the same room as the consuls, with
only a handful of police guarding them. He tried to reason with the mob,
but they told him, “[W]e will kill you all, we want the girl”.128 According
to the Ottoman memorandum:

[The members of the mob] climbed up through the metal bars outside, and came up
the stairs, breaking off the iron bars of the windows and, overpowering the few
police officers, they burst into the room. The consuls were killed by blows from iron
bars and pieces of chairs, the Vali also received a blow to the head and was briefly
knocked senseless.129

After recovering and finding that the consuls had been murdered, Refet
Paşa ordered Salim Bey to “guard the bodies” as he returned to the Konak.
By this time the girl had been produced, and hearing that she had been
released and had arrived at the Konak, the mob dispersed, firing shots in

124
BOA HR.SYS 16/293, 7 August 1876, memorandum on the grievous Salonica incident
(Selanik Vak`a i müellimesi). My thanks to Sinan Kuneralp for bringing this file to my
attention.
125
Mazower, Salonica, p. 172.
126
BOA HR/SYS 16/293.
127
Gradeva and Kuneralp, On Love, Religion and Politics, p. 6.
128
BOA HR.SYS 16/293.
129
See Plate 3 and Plate 8.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 101

celebration.130 Meanwhile, what were the security forces of the second-

largest city of the empire doing while their governor was being beaten
about the head by an angry mob? Even the polite official language of the
Ottoman document cannot hide their sheer incompetence. Salim Bey
explained the delay in his bringing troops to scene as a result of “not
having written orders”. The captain of the Ottoman corvette, the I_ claliye,
did land a party of marines but, for reasons that are unclear, marched them
to the garrison barracks and not to the mosque. When he did get to the
garrison where he met Ata Bey, the corporal of cavalry, they “had quite a
long conversation about how all the consuls of the city should protest the
improper behaviour of the American consul” rather than rushing soldiers
to the scene.131 The chief of police, Salim Bey, Corporal of Cavalry Ata
Bey, and the captain of the I_ claliye were all found guilty by the court-
martial of various degrees of “slackness and negligence of duty”. Salim Bey
and Ata Bey were sentenced to being stripped of their rank; to being
expelled from the police force and the army, respectively; and to serve
sentences of ten and five years, respectively, of “fortress imprisonment”.
Riza Bey got off relatively lightly with forty-five days’ imprisonment and
suspension from the navy for one year.132
The consequences of the event for the Ottoman state were dire.
Although the sultan immediately sent his ADC to the French and
German embassies to present his condolences, and a commission of
enquiry did arrive forthwith at Salonica, what was at issue was the prestige
of the Great Powers. This was symbolized by the warships from various
countries that anchored off Salonica and trained their guns on the citadel.
The ultimate insult of the French naval squadron not firing the customary
salute to the citadel was avoided at the last moment.133 As aptly put by
Mazower: “The symbolic power of the 1876 murders lay precisely in the
fact that the victims were consuls, members of perhaps the most privileged
political class in Salonica”.134 An imperial commission of enquiry, headed
by Vahakn Efendi, an eminent member of the Istanbul Armenian

130
BOA HR.SYS 16/293, memorandum based on the proceedings of the court martial of the
police chief (Alay Beyi), Salim Bey, Corporal of Cavalry Ata Bey, and the captain of the
ship I_ claliye, Riza Bey. Presided over by Ferik Necip Paşa.
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.
133
TNA, FO 195/1107, 14 May 1876, British Consul Blunt to Sir Henry Elliot. Blunt
commented on the unwillingness of the French squadron to salute the citadel: “The
etiquette question was most inappropriate and I may say improper”. Blunt enclosed a
list of the warships in the port. Of the total of fourteen ships, only six were Ottoman.
134
Mazower, Salonica, p. 176.
102 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

community, and a high-ranking bureaucrat, arrived and soon earned the

respect of the foreign community, even if it had to tread lightly to avoid
antagonizing the Muslim population.135 Thirty-five arrests were made;
the accused were tried, and six were hung publicly, with the boats from
the warships of the foreign powers standing offshore to bear witness. The
French ambassador at the Sublime Porte, De Bourgoing, even asked for
capital punishment for Refet Paşa, but Paşa was simply demoted.
Meanwhile, Abdülhamid II had acceded to the Ottoman throne on 24
August. His coronation gift was to try to find the FF 900,000 compensa-
tion that the Ottoman state was forced to pay as compensation to the
families of the two consuls.136
The basic, and obvious, question is the following: how did the conver-
sion to Islam of a young peasant girl precipitate a major diplomatic crisis?
The question is all the more relevant when we bear in mind that in the cases
mentioned earlier, also occurring in the Vilayet of Salonica and also
involving the conversion of young Christians and meddling consuls, noth-
ing remotely similar happened.137 The answer must lie in the historical
context. The events coincided with the outbreak of the Bulgarian crisis,
which was to lead to Gladstone’s famous pamphlet “The Bulgarian
Horrors”.138 Tension was high, and rumour abounded:

The Bulgarian insurrection actually broke out just three days before the killing of
the consuls in Salonica; rumours of the rising had reached the city, together with
reports of outrages on Muslim villagers and of plans to drive them from their
homes.139

135
FO 195/1107, 11 May, Blunt to Elliot: “I believe that the Commission are acting
cautiously with regard to the arrests.” It is significant that the Porte should send an
Armenian official to head the commission. No doubt this was not accidental, as a high
ranking Christian official would make a good impression on foreign public opinion.
Vahakn Efendi (Hovhannes Vahanyan) was a prominent jurist, had served as under
secretary of justice, and had been part of the commission that had drafted the
Constitution of 1876. He had also worked with Cevdet Paşa in the Ministry of Justice.
See Vartan Artinian, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Ermeni Anayasası’nin Dog uşu 1839 1863
(The birth of the Armenian constitution in the Ottoman Empire) (Istanbul, 2004), pp. 78,
84, 93, 118. My thanks to Aylin Beşiryan for this information.
136
Gradeva and Kuneralp, On Love, Religion and Politics, p. 7. As the Ottoman treasury
was bankrupt it was unable to raise the sum, and Sultan Abdülhamid had to borrow the
money from his personal Greek banker, Zarifi.
137
See above, pp. 85 87.
138
Magnus, Gladstone, p. 242; W. E. Gladstone, The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of
the East (London, 1876).
139
Mazower, Salonica, p. 178.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 103

As always in such situations, rumour and word of mouth played a large

role in the escalation of the event, with Christians and Muslims feeding off
each other. On 16 May the British consul, Blunt, wrote to the vice consul in
Kavala that he was pleased to hear that the rumour to the effect that the
Muslims of Kavala were planning a “general massacre of the Christians”
was unfounded.140 On 20 May the vice consul in Janina was to report:

At Janina also the authorities took a very sad view of the affair but the mass of the
musselmen [sic] in that place did not share the same feeling but on the contrary
seemed to think that it served the consuls right for interfering in other peoples’
business.141

The discrepancy between the feelings of Ottoman officialdom and those of

the population at large has to be explained. For senior officialdom, the
Salonica affair was indeed “grievous”, as it seemed to confirm the worst
stereotypes that they were trying desperately to distance themselves from.
For the masses of humble folk, however, the issue was seen as a threat to
what they held most dear – their honour.142 To a great extent the feeling of
insecurity and wounded honour had to do with the role of women. Women
were seen as the repository of a community’s honour, and it was not such a
huge leap for the honour of the community to become the honour of the
nation. For the Christians this was a perfect example of what Irvin Schick
has termed “the mobiliz[ing] of centuries old gender and sexual stereotypes
in the service of nationalist policies”.143 And this was even more true for
Muslims, accustomed as they were to seeing themselves as the ruling
element and fearing an imminent Bulgarian insurrection descending
upon Salonica. In the immediate wake of the murders, in the atmosphere
of general panic, there were very real doubts as to the loyalty of the troops,
most of whom, it was feared, sympathized with the mob: “The Salonica
Batallion in particular is comprised chiefly of peasants from the adjoining
villages who all more or less have friends and business connections with the
Mahometan population in this town”.144 What would today be called

140
FO 195/1107, 16 May 1876, Consul Blunt to Vice Consul Gawelkiewicz in Kavala.
141
FO 195/1107, 20 May 1876, Vice Consul Blakeney to Consul Blunt.
142
BOA HR/SYS 16/293. The file includes a list by profession of the arrested and condemned
men. They included porters, slaughterhouse workers, menial men at arms (kavas), ice
salesmen, carpenters, and a barber. It is highly likely that many of the actual culprits were
not arrested. As always in cases like this, it was more important for justice to be seen to be
done.
143
Irvin Cemil Schick, “Christian Maidens, Turkish Ravishers”, in Women in the Ottoman
Balkans, p. 295
144
FO 195/1107, 11 May 1876, Consul Blunt to Sir Henry Elliot.
104 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

public opinion was a very real consideration in the planning of the funeral
of the consuls. Although the French and some of the other foreign repre-
sentatives wanted something resembling an occupation, with large num-
bers of troops landing from the ships in the harbour, Blunt counseled
moderation: “[A]ny unnecessary foreign military display at funerals may
be dangerous in present critical state of affairs and should be avoided if
possible”.145 In the event, the funeral was very carefully stage-managed,
with the cortege being led by a company of Ottoman infantry followed by
the Vali, Eşref Paşa, and the imperial commissioner, Vahakn Efendi, with
the representatives of the foreign community following behind.146
Indeed, the various parties were right to worry about Muslim public
opinion. The gristly spectacle of the public hangings, in particular, had
created a great deal of resentment well beyond the walls of Salonica. On 11
August the Foreign Ministry sent a circular telegramme to the Ottoman
embassies in London, Paris, and Berlin. The ambassadors were instructed
to make representations at their respective posts to the authorities there,
telling them not to insist on further executions: “You are of course aware
of the terrible effect that the first six executions had on the population of
Salonica and what an echo they created in the whole empire”. The ambas-
sadors were instructed to point out that “only time could now calm senti-
ments” and that new executions would only cause unnecessary
provocation. They were to argue that the commutation of the sentences
to hard labour for life “would have a much more salutary effect on the
public mind . . . then the spectacle of an implacable justice that they do not
even see the aim of.”147
Two of the three officers who were convicted, Salim Bey and Rıza Bey,
were exiled to the island of Rhodes. Evidently rumours circulated that they
had been received as heroes on the island and were getting preferential
treatment in prison. The Mutasarrıf of Rhodes denied this and stated that
he had been on the ship that had brought the convicts to Rhodes; “the
reason why the notables, officials and population of this place were there
on the quay was to meet me merely out of respect for my rank”. He

145
FO 195/1107, 10 May 1876, Consul Blunt to Sir Henry Elliot.
146
FO 195/1107, 20 May 1876, Consul Blunt to Sir Henry Elliot: “Every one admired the
energy and goodwill with which the Governor General and the Imperial Commissioner
comported themselves to keep order throughout the town and to render every possible
honour to the funerals”.
147
BOA HR.SYS 16/293, 11 August 1876, the foreign minister, Safvet Paşa, to imperial
embassies in London, Paris and Berlin. The document states that at the time of writing ten
men had been executed.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 105

disclaimed the rumour that the population had given the prisoners a heros’
welcome. He also denied that Salim Bey had been given private quarters.
Rıza Bey was free to walk around the fortress, he said, as he had been given
a lighter sentence.148 As is often the case, what the Ottoman official denied
is most likely to be what in fact happened; it is highly likely that the crowd
that had turned out to meet the ship was there to do honour to the
convicted officers. The Salonica affair had become a cause celèbre and no
doubt many thought Salim Bey and Rıza Bey had been sacrificed to foreign
pressure.
A remarkable assessment of the background for the Salonica affair was
written by the dragoman of the Vilayet, Dimitraki Efendi:

The quite justifiable wish of the Imperial Government to make use of the patriotism
of the Muslims to rid itself of its internal enemies and to stifle the Bulgarian
revolution, had somewhat over excited the masses in the Vilayet and a marked
coldness between Christians and Muslims had been the consequence.149

conversion and apostasy in turbulent rumeli

Well after the “grievous Salonica affair”, the Ottoman Balkan provinces –
or Rumeli, as the Turks called the region – continued to be a flashpoint of
religious and national tensions. A special inspectorate for the Vilayets of
Rumeli (Rumeli Vilayatı Müfettiş-i Umumiligi) was created in 1903 and
headed by one of the empire’s most distinguished statesmen, Hüseyin
Hilmi Paşa, with the task of carrying out the census in Ottoman
Macedonia.150 In this tense milieu, and against the general backdrop of
the Macedonian Crisis, conversion and apostasy cases can be seen as a
microcosm of broader national tensions.151
On 9 January 1903 the Vilayet of Yanya reported that two converts, a
boy and a girl named Vasil and Katrina, had caused a commotion in the
kaza of Losna. Although they were both over fifteen, and therefore above
the minimum legal age for conversion, and although their conversions

148
BOA HR.SYS 16/293, 1 Kanun u Evvel 1292 / 14 December 1876, the Mutasarrif of
Rhodes to the Sublime Porte.
149
Ibid., 25 October 1876, report by the dragoman of the Vilayet of Selanik, Dimitraki
Yenidunia, to His Excellency Safvet Paşa, foreign minister.
150
Ipek Yosmaog lu, “Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National
Identity in Ottoman Macedonia”, IJMES 38 (2006), 55 77.
151
On the background to the “Eastern Rumelian Crisis”, see F. A. K. Yasamee, Ottoman
Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878 1888 (Istanbul, 1996),
pp. 153 78.
106 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

had been carried out in the kaza council according to the proper proce-
dure, in the presence of the delegate of the Greek Metropolitan, as soon as
they came out of the government building the delegate had proceeded to
cause a commotion. He had “claimed that the conversions were forced
and had provoked the Christians, of whom there were many, being
market day, saying ‘there is no government’ [these children have been
forced]”.152 The crowd had surged against the security forces, but an
incident had been averted. The Mutasarrıf of Berat (in present-day
Albania) had reported that the delegate was probably acting at the behest
of the Greek consul at Berat, who had encouraged him to stage a
provocation.153
A remarkable aspect of this affair was that the Greek consul at Berat had
made no official démarche. The Ottoman authorities knew about his
intentions because, as a subsequent cipher telegramme from Yanya stated,
“we have had access to the correspondence between them”. To put it
plainly, they had intercepted the telegrammes sent by a member of the
diplomatic corps.154 The Vali of Yanya did, however, have the presence of
mind to declare, “Although we should utterly reject the intervention of the
Consul in matters beyond his authority, this much commotion cannot be
without cause and we should closely look into the matter to see if anything
untoward has come to pass”.155
A few days later another telegramme from the Greek consul was inter-
cepted, claiming that the Christian girl had changed her mind about
converting and had been replaced by an impostor, a Muslim girl who
had been presented to the commission of inquiry in her stead. The Porte
evidently took these claims very seriously, and on 21 January the Vali of
Yanya was ordered to intensify his investigations, because

although what the Consul claims is highly unlikely, his claims cannot be entirely
without foundation, even the rumour of such events, leave alone their actual

152
BOA DH.MKT 829/60, 27 Kanun u Evvel 1319 / 9 January 1903, the Vilayet of Yanya to
the Ministry of the Interior. This voluminous file contains some fifty folios of correspond
ence relating to the investigations carried out by Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, inspector of Rumeli.
153
Ibid. The Vilayet had ordered that a commission of inquiry consisting of one Muslim and
one non Muslim member be sent.
154
Ibid.
155
Ibid. Enclosing a telegramme from the Greek consul of Berat to the Greek consul at
Monastir: “Consulat de Grece Monastir. Fille et jeune homme mineure sont detenus aux
zapita de Leoussian autorite locale refuse de les remettre a Metropole et cherche les
convertir emotion generale. Veuillez prevenir Excellence Hilmi Pacha. Counsul Berat
Svoronos”.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 107

occurrence, is not to be tolerated. We must not give our enemies the slightest excuse
to attack us.156

Meanwhile, tension between the Muslim and Christian communities was

mounting. According to the Vali of Yanya, the intrigues of the consul and
the delegate of the Metropolitan were the result of “national feeling
(hissiyat- ı milliye)”.157
A few comments are in order here. First, the Porte clearly sensed that
something suspicious was indeed going on, hence the order to “secretly
investigate further”. Second, in noting the intervention of the Metropolitan
delegate based on “national feelings” (hissiyat-i milliye saikasiyla”), the
Porte was well aware that the issue was far broader than the conversion of
two adolescents. The way in which the conversions of obscure figures could
become considerations in high politics is observable in the suggestion of the
Vilayet of Yanya that no further measures be taken given that “this would
only further enflame Greek public opinion that is presently in a great state of
excitement over the Bulgarian issue”.158 The conversion of two obscure
adolescents had thus become an international crisis involving the Porte, the
kingdom of Greece, and the local Ottoman Greek (Rum) community.
One year later the matter still had not been settled. Osman Fevzi Paşa
was to write on 29 March 1904 that Vasil and Katrina, now called Ismail
and Hamide, had been living in the house of a certain Bayram from Losna.
However, they had been “threatened by the Christians and have now
escaped”. Vasil had taken refuge in the Greek consulate in Berat, while
Katrina had sought sanctuary with the local Metropolitan. It was the
intention of both to commit apostasy.159 The Vali referred to a previous
correspondence with the Ministry of Justice, where “it was made clear that
in the case of those who chose to commit apostasy the procedure is to
remove them to another location”. He also pointed out that as both the
boy and the girl were Ottoman subjects, it was highly irregular for the
Greek consul and the Metropolitan to give them refuge.160

156
Ibid., 8 Kanun u Sani 1319 / 21 January 1903, the Sublime Porte, Ministry of the Interior,
to the Vilayet of Yanya.
157
Ibid., 12 Kanun u Sani 1319 / 25 January 1903, the Vali of Yanya to the Sublime Porte.
158
Ibid., 1 February 1903, the Sublime Porte to the Vilayet of Yanya. The words used here are
“Yunan efkâr ı umumiyesi”, meaning citizens of Greece rather than Ottoman Greeks (Rum).
159
Ibid., 16 Mart 1320 / 29 March 1904. Cipher telegramme from the Vilayet of Yanya to
the Sublime Porte. The names Vasil and Katrina suggest that the converts in question may
have been of Slavic origin.
160
Ibid.
108 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The concern was, as always, foreign meddling in their religious affairs:

[It] is extremely necessary that no ground or excuse be given for censure on the part
of foreigners and that they be prevented from carrying their interference as far as
our religious affairs.161

The case of Vasil and Katrina evidently came across the desk of no less a
personage than the Grand Vizier, Ferit Paşa, who wrote to the Ministry of
the Interior, telling them that he had made the necessary démarches with
the Greek embassy in Istanbul and the Patriarchate. The embassy had
agreed to instruct the consul at Berat to hand Vasil over to the Ottoman
authorities. Ferit Paşa made it very clear that when the pair were handed
back, as confirmed apostates, “they should be removed from their locality
and sent to a suitable place to avoid causing the excitement of the Muslim
population”.162
The file that these documents come from also contains a detailed report
by the inspectorate for the Vilayets of Rumeli detailing some fifteen cases of
abducted girls and forced conversions occurring in the year 1903.163 In the
majority of the cases the abducted girls were returned to their families and
the culprits given prison sentences. However, in cases where the girls had
been forced into Islam but had subsequently married Muslim men, the
authorities were reticent about pursuing the matter. In these cases the
formula always went as follows: “[A]fter conversion and marriage it is
no longer in the public interest, nor is it wise to carry out further inves-
tigations. The complainants are to be given suitable answers and the
matter closed”.164 Evidently the authorities were reluctant to transgress
the sanctity of the household as this would raise more hackles with the
Muslim population.

conclusion
In examining the rather opaque documentary story of Ottoman conver-
sion policy and ideological control in the late Ottoman era, the interesting
thing is precisely what the documents do not tell us. The constant repeti-
tion of orders “not to do something” is a fairly clear indication that the
undesirable act was in fact being committed. Forced conversion, although

161
Ibid.
162
Ibid., 23 May 1322 / 5 June 1904, Grand Vizier Ferit Paşa to the Ministry of the Interior,
Sublime Porte Secretariat No. 913.
163
Ibid., report by the Inspectorate of Vilayets of Rumeli.
164
Ibid.
 Conversion as Diplomatic Crisis 109

repeatedly banned by the centre, was in fact taking place. The impression
derived from the documentary evidence is one of worry verging on panic
among the Ottoman elite; set upon by ambassadors, consuls, missionaries,
and sundry other meddlers, they were finding it increasingly hard to retain
their ultimate sovereignty. The fact that the Hat-ı Humayun of 1856 was
seen, quite rightly, as a foreign imposition by no less a personage than
Reşid Paşa himself, and his warning that it would raise the expectations of
the reaya to unsustainable levels is worth remembering in this context. In
the increasingly cramped space between foreign pressure, the religious
sensitivities of their own subjects, and (last but by no means least) their
own sincere conviction that a fundamental revamping of the state ideology
was vital, the Ottoman élite desperately strove to remain masters in their
own home.
The eloquent example of Ziver Bey, who emphasized that even some-
thing as straightforward as the setting up of a community coffer for needy
converts had to be kept secret from “foreign bigots”, speaks volumes
about this feeling of being restricted in their own domain. On the other
hand, in the mindset of the diplomats and missionaries, the sheer effrontery
of a Christian envoy preaching about the Qur’an to the Caliph of Islam, or
the gall of missionaries provoking recent Turkish converts to publicly
denounce Mohammed as a false prophet in the capital city of the
Caliphate, did not seem abnormal to most people in the West, so firmly
convinced were they of the superiority of their “civilisation”. To say that
missionaries going around the capital city publicly insulting the dominant
official religion were causing “a certain effervescence” was the height of
conceit.
By the second half of the century the wielders of the “artillery of
heaven”, unlike the earlier American missionaries operating in Ottoman
Lebanon in the 1820s, no longer felt the need to “placat[e] Ottoman rulers
by avoiding Muslims” and focusing on Eastern Christians.165
An imperial order dated 1 August 1897 clearly reflects the concerns of
the centre as it provides for the constitution of a mixed commission whose
specific brief was

to prevent the spread of the influence of foreigners and to ensure that each remains
in his own confession, and to prevent the conversion of His Imperial Majesty’s
subjects to Protestantism as well as other foreign creeds.

165
Makdisi, The Artillery of Heaven, p. 100.
110 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The commission was to be made up of three Muslim officials (one each

from the Şeyhulislam’s office, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry
of the Interior), two Armenians, and one Greek Orthodox.166
The cases discussed here also illustrate that conversion and apostasy
cases had become symbolically loaded issues as they overlapped with
nationalist agendas on the part of former subject peoples, such as the
Greeks, as well as those of peoples beginning to agitate for autonomy or
independence, such as the Serbs and Bulgarians. In the 1903 census in
Macedonia some villagers had actually wanted to be registered as belong-
ing to the Serbian denomination (Sırb mezhebi) but had been told that this
was out of the question because “Serbness is not a denomination but a
nationality (Sırblık bir mezheb olmayub milliyet bulunduguna)”.167 As in
the case of the Salonica affair, the people involved became symbols of
national honour: the contested girl symbolizing the honour of the
Christians and Muslims, and the Ottoman officials, who were perceived
as having become scapegoats for the ire of the foreigners, becoming heroes
defending the national honour of the Ottomans.
In the event, the number of Muslim conversions to Christianity
remained minimal, but this was not something that could have been
taken for granted at the time. As far as the missionaries were concerned,
the Ottoman state gave as good as it got. The memorandum prepared by
the sultan for Ahmed Şakir Paşa reflected this state of mind: “Although the
Sublime State cannot force anyone to accept Islam, we can never tolerate
the conversion of Muslims to Christianity.”168
On the other hand, the official declaration by the highest authorities in
the land that each Ottoman subject was free to practice whatever religion
he or she chose, together with the spreading belief that the death penalty
was no longer the punishment for apostates, was to have some unforeseen
results. Right across the empire there emerged, men and women who had
been officially Muslims, but who now declared that they had been secretly
Christian all along and wanted to be recognized as such.

166
BOA, Irade Hususi 123, 3 Rebiyülahir 1315 / 1 August 1897, Yıldız Palace Imperial
Secretariat No. 3659.
167
Yosmaog lu, “Counting Bodies”, p. 65.
168
BOA. YEE A 24/X/24/132, 28 Kanun u Evvel 1314 / 11 January 1898, decoded cipher
telegramme fromYıldız Palace to Ahmet Şakir Paşa.
 3

“Crypto-Christianity”

‘I have held the said Gasparo to be a Marrano. And we hold Marranos to be

those who, like ships, sail with two rudders’.
Venetian Rabbi Chain Saruc’s testimony before the Inquisitional
Tribunal of Venice (1580)1

‘Turkish stupidity, or rather perhaps Turkish indifference to what lay

beneath the surface so long as appearances were more or less kept up . . .
Thus arose the bodies of the so called Crypto Christians’.
R. M. Dawkins, “The Crypto Christians of Turkey”2

crypto-christians and the reform edict of 1856

Simultaneously with the events described in the last two chapters, across a
broad geographic region ranging from Albania to the Pontus on the Black
Sea coast, people emerged, taking the official declaration of religious
freedom at its word, to announce that in their hearts they had never been
Muslims and had secretly adhered to their former (Christian) faith. As the
historical and political conjuncture changed from the relatively liberal
Tanzimat State to the much more authoritarian conservative rule of the
Hamidian State, crypto-Christianity came to be seen as even more of an
aberration.
Anthony Bryer, in his seminal study of crypto-Christianity, was to
observe that after the Crimean War, when the British and French became

1
Anthony Molho, “Jews and Marranos Before the Law: Five Mediterranean Stories”,
GRAMMA 6 (1998), 13 30.
2
R. M. Dawkins, “The Crypto Christians of Turkey”, Byzantion 8 (1933), 247 75.

111
112 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the self-appointed guarantors of the Christian populations of the empire,

“What the Allies had not bargained for was the number of supposed
Christians, supposedly registered as Muslims, who now emerged out of
the woodwork to declare themselves under British and French – and
Russian – protection”.3 The people who emerged as secret Christians
were spread over the entire Ottoman Empire and were known by a number
of names, such as “meso-meso, paramesoi, and dipistia in Greek; in Serbia
droverstsvo; in Cyprus patsalosi (piebalds), apostolikoi (wild carobs) or
linovamvakoi (linen-cottons); in Albania laramanoi (motleys)”. Bryer was
to note some of their most typical common characteristics:

‘Nineteenth century accounts of the crypto Christians after they had emerged have the
air of well worn anecdote, but are consistent. They had held double names, Christian
and Muslim (where Mehmet and Ali were avoided). They were baptized and kept
fasts, but underwent sünnet (circumcision) and had two marriages, with a Christian
koumbaros and a Muslim master of ceremonies. Their daughters did not marry out
and Muslim brides brought in were secretly baptized. They went to the mosque in
Ramadan; sometimes they were buried in a Muslim cemetery even but with simulta
neous Christian service. . . . Elsewhere the crypto Christians had a cant language [and
used it] in front of real Muslims they referred to swine as their “parents in law’’.4

One of the definitive factors in the religious strategy of Ottoman crypto-

Christians was military service. Although after the Tanzimat reforms it had
become accepted in principle that all Ottoman subjects would perform
military service, in practice the process was delayed. The main reason was
the obvious reluctance on the part of the non-Muslim population, who did
their best to avoid military service. Another very important factor in this
delay was the reluctance of the Muslim officialdom to accept such a
measure. Yet the principle remained the rule even if it was not applied.
The first service to admit Christians was the navy, which readmitted
Ottoman Greeks in 1845 after they had been purged during the Greek
War of Independence. In 1850 it was decided that non-Muslims would be
admitted to the Military Academy. In 1856 it was decided to postpone the
conscription of non-Muslims, and it was determined that they would pay a
“military donation” (bedel-i askeri), in effect an exemption tax. Effective
conscription in all the services was actually implemented in 1910. 5

3
Anthony Bryer, “The Crypto Christians of the Pontos and Consul William Gifford Palgrave
of Trebizond”, Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon, Bulletin of the Centre for Asia
Minor Studies, Athens (DELTIO) 4 (1983), 15.
4
Ibid., pp. 16, 21.
5
On the issue of military service, see Eric Jan Zurcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System
in Theory and Practice”, International Review of Social History 43 (1998), 439 40. For a
 “Crypto-Christianity” 113

The phenomenon of crypto-Christianity and the official reaction to it

was also overdetermined by the realities of international power politics
discussed in the previous two chapters. Of the two major cases to be
examined here, the Kromilides were to openly declare their Christianity
in the relatively more tolerant context of the Tanzimat State, whereas the
Stavriote declaration coincided with the more self-consciously Islamic
regime of the Hamidian period.
Another factor relating to crypto-Christianity was of course geography.
Most crypto-Christian communities were to be found in the mountains or
other remote areas, where the established orthodoxies were not able to
penetrate or penetrated only superficially. As the great Fernand Braudel
declared,“In the mountains then, civilization is never stable”; hill peoples
resisted or yielded only superficially to established religion and had to be
constantly conquered anew.6
A fascinating recent study by Yorgos Tzedopoulos makes the connection
between this “coming out” process all over the empire and the “Tanzimat
reforms . . . which granted religious freedom and made conversion possible,
at least theoretically for Muslims.”7 This placed the Ottoman administra-
tion in a serious quandary. On the one hand, it had indeed promised
religious freedom to its subjects; on the other hand, there seems to have
been a genuine fear that apostasy from Islam would become so widespread
as to threaten the state itself.8 The term “apostasy” is used deliberately here,
for as far as the Ottomans were concerned, the people in question were
becoming apostates from Islam, which only recently had been a
crime punishable by death. As seen earlier, the Sultan had officially banned
the execution of apostates, yet the social stigma, albeit reduced, was still very
powerful among the population at large.9 Indeed, apostasy and crypto-
Christianity were seen almost as a contagious disease that had to be kept

more detailed study, see Ufuk Gülsoy, Osmanlı Gayrımüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni (The
military service adventures of the Ottoman non Muslims) (Istanbul, 2000).
6
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II
(London, 1972), vol. 1, pp. 34 5.
7
Yorgos Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets: Crypto Christianity in the Pontos”, DELTIO 16
(2009), 165.
8
Their worries were not without grounds. The Protestant missionaries believed that crypto
Christianity was a good way of evangelizing among Muslims: “It is the conviction of a large
number of workers among Moslems that the ultimate hope of bringing Christ to the
Moslems is to be attained by the development of groups of followers of Jesus who are
active in making Him known to others while remaining loyally a part of the social and
political groups to which they belong in Islam.” See, James Thayer Addison, The Christian
Approach to the Muslim (New York, 1942), p. 305.
9
See Chapter 1 in this volume.
114 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

in check. Even before the Reform Edict openly declared religious freedom,
there had been a spate of apostasy in Rumeli. On 11 March 1844, the Müşir
of Rumeli, Mehmed Reşid Paşa, reported that in Noveberde in the sancak of
Niş, three Christians who had some time earlier converted to Islam had
reverted to Christianity. The Paşa made sure to stress that “apostates of this
nature are numerous in those parts and the matter may infect others”.10
This did indeed seem to be happening, in the new atmosphere of prom-
ised religious freedom, as one group after another came forward and
declared that they had always been Christian. Antonina Zhelyazkova has
noted that some Albanian Catholics had adopted Islam only in order to
avoid paying the cizye (poll tax). They secretly continued to observe their old
customs, and in remote areas the local priests allowed them to take part in
services. Men took communion in secret and married Christian women,
“declaring that they did not want the name of Christ to leave their homes for
good”.11 These people now declared that they wanted to worship openly as
Christians. Similar practices were seen among the formerly Orthodox of
Ispat, Berat, Skopje, and Montenegro.
Stavro Skendi also records the curious case of the Shparataks, from the
region of Shpat northeast of Berat and near Elbasan, who seemed to
actually “shop around” for religious faith depending on which was more
advantageous at the time. The Shparataks were Albanian crypto-
Christians who had two names, a public Muslim one and a private
Orthodox Christian one. As far as the Ottomans were concerned, they
were Muslim, and in 1832 the Ottoman government ordered them to
arms. At this point they decided to cast off the cover of Islam and declared
that they were Christians. For reasons that are unclear, Skendi seems
unsure of his source, which declares that because of “good administra-
tion” the authorities tolerated the situation. “Was it because the Ottoman
government, tired of the 1821 Greek Revolution, wanted to prevent
Albanian revolts or was it because it was on the road to the reforms of
1839?”12 The Shparataks came under pressure again in 1846, when the

10
BOA Irade Dahiliye 4627, 19 Safer 1260 / 11 March 1844, Müşir of Rumeli Mehmed
Reşid Paşa to the Serasker (commander in chief). Nonetheless, the measure taken was no
worse than their imprisonment.
11
Antonina Zhelyazkova, “Islamization in the Balkans as an Historiographical Problem:
The Southeast European Perspective”, in Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroghi (eds.), The
Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography (Leiden, 2002), pp. 244 5.
12
Stavro Skendi, “Crypto Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans”, Slavic
Review 26 (1967), 227 46; see Natalie Clayer, Religion et Nation chez les Albanais
XIX XX e Siècles (Istanbul, 2002).
 “Crypto-Christianity” 115

law of conscription was applied in Albania and the Ottoman authorities

demanded that the Albanian provinces provide their quota of recruits.
Again they protested that they were Christians. The residents of Eşbat
(as the Ottomans called the region) appear once again in 1889, when a
series of reports stated that they numbered some 4,000 souls, 1,600 of
whom professed Islam in public but practiced Christianity in private.
The reports stated that “this was well known by the Ottoman admini-
stration”. They had always performed military service. The worry as
expressed in the reports was that this new trend to profess Christianity
openly in public could spread to the other villages in the area. What is
interesting here is that, as will be seen later in the cases of the Kromlides
and the Istavri, what had been common knowledge in the pre-Tanzimat
period and had not constituted a problem, became a political problem in
the Hamidian era: “It appears that to leave the state of Crypto-Christianity
and to declare publicly Christian faith was perceived by the Ottoman
administration as an act of political disloyalty . . . with the growth of
non-Muslim nationalisms.”13
The matter came up again in 1897, when the governor of Elbasan asked
them to make up their minds – to serve in the army if they were Muslims, or
to pay taxes if they were Christians. At this point the Shpataraks decided to
declare that they would become Uniates enjoying the protection of Austria-
Hungary. The Shparataks then became a bone of contention between the
Porte, who wanted to keep them as loyal Muslim subjects; Austria, which
somewhat reluctantly gave them support; and Russia, which did not want
to lose an Orthodox Balkan population.14
A Bulgarian source indicates that in at least one case a Christian
population was punished for “coming out”. Several villagers in Skopska
Crna Gora who had been crypto-Christians “trusted the Hat-ı Şerif and
came out into the open as Christians”. Despite declarations of religious
freedom, the villagers were exiled to Anatolia. As a result of the interven-
tion of the ambassadors of the Great Powers the exile was lifted, and they
were allowed to return. During their exile and return they were subjected
to ill-treatment, and half of them perished. All this happened in the 1840s,
“[at] the time that Mustafa Reşid Paşa was solemnly affirming that the
empire was on the road to Europeanization and modernization. One had

13
Akşin Somel, “The Problem of Crypto Christians in Albania during the Hamidian
Period”, in his South East Europe in History: The Past, the Present and the Problems of
Balkanology (Ankara, 1999) pp 117 24.
14
Skendi, “Crypto Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans”, p. 241 and n. 67.
116 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

to admit nonetheless that a certain measure of ‘progress’ had taken place,

at least all these people were not massacred on the spot for having rejected
Islam.”15
Particularly important groups of crypto-Christians were the Hemşinli,
who were Armenians from the Pontos who inhabited the coast and the
mountain fastness in the north-east Black Sea region.16 The Hemşinli had
been forced to convert in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centu-
ries; some had continued to worship Apostolic Christianity secretly. These
people were known as the kes-kes (Armenian for “half-and-half”). They
spoke Armenian and until the late nineteenth century secretly celebrated
the Transfiguration of Christ (Vartavar) and baptized their children with
holy water (miwron). After the Reform Edict of 1856, some Hemşinli
living in the Karadere region east of Trabzon attempted to revert to their
old faith.17 They broached their intention to their local aga, Suiçmezoglu,
who assented and told them to make a list of the families who wanted to
return to Christianity. When three officials from Istanbul came to
Sürmene, the matter was put before them. At this point the mollahs from
Of, a neighbouring region inhabited by Laz, famous for their Muslim zeal,
intervened and stated that if the Hemşinli were allowed to revert, so should
they, as they had been converted from Greek Orthodoxy. The ploy
worked, as the officials, fearing the scandal of the prospect of the famous
“hocas from Of” (Oflu Hoca) becoming apostates, hurriedly left the area
promising to return, but never did. Both the Greeks and the Muslims
claimed the Oflis, the first as early martyrs, the latter as a legendary mass
conversion. What Michael Meeker observes regarding the Oflis is valid for
crypto faiths in general at this historical conjuncture: “These older tradi-
tions acquired a new colouring with the advance of a nationalist outlook
and expectation during the second half of the nineteenth century”.18

15
A. Velkov, E. Radusev, E. Siljanova, M. Kalicin, and A. Radusev, Sources Ottomanes sur
le Processus d’Islamisation aux Balkans (XIV XIX siècles). Traduction des documents
(Sofia, 1990), pp. 33 4. My translation, with thanks to Maria Todorova for checking the
bibliographical details.
16
Claire Mouradian, “Aperçus sur l’Islamization des Arméniens dans l’Empire Ottoman: le
cas des Hamchentsi/Hemşinli”. Paper presented at the conference Conversion to Islam in
the Mediterranean World, Rome, 4 6 September 1997. Cited with permission of the
author.
17
Hovann H. Simonian, “Hemshin from Islamicization to the End of the Nineteenth Century”,
in Hovann Simonian (ed.), The Hemshin: History, Society and Identity in the Highlands of
Northeast Turkey (London, 2007), pp. 52 99.
18
The image of the “Hoca from Of`” (Oflu Hoca) has become a Turkish stereotype for
zealous, even bigoted, Islamic faith. The region is even today reputed to produce Islamic
clerics; as the saying goes, “Of (only?) produces Hocas” (Of ’dan hoca çıkar). Anthony
 “Crypto-Christianity” 117

Nonetheless, some Hemşinli families did revert to Christianity in 1858.

Another wave of apostasy is recorded by the British Consul Palgrave
in 1869. This involved a group of converted Armenians living in the
Yomra district, closer to Trabzon. Palgrave told his superior,
Ambassador Henry Elliot, that the intended apostates had given him
a petition claiming that if they were successful, some 2,000 families
would emulate them. Palgrave also stated that their only aim was to
avoid military service. Their plans did not work because, together
with the families who had become apostates in the late 1850s, they
were put in the category of tanassur (convert to Christianity) and told
that the acceptance of their new status as Christians did not excuse
them from military service.19
Simonian makes the following telling point: “In the conservative
milieu of the Pontos, religious and secular authorities did not share
the liberal ideas coming from Istanbul. Not only did they not display
any zeal in implementing the new reforms, but often they did their
best to obstruct them”.20 The observation of the intrepid traveler
Edith Durham regarding the Albanians can be said of crypto-
Christians in general: “The ground fact is this. The North Albanian
tribesman is an Albanian first. He has never absorbed the higher
teaching of either Christianity or Islam. . . . Christ and Mohammed
are to him two super natural ‘magic dickies’, each able, if propitiated,
to work wonders.”21 Evidently a considerable number of people
hitherto considered Muslim now chose to declare that they had been
something else all along. Or, in another manner of speaking, they
wanted to opt for a very different “magic dickie”.

Bryer also noted their zeal. See Anthony Bryer, “Nineteenth Century Monuments in the
City and Vilayet of Trebizond: Architectural and Historical Notes”, Archeion Pontou 29
(1968 69), particularly pp. 109 10, n. 3: “The Oflis are among the curiosities of Lazistan.
They were supposedly Greeks who were said to have converted to Islam. . . . Whatever the
truth of this oft quoted story, the Oflis combine a fanatical devotion to Islam with the
retention of the Pontic Greek dialect”. On the overlap of religion and nationalism in
the case of the Oflis, see Michael E. Meeker, “Greeks Who Are Muslims: Counter
Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Trabzon”, in David Shankland (ed.), Archeology,
Anthropology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia: The Life and Times of F. W.
Hasluck, 1978 1920 (Istanbul, 2004), p. 309:
19
Simonian, “Hemshin”, p. 76. As will be seen later, this was the same category that was
applied to the neighbouring Kromlides in precisely the same period. It seems to have been a
general pre emptive policy.
20
Ibid., p. 77.
21
M. Edith Durham, High Albania (London, 1909), p. 313.
118 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

two spectacular cases of crypto-christianity:

the kromlides of the pontos and the stavriotes
of akdag maden
One of the most interesting instances of revelation of crypto-Christianity
occurred in the eastern Pontus, in the region of Kromni, a mountainous
area between Trabzon and Gümüşhane (Argyroupoli). The Kromlides
were Greek-speaking Muslims who in 1857 declared their Christian iden-
tity and claimed the right to be recognized as Orthodox.22
Yorgos Andreadis claims that the Kromlides community had intended
to declare their Christianity in the immediate wake of the declaration of the
Gülhane Edict of 1839, but had been advised by the Metropolitans of
Trabzon and Chaldea not to be in too much of a hurry as it was unclear
whether the rights granted to Christians extended to the crypto-Christians:
“It had not been said anywhere that Muslims could abandon their religion
and take another”. The debate between the Kromlides and the
Metropolitans lasted five years; “the Metropolitans knew about the fate
of the Armenians who had declared themselves. The state had imprisoned
them”. In 1843, while an Armenian apostate was in the process of being
tried in the court of Trabzon, the Metropolitans counseled prudence and
told the Kromlides’ leader, Molla Süleyman, to await the outcome of the
trial. The Armenian was convicted of apostasy and executed. This was too
much for the octogenarian community leader, Molla Süleyman, who
collapsed on hearing the news.23
The Kromlides (Kurumlu in Turkish) were a silver-mining community
inhabiting fifteen villages that had converted to Islam sometime in the mid-
seventeenth century.24 Andreadis claims that for centuries the Kromni had
practiced Islam in public and Christianity in private, usually in secret
chapels hidden under big houses (konak). The Krumi, as he calls them,

22
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, p. 169.
23
Yorgo Andreadis, Gizli Din Taşıyanlar (Those with a secret religion) (Istanbul, 1999),
pp. 66 7. Originally published as Oi Klostoi (Thessaloniki, 1995). The author is a
descendant of a Kromlides family, and the book is based partly on the oral history accounts
of his grandmother, Sophia Yazıcıog lu/Grammatikopoulos, who was the granddaughter
of Molla Süleyman, the community leader at the time of the declaration of the Kromlides.
This is a very useful book, although there are no sources indicated, and the layout is
somewhat amateurish. Andreadis gives population figures of 6,000 10,000 in Kromni and
60,000 in Argyroupoli. It is interesting that Andreadis should mention Armenians, who
were probably the Hemşinli. It is also natural that the Metropolitans would have news of
the tribulations of another Christian community in the same region.
24
Ibid., p. 14. Andreadis states that the Kromlides must have converted around 1650.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 119

were by no means a marginal community; in fact, they were the notables

and élite of the region. The “overt Christians” were supported by the
crypto-Christians in their dealings with Ottoman officials, who were not
too intrusive as the miners were seen as a somewhat privileged community
who supplied an essential service and in return were exempted from
military service. The Muslim religious leaders, the mollas, were also the
Orthodox priests. Baptisms and other Orthodox observances were carried
out secretly, and outwardly, Andreadis claims, the Kromlides were indis-
tinguishable from Muslims. Andreadis also paints a picture of life among
the Kromlides as one of continuous subterfuge and fear of disclosure to
their Muslim neighbours.25
Yorgos Tzedopoulos paints a very different, and more historicized,
picture. First of all, he points out that it would be impossible for such a
community to remain clandestine for such a long time. Tzedopoulos
rightly criticizes the crypto-Christianity narrative that is imbedded in the
discourse of Greek nationalism, which is a diachronic interpretation of
secret faith under the public mask of Islam and a heroic return to the “true
faith”. Thus the Greek nationalist “equated crypto-Christianity with
crypto-Greekness”.26 Another important issue is the whole question of
secrecy. Just how secret were the beliefs of the Kromlides? Here
Tzedopoulos follows Luise White:

‘[Secrets] change and are negotiated and renegotiated regularly. Secrets and secrecy
are social acts, constantly aware of audiences and publics. . . . When we realize how
poorly secrets are kept, how selective and managed tellings ‘leak’ information to a
wide variety of audiences, it seems clear that secrets ironically are ways of making
information known.’27

Tzedopoulos’ point is that “nobody was really surprised when some

17,000 Kromlides declared their Christianity in 1857.”28 This observation
was also made by the British consul in Trabzon, Alex Stevens, who upon
hearing about the declaration of the Kromlides remarked upon “the
extreme indifference with which all Mahomedans talk of the intended

25
Ibid., pp. 24, 25, 33 5. Particularly striking is his claim that the Kromlides did their best
not to marry their marriageable daughters to “Turks”, but did not object to taking brides
from the Turks. The young Muslim bride was not allowed access to her husband until she
had been baptized and initiated into the ways of the Kromlides by her mother in law and
other female relatives.
26
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, p. 168.
27
Luise White, “Telling More: Lies, Secrets, and History”, History and Theory 39 (2000),
22, as cited in Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”.
28
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, p. 169.
120 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

change: – from time immemorial a suspicion has been attached to the

inhabitants of the district of Kooroom, that they are neither Mussulmans
nor Christians”.29
In some of the regions where the Kromlides lived, they made up,
together with “real” Christians, the majority of the population.
According to the “census” carried out by the acting British Vice Consul
Stevens, the Santa district was the only area in the Pontic range “with no
Muslim residents”. Bryer puzzles over the issue: “I fail to understand the
necessity for secret Christianity in an area which had no Muslims, and
tentatively suggest that the crypto-Christians of Santa may have once been
Muslims who, because of the overwhelming majority of Christians who
surrounded them, were in the process of becoming Christian.”30 So
crypto-faiths could be a two-way conduit; one automatically assumes
that any conversion had to be from the weaker (usually Christian) to the
stronger (usually Muslim) side.
Why did the Kromlides undertake such a move? Naturally, Greek
nationalist historiography portrays this episode as a sort of neo-
martyrdom wherein the religious impulse was paramount. There is an
alternative explanation. The silver mines of Gümüşhane and Kromni had
become uneconomic by 1857, and the state had decided to close them
down. This meant that the Kromlides would be liable to conscription like
all other Muslims: “After the failing of the mines [of Kromni] the kryfoi of
Kromni, seeing no more profit in being Muslim, wishing also to avoid
military service, and putting much hope on the Hatt-i Humayun that
affirmed freedom of religion, dared cast aside the mask of Islam and
presented themselves to the world as Christians.”31
Indeed, in the beginning the entire affair was treated as something of a
joke: “At first the Turks made fun of the event. The saying ‘the High Street
has turned to mud. The Kromlides have turned to gavurs (infidels)’ spread
throughout Trabzon.”32 Humour, however, was soon to give way to
concern, particularly when the Kromlides sent a delegation to Istanbul to
present their case to the ambassadors of the Great Powers. The text of the

29
Byer, “The Crypto Christians of the Pontos”, p. 35.
30
Bryer, “Nineteenth Century Monuments”, p. 112.
31
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, p. 176, citing A. Parcharidis, History of Kromni
(Trebizonde, 1911), p. 49.
32
Yorgos Andreadis, Gizli Din Taşıyanlar , p. 76: “Uzun sokak çamur oldu. Kromlidesler
gavur oldu”.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 121

petition shows that they were very much in tune with the power politics of
the time:

‘We depute these gentlemen [the Kromlides` representatives] by our firm and
common decision to effect by the way they deem appropriate the disclosure of
our up to the present hidden from the Ottomans Christian Orthodox religion.
Hence we plead their Excellencies the Ambassadors of the Imperial Powers of
England, France, Austria, Russia and Greece . . . to lead them [the representatives]
into doing what is necessary for our religion and freedom’.33

This move could not have made them popular at the Porte, which was
extremely sensitive about what it called the “wagging of tongues” and
“loose talk”, as we have already seen many times. The Kromlides had
indeed opened a can of worms.
The Porte did not take long to retaliate. It could not refuse outright to
recognize the claims of the Kromlides as it had just made public declara-
tions of religious freedom. But, as the saying went, “the Ottoman knows
many tricks” (Osmanlıda oyun çok). The trick in this case was to create a
special category for the reborn Christian Kromlides, the “tenassur-u rum”
(literally “Christianized Orthodox”, actually meaning “converts to
Christianity”). It is worth noting at this point that although the
Kromlides were, officially speaking, mere apostates (mürted), the state
was creating a discrete category whereby it could punish them without
incurring the wrath of the Powers or contravening the newly declared
freedom of religion. The Kromlides, while hoping to get the best of both
worlds, ended up getting the worst. “Thus the Kromlides were obliged to
serve in the army as former Muslims and be recorded under both their
Muslim and Christian names. In this way the Ottoman state ascribed
officially to the Kromlides the double identity they had given up in favour
of Christianity.”34 To the diabolically clever move of the state was added
the cruelty of the local Muslims, who forbade their erstwhile co-religionists
from paying homage to their dead in Muslim cemeteries. The logic was
that as Christians they had no claims over the mortal remains of
Muslims.35
For generations the Kromlides had tried to shake off their tenassur
identity. One way of doing this was through the manipulation of official
documents. Children born into tenassur families were ascribed to
Christian families, or the names and identities of deceased Christians

