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An Introduction to Economic Geography Globalization
Uneven Development and Place 1st Edition Danny
Mackinnon Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Danny Mackinnon, Andrew Cumbers
ISBN(s): 9781408249994, 1408249995
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 27.64 MB
Year: 2007
Language: english
AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
‘A thoughtful, stimulating, accessible introduction to the range of approaches used by economic geographers
to understand and explain the patterns and processes of contemporary globalization and uneven development.’
Professor Peter Daniels, University of Birmingham
Today’s rapidly flowing global economy means the economic geographical perspective has never been more important.
An Introduction to Economic Geography comprehensively guides students through the core issues and debates of this
vibrant and exciting area, whilst simultaneously exploring the range of approaches and paradigms currently invigorating
the wider discipline. Rigorous in approach, yet accessible in style, the authors demystify and enliven a crucial subject
for study in the 21st century.
Underpinned by the themes of globalization, uneven development and place, the text conveys the diversity and
vitality of contemporary economic geography. It balances coverage of traditional areas such as regional development
and labour markets with insight into new and evolving topics like neoliberalism, consumption, information and
communications technologies and tourist geographies.
MAIN FEATURES
● A global and balanced view is afforded through research, case studies and examples drawn from a
diverse range of countries, a chapter on the global South and coverage throughout of both developed
and developing countries.
● A political economy approach is supported by cultural and institutional insights that offer students a
variety of perspectives on each topic and a culturally sensitive overview.
● In-text features, including chapter maps, reflective questions and exercises, encourage the reader to
engage with the material, test knowledge and understanding, and reflect.
●
●
Dedicated boxes provide a range of lively and topical case studies and examples to illustrate wider points.
A wide range of maps, tables and photographs illustrate and help clarify the key concepts and examples.
AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
An Introduction to
Economic Geography
An Introduction to
Economic Geography
Globalization, Uneven Development
and Place
ISBN 978-0-13-129316-8
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
10 09 08 07
Brief contents
List of tables xi
List of figures xiii
Preface xvi
Acknowledgements xviii
Part 1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introducing economic geography 1
2 From commercial geography to the ‘cultural turn’? Approaches to
economic geography 21
3 Shaping the capitalist economy: key actors and processes 42
4 Spaces of production and consumption 67
Glossary 308
References 329
Index 347
v
ITEG_A01.QXP 23/3/07 12:09 Page vi
‘This is an excellent and comprehensive introduction to the diverse field of economic geography. Its clear
style, engaging case studies and well-constructed summaries of the major debates make it an invaluable
resource. It should be essential reading for students at all levels.’
Andrew Jones, Birkbeck College, University of London, and member of the Economic
Geography Research Group
‘A thoughtful, stimulating, accessible introduction to the range of approaches used by economic geographers
to understand and explain the patterns and processes of contemporary globalization and uneven develop-
ment. An excellent platform for more advanced exploration of some key themes in contemporary economic
geography.’
Peter Daniels, University of Birmingham
‘A stimulating and accessible introduction to a core area of the discipline. Ranging from traditional topics
such as regional development, multinational firms and labour markets, to new concerns focused on know-
ledge-based economies, learning regions, spaces of consumption, and the Internet economy, An Introduction
to Economic Geography conveys a clear sense of the diversity and vitality of contemporary economic
geography.’
Neil Wrigley, University of Southampton, and Editor of Journal of Economic Geography
ITEG_A01.QXP 23/3/07 12:09 Page vii
Contents
List of tables xi
List of figures xiii
Preface xvi
Acknowledgements xviii
Part 1 INTRODUCTION
vii
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Contents
viii
ITEG_A01.QXP 23/3/07 12:09 Page ix
Contents
ix
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Contents
13 Conclusion 303
13.1 Summary of key themes 303
13.2 Globalization , neoliberalism and regional development 305
Glossary 308
References 329
Index 347
Supporting resources
Visit www.pearsoned.co.uk/mackinnon to find valuable online resources
Companion Website for students
• Key annual updates in Economic Geography
For more information please contact your local Pearson Education sales
representative or visit www.pearsoned.co.uk/mackinnon
x
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List of tables
2.1 Approaches to economic geography 23 7.1b Foreign direct investment inward stock by
2.2 Fordist and post-Fordist modes of regulation 32 world region and selected countries as a
3.1 Ownership structure of share capital in the percentage of world total, 1914–2001 145
UK’s privatized utilities, 1993 45 7.2 Hymer’s sterotype, in which the space–
3.2 The growth of the service sector 52 process relationship takes the form A–B–C 148
3.3 The economic roles of the state 63 7.3a The world’s most ‘transnational’ MNCs
4.1 Quantities of wheat and cloth production 69 and selected other MNCs, rankings, 2003 151
4.2 The spatial division of labour in 7.3b The world’s top 15 non-financial MNCs,
manufacturing 78 ranked by foreign assets, 2003 151
5.1 Three perspectives on economic 7.4 Employment change in 10 largest
globalization 90 integrated oil companies, 1991–1998 153
5.2 Exports and imports by geographical 7.5 Key oil and gas mergers and acquisitions in
region, 1913 93 period since 1998 153
5.3 Shares of world GDP, 1820 and 1913 93 7.6 Differences between US, German and
5.4 Merchandise exports as percentage of GDP, Japanese TNCs 155
1913–1998 (1990 prices) 95 7.7 Advantages and disadvantages of MNC
5.5 World rankings for manufacturing value inward investment for host regions 158
added, 2000 102 7.8 Footloose MNCs: recent examples of
5.6 World rankings for manufacturing exports, relocation/closure of FDI plants in Central
1963–2004 104 Europe 163
5.7 Growth rates by categories of state in the 8.1 The decline of industrial employment in
developing world and former communist selected G7 countries: percentage of
world, 1975–2001 105 workforce employed in industry 170
5.8 Income inequality indicators for selected 8.2 Leading exporters and importers in world
countries, 2005 109 trade in commercial services, 2004
6.1 Unemployment insurance: members as a (percentage and rank) 176
percentage of the labour force in selected 8.3 Outward FDI in services by country, 2001 177
European countries 118 8.4 The top ten accounting firms, ranked by
6.2 The Keynesian Welfare State 119 total revenue, 2003 178
6.3 Long-term growth rates, 1820–1970 120 8.5 London’s share of international financial
6.4 Major regional economic blocs 132 markets 185
6.5 Regional inequalities: variance of the log of 8.6 Selected offshoring cases, UK, 2003–2004 193
regional GDP per capita 140 9.1 Trends in knowledge v routine jobs in the
7.1a Foreign direct investment outward stock by US economy 208
leading investing countries as a percentage 9.2 Deindustrialization in selected developed
of world total, 1914–2001 145 economies: an uneven global picture 209
xi
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List of tables
9.3 Job losses in selected West European 9.7 Global framework agreements concluded
regions through deindustrialization 210 between MNCs and global union
9.4 Fordist and post-Fordist labour federations, as at September 2005 220
markets 211 11.1 Key theories of development 259
9.5 Average job tenure and tenure distribution 12.1 International tourism arrival and origin
for selected OECD countries 214 regions, 2004 282
9.6 Geographical variations in trade union 12.2 The shift to post-Fordist consumption in
decline for selected OECD countries 217 tourism 284
xii
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List of figures
1.1 Scales of geographical analysis. 3 3.8 Macy’s: A famous New York department
1.2 ‘A shrinking world’. 4 store with nineteenth-century origins. 58
1.3 Falling cost of London–New York telephone 3.9 The original retail district in nineteenth-
calls. 5 century New York City. 59
1.4 Banana split: who gets what in the banana 4.1 A freight train passing through Laramie,
chain. 6 Wyoming. 70
1.5 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 4.2 Chicago and the American Railroad
(PPP), 2003. 7 Network, 1861. 71
1.6 Foreign investment and capital utilization 4.3 Surface mail (1866–69) and telegraph
in China, 1999 8 transmission (1870), times in days. 72
1.7 Skyscrapers in Shanghai. 9 4.4 The process of cumulative causation. 73
1.8 Poverty in Africa. 9 4.5 UK manufacturing employment, 1851. 74
1.9 The iceberg model. 12 4.6 Europe in 1875. 75
1.10 Employment in financial and business 4.7 The US manufacturing belt in 1919. 76
services in Britain, 2005. 13 4.8 Shipbuilding employment in Britain, 1911. 76
1.11 Industrial districts in Italy. 17 4.9 The manufacturing belt in the former
2.1 Demand and supply curves. 22 Soviet Union. 77
2.2 Regional economic specialization in Asia 4.10 The regional distribution of employment in
under colonialism. 24 Britain, 1841–1986. 80
2.3 Weber’s locational triangle. 26 4.11 The location of ‘Silicon Valley’. 81
2.4 Central places in southern Germany. 26 4.12 McDonald’s in Beijing. 83
2.5 Dialectics. 28 5.1 Transport and settlement patterns in a
2.6 Gentrification in London Docklands. 30 colonial economy. 94
2.7 Christmas consumption. 36 5.2 The growing interconnectedness of the
2.8 The sports utility vehicle (SUV). 38 world economy. 96
3.1 The process of production under 5.3 The growth in global currency transactions
capitalism. 44 relative to global trade plus foreign
3.2 Wall Street. 46 investment. 97
3.3 Venture capital investment in the United 5.4 The world trade network. 99
States by region, 1997. 46 5.5 The world’s macro-regions. 100
3.4 North-east England: regional setting and 5.6 World map of manufacturing production. 101
settlements. 47 5.7 World map of services exports. 103
3.5 Kondratiev cycles. 49 5.8 World map of chronic undernourishment. 106
3.6 Location of the textiles industry in 5.9 Countries whose economic wealth declined
northern England, 1835. 50 in real terms, 1990–2001. 107
3.7 The Ford assembly line. 55 6.1 A world of states. 116
xiii
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List of figures
6.2 Expenditure on UK regional assistance, 8.10 The network of world cities. 182
1960–96. 120 8.11 Lower Manhattan skyline. 183
6.3 Areas eligible for regional development 8.12 Global music sales, 1970–2001. 188
grants in France. 122 8.13 Leading MP3 distribution companies. 190
6.4 The economic crisis of the 1970s: inflation 8.14 Offshore processing in the airline and
and unemployment rates in the US and insurance industries. 191
Europe, 1960–87. 123 8.15 Major service centres in India. 194
6.5 Hong Kong skyline. 125 9.1 Differences in labour costs between selected
6.6 The location of the Singapore–Johor countries. 200
Bahru–Batam/Bintan Growth Triangle in 9.2 Spatial variations in unemployment by
South-east Asia. 126 state for the United States, January 2006. 201
6.7 The geography of China’s ‘open door’ 9.3 Labouring in a pre-modern landscape:
trading policy. 130 ‘The Harvesters’ by Hans Brasen. 202
6.8 UK public sector expenditure and 9.4 Trade union density: Canada, US and UK,
investment 1967/8 to 2004/5. 134 1900–2004. 203
6.9 Government expenditure versus GDP 9.5 Call centres: an ‘assembly line in the
growth for OECD countries. 135 head’? 208
6.10 Areas eligible for regional policy assistance, 9.6 The flexible firm model. 212
1979 and 1993 137 9.7 Trade union recognition deals and
6.11 The structure of economic governance in membership levels in the UK, 1997–2003. 218
Wales post-devolution (after 1999). 138 9.8 Major international migration movements
7.1 FDI flows, 1970–2004. 146 since 1973. 223
7.2 Global geography of US versus Japanese 9.9 Illegal immigrants crossing the Mexican–
automobile producers. 156 US border. 224
7.3 Nissan factory, Sunderland, north-east 10.1 Investment in knowledge as a percentage
England. 160 of GDP among OECD countries, 2002. 229
7.4 Map of export processing zones in 10.2 Research and development. 229
developing countries. 161 10.3 The linear model of innovation. 231
7.5 The strategic coupling of regions and 10.4 The interactive model of innovation. 231
global production networks. 164 10.5 Apple’s iPod. 232
8.1 Services as a percentage of employment in 10.6 The spiral of knowledge creation. 233
G7 countries. 168 10.7 Map of UK clusters. 237
8.2 Services–GDP correlation. 173 10.8 Porter’s diamond model. 239
8.3 World trade in commercial services, total 10.9 Map of Hollywood. 240
exports, 1980–2004. 174 10.10 Map of Motor Sport Valley (MSV). 243
8.4 World exports of commercial services by 10.11 ‘It pays to be well connected’. 244
category, 1990, 2000, 2004. 174 10.12 Local buzz and global pipelines. 249
8.5 World exports of ‘other commercial 11.1 The global North and South. 253
services’ by category, 2003. 175 11.2 Changing conceptions of development. 256
8.6 Regional shares in world trade in ‘other 11.3 Calculating the human development index
commercial services’, 2004. 175 (HDI). 257
8.7 Share of services in total outward FDI of 11.4 HDI categories by country. 257
G7 countries, 1992–2002. 177 11.5 Rostow’s stages of economic development. 258
8.8 Growth of international derivatives 11.6 Dependency theory. 260
markets, 1995–2005. 179 11.7 Total debt service as a percentage of goods,
8.9 ‘Redlining’ in Los Angeles. 180 services and income. 262
xiv
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List of figures
11.8 Oxfam cow loan scheme. 265 12.4 The Rocks, Sydney. 287
11.9 The digital divide, 2000. 267 12.5 Kaikoura, New Zealand. 288
11.10 Income trends by region, 1960–98. 268 12.6 Distribution of regional tourist
11.11 An MST protest march. 271 expenditure in the UK, 2004. 289
11.12 The thirty major dams in the Narmada 12.7 Tourist regions in Portugal. 290
Valley, India. 271 12.8 Butler’s tourist-area cycle model. 292
11.13 Net overseas development assistance in 12.9 Location of Still Bay and Utrecht, South
2004 as a percentage of GNI. 276 Africa. 293
12.1 Thomas Cook advertisement for a tour of 12.10 Leakage in the tourist industry. 295
Scotland, late nineteenth century. 281 12.11 ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’. 297
12.2 International tourism receipts, 2004. 282 12.12 Gateshead Quays Regeneration Area. 298
12.3 Map of The Rocks, Sydney. 286 12.13 Abandoibarra, Bilbao. 299
xv
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Preface
Economic geography has become a highly diverse and ductory general textbook for British students, certainly
open field of research in recent years, incorporating a when compared to other areas of human geography,
wide range of research topics, theories and methodolo- such as political geography, ‘concepts/approaches’ or
gies. The influence of the so-called cultural and ‘methods’, which seem to have witnessed a profusion of
institutional ‘turns’ in particular has enlivened the textbooks in recent years. Three main types of existing
subject, exposing it to new ideas and concerns (Thrift, texts in economic geography can be identified, along-
2000). New areas of interest such as consumption, cor- side chapters in introductory human geography
porate cultures and gender relations in the workplace collections such as Cloke et al. (2005) and Daniels et al.
