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REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 870
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).4393/2010
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
OM PARKASH Respondent(s)
O R D E R
Hrishikesh Roy, J.
1. Heard Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellant(s). Also heard Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Amicus
Curiae assisted by Mr. Kunal Chatterjee, learned counsel for the
respondent.
2. The challenge here to the judgment and order dated 26.06.2008
in the LPA No.6/2003 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh
whereunder, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated
21.05.2003 was upheld by the Division Bench. Through the said
judgment, the termination of the respondent ordered by the
appellant(s) on 25.06.1996 was found to be unsustainable on the
ground of not providing due opportunity to the delinquent. The
learned Single Judge set aside the penalty of removal from service
granting all consequential benefits to the delinquent. The Court
however observed that the employers were at liberty to proceed to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Joshi
Date: 2024.11.16
conduct inquiry on the charges in terms of the
16:48:52 IST
Reason: Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation, 1960 (for short “LIC Staff
Regulation”, and take necessary action.
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3. The disciplinary authority while ordering removal from service
of the respondent through the order dated 25.06.1996 (Annexure P-1)
considered the absence from duty by the respondent to be a case of
abandonment of service under Regulation 39(4)(iii) read with
Explanation 1 of the LIC Staff Regulation. The order notes that the
delinquent failed to respond to the notice(s) issued to him.
Moreover his whereabouts were not known for over 90 days, as
specified in the LIC Staff Regulation. The respondent who was
serving as an Assistant Administrative Officer in the LIC, since
25.9.1995 absented himself from duties without informing his
employer. The LIC’s letters addressed to him to resume duties
remained unanswered by the delinquent. Then the chargesheet-cum-
show cause notice was issued on 14.02.1996 proposing his removal
from service. But the same was also not answered.
4. The Authority therefore considered it to be a case of
abandonment of service and by invocation of powers under Regulation
39(4)(iii) ordered from removal of the delinquent. The relevant
part of the Regulation reads as under:-
“39 (4) (iii) Where an employee has abandoned
his post, the disciplinary authority may consider the
circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon
as it deems fit.
Explanations: 1. For the purpose of this regulation,
an employee shall be deemed to have abandoned his post
if he absents himself from duty without leave or
overstays his leave for a continous period of ninety
days without any intimation therefore in writing.
2. All communications under this regulation and
copies of orders passed there under may be delivered
personally to the employee if he is attending office;
otherwise they shall be sent by registered post to the
address noted in the service record. Where such
communications or copies of orders cannot be served on
him personally or by registered post, copies thereof
shall be affixed on the notice board of the office in
which the employee is employed, and on such affixing
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such communications and orders shall be deemed to have
been properly served on him.”
5. Assailing the judgment of the High Court granting relief to
the delinquent, Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Counsel would
point out that notice(s) were issued on 06.10.1995, 06.11.1995 and
19.12.1995 to the respondent prior to the chargesheet-cum-show
cause notice on 14.02.1996. In those, the delinquent was informed
about his unauthorized absence from office with effect from
25.09.1995 and requiring him to rejoin services immediately or
action would be taken against him under the LIC Staff Regulation.
This was followed by chargesheet-cum-show cause notice which
reflected the endorsement of the Postal Authorities to the
communication dated 06.11.1995 to the effect that on enquiry it was
learnt that the respondent had abandoned his job and left his place
of residence. As all the notice(s) remained unanswered by the
delinquent, the authorities invoked the powers under Regulation 39
(1)(f) and ordered delinquent’s removal from service.
6. When the appeal of the delinquent was rejected by the
Appellate Authority through order dated 19.08.1997, the respondent
filed the writ petition resulting in the impugned orders of the
Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court.
7.1. Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Counsel would firstly
submit that the appellant(s) had taken all steps to serve notice on
the delinquent who was not to be found since 25.09.1995 and
therefore treated it to be a case of abandonment of service. The
termination of service was accordingly ordered, under the
Regulation 39(4)(iii).
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7.2 It is next pointed out that around that period, the respondent
secured employment as AG-III Depot in the Food Corporation of India
(FCI) on 14.04.1997 and although this was an important indication
of abandonment of service by the respondent, he failed to disclose
the same in the Writ Petition No.41 of 1998, which subsequently
came to be filed before the High Court on 05.01.1998.
7.3 The Senior Counsel submits that the respondent absented from
duty for 90 days without intimation to his employer and since the
notice(s) addressed to the delinquent remained unanswered,
conducting an inquiry into the charge of unauthorized absence was
an impossibility. Therefore, the employer had rightly treated it to
be a case of abandonment of service and terminated the respondent.
8. The respondent despite notice, was un-represented and
accordingly Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel was requested
to assist the Court. Mr. Gupta adverts to the circumstances under
which the respondent’s services were dispensed with by the
appellant(s) and points out that service of notice as claimed by
the appellant(s), may have to be treated with caution as the
concerned notice(s) were sent to different addresses.
9. On the above aspect, it is discernible that three notice(s)
were sent to the permanent address. In response to the second
notice dated 06.11.1995 which returned back to the appellant(s),
the postal remarks in Hindi reads as under:
“pata karne par pata chala hai ki praptkarta kahin se
naukari chodkar chala gaya hai. R.L. wapas ki jati
hai” [English Translation: on enquiry it has come to
know that the consignee has left job and gone. R.L is
returned herewith]”
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10. Importantly, the respondent secured employment with the FCI on
14.04.1997 and although his Writ Petition was filed six months
after securing the new job, the employment with the FCI was
concealed in the Writ Petition. If this vital aspect was known the
High Court possibly would have taken a different view and the
respondent abandoning his job with the LIC, could have been easily
inferred.
11. Relief was granted to the respondent by the High Court on the
ground that the termination order was passed without affording a
reasonable opportunity or conducting an inquiry into the charge of
absence from duty. But in granting such relief, the Court
overlooked that it was a case of the respondent abandoning his
services without informing his employer about his whereabouts.
Subsequently, it came to light that he joined the FCI on
09.05.1997.
12. Such conduct of the respondent could not have been condoned by
the employer and therefore, in our assessment, treating the
respondent to have abandoned his service and taking appropriate
action against him, in terms of the LIC Staff Regulation, cannot be
faulted. It is also necessary for us to say that as the delinquent
was guilty of suppression of the fact of his employment with the
FCI, he was disentitled to equitable relief from the High Court in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. With the above conclusion, the High Court in our assessment,
erred in granting relief to the respondent by allowing the Writ
Petition. The impugned order is accordingly set aside and quashed.
With this, the appeal stands allowed leaving the parties to bear
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their own cost.
..................J.
[ HRISHIKESH ROY ]
..................J.
[ S.V.N. BHATTI ]
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 13, 2024.
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ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.4 SECTION XIV-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).4393/2010
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
OM PARKASH Respondent(s)
([ HIGH UP ON THE BOARD ] Shri Jaideep Gupta, learned senior
counsel as Amicus Curiae, shall be assisted by Mr. Kunal Chatterjee
Advocate. )
Date : 13-11-2024 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HRISHIKESH ROY
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.V.N. BHATTI
For Appellant(s)
Mr. Kailash Vasudev, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Ekta Choudhary, AOR
Mr. Divyank Dutt Dwivedi, Adv.
Ms. Jeba Khan, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jaideep Gupta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Kunal Chatterjee, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable
order.
Pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
[DEEPAK JOSHI] [KAMLESH RAWAT]
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed Reportable Order is placed on the File)