33
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, p. 177.
34
Ibid., p. 180.
35
Andreadis, Gizli Din Taşıyanlar, pp. 70 1.
122 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

would be substituted for tenassur names. The aim in both cases was to
reduce the number of tenassur to a minimum.36 Ottoman archival sources
indicate, however, that at the very least the practice of double-naming
continued.
On 19 February 1903 the Population Registry Bureau (Sicil-i Nüfus
Idare-i Umumiyesi) reported a curious case that had come before it. Two
non-Muslims from Trabzon had applied to the Vilayet authorities to
register a change of address. Their names appeared as follows: “Baki son
of Osman Konstantin son of Mustafa Yani, and (the second person) son of
Baki, Yani Osman Kostantin.”37 When the Vilayet of Trabzon was asked
“why Muslim names were accompanied by Christian names”, it replied,
“In the nahiyes of Yumra and Maçka attached to Trabzon and in Trabzon
itself and in the kaza of Dorul attached to the sancak of Gümüşhane,
approximately some seventy-five years ago, some of the population in
the villages who had been Orthodox converted to Islam and later commit-
ted apostasy (irtidad etmiş)”. The Vilayet went on to say that “The names
that they took at the time of their apostasy were recorded in the ‘old
registers’ (defter-i atik) in red ink, when the registers were renewed in the
recent census of 1299 (1881–1882) the said names were copied [into the
new registers defter-i cedid] exactly”. In the subsequent correspondence
between the province and the Porte “regarding this matter of
Christianization and apostasy (keyfiyet-i tanassur ve irtidad)”, it was
reported that the people in question had been registering their children
under Greek names but that they had “been regularly obliged to perform
military service”.38 Although the order of events mentioned in the
document, Orthodoxy–Islam–Orthodoxy, does not reflect the Kromlides’
story, the fact that the approximate date fits, and the fact that the geog-
raphy (Dorul is almost certainly Torul) is exactly the same, make it highly
likely that the people in question were tannasur-u rum Kromlides. The
fact that the document specified that they had been “obliged” to perform

36
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, p. 181, n. 64. Tzedopoulos is quite rightly suspicious of his
sources here because such manipulation “would require the forbearance of local
authorities”.
37
BOA DH.MKT 656/25, 21 Zilkade 1320 / 19 February 1903, Population Registry Bureau
to the Sublime Porte: “Baki oglu Osman Kostantin veled I Mustafa Yani ve Baki o glu Yani
Osman Kostantin”. They were evidently father and son.
38
Ibid. The census referred to here is the census that was carried out between 1882 and 1885.
In 1903 it became compulsory to have an Ottoman identity card, called the nüfus tezkeresi,
which had to be produced for all official transactions, including the sale and purchase of
property. This compulsion may have been the reason why these people surfaced in the first
place. On this issue, see Chapter 4 in this volume.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 123

military service also points in this direction. What probably happened was
that when the old register was copied into the new one, the red ink was
disregarded and the names were copied in black, thus erasing all trace of
the apostasy. It is also possible that some collusion or bribery may have
occurred here.39
The same document also mentions a similar case involving people from
the kaza of Giresun, also on the Black Sea coast. These latter were said to
be “originally Orthodox (Rum) who had converted and submitted to
conscription for many years who now declare that they want to go back
to their old religion”. The Porte harbored no illusions about them: “It is
quite clear that their deviation into apostasy (girive-i irtidada sapmalari) is
purely for the purpose of avoiding military service. This should not be
allowed on any account as such perfidious claims of Christianity will be
materially and morally extremely injurious. . . . Wherever such people are
encountered they should be immediately conscripted”. The Porte also
declared that “a person cannot have two names, wherever such a claim is
made [if the person is officially Muslim] they should not be listened to and
their identity papers corrected, bearing only the Muslim names.”40
Yet, as in so many other instances where the official orders and the
reality on the ground did not match, the practice of double-naming
evidently persisted. A few months later the Porte was to issue almost
exactly the same order with an interesting addendum: “The existence of
such people [bearing double names] on their identity papers is harmful not
just in their own locality, but elsewhere. When such people travel here and
there they will be a bad influence on people in other localities and this will
cause much wagging of tongues”.41
Evidently what we are facing here is a typical case of double naming
where a person was Osman or Constantine depending on who was asking.
The phenomenon was quite common in Anatolia and the Balkans. As
noted by Mark Mazower: “The uses of secrecy also lay behind the custom
of double naming, in which Suleiman turns out to be known as

39
I would like to thank Cem Behar for the point about the re copying of the registers.
Although the date of conversion/apostasy mentioned in the document is approximate
“some seventy fıve years ago” it would date their conversion to around 1828, which
would be about right as the date of conversions after the failure of the silver mines. See
Bryer, “The Crypto Christians of the Pontos”, p. 32: “By 1829 the famous declining silver
mines of Argyropolis were in their last gasp”. The officials in question may have been
speaking on the basis of imprecise local lore.
40
BOA DH.MKT 656/25. The Porte referred to an order sent to the Vilayet of Trabzon to
that effect, dated 11 Temmuz 1301 / 24 July 1895. Evidently the problem had a history.
41
Ibid., Ministry of the Interior to the Sublime Porte, 12 Safer 1321 / 10 May 1903.
124 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Constantine, Hussein as Giorgi. A double name allowed one to dodge

between inconvenient categories, also serving to keep a man’s real name
hidden. . . . [M]ultiple names were a weapon of the weak against
the strong.”42 The descendants of the Kromlides seem to have turned the
tables on the state by converting an originally discriminatory category into
an ambiguous identity that could be made to work for them.

the story of the stavriote/istavri

When the mines of Kromni stopped working, many of the miners sought
work elsewhere in the empire and abroad. One such group was the
Stavriote, who immigrated to the region of Akdag Madeni near Yozgat
in the Vilayet of Ankara in central Anatolia. The Stavriote had not taken
part in the action of 1857. William Hasluck recorded their existence as
“crypto Christians proper, belonging to the Greek rite and Greek by
speech, [who] existed till recent years in the neighbourhood of
Trebizond: they were known generally as the ‘Stavriotae’ from Stavra in
the ecclesiastical district of Gümüşhane. They are said at one time to have
numbered 20,000 in the Vilayets of Sivas, Angora, and Trebizond, now all
have returned to open profession of their faith”.43
The Stavriotes officially requested to be recognized as Christians on the
basis of the Constitution of 1876, which confirmed religious freedom.
Unfortunately for them, their “emergence” as Christians was badly timed.
The relatively tolerant atmosphere of the late Tanzimat State had ceded to
the much more strictly Muslim etatisme of Abdülhamid II ( r. 1876–1909).44
After the upheavals of the Armenian massacres in the 1890s, a leading
military figure, Müşir Şakir Paşa, was appointed general inspector for
Eastern Anatolia. Şakir Paşa came across the Stavriotes during his travels
and referred to them as the “people of two cults” (iki ayin icra eder ahali),
and, as such, they were highly anomalous in the Ottoman system. In
earlier, more tolerant periods they had been ignored, but now, in a period
of crisis, they became the focus of the unwelcome attention of the state.45

42
Mazower, The Balkans, pp. 63 5. The concept of “weapons of the weak” owes its origin
to James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New
Haven, Conn., 1985).
43
William Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, vol. 2, pp. 469 70.
44
On Muslim etatisme, see Selim Deringil, The Well Protected Domains (London, 1998),
Chapter 2.
45
BOA YEE A/24 X/24/132, the inspector of Eastern Anatolia, Şakir Paşa, to the Vilayet of
Ankara, 11 Ag ustos 1313 / 23 August 1897.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 125

They had presented a fake registry of births, deaths, and marriages, greatly
downplaying the number of births. Şakir Paşa felt that all this was very
dangerous as “such an example can cause confusion in the minds of other
simple Muslims”, meaning, perhaps, that they might be tempted to come up
with a similar story. Yet the inspector general of Anatolia recommended
nothing worse than the temporary exile of the community leaders and the
reprimanding of the Patriarch of Trabzon. He added that “reliable imams
should be sent to their villages, they should be severely adjoined to send their
children to school and give them Muslim names.”46 The fear that apostasy
might be contagious was behind Şakir Paşa’s order to the Vilayet of
Trabzon to investigate whether more Muslims were about to renege on
their religion. On 3 May 1899 the Vali of Trabzon reported that “he had
carried out secret investigations in Durul and Kurum which revealed that
there was no such talk or inclination among the Muslim population”.47
Another interesting aspect of the suspicion surrounding the Istavri
leaders was that they had somehow been linked to the Armenian troubles.
When the Vali of Ankara reported that the Istavri leader, Kobcu Oglu
Ibrahim Efendi, should be removed from his post on the Administrative
Council, the reason given was “his closeness to those people calling
themselves Istavris and his encouragement of the Armenians in their
perfidious activities”.48 Even if it were untrue, this latter accusation
would be sure to discredit any official.
The region continued to come up in dispatches. On 8 December 1900
the Vali of Trabzon reported that he had never ceased his vigilant obser-
vations of the nahiyes of Maçka and the kaza of Durul. Interestingly,
however, the governor makes no mention of crypto-Christianity, merely
stating that “some seventy or eighty years ago some of the Muslims of these
parts, falling prey to the deceptions of priests became Christian.” This had
come to the attention of the authorities during the census of 1853:
“Because Christians do not give soldiers and as these people had converted
to Christianity, at the time it was felt that if they were exempted this would
set a bad example. Therefore they were registered in the population
registers as mutenassır and they are liable for military service”. The Vali

46
Ibid.
47
BOA YEE A 24/X/24/132, 23 Zilhicce 1316 / 3 May 1899, the Vali of Trabzon, Mehmed
Kadri, to Şakir Paşa.
48
BOA DH.MKT 494/18, Enclosure 21, 24 Teşrin i Sani 1310 / 7 November 1894, the Vali
of Ankara, Memduh, to Mutasarrıf of Yozgad. This is a very interesting (and very large)
file running to some hundred folios on the Istavri question. On the “Armenian troubles”,
see Chapter 5 in this volume.
126 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

declared that “because close attention was given to the matter no further
Christianization has occurred”. However, he pointed out that in said
villages of the mutenassır, “there are no places of worship but the churches
and no schools but those of the Christians”. Because of this “abandoned
state” of the Muslim population of the region “a time may come when
these too will turn Christian”. The only solution was to provide schools in
these areas as well as small mosques (mescid).49
There is a very interesting, albeit sporadic, paper trail relating to the
Stavriote/Istavri in the Ottoman archives. On 3 January 1901 the Istavri
presented a petition to the Ministry of the Interior. It is worth quoting this
document in extenso as it sheds considerable light on this elusive question:

‘Your servants are from the Istavri people from the town of Ak Dag Madeni
attached to the sancak of Yozgad. Our fathers and forefathers were all Muslims
but somehow (her nasılsa) to avoid military service, for some time hence, we have
now become outwardly (zahiren) Muslim but inwardly Orthodox (batınen
Rumuz). Our leaders [from the Kobcu Oglu clan] Kobcu Og ulları Mustafa and
Şakir and Mahmud and Kara Mustafa son of Hüseyin who have always duped us
are now pressuring us to turn Christian. Since the year two hundred and ninety six
[1879 80] they have prevented us, numbering some two hundred families, from
openly registering our births in the population registers. We are being shamed
before our neighbours who call us, ‘those of two religions’ and our Muslim senti
ments are being ruined. Meanwhile we are being pressured by the government to
register our births but we fear our leaders who can easily destroy us.’50

The petitioners duly requested that their leaders be removed from the area,
whereupon they would gladly register their births. The Istavri in question
did not seem unduly troubled about reconciling their open admission of
being inwardly Christian and outwardly Muslim with sensitivity to their
“Muslim sentiments” (hissiyatı I_ slamiye). They also seem to think that
being “inwardly” Christian was enough to get them out of military service.
Some nine months later the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad ordered an investigation.
What brought the matter to the attention of the authorities was the rumour
that a priest named Kyrilos had been collecting money from the Istavri
population under the guise of collecting money for a school and was then

49
BOA Y.MTV 209/89, 25 Teşrin i Sani 1316 / 8 December 1900, the Vali of Trabzon, el
Seyyid Mehmed Kadri, to Yıldız Palace Imperial Secretariat.
50
BOA DH.MKT 494/18, Enclosure 24, 18 Kanun u Sani 1317 / 31 January 1901, petition
from Istavri residents of Ak Dag Maden to the Ministry of the Interior. The population
registers being referred to here are the “current registers” (vukuat defterleri), which would
record, on a daily basis, the births, deaths, marriages, and migrations. On this point, see
Cem Behar, “Sources pour la démographie historique de l’Empire Ottoman. Les tahrirs
(dénombrements) de 1885 et 1907”, Population 1 2 (1998), 161 78.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 127

sending the money to Greece. Kyrilos was also reportedly encouraging

some of the Muslim population to convert to Christianity. Two officials
were sent and carried out a detailed inquest in the town of Akdag Maden.
The following are excerpts from the interviews they conducted.51
The first person interviewed was the teacher (hoca) of the rüşdiye
(secondary school), Hacı Tevfik Efendi, who had informed on Kyrillos.

“Hoca Efendi! Do you know the priest Kyrilos the Orthodox priest of your kaza?
Where is this Kyrilos from?”
“I came to Maden twenty years ago. I have known him ever since. I have always
known him as someone from here. I do not know where he is really from.”
“Do you know Kobcu Og lu Mustafa and Şakir Efendi, Derviş Vecir Ali and the
Chief of the Municipality Ibrahim and the Director of the Tobacco Rejie Rıza
Efendi? Do you frequent them? What is their religion? What sort of men are they?”
“For a time I taught Kobcu Oglu Mustafa and Şakir Efendi as well as Derviş
Vecir Ali. Ever since I have been here I have seen them as Muslims. Later they
committed apostasy. The man called Pir (Derviş) Ali also committed apostasy.
They now go . . . to the church. They have now become Christians.52 Although the
Kobcu Oglu brothers and Derviş and Pir Ali became apostates their apostasy was
not recognized by the Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects. Hence they are still
known as Muslims and are called by Muslim names.”
“Are the daughters of these men, Kobcu Og lu Mustafa and Şakir and Pir Ali,
always married off to Christians? By what names are their children called? Do you
have any information on that?”53
“Yes, they marry their daughters to Christians. They also take brides from
Christians. Their newly born children are given Christian names.”

The next person interviewed was Ibrahim Oglu Mustafa Efendi (Kobcu
Oglu) from the Istavri community.54

“What is your name? How old are you? What is your profession? Are you married?
What is your nationality?”
“My name is Mustafa Efendi son of Ibrahim. I am a shopkeeper. I am fifty two
years old. I am married. I am a subject of the Sublime State.”
“Do you have another name particular to the Istavri?”
“Yes I do. It is Nikola.”
“When did you join this Istavri community?”

51
BOA DH.MKT 494/18, Enclosure 27, 12 Eylul 1317 / 25 September 1901, detailed Report
of an investigation carried out by an official from the Defter i Hakani of Yozgad (signature
illegible) and the commissar of police, Mecid Sabit. I have quoted this particular file in
extenso because it is one of the very rare cases where the Ottoman archives actually give a
voice (literally, in this case) to the people involved.
52
Ibid., p. 1.
53
Ibid., p. 2.
54
Ibid., p. 3. Date of interview 13 Eylul 1317 / 26 September 1901.
128 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

“The name Istavri is the name of a village. I am actually from the Orthodox
community (Rum). My father Ilya came here from Gümüşhane. I was born here.”
“As you say you are from the Orthodox community, and that your name is
Nikola, why do you also have a Muslim name?”55
[No answer was given to the last question]
“What are the names of your children?”
“We have always been Orthodox (aba an ced Rum cemaatindeniz). Everyone
knows. We are registered in the church. At some date we began to be conscripted
and that was when we came to be called by Muslim names. We still give soldiers.
For the last fifty eight years when children are born they are given Christian names
and our religious rites are carried out in the church. Our births, deaths and
marriages are recorded in the church register. The people called the Istavri here
number one hundred and fifty families. They all have two names.”56
“At some date you became Muslims and took up Islamic ways and practices.
You passed for Muslims for quite a long time and went to [Muslim] schools and
medreses where you learned from Muslim books. Then you committed apostasy
and joined the Orthodox community. All of this is recorded in the official
registers.”
“We have always been Christians but we still go to Muslim schools to learn how
to read and write. If we had ever [really] become Muslims, there are all these
Muslims here, we would have taken brides from them and given brides to them.
Ask [anyone] if such a thing ever came to pass?”
“To whom are your daughters married?”
“One is married to Lazar the jeweler, the other to Mihal the blacksmith. Another
is married to someone from our clan (mezhebimizden), Ismail son of Salih, an
Istavri who has the Christian name of Konstantin son of Panayot.”

The next person to be interviewed was Yusuf Aga Zade Nuri Aga, who
had also informed on Kyrilos.57

“Do you know of anyone from the Muslim community or any converts who later
turned Christian and apostate (tenassur ve irtidad etmiş)?”
“There are those who are called the Istavri who number some one hundred and
fifty families who used to call themselves Muslims. They used to take brides from
Muslims. They were constantly with the Muslims. They used to come to the
mosque. Now these people go to the church. They give and take brides from
Christians. They are known by Muslim and Christian names. Apart from them,
none of the Muslims has become a Christian. All this is known to the government”.

The commission of enquiry then wrote a long summary report. It declared

that Kyrilos was in fact from the island of Corfu and had “through devious

55
Ibid., p. 4.
56
Ibid. This would place the date as 1853, which more or less approximates the date of the
Kromlides’ declaration of 1857.
57
Ibid., p. 5, 14 Eylul 1317 / 27 September 1901, Yusuf Ag a, Zade Nuri Ag a, merchant,
thirty eight years old, from the Ashali neighbourhood in Maden.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 129

means” acquired Ottoman nationality. He had been collecting money

under false pretences and sending the money to Greece. He had
also “caused some four hundred people in two hundred and fifty house-
holds, who had always been Muslims, to Christianize and become
apostates”.
Kyrilos had also been responsible for marrying the daughters of these
Muslims, Kobcu Oglu Mustafa, Şakir, and Derviş, to Christians. He had
also taken the daughter of Pir Hasan for his own wife. The Commission
concluded:

‘Those people whom he encouraged to Christianize and become apostates were

actually [originally] Orthodox, who, quite some time ago, took on Islamic names,
studied in Islamic educational institutions, attended the mosque, and for years,
fulfilled the obligations of Islam. But they avoided taking brides from those who
had always been Muslims or giving brides to them, marrying only within their own
group; thus abstaining from forming true material and moral ties [with the
Muslims]. After the war of “ninety four” [H.1294/C.E. 1878 79] they started to
go to the mosque sometimes and to sometimes go to the church, following the rites
of both religions. In their community they would be called by their old [Christian]
names and among the Muslims they would be called by their Muslim names. These
are the people called the Istavri.’58

An earlier, more detailed report by the Kaymakam of Akdag Maden stated

unequivocally that the main aim of the Istavri was to avoid military service.
There were 581 Istavri in Akdag Maden itself and in the surrounding
villages. They had been known as Muslims until the census of 1882,
when they had declared that they were Christians. The official instructions
were to ignore their claims and to keep treating them as Muslims.59 Yet,
the Kaymakam reported, “the Istavri were most determined and united.
They openly worshipped in the Christian manner despite all warnings.
They have taken to openly using their Christian names and it is feared that
in time their Islamic identity will be entirely lost.” Kryrilos and the Istavri
were in fact so powerful that “they have come to believe that the dismissal
or rotation of any state official is the result of their deceitful
machinations”.60
Kyrilos proved to be a tough nut to crack. His reputation evidently
preceded him, even in the upper reaches of the Ottoman bureaucracy. On 8

58
Ibid., p. 6. The reference to “the war of ‘94” is evidently a mistaken reference to the war of
1877 78, which came to be called the “war of ‘93” (H 1293).
59
Ibid., Enclosure 38, 5 Şubat 1318 / 18 February 1902, the Kaymakam of Maden to the
Mutasarrıf of Yozgad.
60
Ibid.
130 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

March the Vali of Ankara was to report that Kyrilos had “imported
seditious literature from Athens and was using this to confuse the minds
of the local population.”61 In addition to the commission of enquiry
mentioned earlier, the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad sent an agent to investigate
Kyrilos’s activities secretly and report on what was going on in the Istavri
community. He duly reported back that although their original informant
had reneged on his information and was now claiming that Kyrilos was in
fact not marrying off Muslim girls to Christians, his secret investigation
had shown that this was in fact the case.62 Apparently some of Kyrilos’s
tactics amounted to open blackmail. A petition from the Christians of the
village of Güllük claimed: “Just as we were praying in our church for the
long life of our Sultan he entered the church, took the Bible from our priest
and forced us all outside. He then closed the church.” The petitioners
claimed that he said he would refuse to let them use the church until they
gave him the money he demanded, which was between 100 and 500 kuruş
per household.63
On 3 November 1902 the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad reported that he had
invited Kyrilos to his office, where the latter had “used threatening lan-
guage and carried on in a manner unsuitable for a government office”.
Kyrilos was also falsely claiming to be the representative of the Patriarch of
Gümüşhane. The Mutasarrıf concluded that “this Kyrilos is a most evil
and harmful man” (şerir ve muzir bir adam olup).64
A few weeks later it was reported that Kyrilos had “secretly wed to his
son Demistocles, the daughter of Kobcu Oglu Mustafa Efendi”. This was
said to be most untoward as “the Şeriat forbids the marriage of a Muslim
to a foreigner”. Kyrilos had been warned but had completely ignored all
warnings.65

61
Ibid., Enclosure 39, 23 Subat 1318 / 8 March 1902, the Vali of Ankara, Mehmed Memduh
Paşa, to the Ministry of the Interior.
62
Ibid., Enclosure 15, 12 March 1318 / 25 March 1902, Mehmet Ta’ali, special agent sent to
investigate this matter, to the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad. It is quite possible that the original
informant had been threatened by Kyrilos.
63
Ibid., Enclosure 22, 25 Mart 1318 / 7 April 1902, the petition signed by the headman
(muhtar) sent to the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad.
64
Ibid., Enclosure 6, 21 Teşrin i Evvel 1317 / 3 November 1901, the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad
Rükneddin to the Sublime Porte.
65
Ibid., Enclosure 12, 8 Teşrin i Sani 1317 / 21 November 1901, the Kaymakam of Maden to
the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad. Kobcu Og lus’s daughter, an official Muslim, would indeed be
debarred by the Şeriat from marrying a non Muslim. The reference to “foreigner” here
evidently means Christian.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 131

Kyrilos seemed indomitable. When the Kaymakam of Maden protested

the marriage of the daughter of Kobcu Oglu Ibrahim to a certain Yanko,
and the marriage of the daughter of Kobcu Oglu Şakir to a certain Fides,
Kyrilos coolly replied that “I_ brahim and Şakir have been worshipping
openly and faultlessly in the Christian way for generations. The Sublime
Porte is fully in cognizance of their status as Istavris”.66
In fact, Kyrilos also seemed to be set on converting “real” Muslims to
Christianity. On 28 April 1902 the headman (muhtar) of the village of
Koyunlu reported that a young man named Sofracıoglu Ömer had fallen in
love with a Greek girl from Maden. The girl had converted to Islam, and
the couple had then spent a few days in Koyunlu. Ömer had decided to take
employment in his wife’s Christian neighbourhood and had then been
taken into the army. When he returned, “he and his wife had both been
tricked by Kyrilos Efendi and had both become apostates from Islam and
had become Christian”.67
The Kaymakam of Maden was to write another long report on the same
day. He confirmed that in fact Kyrilos had converted Ömer to Christianity;
it was specified that Ömer was not an Istavri, and that he had gone
missing for the previous days; “clearly he has been hidden away as a result
of the said priest’s machinations”. The official made a clear distinction
between the “Istavri tribe” (kabile-i mezkur) and other Muslims: “[t]hose
who do not belong to the said tribe [who reside] in other villages”. Kyrilos
was also active among them. The Kaymakam stressed that “unless the said
priest, together with his henchmen Kobcu Oglu Mustafa, Şakir and
Ibrahim Efendi are removed from here, we can expect much more difficulty
in the future. This is the only way we can stop this Christianization and
apostasy (tanassur ve irtidad)”. He also confirmed that Kyrilos had been
collecting money for “the Greek seditious committee called the Etniki
Eteria”.68 A Greek source based on Greek and Russian diplomatic docu-
ments also makes frequent reference to Kyrilos.69 In a communication
dated 8 April 1899, the Russian embassy mentioned “the priest whose
removal had been requested by the Porte, is named Kyrilos, he is the

66
Ibid., Enclosure 22, signed as “Deputy of the Greek Patriarchate Kyrilos”.
67
Ibid., Enclosure 22, 15 Nisan 1318 / 28 April 1902, the Muhtar of Koyunlu, Mehmed, to
the Kaymakam of Maden.
68
Ibid., Enclosure 25, 15 Nisan 1318 / 28 April 1902, the Kaymakam of Ak Dag Maden to
the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad.
69
Konstantinos Fotiadis, Piges tis istorias tou kryptochristianikou provlimatos (History of
the Crypto Christian Question) (Thessaloniki, 1997). My thanks to Yorgos Tzedopoulos
for this reference and the translations.
132 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

delegate of the archbishop”.70 It appears that Kyrilos was in regular

contact with the Russians. On 9 April the Russian embassy in Istanbul
wrote that the Kaymakam of Akdag Maden had put two of its wealthiest
inhabitants in chains and sent them to Ankara. The two men, named as
Nikolaos Kioptsidis and Chatzi-Isaak Kiopstidis, had been jailed and then
exiled; the former was none other than Mustafa Kobçu Oglu and the latter
Mahmud Kobçu Oglu.71
The most detailed account of Sofracıoglu Ömer’s apostasy is to be
found in the record of a long series of interviews.72 The story that emerges
is very interesting in its details. It appears that at the age of twelve or
thirteen Ömer, who had been orphaned at a tender age, was given as a
servant to the “Greek” family of one Eftim Aniki, where he worked for one
year.73 He then served in the family of another “Greek”, Çopur Nikola,
the uncle of Eftim, for another four years. While he was in Nikola’s
household he met and fell in love with a Greek girl, Peti (or Peni, she is
referred to by both names), daughter of Deli Yani, who was either a
relative or close friend of Çopur Nikola. He then took the girl to his
home village of Koyunlu where he told his family that he intended to
convert her to Islam and marry her. However, while they were staying
with the Sofracıoglu family, it became evident that neither he nor his
intended prayed at prayer time and that (although it was the month of
Ramazan) they did not fast. It was also curious that the girl’s family did not
pursue her in any way. It was thus discovered that Ömer had in fact already
converted to Christianity. This had occurred in 1890 when he was
taken to the Metropolitanate in Kayseri, where he was baptized and the
couple were married. All of the five people interviewed agreed that Kyrilos
was the moving force. In fact, Ömer and his wife soon went back to the
Christian neighbourhood, where they were seen going to church. The
Sofracıoglu family then decided that the one way to cure the boy was to
send him to the army. So they did, and Ömer served in the Hicaz for
two years. Meanwhile, while Ömer was in the army, his wife had given

70
Ibid., p. 130. The “archbishop” mentioned here is the Metropolitan of Chaldia
Gümüşhane, who had under his jurisdiction all the mining communities founded by the
Pontic miners.
71
Ibid., p. 133. This is the same Mustafa Kopçu Og lu questioned earlier.
72
BOA DH.MKT 494/18, Enclosure 28. Beginning with the interview of Sofraci Og lu Ismail
Durmuş, older brother of Ömer, 23 Nisan 1318 / 6 May 1902. Report and depositions of
interviews signed by Hacı Arif Efendi, official in charge of the investigation.
73
Although the references in the documents are always to “Greeks”, it is highly likely that
these families were in fact Istavri families who had declared their Christianity.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 133

birth to a girl who died soon afterwards and was buried as a Christian.
When he returned, the Muslim family immediately placed him under
observation in their home and forbade him from going to his wife; they
also arranged for some ulema to come and preach to him. All of this was to
no avail, however, and Ömer escaped to join his wife. He had then gone
missing. His brother Ismail had informed the Kaymakam and the military
authorities about the circumstances of the apostasy and Ömer’s
disappearance.74
The following are excerpts from some of the interviews relating to this
story. The first person to be interviewed was Ömer’s older brother, I_ smail.
I_ smail was asked about his family and the circumstances of his brother’s
apostasy.

“We were three brothers. One of my brothers died doing his military service in
Yemen. The other, because he was an orphan was given as a servant to the
Christians in the Istanbulluoglu neighbourhood in Akdag Maden. This is the
Ömer who somehow became an apostate.”
“How old is this Ömer now and where is he? Who did he serve in the
Istanbulluog lu neighbourhood? How old was he when he began his service?
How many years did he serve them? Why did he convert?”
“My brother Ömer must have been twelve or thirteen when he became a servant
in the household of Eftim Aniki from Karahisar, he was to receive a hundred kuruş
every six months. Then he served for four years in the household of Çopur Nikola
the uncle of Eftim. While he was there he established an interest in the girl Peni, who
was a relative or friend of Nikola and was the daughter of Kozlis Og lu Deli Yani. In
the year 1312 [1898] he brought this girl to the house of our uncle Ali saying I am
going to make this girl a Muslim and I am going to marry her. But because this was
the time of the Armenian troubles we did not immediately proceed with her
conversion. However, we noticed that neither of them prayed, and though it was
the month of Ramazan, nor did they fast. When I asked Ömer about this he said
that he had preferred Christianity, that they had given him a lot of money and he
had become an apostate to marry this girl. He then encouraged me and my family to
become Christian. I of course refused very sternly and encouraged and threatened
him, telling him to go back on his apostasy. When I found out that he would never
come back to Islam, I arranged for him to be taken into the army.”
“Do you know what name they gave your brother? Did he tell you?”
“Yes he did. His name was Yani. As he told me they sprinkled water on him and
did whatever they do for baptism.”
“Who did this?”
“All those who gave my brother money to convert. But it was Eftim Efendi who
encouraged him and the priest, who was then the schoolteacher, and is now the
delegate of the Metropolitan, Kyrilos, who arranged it.”

74
BOA DH.MKT 494/18, Enclosure 28.
134 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The above is a short excerpt from testimony spanning several folio pages.
There are several important aspects to be considered in the passage. It
should be noted that the term “somehow” (her nasilsa) occurs here. Ömer
is mentioned as having “somehow” converted. This was a term used
regularly in official Ottoman parlance when the scribe wanted to make a
reference to an event that was somehow embarrassing, yet had to be
mentioned. The other interesting point is the reference to the “Armenian
troubles” as the reason for the delay in the conversion of the girl. This is
very likely a reference to the official discouragement of the conversion of
Christians during the Armenian massacres of the 1890s. Ismail’s statement
that Ömer turned up at his uncle’s house in 1312 (1898) would place the
date at about the right time. Moreover, perhaps the most striking thing in
Ismail’s testimony is the claim that Ömer attempted to proselytize him and
his family.75
The interview of one Mustafa Aga is particularly interesting as it casts
light on how the Istavri were seen in the area.

“Do you know Sofracıoglu Ömer from your village? Is this Ömer from Muslim
ancestry or is he an Istavri from Maden who practice two rites?”
“Yes, I know him. There is nothing suspicious in Ömer’s family or lineage. They
are a yörük family who have always been Muslims. In fact our village (Koyunlu) is
older than Maden and we suspect no one. Ömer committed apostasy.”76

Another resident of the village of Koyunlu, Mehmed Kethuda, was also

asked about the religious inclinations of the Sofracıoglu family.

“Are there any Christians in your village?”

“Our village has always been entirely Muslim. It is in fact older than the kaza of
Maden.”
“In your village live Sofracıoglus Durmuş and Ömer. Do you know them? Are
they Muslims? Or are they Istavri who practice two rites?”
“Yes, I know them. They are yorüks, the sons of Ismail Çavuş, and have always
been Muslims. We have no Istavris in our village.”
“How do you know that Eftim Efendi and the priest Kyrilos were responsible for
Ömer’s apostasy?”
“This boy grew up in Eftim Efendi’s household almost as his child. We were
greatly anxious about his apostasy [and] they encouraged it and are still encou
raging it. Many people in our village know this.”77

75
Ibid., and see Chapter 5 in this volume.
76
Ibid., the testimony of Ibiş Kahya Og lu Mustafa Ag a from the village of Koyunlu, 23
Nisan 1318 / 6 May 1902. The yörük were originally nomadic peoples of Anatolia.
77
Ibid., the testimony of Mehmed Kethuda, son of Mustafa Kahya, 23 Nisan 1318 / 6 May
1902.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 135

It emerges from the above that the Istavri were always suspect and were
distinguished from “true” Muslims. Although Mehmed Kethuda stated
that everyone knew that Eftim and his entourage encouraged Ömer, and
although there is no mention of whether they were Istavris, as they are
referred to as Greeks or Christians, it seems highly likely that they were
Istavris who had declared their Christianity. On 1 May 1902 the Vilayet of
Ankara decided that Ömer had to be found and “secretly sent somewhere
far away so that he can serve as an object lesson to others”.78
Apparently object lessons were indeed needed, because soon after the
Sofracıoglu Ömer affair a very similar case occurred. The Mutasarrıf of
Yozgad reported that a certain Velil, the son of Molla Osman, had been
placed, like Ömer, in service in the household of a Greek family in Maden.
After he had been with them for some seven or eight years, it began to be
put about that he too had been “tricked by the [Greek] community” into
converting. The Mutasarrıf reported that these cases of the misleading of
Muslim boys were the result of “evil machinations” on the part of the
Greeks. He made sure to stress that “these are sensitive issues and all
investigations must be carried out secretly and with the utmost care.”79
On 19 May 1902 the Vali of Ankara reiterated that “these evil machina-
tions” had to be stopped at all costs.80
Whatever the aims of the Istavri community may have been in declaring
their Christianity, they certainly included avoiding military service. The
Vilayet of Ankara reported that the total number of soldiers mobilized
from Ak Dag Maden since 1879 was thirty-nine. Of these, only four had
actually been put into uniform, and four others had paid the bedel.
The remaining thirty-one conscripts were “absent because they circulate
here and there with their Christian names”, thereby making it difficult to
trace them as Istavri liable for military service. Moreover, the fact that
since 1877 the Istavri had refused to register their births, deaths, and
marriages in the Muslim registers meant that a large portion of their
population was unaccounted for, making it impossible to trace who was
liable for service.81

78
Ibid., Enclosure 20, 18 Nisan 1318 / 1 May 1902, the Vilayet of Ankara to the Ministry of
the Interior.
79
Ibid., Enclosure 30, 29 Nisan 1318 / 11 May 1902, the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad to the Vali of
Ankara.
80
Ibid., Enclosure 31, 12 Mayıs 1318 / 25 May 1902, the Vali of Ankara, Mehmed Memduh
Paşa, to the Ministry of the Interior.
81
Ibid., Enclosure 32, 12 Mayıs 1318 / 25 May 1902, the Vilayet of Ankara to the Ministry
of the Interior.
136 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The Istavri were actually recognized as Greek by the Greek Orthodox

Patriarchate in Istanbul. On 13 June 1902 the Greek Patriarch wrote to the
Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects: “[These people] who were
inwardly Christian, because of the requirements of the times appeared as
Muslims for a period, have been recognized as Christians since the
Auspicious Tanzimat. Since then, like all the other Christians they have
been openly worshipping according to their faith.” The Patriarch protested
that they were being forced by the local authorities to send their children to
Muslim schools and register themselves in the population registers as
Muslims.82
One of the main reasons the Istavri leaders seemed to be unassailable
was the fact that they were extremely rich and used their wealth to buy
political influence. On 11 December 1902 a report dealing with this aspect
of their power stated: “The said persons who are holders of great fortunes,
use this money to secretly work towards encouraging Muslims to become
apostates. They work towards this aim all the time, and have established
such a diabolical tribe (iblisane bir kavmiyet) that one is shocked.”83 The
report mentioned by name a Kavasoglu Ibrahim and his brother-in-law
Hüsnü:

‘[B]oth of whom are shown to be Muslims and the other apostates put all of their
fortunes at their disposal and aid them secretly to make sure that they always hold
government offices. . . . If these apostates remain where they are and if Ibrahim
and Hüsnü Efendi continue to hold government offices, God beware, they will
poison all the Muslims in Maden through some means, either with money or with
women. In fact Ibrahim Efendi, during the late Armenian troubles stirred up the
Armenians.’

The report then gave a long account of how Ibrahim Efendi was removed
from government positions by the order of the various Valis of Ankara but,
“through the protection of Kobcu Oglu Mustafa who has millions at his
disposal, was reinstated to his position on the local court”. The writer of
the report was unequivocal about the connection between money and
power, repeating that Kobcu Oglu controlled “millions of lira”:

82
Ibid., Enclosure 33, 31 Mayıs 1318 / 13 June 1902, the Patriarch of the Rum Millet to the
Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects. The Patriarch in question was Joachim III (1901
12), who was one of the most important Patriarchs of the modern period. See www.
patriarchate.org/patriarchate/former patriarchs/joachim iii 2nd time.
83
Ibid., Enclosure 36, 28 Teşrin i Sani 1318 / 11 December 1902, the investigating official,
Mehmet Arif, to the Sublime Porte.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 137

Through the use of this fortune and their political influence the apostates in our
area will never be registered in the population registers and our brothers here will
lose all peace of mind. . . . Please may God will that these apostates be chastised and
that any means possible be used to put down this secret committee and avert the
danger.84

These are very strong words. We note again the ultimate accusation, “hav-
ing encouraged the Armenians”, which was sure to catch the attention of the
upper echelons of the state, possibly reaching the sultan himself.
Furthermore, the Istavri are classified as “apostates” (mürtedler) who have
become a “clan” or “secret committee”, an accusation very likely to pro-
voke the fears of a notoriously suspicious sultan. Another salient point is the
mention of “poisoning through women”, clearly a reference to the apostate
lads being married off to “Greek” girls. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the
Kobcu Oglu clan did indeed have political clout, because soon after their
imprisonment in Ankara in April 1899 Kyrilos was informed by the Russian
embassy that “After an order by the Minister of the Interior, Mahmud and
Mustafa Kiouptsidis from Akdag have been freed and sent home”.85
It seems that the Istavri question was still on the agenda one year after
Mehmed Arif Efendi’s report. On 18 November 1903, the Ministry of the
Interior composed a memorandum summarizing the situation. In addition
to Kryrilos, who had arranged for the marriage of the daughter of the Istavri
Kobcu Mustafa to his son Demistocles, the Istavris Şakir and Hüseyin
Efendis had married their daughters to one Nikola from Talas and one
Madrike, son of the priest Panayot. The memorandum also pointed out
that the poorer Istavri were being forcibly prevented from registering their
births, deaths, and marriages in the Muslim registers. It was still feared that
“unless the priest Kyrilos and his henchmen among the Istavri are removed,
it is possible that the Istavri population who appear as Muslims in the
registers will all become apostates.” Naturally the state took a very bureau-
cratic and pragmatic approach. The memo pointed out that if the Istavri
were left in their present condition, they were in a state of limbo:

‘[A]s the said people cannot be made to register as Muslims the state loses military
man power. As they are also not registered openly as Christians the state treasury
loses income from the bedel i askeri.’86

84
Ibid. Mehmed Arif was evidently out of his depth in money matters as “millions of lira” at
that time would amount to a sizeable portion of the state budget.
85
Fotiadis, Piges tis istorias, pp. 136, 140, documents from the Russian embassy in Istanbul.
86
BOA DH.MKT 494/18, 5 Tesrin I Sani 1319 / 18 November 1903. So it seemed that the
Istavri were really, in the words of Bryer, “getting the best of both worlds”. See Bryer, “The
Crypto Christians of the Pontos”, p. 21.
138 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The year 1905 saw a concerted effort to solve the Istavri problem. The
Vilayet of Ankara was ordered in no uncertain terms to register the Istavri
as Muslims. The minister of the interior, Mahmud Memduh Paşa, together
with Şakir Paşa made this into something of a pet project. The protesta-
tions of the Patriarchate and the foreign embassies were of no avail. In
several instances the Mutasarrıf of Yozgad and the Vilayet of Ankara
actually declared that they had granted freedom of religion. This proved,
however, to be a subterfuge designed to force more Istavri into the open.
The priest Kyrilos Caratzas and several Istavri leaders were marched to
Ankara, where they died in prison.87
Both the Istavri and the Kromlides were actually recognized as
Christians in 1910 after the Young Turk Revolution. As the Young
Turks actually enforced military service obligations for Muslims and
non-Muslims alike, there was no longer any advantage in claiming non-
Muslim status. “In 1910 the Kromlides and the Stavriotes were permitted
to register solely with their Christian names.”88 This meant that they
would be forcibly deported during the population exchange between
Greece and Turkey in 1923–24.
There is, however, an ironic sequel. Just before they were deported, the
Kromlides pleaded with the officials in the exchange commission that they
were Muslims: “Please save us, we are actually Muslims they cried”. Their
pleas were ignored.89
What should we make of these rather puzzling documents? It is fairly
clear that we are in the domain of what Yorgos Tzedopoulos calls “public
secrets”, or what Louise White refers to as “secrets as a way of making
things known”. One of the people interviewed by the commission, Nuri
Aga, actually said that the condition of the Istavri was “known to the
government”. The fact that at some point the Istavri “sometimes went to
the mosque and sometimes to the church” certainly puts a new light on the
question of “crypto” religion. At some stage in their history, probably
around the mid-1850s, there was nothing “crypto” about the Istavri. The
priest Kyrilos said as much when he claimed that the “state was fully in
cognizance of the status of the Istavri”. It also appears that they were left
pretty much to their own devices. The state seems to have forgotten about
them after Şakir Paşa, and they come up again only because the “perfidious

87
Deringil, The Well Protected Domains, p. 81. See also R. Janin, “Musulmans Malgre Eux,
Les Stavriotes”, Echos D’Orient 15 (1912), 495 505.
88
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, p. 184.
89
Robert Enhegger, “Evangelidos Misailidis ve Türkçe Konuşan dindaşları” (Evangelidos
Misailidis and his Turcophone co religionists), Tarih ve Toplum 9 (1988), 177, n. 2.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 139

priest” Kyrilos is reported to be collecting money for Greece. The gist of the
summaries in the reports just quoted is that it is almost normal for the
Istavri to “Christianize and become apostate” because they had been
Christian in the first place – because, in a manner of speaking, they had
never been “real” Muslims. The Kaymakam of Akdag Maden did indeed
distinguish between the Istavri “tribe” and other Muslims. Similarly, the
people interviewed in the case of the apostate Ömer/Yani made it clear that
they did not consider Istavris true Muslims. The very questions the inter-
viewer asked also implied that there was a clear prejudice and that Istavris
were somehow suspect.
Another interesting clue is the passing mention of the apostasy of the
Istavri “not being recognized” officially by the Ministry of Justice and
Religious Sects; the implication is that apostasy was now a legal category
recognized by the state, as in the case of the Kromlides, who became
tanassur-u rum. Indeed, the term “tanassur ve irtidad” – literally, “to
Christianize and apostatize” – seems to set them apart from straightfor-
ward apostates, who are called simply “mürted”.
Apart from allegedly collecting money for a foreign power, Kyrilos’s
cardinal crime was that he had performed the marriage ceremonies of
women who were still officially Muslim to Christian men (indeed, marry-
ing one himself). In their petition the Istavri “people” claimed to be
Muslim while admitting that they were “inwardly” Christian. Yet they
seemed to think that their outward conformity to Islam was the persona
they preferred, and moreover, all the more striking, they did not seem to
perceive any contradiction in this state of affairs. Although the petition,
claiming genuine adherence to Islam, and the interview of Kobcu Oglu,
where he categorically stated that they had always been Christians, seem at
first glance to be diametrically opposed, a careful reading reveals that
Kobcu Oglu refers to his Istavri son-in-law as “from our confession, an
I_ stavri” (mezhebimizden) whose Muslim and Christian names he cites in
one breath. This seems to imply that the internal/external dichotomy as
expressed in the petition was not a dichotomy at all. Is it totally unreason-
able to speculate that the Istavri/Kromlides actually sincerely believed in
both their religions?
Yorgos Andreadis recounts how the main source of his book, his grand-
mother Afrodite, always said that she wanted to be totally washed after her
death, “as was the Muslim funerary custom”.90 Furthermore, all the Greek
names that the family took that Andreadis mentions are direct translations

90
Andreadis, Gizli Din Taşıyanlar, p. 43.
140 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

of Turkish names; Yazıcıoglu becomes Grammatikopoulos, Başoglu

becomes Kephalides, Melekendon becomes Angelopoulos, and Cevahir
becomes Adamantia. Even as he tries to show how the Kromlides were
genuine secret Christians, Andreadis makes a telling comment: “In Kromni
there were no secret priests but Muslim mollas showed people the way. In
the days of ignorance and darkness . . . these molla priests kept Kromni
loyal to Christ”.91
There are, however, some very important loose ends in all these stories.
Why would wealthy “Greeks” want to convert poor Muslim boys to
Christianity and marry them to their daughters? How did Ömer expect
to convert a Christian girl to Islam when he was himself already a
Christian? One also has to bear in mind that all the testimonies referred
to here were written by official scribes who framed the questions and
answers to suit their agenda or brief. The answer may lie within the family
structures of the Kromlides/Istavri. The family structure of the Pontic area
south of Trabzon was organized in patrimonial clans.92 This meant that
families exchanged women for reproduction, and there were strict rules of
exogamy forbidding marriage between cousins. Olga Sapkidi’s sources
mention prohibition of marriage stretching all the way to the seventh-
degree relatives.93 Men were usually not exchanged and, even after mar-
riage, remained in the households of their fathers. An exception was made
only when there was no son in the family to continue the blood-line. In this
case a groom who would live with his wife’s family would be taken: “then
the groom became a ‘sogambros’ and he had to take the surname of his
wife, which is the surname of the household whose reproduction and
continuation he was called [upon] to secure”. The arrangement would
require the agreement of the household of the groom, “which meant he had
to insure with his choice a higher social position or prestige”.94 It is highly
possible that Ömer/Yani was a “sogambros”. He had already been in the
families of Eftim and Çopur Nikola for some years as a trusted servant, and
Deli Yani was either their relative or a close friend. He and Peti may

91
Ibid., pp. 79, 80, 82.
92
Olga Sapkidi, “Family Structure in the Pontos”, Encyclopedia of the Hellenic World, vol. 1:
Asia Minor (http://asiaminor.ehw.gr/forms/fLemma.aspx?lemmaid=7481&contlang=58). I
owe thanks to Yorgos Tzedopoulos and Eleni Gara for this reference and the insights that
they were kind enough to share with me on the story of Ömer/Yani, which inform my
analysis here.
93
Sapkidi, “Family Structure in the Pontos”.
94
Ibid. The word “sogambros” means “internal groom” and is reflected exactly by the term
“içgüveysi” in Turkish, which means exactly the same thing.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 141

actually have loved each other. We can likewise speculate that Deli Yani
did not have a son and that he had prohibitively close blood ties with the
Christians in the area. It is also worth noting that Deli Yani did not seek a
groom from the more established Muslim families in the area but rather
from a Yörük family, who were probably considerably poorer and of
lower status, who would be prepared to assent to such an arrangement.95
One of the respondents in the inquest mentioned that “these boys are
orphans”. It is also possible that Ömer’s family did indeed assent, and
that would account for Peti’s “embracing Islam” at the behest of Ömer/
Yani. This could have been a face-saving arrangement whereby for Ömer’s
family it was a marriage between Muslims, and for Peti’s family a marriage
between Christians. Certainly, when things became complicated and the
authorities became involved, Ömer’s brother would declare that “he had
scolded Ömer” and that he had arranged for him to be conscripted into the
army. Moreover, the fact that Ömer and his wife went back to his wife’s
family and that both were seen attending church strongly implies that
Ömer/Yani was living the life of a good “sogambros”. Although all of
this is speculation, except for the position of the “sogambros”, it remains
possible that for Deli Yani family was more important than religion. It is
therefore also possible that the case of the “conversion” of the boy Velil
was a similar “sogambros” story. It is also worth noting that Ömer was
from a Yörük family, and as Tzedopoulos points out, some of the original
Kromlides were actually Christianized and Hellenized Turkmen.96

cases of double identity

On 20 July 1913 the Vilayet of Sivas reported a very puzzling inheritance
dispute in the kaza of Tokad. The case involved a certain Ali Mümtaz, who

95
The Yörüks were reknowned for their heterodoxy and syncretism. See Hasluck,
Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, particularly p. 130: “It is generally reported of
Yuruks that circumcision is not usually practiced among them”.
96
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, pp. 174 5: “Some of the nineteenth century Kromlides were
reportedly not descendants of converts to Islam but Muslims (often of Turkmen origin) who
had been linguistically Grecisized and practiced a syncretistic form of Christianity.”
Fotiadis’s Russian source also mentions another possible “sogambros” in the family of
Yusuf/Iosif Kahveciog lu. Iosif does not have a son, so he marries his daughter Sultana to a
Muslim, a certain Savvas/Derviş. See Fotiadis, Piges tis histories, p. 140, the Russian
embassy in Istanbul enclosing a “List of the Christians of the mine of Akdag of the diocese
of Chaldia who are not recognized as such by the Imperial Government but are regarded as
Ottomans [Muslims].” What follows is a list of 150 families with the members of each one,
their Christian and Muslim names, and their places of residence. Piges tis histories, p. 141.
My thanks to Yorgos Tzedopoulos for providing and translating the reference.
142 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

had died intestate, leaving considerable wealth and apparently having no

heirs. The curious thing was that Ali Mümtaz was buried in the Armenian
cemetery by Armenian priests. Soon after the funeral a certain Karabet
Asfaryan materialized, claiming that the deceased had been in fact Bogos
Asfaryan, his older brother. When an investigation was carried out, it
turned out that Bogos had converted to Islam in 1896 and had been an
official Muslim until his death in 1909. Bogos Asfaryan/Ali Mümtaz had
thus led a double life for thirteen years.97 As the amount of wealth
(probably in the form of real estate) was considerable, the authorities
had to take a close look at the matter. In its records, the Ministry of
Justice and Religious Sects found that Bogos had indeed legitimately con-
verted and that his conversion had been recorded at the ministry. What the
ministry claimed had happened was that Bogos had been registered as an
Armenian in the old population registers (defter-i atik), but his new
Muslim identity had not been registered in the new registers. He had
therefore fallen into the category of “unregistered population” (nüfus-u
mektume). After his conversion he had “never been seen fulfilling his
religious obligations and he acquired property both as Ali Mümtaz and
Bogos Asfaryan”.98 Moreover, the deceased had never had his identity
papers corrected. The ministry officials were certainly not pleased, either
with the deceased or with their underlings in Tokad:

‘[H]e did not sever his relations with his previous community and did not seri
ously embrace Islam, nor did he take any measures against any claims on his
wealth by the Armenian community in the event of his death, all of this points in
the direction of his [eventual] apostasy. . . . The fact that he was known as Muslim
there and that he bought property in his Muslim name, yet the fact that the
authorities allowed his body to be buried by Armenian priests cannot be called
proper procedure.’