have been embraced by economic geographers, along- (2005) and more specialized books on particular topics
side work on more ‘traditional’ topics such as regional (e.g. consumption or labour markets). First, there are
development, large firms and labour markets, often those that focus on a core theme such as globalization,
informed by new perspectives. As a result, the notion of of which Dicken (2003a) and Knox et al. (2003) are the
the economy as a self-evident and self-contained entity established favourites. Second, a number of edited col-
as been destabilized, leading to an extension of its lections in the form of readers or companions
boundaries and the forging of new linkages with a presenting overviews of key topics or selections of
range of other subject areas. The profusion of ‘classic’ papers have been published in recent years
approaches and methodologies means that there is no (Barnes and Sheppard, 2000; Barnes et al., 2004; Bryson
single approach or ‘paradigm’ that dominates the field. et al., 1999). Third, more advanced research-level texts
Such diversity and pluralism has generated consider- such as Hudson (2005) are also available. This book
able excitement and vitality among researchers and aims to provide a text that is more accessible and
students. At the same time, however, it has raised con- student-friendly than the second or third of these types
cerns about the coherence, identity and purpose of while incorporating a broader range of topics than the
economic geography (see Antipode, 2001). One of the first. It is designed to guide students through key
major challenges is that of how to communicate the debates and issues in an integrated fashion.
diversity of the subject to the relatively uninitiated, par- Three main theoretical approaches can be identified
ticularly economic geography students, many of whom within contemporary economic geography: spatial
may expect to be introduced to a single ‘right’ approach analysis, political economy and cultural economy
or a clear set of core concerns (Barnes, 2006). (Chapter 2). As Hudson (2005, p.15) argues, the latter
Our purpose in writing this textbook is to convey two should be seen as potentially complementary
some of the diversity and vitality of contemporary rather than alternative approaches, providing different
economic geography to students. It is intended to work ‘analytic windows’ from which to view the economy.
as an introductory text for undergraduate geography While the book is underpinned by our favoured pol-
students taking courses in economic geography at the itical economy approach, we have sought to connect
equivalent of Levels 1 and 2 in England and Wales this to some of the cultural and institutional insights
(Levels 2 and 3 in Scotland). Our decision to write this that have informed research in recent years. Rather
book was prompted by the apparent lack of an intro- than having ‘a 1970s/1980s feel’ about it – as one
xvi
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Preface
reviewer commented on the original book proposal – closer linkages between the economies of distant coun-
the ‘new’ or revised form of political economy that we tries and regions.
have adopted has moved beyond the rather clunky and In selecting the topics and issues covered in the
deterministic nature of earlier versions to become more book, we have tried to reflect contemporary concerns in
flexible and open to the importance of context, differ- economic geography. Relatively ‘new’ areas (to econ-
ence and identity (Peck, 2005, p.166). To adopt omic geographers), such as consumption, services and
Hudson’s terms, our approach can be described as ‘cul- the cultural industries, are incorporated alongside
turally sensitive political economy’ rather than a more ‘traditional’ ones such as regional development,
‘politically sensitive cultural economy’ (Hudson, 2005, agglomeration and labour. The book is global in terms
p.15). of its geographical range and scope, and we have tried
This book is underpinned by three main thematic to include research and case studies drawn from a range
concerns, highlighted in the subtitle: globalization, of countries and regions. Economic development in the
uneven development and place. Globalization is one of ‘global South’ is the subject of a discrete chapter, and
the key forces reshaping the geography of economic the connections between developed and developing
activity, driven by multinational corporations, financial countries are highlighted throughout the book. Such is
institutions, international economic organizations and the breadth and diversity of the subject, however, that
governments. It has sparked a wave of protests from significant omissions are inevitable. Perhaps the most
‘anti-globalization’ activists and groups since the late obvious of these is the set of relations between the
1990s. In many ways, globalization provides a key con- economy and the environment (see Hudson, 2005,
temporary vehicle for examining the longer-standing pp.38–56), though individual readers will identify
concerns of economic geography, many of which can others (transition economies receive little direct atten-
be related to the overarching concepts of uneven devel- tion, for instance). In general terms, the outlook and
opment and place. We view uneven development as an scope of the book are inevitably limited by our UK res-
inherent characteristic of the capitalist economy, idence, reliance on English-language materials and
reflecting the tendency for growth and prosperity to be immersion in the concerns of Anglo-American human
geographically concentrated in particular locations geography. More specifically, our personal research
(Smith, 1984). The theme of place, in turn, reflects interests in areas such as regional development, labour
geographers’ traditional interest in distinctive localities. markets and state restructuring in developed
Crucially, however, such local distinctiveness must be economies have probably exerted some (indeterminate)
seen as the product of interaction with wider economic influence over the selection of topics and approach.
processes, not isolation. In this sense, one of the main Please note that bold text indicates an entry in the
geographical effects of globalization is the forging of Glossary.
xvii
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Acknowledgements
The idea for the book emerged from a discussion Birmingham, Dr Michael Punch at University College
between Andrew Taylor of Pearson Education and one of Dublin and Dr Pete North at Liverpool. We have tried to
the authors. Andrew has subsequently been the editor incorporate their suggestions wherever possible and the
responsible for the book and we are grateful to him, Sarah book is undoubtedly much better as a result. Special
Busby and the rest of the team at Pearson for their assist- thanks are due also to Keith Chapman, for the support
ance and patience. Most of the figures in the book were and encouragement he has provided to both of us in our
drawn by the production team at Pearson while Alison careers, and to close colleagues in the Geography
Sandison and Jenny Johnston at Aberdeen provided more Departments at Aberdeen and Glasgow, for general
specialist cartographic support. We would also like to camaraderie. Andy would also like to acknowledge the
thank the various reviewers of both the original proposal help and advice of Ray Hudson from PhD days onwards,
and, especially, the draft chapters, particularly the three and lastly give a big thanks to Fran and Anna for their
reviewers of the entire text – Professor Peter Daniels at continuing support, tolerance and love.
Publisher’s acknowledgements
We are grateful to the following for permission to Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the Twenty-first
reproduce copyright material: Century, 4th edn, copyright (© Peter Dicken 2003);
Figures 1.1, 3.1 and 9.8, reprinted by permission of Figure 1.4 from www.ideas-forum.org.uk, illustration
Sage Publications Ltd from Castree, N., Coe, N., Ward, drawn by Jan Nimmo; Figure 1.6 from Environment
K. and Samers, M., Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and Planning, 2002, A 34, p. 1583, PION Limited;
and Geographies of Labour, copyright (© Noel Castree, Figure 1.9 drawn by Ken Byrne, in Gibson-Graham,
Neil M. Coe, Kevin Ward and Michael Samers, 2004); J.K. 2006, A Postcapitalist Politics, Minneapolis and
Figures 1.2, 3.5, 5.2a, 5.2b, 5.4, 5.6, 5.7, 6.7, 7.2 and 7.4 London: University of Minnesota Press, p. 70; Figure
and Table 7.6 reprinted by permission of Sage 1.11 from ‘Industrial districts’, in A Companion to
Publications Ltd from Dicken, P., Global Shift: Economic Geography, edited by Sheppard, E. and
xviii
ITEG_A01.QXP 23/3/07 12:09 Page xix
Publisher’s acknowledgements
Barnes, T.J., Blackwell Publishing (Amin, A. 2000); (Publishers) Ltd; Figure 4.7 from Geography and the
Figure 2.1 reproduced with permission from Lee, R., Urban Environment, Vol. IV, Herbert, D.T. and
Progress in Human Geography, 26, copyright (© Sage Johnston, R.J. (eds) after Conzen, M., copyright 1981,
Publications, 2002), by permission of Sage Publications copyright John Wiley & Sons Limited, reproduced with
Ltd; Figure 2.3 from Industrial Location, John Wiley & permission; Figure 4.11 adapted from the Rand
Sons, Inc. (Smith, D.M. 1981); Figure 2.5 from McNally World Atlas, 1992; Figures 5.1, 11.2, 11.5
Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American Human and 11.6 from Geographies of Development, 2nd edn,
Geography since 1945, 6th edn, Johnston, R.J. and Potter, R.B., Binns, T., Elliott, J.A. and Smith, D.,
Sidaway, J.D., Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd, 2004, Pearson Education Limited; Table 5.1 from Global
reproduced by permission of Edward Arnold Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Polity
(Publishers) Ltd; Figure 3.3 from ‘Financing entrepre- (Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J.