Therefore, the Ministry concluded, “if a legitimate heir comes forth, in

order to avoid complications between the two communities as to his
[Ali/Bogos] true faith”, any property acquired as Bogos Asfaryan should

97
BOA. DH. ID 116/70, 7 Temmuz 1329 / 20 July 1913, the Vilayet of Sivas to the Ministry
of the Interior, Secretariat of the Vilayet of Sivas, No. 21814. The date of the conversion
fits the date of the Armenian massacres in the 1890s, when many Armenians converted in
order to save their lives. See Chapter 5 in this volume.
98
Ibid., 18 Ag ustos 1329 / 31 August 1913, the Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects to the
Vilayet of Sivas, response to a query from the Vilayet of Sivas regarding the property of the
late Ali Mumtaz, who died heirless in Tokad, appearing as a Muslim, signed by Deputy
Minister Ali.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 143

be given to the heirs, and any property acquired as Ali Mümtaz should be
left to the state treasury (mirî).99
It appears that Bogos fashioned himself as a Muslim vis-à-vis the state
and as an Armenian vis-à-vis the Armenian community. Another aspect of
the affair is that as Tokad was a small place, this deception could not have
been carried out without the full knowledge of both communities and the
authorities.
A similar case came up in the dispatches from Diyarbakır on 17 April
1910. A man calling himself “the convert Ali Riza” had presented himself
at the government offices and declared that he wanted to revert to his
original faith; he was Armenian and was called Kevork. Upon investi-
gation it was discovered that Kevork had indeed converted twenty-two
years previously and that his conversion had been approved locally and
with the Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects. It now became apparent
that Ali Riza/Kevork had been a local businessman who had gone bank-
rupt and converted “in order to solve his difficulties”, presumably meaning
that he thought that conversion would wipe out his debts. When it failed to
do so, he had decided to return to his old faith. He was “frequently
applying to the government offices to have his apostasy recognized”.100
When the Vali asked Istanbul what his line of conduct should be, he was
told, “although it is natural that you should apply the law . . . In matters
such as these the governors are advised to act in accordance with local
conditions and to avoid anything likely to give rise to conflict among the
population”.101 Although it is not indicated anywhere in the document
that Ali Rıza/Kevork led a double life, it is highly likely that everyone in
Diyarbakır knew his origins.
Another case of double identity was reported on 29 May 1912 from the
sancak of Amasya. It involved an Armenian woman named Lusiya
Kazazyan, who had converted to Islam on 15 October 1905 but now
wanted to return to her former faith. Her formal conversion procedure
had been carried out, and she had taken the name Ayşe Sıdıka.
The Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects had duly registered her con-
version and had approved of her being issued new identity papers. Yet it
appears that the matter was not quite so straightforward. Lusiya/Ayşe had
also been involved in local politics as a dedicated supporter of the

99
Ibid.
100
BOA DH.MUI. 86 12, 4 Nisan 1326 / 17 April 1910, cipher telegramme from the Vilayet
of Diyarbekir, signed by Vali Galip.
101
Ibid., 6 Nisan 1326 / 19 April 1910, cipher telegramme from the Ministry of the Interior
to the Vilayet of Diyarbakir.
144 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Committee of Union and Progress and was also reputed to be of somewhat

loose morals, making her a target for the conservative opposition.
The Mutasarrıf Nureddin Bey was to write to his superiors in Istanbul:

‘According to precedent and previous practice in such cases where [the Christian]
person has converted to Islam but has later become apostate, the person must
produce a certificate from their Patriarchate testifying that they were hitherto
unregistered in the census registers. In this case, making absolutely no mention of
the apostasy (keyfiyet i irtidaddan kattiyetle bahs edilmiyerek), they are registered
as new entries in the population registers as done for other hitherto unregistered
persons and are given an Ottoman identity certificate’.102

As seen in the earlier case of Bogos Asfaryan, the category of “unregistered

population” was a very useful way of solving the problem as the person did
not officially exist until he or she had been registered and issued identity
papers. Nureddin Bey further recommended that in order to pre-empt any
undue provocation of the population “who may get excited”, Kazazyan
should be temporarily removed to another place.103 It seems that the
matter did not end there. Some five months later Nureddin Bey’s successor
as Mutasarrıf, Ahmed Macid Bey, would write to his superiors that

‘We should remember that the Great Powers have been pressuring the Sublime
State to include the freedom of apostasy formally in treaties and that it has always
rejected this, saying that the Islamic religion would not allow it. . . . This place
[Amasya] is very conservative and deeply religious and cannot be compared to
other locations where the ideas of freedom have taken root. . . . Although the
violence of the Şeriat ruling for those who commit apostasy is well known, and
although we cannot interfere in matters of conscience, it is still disturbing that the
rejection of the greatest of revealed religions should be reduced to a mere admini
strative matter.’104

The solution proposed by the Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects is

significant here. To officially allow a convert to Islam to register as
“unregistered population” and to make no mention of a previously held
faith in the newly issued identity papers shows that the state colluded to an
important extent in the self-fashioning of the convert. Naturally the state’s
attitude was prompted by the desire to avoid complications, popular
reaction, etc. But in instances like that of Lusiya Kazazyan and Bogos
Asfaryan, it allowed people to “legally disappear” and be born again,

102
BOA DH.ID 116/72, 19 Kanun u Sani 1328 / 31 January 1912, the Mutasarrıf of
Amasya, Nureddin Bey, to the Ministry of the Interior.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid. BOA DH.ID 116/72, 16 Mayis 1328 / 29 May 1912, the Mutasarrıf of Amasya,
Ahmet Macid, to the Ministry of the Interior.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 145

very often in another locality, with a new identity. The case of Bogos/Ali is
all the more striking as the “convert” in question was allowed to legally
disappear (and to acquire property as a Muslim) yet remained in full view
of the community. Although Ahmed Macid did not approve, he was quite
right: the matter of apostasy from Islam was being reduced to a mere
administrative measure.
A similar case involving double naming was reported from the Vilayet
of Erzincan on 30 December 1901. An Armenian by the name of Keşişoglu
Krikor had converted in 1887 and taken the name Hidayet. He had later
apostatized and again started using his old name. It was determined that
“it is unsuitable that he go here and there sometimes appearing as an
Armenian and at other times as a Muslim”. It was determined that he
should be exiled to Rhodes, as he was also “suspected of perfidious
activities”.105
One of the most spectacular cases of double identity that I have encoun-
tered is the case of the Armenian Bishop Harutyun of Sis. On 28 November
1886, the sultan’s private secretary, Süreyya Paşa, reported that “The
Archbishop of Sis Artin Efendi has recently converted to Islam and taken
the name of Mehmet Emin Efendi”.106 The person converting was none
other than Harutyun Achabayan, one of the most senior clerics in the
Catholicosate of Cilicia.107 This is a very interesting case because it enables
us to undertake a contrapuntal reading of the Ottoman and Armenian
sources.
First, the story as it appears in the Ottoman documentation. The initial
emergence of Artin/Harutyun/Emin Efendi in the above document is
followed by a considerable paper trail. On 4 July 1888 it was reported
that Emin Efendi had sent a telegramme to the Porte, requesting that his
monthly stipend be augmented by five hundred kuruş, as “he was ailing in
body and had many dependents” . He also requested permission to move
himself and his family, who consisted of eight souls, to Istanbul and was
awaiting the sultan’s permission to do so. He also pleaded poverty and

105
BOA DH.MKT 1906/15, 17 Kanun u Evvel 1317 / 30 December 1901, the Secretariat of
the Ministry of the Interior.
106
BOA DH.I_ D 866/81, 1 Rebiyülevvel 1303 / 28 November 1886, the imperial private
secretary, Süreyya Paşa. Sis is present day Kozan in the province of Adana.
107
I am indebted to Kevork Bardakjian for the information on Bishop Harutyun. Bardakjian
very generously traced him in the Armenian sources and translated them, and states that
“This man was consecrated bishop at the age of twenty by Giragos II; and he ordained 60
priests and consecrated one Catholicos”. E mail communication dated 24 November
2006.
146 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

requested funds for the move. He was accordingly awarded 2,000 kuruş,
and the Vilayet of Adana was reminded that he had already been given
5,000 kuruş as an “imperial favour”.108
By 17 July we see that Mehmet Emin Efendi had departed from Adana
having received his travel expenses.109 Upon arrival in Istanbul, “because
of his special position” it was arranged that he be settled in a house
specially rented for him, and that it be ensured that his salary “be paid
regularly without falling into arrears”. In return for all this royal favour,
Emin Efendi was expected to earn his keep. He was to do this by working
for the Press Office, “because he reads and writes good Armenian”.110
Apart from the tragic irony of an Armenian bishop being set to work
translating Armenian newspapers, there is another possible dimension;
no doubt some of the literature that came his way would have consisted
of politically sensitive material in Armenian that the Palace and the Porte
would want to keep tabs on. It is worth pointing out that Mehmed Emin
Efendi was certainly getting special treatment. At a time when it was quite
normal for state officials’ salaries to fall into arrears, it was ordered
specifically that he be paid regularly.111 Yet, despite specific instructions,
it appears that his salary did fall into arrears; by November he was writing
that he “was in a state of great need”. The Ministry of the Interior was duly
instructed again that his accumulated salary should be paid and that his
salary should not fall into arrears.112 No less a personage than the Grand
Vizier himself, Kamil Paşa, acknowledged the order and instructed the
Ministry of Finance to make regular payments “on the basis of the transfer
of the salary that Mehmed Emin Efendi had been receiving in Kozan”. This
reference is all the more interesting as it shows that well before his transfer

108
BOA DH. MKT 1506/68, 24 Şevval 1305 / 4 July 1888, the Sublime Porte to the Vilayet
of Adana. These were considerable sums of money. At the time an average government
official would receive something around 1,700 kuruş a month. On salary levels of
Ottoman officials, see K. Boratav, G. Ökçün, and Ş. Pamuk, “Ottoman Wages and the
World Economy”, Review 8 (1985), 379 406; and P. Dumont and F. Georgeon, “Un
bourgeois d’Istanbul au debut du XXeme siècle”, Turcica 17 (1985), 127 88. My thanks
to Cem Behar for this information and these references.
109
BOA DH.MKT 1526/60, 20 Zilkade 1305 / 17 July 1888, the Sublime Porte reporting on
correspondence received from Adana.
110
BOA DH.MKT 1531/104, 29 Zilkade 1305 / 7 August 1888, the Minister of the Interior
to the Sublime Porte.
111
On the matter of official salaries falling into arrears, see Carter Findley, Ottoman Civil
Officialdom (Princeton, NJ, 1989), pp. 293 332.
112
BOA Irade Dahiliye 86541, 27 Safer 1306 / 2 November 1888, Yıldız Palace Imperial
Secretariat, Imperial Secretary Süreyya Paşa.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 147

to Istanbul, Mehmed Emin had been on the state payroll.113 By January

1889 we find Emin Efendi installed in a house rented for him in the Cerrah
Paşa district, with a monthly rent of 120 kuruş.114
When put against the Armenian sources, it appears that the case as
reflected in the Ottoman documentation is merely one facet of a long and
tragic tale. After the death in 1866 of his mentor the Catholicos of Cilicia,
Giragos II, Bishop Harutyun Achabayan had been involved in the secret
consecration of Bishop Nigoghos as Catholicos. This consecration was
opposed by the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, who replaced him in
1871 with Bishop Mgrdich Kefsizian. Catholicos Kefsizian persecuted
those bishops who had secretly consecrated Nigoghos, particularly
Bishop Harutyun, and “so intensified his persecution that Harutyun
Episkopos became a dajig (Muslim) taking the name of Emin [Efendi]
but he did not leave Sis”.115
As to the circumstances of Bishop Harutyun’s conversion, the Armenian
source provides the following details. When Bishop Harutyun was the
prelate of Antioch he met a woman named Miriam, who told him that
she wanted to be divorced from her husband, who was impotent. The
bishop dissolved the marriage and married Miriam to his assistant as a
“nominal spouse”. Miriam then became pregnant: “Bishop Harutyun
found himself between two swords, the persecution of the Catholicos
Mgrditch on the one hand, and the pregnancy of Miriam on the other.
He solved the problem by converting to Islam, and harboured a grudge
against Mgrditch.”116 Although he supposedly became Emin Efendi, he
remained Christian at heart. He had three children (two girls and a boy),
and he baptized all three himself. “As a Muslim I_ skender was recruited
[into the army and] having completed his service, returned to Sis. They
arrested him and subjected him to torture [to force him] to deny his faith;
he did not.”117
There is an interesting epilogue to I_ skender’s story in the Ottoman paper
trail. On 4 September 1902, no less an authority than the Ottoman Council
of Ministers discussed the matter of I_ skender. It had been put before the

113
BOA DH.MKT 1581/84, 29 Safer 1306 / 4 November 1888, the Grand Vizier, Kamil
Paşa, to the Ministry of the Interior.
114
BOA DH.MKT 1570/115, Selh i Rebiyülahir 1306 / 2 January 1889.
115
Papgen Guleserian (Papgen A. Atoragits Gatoghigos Medzi Dan Gilio), Badmutyun
Gatoghigosats Giligio (1441 en minchev mer orere), 2nd ed. (Antilias, Lebanon, 1990),
column 690.
116
Ibid.
117
Guleseiran, Badmutyun, translation by Kevork Bardakjian.
148 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

council that “Iskender, the son of the late Emin Efendi, and his daughters
insist that they are Christians”. It had been established that

‘I_ skender, although known in his locality as a Muslim, in his primary examination,
had denied his faith and insisted that he was an Armenian and had married an
Armenian. . . . This is clearly the result of his wish to avoid military service. . . . It
should be made clear to the Vilayet of Adana that the statements of those who
commit apostasy are not to be taken into account, and that they are to be
conscripted forthwith into the army’.118

According to the Armenian sources, it appears that for a long time after his
conversion Harutyun/Emin Efendi led a double life:

‘A pseudo Muslim Emin Efendi, as an Achabahyan, served the altar of the Ach [i.e.,
the Reliquary containing the relics of St Gregory the Illuminator’s right hand] which
the Achabans [i.e., custodians of the Reliquary] had not removed after the Ach had
been moved to the Monastery, during the reign of Catholicos Teodoros. . . . They had
assigned a special room for the Ach, and had erected an altar in the image of
Lusavorich [i.e., St. Gregory the Illuminator] and an ever burning lamp. Emin
Efendi personally attended the altar and the ever burning lamp, and prayed there
alone. . . . Bishop Giragos Pekmezian, once reviled this pseudo Muslim spitting on
him and telling him ‘you destroyed your future for a woman, otherwise you were a
man worthy of becoming catholicos’. Those who knew him have characterized this
former bishop as an opportunist and a hypocrite.’119

How does a man who could have been ordained as one of the most high-
ranking clerics in the Armenian Apostolic Church end up translating
newspapers for the sultan, who became the bane of Ottoman
Armenians?120 What tentative conclusions can we draw from a compara-
tive reading of the Ottoman and Armenian sources? Although the precise
date of Harutyun’s conversion is unclear, it occurred after 1871, when
Bishop Mgrdich Kefsizian became official Catholicos and started persecu-
ting him. It also appears that he met Miriam after this date. In any event,
after his conversion he remained in Sis, as the Armenian source indicates.
As the Ottoman documents state that the salary he was to receive in
Istanbul was the “transferred salary he drew from the Kozan Public

118
BOA MV (Meclis i, Vükela) 104/72, 30 Cemaziyelevvel 1320 / 4 September 1902, the
deliberations of the Council of Ministers regarding I_ skender, son of the late Emin Efendi.
There is a discrepancy between the Armenian and Ottoman accounts. The Armenian
source indicates that I_ skender declared that he was a Christian after his return from the
army, yet we learn that Emin Efendi is in fact dead by 1902.
119
Guleseiran, Badmutyun, translation by Kevork Bardakjian.
120
There are four hierarchical Sees in the Armenian Apostolic Church: the Catholicosate of
Etchmiadzin, Cilicia (Sis), Jerusalem, and Istanbul. See Hratch Tchilingirian, The
Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church (www.sain.org).
 “Crypto-Christianity” 149

Coffer”, Harutyun/Emin was apparently receiving an Ottoman salary the

whole time he was tending the eternal flame of Saint Gregory the
Illuminator as a “pseudo-Muslim”.121 The Armenian source states that
he personally baptized his children, yet his son was called I_ skender, indi-
cating that he had a Muslim public identity and was conscripted into the
army as a result. Who were the eight members of family that Mehmed
Emin Efendi brought with him to Istanbul? We can only surmise that the
group included Emin and Miriam, the servant who was the nominal
“husband”, and maybe I_ skender and his spouse along with one of the
daughters and her husband, as well as his second (unmarried?) daughter.
In conclusion, what can we say about this story, which abounds in loose
ends and unanswered questions? Sis in the 1870s was a small place, and the
scandal surrounding Harutyun’s “conversion” must have been the perfect
example of a “public secret”. Harutyun lived in his native Sis for at least
ten years as a “pseudo-Muslim”. What made him decide to leave and go to
the capital? One can only guess. Maybe he had had enough of being “spat
upon” and pushed around by his native Armenian community. On the
other hand, that same community did not ban him from serving at the altar
of one of the holiest relics of their faith. Thus one can argue that Bishop
Harutyun was a “double crypto” or a “public crypto”, because he was
receiving a salary from the Ottoman government and was thus considered
a convert, while as far as the Armenian community was concerned he was
still an Armenian and a “pseudo-Muslim”.
The Ottoman state was never “ethnicity blind” when it came to
appointment to important official positions. At the time that they were
apparently tolerating Bishop Harutyun’s double persona, a contemporary,
the Armenian Metropolitan (marhasa) of Erzurum, Artin Zahabedyan
Efendi, became a candidate for the Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate. His
candidacy was discussed in the Council of Ministers on 23 March 1885.
The matter before them was “the rumour that this man had once been a
Muslim and had at some time committed apostasy [and had become a
Christian]”. The Ministers pointed out that “although the private life of
this man cannot be held against him”, it was still necessary to investigate
the matter and to determine whether “the spread of these rumours would
have any political consequences on his appointment to such a position”.
During the course of their deliberations, the Minister of Pious
Foundations, Kâmil Paşa, declared that “these were baseless rumours

121
BOA I_ rade Dahiliye 86541, 27 Safer 1306 / 2 November 1888, “Kozan Mal Sandukuna
muhavvel bulunan beş yüz guruş maaşının buraya nakli”.
150 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

put about by ill wishers” who wanted to discredit Artin Efendi.

He declared that the candidate possessed all the qualifications necessary
for the appointment.122
The question is, in whose eyes were these rumour-mongers seeking to
discredit Artin Efendi? It is highly likely that if he indeed turned out to be
an apostate from Islam, despite the polite fiction about his private life not
being held against him, he would not be acceptable to Ottoman official-
dom. Nor would he be acceptable to the Armenian Church hierarchy,
particularly the senior Katogigos of Echimiadzin, if he turned out to be a
converted dajig (Muslim). It seems the rumours had no effect, and
Zahabedyan was actually ordained as Patriarch.123
Double identity could also appear in the guise of a confrontation
between subjects and the state over tax and/or military service obligations.
On 12 June 1850 the Eyalet of Urfa reported that two men named Hacu
and Asib, who had been arrested for robbery, had converted to Islam
eighteen years previously and had now reverted to Christianity. It had
been determined that “because their conversion had been forced it was not
valid”. The Eyalet of Urfa had been asked to look into the matter and
determine where these two men had lived since their conversion and to
determine whether “they had paid their cizye secretly or openly as reaya”.
Upon investigation of the cizye registers at Urfa, it transpired that “both
Hacu and Asib had taken their cizye receipts for the years 1849 and 1850.”
The two men were summoned before the local administrative court, where
they were invited to return to Islam, “but proved stubborn in their apos-
tasy”.124 The key term here is having “paid their cizye secretly or openly”.
The only reason a person who was ostensibly a Muslim would pay cizye
secretly would be to enable him to claim at some subsequent date that he
had always been a “cizye payer” (cizyegüzar) and therefore a non-Muslim.
On the other hand, if he paid cizye openly, he was obviously a reaya. What
seems to be happening here is that the men in question were taking out a
form of re-insurance. Possibly, when confronted by the tax collector they
would claim Muslim status, or, inversely, when confronted by the
conscription officer they would produce their cizye receipts as proof of
their status as zimmis.

122
BOA MV 2/28, 10 Mart 1301 / 23 March 1885.
123
He served from 1885 to 1888 as Harutyun I Vahabedyan. See Vartan Artinian, Osmanlı
Devleti’nde Ermeni Anayasası’nın Dog uşu 1839 1863 (Istanbul, 2004), p. 141. My
thanks to Aylin Besiryan for this reference and the comment about Etchmiadzin.
124
BOA A.MKT.UM 18/39, Gurre i Şaban 1266 / 12 June 1850, the Muhafiz of Urfa,
Esseyid Hasan Mümtaz, to the Sublime Porte.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 151

All of these cases have interesting similarities. The people in question

who have either led double lives or have appeared in one identity or
another at different times seem to have done so over a long time span:
Bogos is Ali for thirteen years; Lusiya is Ayşe for seven years; Krikor is
Hidayet for four years; Hacu and Asib had been Muslims for eighteen
years; and Bishop Harutyun is Emin Efendi for nearly ten years. As in the
earlier cases of the Kromlides and Stavriote, it is more than likely that their
identities were “public secrets”. In fact, the reason they came to the
attention of the authorities at all was not their religious affiliation, but
other factors. Bogos was rich and had a contested inheritance; Lusiya
seems to have been involved in one way or another in the local politics of
Tokad; Krikor is suspected of perfidious activities; Hacu and Asib had
been pursued because they were accused of robbery. Thus, until challenged
in some way by circumstances arising from events that did not necessarily
have to do with their religious identity, their double identities had not been
disclosed.

conclusion
Both the Kromlides in 1857 and the Istavri in 1879 took the Tanzimat
State at its word. The Kromlides trusted the Hat-ı Humayun of 1856 and
the Istavri the Constitution of 1876. Both turned out to be wrong.
Nonetheless, the Porte was also caught in a quandary. It had made binding
and public declarations of religious freedom in front of foreign witnesses. It
had also made promises to its subjects, both Muslim and reaya. Now it
seemed to be faced with the danger that the crypto phenomenon would
infect a much larger segment of the population and that the declaration of
religious freedom would lead to much more complicated consequences
than it had foreseen. The two cases discussed here, though involving very
similar communities, occurred in very different historical conjunctures.
The Kromlides were hoping to ride on the crest of reforms that seemed
to be expanding. The Istavri, on the other hand, made their move just as
Abdülhamid II was about to abrogate the Constitution and to close down
the Parliament at the beginning of a regime that would put its emphasis on
Islamic unity.
The whole issue of crypto-religion and its relationship to state power
raises some interesting questions. Particularly in cases such as the
Kromlides, where the secret was a public secret, the question seems to
revolve around a process that one might call “bluff and counter-bluff”.
When the Kromlides or the Istavri “came out”, they were in a sense
152 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

bluffing the state by confronting it with its own promises and commit-
ments. What they had not bargained for, however, particularly in the case
of the Kromlides, was the state seeing their bluff and coming up with
the diabolically clever counter-bluff of the “tenassur-u rum”. After all,
the “secret” of double faith “had always been known to the state”, as one
of the people interviewed declared. So, to return to the theme of polite
fiction, what was being torn asunder here was the veil of polite fiction that
the Kromlides or the Istavri were Muslims.
As to crypto-faith and syncretism in general, a few comments are in
order here. Crypto-faiths were evidently not static systems of belief, nor
were they a one-way street. The direction of conversion was not always
Christianity to Islam, but could also be Islam to Christianity by way of
syncretism, as seen in the case of the Turkmen and Alevi in the hinterland
of Trabzon and Gümüşhane.125 It is important at this point to distinguish
between syncretism and crypto-Christianity. Crypto-Christianity (or any
crypto-faith, for that matter), is a set of beliefs that one practices con-
sciously, knowing the possibly dire consequences if one is discovered.
Syncretism suggests a set of beliefs and practices that seem to be acquired
ad hoc or are remnants of previously held beliefs that have filtered into the
“new” faith. Clearly, the border between crypto-Christianity and syncre-
tism is porous, and one may, and often does, blend into the other. Hasluck
has admirably delineated the paths that such influence and counter-
influence could follow. A Muslim or Christian sanctuary could become
“ambiguous” through the circulation of the legend that the saint worship-
ped by Muslims had secretly converted to Christianity or vice versa, or that
a Muslim saint’s sanctuary was shared by a Christian.126 The great attrac-
tion of the Sumela monestary for Muslims is a good example. Anthony
Bryer also gives a detailed account of the funeral of a highly respected
Orthodox archbishop of Trabzon who was honoured by Muslims, who
closed their shops and followed the funeral cortege.127 In time such a figure
could become a saint for both religions.
Crypto-Christianity has also provided suitable material for quasi-racist
stereotyping. R. M. Dawkins seemed to envision a sort of “hierarchy of
crypto-ism”. At the bottom are the adherents of a “mystical syncretism”
brought about by “dervish influence”. This shades into the “great class of
indifferents”, of which Dawkins gives the Albanians as the most current

125
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, pp. 174 5.
126
Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, p. 570.
127
Bryer, “Nineteenth Century Monuments in the City and Vilayet of Trebizond”, p. 105.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 153

example. Next are the “imperfectly converted”, who seek moral but
mostly material help “from whatever holy man and holy place . . . may
be at hand”. At the apex of the hierarchy are the “genuine Crypto-
Christians: who ex animo believe in Christianity and hate Islam.”128
Dawkins gives flesh and blood to his categories. At the bottom are the
linobambaki of Cyprus, who had “not much [that was] heroic about
[them]” and were always “rather a joke to their fellow Christians”. They
were nothing like the Kourmoulides of Crete, who were in a state of
constant insurrection, and consequently “nowhere else was the struggle
against the Turk so continuous or so heroic”. His highest praise is for
the “Stavriotai of the Pontos . . . the most important of all. If the
Linobambakoi represent the comedy of the Crypto-Christian way of life,
the Stavriotai represent its tragedy”.129 Clearly Dawkins’s sliding scale of
“heroism” functioned in proportion to his own and his subject’s “hatred”
of the “Turks” and Islam.
Naturally no religious community is going to welcome the conversion of
any of its members to another faith; the official nationalist grand narratives
of conversion seem to favour forced conversion over voluntary. Then, after
all, there is someone else to blame, the aggressor, the “Turk” whom it was
impossible to resist; therefore, as a tragic and inevitable result of pressure,
some of the community took this road in order to survive.130 This narra-
tive is not actually wrong; very often that is what happened; it is just that
the forced conversion narrative was always more attractive for nationalist
discourses. It is also convenient to believe in members of the crypto-
Christian community “hating Islam” for hundreds of years, although it is
difficult to conceive how one can actively hate a faith one has practiced for
so many generations. When he was questioned, the Istavri notable Mustafa
Kobçu Oglu quite openly stated that “they had always been Christians”
but had posed as Muslims in order to send their children to Muslim schools
so that they could learn to read and write. Why would someone voluntarily
send their children to the school of the “hated faith”? He also referred to
the Istavri as “mezhebimiz”, “our faith”. It may just be possible that some
cyrpto-Christians actually believed in both the faiths they professed.
Crypto-Christianity as it played out in the late Ottoman Empire also
provides interesting glimpses into the different perceptions of the self, that

128
Dawkins, “The Crypto Christians of Turkey”, p. 273.
129
Ibid., p. 274.
130
Stavro Skendi, Balkan Cultural Studies (New York, 1980), p. 160: “The crypto
Christians [in the Balkans] it is believed, emerged in periods of outbursts of anti
Christian fanaticism”.
154 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

of the individual often clashing with the identity the state power wanted to
assign to its subjects. We saw how the process of registration of identity
proved to be a very slippery business as the people who were supposed to
be registered and controlled proved able to deliberately fall between the
cracks. That was the story of the “double-namers”. In the days before
photo-IDs, men could successfully avoid conscription by circulating under
Christian names. It was actually quite easy to “disappear” and become
invisible to state authorities. A timely greased palm could make sure that
the red ink in the old population register, marking you as a convert with
your previous Christian name as well as your new Muslim name, was
copied into the new register in good black ink, thus enabling what was
supposedly impossible that is, that Yani was at the same time also Ahmet.
On the other hand, the system could be used in one’s favour by actually
seeking registration as “unregistered population” and asking on that basis
to be issued new identity papers, which would conveniently omit any
mention of past conversion or apostasy.
Another aspect of conversion narratives like that of Bishop Harutyun is
that they are a vivid illustration of Ottoman weakness. In vivid contrast to
the “symbolic victories” and the public flouting of the conversion of
distinguished figures such as the Orthodox priest, Mehmed of Athens,
who converted in front of Ahmed I (1603–17), or the Hungarian I_ brahim
Müteferrika, who became famous for founding the first Ottoman printing
press in the eighteenth century, Bishop Harutyun is treated almost as an
embarrassment and is hidden away in an obscure post translating
newspapers.131
Crypto-Christianity also serves to illustrate the way in which the rise of
nationalism articulated with and acted upon the processes of conversion
and apostasy during this turbulent period. A phenomenon that had been
either deliberately ignored or unknown now acquired explosive properties.
In a political conjuncture where grey areas and polite fictions were no
longer tolerated, the souls and bodies of the crypto-Christians became
contested territory between rival nationalisms, the Great Powers, and
the Sublime Porte. The ups and downs of the nationalist narrative in
Greece relating to the Kromlides, who went from heroic secret resisters
to elements defiled by Turkishness and Islam, so convincingly illustrated
by Tzedopoulos, is very much a case in point.132 Maurus Reinkowski also
points out that many of the crypto-Christian peoples of the Balkans and

131
Krstic, “Illuminated by the Light of Islam”, pp. 54, 59, 61.
132
Tzedopoulos, “Public Secrets”, pp. 188 90.
 “Crypto-Christianity” 155

the Middle East emerged as a result of the rise of nationalism and European
intervention: “[T]he emerging nation states of the 19th and early 20th
century demanded unambiguous confessions of loyalty. And indeed,
Europeans, when describing crypto-religious groups in purely confessional
terms, talked very much along the lines of nationalist argument.”133
The mass apostasy that the Ottomans feared and that the missionaries
and their supporters wanted did not happen. Either the crypto movements
remained hidden, or their effects were contained. Moreover, at precisely
the time when the Ottomans feared that many might be about to leave their
ranks, history gave them a new resource, the career converts of the failed
“Springtime of the Peoples”.

133
Maurus Reinkowski, “Hidden Believers, Hidden Apostates: The Phenomenon of Crypto
Jews and Crypto Christians in the Middle East”, in Dennis Washburn and Kevin
A. Rheinhart (eds.), Converting Cultures: Religion, Ideology and Transformations of
Modernity (Leiden and Boston, 2007), pp. 409 33.
 4

Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman

Citizenship

“For you know, Aubrey, do you not, that Bonaparte turned Turk?”
“I heard of it Sir, of course; but no one has ever asserted that he recoiled
from swine’s flesh or a bottle of wine. I put it down to one those foolish things
a man says when he wishes to be elected to Parliament, such as ‘give me your
votes and I undertake to do away with the National Debt in eighteen
months’. I do not believe, he is any more a Mussulman than I am. You
have to be circumcised to be a Turk.”
“For my own part I have no knowledge of the gentleman’s soul, or heart or
private parts.”
Conversation between Commodore Jack Aubrey and
Lord Keith, Supreme Commander of the Fleet, Royal Navy, in the novel
The Hundred Days by Patrick O’Brian

what did it mean to “become an ottoman” in the

nineteenth century?
The whole issue of crypto-Christianity posed critical challenges to the
Tanzimat State as it seemed to be the thin end of the wedge that could
become the undoing of the project. The process of the “coming out” of the
crypto-Christians overlapped with the “coming in” of new people. After
the “springtime of the peoples” in 1848, Europe was to face the most
serious challenge to the imperial system since the French Revolution. The
fallout of the failed revolutions in Hungary and Poland were the thousands
of refugees who sought asylum in Ottoman domains. Like the crypto-
Christians who openly declared their “true” faith, the influx of a large
number of foreigners, many of whom at least nominally converted to
Islam, caused a further transformation in the politics of conversion. This

156
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 157

issue was to be coupled with the idea of formal citizenship after the
formulation of the Ottoman Citizenship Law of 1869. After the promul-
gation of this law, Ottoman citizenship was to be officially decoupled from
religion as conversion to Islam would no longer be a sufficient condition
for Ottoman citizenship, and it became the rule that each case be consid-
ered on its merits. Nonetheless, in practice Islam was to remain the primary
focus of Ottoman identity and to become even more so during the
Hamidian period. Yet it was in 1885, during the Hamidian period, that
the practice of obligatory identity papers was instituted for all Ottoman
citizens regardless of religion.
The most important transformation in the politics of conversion
was that the late Ottoman Empire seemed to develop what might
be called a “hierarchy of conversion”.1 This was a sort of sliding
scale of conversions whereby the status that the state accorded the
convert was based on criteria like usefulness or nuisance potential,
ranging from the high-ranking qualified military experts, which
would put them at the top of the hierarchy; to the tolerable but not
necessarily desirable conversions of middling elements such as rail-
way technicians, policemen, etc., to the downright undesirables such
as the European rif-raff who converted to escape crimes, unhappy
love affairs, or debts.
According to Ottoman tradition based on the Islamic law of subjecthood,
conversion to Islam on Ottoman soil made the convert automatically a subject
of the Sultan/Caliph. As put in a major recent study by Macit Kenanoglu:

‘Although Islamic jurists in the classical period did not use the term citizen
ship, (vatandaşlık) the concept of citizenship was known to Islamic law.
According to Islamic law, those belonging to the Islamic state that has
established sovereignty over the Dar ul Islam become the ehlü dari’l Islam,
that is to say the people, the subjects of the Islamic state . . . Because Islam
subsumes faith and citizenship.’2

Yet many if not most of the neophyte Muslims remained nominal converts;
their conversions amounted to little more than a polite fiction.
Nonetheless, the term “career convert” as I use it here is not intended to
imply that all of these men were insincere in their pledge of service to their
new sovereign – far from it, as seen in the case of the commander-in-chief

1
I am indebted to Ussama Makdisi for this concept of the “hierarchy of conversions”.
2
Macit Kenanog lu, Osmanlı Millet Sistemi, p. 13. The italics are in the original. On this see
also Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, Hukuk u Islamiyye, Chapter 3, “Dar ül Harp Dar ül Islam”.
158 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

of the Ottoman forces in the Crimean War, Ömer Paşa Latas, a Croat by
origin.3
So what did it mean to “become an Ottoman” in the nineteenth
century? One of the interesting aspects of the relationship of the
Hungarian converts to their new country was that they always referred
to the Ottoman sultan as the “Sultan of the Turks”.4 They also addressed
the Ottoman officials as “Turks”, and were somewhat confounded to
find out that many of them were not Turkish at all, but were Ottoman to
the core, as in the case of Ömer Paşa Latas himself, who was living proof
that a successful career convert could achieve the highest honours. As
commander-in-chief (Serdar-ı Ekrem) of the Ottoman forces during the
Crimean War, Ömer Paşa was awarded the Grand Cordon the Military
Order of the Bath in 1855, one of the highest decorations bestowed by the
British crown.5 He must have served as a role model for many of the neo-
Ottoman Hungarians. Another curious twist to the way in which the
Hungarians related to their new society was that because they saw the
Ottoman Empire almost as a Turkish nation-state, and because they were
imbued with the ideals of Romantic Revival nationalism, they had very
little sympathy for insubordination on the part of the subject peoples of
the empire; hence their willingness to volunteer to suppress the Bosnian
rising. In fact, what had brought down the Hungarian Revolution was to

3
Ömer Paşa Latas (1806 71) was born Mihailo Latas in Serbian Kraina Janja Gora, the
municipality of Plaski in present day Croatia. Educated at military school, he joined the
frontier regiment. Latas fled to Bosnia in 1823 to escape charges of embezzlement. There he
converted to Islam while he was serving as a tutor to the children of a Turkish merchant.
When the family moved to Istanbul, he came with them. He was appointed lecturer at the
Turkish military academy and moved up through the ranks. His highest rank was to be
commander of the Ottoman Army in the Crimean War. An Ottoman biographical ency
clopedia has the following short entry on Ömer Paşa: “Originally one of the German Slavs.
Studied mathematics in his native land. Came to the Ottoman lands and entered the
entourage of Senikli I_ brahim Paşa and became a Muslim. Reached the highest ranks in
the Ottoman army, Commander in Chief of Ottoman Forces during the Crimean War,
twice the Muşir of Rumelia.” Sicil i Osmani (Istanbul, 1983), vol. 4, pp. 1322 3.
4
Kemal Karpat, “Kossuth in Turkey: The Impact of the Hungarian Refugees in the Ottoman
Empire 1849 1851”, Hungarian Heritage Review 23 (March 1990), 23.
5
Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir. Tezkire, no.7, “Bakiyye i Vekâyi i sene 1271”, p. 52. Cevdet mis
takenly states that Ömer Paşa was granted the Garter, “dizbag ı nişanı”. See The Times of 3
September 1855: “The Investiture of Omar Pasha with the Grand Order of the Bath was
performed with much ceremony on the 11th [August] at the official residence of the English
Ambassador at Pera.” My thanks to Edhem Eldem for this clarification and this reference.
Ömer Paşa had also served in Lebanon against the Druze in 1843, and he is referred to in the
Arabic literature as al nimsawi, or the Austrian. My thanks to Ussama Makdisi for this
information.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 159

a great extent the Hungarian nationalists’ inability to come to terms

with their own minorities, the Croats, Serbs, and Romanians. What was
taking place was that the romantic Hungarian nationalists, even as
neophyte Muslims, were bringing their own migrant bourgeois central
European notions of liberal Romantic Revival nationalism into a late
Ottoman Islamic context.6 Such men would have no sympathy for
insurgent Bosnian Beys or Arabs or Druzes, whom they were likely to
see as seditious elements or savage rebels. Now owing allegiance as
Muslim (nominal or not) subjects of the Muslim sultan, whom they
saw as the “Sultan of Turkey”, they adjusted to their new roles remark-
ably quickly. The chapter that follows traces the transformations in the
politics of conversion as they emerge in cases ranging from illustrious
Hungarian officers to Bulgarian brigands turned into Muslim police-
men, and how this related to the changes in the concept of Ottoman
citizenship.

career conversions or migrant souls:

the hungarian refugees of 1849 7
During the Hungarian uprising of 1956, on 23 October, the Hungarian
demonstrators facing Soviet troops in Budapest rallied around the statue of
General Joseph Bem, one of the heroes of the Hungarian Revolution of
1848. Situated on the Bem Rackpart on the banks of the Danube, the statue
depicts Bem in a heroic pose, one arm in a sling, the other pointing into the
distance. The aim of the demonstrators who made Bem the focal point of
their rally was to celebrate him in his persona as an anti-Russian fighter.
Bem, who was Polish, had been a leader of the 1830 uprising in Poland
against the Russians, and had later come to Hungary to take a leading role
in the Revolution of 1848. Today he is still one of the heroes in the
pantheon of post-Soviet Hungary. Hardly any of the demonstrators of
1956 would have known that Joseph Bem, heroic commander of the

6
On the Hungarian intolerance for any idea of autonomy for any of the other peoples of the
Habsburg Empire, see Keith Hitchins, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania
1780 1849 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 183; Robert W. Seton Watson, “The Era of Reform
in Hungary”, Slavonic and East European Review 21, part 2 (1943), 166; Gelu Neamtu and
Ioan Bolovan, The Revolution of 1848 1849 in Transylvania (Cluj Napoca, 2004), p. 35.
7
I owe thanks to Kahraman Sakul for his help in compiling the material for this section.
160 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

honvéd forces, died as Murad Paşa, a circumcised Muslim and an

Ottoman officer.8
The nineteenth century ushered in a new kind of “renegade”, the
romantic who adopted a “pet cause” as his own and was even prepared
to die for it, the ultimate example of which is of course Lord Byron. But the
rising tide of Romantic nationalism did not always run against the
Ottoman Empire. After the “Springtime of the Peoples” from the 1830s
to the 1850s, many Poles, Hungarians, Italians, and others, fleeing
Austrian and/or Russian enemies, took refuge in Ottoman domains. This
placed the Ottoman élite in something of a quandary. The Ottoman
Empire was every bit as legitimist a monarchy as Habsburg Austria and
Romanov Russia. The Ottomans could not be expected to love nationalist
separatists and had as much to lose by their activities as Austria and
Russia, if not more, because they were weaker. Yet it was this very weak-
ness that made it tempting to welcome the newcomers as most of them
were trained military men with specialist skills. One Turkish historian has
actually referred to them as a “providential hail of trained cadres”.9 But
the idea of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” as a modus operandi
could, and did, get them embroiled in severe diplomatic crises, as both
Austria and Russia demanded that the “insurgents”, as they saw them, be
handed over to be tried for treason. This was made all the more compli-
cated by the fact that the Sublime Porte had treaties of extradition with
both Austria and Russia dealing with the reciprocal return of fugitives.10
On the other hand, one of the main aims of the Ottoman state after the
Tanzimat reforms of the 1840s was to appear as a member of the “civilized
powers”, and what better way to do so than to extend its magnanimous
protection to romantic fugitives who happened to be universally popular
in the two more powerful states that they needed to court, that is, Britain

8
I would like to thank my friend and colleague Andras Kovacs from the Central European
University, Budapest, for bringing Bem to my attention. On the symbolic significance of
the statue during the demonstrations of 1956, see Gabor Bona, The Hungarian
Revolution and War of Independence of 1848 49 (New York, 1999), p. 483. The
honvéd were the Hungarian national army.
9
I_ lber Ortaylı, I_ mparatorlug un en Uzun Yüzyılı, pp. 29, 30.
10
The treaties in question were the Austrian Ottoman Peace of Belgrade of 1739, whereby
diplomatic representatives of Austria were granted jurisdiction over Austrian subjects in
Ottoman territory, and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, which granted Russian
authorities similar powers.. The critical article is Article 2, which states that all prisoners
taking refuge in either empire would be sent back: “With the exception however of those
who, in the Empire of Russia, shall have entered the Christian religion, and in the Ottoman
Empire the Mahometan religion.” See J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East, vol. 1, pp. 47 51, 55.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 161

and France? This is not to say that there was not a genuine feeling of
sympathy for the fugitives, and there were illustrous precedents.11 The
famous conservative jurist Ahmet Cevdet Paşa cited a sura from the
Qur’an justifying Grand Vizier Reşid Paşa in his determination not to
hand the Hungarians over to their enemies:

‘The Hungarians were forced to take refuge in the Ottoman lands. The Austrians
and the Russians demanded their return. Many people in high places were afraid of
provoking the wrath of these two neighboring Great Powers. . . . Reşid Paşa, in
keeping with the ruling in the Qur’an (‘if one of the infidels (mushrikin) asks you for
refuge you offer him refuge’) persisted in his resolve to protect and shelter the
fugitives thus earning the admiration and great honour of the Europeans and
Americans for the nation of Islam.’12

Soon after the defeats of the Hungarian forces in the summer of 1849,
Hungarian, Polish, and Italian forces began to flood into Ottoman terri-
tory seeking asylum, many of them accompanied by their families. Bem led
a spectacularly successful campaign against the Austrian forces until they
had to ask for Russian support. On 6 July 1849 Bem’s honvéd forces were
conclusively defeated by the Russians under General Lüders, and some
1,120 Hungarians crossed the Danube and sought refuge with Ottoman
forces in the garrison border town of Vidin. Among them were General
Bem, Count Batthany, and thirty-six officers. Thus began one of the most
delicate operations of diplomatic tightrope-walking that the Ottoman
Empire was to experience in the nineteenth century. Under severe pressure
from Austria and Russia to hand over the “rebels”, the Ottomans sought
to find a way to save the asylum seekers and yet avoid the combined wrath
of Austria and Russia.
By late summer the list of refugees seeking asylum in Ottoman territory
was beginning to look like a “who’s who” of the Hungarian revolution
as Bem was soon joined by General Mor Perczel, General Lazar Mesaros,
General György Kmetty, the Polish General Dembinski, as well as ex–Foreign

11
A prominent Hungarian revolutionary of the eighteenth century, Ferenc Rakoczi, had also
been given asylum in Ottoman territory. After making a brief bid for Hungarian inde
pendence from the Habsburgs in 1711, Rakoczi had ended up in exile in the small town of
Tekirdag (Rodosto) on the shores of the Marmara Sea, where he died in April 1735. The
house he lived in is still a museum. On him see Agnes Varkongy, “Rakoczi’s War of
Independence and the Peasantry”, in Janos M. Bak and Bela Kiraly (eds.), From Hunyadi
to Rakoczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary (New York,
1982), p. 385.
12
Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir (Ankara, 1986), vol. 1, p. 12. The sura is Al Tawba 9:6: “Wa
in ahadun minal mushrikîn istijaraka fa ’ajirhu.” My thanks to Alexis Wick for his help
with the transliteration.
162 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Minister Count Kazmer Batthyany and Prime Minister Bertalan Szemere, “A

few government commissioners and officials completed the émigré’s civilian
population.”13 On 22 August the crisis reached its peak when the leader of the
Hungarian revolutionaries, Layos Kossuth, himself sought refuge in Ottoman
dominions travelling on a forged British passport under the name of
“Bloomfield”.14 By October the remnants of the Hungarian army piled up
on the Ottoman border together with civilian dependents and camp followers
numbered some 3,700. The major portion of these returned as part of a
“repatriation mission” arranged by imperial authorities on October 21.
Nonetheless, “Hungarian emigrant communities – taking into account the
constant fluctuation of their population – amounted to anywhere between
1,200 and 1,500 during the 1850s. . . . The émigrés’ community initially
centred itself within the Ottoman Empire”.15 Some Turkish sources have
claimed that in the first days, faced with the reluctance of the Ottomans to
let them in, the refugees actually threatened to turn Muslim on the spot.16 On
26 August the Ottoman envoy, Fuad Bey, who had been sent out to Bucharest
with the specific brief of looking into this matter, reported, “If they are
pressured the least bit more, the lot of them will become Muslim. Although
this is a good thing, it is highly likely to complicate matters as it will not be
possible to refuse them.”17
Those refugees who made it clear that they had no intention of even flirting
with Islam were still to be given refuge as a personal favour of the sultan.
However, the converts “received preferential treatment from the very start”.18
At this point General Bem together with 256 of his followers announced
that he had converted to Islam and had taken the name Murad Paşa. He
was received with great pomp and ceremony by Ferik Halim Paşa, the

13
Gabor Bona, The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, pp. 440 1. Bona gives
the total figure of émigrés at around 500, most of whom were honvéd officers and soldiers:
“there were also about twenty commissioned field officers (colonels, lieutenant colonels,
and majors), 120 junior officers . . . and 260 non commissioned officers and private
soldiers”.
14
It seems Kossuth contacted Ömer Paşa, commander of the Ottoman armies in Wallachia,
before he presented himself at the border. See Denes A. Janossy, Great Britain and Kossuth
(Budapest, 1937), p. 32.
15
Bona, The Hungarian Revolution, p. 441.
16
Abdullah Saydam, Osmanlıların Siyasi I_ lticalara Bakışı ya da 1849 Macar Leh Mültecileri
Meselesi (The Ottoman attitude to political asylum or the Hungarian and Polish refugees
of 1849), offprint from Belleten 66 (1997), 339 85.
17
BOA DUIT 75 1/11, lef. 3. As quoted in Abdullah Saydam, “Müslüman olan Macar Leh
Mültecileri Meselesi” (The affair of the Hungarian and Polish refugees’ conversion to
Islam), Toplumsal Tarih 4 (1995), 34 53.
18
Karpat, “Kossuth in Turkey”, pp. 18 23.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 163

commander of the Ottoman forces at Vidin. This development caused the

rumour to spread in European capitals, encouraged by Austrian and Russian
agents, that the Ottomans were forcing the refugees to convert. In fact, one
particularly fantastic rumour was to the effect that Kossuth himself had
converted. The rumours were ugly, to the point that they claimed that the
“Turks” were molesting the women and children of the refugees. This caused
Kossuth to write a letter to Lord Palmerston complaining about pressure
being put on him and his followers to convert to Islam; the letter got out to the
press, causing much distress at the Sublime Porte. Although the nature of this
pressure remains unclear, it seemed real enough to Kossuth and his friends:
“Only his conversion to Islam, together with that of his fellow-refugees could
save them from extradition in case of the Porte being unable to avoid the
united Russo-Austrian demands. This was the advice that some of the min-
isters forwarded to Kossuth.”19 He would later disclaim the letter and write a
public declaration to the Ottoman grand Vizier, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, as well
as respectfully thanking sultan Abdülmecid I for his protection and hospital-
ity. He admitted that the letter to Lord Palmerston had been written in a
moment of despair, “when it seemed that we had no choice but that between
renunciation or extradition”.20
Although the Ottoman authorities were justified in denying accusations
of forcible conversion, the wording of the instructions sent to the governor
of Vidin imply that conversion was implied as an option to save the skins of
the refugees: “If things take a turn for the worse, according to our treaties
with Russia, Muslim refugees cannot be turned back. It is a matter of
lightly implying (hafifce hikaye) that there may be a similar way to protect
them [the Hungarians] if this causes them some comfort (teselliyat).”21
The key terms in this document are “lightly implying” and “comfort”.
Any historian familiar with the subtleties of Ottoman chancery language
will get the message here. The Hungarians and Poles were being told in
plain language: “We cannot offer you asylum publicly as we have explicit
treaty obligations with Russia and Austria, but we may be able to save
you”.22 In actual fact the governor of Vidin wrote to the Porte