neurship: venture capital and regional development’, 1999); Table 5.2 from The Geography of the World
Mason, C.M. and Harrison, R.T., in Money and the Economy, Knox, P. and Agnew, J., Edward Arnold
Space Economy, Martin, R. (ed.), copyright 1999, copy- (Publishers) Ltd, 1989, reproduced by permission of
right John Wiley & Sons Limited, reproduced with Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd; Table 5.3 adapted
permission, taken from PricewaterhouseCoopers from Table 3-1c, Shares of world GDP, 1000–1998, The
LLP/National Venture Capital Association MoneyTree World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, © OECD
report based on data from Thomson Financial; Table 2001; Table 5.4 adapted from Table 3-2b, Merchandise
3.3 from Geographies of Economies, Lee, R. and Wills, J., Exports as Per Cent of GDP in 1990 Prices, World and
Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd, 1997, reproduced by Major Regions, 1870–1998, The World Economy: A
permission of Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd; Figure Millennial Perspective, © OECD 2001; Figure 5.5 from
3.4 from Wrecking a Region, Hudson, R., 1989, p. 4, ‘Brave new world’, in Geographical Magazine, 67(1),
PION Limited; Figures 3.6, 4.5 and 4.8 from Atlas of Circle Publishing (Evans R. 1995); Figure 5.6 from
Industrializing Britain 1780–1914, Lawton, P., copyright Industrial Development: Global Report, 1997, United
© 1986, Methuen, reproduced by permission of Taylor Nations Industrial Development Organization (1997);
& Francis Books UK; Figure 4.2 ‘Map: Nature’s Table 5.7 from Millennium Development Goals: A
Metropolis with American Railroads, 1861’, from compact among nations to end human poverty, Human
Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, by Development Report, UNDP (2003); Table 5.8 from
William Cronon, copyright © 1991 by William Cronon, International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade
used by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.; and Security in an Unequal World, Human
Table 4.2 from Massey, D., Spatial Divisions of Labour: Development Report, UNDP (2005); Table 6.1 from
Social Structures and the Geography of Production, 1994, ‘The rise of the workfare state’, in Geographies of Global
Macmillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave Change: Remapping the World, 2nd edn, edited by
Macmillan; Figure 4.3 from ‘Annihilating space? The Johnston, R.I., Taylor, P. and Watts, M., Blackwell
speed-up of communications’, in A Shrinking World? Publishing (Painter, J. 2002); Figure 6.2 from ‘UK
Global Unevenness and Inequality, edited by Allen, J. regional policy: an evaluation’, in Regional Studies, 31,
and Hammett, C. (Leyshon, A. 1995), by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd (Taylor J. and Wren C. 1997),
Oxford University Press; Figure 4.4 from Industrial http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals; Figure 6.3 reprinted
Location, 2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing (Chapman, K. from Progress in Planning, 44, Tuppen, J.N. and
and Walker, D. 1991); Figure 4.6 from Peaceful Thompson, I.B., ‘Industrial restructuring in contem-
Conquest: The Industrialisation of Europe 1760–1870 porary France: spatial priorities and policies’, p. 126,
(Pollard, S. 1981), by permission of Oxford University copyright (1994), with permission from Elsevier; Table
Press; Figures 4.7, 4.9 and 11.1 from The Geography of 6.3 from Capitalism since 1945, Blackwell Publishing
the World Economy, 4th edn, Knox, P., Agnew, J. and (Armstrong, P., Glyn, A. and Harrison, J. 1991); Figure
McCarthy, L., Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd, 2003, 6.4 from The Condition of Postmodernity, Blackwell
reproduced by permission of Edward Arnold Publishing, (Harvey, D. 1989); Table 6.5 from
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Publisher’s acknowledgements
Environment and Planning A, 2004, 36, p. 2098, PION http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals, and from World
Limited; Figure 6.8 from HM Treasury (2005) Public Investment Report 1996: Investment, Trade and
Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2005, reproduced under International Policy Agreements, UNCTAD (1996);
the terms of the Click-Use Licence; Figure 6.10 from A Figure 9.4 and Table 9.6 from ‘A cross-country study of
United Kingdom? Economic, Social and Political union membership’, in Institute of Labour Discussion
Geographies, Mohan, J., Edward Arnold (Publishers) Paper 2016, IZA (Blanchflower, D. 2006); Table 9.4 from
Ltd, 1999, reproduced by permission of Edward Arnold ‘Places of work’, in A Companion to Economic
(Publishers) Ltd; Figure 6.11 from ‘Devolution and Geography, edited by Sheppard, E. and Barnes, T.,
economic governance in the UK: uneven geographies, Blackwell Publishing (Peck, J. 2000); Table 9.5 from
uneven capacities?’, in Local Economy, 17, Taylor & World Employment Report 2004–05, p. 191, copyright
Francis Ltd (Goodwin, M., Jones, M., Jones, R., Pett, K. © International Labour Organization; Figure 9.6
and Simpson, G. 2002), http://www.tandf.co.uk/jour- reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd from
nals; Table 7.2 from Environment and Planning D: Allen, J. and Massey, D. (eds), The Economy in Question,
Society and Space, 1985, 3, p. 37, PION Limited; Tables copyright (© 1988), taken from Flexibility, Uncertainty
7.3a and 7.3b from World Investment Report 2005: and Manpower Management, Institute of Manpower
Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization Studies Report 89, Institute of Employment Studies,
of R and D, UNCTAD (2005); Table 7.4 from ‘Changing (Atkinson, J. 1984); Figure 9.7 from Labour Force
relationships between multinational companies and Survey, TUC; Table 9.7 from International Framework
their host regions?: A case study of Aberdeen and the Agreements: Increasing the Effectiveness of Core Labour
international oil industry’, in Scottish Geographical Standards, Global Labour Institute, www.global-
Journal, 117(31), Royal Scottish Geographical Society labour.org. (Gibb, E. 2005); Figure 9.8 from Castles, S.
(Cumbers, A. and Martin, S. 2001); Figure 8.3 from and Miller, M., The Age of Migration, 2nd edn, 1998,
Measuring Trade in Services, WTO (2006); Tables 8.3, Macmillan, reproduced with permission of Palgrave
8.4 and 8.6 from World Investment Report 2004: The Macmillan; Figure 10.1 ‘Investment in knowledge’,
Shift Towards Services, UNCTAD (2004); Figures 8.4, OECD Factbook 2006: Economic, Environmental and
8.5 and 8.6 and Table 8.2 from International Trade Social Statistics, © OECD 2006; Figure 10.6 from The
Statistics 2005, WTO (2005); Figure 8.7 from Figure Knowledge-creating Company: How Japanese Companies
B.5.4. Share of the service sector in the total inward FDI Create the Dynamics of Innovation, (Nonaka, I. and
positions of OECD countries, OECD, International Taekuchi, H. 1995), by permission of Oxford University
Direct Investment Statistics, June 2005, reproduced in Press, Inc.; Figure 10.7 from Trends Business Research
Measuring Globalization OECD Economic Globalization et al., 2001; Figure 10.8 from ‘Locations, clusters and
Indicators, © OECD 2005; Figure 8.8 and Table 8.5 from company strategy’, in The Oxford Handbook of
International Financial Services London (IFSL); Figure Economic Geography edited by Clark, G.L, Feldman, M.
8.9 from Environment and Planning A, 1996, 28, pp. and Gertler, M. (Porter, M.E. 2000), by permission of
1209–32, PION Limited; Figure 8.10 reprinted from Oxford University Press; Figure 10.9 from ‘A new
Cities, 16(6), Beaverstock, J.V., Smith, R.G. and Taylor, map of Hollywood: the production and distribution
P.J., ‘A roster of world cities’, copyright (1999), with of American motion pictures’, in Regional Studies,
permission from Elsevier; Figure 8.13 from 36, Taylor & Francis Ltd (Scott, A.J. 2002),
Environment and Planning A, 2001, 33, p. 69, PION http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals; Figures 10.10 and
Limited; Figure 8.14 reprinted by permission of Sage 10.11 reprinted from Geoforum, 31, Henry, N. and
Publications Ltd from Dicken, P., Global Shift: Pinch, S., ‘Spatialising knowledge: placing the knowl-
Transforming the World Economy, copyright (© Peter edge community of Motor Sport Valley’, copyright
Dicken 1998), taken from ‘Telecommunications and (2000), with permission from Elsevier; Figure 10.12
the changing geographies of knowledge transmission reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd from
in the late twentieth century’, in Urban Studies, 32, Bathelt, H., Malmberg, A. and Maskell, P., Progress in
Taylor & Francis Ltd (Warf, B. 1995), Human Geography, copyright (© 2004 Sage
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Publisher’s acknowledgements
Publications); Figure 11.3 from International M. Williams 2004); Figure 12.13 reprinted by permis-
Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in sion of Sage Publications Ltd from Rodriguez, A.,
an Unequal World, Human Development Report, Martinez, A. and Guenga, G. ‘Uneven development:
UNDP (2005); Figure 11.6 adapted from R.B. Potter, new urban policies and socio-spatial fragmentation in
Urbanisation in the Third World (OUP, 1992), by per- metropolitan Bilbao’, in European Urban and Regional
mission of Oxford University Press; Figure 11.8 from Studies, 8, copyright © 2001 by SAGE Publications.
Introducing Human Geographies, 2nd edn, Cloke, P.,
Crang, P. and Goodwin, M. (eds), Edward Arnold Photographs
(Publishers) Ltd, 2005, © 2005 Hodder Arnold, repro- Figure 1.7 John Lawrence, Getty Images; Figure 1.8 ©
duced by permission of Edward Arnold (Publishers) Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis; Figure 2.6 Robin
Ltd; Figure 11.10 from Making New Technologies Work MacDougall, Getty Images; Figure 2.7 Franco Zecchin,
for Human Development, Human Development Report, Getty Images; Figure 2.8 © David Cooper/Toronto
UNDP (2001); Figure 11.13 from ‘Net ODA in 2004 as Star/Corbis; Figure 3.7 Source: Mary Evans Picture
a percentage of GNI, aid rising sharply, according to the Library;
latest OECD figures (13 December 2005)’, © OECD Figure 9.3 Corbis; Figure 9.5 © Sherwin Crasto/
2005; Figure 12.1 © Imagining Scotland: Tradition, Reuters/Corbis; Figure 9.9 © Danny Lehman/Corbis;
Representation and Promotion in Scottish Tourism since Figure 10.2 © Jim Craigmyle/Corbis; Figure 10.5 ©
1750, Gold, J.R. and Gold, M., 1995, Ashgate; Table 12.1 Dana Hoff/Beateworks/Corbis; Figure 11.11 Luciney
from Tourism Highlights, 2005, World Tourism Martins, http://www.mst.org.br; Figure 12.11 ©
Organization; Table 12.2 from Consuming Places, Urry, National Museums Scotland, Licensor www.scran.ac.uk;
J., Routledge, Thomson Publishing Services, North Figure 12.10 from From Mahsuri to Mahathir, Insan, (B.
Way, Hanover HANTS SP10 5BE; Figure 12.3 reprinted Bird 1989)
from Annals of Tourism Research, 27, Waitt, G., We are grateful to the Financial Times Limited for
‘Consuming heritage: perceived historical authenticity’, permission to reprint the following material:
copyright (2000), with permission from Elsevier; Figure 5.3 redrawn from ‘Global capital, trade
Figure 12.6 ONS (2005) Travel Trends 2004, reproduced and foreign currency transactions’ (Lee, R., 2002) ©
under the terms of the Click-Use Licence; Figure 12.7 © Financial Times, 20 March 2002, p. 29; Figure 8.12 from
Contemporary Portugal: Dimensions of Economic and ‘Rock ’n’ roll suicide’ (Sanghera S., 2001), © Financial
Political Change, Syrett, S. (ed.), 2002, Ashgate; Figure Times, 15 November 2001, p. 19.
12.8 reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd In some instances we have been unable to trace the
from Shaw, G. and Williams, A.M., Tourism and owners of copyright material, and we would appreciate
Tourism Spaces, copyright (© Gareth Shaw and Allan any information that would enable us to do so.
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ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 1
Part 1 Introduction
Chapter 1
Introducing economic
geography
economic development. This is followed by a dis-
Topics covered in this cussion of each of the three main themes of the book:
chapter globalization, uneven development and place. In
section 1.3, we provide a brief definition of the
➤ The main themes of the book: economy and a basic introduction to economic geog-
● globalization and connections across space; raphy as a distinct subject area. This is followed by an
● uneven geographical development; outline of the political economy perspective that
● the importance of place.
informs our approach in this book. Finally, section
1.5 describes the contents of the remainder of the
➤ The meaning of the economy.
book.
➤ The nature of economic geography as an
academic subject.
➤ The political economy approach to economic
geography that we adopt in this book.
1.1 Introduction
Our aim in this book is to examine the changing geog-
raphy of economic activity within the contemporary
Chapter map world economy. As economic geographers, we are par-
ticularly concerned with the location of different types
In the introduction to this chapter, we highlight some of activity, the economies of particular regions and the
of the key questions addressed in this book and relate economic relationships between different places. A
these to contemporary debates on globalization and number of key questions are addressed in the book.