19
Janossy, Great Britain and Kossuth, pp. 36 7.
20
For the full text of the letter, see BOA DUIT 75 2/6.
21
BOA Dosya Usulu Tasnif (DUIT), no. 75 1/30, lef. 1. As quoted in Saydam, Osmanlıların,
p. 352.
22
Charles d’Eszlary claims that some 3,500 Hungarian and other troops had been turned
over to the Austrians and that this had a determining effect on the others in their decision to
convert. See Charles d’Eszlary, “l’emigratıon Hongroise de Louis Kossuth en Turquie entre
1849 1850”, VI Türk Tarihi Kongresi (Ankara 1967), pp. 430 50.
164 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

guaranteeing that no pressure had been applied. What had happened was
that some Hungarian and Polish refugees, communicating through inter-
preters, had insisted that they wanted to become Muslims; they had “been
told the consequences of such a step, such as never being able to return to
their homelands, but they had insisted”.23 At this point it is highly likely
that they had been made aware of the exclusion clauses in the treaties:

‘There was only one legal way out of the dilemna and the Turks tried it. If the exiles
were to convert to Islam, none of the treaties would apply to them. Turkish generals
harangued the refugees, promising them high ranks in the Ottoman army. Generals
Bem and Guyon and a few other Poles and Hungarians decided to undergo the
rather formal ceremony of conversion. Kossuth himsef would not hear of conver
sion and in a bitter letter to ‘Murad Pasha’ (Bem) he denounced those who had
given in to the Turks.’24

At this point, on 18 September 1849, two letters were received at the camp
in Vidin. Both were adressed to Kossuth; one was from the ambassador of
the Habsbug Empire in Istanbul, Count Andrassy, himself a Hungarian,
the other from the ambassador of the Polish government in exile, Count
Czaykowski. The letters stated that only conversion would assure that the
refugees were not handed back, and “the letters also stated that after a time
they would be allowed to go back to their own religion and go to whatever
country they wanted, or, if they so wished, they could stay and take up
positions in the Ottoman army”.25
The position of the refugees must be considered here. They had been
sequestered in a garrison town that could scarcely support itself, let alone a
new population of several thousand desperate men and their families. For
some two or more months they expected daily to be handed over to their
enemies to face, almost certainly, execution. Rumours must have been rife
and morale low. Although the official position of the state regarding
conversion was very subtle, this did not prevent “a number of zealots
[from] attempting to persuade them to accept Islam by reminding them
that they might otherwise be surrendered to the Austrians and
Russians.”26

23
DUIT, no. 75 1/41, lef. 5, letter from the governor of Vidin dated 21 October 1849, as
quoted in Saydam, Osmanlıların, p. 352, n. 42.
24
Istvan Deak, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848 1849
(New York, 1978), p. 340.
25
Bayram Nazir, Osmanlıya Sıg ınanlar. Macar ve Polonyalı Mülteciler (Those who took
refuge with the Ottomans: The Hungarian and Polish refugees) (Istanbul, 2006), p. 82.
26
Karpat, “Kossuth in Turkey”, p. 22.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 165

Some of their comrades had already converted and were telling them
that it was not so bad; others were putting pressure on them to convert.27
Meanwhile, the Porte was frantically seeking a solution that would satisfy
all parties. At this point France and Britain made it clear that they sup-
ported the Ottoman Empire in its reluctance to give up the refugees. British
support went so far as to send a squadron of the Royal Navy, which took
up station just outside the Dardanelles.28 There was also the mounting
feeling in Istanbul that it would be very damaging to the international
prestige of the sultan if he were ever to hand over to their executioners men
who had put themselves at his mercy.29
On 18 February 1850, Lajos Kossuth and his party, numbering fifty-
seven people, embarked on the Ottoman ship the Tair-i Bahri bound for
Gemlik on the western Anatolian coast. On 31 March 1850 the refugees
had reached Kütahya, the small town where they would be interned until
their release in August 1851. The group included illustrious names like
Count Casimir Batthyany, General Mesaros, General Perczel, Adolphe
Gyurman, and Alexandre d’Asboth. After his release, Kossuth arrived in
Southampton on 28 October 1851, where he made a speech thanking the
Ottoman state for its hospitality.30
The story of the “Muslim Hungarians” remains more curious. The
latest Turkish source states that the group of Muslim Hungarians who
left Vidin on 1 November 1849 numbered 241.31 It had been decided to
send Bem (Murad Paşa) and his party of fifteen separately to Aleppo,
where they would be interned until things quietened down; they would

27
One of the great fears of the Ottoman authorities was actually that fighting would break
out between the converts and their erstwhile co religionists. By 26 September the governor
of Vidin wrote to Istanbul that the total number of refugees had reached some 6,000 souls.
The Ottoman government undertook to feed, clothe, and shelter them. Saydam provides a
table showing the numbers of raincoats, underwear, boots, socks, and so forth that were
provided. See Osmanlıların, p. 355.
28
Ibid., p. 370.
29
The overwhelming majority of the refugees were Hungarians, together with a “consider
able number” of Poles and 400 Italians. See ibid., p. 355.
30
Ibid., p. 384. There is considerable material in Turkish on various aspects of Kossuth’s
internment. See, for example, Abdullah Saydam, “Kütahya’a Mülteci bir Cumhurbaşkanı:
Louis Kossuth” (A refugee head of state in Kütahya: Louis Kossuth), Tarih ve Toplum 28
(1997), 5 14; Bayram Nazir, “Lajos Kossuth’u Kütahya’dan kaçırma girişimleri”
(Attempts to abduct Lajos Kossuth from Kütahya), Tarih ve Toplum 36 (2001), 15 19.
31
Nazır, Osmanlıya Sıg ınanlar, p. 119. See also Karpat,”Kossuth in Turkey”, p. 22: “A list of
the Hungarian and Polish refugees who were given military appointments in the Ottoman
army shows that 193 were assigned to various units in Rumeli, while twenty one were sent
to Istanbul. Thus the number of officers converted to Islam was well over 200”.
166 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

then be employed in active service. Bem kept petitioning for active service
in Ottoman armies in Rumelia, where he would have a chance to fight the
Russians. The Porte, on the other hand, thought this unduly provocative at
this time and felt that he should be stationed in the Arab provinces.
Accordingly, Bem and nineteen of his followers, all of whom had taken
Muslim names, arrived in Aleppo in the early spring of 1850. The group
included Major General Kmetty (Ismail Paşa), Major General Stein
(Ferhad Paşa), Zarzecsky (Osman Bey), Woronieczky (Yusuf Bey),
Grimm (Mustafa Bey), Baroti (Osman Bey), Toult (I_ brahim Bey), Fiala
(Ömer Bey), Hollan (I_ skender Bey), Nemegyei (Ömer Bey), Albert (Selim
Bey), Orosdy (Ömer Bey), and Schinberk (Tahir Bey); each was given a
salary according to his rank.32
A certain mystery surrounds the life story of Murad Paşa. Although he
was Polish, his illustrious role in the Hungarian Revolution identified him
with the Hungarians (Macar) as far as the Ottomans were concerned. He
was never referred to as Polish (Lehli).33 There is never any doubt about
the sincerity of his conversion in the Turkish literature on the subject:
“Murad Paşa’s sole aim after his conversion to Islam was to be of service
to his new country and to his sovereign Abdülmecid whom he esteemed
highly. He hated Russia with a passion”.34 Indeed, what seems to have
convinced him to convert was the statement made by his hosts that those
who converted would fight against Russia in the Ottoman army.35
Bayram Nazir claims that,

‘[N]o special ceremony was carried out for those who converted. Those who were
to accept Islam kneeled before the Müftü in the mosque and repeated the şehadet.
They also stated that they were converting of their own free will and desire. . . .
Ceremonies such as circumcision and the cutting of the hair were postponed.’36

Bem is the only one among the senior Hungarian refugees who appears in
the sources as having been circumcised at Vidin. A contemporary source
gives a very detailed account of his circumcision, and, as it is the only such

32
Nazir, Osmanlıya Sıg ınanlar, pp. 369 71.
33
See, for example, Bayram Nazir, “Macar özgürlük savaşcısı Osmanlı Murad Paşa’sı, Jozef
Bem’in Ölumu üzerine bir tekzip yazisi” (A declaration of denial regarding the death of
Josef Bem, Hungarian freedom fighter and the Murad Paşa of the Ottomans), Toplumsal
Tarih 12 (1999), 32 4. The Encyclopedia Britannica refers to Bem as “also called Murad
Pasha” and mentions that “as governor of Aleppo, where at the risk of his life, he saved the
Christian population from being massacred”.
34
Nazir, Osmanlıya Sıg ınanlar, p. 32. Although some sources claim that Ben (Murad) was
appointed Vali (governor) of Aleppo, this is unlikely.
35
Ibid., p. 85. 36 Ibid., p. 86.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 167

account, it is worth quoting in some length. It describes Bem’s first days at

Vidin:

General Bem had been wounded in seven or eight places and was under the care of
special surgeons and doctors. One day he came to the mosque where Muslims were
praying. He entered the mosque and said that he wanted to be honoured with
Islam. He was introduced into the faith according to the proper custom. However,
he then asked the imam of one of the military units “what do I have to do to fully
become a Muslim?”.The imam advised him to become circumcised. General Bem
immediately called for his local aid and told him that he wanted to be circumcised.
The matter soon reached the ears of the Müftü of Vidin and other officials. Because
his wounds had still not healed, he was cautioned that to add yet another wound
would cause a loss of blood which could cause him to lose his life, and he was
advised to delay his circumcision until his wounds had completely healed. Because
he was adamant, having no other choice, the army surgeon was summoned and he
was circumcised.37

Bem was treated with great respect by his Ottoman hosts, who no doubt
knew that he was a brilliant soldier who had commanded an army of
30,000 men and 110 guns and had almost won. On the other hand, the
honvéd General was “under no illusion about his fate if he fell into Russian
hands”.38 Nor could the Hungarians have harbored any illusions about
what would happen to them if they fell into Austrian hands. Austrian
vengeance had been brutal. From 1848 to 1850 some 150 people had
been executed, and a total of 1,200 were imprisoned in fortresses. All the
leaders of the revolution who had escaped were tried in absentia. They
were sentenced to death and hung in effigy, “their names symbolically
nailed to the gallows”.39 A quiet life as a Muslim certainly seemed the
lesser evil. Not that this was an easy decision; one of the exiles, Gábor
Egressy, agonised over it in his diary. He refers to the “diabolical” alter-
native of having to choose between the “terrible logic of retaliation” and
denying “the homeland, the nation, the family and memory”, becoming
exiled both physically and spiritually.40

37
Mehmed Tevfik, Cok Yasa! Csok Jasa! Yadigâr ı Asrı Abdülhamid Han (Long Live!
Memento of the century of Abdülhamid Han) (Istanbul, 1294), pp. 9 10. This is a volume
written as the account of an official visit by an Ottoman delegation to Hungary in 1878.
They were invited by the Hungarians as a gesture of thanks for the granting of asylum in
1848. My thanks to Professor Geza David of Budapest Elte University for this reference.
38
Ian Roberts, Nicholas I and the Russian Intervention in Hungary (London, 1991), pp. 211,
213. The Russians gave the Ottomans a list of some 1,000 Poles whom they wanted
returned.
39
Bona, The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, p. 436.
40
Gábor, Törökörszági Naplo 1849 1850. My thanks to Lilla Balazs for this reference.
www.terebess.hu/keletkultinfo/index.html.
168 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Other Hungarian followers of Bem are also variously described as “out

of exigency becoming Mohammedans”, as in the case of John Fiala.41
Similarly, Albert Anzelm was “forced by circumstances to become
Mohammedan”, together with Julian Kune. All of these men ended up in
America. It is highly unlikely that they remained Muslims.42
After his appointment to Aleppo with the rank of Ferik (the highest rank
in the Ottoman Army at the time, corresponding to Army Commander),
with a top salary of 7,500 kuruş, Bem plied the Porte with many projects
that he envisioned as uplifting and progressive, such as that of building a
gunpowder works in Aleppo. He died on 10 December 1850, in Syria
fighting the Druze, and was buried with full military honours.43 The state
paid all his debts and decided to erect an ornamental headstone. His
belongings were taken to Europe by Ismail Paşa (General Kmetty). In
1929 his remains were taken to Poland via Istanbul and Budapest; “his
coffin was wreathed in Polish and Turkish flags as it left Sirkeci station.”
The remains were placed in a mausoleum in Tarnov, his hometown in
Poland.44 Another heroic figure of the Hungarian struggle, General
György Kmetty, also converted to Islam together with Bem, and served
with him in Aleppo as Ismail Paşa. After Bem’s death he went to London.
When the Crimean War broke out he returned to the Ottoman Empire and
fought with distinction in the defence of Kars, a key fortress in eastern
Anatolia. In 1856 he was promoted to the rank of Ferik and decorated by
the sultan. He then went back to London, where he died in retirement on
25 April 1869. He received a pension from the Ottoman state until the day
he died. He was buried in Kentsal Green cemetery in London. His grave-
stone was donated by the Ottoman embassy, and a resumé of his life and
career were inscribed in Turkish, Hungarian, English, and Latin.45 The
inscription on the headstone reads as follows: “George Kmetty (I_ smail
Paşa) 1813–1869. Lieutenant-General of the Ottomans. Defender of Kars.

41
Edmund Vasvary, Lincoln’s Hungarian Heroes: The Participation of Hungarians in the
Civil War 1861 1865 (Washington, DC, 1939), p. 52.
42
Ibid., pp. 43, 63, 64.
43
It was rumoured in Europe that he had been poisoned by the Ottomans. In response to this
rumour, the Ottoman chargé d’affaires in Brussels, Eugene de Kerckhove, published a
denial in the L’Independence Belge. See Bayram Nazir, “Jozef Bem’in Ölümü Üzerine bir
Tekzip Yazısı” (An article of denial regarding Jozef Bem’s death), Tarih ve Toplum 23
(1988), 23 34.
44
Nazir, Osmanlı’ya Sıg ınanlar, pp. 376 7. See also www.manofpoland.net.
45
Edit Tashnadi, “18 19 Yüzyılda Osmanlı’da Macar Mültecileri” (Hungarian refugees in
the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), Tarih ve Toplum 36, no.
215 (November 2001), 71 5.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 169

Chief of the forces in Syria. In whom Hungary mourns a brave commander

in her National War 1848–49. Erected by the command of the Sultan”.46
The Ottoman government was bestowing the highest honours on an
apostate. Clearly there is a contradiction here. Or is there? It may very well
be the case that all along the Ottomans knew that the “conversions” of
these people were symbolic and treated them as a polite fiction. How
sincere were their conversions? This is an issue hardly touched upon in
the Turkish literature, where the conversions are taken at face value.47 It
seems legitimate to speculate that for many of the “converts” this may have
been the case. The list is too long to elaborate on here, but a few more cases
may be mentioned, such as Jozsef Kollmann, who fought in the Crimean
War under the name of Fevzi Paşa, and Sandor Farkas, who taught for
many years in the Ottoman Military Academy as Macar Osman Paşa
(Osman Paşa the Hungarian) and who was the father of Nigar Hanim
(Binti Osman), renkowned as Turkey’s first woman poet.48
There are many similar life stories, such as that of another
“Hungarian”, Count Richard Guyon, in fact a British subject, who ini-
tially distinguished himself by fighting brilliantly during the Hungarian
Revolution. In the Ottoman Empire, after arriving in Vidin with Bem, he
converted to Islam and took the name of Hürşid Paşa. Guyon/Hürşid Paşa
is a very good example of an ambiguous “conversion”. Originally sent to
Damascus together with Bem, Guyon was recalled to Istanbul just before
Bem’s death. There is some doubt about whether he actually converted,
and at least one source specifically states, “He was greatly importuned to
embrace Mohammedanism with all the allurements of high honour and
military command. . . . He resolutely declined conversion, but accepted the
duties of an anomalous office”.49 During the Kars campaign in north-
eastern Anatolia in 1854, Guyon was largely responsible for setting up the

46
James Stuart Curl, Kentsal Green Cemetary: The Origins and Development of the General
Cemetery of All Souls, Kentsal Green London 1824 2001 (London, 2003), p. 259. My
thanks to Tom Garnett of University College, London for this reference. See Plate 2.
47
For instance, Saydam, in his otherwise admirably documented study, refers to “Mirliva
(Major General) Kamti” (Kmetty) as “one of the refugees who had converted to Islam”.
See Osmanlıların, p. 377.
48
Many Hungarian refugees also remained in the Ottoman Empire and took up humble
trades like carpenter, coachman and leatherworker. See the table on p. 19 of Saydam.
Osmanlilarin. Comp. BOA A.MKT.NZD 11/89, 27 Ramazan 1266 / 6 August 1850,
Ahmet Efendi and Veli Ag a, two Hungarian converts who were employed in municipal
building services in Istanbul.
49
The Daily News of 14 May 1855 reported that “he is literally adored by the troops”. See
www.batteryb.com/Crimean War /biographies/genguyon.htm.
170 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

logistics of the defence of the key fortress town against the Russians. He was
so popular with the ordinary Ottoman soldiers that they supposedly shouted
“We want Hürşid Pasha!” (Hürşid Paşayı I_ steriz!), demanding that he be
put in overall command. He was not, and was blamed for the eventual rout
of the Ottoman army at the battle of Kürekdere. He died in Istanbul in 1855,
unemployed. His gravestone in the British military cemetery in Haydarpaşa
bears the following inscription in Hungarian: “Turkish Paşa, Son of France,
Born in England, Hungarian Nationalist”.50
The Hungarian converts became something of a legend in the domains
of the sultan. The intrepid Arminius Vambery was to note: “We then lived
in the era of Hungarian refugees. Some hundreds of my countrymen made
believe that they had been converted to Islam. A popular belief had got
abroad that the whole Magyar people would acknowledge Mohammed as
their prophet, and whenever a Mohammedan came across a Madjarli the
fire of the missionary was blazing in his heart”.51
In many ways Arminus Vambery is the ultimate career “convert”. The
quotation marks around the word “convert” are deliberate here. Although
Vambery professed Judaism, Islam, and Calvinist Protestantism at different
stages in his life, he claimed to be a freethinker and never to have believed in
any of them. He was to be an impoverished Jewish tutor, an Istanbul Efendi,
a wandering haji and dervish, a leading Hungarian orientalist, a secret
(double) agent, and a guest of Queen Victoria at Windsor, all in one lifetime.
He was born in 1831 or 1832 as Haim Wamberger into an orthodox Jewish
family in the village of Duna Szerdahely in Hungary (now Dunjaska Streda
in the Czech Republic), situated on an island in the Danube.52 In the book
that made his fame, Travels in Central Asia, he makes no mention anywhere
of his Jewish origins.53 In his autobiography, written and published after he
had “arrived” as an established international figure, he is much less coy
about his Jewish origins, mentioning them as a “problematic blessing”.54

50
Tashnadi, “18 19 yüzyılda Macar Mültecileri”, p. 75. “Török Fö.Tabornok. Frankhon
ivadéka. Angolhon szülöttje. Magyarhon Vitézze” (see Plate 1).
51
Arminius Vambery, Arminius Vambery: His Life and Adventures by Himself (London,
1883), p. 13.
52
Lory Alder and Richard Dalby, The Dervish of Windsor Castle (London, 1979),
pp. 16 17. His date of birth is not clear. Jews in Habsburg Hungary were not required
to register their births. He later “chose” 19 March 1832.
53
Arminus Vambery, Travels in Central Asia: A Journey from Teheran across the Turcoman
Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bokhara and Samarkand. Performed
in the year 1863 (London, 1864).
54
Arminius Vambery, The Life and Adventures of Arminius Vambery by Himself (London,
1883), vii: “I was born in Hungary in 1832 in the small town of Duna Szerdahely”.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 171

Vambery also moved in Hungarian émigré circles in Istanbul in the early

1850s. In a biography of the great Hungarian traveller, there is a photo-
graph of Vambery sitting at a table with Daniel Szilanyi, identified only as
a “former officer of the Hungarian Army of Liberty”. Both are in Turkish
dress, wearing a fez, and Szilanyi is smoking a water pipe.55 Further on in
his travels, in Diadin, Persia, Vambery ran across General Kolmann, now
Fevzi Paşa, one of the first Hungarian émigrés with whom Vambery had
become acquainted in Istanbul.56 When Vambery first arrived in Istanbul
in 1857 as a young man of twenty-five, the city was full of Hungarian
refugees, many of whom no doubt have fallen through the cracks of
history. One of Vambery’s main sponsors in the Ottoman capital was in
fact Ismail Paşa/ General Kmetty, who got him his first job as a tutor in the
home of Hüseyin Daim Paşa. Kmetty was also to help him when he turned
up in London in 1864 upon his return from Central Asia. By this time
Ismail Paşa/Kmetty was living in London as a popular member of the
London social set.57
Whether or not Vambery was right in his claim that his countrymen
“made believe that they converted” (and he would know something about
“make believe”), the Ottoman archival records provide ample evidence
that at least some were genuine enough. A register spanning the years
H. 1265–68 (1849–53) records the conversion of 35 Hungarians out of a
total of 340 conversions listed. At over 10 percent of the total number of
converts listed in the register, the Hungarians are the single largest group of
Christian converts apart from Ottoman Greeks and Armenians.58
A typical entry in the register reads as follows:

One has presented himself here who was originally of the Hungarian millet (an asl
macarlu), he was offered the faith [he converted], given the name Ahmed Tevfik
and was sent to the official hospital (bimarhane) for his circumcision.59

This particular register actually records the conversion of two Hungarians

on the same day; although they are separate entries, the wording is vir-
tually identical:

55
Alder and Dalby, The Dervish of Windsor Castle. The photograph appears on p. 48. No
information is given on Daniel Szilanyi.
56
Ibid., p. 69.
57
Ibid., pp. 243 4.
58
BOA Bab ı Âli Evrak Odası (BEO) A 592 Sadaret Nezaret ve Devair 634. My thanks to
Dilek Akyalçın Kaya for this reference.
59
Ibid., 20 Muharrem 1267 / 25 November 1850. The original names of the converts are not
mentioned.
172 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

“One who has presented himself here sent by the Foreign Ministry who was
originally of the Hungarian millet was offered the religion and given the name
Mehmed was sent to the official hospital for his circumcision.”60

In most of the cases of Hungarian converts the record states that they were
sent by the Foreign Ministry, presumably because of their status as polit-
ical asylum seekers. There is one entry of a Hungarian conversion en
famille:

Mehmed Tevfik who was originally a Hungarian subject, his wife Ayşe
Sıdıka, his elder daughter Fatma al Zehra and his other daughter Hadice
and his other daughter Emine, all sent by the Foreign Ministry were given
their names and all five members of the family were honoured with the glory
of Islam. They have been sent to the Muşir Paşa of the Ministry of police to
be shown a place.61

Another entry deals with a father and son:

Mahmud and his son Mehmed who were originally Hungarian subjects have been
honoured with the glory of Islam have had the religion presented to them and have
been sent to the Chief of Staff (Babı Seraskeri) for their circumcisions. Because they
were sent from His Highness Ömer Paşa Commander of the Army of Rumeli they
have been sent back to him. (Marginal note: because this was according to an
Imperial order there is no petition).62

These two seem to be a particularly well connected father and son, because
the Ömer Paşa in question was Ömer Paşa Latas himself. On 14 April
1850 a group of 200 newly converted Hungarians were attached to the
force that was being mustered at Şumnu to quell the uprising in Bosnia:
“As they were leaving the city the müftü sacrificed a sheep to them and
lifting up his hands, said ‘I pray for your victory’. After intonations of
‘amen’ the newly converted refugees set off with their newly found broth-
ers in religion for Bosnia”.63 The greatest irony was that the Bosnian Beys

60
Ibid., 6 Ramazan 1267 / 5 July 1851. The procedure for the other Hungarian is exactly the
same except that he was named Ahmed. Also dated 6 Ramazan 1267.
61
Ibid., 29 Şevval 1265 / 17 September 1849. “To be shown a place” presumably meant a
dwelling place.
62
Ibid., 23 Muharrem 1266 / 9 December 1849. This last note was presumably because the
convert would make his application to convert by a petition, so Mahmud and Mehmed, by
being presented directly by the sultan, were being given preferential treatment. It would be
fascinating to know just who these people were; unfortunately, the register does not
provide their original Hungarian names.
63
Nazir, Osmanlıya Sıg ınanlar, pp. 186 7.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 173

whom they were being sent to put down had been Muslims since the
fifteenth century.64

polish refugees and converts

In the first days after the military débacle of August 1849, Polish refugees
actually outnumbered Hungarians.65 Leading names among them con-
verted to Islam, such as Szarcinsky (Osman Bey), Tabatinsky (Ali Bey),
and Count Kossielski (Sefer Paşa), all of whom took up military duties in
the Ottoman Empire. This development was severely criticized by Austria
and Russia, who accused Ömer Paşa of forcing these men to convert.66
Ahmet Vefik Bey (later Paşa) was sent as the sultan’s special emissary to
Vidin, where he was to tell the refugees:

I give you my word of honour that you will not find more noble and magnanimous
protection anywhere as that extended to you by my Master Sultan Abdülmecid. If
any of you want to stay with us they will be given a military or civilian position in
keeping with his present rank or station, without needing to change his religion.67

Although the Ottoman authorities repeatedly denied such accusations of

forced conversion, there does seem to be the possibility (as in the case of the
Hungarians mentioned earlier) that conversion was at least suggested as an
option: “Although the Ottoman authorities vehemently denied such accu-
sations, it is clear that as a result [of conversion] they were able to become
Ottoman subjects and guarantee their safety from the danger of being
returned’.68 Ortaylı goes so far as to claim that “these Polish officers
became the vanguard of Ottoman modernisation during the century of
the Tanzimat”.69

64
Ömer Paşa Latas’s intervention in Bosnia broke the resistance of a local elite of notables
who fought against the Tanzimat reforms which damaged their privileged position. The
historian and Nobel laureate Ivo Andric wrote a novel about Ömer Paşa Latas, emphasiz
ing “The cruelty and historical hatred of converts towards their former nationals.” See
Boyan Aleksov, “Serbian Historians on Religious Conversions”, p. 169.
65
See the table given by Saydam, where he gives the figure of 833 Poles versus 53 Hungarians
for the date of 28 August 1849. Saydam, Osmanlıların, p. 350.
66
I_ lber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı Imparatorlug u’nda Askeri Reformlar ve Polonyalı Mülteci
Subaylar”(Military reforms in the Ottoman Empire and the Polish refugee officers), in
I_ lber Ortaylı, Osmanlı I_ mparatorlug u’da I_ ktisadi ve Sosyal Deg işim. Makaleler
(Economic and social change in the Ottoman Empire: Articles) (Ankara, 2000),
pp. 185 91.
67
Ibid., p. 189. 68 Ibid.
69
Ibid.
174 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

One illustrious example is Count Constantine Borzecki (Mustafa

Celaleddin Paşa). The son of a minor Polish aristocrat, Borzecki had
come to Istanbul in the autumn of 1849 and had converted to Islam.
According to the memoirs of his son Enver, “He at first accepted Islam
for its practical aspects but later became a true Muslim”.70 We learn also
from his son that he did not frequent European circles in Istanbul, prefer-
ring the company of Polish converts like himself: “These people, who had
severed their ties with their own civilization, but who were not really
accepted by conservative Muslim circles, only felt at home among their
own kind”.71 Nonetheless, Mustafa Celaleddin Paşa fought valiantly in
the Crimean War and died from wounds suffered during the fighting with
the Montenegrin rebels in 1876. Interestingly enough, Mustafa Celaleddin
Paşa’s renown in the Ottoman Empire and present-day Turkey is not for
his military exploits but for his pioneering work in Turcology. His book
Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes is generally recognized as the first work to
systematically analyse the origin of the Turkic peoples. The great Turkish
poet Nazım Hikmet was his great-grandson.72
Another migrant soul was Count Michael Izador Czaykowski. He
was a Polish patriot who fled to Istanbul in the 1830s; he first worked as
the director of the Agence d’Orient, a news wire service based in Pera.
He later converted to Islam and took the name Sadık Paşa. He also
renamed his two sons, Adam and Ladislas, Enver and Muzaffer, though
they and their mother remained Roman Catholics. Czaykowski’s life
project became the effort to secure Ottoman backing for Polish military
action against Russia in the Caucasus. From 1844 to 1848 he constantly
sought the Porte’s backing for a military force made up of Polish refugees
and Polish deserters from the Russian ranks. The Porte’s response was
lukewarm, although he did get some backing; even during the height of
the tension in 1849 the Porte repeatedly postponed his plans. The
Crimean War seemed to provide a golden opportunity for Sadık Paşa’s
plans. He was made commander of the so-called Sultan’s Cossack
Regiment, which was first intended to fight in the European theatre but

70
Jerzy S. Latka, “Polonya, Mültecileri ve Yeni Fikirler” (Polish refugees and new ideas),
Tarih ve Toplum 10 (July 1991), 23 37.
71
Ibid.
72
Mustafa Celaleddin Paşa, Les Turcs Anciens et Modernes (Istanbul, 1869). The basic
premise of the text was the theory of “Turco Aryanism”, which claimed that the Turks
were an Aryan race and hence that the European prejudice against them was ill
founded.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 175

was later assigned to the Caucasus front. The Sultan’s Cossacks were
never deployed.73
In 1914, just on the eve of the war that would end the Ottoman Empire,
the Young Turk government appointed a new ambassador to Washington.
Before he left to take up his post, the new ambassador paid a courtesy call
on his counterpart, Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador in
Istanbul. He was introduced as Alfred Budanski, “a Christian Ottoman
of Polish origin”. Just before he left, Budanski paid another call on
Morgenthau and surprised him by saying, “My name is no longer Alfred
Budanski. Yesterday I became a Muslim and my name is now Ahmed
Rüstem Paşa”.74 There are some interesting discrepancies in the informa-
tion given by Heath Lowry in the article just cited. Far from having
converted “yesterday”, Alfred was the son of Bilinski (first name
unknown), a Polish refugee who had sought refuge in the Ottoman
Empire in 1854, converted to Islam, and taken the name Sadeddin Nihat
Paşa. Sometime in the early 1880s Alfred Bilinski converted to Islam and
took the name Ahmed Rüstem. Having entered the Ottoman diplomatic
service, he served in various posts, the last one being as ambassador to
Washington in 1914. He clashed with the American press over the treat-
ment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, publishing articles claim-
ing that the treatment meted out to the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire
was far better than the treatment of the American blacks or the Philipinos.
He wrote a very strongly worded letter to President Woodrow Wilson, for
which he was asked to apologize. Ahmed Rüstem Bey refused and, resign-
ing his post, returned to Istanbul; from there he crossed over to Anatolia to
join the nationalists around Mustafa Kemal.75
After the war, on 22 September 1919, at Sivas in central Anatolia,
Mustafa Kemal received the American delegation led by General
C. Harbord. In the entourage that welcomed the American delegation
was the ex-ambassador, now calling again himself “Alfred Rüstem
Bey”.76 Alfred Rüstem’s career, therefore, was to span both the Ottoman
and Republican periods.

73
Stefaniya Skochen, “Polonya Kuzey Kafkasya I_ lişkileri” (Polish relations with the
Caucasus), Tarih ve Toplum 29 (June 1998), 55 7.
74
Heath Lowry, “The Ottoman Renaissance: The Conqueror’s Dream”, Cornucopia 34
(2004), 28 9.
75
Şenol Kantarcı, Ahmed Rüstem Bey (Istanbul, 2009).
76
Mehmed Ali Kışlalı, “Atatürk, Ermenistan, ABD” (Ataturk. Armenia and the USA),
Radikal, 18 March 2005.
176 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

opportunists and “humble pie” conversions

Below the social standing of the illustrious career converts, one finds
hundreds of cases of men and women of more modest backgrounds for
whom conversion to Islam and taking refuge in the Ottoman Empire was
almost a cheaper alternative to immigration to America. Some were
unscrupulous adventurers and others simply losers. These people were
very carefully watched by the Ottoman authorities, and one gets the feeling
that they were not all that welcome.
“It is undesirable that such people of unknown reputation and identity
accumulate in Istanbul”; so wrote the minister of police, Saffet Paşa, on 1
June 1902 regarding a certain “Abdelhak”. Abdelhak was “a Pole who
had been a French subject” and who had converted to Islam in the
Ottoman North African province of Tripoli (Trablusgarp). The minister
made it clear that “the normal practice in such cases is that such people are
not sent to Istanbul but to other vilayets”. In keeping with this practice,
Abdelhak had been sent to Konya, where he had been kept under surveil-
lance. It was ordered that he be found some employment; he had accord-
ingly been employed as a policeman. Now he declared that he was
unhappy; “as he did not speak Turkish he now wanted to leave this
place”. It was also suspected that he might “take refuge in the Russian
Consulate” as this consulate protected French subjects in Konya. The
minister made it very clear that “because of the great number of people
of this ilk for whom it is very difficult to find money . . . It is extremely
undesirable for them to be set free in Istanbul without making sure of the
sincerity of their conversions and ascertaining that they are of good
repute”.77 A week later, some further details surfaced about Abdelhak.
The Ministry of Interior wrote that he had been in the French navy when he
converted in North Africa and had been sent to Istanbul by the Ottoman
authorities; from there he had been sent to Konya, where he had been
enrolled as a policeman. It is also interesting that the Ministry of Interior
stated that “by converting he does not lose his original citizenship”.
Clearly Abdelhak was in a very different category compared to the more
illustrious converts mentioned earlier, who had been granted Ottoman
citizenship.78

77
BOA DH.MKT 523/32, 23 Safer 1320 / 1 June 1902, the Ministry of Police no. 298, the
minister, Saffet Paşa, to the Ministry of the Interior.
78
Ibid., 26 Mayis 1318 / 8 June 1902, the Ministry of the Interior Secretariat to the Ministry
of Police (tebdil i mezheb etmekle tabiyet i aslisini zayi etmiyeceg i).
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 177

It appears that the police force was a sort of dumping ground for
converts of uncertain provenance and doubtful loyalty. This is not surpris-
ing as it was the least prestigious of the services. One such case is that of
“the Bulgarian brigand (komitacı) Ustoyanov (Stoyanof)”, who surren-
dered to the authorities in Salonica. Here we have a perfect case of a
poacher turned game keeper, as Stoyanof moves up through the ranks of
the Ottoman police force, ending up as Mehmed Sadık Efendi, a chief
constable (Serkomiser) in the police force of Istanbul.79 On 27 January
1906 he appears in the official record as “Mehmed Sadık Efendi who had
been a Bulgarian brigand but has surrendered and converted”. He had also
sent two letters to Ottoman military commanders in the area informing on
his former comrades. The attitude of the authorities was initially sceptical,
but it seems that Mehmet Sadık soon convinced them of his loyalty. On 12
June the Vali of Salonica wrote that Mehmet Sadık, “from whose loyal
service we have benefited”, had been summoned by imperial order to
Istanbul, where he had been given seven gold liras and sent back. He had
now “completely spent this money and was destitute”. The Vali also
pointed out that “because of the danger in these parts from the Bulgarian
committees it is unsafe to keep him here”; he duly recommended that
Mehmed Sadık be sent elsewhere with a suitable salary.80
A few months later Mehmet Sadık was seriously wounded while fight-
ing his erstwhile comrades, but was said to have “distinguished himself
and was instrumental in the capture of a band (çete) of some thirty
brigands together with their leaders”. He had also proven himself in the
“cutting down and questioning of Bulgarian brigands as well as the
capture of rifles and bombs”. Not surprisingly, “the perfidious elements”
in the area were “looking for an opportunity to kill him”.81 Some three
months later Mehmet Sadık’s star seemed to be on the rise. The Ministry of

79
BOA ZB (Zaptiye Nezareti) 451/59, 14 Kanun u Sani 1322 / 27 January 1906, the minister
of police to the Vilayet of Selanik. A komitacı (komitadji in Bulgarian) is a brigand or a
freedom fighter depending on which side of the political spectrum you are on. The word is
of Slavic origin.
80
BOA Y.MTV 299/1, 30 Mayis 1323 / 12 June 1907, the Vali of Selanik, Mehmed Rauf
Paşa, to the Imperial Palace Secretariat. It must be born in mind that these were the years
when the struggle between the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)
and the Ottoman forces was at its peak. It is unclear which particular group of “Bulgarian
brigands” Stoyanof had belonged to. On the “Macedonian Question”, see Mark
Mazower, The Balkans, pp. 4, 93, 94.
81
BOA. Y.MTV 301/113, 16 Agustos 1323 / 29 August 1907, the General Military
Inspection Committee (Umum Teftiş i Askeri Komisyonu). Çete is derived from the
Bulgarian cheta, meaning “armed band”.
178 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Police ordered that he be sent to Istanbul from Salonica, where he had

“given loyal service”. An imperial irade had been issued appointing him
chief constable (Serkomiser) with a salary of 1,000 kuruş.82
These somewhat suspect conversions occur throughout the period of
this study. On 24 March 1852 the Vilayet of Erzurum reported that a
French doctor by the name of Monsieur Merlot had converted and taken
the name of Murad Efendi, and had been a “guest in the house of the Vali”
pending an investigation into his circumstances. The Vali pointed out that
“as he is destitute he wishes to set up a medical practice”. Upon inves-
tigation the Porte wrote to the Vali to the effect that Merlot/Murad had
“outstanding gambling debts of seven thousand five hundred kuruş”
owing to a French citizen and that the French embassy was interceding in
favour of his creditor. It was therefore determined that Merlot/Murad
could indeed practice medicine in Erzurum but that “his accumulated
salaries are to be added up”; after the said sum was deducted and handed
over to the French consul in Erzurum, he could keep the balance.83
Evidently M. Merlot had tried to convert to escape his gambling debts,
but his stratagem failed.
Negotiation seems to have been the key word in another case of career
conversion, that of Halil Said Shihab, the Maronite müdir of the district of
Dayr al Qamar in the Shuf mountains of Lebanon. Halil Said appeared in
Istanbul on the eighth of November 1898, stating that he had converted to
Islam and that he wanted a government post.84 A descendent of an illus-
trious figure of the Maronite Shihabs, Amir Bashir Shihab, Halil declared
that he had moved to Istanbul with all of his family. He also declared that
as he had been receiving a salary of 1,900 kuruş as müdir, he now desired a
salary of “at least four thousand kuruş in order to keep up a comparable
lifestyle” in Istanbul. He also stated in his petition that he wanted a
position in the Council of State (Şurayı Devlet) or Board of Taxation
(Cemiyet-i Rüsumiye). He was duly given an audience with the minister

82
BOA ZB 610/ 9, 19 Eylül 1323 / 2 October 1907, the Ministry of Police to the Vilayet of
Selanik; Irade Hususi 89, Yıldız Palace Imperial Secretariat no. 3678, 28 Receb 1325 / 6
September 1907, signed by the imperial private secretary, Tahsin Paşa. Imperial Order
decreeing that Mehmet Sadık Efendi be employed in Istanbul as chief constable
(Serkomiser).
83
BOA HR.MKT.54/86, 2 Cemaziyelevvel 1268 / 24 March 1852, the Vilayet of Erzurum to
the Sublime Porte; 6 Rebiyulahir 1269 / 17 January 1853, the Sublime Porte to the Vilayet
of Erzurum.
84
BOA I_ .RSM (I_ rade Rüsumat) 9.1316 N 6, 26 Teşrin i Sani 1314 / 8 November 1898,
petition presented by Mir Halil Sa’id Shihab to the Office of the Grand Vizier. My thanks
to Malek Sharif for this reference.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 179

of interior and awarded a salary of 3,000 kuruş, and an irade was issued
for his “appointment to a position in keeping with his condition”.85
It remains unclear what the Ottoman state had to gain from the
conversion of Halil Said Shihab, except perhaps the prestige of the
scion of such an illustrious family becoming a Muslim. On the other
hand, it is equally unclear what Halil Said had to gain by this act, except
perhaps a comfortable sinecure in Istanbul with a good (negotiated)
salary.86
Another case emanating from Lebanon was that of Muhlis Es’ad.
Originally a Maronite Christian, he had converted to Islam some years
previously while he had been director of the post and telegraph office in the
kaza of Shuf. Muhlis Es’ad presented a petition stating that after his
conversion he had travelled widely in the Christian villages and “encour-
aged many people to come to Islam”. He claimed that he had done this at
great personal expense. The self-designated missionary strongly implied
that he would like an “imperial favour, an invitation to Istanbul and
possibly a decoration” for his trouble.87
Conversion to Islam was often seen as providing opportunities for
people who were marginal eccentrics in their own country. One such
person was Muhammed Muhtar Bey, appearing in the despatches as
“the [converted] twenty-seven-year-old son of Monsieur Vatin, retired
General from the Belgian army”. Muhammed Muhtar had become the
chief reporter of the Belgian newspaper Opinion, in which he had taken to
publishing long articles extolling the virtues of Islam and supporting the
Ottoman Empire. He had been forwarding these to his friend in Istanbul,

85
Ibid., the minister of the interior, Memduh Paşa, to the Grand Vizier’s Office, 2 Şaban
1316 / 16 December 1898; memorandum of Grand Vizier Rıfat Paşa, 25 Şaban 1316;
announcement of irade by Sultan’s private secretary, Tahsin Paşa, 1 Ramazan 1316. It
seems that fluid religious allegiances were well precedented in the Shihab clan. See Engin
Akarlı, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861 1920 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993),
pp. 13 16, 21: “For over a hundred years after [the battle of] Ain Dara [1711] the Shihabs
remained the paramount clan of the old ‘Druze Mountain’ without a serious internal or
external challenge”. Originally Sunni Muslims, a branch of the Shihab family converted to
Maronite Christianity. Amir Bashir Shihab became Amir of Lebanon in 1788. “The amir,
who practiced Sunni Islam in public and Christianity in private, allowed a Maronite priest
to take charge of his spiritual life.” On the other hand, Kamal Salibi unequivocally states,
“Bashir was born a Maronite and died a Maronite. . . . But he made no show of the
Christian faith he formally professed.” See Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions:
The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London, 1988), p. 109.
86
It should be remembered that the sums in question here are considerable amounts. See
Chapter 3, n. 116, in this volume.
87
BOA Y.PRK. UM 29/26, 17 Kanun u Sani 1309 / 30 January 1893, the Vilayet of Beirut to
the Imperial ADC, Derviş Paşa,
180 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Abdullah Hasib Bey, the inspector of foreign schools.88 Hasib Bey treated
the letters with caution, saying that he had merely kept up a casual
correspondence with Muhammed Muhtar, yet he admired the fact that
“he was sincerely attached to the Sublime State and the August Personage
of the Caliph of Islam”. He said his correspondent was to be commended
for single-handedly defending Islam in a Christian country and publishing
articles favourable to the Ottoman state. Hasib Bey also enclosed a trans-
lated summary and commentary by the editor of Opinion of the article by
Muhammed Muhtar. In the article Muhammed Muhtar stated, in sum,
that Islam was to be the salvation of black Africa and it should be encour-
aged to spread in the Belgian Congo. The “black population” of the Congo
should be “not politically but spiritually united with the Ottoman
Caliphate”. Indeed, Islam had been much more successful in sub-
Saharan Africa because “Islam is a very simple religion suitable for the
simple minds and intelligence of the blacks”. Islam should more aggres-
sively oppose the activities of Christian missionaries. Indeed, Islam had
been so successful in Africa that “We now see composition and debating
competitions among the Touareg and geometry being taught in the
Sudan”. All this was due to the work of Islamic missionaries, and the
Ottoman state should be even more involved in spreading Islam in
Africa. Claims such as these, stretching the limits of credibility (composi-
tion competitions among the Tuareg?), were not uncommon among con-
verts of dubious provenance. No doubt Muhammed Muhtar was
expecting some form of royal favour, either some money or a decoration.89
Another, and rather sad, marginal case was that of Ahmed Hamdi
Efendi, the son of the Russian General Nikolayef Dorovich Ivanof, who
had converted to Islam in 1892. After his conversion he had been studying
in Istanbul, but had been sent back to St. Petersburg at the insistence of his
father. He had then run away and come back to Istanbul, and was then sent
to Konya, where, “after completing his necessary term of service”, he had
been appointed to Izmir to serve in the police. After someone informed on
him for some alleged illegal activity, he was sent back to Konya, from
whence he had come back to Istanbul. He had presented a petition stating
that “[because] he was destitute and did not want to be handed back to his
father whom he hated, and because he spoke six languages, he was asking

88
BOA Y.PRK .MF 2/10, 14 Kanun u Evvel 1306 / 27 December 1890, letter to an unknown
recipient from Abdullah Hasib, the inspector of foreign schools.
89
Ibid. Enclosed translation of an article in l’Opinion.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 181

to be appointed to a position of police commissar third class”. His request

was refused.90
These marginal cases were always considered suspect and kept under
police surveillance. Such was the case of a certain Mehmed Said, who had
been a French doctor by the name of Petri Gaston Diyumi. After convert-
ing, Mehmed Said had gone to Egypt, where he had become involved in the
clandestine activities of the Hizb-u Watani (Nationalist Party) and had
been exiled by the British. He had married and settled in Nablus in
Ottoman Palestine. The authorities reported that there was nothing suspi-
cious about his behaviour.91
Another such case was a German who had become Mehmed Sadık
Efendi, a cavalry officer who had been assigned to the Sixth Army in Iraq
“because of his suspicious behaviour”. He now wanted to resign from his
post. Permission was granted, but it was specified that “he be kept under
surveillance everywhere he goes”.92

conversion and citizenship

As the Ottoman state found itself surrounded by former subject peoples
who now had states of their own, the “nationality” of Greek, Bulgarian,
and Serbian ex-subjects became a problem. As seen in the case of the
Hungarian and Polish refugees around mid-century, the rule had been
applied in such a way that if a person converted to Islam in Ottoman
territory, he or she was automatically considered an Ottoman subject. Yet
this was to have unwanted consequences as time went by. As the century
drew to a close and the twentieth century began, Ottoman lands became a
refuge for various shades of suspicious characters. This made the Ottoman
authorities suspicious of “converts” who might be converting with ulterior
motives, such as espionage or commercial penetration. Also, these converts
were often escaping from the consequences of a crime such as murder,
embezzlement, theft, or desertion from military service. As a result, a

90
BOA ZB, 334/9, 18 Mayis 1325 / 31 May 1909, the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry
of Police, no. 328.
91
BOA DH.MKT 1373/97, 22 Muharrem 1304 / 11 October 1886, memorandum of the
Ministry of the Interior. The name of the person is difficult to decipher as the Ottoman
scribes wrote down the foreign names as they heard them, and it may well be an incorrect
spelling. Unless the name is very obvious, like Yani or Maria, the spelling in the Ottoman
document has been used.
92
BOA Y.MTV 60/78, 11 Mart 1308 / 24 March 1894, the Office of the Chief of Staff,
Serasker Rıza Paşa.
182 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

number of restraints and interdicts were brought into play. The Ottoman
Citizenship Law of 1869 (Osmanlı Tabiyet Kanunamesi), which had a
direct bearing on the issues of conversion and apostasy, was an interesting
document. It was very inclusive on the matter of who might be of benefit to
the state, but equally exclusive when it came to the question of whom the
state would be obliged to protect and provide for. Partly based on the
Napoleonic Code Civile, it has been hailed as “[the advent of] secular
principles because the primary differentiating criterion in a person’s cit-
izenship status was no longer whether they were Muslim or Christian but
whether or not they were Ottoman.”93 The law instituted the category of
“foreigner” (ecnebi), which included all foreign nationals regardless of
religion; it also formalized the concept of “Ottoman”.94
Another important consideration was to be the status of Muslims who
were not subjects of the Ottoman Empire. As more and more Muslims
came under the rule of Christian empires, by the end of the century there
were far more Muslims who were subjects of the British Raj or under
Dutch, French, or Russian rule. These were to be subsumed under the title
of “foreign Muslims” (ecnebi müslüman). This measure was actually
deemed necessary because it was feared that the Muslim subjects of foreign
powers could act as potential fifth columns and infiltrate the holy land of
Hicaz. 95
Yet religion continued to be a factor in affairs of citizenship. In many of
the cases appearing in the archival record relating to previously subject
peoples, we see this yoking together of religion and citizenship. One such
case was reported from the Vilayet of Kosovo on 14 January 1894. It
involved a certain Milan Rakovic, who had fled from Serbia, where he
was wanted for theft and murder. Rakovic had been arrested by the
Ottoman military authorities and was now being kept in Senice.
The Serbian embassy had demanded that he be handed back. Claiming
that he was sure to hang if handed back, Radovic had converted and

93
Gülnihal Bozkurt, Batı Hukuku’nun Tűrkiye’de benimsenmesi (The adoption of Western
law in Turkey) (Ankara, 1989), p. 23.
94
Düstûr 1 Tertip 1 1289 (1872), 16 18. The parts of the law that are particularly germaine
to our topic here are article 3, which allowed a “foreigner” (ecnebi) to apply for Ottoman
citizenship after five years’ residence in the Ottoman Empire; article 4, which states that the
Ottoman state can waive this condition for those foreigners whom it considers “excep
tional cases” and to whom it sees fit to grant Ottoman citizenship; and article 9: “Any
person living in Ottoman domains is considered an Ottoman subject and is treated as an
Ottoman subject. If he is of foreign nationality he must prove his nationality according to
accepted procedures”.
95
Deringil, The Well Protected Domains, Chapter 2.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 183

taken the name Mehmed.96 When the Serbian embassy insisted on his
return, they were told that in the year 1891 a certain Ali Bin Ibrahim from
Drama had deserted from the Ottoman army and had crossed over to the
Serbian side. When the Ottoman authorities asked for his return, they had
been told that he had become a Christian and therefore could not be handed
back. As this created a precedent, Milan/Mehmed would not be returned.
One year later the matter was still not resolved as the Serbian embassy was
claiming that the treaty stipulations applied only to ordinary criminals and
not to political crimes. As Racovic was a deserter, this was a political crime.
They did not recall any case involving an Ali bin Ibrahim.97 It is important to
note here that the extradition treaty with Serbia must have included a clause
whereby if the escapees converted to Christianity or Islam, respectively, they
could not be extradited. It will be recalled that it was such treaty clauses that
had saved the Hungarian asylum seekers in 1849.
The Ottoman Council of Ministers debated a similar case on 13 June
1901. A Russian soldier named Comzu from the Sixth Cossack Regiment at
Oltu, being pursued for theft, had crossed the border, taken refuge in the
Vilayet of Erzurum, and converted to Islam. The Russian authorities were
now negotiating his return in exchange for an Ottoman soldier by the name
of Ömer, who had deserted and was being held by the Russians at Oltu. The
ministers agreed that the treaty stipulations were very clear regarding the
exemption from extradition of those who had converted to the religion of
the other side. However, there was no indication that Ömer had converted
to Christianity. The ministers duly concluded that Ömer could be extradited
from Russia. Comzu, by contrast, even if his conversion was due to fear, had
converted and was thereby exempt from extradition.98
The Sixth Cossacks seemed to take quite an interest in Islam. On 6 June
1903 it was reported that three of its members had crossed over to the
Ottoman side and declared that they had converted. The Ottoman Foreign
Ministry had instructed its ambassador in St. Petersburg to inform the
Russian government about the event. The minister did specify, however,
that these neo-Muslim Cossacks were not to be trusted “as they may have

96
BOA DH.MKT 71/14, 1 Kanun u Sani 1310 / 14 January 1894, the Vali of Kosovo, Haci
Mehmed Hafız, to the Ministry of the Interior, Secretariat of the Vilayet of Kosovo, no. 373.
97
Ibid., 8 Safer 1313 / 31 July 1895, the foreign minister, Tevfik Paşa, to the Ministry of the
Interior.
98
BOA MV 102/52, 25 Safer 1319 / 13 June 1901, the minutes of the meeting of the Council
of Ministers. Oltu, today a sub district of Erzurum, had been in the Russian occupied part
of Anatolia since the war of 1877 78. See Map 2.
184 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

converted in order to act as spies”, and he advised that they be stationed in

localities far from the border.99
The Russo-Ottoman border seems to have been quite an active place at
the turn of the century as regards matters of conversion and apostasy. On
26 May 1907 the Ministry of Police reported that “Ahmed Tevfik Efendi
and Hasan Raşid Efendi, originally Russian subjects who recently came to
Istanbul and were honoured with the glory of Islam”, had been detained by
the Russian consulate in Istanbul. The two young men, who had been
registered as students in Istanbul after their conversion, had been given
Ottoman passports and had gone to the consulate to procure visas to visit
their homes in their native town of Kazan. The consul had refused to
recognize their conversion, confiscated their passports, and jailed them in
the consulate prison. After the protests of the Porte, they were released.100
On 21 June 1894 the Vilayet of Yanya reported that a certain Yani, son
of Andon Kasilupanoplu, and his wife had arrived there “as refugees
wanting asylum and to convert to Islam”. The Greek consul in Yanya
and his dragoman together with two armed kavass (consulate orderlies)
had forced their way into the inn where the couple were staying and
“attempted to drag his wife off to the Consulate”. The police had inter-
vened, and the Vali had been notified. When the Greek consul was con-
fronted about the matter he claimed that the persons in question were
parading under false identity and were wanted in Athens for stealing
44,000 franks. Both the couple and their rooms were searched, and noth-
ing was found.101 The couple may well have wanted to convert in order to
escape pursuit.
The Ministry of Police records at the beginning of the twentieth century
abound with cases of suspect conversions. On 5 March 1905 it was
reported that a certain Andon Diragic had deserted from the Hungarian
army and converted to Islam, offering his services to the Ottoman army.
He had been assigned to the police in the Vilayet of Ankara.102

99
BOA A.MKT.MHM 732/7, 24 Mayis 1319 / 6 June 1903, the minister of foreign affairs,
Tevfik Paşa, to the Sublime Porte.
100
BOA DH.MKT 1170/84, 13 Rebiyulahir 1325 / 26 May 1907, the minister of police to
the Ministry of the Interior.
101
BOA DH.MKT 257/29, 17 Zilhicce 1311 / 21 June 1894, the Vilayet of Yanya Secretariat
No. 79 to the Ministry of the Interior, signed by Vali El Hac Zeki.
102
BOA ZB 338/61, 20 Subat 1321 / 5 March 1905, the Ministry of Police to the Foreign
Ministry. Some six months later it was reported that he had been moved to Edirne under
police escort. ZB 379/84, 16 Kanun u Evvel 1321 / 29 December 1905.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 185

Hungary continued to provide more than its fair share of converts. On

15 March 1906 the Ministry of Police reported that a student “who had
arrived last year to study in Istanbul” had converted and taken the name
Fuad Eminüddin. It was stipulated that he be “secretly kept under surveil-
lance”.103 Eminüddin was actually Jorj Misaros Leon, a member of the
Association Asiatique of Budapest, who had arrived with a letter of rec-
ommendation from Arminius Vambery himself and had converted to Islam
on 3 December 1905. The Ottoman embassy in Vienna was asked to
investigate his background.104
The Ottoman police were certainly kept busy with the surveillance of
suspect converts.105 Such was the case of a Russian, Manuel Nayilev,
who arrived in Taşluca in Ottoman Kossovo having crossed over from
Bosnia at the end of 1909. Nayilev claimed that he had converted to Islam
in Bulgaria some two years previously, and that he now wanted his
conversion to be recognized officially and to become an Ottoman citizen.
The authorities in Kossovo had passed him on to the governor of
Salonica, where he was being detained for questioning. Nayilev appears
to be something of a mystery man, as it was rumoured that he had a shady
past and was suspected of having previously committed a crime in
Salonica. The governor therefore postponed the conversion procedure
pending an extensive investigation, and Nayilev was sent to Istanbul
under escort.106 Upon being questioned, Nayilev said that he was forty-
four years old, had been employed in his native town of Virhofka as a
shop assistant, and had for some ten years “ been thinking of converting
to Islam”. He had travelled from Russia to Port Said; he had acquired a
passport from the Russian consulate there and had turned up in Taşluca
via Bosnia. All he wanted was to become a Muslim and an Ottoman
citizen. When the investigations in Salonica and Scutari did not turn up
evidence of any criminal past, Nayilev was duly released from custody,

103
BOA ZB 379/6, 2 Mart 1322 / 15 March 1906, the Ministry of Police, memorandum. A
few months later the police reported that Eminuddin had been joined by another
Hungarian student, Zoltan Mandos. The “watchers” had reported that the two seemed
exclusively interested in their studies. ZB 379/67, 6 Agustoe 1322 / 29 August 1906.
104
BOA ZB 338/72, 2 Mart 1322 / 15 March 1906, the Ministry of Police to the Foreign
Ministry.
105
In the archival funds of the Ministry of Police, BOA Zaptiye (ZB), and the Ministry of
Interior General Security, BOA Dahiliye Emniyet i Umumiye (DH.EUM), there are
literally hundreds of cases very like the samples cited here.
106
BOA DH.EUM. THR. 25/4, 19 Kanun u Evvel 1325 / 31 December 1909, the governor
of Selanik to the Istanbul Directorate of Police.
186 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

and his request for formal conversion was referred to the Ministry of
Justice and Religious Sects.107
People who converted for no ostensible reason became the object of
extreme scrutiny and suspicion. It was sometimes even required that they
prove that they were not insane. Such was the case of the Greek subject
Kaliyaris, who turns up in the police record in 1910. Kaliyaris was sent to
the official hospital (bimarhane) “where he was watched day and night” by
“experts on mental disorder to see if he displayed any physical or mental
signs of mental illness”.108
Another such person who converted for no apparent reason was a
German by the name of Josef Ishmael, who claimed to have converted
and to have taken the name Yusuf Reşid. Yusuf now requested that he be
“exceptionally” (istisnaen) granted Ottoman citizenship. The police inves-
tigation report noted that “no undesirable behaviour [on his part] had so
far been noticed”, but it did not omit to point out that although Yusuf’s
conversion had been duly registered at the Ministry of Justice, he contin-
ued to use his German name professionally. The police also reported that
he had recently moved to another neighbourhood and gave his precise
address.109

citizenship defined and delineated

As the nineteenth century ended, the Porte began to consider the relation-
ship of citizenship and religion on a comparative basis and sought to find
out what the practice was in other states. On 3 March 1888, the Ottoman
ambassador in Rome, Photiades Paşa, was asked to enquire whether
Italian subjects lost their citizenship if they converted to Islam. Photiades
replied that they did not.110
As the flotsam and jetsam of a Europe in turmoil continued to turn up in
increasing numbers over the last years of the nineteenth and the first decade
of the twentieth century, the Ottoman authorities decided to curtail access

107
Ibid., 6 Kanun u Sani 1325 / 19 January 1910, deposition of the Directorate of Police,
signed “Manuel”, enclosing the final report from the Directorate of Police to the Ministry
of Justice and Religious Sects.
108
BOA DH.EUM.THR 38/53, 14 June 1326 / 27 June 1910, the Ministry of Police to the
Ministry of the Interior.
109
BOA DH.ID 61 1/63, 17 Kanun u Sani 1330 / 30 January 1914, Istanbul General
Directorate of Police, no. 12394, to the Ministry of the Interior.
110
BOA HR/MTV 568/36, 3 March 1888, the foreign minister, Said Paşa, to the Ottoman
ambassador to Italy, Photiadis Paşa. My thanks to Sinan Kuneralp for this reference.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 187

to Ottoman citizenship. On 19 March 1912 the Council of State (Şurayı

Devlet) prepared a memorandum dealing with the issue of citizenship. It
had been determined that in order to apply for Ottoman citizenship,
foreign subjects did not have to apply for permission from their own
country. The Council of State referred to a regulation it had promulgated
on 18 January 1894 to the effect that even those foreigners not fulfilling the
requirements of the Citizenship Law could become Muslims and apply to
the Ministry of Interior in Istanbul or to the local authorities in the
provinces, whereupon they would be issued Ottoman identification papers
certifying that they were Muslims, but they would not be considered full
Ottoman citizens. Now the Ottoman government had gone one step
further and explicitly declared that conversion to Islam did not automati-
cally entitle the convert to Ottoman citizenship. It had been decided that
each case should be considered on its merits and decided upon according to
the Nationality Law. The reason for this decision was very clearly stated:

‘It has come to our attention that some foreigners who have committed crimes in
foreign countries seek asylum in Ottoman domains in order to escape punishment
and convert to Islam in order to acquire Ottoman citizenship. They then claim
Ottoman protection and this causes complications and difficulties for the Sublime
State. Therefore it has been decided that from now on conversion will not be a
sufficient condition for the granting of Ottoman nationality (ihtidanın tebdil i
tabiyete sebeb i münferid ad olunmaması).’111

One year later this was confirmed by an imperial decree.112

One of the key issues that come up very often in matters of citizenship is
the issue of the property of those who give up or lose their Ottoman
citizenship. A memorandum of the Council of State dated 28 December
1881 presented a detailed discussion concerning two types of cases: those
who gave up their Ottoman citizenship voluntarily and with the approval
of the state, and those who gave up their citizenship without official
approval. The second version proved to be a particularly thorny issue.
The Council of State brought together experts from the Legal Advisors
Bureau of the Sublime Porte and religious authorities (ulema), experts on
Islamic property law.113 The gist of the discussion is extremely interesting
as it reflects a clash between normative/positivist, nationalist legal

111
BOA DH.HMŞ 13/48, 10 Rebiyülahir 1331 / 19 March 1912, the Sublime Porte Legal
Advisors’ Bureau, the memorandum of the Council of State (Şurayi Devlet i Tanzimat).
112
Irade Dahiliye (DH.ID) 116/60, 17 Mart 1329 / 26 March 1913, draft circular from the
Ministry of the Interior.
113
BOA Y.A RES 19/24, 25 Muharrem 1299 / 28 December 1881, memorandum of the
Council of State.
188 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

standards and Şeriat rulings. According to the Ottoman Citizenship Law

regarding those who had left Ottoman citizenship without official appro-
val, their act was not recognized, and they continued to be considered
Ottoman citizens. However, if the state chose to do so, it could annul their
citizenship and forbid their entry into Ottoman domains. Moreover, their
property could not be made over to their children or parents whether they
were foreign citizens or Ottoman citizens; it would be considered deserted
property (mahlul) , in effect being confiscated. It was here that an interest-
ing divergence occurred between the secular and religious experts.
According to the latter, as the person whose citizenship was annulled
was considered dead (fevt eylemiş), income from the property they
owned (akaratı memluke), according to the Şeriat, was liable to inheritance
by their heirs, who were Ottoman subjects. One of the highest ranking
ulema, holding the rank of Sadır-ı Rumeli, Seyf el Din Efendi, was invited
to give his views. The worthy alim declared that although the confiscation
of any state land (arazi-i amiriye) held by one who had lost citizenship was
admissible, income from private property was inheritable, and according
to the Şeriat could not be confiscated.114 In the subsequent discussion the
secular wing of the council carried the day, openly declaring that the
measure was intended as “some sort of punishment for those who changed
citizenship [without leave]” and that the measure was designed to “prevent
the changing of citizenship”; thus the property of those who left Ottoman
citizenship without leave “was to come under political confiscation even if
there were heirs”.115
Some nine years later the same issues were still being debated in the
highest reaches of the Ottoman establishment. A minute from the Ottoman
Cabinet dated 4 June 1890 recorded that among the issues discussed were
the following: “What happens to the property of a woman who is an
Ottoman citizen but marries a foreigner? Is the property of someone who
has left Ottoman citizenship with official leave inheritable by his heirs? Is the
property of one who dies as an Ottoman citizen inheritable by heirs who are
foreigners?” All of these matters were referred to the Council of State.116
It is highly likely that the issue of citizenship, its acquisition, and its loss
were closely linked to the changes in the international political conjuncture.
Particularly after the outbreak of the Armenian crisis of the mid-1890s, the

114
Ibid. The Sadr ı Rumeli was the highest ranking judge after the Şeyhülislam. Kadis
holding this rank usually went on to become Şeyhülislam. My thanks to Cem Behar for
this information.
115
Ibid. “tebdil i tabiyet edenler hakkında bir nev mecazat olmak lazım geleceg i”.
116
BOA MV 10/44, 22 Mayis 1306 / 4 June 1890.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 189

matter of foreign protection of Ottoman subjects became a critical issue. On

29 January 1894 a memorandum from the Yıldız Palace clearly pointed out:
“It is not permissible for anyone to leave Ottoman citizenship without
obtaining an Imperial Irade permitting them to do so”. This was also to
be announced in the press. The memorandum openly stated, “[T]he mis-
understandings on this issue which have been particularly exploited by the
Armenians [should be cleared up]”.117
The issue of an official identity became increasingly salient as the
century neared its end. Particularly in matters of official appointments to
senior ecclesiastical positions, the requirement of Ottoman citizenship
became paramount. On 13 July 1895 the Council of Ministers discussed
the appointment of one Gerasimos (Yerasimos) Efendi as the Greek
Orthodox Patriarch for Antioch. There was some hesitation as to the
appropriateness of his appointment because “he had been born in Greece
and his father still lives in Greece”. Upon investigation, the council was
informed that though this was indeed the case, “the candidate had been
living in the diocese of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem since he was seven or
eight years old”. He had indeed risen to the rank of Metropolitan and had
also served in Istanbul as the deputy for the Jerusalem Patriarchate. It was
concluded that “even if his father is a Greek citizen, he [Gerasimos] is a
loyal Ottoman citizen and his grandfather was an Ottoman citizen, there-
fore there is no objection to his appointment as Patriarch of Antioch”.118
It is important to note that until the second half of the nineteenth
century there was no systematic registration of births, deaths, marriages,
or migration. The first nineteenth-century census was completed in 1831
and was rather haphazard and disorganized. The first Regulation for
Population Registration (Sicil-i Nüfus Nizamnamesi) was formulated in
1878. This led to the first compilation of permanent population registers,
the sicil-i nüfus , which come up very frequently in the chapters of this
book. As put by Cem Behar: “For the first time in the secular pluralist
history of the Ottoman censuses , the individual was taken as the unit of
calculation, irrespective of gender, age, profession or fortune. The mod-
ernisation of the structure of the Ottoman state, which had begun timidly

117
BOA Irade Hususi 56, 21 Receb 1311 / 29 January 1894, Yıldız Palace Imperial
Secretariat, signed by Imperial Secretary Süreyya Paşa. On the Armenian crisis, see
Chapter 5.
118
BOA MV 4/27, 30 Haziran 1301 / 13 July 1895. The same condition applies today;
according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul has
to be a Turkish citizen.
190 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

in the 1840s with the reforms of the Tanzimat were thus concretized in the
domain of statistics”.119
For the first time, these statistics included women. Moreover, another
first for the 1885 census was the institution of the “identity card” (Nüfus
Tezkeresi), which became an obligatory document for all official trans-
actions such as buying and selling and the application for an internal
passport. The application of the regulation making the identity card obli-
gatory remained sporadic until 1903, when a new, firmer regulation was
instituted. Another striking thing about the 1885 census is that it listed the
Ottoman population according to “nation” (millet) for the first time. The
categories were “Muslims (without any other ethnic specification), Greek
Orthodox, Armenian, Bulgar, Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, Latin,
Monophysite, Gypsy non-Muslims, Foreigners and ‘others’”.120
By the turn of the century it had become established that anyone apply-
ing for an official government position was required to present a valid
Ottoman identity certificate. But the requirement was one thing, the reality
on the ground quite another. On 5 July 1903 the Ministry of the Interior
was still bemoaning the fact that not only did some people who applied for
government positions still not have a valid identification certificate, some
had not even been registered in the population registers.121
Official identity was still largely determined by religion, yet it seems as
though religious identity was not as immutable as it had once been. On 28
October 1893 the Population Registration Bureau reported that a certain
Aleksi from Yanina, who had converted to Islam on 16 July 1887 and
taken the name Hüseyin, now wanted to go back to his old name and
religion and be issued identity papers in his old name. The Population
Registration Bureau added that there was also “an Armenian” (no name
was given) who was in the same position.122 Clearly, by 1893 changing
religious identity had become nearly a commonplace.
On 6 May 1894 the Ministry of the Interior noted that in the Vilayet of
Syria, “[some] Greek Orthodox are converting to Catholicism, then after a

119
Cem Behar, “Sources pour la demographie historique de l’Empire Ottoman. Les tahrirs
(dénombrements) de 1885 et 1907”, Population 1 2 (1998), 161 78. My translation.
120
Cem Behar, “Qui Compte? Recensements et statistiques demographiques dans l’Empire
ottoman, du XVIe au XXe siècle”, Histoire & Mesure 13.5 (1998), 135 46.
121
BOA ZB 18/107, 9 Rebiyulahir 1321 / 5 July 1903, the Ministry of the Interior
Secretariat, signed by the minister of the interior, Mehmed Memduh Paşa.
122
BOA Y.PRK.AZJ (Yildiz Perakende Arzuhal ve Jurnaller) 27/84, 15 Teşrin i Evvel 1309 /
28 October 1893. The Population Registration Bureau also stated that they had made no
move to fulfill the desires of the applicants.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 191

time converting to Protestantism and later converting back to

Orthodoxy.” The ministry noted that this was causing confusion in the
population registers and reminded the Vilayet that all non-Muslims who
converted had to have their identity papers checked yearly.123 It is inter-
esting that the only thing the state took issue with was the fact that this
shopping around in religions was causing confusion in the records.
The revision of the Population Registration Law was discussed at length
during the debates of the Second Parliament (1909–14). One of the key
issues was, “[W]hat should be the content of the new Ottoman identity
certificates?” Deputy Hamparsum Boyaciyan suggested that a category
entitled “nationality” (milliyet) should appear on the document because,
given the fact that religion could be changed owing to the freedom of
religion guaranteed by the constitution, “we would be building on a
more solid foundation [if we include nationality]”.124 Another debate
raged over what to do about foundling children who had been discovered
with no indication as to their ethnicity. The Muslim deputies had
demanded that such a child automatically be registered as a Muslim.
This was objected to by the Christian deputies. The deputy for Salonica,
Artas Yorgaki, asked: “What are we going to do if such a child is found in a
village where there are no Muslims? How can we call the child a Muslim?
It is most likely to be one belonging to people of the village.”125

conclusion
The story of the career conversions of the migrant souls remain full of
questions, many of which will never be answered. As to why they took
refuge in Ottoman lands, it would be simplistic to contend, as one Turkish

123
BOA DH.HMŞ 17/41, 29 Şevval 1311 / 6 May 1894, the Sublime Porte, Ministry of the
Interior. Of course it must be remembered that Syria and Lebanon were areas where
religious identity was very porous. See Makdisi, The Artillery of Heaven, p. 80.
124
Fevzi Demir, “Osmanlı Kimlig i Üzerine Osmanlı’nın Son Tartışması: Osmanlı’da
Hüviyet Cüzdanı nasıl olmalı?” (The last discussion on Ottoman identity by the
Ottomans: What should the Ottoman identity card look like?) Kebikec 10 (2000),
245 51. Hamparsum Boyaciyan had been a legendary figure of the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation during the Armenian crisis of the 1890s. Therefore, when he
mentioned “nationality” he definitely meant nationality as in “nationalism”. See
Chapter 5 in this volume.
125
Ibid. In the end, the entry on “nationality” was not included. The Population Registry
Law was passed on 27 August 1914 and, although it underwent important changes,
remained in force until the new law, No. 1587 of 5 June 1972, was passed.
192 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

author does, that “[they came] because this country was of a different
culture and had remained completely outside European currents of
thought”.126 If anything, those who came and stayed, apart from practical
considerations such as physical survival, did so because, by and large, the
parameters of the world they saw in Istanbul or elsewhere in the Ottoman
Empire were not all that different from the places they had left behind.
A constructive comparison can be made here with Linda Colley’s seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century captives who found themselves to some
degree helpless vis-à-vis their Indian, North African, or native American
captors.127 The nineteenth-century career convert was different in several
respects. First, he was usually free to move back and forth between his
old world and his adopted country, unless, like the Hungarians just dis-
cussed, there were political or other circumstances hindering his return.
Kmetty/I_ smail Paşa moved back and forth between his Ottoman and
Hungarian persona; Ladislas Czaykowski/Sadık Paşa went back to Poland
to work for Polish independence. Vambery was a veritable chameleon who
donned his character of “Reşid Efendi” whenever he came to Istanbul. It
must be recalled also that the Ottoman officials sent to Vidin to smooth over
the “crossing” actually told the prospective converts that they could go back
to their original religion if they wished once the danger was over.
Second, unlike the captives of Tipu Sultan of Mysore in the 1780s, or
the English sailors captured by the Barbary corsairs, the nineteenth-
century convert, even if he converted to Islam, was not actually forced to
convert. Third, he “crossed over” at a historical conjuncture when the
power relationship was reversed; here it was the host society and polity
that was in a position of weakness compared to the world he came from.
Yet there are also important similarities with earlier periods, the most
notable being that men of humble or middling social origins could rise to
positions of power that would have been unattainable to them in their land
of origin. Moreover, once having “gone over”, both the renegades of the
earlier periods and the nineteenth-century career converts in the Ottoman
Empire could become thoroughly acculturated in their new surroundings.
The commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army during the Crimean War
was Ömer Lütfi Paşa, a converted Croat from a modest background.
General Bem was immediately made a Ferik (army commander) upon

126
Taner Timur, “Karl Marx ve Johann Bangya, nam I diger Miralay Mehmet Bey” (Karl
Marx and Johann Bangya, otherwise known as Lieutenant Mehmet Bey), Tarih ve
Toplum, no. 35 (November 1986), 14 15.
127
Linda Colley, “Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaboration and Empire”, Past
and Present, no. 168 (August 2000), 170 93.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 193

converting. All his companions who came with him received ranks that
were either comparable or superior to the ranks they had held as
Christians. At a more humble level, the ex-brigand Stoyanof/Sadık
received a very respectable salary and held a good rank as chief inspector
of police (Ser Komiser). There was little difference for a Hungarian or a
Polish professional soldier between, say, taking up service for the Ottoman
sultan or for the Union army during the American Civil War.128 In the case
of a Pole, service in the Ottoman ranks had the added attraction of
furnishing the opportunity to strike a blow against the hated enemy,
Russia.
For the Ottoman Empire, this “providential hail of qualified cadres”
could only have been welcome. Yet we have seen that there was a definite
hierarchy of conversions, lower-class converts being much less welcome.
We have seen that many of the refugees became attached to their new
homeland, but they seem also to have remained a distinct cast whose
stigma of “foreigner” or “infidel” never really vanished. The refugee,
even if he was a convert, even if he rose to the rank of Paşa, would always
be “gavur (infidel) so and so Paşa” in private conversation. Ömer Paşa was
referred to in the Arabic literature as al-nimsawi, or the Austrian, when he
fought against the Druze in Mount Lebanon in 1843.129 So can we speak
of a class of nineteenth-century devşirme, a sort of latter-day Janissary?
What was the difference between an Ottoman high official who had been
taken into the Ottoman elite through the child levy during the earlier
period and the migrant soul of the nineteenth century? It is quite clear
that the way in which the Ottoman elite viewed non-Muslim origins had
greatly changed by the nineteenth century. One of the most illustrious
figures of the Tanzimat era, I_ brahim Edhem Paşa, who actually rose to
the rank of Grand Vizier, made a rather lame effort to hide his origins as a
converted Greek slave, and his son, Halil Edhem Paşa, put about the fake
story that his father had Circassian Muslim origins. Why did he feel
obliged to do so? According to Edhem Eldem: “It is possible that the fact
that Edhem Paşa was an exceptional case, an anomaly in an age where

128
Of the 4,000 or so Hungarians in the United States in 1860, “About 800 of them served in
the Union Army of whom 80 to 100 were officers”. See Eugen Pivany, “Hungarian
American Historical Connections”, a treatise read (in part) on the occasion of assuming
his seat as the foreign member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.
Translated from the Hungarian, 4 October 1926, published in 1927, pp. 57, 58. My
thanks to Zolt Banheggy for this reference. See also Vasvary, Lincoln’s Hungarian
Heroes.
129
Personal communication from Ussama Makdisi.
194 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

modernity, modern identity and citizenship [had become the norm] made
him an anachronistic exception”.130
How did these people see the land that they had adopted and the people
that had suddenly become their co-religionists and co-citizens? Obviously,
each case must be considered separately as the migrant souls were
extremely internally differentiated, ranging from bona fide aristocrats to
humble peasants and technicians. The other open question is, how far can
one “adopt” an identity?
A Polish convert, Isa Saharin (Pruski), who had been attacked in the
press for his frank criticism of the Ottoman Empire, was to reply in an
equally frank manner:

Poland is my Mother and Turkey is my Stepmother. Until my Mother is resurrected

my aim is to work for the good of my adopted country. Because of this, as a
Muslim, I have the right to state my views on anything that I choose. It is my
right to praise the good and criticise the bad things that I see here. It is my purpose
to always wish the best for this country and work towards overcoming all the
difficulties.131

Some chose to reconcile their two identities, as in the case of Mustafa

Celaleddin Paşa, who, with his theory of “Turco-Aryanism”, sought to
show that his adopted country and native culture were actually not
alien.132 In cases such as that of Sadık Paşa, it is highly unlikely that they
became practising Muslims given the fact that their families remained
Christian. Some became thoroughly Ottoman, or even Turkish, to the
point of becoming militant Turkish nationalists, such as Alfred Rüstem.
Such was also the case of Hasan Enver Celaleddin Paşa, who was to
continue the work of his father and write articles based on his father’s
notes, which would actually be inspirational for latter-day proponents of
ideological Turkism (Türkçülük).133 In a sense, Enver Celaleddin was
echoing his father’s words: “[Therefore] there is no racial connection
between the Turks and the Chinese. The Turks are a member of the

130
Edhem Eldem, “I_ brahim Edhem Paşa Rum Muydu?” (Was I_ brahim Edhem Paşa a
Greek?), Toplumsal Tarih 16 (October 2010), 2 12. Edhem Paşa was one of the thou
sands of residents of the island of Chios enslaved after the punitive raid of Ottoman forces
(1821) during the Greek War of Independence.
131
Latka, “Polonya Mültecileri”, p. 53.
132
Ibid., p. 54. Latka points out that for two years he attended a seminary where he would
have been exposed to the standard Catholic image of “The Turk” as a great danger to
Christian civilization.
133
“Türkçülüg ün Tarihinden Hasan Enver Celaleddin Paşa nın Edebiyat ı Umumiyye
Mecmuası Yazıları”, Tarih ve Toplum 2 (January 1984), 15, 18.
 Career Converts, Migrant Souls, and Ottoman Citizenship 195

white races like the Europeans. Moreover, the Turkish race is one of the
oldest of the white races.”134
Perhaps the most difficult question is the question of the sincerity of the
conversions of the migrant souls. Murad Paşa (Bem) was circumcised. For
others, such as Ismail Paşa (Kmetty), an Islamic persona was a character
mantle that was assumed as a matter of convenience. Still others, such as
the brigand-turned-policeman Stoyanof, used Islam and Ottoman citizen-
ship as a means of furthering opportunist careers as adventurers operating
in the interstices of Turco-European cultural millieux.
The fact that the modern Turkish sources used here do not in any way
bring up the matter of the sincerity of the conversions is indicative of a
certain frame of mind. If even modern published sources take the Islam of
the convert at face value and simply assume that there was nothing unusual
about the fact that Ismail Paşa should revert to being Kmetty in London,
and then resume his identity as Ismail Paşa when he returned to Turkey,
this is also indicative. None of the modern Turkish sources dealing with the
Hungarian or Polish converts that I have seen mention even the possibility
that the conversions may have been nominal. The modern sources have the
same mindset as their subject matter; as far as they are concerned, it was
enough for “so and so Paşa” to go through the motions of being a
Muslim.135
The relationship between citizenship and religion in the twilight of the
Ottoman Empire followed the ups and downs of political conjuncture. The
Hungarian and Polish refugees were saved by the yoking together of
the ancient practice of conversion that made one automatically a subject
of the sultan /Caliph, and the specific bilateral treaties whereby conversion
absolved them from the extradition clause. As the century wore on, the
Tanzimat State felt the need to regulate citizenship on a basis that would
have an equivalent in international law; hence it passed the Citizenship
Law of 1869. Yet conversion to Islam still facilitated (even if it did not
ensure) Ottoman citizenship, causing many dubious characters to take
refuge in Ottoman domains. Similarly, the category of “foreign
Muslims” also indicated that Islam was no longer a sufficient condition
for citizenship. Finally, just as the Ottoman Empire was about to plunge

134
Enver Celalettin Paşa, “Türklerin Aslı” (On the Origins of the Turks), Edebiyat ı
Umumiye Mecmuası, no. 31 (2 June 1917). As reproduced in Tarih ve Toplum 7, no.1
(January 1984).
135
Nazir, Osmanlı’ya Sıg ınanlar, pp. 81 7. In this latest major work on the issue the author
does not in any way adress the sincerity of the conversion.
196 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

into the war that was to be its end, it actually formally broke the con-
nection between religion and citizenship.
However, none of the conversions mentioned here, even those occurring
under highly dubious auspices, were rejected. The Şeriat ruling, which was
always interpreted as meaning that anyone who declared that he or she
wanted to embrace Islam was entitled to be initiated into the faith, seems to
have been the operative principle in all of the cases mentioned. Even
someone so obviously dubious such as the Belgian propagandist for
Ottoman missionary activities in the Belgian Congo was still treated as
more than a quack journalist; the prodigal son of the Russian general was
not dismissed outright; and the Cossacks who had suddenly become
enamored of Islam were admitted. Others like them, whose provenance
and loyalty were dubious at best, were made Ottoman policemen. There is
no mention of the outright rejection of any of the conversions discussed in
this chapter, even if they were patently bogus. This is in stark contrast to
the treatment of the Armenian converts in the next chapter, where desper-
ate people resorted to desperate measures to have their conversions
accepted.
 5

Conversion as Survival

Mass Conversions of Armenians in Anatolia,

1895–1897

Asia Minor is indeed the trunk of Turkey, the real Turkey.

Leon Trotsky1

The British Ambassador [Sir Philip Curie] was a very nasty man. He had an
audience with me once, at the time of the Armenian crisis. He crossed his legs
and began to yell at the top of his voice, saying you do such and such things
to the Christians. I was so angry that I said to myself, now I shall get at your
throat and kill you, but what can I do, I am in a responsible, official position
(memurum). My Ottoman nerves were so infuriated that I was barely able to
control myself. Tears came to my eyes after the Ambassador left; I cried . . .
Abdülhamid II to his doctor, Atıf Hüseyin2

the end of the tanzimat state

The Tanzimat State ended with the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid
II (r. 1876–1909). Apart from the obvious factor of separatist nationalism,

A previous version of this chapter was published as an article in Comparative Studies in

Society and History 51 (April 2009), 344 71, “‘The Armenian Question Is Finally Closed’:
Mass Conversions of Armenians during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895 1897”. Although
the Armenian genocide of 1915 is still a very politically vibrant issue, and a great deal of
literature continues to be devoted to it, the massacres of the 1890s have received surprisingly
little attention. I have deliberately excluded the conversions that occurred in 1915 as I intend
to write a monograph dedicated specifically to that issue.
1
Leon Trotsky, The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky: The Balkan Wars 1912 13
(New York, 1993), p. 240.
2
Engin Deniz Akarlı, The Problem of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary
Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876 1909), unpublished Ph.D. dis
sertation, Princeton University (1976), p. 52. Akarlı is citing the unpublished personal
diaries of Atıf Hüseyin, the sultan’s private doctor.

197
198 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

it foundered on strong vested interests on the part of Muslims and

non-Muslims alike who did not want to change the status quo, popular
resistance to more direct and efficient rule, and on the failure to integrate
the peripheral elements into its project.3
Unlike the Tanzimat State that had still sought to include the non-Muslim
population in its project, even as it balked at the prospect of the emergence
masses of crypto-Christians, and even as it accepted the nominal conversions
of various classes of Christian asylum seekers – some of them very dubious
characters – the mass conversion of Armenians during the massacres of the
1890s was to reflect a fundamental change in the Ottoman politics of
conversion. The Armenians who converted to save their lives were not
accepted as real Muslims; the sultan and his bureaucracy feared that they
could serve as a potential fifth column, or that they would complain to the
representatives of the foreign powers that they had been converted by force.
Although many of the reforms relating to infrastructure, education, and
the modernisation of the bureaucracy begun during the Tanzimat State
were to continue, the basic nature of the Hamidian era was to be very
different. This was no longer a period when the state made promises to its
subjects, Muslim and reaya alike. After the loss of the bulk of the Christian
population in the Balkans, the Hamidian regime fell back on what it saw as
the only reliable elements, the Muslims.4 Parliament was abrogated, the
Constitution suspended, and Mithat Paşa exiled and later executed.5 After
the disastrous war with Russia in 1877–78, leading to the loss of the
greater part of the most valuable remaining Ottoman lands in the
Balkans, the sultan and his entourage feared that Anatolia, the last strong-
hold, would go the same way. The Armenian population of the Ottoman
Empire was the last of the Christian communities to make a bid for
autonomy.6 After the establishment of the Armenian revolutionary

3
On popular resistance, see Ahmet Uzun, Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler. On the centre and
periphery issue, see Şerif Mardin, “Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”,
Daedalus 39 (1972), 169 90.
4
Stephen Duguid, “The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia”, Middle
Eastern Studies 9 (1973), 130 55.
5
Ibrahim Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Midhat Paşa ve Taif Mahkumları (Midhat Pasa and the
convicts of Taif) (Ankara, 1985). There is considerable controversy over the question of
Midhat Paşa’s incarceration in the prison of Taif and the manner of his death. Although it is
fairly certain that he was murdered on the orders of the sultan, no official fetva was issued
by the Şeyhülislam, and to this day no trace has been found of an official order to have him
executed.
6
The literature on the Armenian Question is vast. A sample of some of the most recent
important works on the Armenian Question are: Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The
Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York, 2006);
 Conversion as Survival 199

organizations, the Dashnaktsuthiun and the Hunchakian, in the closing

years of the nineteenth century, the “revolutionary committees”, as they
came to be known, deliberately sought to emulate the Balkan model of
activism. The Greek, Montenegrin, Serbian, and Bulgarian komitaji
were adopted as role models. Revolutionary agitation was to lead to
foreign intervention and the eventual creation of an autonomous or
independent Armenia.7 Vahakn Dadrian is perfectly correct when he
states that “the Armenian Question had become an extension of the
Eastern Question, the Turco-Armenian conflict functioned as an integral
part of that crucible, i.e. as a test case for the preservation of the empire.”8
An Ottoman document emanating directly from Yıldız Palace at this time
clearly drew the parallel: “However, the Armenian affair is not like the
Bulgarian or the Serbian affairs, because it has arisen in Anatolia which is
the crucible of Ottoman might”.9 The possible emergence of an Armenian
state in eastern Anatolia had to be prevented at all costs. An Ottoman
document published soon after Abdülhamid’s deposition openly asked:
“Did they [the Dashnak] intend to take the same road as the Bulgarians,
that is to say, use Russian support to achieve unity and then turn on the
Russians?”10
Arminius Vambery, whom we met in the previous chapter, recounts
that in the course of one of his audiences with Abdülhamid, the latter
told him:

By taking away Rumelia and Greece, Europe has cut off the feet of the Turkish State
body. The loss of Bulgaria, Serbia and Egypt has deprived us of our hands, and now
by means of this Armenian agitation they want to get at our most vital parts and
tear out our entrails this would be the beginning of total annihilation, and this we
must fight against with all the strength we possess.11

Raymond Kevorkian, Le Genocide des Armeniens (Paris, 2006); and Fuat Dündar, Modern
Türkiye’nin Şifresi (The code of modern Turkey) (Istanbul, 2008).
7
See Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of
Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and
London, 1975), p. 94.
8
Vahakn Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the
Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence, RI and Oxford, 1995), p. 185.
9
BOA Y.PRK. BŞK 32/94, Yıldız Palace Imperial Secretariat, 1585, 20 Safer 1311 / 2
September 1893.
10
Osman Nuri, Abdülhamid i Sani ve Devr i Saltanatı. (Abdulhamid the Second and his
reign) (Istanbul, 1327/1909), p. 863.
11
Lory Alder and Richard Dalby, The Dervish of Windsor Castle, p. 359. Arminius Vambery
prided himself on the fact that he had the sultan’s confidence and was the only foreigner
who could get an audience at short notice. He appeared before the sultan in his persona of a
Hungarian convert, Reşid Efendi.
200 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

This fear lent a deeper dimension to the Hamidian policy regarding

Anatolia, which has been described as the “politics of unity”.12 The
Islamic population had to be wooed to the side of what came to be
considered “official Islam”. This was a defensive policy that emphasised
the sultan first and foremost in his capacity as an Islamic ruler, the Caliph
of All Muslims (Halife-i Müslimin), but also as a legitimate autocrat like
his contemporaries, the kaiser and the tsar.13
Although Marc Baer compares Mehmed IV (r. 1648–87) and
Abdülhamid and draws the conclusion that both “encouraged a revival
of piety” and attempted to establish direct links with the people, and that
Abdülhamid’s “revival of piety also occurred during a period of crisis and
was also linked to conversion”, the comparison is somewhat forced, to say
the least. Mehmed IV was a ruler who commanded an empire that was still
one of the greatest in the world, whereas Abdülhamid ruled a state that was
fighting for its very survival. Nor did Mehmed IV have to contend with the
question of nationalism.14
The Armenian Question, as it came to be called, became a theatre of
conflict between the Great Powers, particularly Britain and Russia, with
Germany and France playing a secondary role. Britain, led by the Liberal
giant Gladstone, took a close interest in the fate of the Ottoman
Armenians, who were seen as “Christians in peril”.15 The Armenian
massacres actually brought Gladstone out of retirement and enraged him
to the point that he declared that Turkey “deserved to be wiped off the
map”.16 One of the major influences on the fate of the Ottoman Armenians
was the thorny question of “Armenian Reform” in the six vilayets, which
became a sticking point between the sultan, his government, and the
Powers, particularly the British.17 The “six provinces” (vilayatı sitte) of
Sıvas, Erzurum, Mamüretülaziz, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, and Van, where the
great majority of the Ottoman Armenians lived, provide the geographical
setting for this chapter. The Armenian revolutionary organizations, the

12
Duguid, “The Politics of Unity”.
13
Selim Deringil, The Well Protected Domains, Chapter 2.
14
Marc Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, pp. 250 1.
15
Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the
Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians (Oxford, 2005).
16
Philip Magnus, Gladstone: A Biography (London, 1963), p. 430.
17
Armenian reforms had been officially included in the Treaty of Berlin (1878) under Article
61. See J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (1956), vol. 1, p. 190: “The
Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and
reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians,
and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds” (see also Map 2).
 Conversion as Survival 201

m a p 2 . The Six Vilayets (Vilayat ı Sitte), the primary geography of the Armenian
massacres. (Map courtesy of Ömer Emre)

Dashnak and the Hunchak, had been working hard to enliven nationalist
consciousness among the largely peasant population of these regions,
with uneven success. Yet the Ottoman state, in the shape of Sultan
Abdülhamid, his bureaucracy, and the Turkish/Kurdish élites in the six
vilayets, came to see the “Armenian committees” as a very real threat to
their dominant position. The Armenian Question became Abdülhamid’s
primary bête noire as he “came to fear the Armenians and became firmly
convinced that all Armenians were under the control of the committees”.18
Broadly speaking, this was the political and social context in which the
widespread massacres, mass conversions, and in some cases re-conversions,
of the Armenian population in the region occurred.19 Many Armenians
converted to Islam in order to escape death; some later converted back to
their former faith, some did not.
The Ottomans saw the reform issue as unacceptable interference in their
internal affairs. The Sublime Porte also feared that this was a first step in

18
Osman Nuri, Abdülhamid i Sani, p. 823.
19
On the Armenian revolutionary organizations the seminal works are still Louise
Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, and Anahide Terminassian,
Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Cambridge, MA,
1984).
202 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

securing autonomy and perhaps even eventual independence for the

Armenian vilayets. Russia, very often at odds with its own Armenian
population in the Caucasus and, since the war of 1877, occupying the
regions of Kars and Ardahan, adjacent to the Armenian-populated vilayets
of eastern Anatolia, was a major player in the region, and in this sense the
Armenian Question also overlapped with the Great Game in Asia.20
Germany became the closest ally of the Ottoman Empire during the reign
of Abdülhamid, but played a relatively minor part in the Armenian Question
at this time.21 France had an interest in the Armenian Question because it
could not afford to leave the scene to Britain. One of the major sources used
in this chapter, and set against Ottoman archival material, is the correspon-
dence of the French consul, Gustave Meyrier, who was an eyewitness in
Diyarbakır during the massacres.22
Another critical issue that provides the background for the massacres
and conversions was the rise of Turkish/Ottoman nationalism. Although it
would be somewhat premature to talk about Turkish nationalism as it was
understood after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, there were none-
theless stirrings in that direction among Ottoman ruling circles beginning
in the late nineteenth century. In the memoirs of Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, the
minister of police during the turbulent 1890s, the tenor of the writing
verges on racism. After the Zeytun uprising in 1895, Nazım Paşa is
informed that among the documents captured from the Zeytun rebels
there is the correspondence of a certain “Little Hasan” (Küçük Hasan),
who is mentioned as a Turkish official working for the Armenians and
providing them with vital information:

I was particularly distraught to the point of becoming ill by the thought that a Turk
should become the tool of the committees who were thirsting for Turkish blood.
However, after a thorough investigation, we learned that the said person was
actually an Armenian convert, and by posing as a Turk son of a Turk, had used

20
Ron Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington,
1993). This is by far the best source to date on the fate of the Russian Armenians in
imperial Russia. On the history of modern day Soviet Armenia, see Claire Mouradian,
L’Arménie (Paris, 1995).
21
Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Down in Turkey Far Away: Human Rights, the Armenian
Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany”, The Journal of Modern History 79
(2007), 80 111. This fascinating article explains how the Zionist leader Theodor Herzl
actually considered propagandizing for Abdülhamid in return for concessions in Palestine.
22
Gustave Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir. Correspondance diplomatique du Vice
Consul de France, presentée et annotée par Claire Mouradian et Michel Durand Meyrier
(Paris, 2000).
 Conversion as Survival 203

the committee for his personal gain. In this way, in keeping with his nature, he
killed two birds with one stone by aiding his people and filling his purse.23

As will be seen later in the issue of official reluctance or unwillingness to

crack down on the perpetrators of the massacres, there was a very real
notion of “us” and “them” – the former being the Muslims, that is, Turks,
Kurds, and others; the latter being the Armenians. This attitude would
later become prominent in the leadership of the Young Turks. Ahmed Rıza
“jotted the following in his private notebook, ‘Christians acquired pri-
vileges when they rebelled [and] they desired to rebel when they acquired
privileges’”.24
In almost all the cases of mass conversion cited here the explanation given
by Ottoman officials was that the Armenians were converting because “they
feared the Kurds”. The “Kurds” referred to are mostly the nomadic popula-
tion of eastern Anatolia that had shared that geography with the Armenians
for centuries. Although the Armenian peasant population had always been
subject to oppression at the hands of the Kurdish agas or şeyhs (tribal chief-
tains or headmen), what has been described as a “benign symbiosis” had
nonetheless existed.25 Or, as Christopher Walker has elegantly phrased it,
“Armenians and Kurds got on with one another tolerably, but not parti-
cularly well”.26 Yet some Armenians characterized their relationship with the
nomadic Kurds as being that of “brothers of earth and water”.27 What then
set the two peoples, Kurds and Armenians, against each other?28 Several
factors disrupted this precarious equilibrium. First, the effects of the central-
izing reforms of the mid-nineteenth century began to be felt in the “six
provinces” only in the 1870s.29 Since the reforms, the Armenians of
Anatolia had suffered from two main ills: double taxation and the depreda-
tions of the Kurdish tribes. Even after they had paid their taxes to the state, the

23
Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, Hatıralarım. Ermeni Olaylarının I_ çyüzü (My memoirs: The inside
story of the Armenian incidents) (Istanbul, 2003, first published in 1924), pp. 258 9.
24
Şükrü Haniog lu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks 1902 1908 (Oxford,
2001), p. 40.
25
Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, p. 101.
26
Christopher Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (Chatham, Kent, 1991), p. 137.
Walker’s is still the most detailed study on the 1890s massacres.
27
Jelle Verheij, “Les frères de terrre et d’eau: Sur le role des Kurdes dans les massacres
arméniens de 1894 1896”, Les Cahiers de l’autre Islam 5 (1999), 225 76.
28
Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, p. 7. Nalbandian notes that on
some occasions, like the 1862 risings in Van and Zeytun, Armenian and Kurdish peasants
had fought together against their oppressors.
29
Janet Klein, Power in the Periphery: The Hamidiye Light Cavalry and the Struggle over
Ottoman Kurdistan, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University (2002), p. 116.
204 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Kurdish şeyhs of the area would demand further payment.30 The power of
the big Kurdish lords, the mir, who controlled vast territories, was broken by
policies of centralization in the second half of the century. By the 1880s the
power of the last great warlord of the region, Bedirhan Bey, had been
eliminated, and intra-tribal feuding recommenced.31 When these regional
warlords lost their weight, a power vacuum in the region was filled by “tribes
which had hitherto been kept in check by the mirs.”32 It was from these tribes
that the Hamidiye Light Cavalry was to be recruited in the early 1890s. This
cavalry was made up of lower-level tribes organized into Cossack-style irreg-
ular cavalry units by Abdülhamid II and his entourage. Ottoman cavalry
officers were actually sent to the military academy in Petrograd to learn
“Cossack-style drill” (kazak usulü talim).33 The official primary aim of
these units was to quell what the state saw as “the perfidious and subversive
activities of the Armenian brigands”.34 The sultan’s policy was to kill two
birds with one stone – to intimidate the Armenian population, and to secure
the loyalty of the Kurds. In a manner of speaking, the Armenians were the bait
for Kurdish obedience and loyalty: “By thus providing paid employment of
high prestige and a virtual license to raid, the Sultan hoped to install in the
Kurds a strong loyalty to him personally.”35 It was these units that would
feature prominently in the massacres and mass conversions of 1895–97
organized and led by Zeki Paşa, who was later to become infamous as the
author of the Sasun massacre.36

mounting tension and mutual demonization

among muslims and armenians
A close reading of the sources, archival and secondary, sheds light on the
gradual, and then rapid, increase in the tension between the Armenians
and Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, leading up to the massacres of

30
Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide, p. 114.
31
Van Bruinessen, Agha Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan
(London, 1992), pp. 181 2: “The denser the administrative network of the state became,
the smaller and simpler the tribes”.
32
Klein, Power in the Periphery, p. 118.
33
Selim Deringil, “Ottoman to Turk: Minority Majority Relations in the Late Ottoman
Empire”, in Dru Gladney (ed.), Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan,
China, Korea, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and the US (Stanford, CA, 1998), pp. 217 26.
34
Ibid., p. 220.
35
van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 186.
36
Deringil, Ottoman to Turk, pp. 222, 223. On Zeki Paşa and the Hamidiye regiments, see
Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, p. 187; and Klein, Power in the Periphery, p. 162.
 Conversion as Survival 205

1894–96 that provided the backdrop to many cases of mass conversion.