1
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How is economic activity organized across different having the same effects everywhere, globalization has
geographical scales? In what ways has the economy different outcomes in different places. Instead of a ‘flat’
become more globally integrated in recent decades? world in which advanced technologies are bringing
How is the growth of information and communica- everyone together on equal terms, as Friedmann
tions technology affecting the location of economic claims, the world is characterized by huge inequalities
activity? In what ways is economic development geo- in wealth, as indicated by the contrasting economic
graphically uneven and what are the reasons for this? fortunes of China and Africa in recent years (see Box
What kinds of economic activity are found in different 1.2). While the speed and density of global economic
types of places? To what extent do locally specific connections has certainly increased, distinct forms of
factors and influences shape processes of economic production are still associated with particular regions.
development? Indeed, the evidence from dynamic growth regions
One of the key forces shaping the geography of such as Silicon Valley in California, the City of London
economic activity is the much-discussed phenomenon and Baden-Württemberg in southern Germany sug-
of globalization. This term refers to the growing con- gests that competitive advantages in the global
nections and linkages between people and firms economy can often be tied to local cultures of produc-
located in different places, manifested in increased tion and specialist forms of skills and knowledge
flows of goods, services, money, information and that are difficult to transfer elsewhere (Storper, 1997).
people across national and continental borders. It has In other words, regions or places remain important in
become a key buzzword of the new millennium, pro- a global system and we need to examine the interac-
moted and supported by many business people, tion between particular places and globalizing
politicians, journalists and academics, and actively processes.
contested and resisted by ‘anti-globalization’ groups In assessing this process of interaction, we need to
and activists. Several prominent writers and academics pay equal attention to global processes and locally
have argued that globalization is bringing about the specific factors (Johnston, 1984). The decision to locate
‘end of geography’ with advanced information tech- a major new investment, for example a car plant or a
nology and communications making location and call centre, in a particular region is not only a product
distance irrelevant since businesses can locate produc- of global economic imperatives; it is also shaped by
tion anywhere and still maintain close contact with local conditions and factors (market position, wage
suppliers and customers (O’Brien, 1992). In a more rates, skills, site availability and financial incentives
recent version of this argument, the New York Times from government agencies). Similarly, while the actions
columnist Thomas Friedmann (2005) argues that new of firms, governments and workers based in particular
technologies are creating a flat world in which work places are structured by the basic pressures of capitalist
can be relocated to a wide variety of locations, as man- production, requiring firms to make profits, workers to
ifest in the shift of service employment to developing earn a living and governments to encourage growth,
countries such as India. they also tend to be informed by locally specific values
While these provocative arguments appear to and beliefs. The conservative culture of the southern
capture important changes in the organization of the states of the United States, for example, is associated
economy, they are rather simplistic and overstated, with anti-trade union attitudes and practices among
relying upon an impoverished view of geography. New business and state-level officials, helping to attract busi-
information technologies are certainly enabling ness into the region in recent decades, in contrast to the
aspects of service employment such as call centres to strong union traditions of the manufacturing heart-
be relocated to developing countries where costs are land in the North-east and Midwest, which has lost
lower, but this trend is focused on particular countries much of its traditional industrial base since the 1970s
like India with others being left behind. Rather than (pp. 454–6).
2
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In this section, we focus on the three main themes of 1.2.1 Globalization and
the book: globalization, uneven development and
place. Our selection of these themes is informed by the
connections across space
basic geographical concepts of scale, space and place. The first underlying theme that runs through this book
Scale refers to the different geographical levels of is that economic activities are connected across space
human activity, from the local to the regional, national through flows of goods, money, information and
and global (Figure 1.1). Space is simply an area of the people. These connections are not new: trading
earth’s surface such as, for example, that contained relations between distant people and places involving
within the boundaries of a particular region or the exchange of goods have existed throughout much
country. Place refers to a particular area (space), of human history. The notion of globalization,
usually occupied, to which a group of people have however, emphasizes that the volume and scope of
become attached, endowing it with meaning and sig- global flows has increased significantly in recent
nificance. The geographer Tim Cresswell (2004, p.8) decades. Increased trade and economic interaction
illustrates the distinction between space and place by between distant places is dependent on technology in
referring to an advertisement in a local furniture shop terms of the ease of movement and communication
entitled ‘turning space into place’, reflecting how across space. In this context, space is understood in
people use furniture and interior decor to make their terms of the distance between two points and the time
houses meaningful, turning them from empty it takes to move between them.
Global
International/
Macroregional transnational/
e.g EU, North America, E. Asia supranational/
connections
National
Translocal
connections
Regional
e.g. California, North East England
Local
e.g. Silicon Valley, City of London
Workplace
3
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1500–1840
1850–1930
1960s
A new set of transport and communications tech- interaction. The effects of these ‘space-shrinking tech-
nologies has emerged since the 1960s, leading to a large nologies’ have brought the world closer together,
expansion in the volume of spatial movement and effectively reducing the distance between places in
4
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terms of the time and costs of movement and com- information to be exchanged at a fraction of the pre-
munication (Figure 1.2). The growth of jet aircraft vious cost (Figure 1.3).
since the 1960s has facilitated the growth of business Information and communications technologies
travel, making it easier for executives to oversee and have effectively shrunk the distance between places,
coordinate economic activities in different countries resulting in ‘time–space compression’ as it becomes
and continents. On top of this, the growth of budget much easier and cheaper to move money and infor-
carriers such as easyJet and Ryanair in Europe or mation across space. The term was introduced by
Southwest Airlines in the United States over the last Harvey (1989a) who argued that the process of
decade or so has underpinned the continuing expan- ‘time–space compression’ has been driven by the devel-
sion of international tourism. Another key trend has opment of the economy, requiring geographical
been the development of containerized shipping, which expansion in search of new markets and supplies of
now accounts for approximately 90 per cent of total labour and raw materials. By overcoming the con-
world trade, greatly reducing the cost and time of straints of geography (distance and space) through
transporting goods over long distances (Dicken, 2003a, investments in transport and communications infra-
p.91). structure, corporations have reduced the effects of
At the same time, new information and communi- distance as it becomes easier and cheaper to transmit
cations technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet, email information, money and goods between places. As
and mobile telephones have spread readily, to the such, time and space are effectively being compressed
extent that many people and businesses are now through the development of new technologies. This is
dependent on them, relying on a crucial but often not an entirely novel process; a previous ‘round’ of
unseen mass of hardware consisting of terminals, fibre time–space compression occurred towards the end of
optic cables and networks. The last decade or so has the nineteenth century through inventions such as rail-
witnessed the rapid growth of the Internet, which had ways, steamships, the telegraph and the telephone
an estimated 140 million users world wide in mid- which allowed goods, information and money to be
1998, increasing to an estimated 600 million in 2002 moved far more rapidly (section 4.2).
(UNDP, 1999, p.5; 2004, p.183). This new ICT infra- Another crucial set of connections across space is
structure has made it possible for large volumes of provided by flows of commodities, defined as products
300
250
200
US dollars
150
100
50
0
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999
5
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Box 1.1
The humble banana is the world’s most Bananas are grown by either indi- interest between groups of people
traded fruit, with 5 billion sold every vidual small farmers, sometimes over who captures the most added
year in the UK (I. Cook et al., 2002). working under contract, or on large value from the product (Watts,
Recently, for example, one of the industrial plantations run by MNCs. 2005, pp.534–6). Figure 1.4 shows
authors bought a bunch of four Either way, the fruit must be grown, how the price of a 30p banana is
bananas for 66p in his local branch of picked and packed and transported distributed between the various
Morrison’s, a British supermarket to the nearest port from where it is actors in the production chain. The
chain. In making this purchase, he shipped in special temperature-con- banana has been the subject of
was, in common with many other trolled compartments to another port several trade disputes, most recently
consumers, primarily concerned with in the destination country (I. Cook between Europe and the US over
the price and physical appearance of et al., 2002, p.4). The fruit is then the European Union’s (EU) system
the banana. Hidden beneath these ripened in special ripening centres of preferential trade with former
aspects, however, lies a complex geog- before being sent to the super- colonies in Africa and the
raphy of production and distribution market by truck. Bananas exported Caribbean. This meant that imports
which links different people and places from the tiny West Indian island of from Latin America, where produc-
together (Watts, 2005, pp.537–8). St Vincent to the UK, for instance, tion is controlled by large American
While individual consumers may are transported to Southampton by agri-business multinationals like
remain unaware of such linkages, the Geest line shipping company, Chiquita, faced a range of taxes
they create real social relationships taking roughly two weeks (Vidal, and restrictions. The US government
between people in different places, for 1999). successfully appealed to the World
example consumers in countries such The complex chain of linkages Trade Organization, threatening to
as the UK and banana farmers in trop- involved in the production, distri- decimate the economies of some
ical countries in Africa, the Caribbean bution and exchange of any particular Caribbean islands where small pro-
and Latin America. commodity creates real conflicts of ducers cannot compete with large
10,000-acre industrialized plan-
tations in Central America (Vidal,
Banana split 1999).
Who gets what in the banana chain Even without such competition,
small farmers were facing a real
Worker struggle to survive due to reduced
1p
prices, longer hours and stricter
Plantation owner quality specifications from buyers (I.
5p
Cook et al., 2002, p.1). By contrast,
4p Shipper the supermarkets, multinational dis-
tributors and assorted ‘middle men’
3p Wholesaler/
importer appear to be making substantial
profits. For the small Caribbean
4p
Ripener farmers, then, and the communities
that are economically dependent on
the export of bananas, the future
13p looks bleak, unless supermarkets
Retailer and consumers can be persuaded to
alter their buying habits, paying
higher prices for fair trade rather
Figure 1.4 Banana split: who gets what in the banana chain. than free trade fruit (Vidal, 1999).
Source: International Development Education Association of Scotland website ‘Banana Link’, at
www.ideas-forum.org.uk/Images/BSplit.jpg; Jan Nimmo.
6
ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 7
or services that are sold commercially. The modern captures the value-added. The role of powerful multi-
economy involves the production and consumption of national corporations (MNCs) in controlling the
a vast array of commodities, spanning everything from production and distribution processes across national
iPods to package holidays. The commodity is so basic boundaries has been the subject of particular scrutiny
to the workings of the economy that Karl Marx – who in recent years (Gereffi, 1994). Exploring the produc-
began his famous work Capital with an examination of tion and consumption of particular commodities, then,
its properties – described it as the ‘economic cell form’ helps us to trace and uncover economic connections
of capitalism. ‘It is as if he is saying that in the same way between places, linking different localities to global
that the DNA sequence holds the secrets to life, so the trading networks (see Box 1.1).
commodity is the economic DNA, and hence the secret
of modern capitalism’ (Watts, 2005, p.532).
Commodity chains link together the production
1.2.2 Uneven Development
and supply of raw materials, the processing of these A basic feature of the process of economic development
materials, the production of components, the assembly that we emphasize in this book is its geographical
of finished products, and the distribution, sales and unevenness. Uneven development is an inherent
consumption of these products. They involve a range of feature of the capitalist economy, reflecting the tend-
different organizations and actors, for example farmers, ency for growth and investment to become
mining or plantation companies, component suppliers, concentrated in particular locations. These areas may
manufacturers, subcontractors, transport operators, be favoured by a particular set of advantages such as
distributors, retailers and consumers. Commodity geographical position, resource base, availability of
chains have a distinct geography, linking together dif- capital or the skills and capabilities of the workforce.
ferent stages of production carried out in different Once growth begins to accelerate in a particular area, it
places (Watts, 2005, pp.537–8). Some parts of the pro- tends to ‘suck in’ investment, labour and resources
duction process add more value or profit, creating from surrounding regions. Capital is attracted by the
tensions between the different participants over who opportunities for profit while workers are drawn by
$30,000+
$20,000–29,999
$10,000–19,999
$5,000–9,999
$1,200–4,999
$510–1,199
Figure 1.5 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (PPP), 2003.
Source: UNDP, 2005, pp.219–22.
7
ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 8
abundant job opportunities and high wages. behind, experiencing conditions of extreme depri-
Surrounding regions are often left behind, relegated to vation and poverty (Box 1.2).
a subordinate role supplying resources and labour to ➤ Within individual countries, too, economic dispari-
the growth area. ties between regions are evident. The rapid
One key aspect of the process of uneven economic economic development of China, for instance, since
development is that it occurs at different geographical the late 1970s has opened up a growing divide
scales (Figure 1.1). This can be illustrated with refer- between the booming coastal provinces in the South
ence to three key scales of activity: global, regional and and East and a poor, underdeveloped interior
local. (Figure 1.6). Developed countries are also character-
➤ At the global level, there is a marked divergence ized by regional disparities, such as the persistent
between the ‘core’ in North America, Japan and North–South divide that has characterized the econ-
Western Europe and the ‘periphery’ in the ‘global omic geography of the United Kingdom since the
South’ of Asia, Latin America and Africa (see Figure 1930s (Amin et al., 2003, p.13).
1.5). This pattern reflects the legacy of colonialism, ➤ Even on a local level within cities, uneven develop-
whereby the core countries in Europe and North ment is present in the form of social polarization
America produced high-value manufactured goods between rich middle-class neighbourhoods and
and the colonies produced low-value raw materials poorer inner-city areas and public housing schemes.
and agricultural products. While a number of East Thus a city like London contains some of the highest
Asian countries, including China, have been able to property prices and salaries on earth only a few
overcome this legacy, experiencing rapid growth and hundred metres away from inner-city districts where
rising prosperity over the past 25 years, others, par- over a quarter of the workforce is out of work and
ticularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have been left living on state benefits.
Values in US $10,000
no data
0–15,000
15,000–65,000
65,000–123,000
123,000–284,000
284,000–608,000
608,000–1,289,000
8
ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 9
Box 1.2
9
ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 10
contain 16 of the world’s 20 most per cent in 1970 (BBC News, as a ‘scar on the conscience of the
polluted cities (World Bank, 1998). undated). The human costs of this world’ in a much-publicized speech
By contrast, Africa has failed to sorry tale of poverty and underdevel- in October 2001 (quoted in Seldon,
develop since independence in the opment are evident in terms of 2001, p.500). A wide range of devel-
1950s and 1960s. Since 1980, its disease, famine and war with HIV opment and ‘anti-globalization’
position relative to other world and AIDS having decimated the adult groups and activists have sub-
regions has actually deteriorated, populations of many countries in sub- sequently helped to focus attention
with the continent appearing to have Saharan Africa in recent years (Figure on Africa, more recently coming
almost ‘fallen out of the world 1.8). The plight of Africa has become together in the ‘Make Poverty History’
economy’ (Agnew and Grant, 1997). a political issue in the West in recent campaign during the summer of
By the year 2000, half of the world’s years with the British Prime Minister, 2005, prompted by the G8 economic
poor were in Africa compared with 10 Tony Blair, describing the continent summit in Gleneagles, Scotland.
The process of economic development is highly key theme of this book. As we suggested in the previous
dynamic in nature as new technologies are developed, section, processes of uneven geographical development
new forms of customer demand emerge and work have created distinctive forms of production in par-
practices change. Over time, patterns of uneven devel- ticular places. During the nineteenth and early
opment are periodically restructured as capital moves twentieth century, highly specialized industrial regions
between different locations, investing in those that emerged in Europe and North America. As a result,
offer the highest rate of return (profit). As a result,
distinct places are associated with sectoral and
new growth regions emerge while established ones
functional divisions of labour. In the United States,
can experience stagnation and decline. As broader
for example, ‘Pittsburgh meant steel, Lowell meant
market conditions and technologies change, the spe-
textiles, and Detroit meant automobiles’ (Clark et
cialized economic base of formerly prosperous regions
al., 1986, p.23), while in the United Kingdom, ‘one
can be undermined by reduced demand, rising costs,
finds metal workers in the Midlands, office
competition and the invention of new products and
professionals in London, miners in South Wales,
methods of production. On a global scale, the most
and academics in Oxford’ (Storper and Walker,
dramatic change in patterns of uneven development is
1989, p.156).
the emergence of East Asia as a dynamic growth
(Peck, 1996, p.14.)
region over the last 30 years or so. Within developed
countries, established industrial regions dependent on Although some of these specific associations have been
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century industries weakened by deindustrialization, the general point
such as coal, steel and shipbuilding have experienced about distinctive forms of production being associated
decline while new growth centres have emerged in with particular places remains important. The City of
regions such as the south and east of the US (the so- London, for instance, continues to be associated with
called ‘sunbelt’), southern Germany and north-eastern finance and business services, Silicon Valley in
Italy. California with semiconductors, Los Angeles with
movies and Milan with clothing design and fashion.
Such variety is continually reproduced through the
1.2.3 The importance of
interaction between wider processes of uneven devel-
place opment and local political, social, economic and
The role of place in shaping economic activity is a third cultural conditions. These conditions reflect the econ-
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ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 11
omic history of a place in terms of the particular indus- turn allows a sense of place which is extroverted,
tries found there and the institutions and practices which includes a consciousness of its links with the
associated with them. In any one place, the interaction wider world, which integrates in a positive way the
between established industries and institutions and global and the local (Massey, 1994, pp.154–5).
contemporary processes of change shapes and moulds
From this perspective, place can itself be regarded as a
the economic landscape (Massey, 1984).
process rather than seen as some static and unchanging
It has become increasingly clear in recent years that
essence. Places are connected and linked through wider
globalization is a differentiated and uneven process,
processes of uneven development operating through
generating different outcomes in different places. In
flows of capital, goods, services, information and people.
particular, globalization seems to be associated with a
Movement of particular commodities like bananas, for
resurgence of certain regions as economic units. The
example, link different parts of the UK to the economies
success of dynamic growth regions such as the City of
of certain Caribbean islands (see Box 1.1).
London (financial and business services), Silicon Valley
(advanced electronics), southern Germany (vehicles
and electronics) and north-eastern Italy (machine Reflect
tools, textiles), for example, is rooted in the specialized
production systems that have flourished there. ➤ Do you agree that specific places (regions) remain
Geographical proximity seems to encourage close link- important within a global economy? Justify your
ages and communication between firms, enabling them answer.
to share information and resources. The existence of a
large pool of skilled labour is a crucial feature of such
regions, allowing firms to recruit easily and workers to 1.3 The economy and
move jobs without leaving the local area. These aspects economic geography
of the local production system encourage innovation
and entrepreneurship, enhancing the competitiveness 1.3.1 The capitalist
of such regions within a global economy.
economy
While globalization is not leading to the erasure of
place as a significant dimension of economic life, it ‘The economy’ refers to the interrelated processes of
does undermine traditional notions of places as production, circulation, exchange and consumption
homogenous and clearly bounded local areas. As such, through which wealth is generated (Hudson, 2005, p.1).
there is a need to rethink place in terms of connections It is through such processes that people strive to meet
and relations across space. It is in this sense that the their material needs, earning a living in the form of
British geographer Doreen Massey’s work on the devel- wages, profits or rent. Production involves combining
opment of a ‘global sense of place’ is of particular land (including resources), capital, labour and knowl-
interest. Massey develops a new conception of place as edge – commonly known as the factors of production
a meeting place, a kind of node or point where wider – to make or provide particular commodities. It relies
social relations and connections come together: on a supply of resources from nature, meaning that
economic activities have a direct impact on the
what gives place its specificity is not some long
environment. The commodities produced are then
internalised history but the fact that it is
either directly consumed by the producers or, much
constructed out of a particular constellation of
more commonly, sold to individual consumers and
social relations, meeting and weaving together at a
households through the market.
particular locus. . . . Instead . . . of thinking of places
Human societies have tended to organize and struc-
as areas with boundaries around them, they can be
ture their economic activities through overarching
imagined as articulated moments in networks of
modes of production. These can be defined as econ-
social relations and understandings . . . and this in
omic and social systems that determine how resources
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are deployed, how work is organized and how wealth is – such as the role of the market, profits and competi-
distributed. Economic historians have identified a tion – are not natural and eternal forces that determine
number of modes of production, principally subsis- human behaviour, as mainstream economists and busi-
tence, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism. Each ness commentators tend to assume. Instead, capitalism
of these creates distinctive relationships between the is a historically specific mode of production that has
main factors of production. Capitalism is clearly the emerged from its roots in early modern Europe in the
dominant mode of production in the world today, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to encompass vir-
operating at an increasingly global scale. It is defined by tually the entire globe today. It has been superimposed
individual ownership of the means of production – fac- on a complex mosaic of pre-capitalist societies and cul-
tories, equipment and money capital – and the tures, resulting in great regional variation as
associated need for most people to sell their labour pre-existing local characteristics interact with broader
power to employers or capitalists in order to earn a global processes (Johnston, 1984).
wage. This allows them to purchase commodities pro- While capitalism is clearly the dominant mode of
duced by other firms, creating the market demand that production in the world today, it does not follow that
underpins the capitalist system. Compared to earlier all economic activity is capitalist in nature. In reality,
modes of production, production and consumption the formal, capitalist economy based on striving to
are often geographically separate under capitalism, cre- maximize profits or earnings coexists with a range of
ating a need for extensive transport and distribution other economic activities and motivations such as
networks. domestic work, volunteering, the exchange of gifts and
A key underlying point here concerns the fact that cooperatives. Gibson-Graham (2006) represents this in
the principal features of the modern capitalist economy terms of an ‘iceberg’ model with the capitalist
economy masking a wide range of other forms of
economic activity (Figure 1.9). The two categories are
not separate in practice, however, with non-capitalist
Wage labour activities interacting with capitalism in a variety of
produces for a market
in a capitalist firm
ways. Think of the relationship between domestic
work and paid employment, for example, or the role of
In schools On the street gift-buying within capitalism. Gibson-Graham (1996)
In neighbourhoods emphasizes the existence of diverse economies, criti-
Within families Unpaid cizing the preoccupation with the formal, capitalist
In church/temple economy among economists and economic geogra-
Between friends phers. This critique has informed a number of studies
The retired
of ‘diverse’ or ‘alternative’ economies such as informal
Gifts Volunteer
Self-employment work, local currencies and cooperatives (Leyshon et al.,
2003).
Barter Moonlighting Children
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Under 10%
11–15
16–20
21–25
Over 25%
Inner London
Outer Outer
London Inner London
London
Outer
London
See
inset
0 100km
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implications and consequences of particular arrange- ized. This role has sparked periodic debates about
ments and processes). According to one recent the social ‘relevance’ of the subject (Peck, 1999).
definition:
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ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 15
set out with particular force by Marx, although for generated in production that accrues to employers
some commentators the growth of a large middle class rather than employees; in the relationships between
of ‘white collar’ workers has blurred the distinction firms within particular industries with large retailers
considerably. Other important social relations are those and manufacturers often able to dictate prices and
between producers and consumers, different firms (e.g. terms to their suppliers (e.g. the cost-cutting strategies
manufacturers and suppliers), different groups of of the large supermarket chains such as Tesco in the UK
workers (e.g. supervisors and ordinary employees) and have reduced prices for farmers); and at the inter-
government agencies and firms. As our case study of national level, in the way that some institutions and
the banana indicated (Box 1.1), the production of a governments – the World Trade Organization (WTO)
simple commodity creates complex social relations or the US – have greater power to set the rules of trade
between people based in different places. Even if some than others.
of the parties – for example, consumers at large super- The ‘secret life of a banana’ (Box 1.2) indicates how
markets in the UK or US – are not aware of such the social relationships between different groups of
relationships, they still exist. people located in different places are structured by
Once we have accepted that the economy is struc- power. At a very basic level, it is clear that some actors
tured by social relations, it is important to recognize in the chain, particularly the supermarkets and the
that these relations will change over time as society multinational firms that coordinate the production and
evolves. We have already pointed to a transformation distribution processes, are in a more powerful position
occurring in Western societies from around the fif- that the small Caribbean farmers or the labourers in the
teenth century onwards where a system of market large Central American plantations. Unequal power
capitalism gradually replaced feudalism as the under- relations in this sense are central in understanding the
lying mode of production. In other words, feudal ties concept of uneven development.