Little by little, any improvement in the conditions of the Christians in the
empire, assured by the Tanzimat State, was whittled away. Already in
1878, an Armenian priest, Bogos Natanyan, was to record the appalling
condition of the Armenians in Palu, who suffered from the depredations
of the Kurds: “O dear God, did you create the Armenians so that they
become bait for these savages? . . . If the Ottoman state wants to assure
the peace and security of its subjects, it should banish these upstart Beys
from this area and forbid them from taking official positions”.37
The Hamidian regime instituted a tax collection system whereby some
of the Hamidiye regiments continued to act as tax farmers (mültezim)
propagating the regime of double taxation. The practice of using the
police force to collect taxes, which the previous reign had attempted to
replace with a more rational tax collection system using civilian collec-
tors, continued alongside the tax farming system whereby the Armenian
population was subjected to oppression and violence from the Hamidiye
tribes, who were now joined by the official security forces.38
Missionaries like Edwin Munsell Bliss reported “systematic insults to
the faith of Christians” inflicted by officials, “something that would have
been impossible in previous reigns”.39 It is ironic that perhaps one of
the most astute observations on the whole Armenian Question should be
made by an Ottoman prince who spent almost his entire life under house
arrest. Salahaddin Efendi, the son of the deposed Sultan Murad V, would
pen the following lines in his diary:

A few Armenians lose their minds and falling under the influence of that inevitable
product of modern progress and civilization [nationalism], become enamored with
the idea of independence. This small group meets with a violent reaction. . . . That
small group has increased and their increasing numbers has increased their power

37
Arsen Yarman, Palu, Harput, Çarsancak, Çemişkezek, Çapakçur, Erzincan ve Civar
Bölgeler. Raporlar (Palu, Harput, Çapakçur, Erzincan and neighboring areas: Reports).
(Istanbul, 2010), translated from Armenian by Arsen Yarman and Sirvart Malhasyan,
vol. 2, pp. 114 15. Bogos Natanyan was the official envoy of the Armenian Patriarchate
who was sent on an inspection mission to eastern Anatolia in 1878.
38
Nadir Özbek, “Anadolu Islahatı, ‘Ermeni Sorunu’ ve vergi tahsildarlıg ı 1895 1908”
(Anatolian reform, the ‘Armenian Question’ and the system of tax collection), Tarih ve
Toplum, no. 9 (Winter 2009), 1 19.
39
Rev. Edwin Munsell Bliss, Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities: A Reign of Terror: From
Tartar Huts to Constantinople Palaces (Philadelphia, 1896), p. 351. As can be gathered
from the title, Bliss was no Turcophile. Yet the accounts given in the book of the lead up to
the massacres and their execution, after allowances for gross prejudice, are still important
as many are based on eye witness accounts, and Bliss did criticize some European news
papers for exaggerating and publishing “reports of the most thrilling type”. See p. 346.
206 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

and daring. This daring is met with blood and many, the innocent as well as the
guilty are killed. . . . It is a great pity for both races! . . . I hope this does not poison
the Ottomans.40

Unfortunately, poison them it did, and some of the Ottomans, Muslim and
Christian, came to see each other as actual or potential enemies. A very
important and tragic aspect of the crisis was that at least some of the
Ottoman ruling élite began to see the Armenians in racist terms, as seen
in the following quotation:

As was shown by the recent demonstration [the 1890 demonstration in Istanbul]

with the purpose of creating an independent Armenian state, the Armenians are like
ticks (parasites, kene) sucking the blood of the Sublime State and occupying its
attention. It is well known that ever since the aforementioned people, or maybe one
should say, traitorous, people have taken refuge in the Sublime State, they
have caused great material and moral damage. Although the Christians and Jews
have always kept their names and never attempted to change them, the Armenians,
whose very nature is penetrated by ingratitude [have followed a different course].
They have changed their names from Karabet, Kirkor or Bedros to Sıdkı, Nail,
Sezai or Sırrı or other Muslim names purely with the perfidious desire to pollute
future generations of Muslims with Armenian blood. [When these Armenians with
Muslim names] are sent to the vilayets with official duties, they marry local Muslim
girls whose families, deceived by the Muslim names, give their daughters to them.
When this Armenian official is relieved of his duties after fathering a few children
[he returns to Istanbul] abandoning his Muslim wife and children never to mention
their names again.41

40
Edhem Eldem, “26 Ag ustos 1896 ‘Banka Vakası’ ve 1896 ‘Ermeni Olayları’” (26 August
1896 ‘Ottoman Bank Incident’ and the ‘Events of 1896’), Tarih ve Toplum 5 (2007),
113 46. On 26 August 1896 a group of some twenty Dashnak militants raided the
Ottoman Bank in Istanbul and held some of the staff for ransom, declaring that they
would blow up the bank if their demands were not met. Prince Salahaddin’s diaries span
the entire period of his incarceration and are part of the personal archive of Edhem Eldem.
Prince Salahaddin Efendi (1861 1915) was kept under house arrest during the entire reign
of Abdülhamid II. Although he penned the section above in September 1896, soon after the
Armenian attack on the Ottoman Bank, it seems that he was well informed on the
Armenian issue in general. For a first hand account of the Ottoman Bank raid, written
by the leader of the Dashnak band that carried it out, see Armen Garo, Bank Ottoman
(Detroit, 1990).
41
BOA Y.PRK.Ş 3/55; memorandum by Esseyid Mehmed Hulusi, member of the Ottoman
Senate (Meclis i Ayan), 9 Kanun u Evvel 1306 / 22 December 1890. My thanks to Noemi
Levy for this reference. Although the racist and paranoic nature of this statement is
obvious, there are some interesting ambivalences and contradictions in the document.
Mehmed Hulusi does not tell us if the so called Armenian impostors actually converted to
Islam. Nor does he clarify under what circumstances the children were brought up. A child
born to a Muslim father is automatically considered a Muslim. My thanks to Christoph
Neumann for helping me decipher the signature seal.
 Conversion as Survival 207

This aspect of “sexual/matrimonial intrique” seems to be a recurring

motif. On 2 November 1893, the commander of the Ottoman Fourth
Army, Zeki Paşa, reported that a certain Osman Yakup had been “mali-
ciously beguiled” by the Armenians into converting to Christianity.42
He had been lured away from Islam by the promise of marriage to a pretty
Armenian girl from the village of Pur, in the vilayet of Bitlis. During the
interrogation of said Osman he had revealed that he was in fact a deserter
from the twenty-third cavalry brigade in Muş:

After his desertion he came to Bitlis where he was approached by some Armenians
who appealed to his lower nature by proposing that, if he converted to the
Armenian faith, they would give him forty liras and marry him to an Armenian
girl. Then he was taken to the village of Pur, where he saw the girl, in whom he
developed a most vivid interest (alaka i şedide). Thereupon he accepted their offer,
was taken to the nearby church with the girl, where he converted to Christianity
according to the Armenian rites, was married to the girl, and took the name of
Mıgırdıç.

At this point the matter had come to the attention of the military autho-
rities, who went to Pur, there finding him in the company of his wife, and
arrested him. During his interrogation he testified to the following:

He confessed that he had been converted to Christianity according to the Armenian

faith. The Armenians then told him that he would in appearance remain a Muslim
and continue to serve in the Ottoman army. He was then taken to the Armenian
Catholicos in Van, together with his wife, and his apostasy was also recorded there.
Osman also testified that there were some twenty others like him, all deserters from
the army. He had been told that they too had been converted “through money and
other means” and placed in military units in Istanbul.43

What can be drawn from this document? It is highly unlikely that a simple
cavalryman could make up the complicated and convoluted story he told.
Furthermore, the great ease with which Osman converted to the Apostolic
Armenian faith seems to be a transposition into the Christian setting of the
simplicity of conversion to Islam. The most striking thing about this case is

42
BOA Y.MTV 86/72, 20 Teşrin i Evvel 1309 / 2 November 1893, cipher telegramme fom
Zeki Paşa, the commander of the Fourth Army in Erzincan, to General Staff.
43
Ibid., imperial order (Irade) dated 1 Zilkade 1311. It appears that “turning” people from
the other side was a practice used by both camps. On 6 March 1892 the governor of Bitlis,
Tahsin Paşa, reported that a young Armenian from the district of Kıg ı had converted to
Islam and declared that he was ready to provide information on the activities of Armenian
revolutionaries. The document states that he is to be used, although he is not to be trusted.
See BOA Y.MTV 75/132, 23 Şubat 1308 / 6 March 1892.
208 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

that it did not happen. A report from the Ministry of the Police dated
2 May 1894 clearly stated that:

When questioned in a very thorough manner here the above mentioned could not
repeat the statement he made in Bitlis and gave several [different] versions of it. He
later changed his language entirely and told a different story stating that as he was a
deserter, hoping for clemency and reward, and under the pressure and direction of
the police officials, he had made the above confession [to the officials in Bitlis].
It transpires from the above that the prisoner is simply an ordinary deserter who
tried to save himself through lies and deceit.44

We may therefore surmise that somebody concocted this scenario with a

view to convincing the sultan that a serious plot was afoot among the
Armenians. Nor were Abdulhamid’s officials above making up stories that
they thought would curry favour with their master. It must also be borne in
mind that Zeki Paşa was the sultan’s brother-in-law and, as such, might
have allowed himself even more levity as far as the truth was concerned, as
the story does seem to be particularly concocted to provoke the sultan’s
legendary paranoia.45
On the Armenian side we have some evidence that demonisation of the
“Turks” had become almost a folkloric aspect of everyday life:

I remembered that whenever a Turk passed by our house, my mother would say,
‘there’s a dog walking by’. We would run over and ask, “Mother where is the dog?’
and my mother would answer: ‘That Turk is a dog’. This is the way they would
teach us that the Turk meant a dog.46

In a similar vein:

“We called the Turkish cemeteries ‘Gor’. We didn’t call them cemeteries”.

44
BOA. Y.MTV 97/76, 25 Şevval 1311 / 2 May 1894, report from the minister of police,
Nazım Bey.
45
Abdülhamit Kırmızı, Abdülhamid’in Valileri. Osmanlı Vilayet I_ daresi, 1895 1908
(Abdülhamid’s governors: Provincial administration in the Hamidian state) (Istanbul,
2007), pp. 105 9. See, in particular, the section entitled “Fooling the Sultan”, where
Kırmızı actually cites many examples of governors and imperial ADCs distorting the
correspondence or telling downright lies. One particular official actually openly stated,
“[L]et them inform on me as much as they like, I have a great capital at my fingertips and
that is lies. I lie, distort and deny as I wish . . .” (p. 106).
46
Armenian Research Centre (henceforth ARC), Dearborn, Michigan, GEN 29, interview
with Mrs. Dickranoohi Nedourian. However, one must bear in mind that these oral
accounts are recorded in the archives of the ARC long after the events, and most of the
interviews involve people who were actually born in the early 1900s. Thus their focus is
1915, not the 1890s. Nonetheless, as with the subject interviewed here, their testimony is
important because it sometimes provides insight into how family lore saw the “Turks”. I
owe thanks to Prof. Dennis Papazian for allowing me to have access to these archives.
 Conversion as Survival 209

“What does the word ‘Gor’ mean?”

“I don’t know, but maybe it was a word of ridicule. It was believed that the
bodies turned into dogs at night and followed you if you happened to be near a
‘Gor’. And if something prevented that dog from returning to the grave, then a dead
Turk would be lying there the next morning.”47

Evidently the canine metaphor cut across the religious divide. On 2 May
1895 it was reported from Arapgir, in the vilayet of Mamuretülaziz
(present day Elazıg), that “The carcass of a dog has been thrown through
the window of the Armenian church. . . . The dog’s head has been thrown
into the Protestant prayer house. Both bore a wooden placard in the shape
of a cross, bearing a threatening message in very vulgar Turkish”. The
event threatened to become a full-blown incident “as a few hundred
Armenians gathered and started shouting and demonstrating and the
Muslim population was calmed by a military show of force.”48
The Ottoman government hastened to declare that this affair was “a
provocation staged by Armenian subversives seeking to sow seeds of
perfidy between Muslim and Christian”. The Ottoman embassies in
European capitals were instructed to publish articles to that effect in the
local press.49 Both the Berlin and London embassies of the Porte published
articles declaring unequivocally that “the vigorous measures of the
Ottoman officials prevented a serious outbreak and it has become evident
that the acts were committed by Armenian subversives”.50 There is a very
real aspect of blaming the victims in this affair. The Armenian Patriarchate
was warned by the government to “prevent such acts not in keeping with
the nature of being an obedient and loyal subject”. Accordingly, both the
Armenian Patriarchate and the Protestant community issued written state-
ments supporting the government position.51 On the other hand, the act
itself – a dog’s carcass thrown into both Armenian Apostolic and the
Protestant places of worship – the somewhat choreographed presentation,
placards in the shape of a cross, and a message in “vulgar Turkish”, all
seem a bit too “pat”, leading the strong suspicion that it may indeed have
been a provocation on the part of one side or the other.

47
ARC, GEN 29, interview with Mr. Antranig Shamigian. The interviewee was born in
Keghi (Kıg ı) in 1898.
48
BOA Y.A HUS 326/75, Grand Vizier Cevad Paşa to the Imperial Receiver’s Office, no.
4300, 19 Nisan 1312 / 2 May 1895.
49
BOA Y.A HUS 327/110, 17 Zilkade 1312 / 13 May 1895, the foreign minister, Mehmed
Said Paşa, to the Grand Vizier, Foreign Ministry Chancery no. 897, enclosing a translation
of article published in the Berlin press.
50
BOA Y.A HUS. 327/125, 4 May 1895, Ottoman embassy in London to the Sublime Porte.
51
BOA Y.A HUS 326/75, 327/110.
210 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

A case that smells even more like provocation occurred, again, at

Arapgir. About one month before the case just described it was reported
that the Catholic bishop and the Protestant community leader had com-
plained that “a piece of wood in the shape of a cross had been nailed to the
door of the Catholic church”. To the “cross” a piece of paper was attached
bearing the legend in Turkish: “People of America, the Armenian
Catholics and Protestants have gone bezerk. If they want to live in peace
they should come to the one true religion otherwise they will become
targets”. The placard also bore “writing in English, French and
German”. The local kaymakam was ordered to find and punish the
culprits with all possible haste.52
Provocative placards (yafta) seem to have been quite the rage of the
time. It was reported from the vilayet of Trabzon that placards in Turkish
had appeared on the walls of mosques in the town of Samsun on a Friday,
presumably for people to see after the Friday prayers. One of these
placards was duly removed and sent to Istanbul. For once, we have a
copy in the file, and it is worth quoting in extenso:

O people! Those of you who are Muslims you must be fearful for the honour of
your families. Because our wives and daughters are frequenting the shops of the
infidels (kafirler) and in these shops they expose their faces and hands. They indulge
in shameful acts with the infidels to an extent never even done with their
husbands. . . . even the daughters of men whom we otherwise know as men of
honour carry on in an unmentionable manner with the sons of the shopkeepers. . . .
The honour of Islam demands that we defend it against our enemies and not to
surrender it in this fashion. . . . If anyone removes this placard, which is unofficial,
he will suffer the wrath of Allah!53

It was later found that the placards had been the work of one Mehmed
Efendi, who had been apprehended and questioned. He had been sum-
moned to Trabzon, where “it became clear that he did not intend to create
a disturbance or excite the populace”. He was dismissed with no worse
than a scolding and told to stay in Trabzon, where he had relatives.54
Although in this case Mehmed Efendi seems to have been something of a
crank, and no serious consequences ensued, the case is indicative of the
times. The open reference to Christians as “enemies of the faith” and the

52
BOA Y.A HUS 325/98 11 Nisan 1311 / 24 April 1895, Grand Vizier Cevad Paşa, Imperial
Receivers’ Office no. 4175.
53
BOA Y.A HUS 327/22, 6 Zilkade 1312 / 29 April 1895, the Vali of Trabzon, El Seyyid
Mehmed Kadri, to the Ministry of the Interior, the Vilayet of Trabzon, no. 64, enclosing
one of the placards.
54
Ibid.
 Conversion as Survival 211

open call to the male population on the most sensitive issue, women’s
honour – this could have ended up very ugly. Very soon after this, it did.
The first of the Armenian massacres was in fact to occur in Trabzon on 13
September 1895. A potentially much more serious case was reported from
Yozgad in central Anatolia, where graffiti had appeared on the inside of the
lavatory door of the main mosque. The graffiti read, “Turks open your
eyes! Be prepared for the beginning of next month!”. The Mutasarrıf of
Yozgad had duly removed the writing, but he had not failed to report the
case to his superior, the Vali of Ankara. The Vali wrote a long report on the
incident. Why would a piece of graffiti on a lavatory wall attract so much
attention? The Vali pointed out that such graffiti often appeared “on walls
of inns, or carved on large trees, or in public toilets and this was a common
practice in Anatolia.” The next part of the report grew more serious:

However, given the delicacy of the times [this can be serious]. At present there are
eighteen Armenians being detained in prison in Yozgad. As these prisoners
are leading figures in the Armenian community here, this [the writing of graffiti]
may be an act of their friends or relatives designed to excite the minds of their
followers. As long as these people are detained it is to be expected that they will
carry out such demonstrations and that this will renew the hatred and anger of the
Muslims.55

The Vali recommended, therefore, that the detained Armenians be brought

to court as soon as possible so that the affair could be brought to an end.56
That a piece of graffiti on a lavatory wall should be deemed important
enough to report to the Grand Vizier is indicative of the state of tension in
Yozgad. Another factor has to be taken into consideration at this point,
and that is the significance of rumour. In all the cases just cited – the dog,
the placards, the graffiti – whoever the perpetrator was, was counting on
the effect of rumour. Rumour that the “Armenians are taking over” or,
conversely, that “the Muslims intend to massacre all the Armenians”
fuelled the anxiety of both sides.57

55
BOA Y.A HUS 329/47, 11 Mayıs 1311 / 24 May 1895, the Vali of Ankara, Mehmed
Memduh Paşa, to the Office of the Grand Vizier. Presumably the lavatory was outside the
main building of the mosque and was open to the public.
56
Ibid.
57
Peter Lienhardt, “The Interpretation of Rumour”, in J. M. H. Beattie and R. G. Lienhardt
(eds.), Studies in Social Anthropology: Essays in Memory of E. E. Evans Pritchard
(Oxford, 1975), pp. 110 37. “The tendency of human beings to prefer blaming their
misfortunes on other people, against whom they can react, rather than on accident is
scarcely to be doubted” (p. 118).
212 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Reports continued to come in bringing into sharp focus the increasing

tension on both sides. From Kekerli, a village in the vilayet of Bitlis, it was
reported that a group of Armenians had interfered with the call to prayer
(ezan). Apparently eleven Armenians had been involved and had fled when
the gendarmes arrived; “seven Muslims and three Armenians witnessed
the act”. It was claimed that “the village headman (muhtar), a certain
Sarkis, and ten members of the village’s elders council had been
involved.” Sarkis had apparently confessed. Once again, the blame was
put squarely at the door of the Armenians: “The aim of the Armenians was
to provoke the Kurdish tribes in the area and create an incident that would
postpone the collection of their taxes”.58
The issue was discussed at the highest level with a view to its possible
implications for world public opinion. The considerations were the fol-
lowing: Should the Kekerli incident be published in the press or not? What
would be the pros and cons? On the one hand, it was thought, it was a case
that was favourable to the Muslim side, presumably because it made the
Armenians look bad as they had interfered with the Muslims’ freedom to
worship. On the other hand, to report on the Kekerli affair “and to forbid
reporting on cases like the Tokad and Erzurum incidents, where the dead
were mostly Armenians, would leave the Sublime State open to accusa-
tions of bias and distortion”. In the end a decision was taken to censor all
three cases.59
This discussion shows that even in the most trivial of incidents, the
Ottomans felt that the world was looking over their shoulder.
Furthermore, the fact that Kekerli had an Armenian headman implies
that it was a mainly Armenian village.
There is also evidence that shows that there was an official attempt to
distance the two communities from each other. A circular directive in 1893
ordered that no Muslim children should be sent to Armenian schools.
The vilayet of Ankara duly reported: “There are no Muslim children in
the Armenian schools in the vilayet proper. We have issued the appropriate
order to the districts to show the utmost vigilance in the matter of preventing
Muslim children attending Armenian schools.”60 The vilayet of Adana also

58
BOA. Y.A HUS 323/16, 14 Mart 1311 / 27 March 1895, telegramme from the Vilayet of
Bitlis; Y.A HUS 325/97, 28 Şevval 1312 / 24 April 1895, the Grand Vizier and imperial
ADC, Cevad Paşa, Imperial Receivers’ Office, no. 4174.
59
BOA Y.A HUS 323/62, 22 Mart 1311 / 4 Nisan 1895, the Grand Vizier and imperial ADC,
Cevad Paşa, to the Receivers Office of the Sublime Porte, no. 3809.
60
BOA Y.MTV 86/99, 27 Teşrin I Evvel 1309 / 9 November 1893, cipher telegramme, the
governor of Ankara to Yıldız Palace.
 Conversion as Survival 213

confirmed that “according to our investigations there are no Muslim chil-

dren, boys or girls, in the Armenian schools in the vilayet, nor will they be
allowed to attend such schools in the future.”61 The vilayet of Aydın was to
report, “[I]n the centre of the vilayet and in its dependencies the Armenian
population is only 1600, according to my investigations, neither in Izmir nor
in the dependencies are there any Muslim children in Armenian schools.”62
It is also significant that these cipher telegrammes were sent to Yıldız Palace
and not to the Ministry of Education, indicating that the sultan took a
personal interest in the matter. Strict censorship became even stricter as
“the word Armenia was struck out of every book”.63
The mounting tension between Christians and Muslims in Anatolia has
been remarked upon by recent research in Turkey. Oktay Özel, who has
studied the inter-sectarian relations in the Black Sea region, comments:

The propaganda of the Armenian revolutionary organizations and their military

activities further heightened the tension between the Muslim and Christian
populations, which broke out into open conflict. These conflicts were to be
reflected at the local level with raids, counter raids and murders between houses
and villages. . . . The tendency of the Anatolian Muslim population towards
violence directed at Armenians increased under the influence or Abdülhamid’s
policies64

Özel points out that in the regions stretching from the central Black Sea
and Sıvas to Erzurum, the population on both sides (Christian and
Muslim) became drawn into a cycle of violence, either directly or through
the activities of “brigands”.

the hamidian massacres and the mass

conversions of armenians
It was against this background that the series of events that have gone
down in history as the “Armenian massacres” occurred. One vilayet after
another experienced the same pattern: inflammatory speeches by mullahs

61
BOA. Y.MTV 84/44, 6 Teşrin i Sani 1309 / 19 November 1893, cipher telegramme, the
governor of Adana to Yıldız Palace.
62
BOA Y.MTV 87/53, 7 Teşrin i Sani 1309 / 20 November 1893, cipher telegramme, the
governor of Aydın to Yıldız Palace.
63
Bliss, Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities, p. 349.
64
Oktay Özel, “Muhacirler, yerliler ve gayrımüslimler. Osmanlı’nın son devrinde Orta
Karadeniz’de toplumsal uyumun sınırları üzerine bazı gözlemler” (Immigrants, locals
and non Muslims: Some observations on social harmony in the central Black Sea in the
last days of the Ottomans), Tarih ve Toplum 5 (2007), 93 112.
214 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

at Friday prayers, attacks on Armenian shops and property, and retalia-

tion in self-defence on the part of Armenians, followed by widespread, and
apparently organized, slaughter, rape, and the abduction of women.65
Particularly after the Sason massacre (18 August to 10 September 1894),
the 1895–96 Zeytun uprising, and the massacres that occurred in 1895–96
in various localities, there is no doubt that the majority of the Ottoman
Armenians in Anatolia lived in a state of terror.66 Even in the documents
published by the modern Turkish state on the basis of the official papers of
Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, the chief of police, the discrepancies in the number of
the dead on both sides is a giveaway.67 In the “troubles” at Trabzon on 13
September 1895, the Muslim dead numbered 11, whereas the Armenians
lost 182.68 In Erzurum on 23 October, the ratio was five Muslim dead to
fifty Armenians. Similarly, in Bitlis on 26 October, the toll was 38 Muslim
dead and 135 wounded, 132 Armenian dead and 40 wounded.69 It is worth
pointing out that in almost all the cases there were far more Armenian dead
than wounded, suggesting a very unequal struggle. In Diyarbakır on 10
October, the Police Commissariat reported 70 Muslim dead and 80
wounded against more than 300 Armenian dead and 100 wounded.70 In
Bayburt on 4 November, against 8 dead and 11 wounded on the Muslim
side, the Armenians lost 170 dead with 35 wounded.71

65
I do not intend to retell the grisly story of the massacres here. My aim is simply to give a
background to the conversions that occurred at this time. There are relatively few com
prehensive accounts of what happened, the most comprehensive still being that of
Christopher Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation; see particularly pp. 121 173.
The official Turkish narrative states that it was the Armenian committees who were
responsible for widespread “uprisings” during this time. A vast apologetic literature exists
on the topic, and the “Armenian perfidy” genre continues to be the dominant discourse
among mainstream Turkish historians. For a representative sample of the apologist
literature, see I_ smet Binark, Ermenilerin Türklere yaptıkları Mezalim ve Soykırım’ın
Arşiv Belgeleri (Archival documents on the cruelty and genocide perpetrated by
Armenians against Turks) (Ankara, 2001). For a recent example, see Osmanlı
Belgelerinde Ermeni I_ syanları 1878 1909 (Armenian uprisings according to Ottoman
Documents (Ankara, 2008, 4 vols.), an official publication of the Turkish State Archives).
66
Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide, pp. 113 31.
67
The sheer discrepancy in the number of Muslim and Armenian dead is something that even
official documents carefully chosen to make the modern Turkish case, namely, that what
happened was legitimate self defence against Armenian “terrorism”, could not hide. In
this, I follow the method used by Edhem Eldem in his “26 Ag ustos 1896 ‘Banka Vakası’ ve
1896 ‘Ermeni Olayları’”.
68
Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, Ermeni Olayları Tarihi (The history of the Armenian events)
(Istanbul, 1998), vol. 1, p. 94.
69
Ibid., pp. 98 99.
70
Ibid., p. 102.
71
Ibid., p. 103.
 Conversion as Survival 215

Diyarbakır, the scene of one of the worst massacres on 2–5 November

1895, features largely in the documents on conversion. On 2 November
the French consul, Gustave Meyrier, was to telegramme his ambassador,
Paul Cambon, “The city is engulfed in fire and blood. Save us”.72 On 10
November 1895, the Vali, Enis Paşa, reported: “In some areas entire
villages of Armenians have been converting and this is causing the kaza
authorities to ask for instructions. As these conversions are not very
convincing I humbly ask for instructions.”73
The governor was referred to an irade dated 1 Teşrin-i Sani 1311
(14 November 1895) that established the official position:

[According to the irade] in order to avoid the misrepresentation of the conversion

of the Armenians, if they apply again when order is restored, then their conversions
can be processed according to the proper procedure. Until then the matter should
be passed over with wise measures.74

This formula of “wise measures” is repeated throughout the documen-

tation and in the context is clearly a euphemism for “palliative” or
“temporary”. The official position appears to have been the following. If
the mass conversion of the Armenians was accepted, this would appear to
the outside world as an official policy of mass forced conversion.
Furthermore, the inter-communal tension created by the recent “distur-
bances” (igtişaşat) had still not abated: “You are to bear in mind that to
cause offence to one section of the population at a time when we are trying
to win the hearts of the population will lead to untold complications”.75
Presumably the “section of the population” that was being spared was the
Muslims, who would be offended by what they would perceive as insincere
conversions.
In the wake of the general atmosphere of massacre and insecurity
that reigned in Anatolia during this period, case after case of mass
conversion was reported from the vilayets. On 5 November 1895 the
vilayet of Erzurum reported that in the previous week three villages,
Hınzıri, Korikul, and Humlar in the kaza of Tercan, had expressed a
desire to “convert to Islam of their own free will”. However, the

72
Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, p. 85 (my translation).
73
BOA A.MKT.MHM 636/25, 29 Teşrin i Evvel 1311 / 10 November 1895, the governor of
Diyarbakir, Enis Paşa, to the Office of the Grand Vizier.
74
Ibid. The term used in all the official correspondence is “tedabir i hakimane ile işin
geçiştirilmesi”.
75
Ibid. This last sentence in the draft memorandum was crossed out. These cancelled
sentences in draft memoranda are actually very interesting because they provide insights
into the official mind.
216 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

governor openly stated that “these conversions are the result of fear of
attacks and will not look good to friend or foe”. The Porte replied:
“The said conversion of the Christian villages is due to a reason and
that is their fear of the assaults of the Kurds. In this case you are to
make clear that mass conversions are not permitted (müctemian
ihtidaların caiz olmadıgı). You are also instructed to defend them
from attack and prevent undesirable events.”76
The formula of “not looking good to friend or foe” (yar ve agyara hoş
görünmemek) is an obvious reference to foreign consuls, missionaries, etc.
A few days later the vilayet of Sıvas similarly reported the following:

Today some 2,000 Kurds attacked the town of Divrig i and started looting the
goods of the Christians. So far 23 Armenians have been killed and some 500
people, men and women, have applied by a petition through their village elders
to become Muslim of their own free will and to be circumcised. If the Kurds do not
listen to reason, it will be necessary to use armed force against them. . . . The
conversion of 500 people at once is likely to draw attention and this will not
have good results at the moment.77

The reference to “drawing attention” and “not having good results just
now” was, again, a clear reference to potential foreign observers. The
answer by the Porte left no doubt about this:

You have reported that some 500 people have applied to convert. For this to be
accepted by the government would mean that it would be shown by subversive
elements as the result of fear and as such it is not acceptable politically. You are to
tell the applicants that their conversion can only be accepted after order has been
restored.78

The phrase “not acceptable politically” is all-important here; this is clearly

a reference to the fact that these conversions were political acts, which the
“subversive elements” (i.e, Armenian committees, missionaries, etc.)
would use, and as such would have political repercussions in the shape
of diplomatic pressure.
Sıvas continued to be a flashpoint. Two days later the governor reported
that in the town of Darende some 200 Armenians had applied to convert to

76
BOA A.MKT MHM 638/32, 23 Teşrin i Evvel 1311 / 5 November 1895; 27 Teşrin I Evvel
1311 / 9 November 1895, the governor of Erzurum, Rauf Paşa, reply by Special
Commission of Ministers. Tercan is today a sub prefecture of the vilayet of Erzincan.
Hınzıri (or Hınzoru) is today a village in Erzincan called Tanyeri/Pınarlıkaya. See Nuri
Akbayar, Osmanlı Yer Adları Sözlüg ü (Dictionary of Ottoman Place Names).
77
BOA A.MKT MHM 660/35, 4 Teşrin I Sani 1311 / 17 November 1895, telegramme from
the governor of Sıvas, Halil Paşa, to the Grand Vezier.
78
I_ bid., 5 Teşrin i Sani 1311 / 18 November 1895, the Sublime Porte to the vilayet of Sıvas.
 Conversion as Survival 217

Islam and “were applying every day to the government offices”. They had
been turned away according to official instructions.79
An observation is in order here. The reference to “people applying every
day to have their conversions accepted” refers to the official conversion
procedure in force in the Ottoman Empire referred to in Chapter 1. In times
of extreme crisis, such as the massacres of the 1890s, an Armenian village
that had offered to become Muslim, but had not yet been accepted, would
be in a dangerous state of limbo, making the villagers even more of a target
for their enemies, who could accuse them at any time of insincerity or, even
worse, potential apostasy.
In some cases, out of desperation, in order to force the hand of the
government, Armenians even declared that they had been circumcised. On
12 November 1895 it was reported from the vilayet of Mamüretülaziz that
the Armenians from the village of Perri had “performed their own circum-
cisions” (kendü kendilerine hitanlarını icra eyledikleri). Yet this did not
prove good enough. The Porte replied: “This matter results from two
reasons. One is the fear of the attacks of the Kurds; the other is to enable
them at a later date to complain to the foreigners that they were converted
by force. . . . They are to be told that if they still want to convert indivi-
dually when order is restored the matter will be considered according to
the proper procedure and precedent.”80
On 27 November the vilayet of Bitlis reported that “all the men and
women” in three villages attached to the kaza of Genc – Mezan, Erzif, and
Tanimaveran – had applied to convert. The answer from Istanbul was
almost copied verbatim from the telegramme just quoted: “The official
acceptance of mass conversions by Armenians will cause this to be seen as
forced conversion. . . . If they apply again when order has been restored, the
matter will be considered according to proper procedure and precedent.
Until then the matter should be passed over with wise measures as ordered
in the imperial irade.”81
In some cases the conversion issue comes up in what seem to be quite
mundane circumstances. On 27 December the Mutasarrıf of Dersim asked

79
Ibid., 7 Teşrin i Sani 1311 / 20 November 1895, the vilayet of Sıvas to the Sublime Porte.
80
BOA A.MKT.MHM 657/24, 30 Teşrin I Evvel 1311 / 12 November 1895, the governor of
Mamuretülaziz, Amirî, to the Sublime Porte; 31 Teşrin i Evvel 1311 / 13 November 1895,
the Sublime Porte to the governor of Mamüretülaziz. Mamüretülaziz is present day Elazıg .
Perri is the present day bucak of Akpazar. See Tahir Sezen, Osmanlı Yer Adları (Ottoman
place names, BOA publication).
81
BOA A.MKT. MHM 619/24, deputy governor of Bitlis, Ömer Paşa, to the Sublime Porte,
14 Teşrin i Sani 1311 / 27 November 1895. The Sublime Porte to the vilayet of Bitlis.
218 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the following question: “[W]hat is to be done about people who were

previously Armenian when they were fiancéed and now want to marry as
Muslims?” The problem arose because of the official refusal to recognize
Armenian conversions, which was holding things up bureaucratically.
Another related issue was that neo-Muslim Armenians were demanding
that they be registered as Muslims and, as such, that they be exempt from
the military service tax, the bedel-i askeri. At this point, the issue of
“voluntary” conversion being carried out “without any coercion, force
or pressure” is stressed and repeated so many times (verbatim three times
within two paragraphs) that it seems particularly suspicious. The reason
given to prove how “voluntary” these conversions were is instructive:
“The fact that these conversions were carried out after the restoration of
order and after their villages were attacked by Kurds and the Kurds
dispersed, shows that they converted only because they had found the
true religion”.82 Apparently, fear of a repetition of Kurdish attacks as a
motive for conversion did not occur to the writer of the report, who was
just that bit too eager to stress that the Armenians had experienced a
spiritual enlightenment.
Another case of dubious spiritual enlightenment is a petition presented
by the Armenians of the kaza of Koyulhisar in Sivas. It is worth quoting in
total as it is a particularly poignant example of the plight of a desperate
people:

We are Armenians from Koyulhisar and our lives and property have been spared
thanks to our beloved Padişah. Fifteen days after the disturbances some of us, of
our own accord, decided to accept Islam. Now the local government is insisting that
we become Armenian again, but we did not convert out of fear or pressure. We saw
that this was the true faith may Allah grant eternal life to our glorious Padişah,
amen. Until now everybody was free to belong to any confession they wanted. Has
this permission been revoked? If our Islam had been due to fear, all of us would
have converted. But some of us have remained Armenians. Please for the sake of
Allah and our Sultan send us reliable officials who can investigate our behaviour
and what is in our hearts. They will see that we converted of our own free will and
register us accordingly in the population and property registers. Because when we
travel here and there our commercial papers and our identity papers state that we
are Armenians, but in our hearts and our dress we are Muslims. This causes
awkward questions. We are presenting this petition in Armenian because the
Muslims will not write it for us. In short, may the state hang us if it pleases, we

82
BOA A.MKT.MHM 658/10, 10 Receb 1313 / 27 December 1895, the vilayet of
Mamüretülaziz Secretariat, no. 409, forwarding a copy of a report from the mutasarrıf
of Dersim. “[M]ahza hidayet i rabbani üzerine kabul ü Islamiyet etmiş oldukları”.
 Conversion as Survival 219

are willing and we will not turn our back on Islam. (Devletimiz bizi idam etsün
ırazıyız Müslümanlıgımızdan vaz geçmeyiz)83

The Vali adopted a rather bleak view of the petition and pointed out that
two women from the same area had recently reverted to Christianity “after
firmly declaring for Islam”. He acknowledged the official order that
“extreme care [was] to be taken in the matter of conversions” and recom-
mended that no action be taken “until the weather improves”, when the
petitioners could be summoned to Sıvas for questioning.84

conversions as fallout of massacre

In fact, most of the conversions that come up in the dispatches were
reported after the ostensible restoration of order, or at least after the
worst of the massacres were over. The kaza of Pütürge in Mamüretülaziz
reported on 1 January that “some one hundred Armenian and Nestorians,
men and women, from the Şirvan village of Amirdun have converted to
Islam and, summoning circumcisers, performed their circumcisions”.
Similarly, in the district (nahiye) of Kerker and in the village of Keferdiz
in Van and “several other villages”, Christians had converted and
“renewed their marriages, performed their circumcisions, and it is heard
that they are praying five times a day in places where there are mosques”.
The report repeated that they were fully aware of the order to “avoid the
official acceptance of mass conversions as this will imply fear of attacks by
the Kurds”, yet pointed out that in none of these cases had the Christians
officially applied to have their status recognized; they were simply living as
Muslims, and the matter was coming up only because of bureaucratic
hiccoughs such as marriages, demands for exemption from the bedel, or
cases like “two Armenians who were members of the kaza Administrative
Council who are unable to perform their duties”. The kaymakam of
Pütürge, apparently quite a resourceful official, had taken it upon himself
to carry out a secret investigation; “through spies sent into their midst it
has been ascertained that they do not intend to renege on Islam”.
He pointed out that in some areas all but a small minority had converted
and that “because this kaza is inhabited by savage and nomadic Kurds and

83
BOA A.MKT. 661/34, 11 Mart 1312 / 24 March 1896, the vilayet of Sıvas to the Sublime
Porte, enclosing a petition signed by eleven residents of Koyulhisar and written in Turkish
using Armenian characters. My thanks to Rober Koptaş for reading the original.
Koyulhisar is now a kaza by the same name in the vilayet of Sıvas.
84
Ibid., 20 Nisan 1312 / 3 May 1896, the Vali of Sıvas, Halil Paşa, to the Sublime Porte.
220 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

we do not have the necessary military force [but] . . . are doing our best to
keep order [we request urgent instructions].”85
Ostentatious religious observance, grown men arranging for their own
circumcision, couples renewing their marriage vows – all of these seem to
be indications of conversion as a result of fear or at least severe pressure.
The official’s reference to the “savage Kurds” in the area also points in this
direction, and the implication in the report is that the local forces were
unable to secure the safety of the neophyte Muslims.
Reports of conversions continued to pour in. On 9 January 1896 the
governor of Mamüretülaziz wrote that “During and after the recent trou-
bles quite a few people singly and in groups presented and continue to
present petitions to have their conversions recognized and to have their
bedel cancelled. According to the present orders we have done our best to
make them change their minds and to delay proceedings”.86
The Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul did not fail to protest to the
authorities. In a communication dated 15 January, the Patriarch declared:

[It has been reported that] fifteen Christian villages in the nahiye of Eg in in the
vilayet of Mamüretülaziz, as a result of the recent terrible events, fearing for their
lives, have converted to Islam. They even became circumcised and converted their
church, which had been looted, into a mosque. The signed declaration that was sent
by the müdür of the place, to the effect that they accepted Islam of their own free
will was signed because they feared for their lives.

The Patriarch made it quite clear that there was nothing voluntary about
these conversions, which had taken place “[i]n the said areas of Anatolia
[where] hitherto unseen oppression and cruelty, insults to Christianity and
efforts to convert Christians have been witnessed”. He declared that he
had received this information in an official letter written to the
Patriarchate. Nor was the worst over; even though the necessary orders
had been sent, it was reported that “the extraordinary fear and terror
caused by the recent terrible events continues to reign and the victims
still feel threatened.” The Patriarch demanded that the conditions be
made propitious for the eventual return to Christianity of these people,

85
Ibid., 19 Kanun u Evvel 1311 / 31 December 1895, the vilayet of Mamüretülaziz forward
ing a report from the kaza of Pütürge (today a Municipality (ilçe) by the same name of the
city of Malatya). Amirdun may well be the present day I_ mrun in the centre of Pütürge.
Keferdiz is the present day village of Dog anyol. My thanks to Professor Jelle Verheij for
these place names.
86
BOA A.MKT. MHM 658/10, 23 Receb 1313 / 9 January 1896, the governor of
Mamüretülaziz, Rauf Paşa, to the Sublime Porte.
 Conversion as Survival 221

“in keeping with the principle of the freedom of religion”.87 The Porte
duly asked the governor of Mamüretülaziz to explain what was going on
and asked why they had accepted the conversions in question. The vilayet
replied that the kaymakam of Egin had indeed disregarded official
instructions and had accepted the petition of the Armenians to convert,
but that there had been no coercion and that the statement about the
church being converted to a mosque was false. The governor admitted
that “many Armenians had been applying singly or in groups and in fact
getting themselves circumcised, we have been obeying the official order
to delay matters”.88 The Patriarchate repeated its demands a month
later: “Reports from the Armenian church Metropolitans (Marhasa) in
the area continue to come in to the effect that many Armenians, laymen
as well as priests, fearing for their lives in the recent terrible events, are
showing themselves as Muslims. We demand that rapid and effective
measures be taken which will guarantee their safety if they return to their
own faith”.89
It seems that although the Porte issued orders that Armenian conver-
sions were not to be accepted, some Ottoman officials actually had diffe-
rent views and did not hesitate to express them. On 15 January the
governor of Van, Şemseddin Paşa, reported that although, as per instruc-
tions, he had been turning down Armenian conversion applications, he
now felt that “because the Armenians here live in mixed villages with
Kurds and therefore have a natural familiarity with Muslims, this inclines
many of them naturally to convert to Islam”. He went on to point out that
this was “causing great anxiety to the Armenian leaders”, and that he had
therefore accepted the recent applications for conversion of twenty-one
Armenian men and women.90 However, this was not looked upon favour-
ably by Istanbul. A special commission of the Council of Ministers replied
to the governor’s telegramme: “Although according to the principle of the
freedom of religion, no objection can be made to individual conversions
and their acceptance according to established practice and precedent,

87
Ibid., 29 Receb 1313 / 15 January 1896, memorandum from the Patriarch of the Armenian
millet, Mag akya Ormanyan, to the Sublime Porte, no. 255.
88
Ibid., 3 Kanun u Sani 1311 / 16 January 1896, cipher telegramme from the Sublime Porte
to the vilayet of Mamüretülaziz; 12 Kanun u Sani 1312 / 25 January 1896.
89
Ibid., 10 Şubat 1312 / 23 February 1896.
90
BOA Y.A RES. 85/12 2 Şubat 1312 / 15 February 1896, the governor of Van, Şemseddin
Paşa, to Yıldız Palace.
222 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

group conversions will lead our enemies to claim that the Muslims are
converting the Christians by force.”91
The claim by the governor that Armenians were “naturally inclined” to
convert because they lived cheek by jowl with Kurds was clearly disin-
genuous, and served to camouflage the fact that most Armenians who
converted were doing so not out of some suddenly discovered affinity for
their Muslim neighbours, but because they were afraid of them. Nonetheless,
the reference to “the principle of the freedom of religion”, both in the
memorandum of the ministers and in the letter of the Armenian
Patriarchate, is important because it shows that the idea of the Tanzimat
period was at least kept alive as a polite fiction.
Indeed, the fact that the Armenians of the area did not live in anything
resembling peace and harmony is borne out by the official correspondence.
On 2 January the British embassy complained to the Porte that some
seventy Armenians from the districts of Ispayrıt and Hizan in the vilayet
of Bitlis had fled to the monastery on the island of Akhtamar on Lake Van.
The embassy claimed that this was because they feared for their lives as
they were the only survivors from thirty-three villages who had not been
killed or forced to convert. The embassy asked that they be permitted to
remain in Akhdamar.92 The governor of Van, Nazım Paşa, who was
Şemseddin Paşa’s predecessor, reported that the Katogigos of Van had
asked for a guarantee of safe conduct for these people, some 120 souls. But
their remaining in Van was not desirable, and they should be sent back to
Bitlis “because they are not of the people of this province”. However, the
governor admitted that “although instructions to this effect were sent to
the local authorities, it has not been possible to convince them to go
back.”93 The matter did not end there. On 4 January the governor of
Bitlis, Ömer Paşa, wrote a long telegramme that is very important as an
indicator of the official mind-set. The Paşa declared that the claim of the
British embassy was totally baseless and that “the 6,000 Armenians living
in the kaza [of Hizan] continue to live there according to their religion and
in all security”. He pointed out that the problem in the area was “entirely

91
Ibid., 13 Ramazan 1314 / 3 Şubat 1312 / 16 February 1896, the minutes of a meeting of the
Special Commission of the Council of Ministers.
92
BOA A.MKT MHM 619/35, 20 Kanun u Evvel 1311 / 22 January 1896, translation of a
memorandum of the British embassy. Ispayrıt is today a region in the vilayet of Bitlis.
Hizan is today the kaza of Aşag ıkarasu in Bitlis. See Osmanlı Yer Adları (Ottoman place
names), BOA Publication 2001.
93
Ibid., 21 Kanun u Evvel 1311 / 3 January 1896, cipher telegramme from the governor of
Van to the Sublime Porte.
 Conversion as Survival 223

the work of a famous Armenian subversive”, a certain Dilboş. Ömer Paşa

declared that Dilboş did not hesitate to attack and kill Muslim and
Christian alike without distinction, and that the Armenians attempting
to flee to Akhtamar were in fact fleeing Dilboş. “Otherwise there is no
reason for good Muslims living in this area since centuries in peace and
harmony with Christians who always freely practiced their religion, to
suddenly start behaving in a manner so reprehensible to our August
Master.”94 After providing a classic example of blaming the victims, the
governor went on to declare: “[I]f the claim of the British Embassy
[that people were being converted by force] were true this would not be
confined to sixty or so Armenians out of some 6,000 population and it
would not have been possible for some sixty Armenians to get past so
many Kurds who are in the area and escape to Akhdamar”. Thus, the
governor was arguing, the Kurds would have done a proper job and not
left a single Armenian. As to those Armenians who did convert: “In Hizan
a few villages of Armenians did convert of their own free will and applied
to the authorities to have their conversions recognized. This was not done
and they continue to live as Muslims, have the ezan chanted and pray five
times a day. It is this that has been used by the Armenian subversives who
seize upon the least excuse to slander the Sublime State.” The governor
added that since Akhatamar was “virtually a home of subversion”, the
refugees should not be allowed to swell the numbers there.95
Two days later Ömer Paşa was to clarify the position even further:

[According to the latest information received from the kaymakam of Hizan] 2,006
men and 1,015 women making a total of 3,211, the majority in 54 villages of
Armenians, have made it known that they have accepted Islam of their own free
will. Some of the people of the said villages kept their own faith. This shows that the
claim of the Embassy is entirely baseless. Because if the Armenians were supposedly
invited to embrace Islam and if those who refused were killed, all the remaining
Armenians in these villages would have been dead and even those going to
Akhtamar would have been killed.