and values of the peasantry and the nobility have given
way to market competition, the pursuit of profit and 1.4.3 Institutions and the
the wage relationship between capital (employers)
and labour (workers) as the key social relationship
construction of markets
shaping economic and indeed human development. Another crucial element in our political economy per-
Increasingly intensive competition between firms is spective is a view of markets as socially constructed
also a critical relationship, driven by the relentless entities that require social and political regulation
pursuit of profit and the subsequent drive to eliminate rather than representing naturally occurring
rivals to gain a greater share of the market. phenomena capable of self-regulation. Unlike main-
stream economics, which holds that markets, if left to
their own devices, will return to an equilibrium pos-
1.4.2 Power ition where supply equals demand and waste is
Having accepted that the economy is structured by eliminated, we believe that unregulated (‘free’) markets
social relationships, it is also important to recognize the are destabilizing and socially destructive. While the
role of power in underpinning these relationships. notion of the free market retains its ideological and pol-
Ultimately all human social relations are underpinned itical power, in reality virtually all economies are
by power, in the sense of the ability or capacity to take mixed, containing substantial public sectors. Following
decisions that involve or affect other people (see Allen, Karl Polanyi (Box 1.3), we emphasize the institutional
2003). Economic relations in this sense are no different. foundations of markets, recognizing that the economy
Power percolates through economic relationships at all is shaped by a wide range of institutional forms and
geographic levels: from that of the household in terms practices. These include cultural rules, habits and
of who makes decisions regarding the domestic budget, norms that structure the social relations between indi-
and who ‘goes out to work’ and who ‘stays at home’; at viduals, helping to generate the trust that underpins
the level of the firm in terms of the share of the wealth legal and contractual relationships, and the direct
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ITEG_C01.QXP 23/3/07 11:53 Page 16
Box 1.3
The work of Karl Polanyi normal fashion. The identification of this phrase suggests, Polanyi views
(1886–1964) on the institutional these fictitious commodities is institutions as constitutive of the
foundations of economic processes is important to Polanyi’s argument, indi- economy:
well known within the social sci- cating that a pure self-regulating The instituting of the economic
ences, making a crucial contribution market economy is impossible since process vests that process with
to the development of wider insti- state intervention is required to unity and stability; it produces a
tutional and sociological perspectives match the supply and demand for structure with a definite function
on the economy. Polanyi’s broad con- land, labour and money (Polanyi, in society; it shifts the place of
ception of the economy and his 1944). The book demonstrates how the process in society, thus
insights into the underlying nature of the construction of competitive adding significance to its history;
market society have come to inform markets depended upon state action it centres interest on values,
debates about contemporary pro- through the upholding of property motives and policy.
cesses of globalization and the social rights and contracts, the introduction (Polanyi [1959] 1982,
‘embeddedness’ of the economy of labour legislation, the establish- pp.243–70)
(Block, 2003). ment of measures to ensure a stable Institutions are both economic and
In The Great Transformation, pub- food supply and the regulation of the non-economic with the inclusion of
lished in 1944, Polanyi explores the banking system. the latter regarded as vital since
origins and development of market In the 1950s, Polanyi turned away religion or government, for example,
society during the nineteenth century. from modern market economies to may be as important in underpinning
He identified land, labour and money the analysis of primitive and archaic the operation of the economy as the
as ‘fictitious commodities’ because economies. This substantive focus monetary system or the development
they are not actually produced for was closely informed by his enduring of new labour-saving technologies.
sale on the market like true commodi- interest in the scope of the economy From this perspective, then, the
ties, a crucial point neglected by and the role of institutions in shaping research agenda is one of examining
orthodox economic analyses, which economic processes, as demonstrated the manner in which ‘the economic
assume that the price mechanism will by his famous analysis of ‘the process is instituted at different
balance supply and demand in the economy as an instituted process’. As times and places’ (ibid., p.250).
intervention of the state in managing the economy and and development agencies, employers’ organizations,
in running systems of social welfare. business associations and chambers of commerce,
Key forms of institution at the national level local political groupings, trade union branches and
include firms, markets, the monetary system, business voluntary agencies. According to Amin and Thrift
organizations, the state and a wide range of state agen- (1994) institutional ‘thickness’ or density is an
cies and trade unions. These are not merely important factor shaping local economic success,
organizational structures; they also tend to incorpo- referring to the capacity of different organizations and
rate and embody specific practices, strategies and interests to work together in the pursuit of a common
values that evolve over time. Economic geographers agenda. While far from typical of the structure of con-
are particularly interested in how local and regional temporary local economies, the industrial districts of
economies are shaped by distinctive institutional central and north-eastern Italy offer a striking illustra-
arrangements (Martin, 2000). Important forms of tion of the role of institutions in shaping local
institutions in this respect include local authorities economic development (Box 1.4).
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Box 1.4
The notion of industrial districts is In the 1980s, however, the renais- were experiencing rapid growth in the
derived from the writings of the sance of industrial districts was 1980s and 1990s.
English economist Alfred Marshall in highlighted by writers like Piore and The industrial districts of central
the early twentieth century. Marshall Sabel (1984) who spoke of a ‘second and north-eastern Italy are scattered
drew attention to the existence of industrial divide’ where mass produc- across the regions of Tuscany, Emilia-
highly specialized industrial regions tion was giving way to new forms of Romagna and Veneto. They became
based on networks of small firms in flexible specialization, based on known as the ‘Third Italy’ to distin-
northern England such as the increased demand for design-inten- guish this new growth region from the
Sheffield cutlery district or the various sive and customized products. rich, industrial North and the poor,
woollen textile areas in west Yorkshire. Flexible specialization was defined in agrarian South. Particular districts
He emphasized the inseparability of terms of the flexible use of machinery include the internationally famous
economic life from local society and and labour within a highly decentral- centres of Prato (textiles), Modena
culture (Amin 2000, p.153). Over the ized production system where (machine tools), Santa Croce (leather
course of the twentieth century, such individual firms concentrated on tanning), Capri (knitwear) and
areas experienced decline, eclipsed specific tasks. Industrial districts Sassuolo (ceramics) (Figure 1.11)
by the growth of mass production and within advanced economies like Italy, (Amin, 2000, p.154). In general, the
large, integrated corporations. France, Japan, Denmark and Spain growth of these districts has been
0 50 100 150km
31
5 4 6 Venezia
4 5 7
Milano 5
Torino 4
9 9 7
5
11 2 9 5
1 5
1 4 2
3 2
Genova
10 10
Bologna
7 9
4
9
6 5 Firenze Ancona
5
5 5 5
5 12
9
1 Metal goods 9 7
2 Mechanical engineering 8
3 Electrical and electronic engineering 7
4 Textiles
5 Clothing 9 Wooden furniture 4
6 Leather tanning 10 Ceramic goods
7 Footwear 11 Toys
8 Leather goods 12 Musical instruments
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based on a revival of local craft tra- socialist parties in Emilia-Romagna, between individual firms within a
ditions and skills, harnessing these to for example, having a strong influ- highly specialized production system,
modern production methods to meet ence over the trade unions, craft underpinned by a common culture,
growing market demand. associations and cooperatives of has generated high levels of trust.
As a number of commentators have small entrepreneurs. Local authorities The sharing of knowledge and ideas
noted, the success of the Italian dis- offered business premises and a between firms has facilitated incre-
tricts is deeply rooted in local culture. range of services to small firms from mental forms of continuous
The strongly communitarian political the 1970s, while a dense network of innovation, although questions
cultures of central and north-eastern labour unions, industry associations remain about the Italian districts’
Italy (socialist in Tuscany and Emilia- and chambers of commerce devel- capacity to adjust to the prospect of
Romagna, Catholic in Veneto) oped a sophisticated reservoir of radical change in market demand or
provided a basis for inter-firm collab- knowledge, skills and resources for technological development (Asheim,
oration with the communist and the use of members. Close ties 1996).
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Chapter 11 proceeds to examine development in the subject area. Highlights the key questions that economic
Global South, identifying the main approaches to geographers address and the changing perspectives that
development, examining broad patterns of inequality inform their work.
and highlighting contemporary policy debates on
Castree, N., Coe, N., Ward, K. and Samers, M. (2004) Spaces
trade, aid and debt. Chapter 12, the last substantive
of Work: Global Capitalism and Geographies of Labour,
chapter, then assesses the development of the tourist
London: Sage, pp.1–23.
industry, emphasizing its importance as a vehicle for
The introduction to a recent textbook on the geography of
the consumption and promotion of place and assessing employment and labour. Begins with brief examples of
its use as a means of economic development in both ‘working lives’, stressing how the experiences of people in dif-
developed and developing countries. ferent locations are linked together under global capitalism.
Finally, a brief conclusion in Chapter 13 pulls the
main themes together and considers some key public Leyshon, A. (1995) ‘Annihilating space?: The speed-up of
policy issues. communications’, in Allen, J. and Hamnett, C. (eds) A
Shrinking World?: Global Unevenness and Inequality, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp.11–54.
Exercises Introduces the key concept of time–space compression,
emphasizing the speed-up of global communications
Think of a commodity that you have recently con-
since the early 1980s. Explains this in terms of the geo-
sumed. This could be something you ate for lunch or
graphical expansion of capitalism over time, facilitated by
breakfast or an item of clothing that you have recently
successive advances in transport and communications
bought. A jar of coffee or a pair of training shoes could technologies.
be an example.
1. When you purchased this commodity, were you pri- Taylor, P.J., Watts, M. and Johnston, R.J. (2002)
‘Geography/globalization’, in Johnston, R.J., Taylor, P. and
marily concerned with the price and physical
Watts, M. (eds) Geographies of Global Change: Remapping
qualities of the good?
the World, 2nd edn, Oxford: Blackwell, pp.1–17, 21–28.
2. Was there anything, a label, to indicate the geo- A stimulating introduction to the relationships between geog-
graphical origin of this good? raphy as a discipline and the issue of globalization. Outlines
3. Why would it have been produced in that particular the rise of globalization as a key topic of interest, discusses the
region or country? uneven geography of globalization and highlights recent pol-
itical debates about the nature of globalization.
4. Under what conditions do you think it would have
been produced (e.g. in a factory, by craft workers, on Watts, M. (2005) ‘Commodities’, in Cloke, P., Crang, P. and
a farm)? Goodwin, M. (eds) (2005) Introducing Human Geographies,
5. What main actors would have been involved in its 2nd edn, London: Arnold, pp.527–46.
production (e.g. MNCs, small firms, farmers)? A review of the commodity as a key topic of interest to geog-
raphers. Highlights the economic importance of the
6. How might the profits be distributed among these commodity within capitalism and the role of commodities in
main actors? linking production in different places by means of com-
modity chains and networks.
Key reading
Useful websites
Barnes, T.J. and Sheppard, E. (2000) ‘The art of economic
geography’, in Sheppard, E. and Barnes, T.J. (eds) A http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/global-library/index.html
Companion to Economic Geography, Oxford: Blackwell, Provides a very accessible and comprehensive introduction to
pp.1–8. key aspects of globalization. The companion website for the
A brief introduction to economic geography as an academic Global Transformations textbook (Held et al., 1999).
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Chapter 2
From commercial geography to
the ‘cultural turn’? Approaches
to economic geography
Topics covered in this
Chapter map
chapter Having defined economic geography in section 1.3, in
this chapter we set out the main approaches that econ-
➤ The development of economic geography as an
omic geographers have adopted over time. This serves
academic discipline.
to frame and position the political economy perspec-
➤ The main approaches adopted by economic
tive that informs this book. We begin by considering
geographers, covering:
the relationship between economic geography and the
● traditional approaches, specifically
neighbouring discipline of economics. In the
commercial geography and regional
remainder of the chapter we examine the different
geography;
approaches that have been adopted in economic geog-
● spatial analysis, emphasizing scientific
raphy, gaining favour at different times. Four main
methods and quantitative modelling;
approaches are identified: traditional economic geog-
● Marxist political economy;
raphy, which was dominant from the late nineteenth
● cultural and institutional perspectives.
century to the 1950s; spatial analysis, embraced in the
➤ Our favoured approach, which can be 1960s and 1970s; political economy, which became
characterized as a modified political economy, popular in the 1970s and 1980s; and a set of cultural
informed by the insights generated by cultural
and institutional frameworks towards which economic
and institutional approaches.
geographers have turned since the early 1990s. The
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latter two approaches are considered in greater detail and self-interested manner, continually weighing up
because of their importance in shaping debates over the alternatives on the basis of cost and benefits, almost like
direction of the discipline in recent years. calculating machines. The market is viewed as an essen-
tially self-regulating mechanism, tending towards a
state of equilibrium or balance through the role of the
2.1 Introduction price mechanism in mediating between the forces of
demand and supply (Figure 2.1).
A key starting point for this chapter is to recognize that While economics developed as a theoretical disci-
no academic subject has a natural existence. Instead, as pline adopting the methods of natural sciences such as
Barnes argues, subjects must be ‘invented’ in the sense physics and chemistry, economic geography established
of being created by people at particular times: the first itself as a strongly factual and practical enterprise (see
economic geography course was taught at Cornell section 2.2):
University in 1893, the first English-language textbook,
As a discipline it [economic geography] grew less
George G. Chisholm’s Handbook of Commercial
out of concerns by economists to generalise and
Geography, was published in 1889 and the journal
theorise, than the concerns of geographers to
Economic Geography was established in 1925 (Barnes,
describe and explain the individual economics of
2000a, pp.14–15). The neighbouring discipline of econ-
different places, and their connections one to
omics was also established in the late nineteenth
another.
century, along with a number of other social sciences.
(Barnes and Sheppard, 2000, pp.2–3)
From the start, however, the two disciplines assumed
different characteristics. In general, a clear contrast can be drawn between the
Economics views the economy as governed by formal and theoretical approach of economics and
market forces that basically operate in the same fashion geography’s more open-ended ethos and more sub-
everywhere, irrespective of time and space. The market stantive concerns. While geography can be seen as
is composed of a multitude of buyers and sellers – the synthetic in nature, focusing on the relationships
forces of demand and supply – who dictate how scarce between, rather than the separation of, processes and
resources are allocated through their decisions about things (Lee, 2002, p.333), economics is analytic, seeking
what to produce and consume. Mainstream neoclas- to separate the economy from its social and cultural
sical economics is underpinned by the idea of context. Key features of each of the four approaches to
‘economic man’, assuming that people act in a rational economic geography examined in this chapter are set
out in Table 2.1, providing an important backdrop to
the ensuing discussion.
22
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
awareness of history, its trials and triumphs, gives an individual or a
people a somewhat skeptical attitude about the importance of
current history. But in Britain those who know and care least about
the nation's great past are the ones most indifferent to the challenge
of the present. They are the industrial working class, and their
indifference results from other influences.
Talking to the planners, technicians, factory bosses, communications
experts, salesmen, and senior civil servants, one finds less
complacency and more enterprise than in most European countries.
In fact, it sometimes seems to the outsider that British society is a
little too self-critical, too contentious. Obviously, it must change to
meet the altered world, but self-criticism pushed to the maximum
can ultimately crush ambition.
If we turn to modern British writing, we find sociologists,
economists, anthropologists, and politicians pouring forth a steady
stream of books analyzing the nation's social, economic, and political
problems. One of the great men of the modern Labor Party, Herbert
Morrison, thought it well worth while to devote his time to the
writing of Government and Parliament. The intellectual leaders of
Britain have turned increasingly to a minute assessment of their
nation and what is right and wrong about it.
This preoccupation with the state of the realm is healthy. The
complacency that was once the most disliked characteristic of the
traveling Briton is vanishing. The British are putting themselves
under the microscope. Nothing but good can come of it.
We hear from the British themselves confessions of inadequacy to
meet the modern world and flaming criticisms of aspects of their
society. As a nation they are fond of feeling sorry for themselves;
indeed, someone has said that they are never happier than when
they think all is lost. Such British statements should not be taken as
representing the whole truth. The reforming element is very strong
in the British character. Without its presence, the social reforms of
this century could not have been accomplished.
Anyone who frequents political, business, and journalistic circles in
Britain will hear more about mistakes and failures than about
success. (The most notable exception to this enjoyment of gloom is
the popular press, which since the war has made a specialty of
boosting British achievements.) Similarly, any discussion of British
character with Britons is sure to find them concentrating on negative
rather than positive traits. Perhaps this is because they are so sure
of their positive characteristics. In any case, the latter constitute a
major share of the national insurance against decline.
Over the years the British trait that has impressed me most is
toughness of mind. This may surprise Americans who tend to regard
the British as overpolite or diffident or sentimental—aspects of the
national character which are evident at times and which hide the
essential toughness underneath.
Although they bewail a decline in the standards of courtesy since the
war, the British are a polite race in the ordinary business of living.
From the "'kew" of the bus conductor or the salesgirl to the "And
now, sir, if you would kindly sign here" of the bank clerk they pad
social intercourse with small courtesies. However, when an
Englishman, especially an upper-class Englishman, desires to be
rude he makes the late Mr. Vishinsky sound like a curate. But it is an
English axiom that a gentleman is never unintentionally rude.
With some notable exceptions, the British are seldom loudly
assertive. They will listen at great length to the opinions of others
and, seemingly, are reluctant to put forward their own. This does not
mean they agree, although foreigners in contact with British
diplomats have often assumed this mistakenly. The British are
always willing to see both sides of a question. But they are seldom
ready to accept without prolonged and often violent argument any
point of view other than their own.
They are a sentimental people but not an emotional one. Failure to
distinguish this difference leads individuals and nations to misjudge
the British.
Sentimentalists they are. Their eyes will glisten with tears as they
listen to some elderly soprano with a voice long rusted by gin sing
the music-hall songs of half a century ago. As Somerset Maugham
has pointed out, they revere age. The present Conservative
government and the Labor front bench are unusual in that they
contain a large percentage of "young men"—that is, men in their
fifties. Sir Winston Churchill did not truly win the affection of his
countrymen until he was well into his seventies, when the old fierce
antagonism of the working class was replaced with a grudging
admiration for "the Old Man."
On his eightieth birthday the leaders of all the political parties in the
House of Commons joined in a tribute that milked the tear ducts of
the nation. When, six months later, Sir Winston retired as Prime
Minister there was another outbreak of bathos. But when two
months after that a new House of Commons was sworn under the
leadership of Sir Anthony Eden, some of the young Conservative
Members of Parliament who owed their offices and, in a wider sense,
their lives to Sir Winston pushed ahead of him in the jostling throng
making for the Speaker's bench. It was left to Clement Attlee, his
dry, thoughtful foe in so many political battles, to lead Sir Winston
up ahead of his eager juniors. Sentiment, yes; emotion, no.
For many reasons the British as a people are anxious to find
formulas that will guide them out of international crises, to avoid the
final arbitration of war. The appeasement of Neville Chamberlain and
his associates in the late thirties was in keeping with this historically
developed tendency. One has only to read what Pitt endured from
Napoleon to preserve peace, or the sound, sensible reasons that
Charles James Fox offered against the continuation of the war with
the First Empire, to understand that this island people goes to war
only with the utmost reluctance.
One reason is that in 1800, in 1939, and in the middle of the
twentieth century the British have lived by trade. Wars, large or
small, hurt trade. Prolonged hostility toward a foreign nation—
Franco's Spain, Lenin's Russia, or Mao's China—reduces Britain's
share in a market or cuts off raw materials needed for production at
home. In this respect we cannot judge Britain by the continental
standards of China or Russia or the United States. This is an island
power.
Because they are polite, because they are easily moved to
sentimental tears—Sir Winston Churchill and Hugh Gaitskell, who
otherwise have few traits in common, both cry easily—because they
are diffident, because they will twist and turn in their efforts to avoid
war (although at times, for reasons of policy, they will present the
impression of being very ready for war), the British have given the
outside world a false idea of their character. Beneath all this is
toughness of mind.
I recall landing in England in April of 1939. It was then obvious to
almost everyone in Europe that war was on the way. On the way to
London I talked to a fellow passenger, a man in his late twenties
who had three small children and who lived in London. "The next
time Hitler goes for anyone, we'll go for him," he said casually,
almost apologetically. He conceded that the war would be long, that
Britain would take some hard knocks, that going into the Navy and
leaving his wife and children would be tedious. But he had made up
his mind that there was no other course. The thing had to be done.
After the war—and, indeed, during it—many Americans ridiculed the
British reaction to the war. They found exaggerated the stories of the
cockney who said: "'arf a mo', Adolph" while he lit his pipe, the
women who shouted "God bless you" to Winston Churchill when he
visited the smoking ruins of their homes. This was a serious error. In
those days, the most critical that had ever come upon them, the
British acted in a manner which made one proud to be a member of
the same species.
But that was a decade and a half ago, and the circumstances were
extraordinary. Nations change—compare the heroic France of Verdun
with the indulgent, faithless France of 1940. Have war and sacrifice,
austerity and prolonged crisis weakened Britain's mental toughness?
I think not.
The prolonged conflict between employers and employed and among
the great trade unions is the most serious friction within British
society. Its critical effect upon Britain's present and future has been
emphasized. I do not believe, however, that in the long run the men
on both sides who hold their opinions so stoutly will be unable to
compromise their difficulties in the face of the continuing national
emergency. In the twenties and thirties such great convulsions in
industrial relations as the General Strike were harmful but not
catastrophic. The British economy was buttressed by overseas
investments and by the possession of established export markets
throughout the world. That situation no longer exists. Anything
approaching the severity of a General Strike could break Britain. In
the end, I believe, the extremists of both sides will realize this and
will find in themselves the mental toughness—for it takes a hard
mind to accept an armistice short of final victory in exchange for the
promise of future benefits—to compose their differences and move
toward a national rather than a partisan solution.
Of course, Britain's difficulties are not confined to the home front.
But I have consciously emphasized the importance of her internal
problems because they reflect the nation's present position in the
world and help to determine how Britain will act abroad.
Just as the last decade has seen drastic changes in industrial
direction in Britain, so the coming decade will witness changes
equally great in the development of Britain's international position.
Britain cannot, and would not if she could, build a new empire. But it
is evident that the country intends to replace the monolithic concept
of power with a horizontal concept. We will see, I am confident, a
steady growth of Britain's ties with Europe and the establishment of
Britain as a link between the Commonwealth nations and Europe.
The British have fertile political imaginations. They are adroit in
discussion and debate. After years of uncertainty a number of
politicians of great influence are moving toward closer association
with Europe. At the moment the Grand Design (a rather grandiose
title for the British to use) is endorsed by Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, Defense Minister Duncan
Sandys, Chancellor of the Exchequer Peter Thorneycroft, and
President of the Board of Trade Sir David Eccles. Given a change in
government, I think we can assume that the idea would be
supported, although enthusiasm would be somewhat less great, by
the leaders of the Labor Party.
What is the Grand Design? It is the concept of a Europe cooperating
in fields of economy and politico-military strategy. It goes beyond
the Europe of Western European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty
Alliance and thinks in terms of a general confederation into which
the Scandinavian and Mediterranean nations would be drawn.
Existing organizations such as the Organization for European
Economic Co-operation would be expanded to include new
members. At the top would be a General Assembly elected by the
parliaments of each member nation. There would be a general
pooling of military research and development.
The establishment of such an association of European states is at
least ten years in the future. The British do not think it should be
hurried. Careful, rather pragmatic, they advocate methodical
progress in which new international organizations could be tested
against actual conditions. Those that work will survive. Those that
do not will disappear.
Is the Grand Design a new name for a third force to be interposed
between the Sino-Russian bloc in the East and the United States in
the West? The British say emphatically not. They see it as a method
of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance by uniting Europe. Naturally,
they believe their flair for diplomacy and politics, their industrial
strength, and, not least, Europe's distaste for German leadership will
give them an important role in the new Europe. Obviously, that role,
as spokesman for both a united Europe and a global Commonwealth,
will be more suitable and, above all, more practical in the world of
1960 than the obsolete concept of Empire.
The development of British action toward the accomplishment of the
Grand Design will be accompanied by the gradual transformation of
what is left of the Empire into the Commonwealth. Ghana,
established as an independent member of the Commonwealth in
March 1957, will be followed by Singapore, Malaya, Nigeria,
Rhodesia, and many more. Since 1945 Britain has given self-
government and independence to well over 500,000,000 souls (at
the same time the Soviet Union was enslaving 100,000,000) and the
process is not over. Certainly there have been shortcomings and
failures—Cyprus is one. But it seems to me that a people prepared
on one hand to abdicate power and turn that power over to others
and at the same time ready to conceive and develop a new plan for
Europe is showing an elasticity and toughness of mind the rest of
the world might envy. We are not attending the birth of a new British
Empire but watching the advent of a new position for Britain in the
world—one less spectacularly powerful than the old, but important
nonetheless. The speed of its development is inextricably connected
with an expanding and prosperous economy at home.
Bravery is associated with tough-mindedness. But bravery is not the
exclusive possession of any nation. The British are a courageous
people, certainly. As certain classes are apt to combine courage with
the national habit of understatement, the bravery of the British has
an attraction not evident in the somewhat self-conscious heroism of
the Prussians. Of course, it can be argued that the apparent
unwillingness of the British to exploit the fact that Pilot Officer Z
brought his plane back from Berlin on one engine or that Sergeant
Major Y killed thirty Germans before his morning tea is a form of
national advertisement more subtle and sure than that obtained by
battalions of public-relations officers.