The governor could not resist adding, “[T]hose misinforming the Embassy
are a few well known missionaries who are in fact the ones who are after
converting people”.96 Apparently there was nothing unusual about the
fact that 3,021 people should suddenly become enamoured of Islam and

94
BOA A.MKT.MHM 619/35, 22 Kanun u Evvel 1311 / 4 January 1896, cipher telegramme
from the governor of Van, Nazım Paşa, to the Sublime Porte.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid., 24 Kanun u Sani 1311 / 6 January 1896. It seems that the Paşa could not add.
224 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

seek the true path “of their own free will” when they were surrounded by
hostile Kurds.

the abduction of women

The fact that this “free will” was often the result of terror was borne out by
the efforts that were subsequently made by some foreign consuls to rescue
women who had been abducted during the massacres and forced into
marriage. Well before the massacres, the abduction of Armenian women
by Kurds was a frequent occurrence in the region that often went unpun-
ished. As early as 1878 Bogos Natanyan was to write : “The greatest
amusement of the men called the agas is to amuse themselves by outraging
the honour of Armenian women. . . . When they are unable to get the
woman they want, they persecute her husband. They are protected by
the local officials.”97 A case that became symbolic of the government’s
proclivity to ignore the abduction cases was the case of Musa Bey. In 1889
a prominent Kurdish sheikh from Muş, Musa Bey, abducted a young
Armenian girl, Arménouhie, who was forced to convert and take the
name Gülizar. Musa Bey was summoned to Istanbul and put on trial,
becoming something of a public hero. The case attracted the attention of
the foreign diplomatic community and became something of a cause
celèbre. Arménouhie was restored to her family, but Musa Bey was acquit-
ted, causing outrage in the Armenian and foreign communities.98 A large
portion of the correspondence of Gustave Meyrier deals with this issue:
“Yesterday they brought back six women, none of them wanted to go back
to her family. I know and I have living proof at hand that these unfortu-
nates behave like this because they are threatened with death by the Kurds
and they have no confidence in the protection of the authorities.” He was
to propose that rather than lodging these women in Muslim homes where
they were subject to threats, they should be handed back to their religious
leaders and kept in the church while the investigation was going on.99 A

97
Yarman, Palu, Harput, Çarsancak, Çemişkezek, Çapakçur, Erzincan ve Civar Bölgeler.
Raporlar, p. 190.
98
Armenouhie Kevonian, Les noces noires de Gulizar (Paris, 1993). To this day Musa Bey’s
trial serves as subject matter for apologetic works that see his trial as an instance of “the
usual enmity and interference of foreigners”: see Musa Şaşmaz, 19. Asrın Davası. Kürd
Musa Bey’in Yargılanması (The case of the century: The trial of Kürd Musa Bey) (Nig de,
1997), p. 123.
99
Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir. Gustave Meyrier to Paul Cambon, 12 March 1896,
p. 85. My translation.
 Conversion as Survival 225

few days later Meyrier was to report that a nine-year-old girl had been
brought in, a Syriac Catholic who refused to go back to her community.
When the bishop of the Syriac Catholics intervened, the governor, Enis
Paşa, “publicly reminded him of the Salonica affair where two Consuls
had been killed in similar circumstances and said he could not expose
himself to similar inconveniences. I take this as a personal and direct
threat.” This statement about the killing of two Consuls in Salonica in
similar circumstances was indeed perceived as a threat by the French and
British embassies, which protested energetically to the Porte.100
Enis Paşa was to come as close as possible to having his knuckles
officially rapped, and he was asked in rather stern terms: “In order for
there not to ensue anything untoward and likely to cause murmurings
please clarify if such a conversation did or did not take place.”101 Enis Paşa
replied: “Christian women who had been dispersed here and there during
the troubles are being recovered and handed back to their families or
religious leaders.” There was a problem, however: “[S]ome of these have
become Muslim of their own free will and married Muslims and are now
firmly declaring that they will not accept either their families or
Christianity”.102 Enis Paşa then went on to recount the conversation he
had with the Syriac bishop. Apparently just as the Armenian Metropolitan
and the bishop were visiting with him, a group of girls and women were
brought in from the surrounding villages. They were questioned in the
presence of the Metropolitan and the bishop and declared that “they
would in no circumstance return to their families or churches”. At this
point the bishop had intervened in the case of the Syriac girl, who was
insisting that she was Muslim and a legal adult. The bishop stated that
because she was a child her testimony was not valid and that she should be
returned to her community. It is at this point that the conversation takes an
interesting turn:

I told the Bishop that we also did not approve of the likes of her remaining Muslim
and that the reason why we did not officially carry out their conversions was
precisely in order for them to be able to return to their previous religions now or
later. But nor can it be acceptable, given the times and the circumstances, to drag

100
Ibid., p. 175. This was discussed as the “grievous Salonica incident” in Chapter 2 of this
volume.
101
BOA A.MKT.MHM 637/16, 13 Mart 1312 / 26 March 1896, cipher telegramme from
the Sublime Porte to the vilayet of Diyarbakir. “Sızıldı” (murmuring, lamentation) was
one of the most common Ottoman euphemisms for “trouble from foreigners”.
102
Ibid., 14 Mart 1312 / 27 March 1896, the Vali of Diyarbakir, Enis Paşa, to the Sublime
Porte.
226 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

such a person by the arm and hair to the church, when they are openly and in front
of witnesses declaring that they are Muslims. This is also against the principle of
religious freedom (hürriyet i mezhebiye) that my government has always defended,
and touches upon the matter of national feelings (hissiyat ı milliye tokunur). From
small matters such as this big problems may arise, particularly as public excitement
has only just been appeased and efforts are being made to assure its continuity.103

This is a very cleverly formulated position. The reference to the official line
not to accept mass conversion is mentioned, ostensibly keeping the door
open for an eventual return to Christianity, although it was highly unlikely
that a terrorized young person would find the courage to take such a step.
The issue of the abduction of women also had a specific gender dimen-
sion. Very often, in addition to fear, shame would have been the reason
why many of these women would refuse to go back to their communities,
as a loss of virginity in these circumstances would have condemned them to
lifelong stigmatization and ended their marriage prospects. Forced con-
version was therefore much more traumatic for women because it involved
institutionalized rape under the cover of “marriage” to their abductors.104
What is most remarkable was the Paşa’s reference to “religious free-
dom”, which was very clearly a polite fiction in this context, not to say a
travesty. Even more striking is his reference to “national feelings” because
it gives away the nature of the massacres as a manifestation of “national
feelings”, implying that a provocative act could once again enflame them,
leading to further massacre. Even so, he makes no admission of mentioning
the Salonica affair directly, stating only that “great problems could arise
from small matters”.105
The British embassy continued to put pressure on the Foreign Ministry,
claiming that “over one hundred Christians remain in the hands of the Kurds
and are afraid to reveal their true religious inclination because of fear”.106
The ministry also relayed information from the British embassy to the effect
that the commission that had been sent to recover Christian women had
brought sixteen such women to Diyarbakır on 11 March: “Because they were

103
Ibid.
104
For a discussion of “sexual humiliation used to intimidate the Armenian community”
during the genocide of 1915, see Katherine Derderian, “Common Fate, Different
Experience: Gender Specific Aspects of the Armenian Genocide, 1915 1917”,
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 19 (2005), 1 25. Although this article deals with a
later period, the experiences of Armenian women in the 1890s must have been very
similar.
105
BOA A.MKT.MHM 637/16. Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, p. 86.
106
BOA A.MKT.MHM 637/16, 28 Mart 1896 / 10 April 1896, the foreign minister, Tevfik
Paşa, to the Sublime Porte, Foreign Ministry Chancery no. 292.
 Conversion as Survival 227

threatened by death by the Kurds who had abducted them and by the Muslim
population, they said they did not want to go back to their families and did
not trust the local authorities to protect them. . . . These threats led them to
change their minds [about declaring for Christianity]”.107
Meyrier repeatedly told his ambassador that the Ottoman authorities in
Diyarbakır were deliberately blocking his efforts to reunite abducted
women with their families. “Their situation is indeed lamentable; in all
this morbid affair, they deserve the most compassion.”108 Meyrier
reported further that the abducted victims were threatened “not only by
their ravishers but also by other Muslims”. He had sent one Muslim and
two Christians into the villages around Diyarbakır to rescue the victims of
abduction, but they had been largely unsuccessful; “it seems many murders
have been committed in the villages for similar reasons”. The consul had
given the delegation a list of some hundred names; they had returned with
only one woman and her daughter. The delegation was sure that the Kurds
hid the victims and sometimes even transported them from one village to
another.109
The British vice consul in Diyarbakır, C. M. Hallward, was to sum up:
“In all about 8,000 appear to have been killed in the vilayet, and 25,000
turned Moslem. Upwards of 500 women and girls have been abducted. . . .
I give these figures for what they are worth and subject to correction. . . .
The general belief is that the whole thing was organized by Ennis Paşa, the
Vali, in concert with some of the leading Moslems”.110 Meyrier had
already identified some of these “leading Muslims”, including Cemil
Paşa, “ex-governor of Yemen known for his fanaticism”, and Arif
Efendi, a local leader of the Kurds. At the behest of the embassies, the
Porte was obliged to send a commission of enquiry to Diyarbakır, led by
Abdullah Paşa, one of the Sultan’s ADCs and one of the few Ottoman
officials about whom the diplomats had anything good to say.111 Meyrier
stated, “Abdullah Paşa knows that the tension in the area is kept up by
them”.112 Abdullah Paşa reported that it was indeed Cemil Paşa and Arif

107
Ibid., 16 Mart 1312 / 29 Mart 1896, the foreign minister, Tevfik Paşa, to the Sublime
Porte, Foreign Ministry Chancery no. 117.
108
Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, 20 March 1896, pp. 175 9.
109
Ibid., 21 March 1896, p. 179.
110
Vice Consul Hallward to Consul Cumberlach, 17 March 1896, British Blue Book:
Turkey 1896, as cited in Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, pp. 215 16.
111
Walker, Armenia, p. 147. The chief dragoman of the British embassy, Adam Block,
referred to Abdullah Paşa as “a fairly straight man”.
112
Meyrier, Les Masacres de Diarbekir, p. 171.
228 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Efendi who had spread the rumour during Ramazan that “all the
Christians were going to be massacred and that this was an order of the
Sultan”. Abdullah Paşa was particularly scathing about Arif Efendi:
“[A]lthough the imperial instructions that the said people be scolded and
told that measures will be taken if they do not mend their ways, will work
on Cemil Paşa, no amount of advice can effect Arif Efendi who is known
for his bad behaviour . . . and is after increasing his influence and glory by
provoking further disturbances”. Accordingly, Abdullah Paşa advised that
Arif be exiled “as an example to others of like mind”.113 The Porte,
however, considerably softened the punishment and instructed Abdullah
Paşa that “Arif Efendi not be exiled but that it be suggested to him that he
remove himself temporarily to Mosul”.114 On 24 March, Abdullah Paşa
asked permission to end the commission and return to Istanbul as “peace
and order reigns again and we have seen the end of Ramazan without any
trouble”.115 Meyrier felt that this issue of abducted girls and women was
something that had broken Abdullah Paşa: “Abdullah Paşa, who at the
beginning had taken this matter to heart, told me lately that he was
discouraged and he no longer wanted to occupy himself with it. He has
certainly received orders from his superiors which have changed, if not his
mode of thought, at least his mode of action”.116
Meanwhile, Enis Paşa, far from being held responsible for the massa-
cres, remained at his post despite the various promises that the French
and British embassies extracted from the Porte that he would be dismissed.
The French embassy actually told Meyrier that the Council of Ministers
had suggested to the sultan that he be replaced.117 Evidently Enis Paşa had
the sultan’s support because he was still in place well after the Inspection
Committee left Diyarbakır. Moreover, he continued to deny the British
claims that a large number of Christians were still being held by Kurds
and to report on cases of “women and children who were dispersed here
and there during the troubles and are now being recovered and turned over
to their families”. He reported on 17 April that two women and two boys
had been brought in from the kazas of Egin and Garb; they had declared

113
BOA Y.A HUS 347/58, 23 Şubat 1311 / 8 March 1895, the Committee of Inspection to
the Sublime Porte.
114
Ibid., 23 Ramazan 1311 / 10 March 1896, the Sublime Porte Receiver’s Office to Grand
Vizier Rıfat Paşa.
115
BOA Y.A HUS 348/52, 11 Mart 1312 / 24 March 1896, the Committee of Inspection to
the Sublime Porte.
116
Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, p. 183.
117
Ibid., Jules de La Bouliere to Gustave Meyrier, 27 February 1896, p. 184.
 Conversion as Survival 229

that they were Christians and been handed over to their families. One of
the women, who had a six-year-old child with her, “had insisted that she
was a Muslim even after she had been put in an empty room with her
brother”. Presumably the brother was to try to dissuade her.118 As late as
the summer of 1896, Enis Paşa continued to hold his post. Again respond-
ing to an accusation of the British embassy that he was carrying out forced
conversions, he confidently declared that “these are the slanders of
enemies” (müfteriat-ı bedhahaniyeden).119

mass conversion as a diplomatic issue

No doubt Enis Paşa would have counted the foreign consuls among his
“enemies”. One of the most celebrated cases of forced conversion and
subsequent return to Christianity was that of the Armenians of Birecik,
near present-day Urfa. This case also became a cause celèbre like that of
Şeyh Musa as it developed into an international diplomatic crisis involving
the British, French, and Russian governments. On 3 March 1895, it was
reported that a sizeable population (some 200 households) of Armenians
had converted to Islam in Birecik, in south-east Anatolia. The Ottoman
government had therefore consented to send a mixed commission of
enquiry to the area, consisting of two officials from the vilayet of Aleppo
and the dragoman of the British embassy, Fitzmaurice.120 The commission
had interviewed leaders of the convert community, who were named as
“ex-Gregorians Haçik Efendi, now called Mehmet Şakir Efendi, and Abos
Efendi now called Şeyh Müslim Efendi, ex-Catholic Hacıbekuzan Efendi
now called I_ brahim Efendi”. The leaders of the community openly stated
that “the recent events had caused them to fear for their lives, and that was
why they became Muslim”. They also promised that they would not
convert back to Christianity once the danger was over. Moreover, “the
conversion of the church which they had made into a mosque was done
entirely at their own expense, and they had no intention whatever of

118
BOA A.MKT.MHM 637/19, 4 Nisan 1312 / 17 April 1896, Enis Paşa to the Sublime
Porte. The fact that this particular woman had a six year old child shows that she had
“married” some six years previously, probably making it impossible for her to return even
if she wanted to. The child would have been born some years before the massacres.
119
BOA A.MKT.MHM 637/33, 1 Temmuz 1312 / 14 July 1896, Enis Paşa to the Sublime
Porte.
120
BOA Y.A HUS 352/1, 18 Şubat 1311 / 3 March 1895, the Sublime Porte, Office of the
Grand Vizier, report prepared by Accountant of the Evkaf of Aleppo Ali Rıza, President
of the Court of Aleppo Mustafa, Dragoman of the British Embassy, Fitzmaurice.
230 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

converting it back to a church”. The Armenians interviewed were then

asked to sign a report written by the commission. The report recorded that
“the community had not been subjected to any pressure or force in accept-
ing Islam but had only acted out of fear of recent events, being obviously in
a state of great distress and poverty after the recent calamities and the
sacking of their property”. On 28 May the Vali of Aleppo was asked his
opinion on the matter. The Ottoman governor reiterated that the
Armenian converts had converted “only because they feared for their
lives” (sırf muhafaza-i hayat maksadına müsteniddir). He pointed out
that the state had two options. The first was to allow the Armenians to
remain where they were and revert to Christianity; if it took this option, it
was necessary to “execute some of those Muslims who had taken part in
the killing and looting, in order to frighten the [rest of the population]”.
This would work, however, only for the urban areas. Those in the country-
side would still not be able to circulate among the Kurdish tribes who were
their neighbours, “which is in fact the very reason for their insistence on
the sincerity of their conversion”. The second option was to move the
converts somewhere far from Birecik, so that when they re-converted back
to Christianity, their Muslim neighbours would not know that they were
apostates.121
What I have called a dangerous state of limbo for all new converts was
remarked upon by Fitzmaurice:

As the legal formalities necessary on conversion to Islam had not yet been
performed, the government refused to recognize them as such before demanding
instructions from Aleppo; and, as the population were still menacing in their
attitude, and reproached them with insincerity in their newly adopted faith, to
prove their sincerity, in the face of threats, the Armenians proceeded to convert
their church into a mosque, which they called ‘Hamidieh Mosque’ after His
Imperial Majesty the Sultan; some of them took a second wife, went through the
rite of circumcision. . . . They now all wear turbans, and are apparently most
zealous in their attendance at the mosque and in the other observances of their
newly adopted religion. . . . A declaration of Christianity by them at the present
would be most dangerous.122

Fitzmaurice, for his part, was convinced that the massacres and conver-
sions were the work of the central government and the local authorities.
“In the final massacre, faced with a Moslem mob crying ‘Our Padishah has

121
Ibid.
122
Vice Consul Fitzmaurice to Sir P. Currie, 5 March 1896, House of Commons
Parliamentary Papers. Turkey, no. 5 (1896), Correspondence Relating to the Asiatic
Provinces of Turkey, pp. 4 5.
 Conversion as Survival 231

ordered that the Armenians be massacred, and that no Christians are to be

left in the country’, the Ottoman official and reserve soldiers who had
turned up in early December stood aside”.123 From Birecik Fitzmaurice
travelled to Urfa, the scene of the most severe massacres, where, he said,
8,000 Armenians had been killed in two days, half of them burnt alive in
the cathedral.124
Fitzmaurice returned to Istanbul in April but was back in Birecik on 30
May as part of the Birecik Commission of Enquiry that the sultan had
agreed to form. He also claimed to have persuaded at least some of the
Armenian converts who had converted “under the influence of terror” to
return to Christianity, and to demand the protection promised by the
sultan. But in the villages he was not so successful as “he found them too
fearful”.125 This is also borne out by the Ottoman sources. The vilayet of
Aleppo reported on 10 September 1896 that in Urfa, “the majority
(kısm-ı azamı) of the 1,000 Armenians who had converted to Islam, having
seen the return of peace and order, have returned to their old faith. The
remnants insist on remaining Muslims. The English official Fitzmaurice
seems satisfied with this outcome and is preparing to leave.”126
It appears that by the summer of 1897 fear still ruled, but the worst was
over, and a shade of normality had returned. There is a very interesting
paper trail relating to the conversion to Islam and potential return to
Christianity of the Armenians in the sancaks of Sason and Genc in the
vilayet of Bitlis. On 11 August, the Foreign Ministry was informed that in
Genc a total of 105 households in 12 nahiyes had made it known that they
had converted during the “troubles of 1895” and now wanted to return to
their original faith, but were afraid to do so. Some of the Armenians who
had reverted back to their original faith had complained that the popu-
lation officer (nüfus müdürü) of Genc, a certain Haydar Efendi, had
tampered with the registers, and by increasing the ages of male children
was now demanding that they pay an extortionate amount of military
exemption tax (bedel i askeri). In reaction, the Armenians had stated
that they were going back to Islam.127 What is remarkable here is that

123
G. R Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865 1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy
in Turkey (Leiden, 2007), p. 27.
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid., pp. 28 30.
126
BOA Y.A HUS 359/6, 28 Ag ustos 1312 / 10 September 1896, the vilayet of Aleppo to the
Sublime Porte.
127
BOA A.MKT. MHM 620/50, 29 Temmuz 1313 / 11 August 1897, the foreign minister,
Tevfik Paşa, to the Sublime Porte, Foreign Ministry Secretariat no. 1969.
232 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the Armenian Islamo-Christians felt that they were in a position that

was at least safe enough to enable them to bargain with the state. One
week later the vilayet of Bitlis reported that “all the Christians who
had converted to Islam during the troubles have now returned to their
old faith without suffering pressure of any kind”. It was further reported
that the Armenians who had claimed that they were being unfairly
taxed also claimed to be part of the “unregistered population” (nüfus-u
mektume).128
In response to the declaration that they would return to Islam, the Vali
of Bitlis was to blandly declare: “It is entirely up to them to decide whether
they want to become Muslims or remain as Christians . . . but it has been
determined by the Ministry of Finance that they are to pay the bedel from
the date of their birth to the date they became unregistered population”. In
other words, the state was telling them that they were responsible for their
tax arrears as Christians even if they turned Muslim. In the event, the
people in question remained Christians.129 Despite the evident tension,
the official fiction was kept up. On 8 November the Foreign Ministry wrote
that “The claim of the British Embassy that the Christians who converted
during the troubles were now afraid to return to their old faith because of
the attitude of the Kurds, is entirely unfounded.” The minister declared,
“[T]he 900 Christians in the kaza of Genc have since reverted back to their
old faith and are practicing their religion in complete peace and
security”.130
It appears that the fallout of 1895 was to last a long time. On 26 April
1902 the British embassy was to report that twelve families amounting to
seventy-five souls in the village of Çatal, kaza of Andırın, vilayet of Aleppo,
“who had been forced to accept Islam to save their lives during the
troubles”, had applied to return to their original faith. The embassy
claimed that they had been prevented from doing so by the local author-
ities, who were forcing them to have their children circumcised and to
marry their daughters to Muslims.131

128
Ibid. “Nüfus u Mektume” was an official category that we have seen earlier in several
similar contexts.
129
Ibid., 5 Ag ustos 1313 / 18 August 1897, the Vali of Bitlis, Ömer Paşa, to the Sublime
Porte.
130
Ibid., 26 Teşrin i Evvel 1313 / 8 November 1897, the Foreign Ministry to the Sublime
Porte, no. 2931.
131
BOA A.MKT. MHM 654/10, 13 Nisan 1318 / 26 April 1902, the Sublime Porte to the
Ministry of the Interior. Andırın is today a sub prefecture of Kahramanmaraş.
 Conversion as Survival 233

conclusion
The conversions of the Armenians in Anatolia during these fateful years
were entirely a survival tactic, as indeed is indicated by the fact that many
went back to their original faith once the danger was over. Some, however,
appear to have remained committed, even zealous Muslims. In an oral
history interview preserved at the Armenian Research Centre, Garabed
Bandazian declared the following:

“Did any Armenian in Perri become a Turk before 1915?”

“As far as I remember, three families became Turks during the 1895 massacre,
Urachian, Mazmanian, and Booloutian.”
“How did the Armenians look upon these people? Did they hate them?”
“The Armenians did not resent them. Even though they had become Turks, they
were still with the Armenians. They still had the Armenian spirit During peaceful
times they did not go to the mosque or carry out their custom of getting washed
several times a day. But when the fear started, they would go to the spring and
obviously wash their hands before they went to the mosque to pray, so they
wouldn’t show they were Armenians.”
“What happened to them in 1915?”
“Nothing happened to them.”
“Because they had become Turks?”
“Yes, they became fanatical Armenian haters. And we heard that one of the
Mazmanian sons . . . and one of the Urachian sons, massacred many Armenians in
Perri. To save their skin, they wanted to show that they were dedicated Turks and
would kill Armenians. That’s the kind of Armenians who became Turks and
preserved their Mohammedanism.”132

The issue of mass conversions of Armenians is obviously linked to the whole

vexed question of whether the massacres were ordered, inspired, or encour-
aged by the sultan and his government. Even if most of the evidence pointing
to official complicity or official inspiration is circumstantial, it is nonetheless
substantial. François Georgeon, in what amounts to the only recent political
biography of Abdülhamid II, gives a very balanced assessment. Georgeon
contends that to view the sultan as “avenging himself against the Armenians”
for forcing him into reforms that he did not want to carry out goes against
“the extreme prudence in foreign and domestic policy that he manifested

132
ARC. [GEN 44] Interview with Garabed Bandazian (May 8 1980), born on 27 November
1907 in the city of Perri in the vilayet of Charsancak (now Akpazar in Tunceli). Although
it is clearly not possible to extrapolate on the basis of this one example how many
Islamized Armenians fit this pattern, the fact that the interview subject mentioned specific
families and individuals suggests that life stories of this sort had become part of the
historical memory of the generation that grew up hearing them.
234 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

during his long reign”.133 Also, there were in fact whole regions that escaped
the massacres through the energetic actions of some local authorities. The
actual massacres were carried out by “the Muslims of eastern Anatolia,
notables, dervishes, ulema, and the sheikhs of Kurdish tribes”. All of these
elements were terrified “by the spectre of an independent Armenia” where
they would become “ immigrants” (muhacir, as it happened in the Balkans.
That was why the massacres “spread like shockwaves” immediately after the
announcement of the acceptance of the reforms by the sultan. Various sources
also attest to the fact that provocative sermons were preached in mosques
after Friday prayers, spreading the rumour that the reforms amounted to the
granting of independence to the Armenians.134 A newspaper published by the
Kurdish opposition to Abdülhamid claimed that he had pardoned murderers
and included them in the ranks of the Hamidiye. The leading article
commented:

Let us consider what disasters have befallen the people, how much blood has been
spilt how many homes ruined as the result of the bloody oppression and murderous
policies of His Imperial Majesty. . . . Had the Kurd previously suffered at the hands
of the Armenian? No! What evil had befallen the Armenian at the hand of the
Kurd? None!135

Christopher Walker, based on his research in the British consular records,

states unequivocally, “That they were the orders of Abdul Hamid there can
be no doubt.” The fact that troops took part in the massacres and that they
began and ended with a bugle call is cited as further proof of official
complicity.136 Enflamatory sermons by mollahs of doubtful provenance,
some amounting to “veritable calls to murder”, would explain why many
of the massacres occurred on Fridays.137 Often local officials like Enis Paşa
at Diyarbekir were involved in aiding and abetting the massacres. Many of
the goods plundered from Armenian shops would later turn up at the
homes of senior officials.138 Dragoman Fitzmaurice, for his part, was
convinced that the massacres occurred at a signal from the sultan: “No
direct orders had been issued . . . but clear hints had come down from

133
François Georgeon, Abdulhamid II le sultan calife (Paris, 2003), p. 293.
134
Ibid., p. 294.
135
Kurdistan, no. 26, 14 December 1900. This is a newspaper published in Cairo primarily
by the sons of the famous Kurdish leader Şeyh Bedirhan Bey. My thanks to Rezzan
Karaman for this reference.
136
Georgeon, Abdulhamid, p. 294. Christopher Walker, Armenia, pp. 146, 157.
137
François Georgeon, Abdulhamid II, pp. 294, 295; Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, Ermeni Olayları
Tarihi (Istanbul, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 94, 100.
138
Gustave Meyrier, Les Massacres de Diarbekir, p. 130.
 Conversion as Survival 235

Yıldız that ‘it would be desirable to give the Armenians a good lesson’. In
an Oriental country, he said, this was all that was needed.”139 Rev. W. A.
Wigram, who travelled in the area soon after the massacres occurred, was
convinced that they were carried out on the orders of the centre:

Diarbekr [sic] in 1895 was one of the centres of the Armenian massacres, and as
many as 2500 perished in this place alone. . . . The massacre was undoubtedly
prompted by the government of Constantinople; but their agents were the fanatical
Kurds who swarm in the slums of Diarbekr. . . . That the massacre was political and
not religious was proved by the fact that the Syrian Christians (who are also
numerous in Diarbekr) did not suffer to anything like the same extent as their
Armenian co religionists. The crowd of refugees who sought sanctuary in the
Jacobite cathedral were not molested. . . . But the very fact that the distinction
was made between Armenians and Syrians, is sufficient to indicate that in this
instance the mob was under some sort of control.140

Although there is no evidence of a direct order on the part of Abdülhamid

to massacre Armenians, the ultimate responsibility rests on him as head of
state:

The extent of Abdülhamid’s direct complicity in the full spectrum of the massacres
is . . . unclear. . . . It may well be that the sultan was not always precisely informed
about the extent and proximate cause of of the massacres in the provinces. . . . This
is not to absolve him of guilt, since he bore the primary responsibility of inculcating
the athmosphere of anti Christian, Islamic chauvinism in which the massacres took
place.141

When Said Paşa, ex-foreign minister and sometime Grand Vizier, took
refuge with the British embassy in 1895, “firmly convinced that the
Sultan intended to deprive him of liberty if not of life”, he was to
confide openly in the British ambassador: “The Sultan’s complicity in
the Sassoun massacres received full confirmation from him, and he
quoted a statement made by His Majesty that the Armenian question
must be settled not by reform but by blood. ‘At first’ he said, ‘I did not
understand his meaning. I thought he referred to war with a foreign
Power, but I find he meant massacre’”.142

139
G. R. Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 25.
140
Rev. W. A Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind. Life in Eastern Kurdistan (London, 1922),
pp. 34 6.
141
Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide, p 55.
142
Roy Douglas, “Britain and the Armenian Question 1894 7”, The Historical Journal 19
(1976), 113 33. Douglas cites Salisbury Papers, Christ Church, Oxford, Currie to
Salisbury, 11 December 1895 (Salisbury, A/135 fos. 249 56).
236 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The fact that the massacres actually ceased abruptly, even if the state of
terror continued, strongly implies that they were not simply acts of sponta-
neous cruelty: “If we regard the atrocities as the mere sadistic cruelty of a
half-mad tyrant, or an expression of Moslem fanaticism, [if] the massacres
could be explained in either of these two ways, there was no way of
stopping them at all. Evidently, they must be seen as deliberate acts of
policy.” Abdülhamid was to tell the British ambassador, Sir Philip Currie,
in 1897 that “the Armenian question” was “finally closed”.143
Indeed, there was nothing essentially “Eastern” or “oriental” about the
Hamidian massacres and the mass conversions of the period. What was
perceived as a thorn in the side of the state had to be torn out or at least
pruned down. The target was no dubious “Armenian peasant
Renaissance”, as argued by Robert Melson, but rather a segment of the
population that was perceived of as potentially disloyal or treacherous.144
The aim was thus to render them ineffectual; in this sense killing them or
converting them (provided the conversion was permanent) achieved the
same result. What Eldem has claimed to be the Hamidian state’s position
vis-à-vis the Armenians after the Ottoman Bank raid can also be trans-
posed to the massacres and mass conversions: “If we accept that this
position of ‘terror against terror’ was the position of . . . Yıldız, it represents
a serious departure from the legalist, bureaucratic and reconciliatory
tradition of the Tanzimat. Even so it is an understanding where, ideology,
realpolitik, and manipulation are dominant , and as such, it is in a strange
and terrifying way, more ‘modern’”.145
How can we contextualize the issue of mass conversions during the
Hamidian massacres, and how do they differ from conversion policies and
practices that we have seen in the previous chapters? In what way does the
story of the conversion of the Armenians during the Hamidian era differ
from the pattern seen before under the Tanzimat State? The most obvious
difference was that the complicated and detailed conversion procedure
that we saw in the previous chapters was not put into practice. In
none of the cases just cited was there any reference to a witness declaring
that the conversions were voluntary, of a priest being present, or of the
family of the convert being given the opportunity to dissuade them. Also,

143
Ibid.
144
Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894 1896”,
Comparative Studies in Society and History 24 (1982), 481 509. See also Robert Melson,
Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust
(Chicago, 1992), p. 69.
145
Eldem, “26 Ag ustos”, p. 146.
 Conversion as Survival 237

the previous regimes and the Hamidian regime itself had no qualms about
accepting the most bogus of conversions, as seen in Chapter 4. The key
seems to be the official policy that individual conversions were permissible
but that mass conversions were not to be accepted. There are several
remarks that can be made on this conjuncture. The ostensible reason for
the state’s refusal to accept mass conversions was that, at some later date,
at the first opportunity, the Armenians would “complain to the foreigners”
that they had been forced to convert. Even if this reason is taken at face
value, it still means depriving the Armenians of a last desperate measure of
defence against being massacred. The official documentation openly stated
on all occasions that the reason for the conversions was “fear of the
Kurds” (ekrad’dan havf ve haşiyetleri), because when an Armenian village
converted, but their conversion was not accepted officially, they were in
that very dangerous state of limbo where they were at the mercy of the
Kurds and other Muslims who were looking for the slightest excuse to fall
upon them. To take a cynical view, this would suit the state because, on the
one hand, they could claim to the observers on the spot, like the foreign
consuls or missionaries and their superiors in Istanbul, that they had
nothing to do with it and that the mass conversions and previous or
subsequent massacres were the result of popular outrage that they could
not control. On the other hand, their interests would be served, either
through the Armenians becoming genuine Muslims or by their eventual
decimation by the Kurds. Moreover, telling the Armenian potential
converts “You may convert individually once order has been restored”
seems disingenuous at best when there was a very real chance that they
would not live that long.
Dragoman Fitzmaurice certainly did not nourish any illusions about the
actual conversions being the result of “free will”:

I would beg here to point out and it is a distinction upon which the Turkish
authorities may lay great stress, that the Moslems did not with axes in their
hands invite the Christians to choose between the alternatives of Islam or death.
They simply showed and proved their determined resolve to massacre all
Christians, and the latter, to save their lives, accepted Islamism. It is the subtle
logical distinction between objective and subjective. The alternatives offered by
the Mussulmans were not Islam or death, whereas the only alternative left to the
Christians were those of death or Islam. So that the Armenians, to save themselves
from certain death, became Mussulmans of their own free will, if, indeed, people
under such terrible circumstances can in any way be considered as free agents
possessing a free will.146

146
Vice Consul Fitzmaurice to Sir P.Currie Birejik, 5 March 1896, Turkey, no. 5 (1896), 3.
238 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

The deliberate delay in the conversion formalities also seems to be repre-

hensible from the standpoint of Islamic jurisprudence. In an earlier period,
at least in one instance, the Şeyhülislam’s office (fetvahane) had issued an
official fetva denouncing the negligence of officials who declined to accept
a conversion:

[I]f any individual from among the infidels presents himself before any governor,
ruler or officer or even anybody from the humble folk, saying ‘make me a Muslim
and initiate me in the faith’, if he was to receive the answer ‘I do not know’ or ‘go to
so and so’, this is verily the greatest of sins. . . . This delay and neglect is against
Şeriat rulings and deserves divine retribution.147

Indeed, just what was meant by “individual” or “isolated” (münferid)

conversions is a moot point. Who decided on the conversion? It would
seem that heads of families would make the decision or, as in the case of
the Birecik Armenians, community leaders. How many heads, or heads
of families, had to be counted for the act to qualify as an acceptable
conversion? It must also be borne in mind that the various references in
the documents to the Armenians “converting freely and without pres-
sure” almost always occur right after a reference to their converting “out
of fear of the Kurds”, which puts an entirely new face on the idea of free
will. It appears that – to Hamidian officialdom, at least – fear of recent
massacres or of their probable repetition amounted to free will. In at
least one case, the Armenians were said to be converting after the
immediate danger had passed because their villages had already been
hit, and this was held as proof of the genuineness of the conversion. In
another case the converted Armenians were told that even if they con-
verted they would still be responsible for extortionist tax arrears. The
frequent reference to grown men having themselves circumcised, in what
were most likely to be primitive hygienic conditions, and this still not
qualifying as a legitimate conversion, also seems to point in the direction
of official complicity. The repeated references to Armenians “applying
every day” to have their conversions recognized, to renew their marriage
vows, must surely indicate a serious degree of desperation that the state
was choosing to ignore. References to “natural inclinations to convert”
because of proximity to Muslims as a genuine motive for conversion
appear to be highly cynical. Open admission that Armenian claims to
forced conversion were baseless because if the Kurds wanted to they

147
BOA. A MKT 86/42, 15 Receb 1263 / 24 June 1847. Fetva from the Şeyhülislam’s office
regarding a breach in the procedure of conversion on the part of the kaza council of
Şehirkoy and the eyalet of Niş.
 Conversion as Survival 239

would not have spared any of them, comes as close as possible to an

official admission of complicity. The official attitude in relation to the
abduction of Armenian girls and women is also highly suspect; in
particular, the mention of the provocation of “national feelings” if one
interfered too much with the abductors strongly implies that some
degree of official approval was extended to the acts that had led to the
inflaming of “national feelings”.
Robert Melson has drawn attention to the distinction that must be made
between the policies of Abdülhamid and the subsequent policies of the
Young Turks:

Sultan Abdul Hamid II had no intention of exterminating the Armenians or

destroying the Armenian millet as such. The main reason why total genocide was
not perpetrated by the Ottoman regime in 1894 1896 was its commitment to
Islam, to the millet system, and to restoring the old order. Abdul Hamid was not
a revolutionary. . . . The Porte was able to go along with or to help perpetrate
massacre, but it was not willing to go so far as to destroy the Armenian millet.148

The Young Turks, on the other hand, made it their policy to deliberately
and systematically exterminate the Armenians. In this genocidal context,
conversion and its acceptance or rejection by the authorities was to take on
a very different hue. When Talat Paşa ordered the deportation of converted
Armenians in 1915 “because no importance should be placed on these
conversions which are fake and temporary”, he was not speaking the
language of the imperial old order; he was speaking the terrifying language
of the future. 149

148
Melson, Revolution and Genocide, p. 69.
149
Taner Akçam, Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur (Istanbul, 2008), pp. 297 8.
 Conclusion

We began by asking what was specific to the nineteenth-century Ottoman

state in the acts of conversion and apostasy, and offered the hypothesis that
what made them specific to the time was their overlapping with the age of
National Revival movements. The previous chapters have examined the
question across a period spanning the pre-Tanzimat era, the Tanzimat
state, and the Hamidian state. The failure of the Tanzimat state was
inevitable given the fact that it was “too little, too late” as far as the non-
Muslim reaya were concerned and given the increase in pressure from the
West. The Hamidian state, turning in on itself and emphasizing Islam,
came to consider non-Muslims as expendable or even, as in the case of the
Armenians, dangerous. In each of the previous chapters the questions of
conversion and apostasy were examined as the expression of a dialectic
between European pressure on the grounds of supposed humanitarianism,
on the one hand, and the desire to maintain Ottoman sovereignty, on the
other. As to the state’s policy on the very desirability or undesirability of
conversion, it seems possible to trace a pattern that resonated with the
historical conjuncture. During the period of the Tanzimat State proper
(1839–76) conversion and even more apostasy, sometimes one immedi-
ately following the other, were seen as undesirable acts – causing the
“imperial headache”, increasing social tension, and bringing down the
wrath of the foreigner. In the case of the “coming out” of the crypto-
Christians, the Porte feared that this would be the thin end of the wedge
causing an avalanche of apostasy. It felt that it had to take measures that
would prevent this and yet keep its pledges of religious freedom. As to the
illustrious career converts of the failed revolutions of Europe, their con-
versions were a matter of convenience at best, and an embarrassment at
worst. The Armenian converts of the 1890s were seen as the undesirable
side effects of the massacres and were not to be trusted as they could later

240
 Conclusion 241

complain to the foreigners that they had been forced to convert, which was
indeed the case.
These concluding comments are intended to flag some of the salient
points that emerge from the story.

on the language of ottoman officialdom

At this point some methodological considerations concerning the language
of Ottoman officialdom are in order.1 Many of the reports, cipher tele-
grams, and memoranda that were used in this book were meant to be “in
house” and, as such, destined only for the eyes of a limited number of
officials. Even so, Ottoman officialdom spoke elliptically and euphemisti-
cally, and it is precisely this wording that is invaluable as a window into the
official mind. For instance, Enis Paşa, the Vali of Diyarbakır, would
always refer to Armenian women who had been abducted by Muslims
and forced to convert to Islam during the massacres of 1895 as “Armenian
women who were dispersed here and there during the troubles” (zaman-ı
igtişaşda öteye berüye dagılmış olan Ermeni kadınları), thus entirely
removing the agency of the abductors.2 Similarly, when the minister of
police, Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, referred to “classes of the population who
intervened in the restoration of order” (asayişin iadesinde müdahil olan
sınıf-u ahali), albeit as an undesirable event, he meant the massacring
mob.3 When the Vali of Sıvas reported that “today some two thousand
Kurds have killed twenty-three Armenians. Some five hundred Christians
now want to convert to Islam of their own free will”, the bland and
unquestioning use of “free will” strongly implies that conversion as a
survival tactic came to be seen as “free will” by Ottoman officialdom.4
Or when it is reported that “the many sticks that are being made in the
carpentry and basket weaver shops in the city [Istanbul] should be

1
I discuss some aspects of this in the The Well Protected Domains; see the section “The
Symbolism of Language” in Chapter 1. For a more recent study, see Maurus Reinkowski,
“The State’s Security and the Subjects’ Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman
Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century)”, in Hakan Karateke and Maurus
Reinkowski (eds.), Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power
(Leiden, 2005), pp. 195 212.
2
BOA A.MKT MHM 637/16, 4 Mart 1312/27 March 1896, vilayet of Diyarbekir to the
Sublime Porte.
3
Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, Ermeni Olayları Tarihi (The history of the Armenian events)
(Ankara, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 94, 45.
4
BOA A.MKT 660/35 4 Teşrin i Sani 1311/17 November 1895, the Vali of Sivas, Halil Paşa,
to the Sublime Porte.
242 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

confiscated and they should be forbidden to make more.” This document

can appear quite innocuous to the untrained eye – that is, until we look at
the date, 13 November 1896, only a few months after the Kum Kapı
massacres of 26 August, when sources reported that the massacring mob
had been bearing similar sticks and cudgels, issued by the police, as some
sources contend.5 Ottoman officials in the provinces often told the sultan
what they thought he wanted to hear, nor were they above downright lies.6
The language of conversion narratives also follows the political climate
of the times. During the Tanzimat they speak of the need to act in accord-
ance with the “requirements of the times” (icabatı asriyyeye göre münasib)
or acts that would “damage the trust of the reaya” (insilab- emniyet-i
reayayi mucib), or, “avoiding the Imperial Headache” (tas’di-i Âli’yi
mucib olmamak). Another thing the Porte could not abide was the occur-
rence of untoward events that “would not look good to friend and foe”
(yar ve agyara hoş gorünmemek). By “friend and foe” the Ottomans
usually meant foreigners of one stamp or another.7 During the Hamidian
period the bureaucracy would speak in terms of “correction of the beliefs”
(tashih-i akaid), or “confusing the minds of simple people” (sade dil
ahalinin tagşiş-i ezhanı), or “the results of the deceptions of the
Armenian subversives” (Ermeni mefsedlerinin asar-i igfalleri).8 During
the Second Constitutional period following the Young Turks revolution
of 1908, one often finds references to acts of conversion and/or apostasy
that somehow “are not in accordance with the age of the constitution”
(asr-i meşrutiyete yakışmaz muamele), or acts not in keeping with “the
felicitous age of Freedom” (asrı dilâra-i Hürriyet).9 The spirit of the age is
thus reflected in the language of the documents. Yet there is also a sub-
current that is discernible to the trained eye. The illiterate peasant lad of
twelve who declares before witnesses that he “had for some two years been
contemplating converting to Islam” because he had “become convinced of
the purity and brilliance of the One True Faith” (Islamin nezafet ve
revnakı) is almost certainly having words put into his mouth. The

5
BOA.Y.A HUS 362/35 31 Teşrin i Evvel 1316/ 13 November 1896. On the motif of
“uniform sticks”, see Edhem Eldem, “26 Ag ustos 1896 ‘Banka Vak’ası’ ve 1896 ‘Ermeni
Olayları’”. See, for example, Christopher Walker, Armenia, p. 167, who refers to the mob
bearing “clubs, similar, carefully shaped”.
6
Abdülhamid Kırmızı, Abdülhamid’in Valileri, pp. 105 109.
7
See Chapter 1 of this volume.
8
Selim Deringil, The Well Protected Domains, Chapter 1; Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, Ermeni
Olayları Tarihi.
9
BOA DH.ID 133/1 28 Haziran/ 12 July 1912.
 Conclusion 243

declaration of his conversion as “entirely a result of his desire for salva-

tion” is also highly suspect.
Similarly, the repetition ad infinitum of the formula that “no sort force
or coercion” (bir güna cebr ve ikrah) was being used in the conversion
process, or the formula that is repeated throughout this book, that all the
converts were converting “of their own free will and desire” (bitp tav verp
rızâ), even in highly dubious circumstances – these are clearly formulaic
codifications for what were at the very least irregularities. Another term
that should be noted is the term “somehow” (her nasılsa). This was a term
that was used regularly in Ottoman official parlance when the scribe
wanted to refer to an event that was somehow embarrassing yet had to
be mentioned, such as the occurrence of an apostasy or some form of gross
negligence on the part of an official.
Another aspect of the official language is that constantly repeated orders
“not to do something” are a fairly certain indication that the practice or act
in question is in fact taking place. In most of the examples mentioned it is a
case of according the reality with polite fictions.

the policy of polite fictions – promises,

secrets, and face-saving
In this book I have referred to “polite fictions” on several occasions. It
would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the late Ottoman
Empire was based on a policy of polite fictions. When real coercive power
to enforce its policies did not exist, as was often the case, the centre had to
reach a modus vivendi with local power holders, vested interests, and even
the humble peasantry, the reaya and the Muslims. In this context, when a
new system of rule, the Tanzimat State, was being put into place, the centre
had to negotiate. As brilliantly put by Harry Harootunian: “[Nationalist]
history’s primary vocation has been to displace the constant danger posed
by the surplus of everyday life, to overcome its apparent ‘trivia’, ‘banalities’
and untidiness in order to find an encompassing register that will fix the
meaning”.10 In other words, nationalist history has no time for the “untid-
iness” of polite fictions as it “tries to fix meaning”.
We began with what I called the Tanzimat State. According to the
Eastern Question paradigm, the “tidy” received wisdom was that the
Tanzimat reforms were the result of foreign pressure on a small cadre of

10
Harry Harootunian, “Shadowing History: National Narratives and the Persistence of the
Everyday”, Cultural Studies, 18 (2004), 181 200.
244 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Ottoman bureaucrats.11 As to the homegrown Turkish version, it was

almost single-handedly the work of Mustafa Reşid Paşa.12 Although that
paradigm has been more or less demolished in the more recent literature,
there are still some important grey areas that have been overlooked. The
most important aspect of the Tanzimat was that it made promises. It was
not a process that was undertaken willingly and enthusiastically by the
Ottoman élite, but once it was under way, they knew there was no turning
back. It is worthwhile here to quote I_ lber Ortaylı in extenso as his work is
still seminal for our purposes.

‘Ottoman westernization turned its face to the West, not out of admiration, but out
of necessity. Let us not forget that Cevdet Paşa, the statesman who appears to be the
most conservative figure of the Tanzimat, was one of the leading lights in the
westernization of the administrative structure. Finally, this unnamed process of
westernization was much more the result of an internal decision rather than a result
of outside pressure. The sources that are very often used by our modern historians
to prove foreign pressure are the memoirs of megalomaniac foreign ambassadors
who claimed to run the empire. Although these are important sources, they are
inadequate and sometimes deceiving historical documents’.13

In Chapter 2 we have indeed seen the extent of Stratford Canning’s

“megalomania”, as he did not hesitate to lecture the Caliph of Islam on
the finer points of Islamic doctrine. On the other hand, we have also seen
that the same Caliph and his government were obliged to send a “secret
order” to the provinces outlawing the official execution of apostates,
knowing full well that an open declaration could undermine the very
basis of sultanic/Caliphal legitimacy. Here the polite fiction was that the
decision was entirely the initiative of the sultan and his government and in
no way the result of foreign pressure. Nonetheless, once given, the Sultan’s
word was a word of honour and had to be taken extremely seriously. No
less a personage than the Şeyhülislam Arif Hikmet Efendi came to consider
the matter a question of “national honour” (namus-u milli). Yet later in the
century, during the Armenian Crisis discussed in Chapter 5, the Vali of
Diyarbakır, Enis Paşa, would have a very different take on “national
honour”. For him, writing in 1895, national honour was the honour that
would be impinged upon if the Armenian women abducted by good
Muslims were to be taken from them. Here the polite fiction was that
these women had converted voluntarily and were content with their lot.

11
M. Anderson, The Eastern Question (New York, 1966).
12
Reşat Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat . . . (Ankara, 1985).
13
I_ lber Ortaylı, I_ mparatorlug un En Uzun Yüzyılı, p. 25.
 Conclusion 245

It has been pointed out earlier that the common mistake is to lump the
Tanzimat Rescript of Gülhane of 1839 together with the Reform Edict of
1856. The Tanzimat Rescript was largely homegrown and was a synthesis
of Islamic statecraft and Western concepts of the rule of law and enlight-
ened despotism. However, the promises of religious freedom that were
made in the Reform Edict of 1856 were indeed largely the result of foreign
pressure and were seen as such by the Ottoman élite themselves. Let us
recall at this point the memorandum penned by Reşid Paşa himself where
he bemoaned the fact that his successors, Âli and Fuad, “gave away too
much too quickly”. As put by Cevdet Paşa in his folksy euphemistic style,
“they sliced too thick” (bol dogradılar).14 Here too the polite fiction was
that the edict was entirely the result of sultanic magnanimity and concern
for the well-being of his subjects.
The promise of religious freedom would also cause some people, like the
crypto-Christians, the Kromlides, and the Istavri, to take the state at its
word and “come out” openly, declaring that they had been Christians all
along. The aim was to avoid conscription. This proved to be a miscalcu-
lation because the Porte balked at the prospect of many more such folk
emerging from the woods and mountains, and some indeed did, as was
seen in Chapter 3. Moreover, as was seen in the case of the Kromlides of
Trabzon, their “secret” faith was something of an “open secret” as they
were among the most prominent people in their area.
The Ottoman state in the nineteenth century was prepared to go quite far
in tolerating such opens secrets, and relegating them to the domain of polite
fiction, as long as the persons in question loyally served the state, or at the
very least did not make trouble. Such was the case of the people discussed
above as “career converts”. It was very clear that the conversions of some of
them were very nominal, not going very far beyond having a Muslim name
and wearing the fez. General György Kmetty was also Ismail Paşa while he
was in Istanbul, but went back to being Kmetty when he was in London. The
polite fiction was that Ismail Paşa was a highly decorated Muslim Ottoman
officer who had fought with distinction in the Crimean War. In reality, he
was a Hungarian aristocrat who lived in London and commuted to Turkey
whenever there was a war with Russia. Some of the career converts did not
convert at all but allowed their Muslim hosts to think that they had; either
way, this polite fiction allowed all parties to save face and to proceed on that
basis. In most of these cases of career conversion, it is unlikely that any of the
converts worked on losing their previous identity even after becoming well

14
Cevdet Paşa Tezakir, vol. 1, Tezkere (Memorandum), no. 10, 74.
246 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

and truly Muslims, some even to the point of being circumcised. The
Hungarian or Polish converts of 1849 remained Hungarian or Polish even
after they had “turned Turk”, even while loyally serving their new sover-
eign, some into the second generation.

on “free will and conscience”

The other important issue that has to be touched upon in these concluding
remarks is the issue of “free will”, which comes up in many of the cases
featured in this book. It is quite safe to say that in the late Ottoman Empire
conversion was not unconditionally encouraged, and apostasy was not
ruthlessly stamped out. Indeed, it seems doubtful whether the state actually
wanted new converts during the Tanzimat State period. They only mud-
died the waters and caused the “Imperial Headache”. According to the
official policy, what was to be done with apostates was nothing worse than
displacement. The state more or less instructed its officials to look the other
way if they “happened to escape during the journey”. It has occurred to me
that this may have been a euphemism for murdering them. However, after
examining hundreds of documents I have come to the conclusion that this
was not the case. The reason is the fact that by the early to mid-nineteenth
century, people were traceable. When a young Armenian girl who had
converted under dubious circumstances and then gone back to Christianity
was shipped off to Istanbul under escort, the Armenian Patriarchate
wanted to know just when they departed and when they arrived.
Therefore, two scenarios could apply here; the polite fiction would apply
that she had escaped, but in fact she either went to live someplace where
her chequered past was unknown or not a problem, like a big city, or was
indeed safely delivered to her destination and often even provided with
some employment or charity.
Yet, even in official documents with their “proper” guarded wording,
one thing that immediately stands out is the oft-repeated formula that the
convert was acting “of his own free and conscience” and that no force or
coercion was applied. This is repeated so frequently that it gives rise to the
suspicion that force or “persuasion” were indeed applied. This suspicion is
compounded by the fact that many of the cases in the archival records
concern young people. The obvious difficulty here is that there is often no
actual proof in the documentation that force was applied, the obvious
exception being the conversions during the Armenian massacres of the
1890s. In those cases, when the local authorities spoke of the people of an
Armenian village “converting of their own free will”, what was at issue
 Conclusion 247

was a matter of life and death, and conversion being used as a strategy of
survival. This whole tragic episode puts an entirely new face on the idea of free
will, as was remarked upon by the British dragoman Fitzmaurice: “[T]he
Armenians, to save themselves from certain death, became Mussulmans of
their own free will, if, indeed, people under such terrible circumstances can in
any way be considered as free agents possessing a free will.”15
The challenge facing the local authorities in more mundane cases was
that they were being asked to pass judgement on something that was
nearly impossible to quantify, that is, sincerity. Not only were they, more
often than not, confronting local resistance to state prying, but the
spectrum of conversions from “voluntary” to “forced” was extremely
broad. Force did not necessarily come in the shape of a sword or an axe,
and “voluntary” conversion could well be the result of incremental
pressure and/or promises of reward. On the other hand, forced conver-
sion, especially of young children, could become “voluntary” with the
passage of time as the child became socialized in an Islamic context. In
cases where one of the parties in a marriage converted to Islam and the
other did not, the latter-day practice of allowing the children to choose
their religion when they came of age was not as humanitarian a measure
as it seems at first glance, the child being very unlikely to change the
religion that he or she had been brought up in. Very often the child or
young person converting would be in a position of some sort of depend-
ency on their “patron”, either as a servant attached to the household or as
a concubine. The whole issue of concubinage offers up another can of
worms. Seen as slavery in the West, this could lead to the clash of two
socio-legal systems, as we saw in the case of Fazlı Bey and his servant in
Chapter 2. In the case of the Stavriote of Ak Dag Maden the relationship
was reversed; there it was a Christian (or crypto-Christian) family that
was causing the conversion to Christianity of the young Muslim servant
boy in their household.
In the archival sampling that I have used for this study, young people or
children of both genders are overrepresented. Although the source materi-
als do not overtly declare it, there is a very real “smell” of sexual abuse, or
at least of molestation.16 Take the case of the boy who is approached by a

15
See Chapter 5 in this volume.
16
Carlo Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian”, in James
Chandler, Arnold I. Davidson, and Harry Harootunian (eds.), Questions of Evidence:
Proof, Practice and Persuasion across Disciplines (Chicago & London, 1994), pp. 290
303. In suggesting this as a distinct possibility, I have tried to heed the warning of Ginzburg
of the need to use a “specific interpretative framework”.
248 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

Halil Aga on board a ship with the “promise of a reward”, who “remains
silent” and whose silence is taken as implied consent to convert while
aboard ship, but who changes his mind as soon as he reaches port; or the
young Armenian girl who suddenly decides to become a Muslim after
being taken to the public baths by her adult Muslim neighbours; or the
ten-year-old Serbian girl in Niş who is abducted and converted, whose
family claim that she had been “bewitched”, to mention a few – all of these
cases give off the same “smell”. The authorities may well have smelt it, too,
as they time and again issued orders banning the conversion of young
children. The frequent references to “avoiding loose talk” also point in
the same direction.17 Of course, there is nothing ambiguous
about the abducted Armenian women and girls of the massacres; yet
even here, the fiction (in this case not even polite) of free will is repeated
time and again. Free will in conversion could indeed be exercised, despite
opposition from the religious community, to enable a marriage that would
otherwise be forbidden by prohibitively close blood ties. Conversion to
Islam was the only way Christian blood relatives of a certain closeness of
kinship (first cousins, perhaps) could marry.18 Similarly, a Christian or
Jewish girl, with no likelihood of a dowry and with diminishing marriage
prospects, may well have exercised genuine free will in converting in order
to marry a Muslim.
Free will also had to be coupled with the legal right to exercise it,
particularly in the case of minors or young people. The struggle over the
bodies and souls of these young people was carried out on the issue of the
legal age of discernment. If the conversion was contested by the family or
community of the convert, their last line of defence was that the convert
was not of the age to be able to exercise free will.
It will be recalled that the issue of minimum age had also been linked
to the issue of free will in the debate in 1879 between the Council of
State (Meclis-i Vala) and the Christian Patriarchates. The Orthodox
Patriarchate had asked for a definitely set minimum age, whereas the
council had argued against this, stating that it was against the principle
of the freedom of conscience.19
Free will could also cut both ways. After the Reform Edict of 1856, the
missionaries thought that the Muslims could exercise their free will and

17
See Chapter 1 in this volume.
18
BOA DH.MKT 829/60 27 Kanun u Evvel 1319 / 9 January 1903, the vilayet of Yanya to
the Ministry of the Interior, dealing with the conversion and elopement of a young Greek
couple.
19
See Chapter 1 in this volume.
 Conclusion 249

become Christian. The Ottomans soon put them right about that. Their
position on this was quite unequivocal; free will did not extend to prop-
agandizing against the dominant faith of the land.20

Denationalization, Devaluation, and Secularization

It seems that in matters of conversion and apostasy two counter-currents
were at work in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ottoman
state. On the one hand, conversion became a very socially and politically
charged issue as it overlapped with the birth and rise of Romantic Revival
nationalism in the Balkans and Anatolia. Therefore, conversion and the
consequent abandoning of a religious community were seen as de-
nationalization, which could have explosive consequences, as we have
seen in cases like the “grievous Salonica Affair” of 1876. On the other
hand, we can talk about a definite devaluation process whereby conversion
and/or apostasy cases went from being strident, soul-wrenching, diplo-
matic crisis creating, potentially murderous affairs, to a routine police
matter. The matter-of-fact tone with which the conversion and apostasy
cases are reported in the Ministry of Police records bear witness to this. “So
and so, a German subject, had converted to Islam” – not a glorious victory
for the Last Revealed Religion, but just one more suspect that the Istanbul
police have to keep under surveillance. Even during the Armenian massa-
cres of the 1890s, the eventual return of some of the Armenian converts to
their original faith, once the danger was over and the situation was
stabilized, came to be accepted as a routine development. Similarly, the
open declaration of the Kromlides and the Stavriote that they were
Christians did not provoke massacres or mass disturbances, as often
happened during earlier periods. It will be recalled that the British consul
in Trabzon actually commented on the “extreme indifference with which
all Mahomedans talk of the intended change”. Similarly, when the
Hemşinli attempted to return to their original faith, they were foiled not
by the coercive power of the state but by a clever stratagem of the “hocas
from Of”, who told the government officials that if the Hemşinli should be
allowed to go back to their original faith, so should they, as they too were
the descendants of converts.
The whole Ottoman stratagem of creating the category of tanassur
(converts to Christianity) is also an indication of the devaluation of con-
version and apostasy. It is highly likely that, as apostates, the Kromlides,

20
See Chapter 2 in this volume.
250 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

the Hemşinli, and the Stavriote would have faced much more dire con-
sequences if they had declared themselves in earlier centuries. In the same
vein, the fact that for over ten years Ali Nuri and Bogos Asfaryan could be
the same person in a small place like Tokad indicates that Bogos/Ali was a
“public apostate” who, far from being put to death, was allowed to
accumulate a serious fortune.
Moreover, the illustrious Hungarian and Polish paşas were able to
operate in Istanbul and in London under Muslim and Christian personas,
respectively. Nobody seems to have made any enquiries as to whether they
were in fact circumcised, and it may even have been considered the height
of indiscretion to do so. The fact that Richard Guyon was buried in the
British military cemetery in Istanbul, even though he was officially Hurşid
Paşa, bears this out. It is inconceivable that the Ottoman embassies in, say,
London or Paris could have been unaware of the ambivalent identity of
these men. They were, after all, decorated Ottoman officers who no doubt
attended embassy functions.
In Chapter 3 we have seen that in the mid-1890s the Population
Registration Bureau regularly dealt with individuals who, having con-
verted to Islam, now applied to return to their original faith. Such was
the case of Aleksi from Yanina, who had become Hüseyin in 1887 and in
1893 applied to become Aleksi again. The same document mentions that
there was an Armenian in the same position.21 Although their wish was not
always granted, apostasy had become a mundane bureaucratic procedure.
In the case of some of them, the problem arose not because of the blasphe-
mous act of apostasy, but because of the fact that it had not gone through
“proper channels” and had not been registered. Another indication of the
devaluation of conversion/apostasy is the almost passing mention of the
apostasy of the Stavriote “not being recognized” officially by the Ministry
of Justice and Religious Sects. The implication is that apostasy was now a
legal category recognized by the state, as in the case of the Kromlides who
became tenassur-u rum. Indeed, the term “tanassur ve irtidad” – literally,
“to Christianize and apostatize” – seems to set them apart from straight-
forward apostates, who are called simply “mürted”.
Ali Riza/Kevork, the local businessman from Diyarbakır who had gone
bankrupt and converted “in order to solve his difficulties” in 1912, is also a
good example of devaluation. When conversion did not allow him to write
off his debts, he had decided to go back to his old faith. He was “frequently
applying to the government offices to have his apostasy recognized”. It

21
See Chapter 4, n. 14, in this volume.
 Conclusion 251

sounds like Ali Riza/Kevork was applying to have a very routine affair
regularized, almost as if he were applying to register a house sale.22
In a similar vein, as early as 1850 Hacu and Asib could “secretly pay
cizye” while ostensibly living as Muslims as a way of proving, in case of
necessity at a later date, that they had been Christians all along. They thus
took out a form of re-insurance enabling them to dodge the conscription
officer or the tax collector.23
Another aspect of the devaluation process are conversion narratives
like that of Bishop Harutyun and General Bem, which are also a vivid
illustration of Ottoman weakness. In vivid contrast to the “symbolic
victories” and the public flouting of the conversion of distinguished
figures such as the Orthodox priest, Mehmed of Athens, who converted
in front of Ahmed I (1603–17), or the Hungarian I_ brahim Müteferrika
who became famous for founding the first Ottoman printing press in the
eighteenth century, Bishop Harutyun is treated almost as an embarrass-
ment and is hidden away in an obscure post translating newspapers.
Similarly, Bem/Murad Paşa is sent to Syria; his wish to remain in the
Balkans and fight the Russians is ignored as it would be seen as a
deliberate provocation.24
This devaluation was accompanied by a secularization of the conver-
sion process. The whole bureaucratization process starting with the
Tanzimat made the conversion ceremony almost a civil rather than a
religious occasion. The fact that the conversion formalities were carried
out in a sitting of the local council, the presence of the priest in the secular
council together with the kadi to bear witness that the conversion was
voluntary, the rule that the next of kin be allowed to try to dissuade the
convert, the issuing of a conversion certificate, the subsequent obligation to
have the conversion registered at the Ministry of Justice and Religious
Sects, and even the publication in the newspapers of reports of conver-
sions – all these are a far cry from the private declaration of the shahada
that binds the individual to Allah, or the ritual submission at the feet of the
sultan during the imperial hunt.25
The next stage was the abolition of the official execution of apostates
from Islam in 1844. Even if this was done in a very circuitous manner and
was occluded by the deliberate obfuscation of the wording of the note

22
See Chapter 3, n. 109, in this volume.
23
See Chapter 3, n. 134, in this volume.
24
Tijana Krstic, “Illuminated by the Light of Islam”, pp. 54, 59, 61.
25
Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, pp. 185 203.
252 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

given to the ambassadors, what was understood to be a fundamental

principle of Islam was nonetheless breached. It was now possible to
think the unthinkable, that a Muslim might, of his or her “free will and
conscience”, embrace another faith. Although this did not happen in any-
thing like the proportions that the missionaries hoped for and the Muslims
feared, it was still technically legal for a Muslim to convert to Christianity.
Even Abdülhamid would tell Layard as much when they were discussing
the case of Ahmet Tevfik Efendi. What he objected to, he told the ambas-
sador, was not that Ahmet Tevfik might have converted to Christianity, for
“there was freedom of religion in his domains”, but that he had actively
worked towards encouraging other Muslims to convert.26
The entire Reform Edict of 1856 dealt with the issue of “freedom of
religion” and was rightly seen as a threat by the Muslim population, who
were now, as the popular saying went, “forbidden to call an infidel an
infidel” (gâvura gâvur demek yasak).
The Nationality Law of 1869 changed the practice whereby any non-
Muslim converting to Islam on Ottoman soil was considered an Ottoman
citizen. Now each case was to be considered on its own merits. The
connection of religious identity and civic identity – or rather, the privileg-
ing of civic identity over religious identity – was a further dimension of the
secularization process. The ban on Ottoman non-Muslim women marry-
ing non-Ottoman Christians and Jews was inspired by the similar ban on
the marriage of Sunni Muslim Ottoman women to Shiites from Iran.
It will be remembered that in the discussions at the Porte over the issue
of the property rights of those who had lost or given up Ottoman citizen-
ship, it was the religious officials who had come down on the side of the
inalienability of the income from property and its inheritability by the heirs
of one who had lost Ottoman citizenship. In stark contrast, the secular
officials had overridden them and openly declared that the confiscation
was a purely punitive and preventive measure. Although the non-Muslim
population were being targeted here, it is still significant that raison d’etat
carried the day over the Şeriat. Even the practice of ostensibly allowing
children from mixed broken marriages to choose their religion upon reach-
ing maturity, rather than always giving custody to the side that converted
to Islam, can be seen as part of the same process. Although it was unlikely
that a child reared in one faith would opt for another upon reaching
maturity, the official declaration that they would have a choice and not

26
Azmi Özcan, Tufan Buzpınar, “Tanzimat, Islahat ve Misyonerlik”, p. 75.
 Conclusion 253

be automatically handed over to the parent who was a Muslim was clearly
a step towards secularization.
Finally, in 1913, a law was passed clearly declaring that conversion to
Islam did not mean automatic Ottoman citizenship. Citizenship was no
longer required to carry the baggage of religion.
We have also seen how the category of “unregistered population”
(nüfus-u mektume) became a very useful way of solving the problem of a
dubious or contested identity, since the person did not legally exist until he
or she had been registered and given identity papers. Therefore, the cat-
egory of “unregistered population” became a very convenient catch-all
pool for regularizing potentially thorny cases of apostasy and/or conver-
sion and, as such, further contributed to the secularization of the
conversion process. In fact, we saw earlier that the Mutasarrif of Amasya
in 1912 protested that it was “disturbing that the rejection of the greatest
of revealed religions should be reduced to a mere administrative matter”.27
He was quite right, that was exactly what was happening. The only thing
that apostates had to do to qualify as “unregistered population” was to
bring a certificate from their patriarchate (or rabbinate) testifying that they
were hitherto unregistered, making absolutely no mention of any conver-
sion or apostasy; they were then registered as new entries in the population
registers, as was done for other hitherto unregistered persons, and were
given an Ottoman identity certificate, anonymity thus being assured.
What I have called the devaluation and secularization process did not
represent by any means a total defusing of apostasy and conversion as
volatile material when yoked to nationalism. The two seem to have been
parallel developments. When acts of apostasy or conversion had little or no
symbolic value, or when they occurred quietly and individually, they
became routine matters. The apostates evoked hatred and fear when they
became the living, walking symbols of the potential unravelling of the
community. Particularly as the act of apostasy overlapped with de-
nationalization, the threat that the apostate posed was that of a possible
precedent. If Dimitri could do it, so could Yannis, or Eleni or Krispina. For
Muslims, it was even worse; something that had been unmentionable until
1844 or 1856 was now, apparently, not only spoken of but, albeit in rare
instances, actually happening. If Ahmet could become Aleko, or Mehmed
could become Yani, and live to tell the tale, when rumours abounded about
what the Alekos and Yanis (or the inverse, the Mehmeds and the Ahmeds)
were doing to their opposite numbers in the unseen spaces of the nationally

27
See Chapter 3, n. 113, in this volume.
254 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

imagined countryside, it was no longer a question of faith, it became a

question of survival; hence the need for the exemplary punishment of the
apostate/convert.
The other important aspect of most of the cases of conversion and/or
apostasy that became explosive issues was that they were public. Ussama
Makdisi’s brilliant study of the case of As’ad Shidyaq, the Maronite who
became an evangelical Protestant, has shown that what made As’ad’s
situation particularly dangerous was not the simple fact of apostasy,
which was bad enough, but the fact that he made a point of declaring his
heresy publicly.28 Makdisi draws attention to the polite fictions of
Ottoman society and how they worked in a Lebanese context. People
converted from Islam to Christianity, technically becoming apostates,
but this was done discreetly and quietly. When it was a case of someone
converting to Islam, the issue was not blown up into a victory for Islam;
rather, the new convert was quietly taken into the fold.29 What made
Shidyaq so potentially dangerous was that he flew in the face of the polite
fictions. Similarly, the Bulgarian girl who converted to Islam in Salonica in
1876 became willy-nilly a public figure and a public issue because, like
Shidyaq, she came to symbolize a deadly threat to the established order.
When the act of conversion or apostasy breaks boundaries, trips wires that
coincide with crises or tensions in the broader context – when Stephana
becomes Ayşe three days after the Bulgarian uprisings just north of
Salonica – that is when the explosion occurs. Even at a more subdued
level, when a young Greek boy in an obscure town in Anatolia is converted
in dubious circumstances, the case can go right up to the Patriarchate in
Istanbul, who can actually warn the Porte that such matters “could cause
coldness and enmity between the communities”.30
On the other hand, the process of devaluation of conversion/apostasy
could take place when the convert/apostate had little or no value as a
symbol. The obscure German engineer Hans, who became Emin, had no
symbolic value and did not pose a threat even if he remained Hans in his
daily practices. Nor did the ex-honvéd Hungarian General Kmetty, who
became I_ smail Paşa but who continued to frequent the London season as
Kmetty. They both had only utilitarian value. Even Ahmed Tevfik Efendi,
who had committed what amounted to a cardinal crime, aiding in the
publishing of tracts that were supposed to entice believers away from

28
Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven, p. 203.
29
Ibid., p. 120.
30
See Chapter 1, n. 78, in this volume.
 Conclusion 255

Islam, could be quietly pardoned and ignored as he disappeared into

ignonimity because he was no longer a symbolic threat; he was no longer
a potential unraveller. To stretch the point a trifle, even the Armenians who
quietly “went back” to their original faith after the bloodletting of the
1890s never had any symbolic value because the pogroms themselves had
been brutal but entirely political acts. What could be a tripwire in one
particular historical conjuncture could well go unnoticed in another. The
bankrupt Armenian businessman converting to Islam in order to escape his
debts in, say, 1880 may well not draw any undue attention, but if he were
to make the same demand in the mid-1890s he might well get a very
different reception.

Symbolic Boundaries and Negotiated Identities

Much of what has been discussed in this book revolves around what
Anthony Smith calls the “inner worlds” and “symbolic boundaries” of
nations, which, he claims, modernists have not given the emphasis they
deserve.31 Speaking as a modernist, I would submit that Smith misses one
very important thing: some symbolic boundaries could be changeable
according to the historical context. What defined “us” one day could
become useless and even dangerous the next when it is easily applied to
“them”. The fact that the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks speak pretty much
the same language did not prevent them from killing each other. But some
symbolic boundaries are indeed immutable. Circumcision is a very good
example, because it was the ultimate marker. General Bem underwent
circumcision despite the advice of his Turkish hosts, who pleaded with
him to wait for his wounds to heal, because “he wanted to become a true
Muslim”.32 The other illustrious Hungarians in Vidin did not follow his
example. Yet we know from the documents that at least some of the
Hungarian refugees were indeed circumcised in subsequent years. It may
well be the case that there was a choice, to cross the ultimate boundary line
or not. Furthermore, the Armenians in Chapter 5 had themselves circum-
cised out of desperation as a means of forcing the state to recognize their
conversions, thus saving their lives. A particularly poignant case came up
in 1915, when an Armenian presented himself in Bolu in central Anatolia
actually pretending to be circumcised and claiming to be a Muslim. The
Mutasarrıf of Bolu wrote, “[U]pon inspection it was seen that he had tied a

31
Anthony Smith, Ethno Symbolism and Nationalism, pp. 18, 25, 40, 49.
32
See Chapter 4, n. 34, in this volume.
256 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

string around his reproductive organ and when the string was cut it
became clear that he was entirely uncircumcised”.33 Evidently this person
was trying to keep his “symbolic boundaries” open, thus avoiding the
death marches.
Jessica Coope’s Cordoba Muslims of the ninth century refused to work
alongside Christians because they were uncircumcised and therefore rit-
ually polluting.34 Linda Colley’s English captives of the 1780s in India,
who feared that they would be forced to convert to Islam, “feared for their
foreskins”. As put by one of them who had actually been forcibly circum-
cised, “I lost with the foreskin of my yard all the benefits of a Christian and
Englishman, which were and ever shall be my greatest glory”.35
Thus, the of acts conversion or apostasy could be seen as something
shameful, something one does not like to talk about, like having a rape in
the family or someone convicted of murder. Tannus Shidyaq, As’ad’s elder
brother, completely ignored his brother’s conversion when he wrote
what he claimed to be a definitive history of the great families of Mount
Lebanon. Tannus did not hate his brother and had tried to save him. He
made the omission because As’ad’s conversion to Protestantism did
not fit the official line; as put by Makdisi, “He became complicit . . . in
expunging his brother’s memory for the coherence of the ‘truthful’ history
that he narrated”.36
There is hardly any mention in the official Hungarian historiography of
the Hungarian heroes of the 1848 Revolution who “turned Turk” or at
least appeared to do so for a good part of their lives. The official Hungarian
narrative that celebrates and commemorates the “martyrs of 11 October”,
the Hungarian patriots who were executed by the Austrians, is almost
entirely silent on the “Turkish episode” of their brothers in arms. Is this
because it is more honourable to die a martyr than to live as a “Turk”?37
I have examined how the historical context affected state conversion
policies and their interface, survival strategies and/or personal negotiations
of identity and accommodation on the part of individuals. Thus, this is not

33
BOA DH.EUM. 2 Şb 51/12/2, 6 Mart 1334 / 29 March 1915, the Mutasarrıf of Bolu
Mustafa to the Ministry of the Interior. My thanks to Sait Çetinog lu for this reference.
34
Jessica Coope, The Martyrs of Cordoba: Community and Family Conflict in an Age of
Mass Conversion (Lincoln and London, 1995), p. 82.
35
Linda Colley, “Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaboration and Empire”,
pp. 170 93. The person in question was a navy ensign, hence the naval terminology.
36
Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven, p. 201.
37
Hungarian school textboks hardly mention Bem’s Turkish episode and his conversion to
Islam. My thanks to Szabolcs Pogonyi for this information.
 Conclusion 257

a book about religion per se but is more concerned with how conversion
and apostasy were used as a negotiating space by various actors – the state,
Muslim subjects, non-Muslim communities and individuals, foreign
powers trying to further sum-zero interests, refugees from political perse-
cution, and plain opportunists. This negotiating space was by no means
some kind of safe haven or sanctuary. Conversion and apostasy tales, as
was seen, often occurred in situations of dire stress or even mortal danger.
But negotiation there was, whether it be the negotiation of identity,
divorce, custody of children, livelihood, political rights, or material well-
being, not necessarily in that order. Moreover, the spectrum of negotia-
tions can be extremely broad. It can range from the inveterate gambler
converting to Islam hoping to escape his gambling debts, to the terrorized
Armenian for whom conversion is a last card to play to save himself and his
family. The negotiation process, therefore, often takes place between
highly unequal parties. The negotiation space can also be used by people
who do not even know they are negotiating, like children who run away
from their parents’ beatings and take refuge with a Muslim neighbour,
claiming they want to convert. Similarly, a mistreated Christian or Jewish
wife may seek the divorce she might otherwise not be granted by convert-
ing to Islam. Negotiation could be carried out literally, as in the case of the
Kromlides, who felt that they would get a better “deal” as open rather than
crypto Christians. Similarly, the Shparataks of Albania actually shopped
around for the religion that would give them the best strategic
advantage.38
One could argue that the concurrent development of intensification and
devaluation in matters of conversion and apostasy occurred precisely
because of the overlap with nationalism. On the one hand, the conversion
of our apocryphal goatherd became a symbol of de-nationalization and
therefore volatile material. On the other hand, as it came to be seen as a
secular rather than a religious betrayal, it went from being a metaphysical
cataclysm to being a political problem. The likelihood of conversion – and
apostasy – coming to be seen as an unraveling of the political rather than
the religious community led to the concurrent intensification of political
conflict, but as it became more and more common, or at least more openly
talked about, devaluation of its significance as a religious matter occurred.
Ultimately, in 1915, even those Armenians who had converted to Islam
were not spared from the death marches; their destruction was clearly a
political, not a religious decision.

38
See Chapter 3 in this volume.
258 Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire

There are very few, if any, spiritual athletes in the pages of this book.
The figures who emerge from the documents are mostly people who sought
to manipulate, bend, outwit, collaborate with, or become invisible to a
system of power that was, itself, making up the rules as it went along. One
will search in vain for Willam James’s “self” who, “hitherto divided and
consciously wrong inferior or unhappy, becomes unified and consciously
right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious
realities”.39 Nor do any of the cases studied fit the neat “seven stages” of
the conversion process as outlined by Lewis Rambo and Charles
Farhadian.40 The context in which they occur differs greatly from the
colonial context studied by Gauri Viswanathan, and the difference is not
only the obvious fact that here the power relationship is reversed, the
ruling class being Muslim.41
The aim of the present study is not to serve as a corrective to blatant
nationalist distortion, but it is perhaps more an invitation to think about
nuances, grey areas, innuendos and what I have called “polite fictions”.
The unsaid as well as the said, the endless repetitions that give off bad
smells, the polite jargon that talks of displacement and dispossession. The
continuous references to acts that are supposed to be voluntary but appear
just that bit “too voluntary”. Things happening that are simply not sup-
posed to happen and things not happening when every standard historical
source tells us that they should.

39
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature
(NewYork, 2002), p. 210.
40
Lewis R. Rambo and Charles E. Farhadian, “Converting: Stages of Religious Change”, in
Christopher Lamb and M. Darrol Bryant (eds.), Religious Conversion: Contemporary
Practices and Controversies (London and New York, 1999), pp. 23 4.
41
Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton, 1998).
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 Index

Abbot, Yanko, German consul, 99, 100 Ali Rıza/Kevork, 143, 250, 251
“Abdelhak”, 176 Aleppo, 7, 45, 165 166, 168, 229 232
Abdi Paşa, imperial chancellor, 46 “ambiguous belief systems”, 17 19
abduction, 40, 89, 224, 227; of women and Anderson, Benedict, 2 3
girls, 5, 89, 214, 224, 226, 239 Andreadis, Yorgo, 118 121, 139 140
Abdülhamid II (r. 1876 1909), 27, 64, 83, Anzelm, Albert, 168
102, 105, 124, 151, 167, 197, 199, apostasy, see also conversion, as martyrdom,
200 202, 204, 206, 208, 213, 233 236, 4; foreign protection of, 7; comparison
239, 242, 252; Islamist étatisme, 124; with earlier periods, 8 12; present day
responsibility for Armenian massacres, stigma attached to, 12; seen as treason, 13;
27, 83, 233 235 as “Imperial Headache”, 38 42; abolition
Abdullah Hasib Bey (inspector of foreign of death penalty for, 20 23, 60 61;
schools), 180 devaluation of, 249 251
Abdülmecid I (r. 1839 1861), 7, 24, 32, 33, “apostasy crisis” (1843), 69 75
36, 53, 73, 84, 85, 163, 166, 173; bans Arif Hikmet Efendi (Şeyhülislam), 36, 53,
execution of apostates, 7; role in 54, 65, 66, 76, 227, 228, 244
Tanzimat, 32 Armenian Apostolic Church, 148, 149
Aberdeen, Lord (British foreign Armenian Catholics, 7, 42, 63, 207, 21
secretary), 70 Armenian massacres, 27, 124, 134, 200 201,
Abu Manneh, Butrus, 32 34, 38, 54, 73 202, 211, 213, 235, 236, 246, 249,
Adanir, Fikret, 4, 11, 114 Armenian millet, 45 47, 48, 221, 239
Addison, James Thayer, 79, 82, 83, 113 Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, 220
Afifi, Mohamed, 58 Armenian Protestants, 7, 209
Agence d’Orient, 174 Armenian Question, 27, 197, 199 202, 205,
Ahmed Budanski, aka Ahmed Rustem 235, 236,
Bey, 175 Armenian revolutionary organizations, 200,
Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, 30, 36, 37 , 65, 76, 78 , 201, 213
102 , 158 , 161, 244, 245 Arnakis, George, 43
Ahmed Şakir Paşa, 110, 124, 125, 138 Artinian, Vartan, 102, 150
Ahmed Tevfik Efendi, 184, 254 Artin Zahabedyan Efendi (Armenian
Akka (Acre, Palestine), 39 40, 40, 52 Metropolitan of Erzurum), 145, 149, 150
Albanians, 18, 99, 117, 152 As’ad Shidyaq affair, 78, 79, 96, 254
Âli Paşa (Grand Vizier), 28, 54, 77, Asfaryan, Bogos, aka Ali Mümtaz, 141 145,
81 82, 83 150 151, 250

275
276 Index

Association Asiatique, 185 British embassy, 70, 73, 74, 222, 223, 226,
asylum seekers, see also refugees, 7, 156, 227, 229, 231 , 232, 235
159, 160 166, 168 174, 181, 183 184, British Foreign Office, 74
193, 195, 198, 223, 235, 255, 257 British vice consul in Diyarbakır
Augustinos, Gerasimos, 38, 39, 64, 67 (C. M. Hallward), 227
Austria, 26, 82, 115, 121, 160, 161, Bryer, Anthony, 111, 112, 117, 120, 120n,
163, 173 123, 137, 152
“Avoiding the Imperial Headache”, 28, 39, Budapest, 159, 168, 185, 193
42, 50, 242 Bulgarian Exarchate, 7
“Bulgarian Horrors” (1876), 102
Baer, Marc, 10, 13 , 20, 44, 46 , Bulgarian komitaji (guerillas), 159, 177,
58, 200 199
Balkans, provinces map, 2, 6, ethnic conflict Bulgarian uprising of 1850, 254
in, 12; dervish orders in, 15; religious Bulgarians, 6, 7, 16, 19, 29, 31, 35, 85, 98,
practice in, 17 19; application of 99, 102, 103, 105, 107, 110, 115, 159,
Tanzimat in, 37; loss of, 198 177, 181, 199, 254
Bandazian, Garabed, 233 Bulliet, Richard, 14
Barkan, Ömer Lütfi, 15, 16 Bulwer, Sir H. (British ambassador), 80,
Batthany, Kasimir, 161 80, 81
Bedirhan Bey, 204, 234 Buzpınar, Ş. Tufan, 83, 252
Behar, Cem, 123, 126, 146, 188 Byron, Lord, 26, 160
Bem, General Joseph, 8, 26, 159, 161 162,
164 168, 169, 192, 195, 251, 255 256; Caliph of Islam, 52, 109, 180, 244
aka Murad Paşa, 160, 162, 164 166, Calvinist Protestantism, 170
195, 251 Campbell, Sir G. (M.P.), 68
Bilmen, Ömer Nasuhi, 15, 58, 60, Canning, Sir Stratford, British ambassador,
88, 157 25, 32, 66, 68 71, 73, 74 75, 78 79,
Birecik Armenians, 229 231, 238 81 84, 133, 244
Birecik Commission of Enquiry, 229 231 “career converts”, 26, 155, 156, 176, 192,
birth certificates, 57 240, 245
Bliss, Rev. Edward Munsell, 63, 205, 213 Catholicism, 91, 92, 95, 190
Borkine (French ambassador), 25 Catholicos of Cilicia (Giragos II), 145, 147
Borzecki, Constantine, see also Mustafa Celaleddin, Enver, 194
Celaleddin Paşa, 174, 194 Cemil Paşa, 227, 228
Bosnia, 4, 5 , 90, 91, 158, 172, 173, 185 census of 1831, 189; of 1853, 125; of 1299
Bosnian Beys, see also Muslim Beys, 159, (1881 1882), 122; of 1882, 129; between
172, 205 1882 and 1885, 122; of 1885, 190; of
Bosnian uprising, 172 1903, 110
Braude, Benjamin, 77 Chaldea, 118, 132, 141
Braudel, Fernand, 113, “Christians in peril”, 200
Breuilly, John, 2 circumcision, 9, 45 47, 112, 141, 166 167,
Britain, 65, 71, 75, 77, 160, 165, 200, 171 172, 217, 219 220,
202, 235 230, 255
British ambassador, 25, 32, 66, 68, 70, 83, citizenship, 12, 13, 26 27, 84, 156 157,
197, 235, 236; Sir Philip Curie, 197, 230, 159, 176, 181 182, 186 189, 194 196,
236, 237; Sir Henry Layard, 83, 252; 252 253; and conversion, 15; and
Sir Henry Elliot, 101, 102, 103, 104, property, 188 189
117 Citizenship Law (Tabiyet Kanunnamesi) of
British consuls, 64, 86 88, 93, 103, 117, 1869, 26, 157, 182, 187, 188, 197
119, 249;Cumberlach, 227; Blunt, 101 , cizye, see also poll tax on Christians, 17, 25,
103, 104 44, 114, 150, 251
 Index 277

colonialism, 68 “Eastern Question”, 67, 199, 243, 244

concubines, cariye, 87 88, 89, 90 91, 247 Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate of
Constitution (1876), see also Ottoman Istanbul, see also Greek Orthodox
Constitution, 7, 23, 29, 64, 66, 102, Patriarchate in Istanbul, 7, 57, 136, 248.
124, 151 Edict of the Rose Chamber, see also Gülhane
conversion, see also apostasy, 1 6; Edict, 23 24, 30 31, 118
conversion and Ottoman citizenship, 158; Eldem, Edhem, 41, 73, 158, 193, 194, 206,
conversion procedure, 42 45; conversion 214, 236, 242
as an emigration alternative, 191 193; Enis Paşa, Vali of Diyarbakir, 215, 225, 228,
conversion as opportunism, 176 178; 229, 234, 241, 244
forced conversion, 13, 16, 19, 39, 54, 59; Erdek, 50
mass conversion, 16, 20, 27, 116, Erdem, Hakan, 12
197 240; voluntary conversion, 13 14; extradition, 26, 160, 163, 183, 195
40 43; certificate of, 44; announced in
press, 46; as denationalization, 5 13; as Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (Grand Vizier), 10, 20
treachery, 22 23; hierarchy of, 193 Ferit Paşa (Grand Vizier), 108
Conversion Ordinance (Austrian) fetwa collections, 44
(1891), 92 Fiala, John, 168
Crete, islamization in, 8 10, 41, crypto Fitzmaurice (British dragoman), 229, 230,
Christians in, 153 231, 234, 235, 237, 247
Crimean War, 24, 65, 77, 111, 158, “foreign Muslims” (ecnebi Müslüman), 182
168 169, 174, 192, 245 foundling children, 191
criminal code (1840), 34 France, 5, 65, 71, 73, 75, 77, 121, 161, 165,
Cromer, the Earl of, 68, 170, 200, 2002
crypto Christians, 10, 22, 111, 112, Fuad Bey, see also Fuad Paşa (Foreign
114 115, 117 120, 123, 137, 153, 154, Minister), 77, 78, 81, 162
155, 156, 198, 240, 245; emergence of,
111 113; as “public secret”, 119 120; Garo, Armen, 206
deputation to foreign powers, 121 genocide, 197, 226, 239
custody of children, 58, 257 Georgeon, François, 146, 233, 234
Czaykowski, Michael Izador, aka Sadık Gladstone, William Evert (British prime
Paşa, 164, 174, 192, 194 minister), 102, 200
Gradeva Rossitsa, 98
Dadrian, Vahakn, 199 Great Powers, the, 7, 25, 67, 101, 115, 120,
Danube Vilayet, 35 144, 154, 161, 200
Dashnak, the (Armenian Revolutionary Greece, 11, 12, 37, 56, 67, 92, 107, 121,
Federation), 199, 201, 206 127, 129, 138, 139, 154, 189, 199
Dawkins, R. M., 111, 152, 153 Greek Metropolitan, 61, 106
Dembinski (General), 161 Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, 50, 57, 58,
“de nationalization”, 11, 249, 253 77, 131, 136; in Istanbul, 49 50, 136
desbot, 41, 56 Greek War of Independence (1821 1826),
Diragic, Anton, 184 10, 12, 28, 112, 194
Directorate of Religious Sects (Mezahib Gregory the Illuminator, 148 149
Müdüriyeti), 94 “Grievous Salonica Affair”, 87, 98 99, 100,
divorce, 58, 85, 86, 147, 257 105, 225, 249
Diyarbakır massacres, 45, 143, 202, Gülhane Edict, see also Edict of the Rose
214, 215, 225, 226, 227, 228, 241, Chamber, 23 24, 30 31, 118
244, 250 Gülhane Rescript, 33 34
double naming, 122, 123, 145 Gümüşhane, 118, 120, 122, 124, 128, 130,
Durham, Edith, 117 132, 152
Düstur (Register of Ottoman Laws), 33, 64, Guyon, Richard, see also Hürşid Paşa, 164,
79, 182 169, 250
278 Index

Halil Rifat Paşa (admiral of the fleet), 36 Istavri, see also Stavriotes, 25 26, 113, 115,
Halim, Paşa (Ferik), 162 124 125, 126, 127 131, 134 137, 138,
Hamidian massacres, 197, 213, 236 139 140, 151 153, 245, 247, 249 250
Hamidiye Light Cavalry, 203, 204 Izmir, 64, 180, 213
Hamlin, Cyrus (American missionary),
21, 22 Janin, R., 138
Harutyun Achabayan (Armenian Bishop Janossy, Denes A., 162, 163
of Sis), aka Emin Efendi, 58 59, 98, Jennings, Ronald, 17
145 149, 148, 151
Hasan Enver Celaleddin Paşa, 194 Kadızadeli, 10, 19
Hasluck, William, 15, 17, 20, 117, 124, Kaiser Wilhelm (emperor of Germany), 200
141, 152 Kamil Paşa (Grand Vizier), 146, 147, 149
Hemşinli, 20, 116, 117, 249 250 Kaliyaris, 186
Herzl, Dr. Theodor, 202 Kars, 64, 168 169, 202
Higher Council for Judicial Affairs (Meclis i Katogigos of Echimiadzin, 150
Valayı Ahkam ı Adliye), 42 Katogigos of Van, 222
Hikmet, Nazım, 174 Kekerli incident, 212
Hitchins, Keith, 159 Kenanog lu, Macit, 44, 157
Hobsbawm, Eric, 2 Kentsal Green, 168
“hocas from Of” (Oflu Hoca), 116, 249 Kitromilides, Paschalis, 4, 11
Hubaysh, Yusuf (Maronite Patriach), 79 Kmetty, György (Major General Kmetty
Hunchak (Armenian revolutionary Györgi), see also Ismail Paşa, 14, 161,
organization), 201 166, 168, 171, 192, 195, 245, 254
Hungarian nationalists, 26, 159 Kocabaşis, 31, 42, 56, 62, 93
Hungarian refugees, 159, 166, 169, Koelle, Dr., 79 80, 83 84
170 171, 255 Konya, 176, 180.
Hurşid Paşa, see also Richard Guyon, 164, Koran, the Holy, 19 20, 33, 60, 68 70, 109,
169, 250 161
Hüseyin, Atif (Abdülhamid II’s Kossielski (Sefer Paşa), 173
doctor), 197 Kossovo, 185
Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, minister of police, 202, Kossuth, Lajos, 162, 163, 164, 165
214, 222, 223, 241 Kromlides (Kurumlu), 25 26, 115,
117n, 118, 119 122, 123, 124, 128,
Ibrahim, Ali bin, 183 138 141, 151 152, 154, 245,
Ibrahim I (sultan r. 1640 48), 19 249 250, 257
Ibrahim Paşa (Kavala), 28 Kromni, 118, 120, 124, 140
Imperial Military Academy, 112, 158, Kum Kapı massacres, 242
169, 204 Kune, Julian, 168
imperial order, ferman, 24, 32, 36, 39 40, Kuneralp, Sinan, 98, 100
52, 65, 78, 109, 172, 177, 178 Kurdish Hamidiye Regiments, 27
I_ nalcık, Halil, 16 Kütahya, 42, 165
Ionian Islands, 34
irade, 39 41, 48 49 Lamb, Christopher, 45, 258
Islam, as not missionary religion, 15; as not Lane Poole, Stanley, 69, 73, 79
inquisitional, 16; and citizenship, 13; and Lazaros, Hadji (American consul,
forced conversion, 13; no miracles in, 15; Salonica), 99
Balkans gradual spread in, 16; “honoured Lebanon, 67, 79, 95, 109, 178 179, 193, 256
with Islam”, 42, 45, 46; as “automatic
divorce”, 58; right to defend against Mahmud II (r. 1808 1839), 29, 32
missionaries, 110 Mahmud Nedim Paşa (Grand Vizier), 34, 38
Ismail Paşa, see also General Kmetty, 14, 161, Makdisi, Ussama, 22, 68, 78, 79, 254, 256
166, 168, 169, 171, 192, 195, 245, 254 Mardin, Şerif, 198
 Index 279

Maronite Patriarch, 95 Obradovic Dositej, 1

Maronites, 67, 79, 95 96, 178 179, 254 Ömer Paşa (Vali of Bitlis), 217, 222, 223
Martyrdom, 11, 120 Ömer Paşa Latas, 158, 172, 173; known as
Mazower, Mark, 4, 17, 100, 101, 123 al nimsawi, 193; commander of Ottoman
Mehmed II ( Fatih, the Conqueror), 76 army during Crimean War 157; gets
Mehmed Sadik Efendi, 177, 181 Order of Bath 158
Mehmed of Athens, 154, 251 Ortaylı, I_ lber, 28, 30, 31, 173
Mehmet Ali Paşa Kavalalı of Egypt, 28 Orthodox Archbishop of Trabzon, 152
Meyrier, Gustave, 202, 215, 224, 225, 227, Ottoman Census Bureau (Sicil i Nüfus
228 229 Idare i Umumiyesi), 122
“migrant souls”, 156, 159, 191, 194 195 Ottoman Constitution (1876), 7
military service, 26, 37, 112, 115, 117, 119, Ottoman Council of Ministers, 147, 149,
121 123, 125 126, 129, 133, 135, 138, 183, 189, 221, 228
148, 150, 181 Ottoman Council of State (Şurayı Devlet),
millet, 7, 19, 31, 39 40, 45 48, 78 79, 157, 178, 187
171 172, 190, 221, 239; Armenian millet, Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 172, 183
45 47, 48, 221, 239; Hungarian millet, Ottoman “identity card” (Nüfus Tezkeresi),
171, 172; Jewish millet, 46; Ottoman 122, 190, 191
Protestant millet, 79, Rum millet, 136 Ottoman Military Academy, 112, 169
millet system, 16, 77, 239 Ottoman Minister of Police Hafız Paşa, 83
Milutinovic, Zoran, 5 Ottoman Minister of Police Hüseyin Nazım
Ministry of Justice and Religious Sects Paşa, 202, 241
(Adliye ve Mezahip Nezareti), 45, 54, 57, Ottoman Minister of Police Nazım Bey, 208
95, 127, 136, 139, 142, 143 144, 186, Ottoman Minister of Police Saffet Paşa, 80,
250 251 96, 176, 177, 184
missionaries, 7 8, 18, 40, 6 78, 80 81, 96, Ottoman officialdom, language of, 47,
109 110, 155, 180, 205, 216, 223, 237, 242 243
248, 252; Islamic 180
mission civilizatrice, 24, 67 Palgrave, William Gifford (British
Mithat Paşa (Grand Vizier), 35, 64; and consul), 117
Ottoman Constitution, 64; executed, 198 Palmerston (Lord, British prime
Mosul, 228 minister), 163
Moulin, Jules, French consul, 100 Paris Conference, see also Treaty of Paris,
Muhtar, Ahmed Paşa (Ottoman ambassador 24, 77 78
in London), 71 Patriarch of Antioch (Greek Orthodox), 189
Murad V (sultan), 205 Patriarchate in Istanbul, Greek Orthodox,
Murad b. Abdullah (c. 1509 86), 8 136; Armenian Apostolic, 220, 254
Murad Efendi, aka Monsieur Merlot, 178 Patriarchate of Jerusalem (Greek
“Muslim Hungarians”, 165 Orthodox), 189
“Muslims of the Virgin Mary”, 17 Perczel, Mor (general), 161, 165
Mustafa Reşid Paşa (Grand Vizier), 32, 69, Phander, Gotlieb Karl, Dr., 79 80
115, 163, 244 police force, as reservoir of dubious
converts, 117
Naqshbandi beliefs, 73 “polite fiction” as Ottoman policy,
nationalism 1 5, 127, 129, 181, 187 150 154, 169, 222, 243 246
nationalism, Turkish, 202 poll tax raised on Christians, see also cizye,
nationalist historiography, 6, 9, 11, 120, 256, 17, 25, 44, 114, 150, 251
“nationality” (milliyet), 110, 191 Pontos, 111, 116, 117, 118, 120, 123, 153
Naum Paşa (Mutasarrif of Lebanon), 95, 96 proselytization, 16, 17, 134
Nestorians, 219 Protestant missionaries, 78, 81
Niş uprising of 1841, 31, 32, 51 Protestantism, conversion to, 78 79, 96,
109, 191, 256
280 Index

protestants, 7, 67, 76, 80, 81, 190, Şeriat, the, 33, 45, 51 53, 74 76, 90, 130,
209 210, 254 144, 188, 196, 238, 252
puberty, age of, 43 55 Şeriat court, 51 52, 90
Şeyhülislam, 19, 21, 36, 44, 53, 65, 76, 110,
Rakovic, Milan, 182 238, 244
rape, institutionalized, 226 Şeyhülislams Minkârizade and Çatalcalı Ali
reaya (meaning Christian), Mahmud II Efendi, 44
desire to protect, 29; learn to “speak Shihab, Halil Said, 178 179
Tanzimat”, 35; forcible conversion of Shparataks, 114 115
children of, 41, 55; winning trust of 37, six vilayets (vilayatı sitte), 200 201
53, 59, 66 “sogambros”, 14 141
registration of births, deaths, marriages, “Springtime of the Peoples”, 155 156, 160
identity and migration, 56, 154, 189 “Statute Regarding New Muslims” (Kanun
Regulation for Population Registration u Nev Müslim), 46
(1878) (Sicil i Nüfus Nizamnamesi), 189; Stavriotes, see also Istavri, 25 26, 113, 115,
permanent population registers (sicil i 124 125, 126, 127 131, 134 137, 138,
nüfus), 189 139 140, 151 153, 245, 247, 249 250
ridda (turning away from Islam), 20 Stevens, Alex (British consul in Trabzon),
Rıfat Paşa (foreign minister)70 74, 120
Rıza, Ahmed, 203 Stone, Frank Andrews, 79
Romanian principalities, 35 Sturmer, Austrian Internuncio, 70
Romantic Revival nationalism, 1 3, Sublime Porte, the, 26, 36, 39, 64, 66,
158 159, 249 68 69, 71, 74 75, 160, 163; Legal
Royal Navy, 156, 165 Advisors Bureau, 187
Rumeli (Rumelia), see also Balkans, Şumnu, 172
provinces map, 2, 6; ethnic conflict in 12; Szarcinsky, see also Osman Bey, 166
dervish orders in, 15, religious practice in,
17 19; application of Tanzimat in, 37; Tabatinsky (Ali Bey), 173
loss of, 198 Takvim i Vekayi, 29
Russel, Lord, (British foreign secretary), 81 tanassur u rum, 117, 122, 131, 139, 249,
Russia, 26, 28 29, 35, 64 65, 77, 93, 115, 250
121, 160, 161, 163, 166, 173 174, 183, Tanzimat Edict (1839), 7, 22, 25, 29, 32 36,
185, 193, 198, 200, 202, 245 39, 66, 76 77
Russian consul at Tarsus, 87 Tanzimat State, and conversion, 10; nature
of, 23 27, 29 42; non Muslim citizens
Saharin, Isa (Pruski), 194 and, 29; the “Tanzimat Man”, 29; end of,
Şakir, Ahmed Paşa, 110, 124, 124, 125, 138 63 66; foreign intervention and, 65;
Salahaddin Efendi, 205 women and, 58 60
Salonica, 37, 41, 52, 55, 85 87, 98, 99, tekke, (dervish lodge), 18
101 105, 110, 177 178, 185 186, 191, Todorova, Maria, 6, 18
225 226, 249, 254 Trabzon, 74, 87 88, 116 120, 122, 125,
Sason massacre, 214 140, 152, 210 211, 214, 245, 249; Consul
“secret order” (irade i hafiyye), 51 52, 55, Stevens in Trabzon, 74; Patriarch of, 125
244 Treaty of Berlin (1878), 89, 200
Şehadet (Shahada), 46, 166 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), 7
Şehriköy, 53 Treaty of Paris (1856), 24, 77
Serbian knez (chieftains), 28 Tripoli, 95 96, 176
Serbian nationalism, 28, 32, 34 Trotsky, Leon, 197
Serbian sancaks, 35 “Turco Aryanism”, 174, 194
Serbs, Serbia, 2, 32, 34, 54, 112, Turcology, 174
182 183, 199 “Turkish Protestants”, 79 82
 Index 281

Turkism (Türkçülük), 194 Vilayet of Bitlis, 207, 212, 217, 222,

Tzedopoulos, Yorgos, 113, 113, 119, 138 231 232
Vilayet of Erzurum, 178, 183, 215
ulema, 32, 34, 42, 53 54, 70, 82, 133, Vilayet of Syria, 190
187 188, 234¸ ulema inspectors, 54 Vilayet of Yanya, 105, 107, 184
unregistered population (nüfus u mektume), Viswanathan, Gauri, 258
142, 144, 154, 232, 253
Urfa, 150, 229, 231 Walker, Christopher, 203
Ustoyanov (Stoyanof), aka Mehmed Sadik “White Man’s Burden”, 24, 67
Efendi, Istanbul chief constable, 177, 181, White, Luise, 119, 138
193, 195
Yarman, Arsen, 205
Vahakn Efendi (imperial commissioner), Yörüks, 134,
101, 102, 104 Young Turk Revolution, 138, 202
Vambery, Arminius, 170, 171, 185, 192, 199 Young Turks, 138, 203, 203n, 239, 242
Van, 200, 207, 219, 221, 222, Ypsilanti, Alexander, 12
Vani Mehmed Efendi, 10, 19
Varkongy, Agnes, 161 Zahabedyan, 149 150
Vefik, Ahmed Bey (later Paşa), 173 Zeki Paşa, 204, 207, 208
Vidin, 32, 35, 54, 161, 163 164, 165, Zeytun uprising, 202, 214
166 167, 169, 173, 192, 255 Zhelyazkova, Antonina, 114
Vienna, 89 90, 185 Ziver Bey, 97, 109
Vilayet of Ankara, 63, 124, 135, 1 138, Zürcher, Eric Jan, 12
184, 212 Zvi, Sabbatai, 13