Although they revere regimental traditions, the British seldom
express their reverence openly. In war they are able to maintain an
attitude of humorous objectivity. During the fighting on the retreat to
Dunkirk I encountered two Guards officers roaring with laughter.
They had learned, they said, that the popular newspapers in London
had reported that the nickname of the Commander in Chief, General
the Viscount Gort, was "Tiger." "My dear chap," said one, "in the
Brigade [of Guards] we've always called him 'Fat Boy.'"
Coupled with tough-mindedness is another positive characteristic:
love of justice. This may be disputed by the Irish, the Indians, the
Cypriotes. But it is true that in all the great international crises in
which Britain has been involved, from the War of Independence
onward, there has been a strong, sometimes violent opposition to
the course that the government of the day pursued. Beginning with
Burke, the Americans, the Irish, the Indians, the Cypriotes have had
defenders in the House of Commons, on political platforms, and in
the press.
This is not the result of partisan politics, although naturally that
helps. Englishmen did not assail the Black and Tans in Ireland
because of love for Irishmen. Indian independence did not find a
redoubtable champion in Earl Mountbatten because of his particular
fondness for Indians. The impulse was the belief that justice or, to
put it better, right must be done.
It is because a large section of the nation believes this implicitly that
the British over the years have been able to make those gestures of
conciliation and surrenders of power which will ever adorn her
history: the settlement with the Boers after the South African war,
the withdrawal from India, the treaty with Ireland.
The British people suffered greatly during both world wars. Yet any
ferocious outbreak of hatred against "the Huns" was promptly
answered by leaders who even in the midst of war understood that
the right they were fighting to preserve must be preserved at home
as well as abroad.
It was this belief in justice, a justice that served all, incorruptible and
austere, which enabled a comparative handful of Britons to rule the
Indian subcontinent for so long. It was this belief in justice,
interpreted in terms of social evolution, which moved the reformers
of the present century in the direction of the Welfare State. The
British concept of justice is inseparably bound to the strong reformist
element within the British people. As long as that element flourishes,
as it does today, we can expect that British society will continue to
change and develop.
Tough-mindedness, a quiet form of bravery, a love of justice; what
else is there? One characteristic I have noted earlier: a living belief
in the democratic process. The British know the world too well to
believe that this delicate and complex system of government can
immediately be imposed upon any people. They themselves, as they
will admit, have trouble making it work. But neither fascism nor
communism has ever made headway. Any political expert can
provide long and involved reasons for this. I prefer the obvious one:
the British believe in democracy, they believe in people. Long ago, as
a young man entering politics, Winston Churchill, grandson of a
Duke of Marlborough, product of Harrow and a fashionable Hussar
regiment, adopted as his own a motto of his father's. It was simply:
"Trust the People."
The actual practice of democracy over a long period of years can be
successful only if it is accompanied by a wide measure of tolerance.
Despite all their vicissitudes, this virtue the British preserve in full
measure. The British disliked Senator McCarthy because they
thought he was intolerant; they were themselves slightly intolerant,
or at least ill-informed, about the causes that inflated the Senator. In
their own nation the British tolerate almost any sort of political
behavior as long as it is conducted within the framework of the law.
Communists, fascists, isolationists, internationalists all may speak
their pieces and make as much noise as they wish. There will always
be a policeman on hand to quell a disturbance.
Toleration of the public exposition of political beliefs that aim at the
overthrow of the established parliamentary government implies a
stout belief in the supremacy of democracy over other forms of
government. Even in their unbuttoned moments, British politicians
will seldom agree to the thesis, lately put about by many eminent
men, that complete suffrage prevents a government from acting
with decision in an emergency.
Early in 1951 I talked late one night with a British diplomat about
the rearmament of Germany. He was a man of wide experience,
aristocratic bearing, and austere manner. During our conversation I
suggested that the British, who had suffered greatly at the hands of
the Germans in two world wars, would be most reluctant to agree to
the rearmament of their foes and that the ensuing political situation
would be made to order for the extremists of the Labor Party.
"I don't think so," he replied. "Our people fumble and get lost at
times, but they come back on the right track. They'll argue it out in
their minds or in the pubs. They'll reject extreme measures. The
Labor Party and the great mass of its followers will be with the
government. The people, you know, are wiser than anyone thinks
they are."
Tolerance is coupled with kindness. British kindness is apt to be
abstract, impersonal. There is the gruff, unspoken kindness of the
members of the working class to one another in times of death. The
wealthy wearer of the Old School Tie will go to great lengths to
succor a friend fallen on evil days. He will also do his best to provide
for an old employee or to rehabilitate an old soldier, once under his
command, who is in trouble with the police. This is part of the sense
of responsibility inculcated by the public school. Even in the Welfare
State it persists. "I've got to drive out into Essex this afternoon," a
friend said, "and see what I can do for a sergeant that served with
me. Bloody fool can't hold onto a farthing and makes a pest of
himself with the local authorities. Damn good sergeant, though."
I remembered another sergeant in Germany. He was a man who had
felt the war deeply, losing a brother, a wife, and a daughter to
German bombs. When it was all over and the British Army rested on
its arms in northern Germany he installed his men in the best billets
the neighboring village could provide. The Germans were left to shift
for themselves in the barns and outbuildings. Within a week, he told
me, the situation was reversed. The Germans were back in their
homes. The soldiers were sleeping in the barns. I told a German
about it afterward. "Yes," he said, "the British would do that. We
wouldn't, not after a long war. They are a decent people."
It is upon such characteristics, a basic, stubborn toughness of mind,
bravery, tolerance, a belief in democracy, kindness, decency, that
British hopes for the future rest.
Any objective study of Britain must accept that, although there has
been a decline in power at home and abroad, the national economy
has recovered remarkably and the physical basis of the economy has
improved. Far from being decadent, idle, and unambitious, the
nation as a whole is pulsing with life. The energy may be diffused
into paths that fail to contribute directly to the general betterment of
the nation. But it is there, and the possession of the important
national characteristics mentioned above promises that eventually
this energy will be directed to the national good.
In the end we return to our starting-point. Although there is a
cleavage between the working class and the middle class, it is not
deep enough to smash the essential unity of the people. No great
gulfs of geography, race, or religion separate them. The differences
between employer and employed are serious. But there is no basic
difference, nurtured by the hatred of a century and a half, as there is
between revolutionary France and conservative France. The constant
change in the character of the classes, the steady movement of
individuals and groups up the economic and social ladders insures
that this will never develop. From the outside the society seems
stratified. On the inside one sees, hears, feels ceaseless movement
of a flexible society.
The long contest with Russia has induced Americans to follow
Napoleon's advice and think about big battalions. But national power
and influence should not be measured solely in terms of material
strength. By that standard the England of the first Elizabeth and the
Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century would have been blotted
out by the might of Spain just as our own struggling colonies would
have been overcome by the weight of England. The character of a
people counts.
So it is with Britain. The ability of the British people to survive
cannot be measured only in terms of steel production. The presence
of grave economic and social problems should not be accepted as
proof that they cannot be solved by people of imagination and
ability. The existence of external class differences should not blind
observers to the basic unity of political thought.
It is natural that in their present position Britons are far more aware
of the ties that bind them to the United States, ties that include a
common language, much common history, dangers shared, and
enemies overcome, than the people of the United States are aware
of the ties that bind them to Britain. But Americans must guard
against the easy assumption that, because Britain is weaker than
she was half a century ago, because she has changed rapidly and
will change further, Britain and the British are "through."
It is often said in Washington that the leading politicians of the
Republican and Democratic parties and the chief permanent officials
of the Treasury, State Department, and other departments did not
recognize the extent to which Britain had been weakened by World
War II. It is hard to understand why this should have been so. The
sacrifice in blood was written large on a hundred battlefields. The
cost in treasure was clearly outlined in the financial position of the
United Kingdom in 1945.
Americans should not fear political differences between the United
States and the United Kingdom on foreign policies. As long as the
British are worth their salt as allies they will think, and occasionally
act, independently. What would be dangerous to the future of the
alliance in a period of crisis would be the growth in Britain of a belief
that Britain's problems, internal or international, can be blamed on
the United States. A similar belief about Britain existed in France in
1940. Verdun occupied the position in French minds that the Battle
of Britain does today in some British minds, that of a great heroic
national effort that exhausted the nation and left it prey to the post-
war appetite of its supposed friend and ally. If this concept were to
be accepted by any sizable proportion of the British people, then the
alliance would be in danger. The possibility that this will happen is
slight. The British retain confidence in themselves, undaunted by the
changes in the world.
The United States can help sustain this confidence. It is difficult to
see why the political, industrial, and social accomplishments of the
British since 1945 are so casually ignored in the United States and
why Americans accept so readily the idea that Britain's day is done.
Certainly many Americans criticized the establishment of the Welfare
State. Certainly ignorance led many to confuse socialism in Britain
with communism in the Soviet Union. Certainly the achievement of
power by the great trade unions has alienated those Americans who
still decry the powerful position of organized labor in the modern
democratic state.
But it is folly to expect that even our closest friends and truest allies
can develop economically and politically along paths similar to those
trod by the people of the United States. It is time that we looked on
the positive side of Britain's life since the end of World War II. We
must remember that this is a going concern. The new nuclear power
stations rising throughout Britain are part of the general Western
community which we lead. British advances in the sciences or in any
other field of human endeavor should not be thought of as the
activities of a rival but as the triumphs of an ally that has in the past
given incontrovertible proof of her steadfastness in adversity, her
willingness to do and dare at the side of the United States.
There they are, fifty millions of them. Kindly, energetic, ambitious,
and, too often, happily complacent in peace; most resolute,
courageous, and tough-minded in the storms that have beaten about
their islands since the dawn of the Christian era.
What is at stake in the relationship between the two nations is
something far greater than whether we approve of Aneurin Bevan or
the British approved of Senator McCarthy. The union of the English-
speaking peoples is the one tried and tested alliance in a shaky
world. Three times within living memory its sons have rallied to
defeat or forestall the ambitions of conquerors. To understand
Britain, to share with her the great tasks that lie before the Western
community is much more than a salute by Americans to common
political thought, a common tongue, or common memories. It is the
easiest and most certain method by which we in our time can
preserve the freedom of man which has been building in all the
years since King and barons rode to Runnymede.
INDEX
Air Force, 239-40
Anne, Queen, 45
Army, 238-9
Attlee, Clement, 36, 58, 77, 78, 87, 88, 108, 113, 152, 235, 280
Bradlaugh, Charles, 30
Cabinet, 43-6
Chamberlain, Neville, 17, 35, 37, 63, 74, 95, 152, 166, 259, 280
Charles, Prince, 15
China (Communist), 79, 184;
British attitude toward, 149-50
Churchill, Sir Winston, 17, 18, 37, 51, 52, 59, 76, 80, 82, 95, 113-
14, 133, 152, 200, 235, 239, 252, 259, 279, 285-6;
party peacemaker, 35;
skill in debate, 40;
on monarchy, 276
clubs, 257-9
Communist Party in Britain, 35, 49, 142-4, 146, 147, 164, 179,
180;
in labor unions, 72, 82, 83-4, 109, 200, 208-15
conurbation, 6, 7
Crossman, R.H.S., 84
Eden, Sir Anthony, 18, 20, 52, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 65, 133,
143, 171-2, 183, 224, 280
Edward VII, 27
Egypt, 54, 55, 61, 66, 88, 143, 151, 155, 156, 168, 183, 184
George I, 45
George IV, 25
Hardy, Keir, 36
Macmillan, Harold, 18, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 65, 89, 155,
269, 282
McNeil, Hector, 62
Odger, George, 30
Plumb, J.H., 45
Reynolds, Quentin, 8
Salisbury, Marquess of, 18, 44, 49, 54, 58, 59, 134
Shinwell, Emanuel, 77
Strachey, Lytton, 20
Townsend, Peter, 26
Welfare State, 101-2, 104, 105, 107, 118, 123, 264, 285, 289
Wilson, Harold, 49
Zilliacus, Konni, 84
A NOTE ON THE TYPE
The text of this book was set on the Linotype in a face called times
roman, designed by stanley morison for The Times (London), and first
introduced by that newspaper in the middle nineteen thirties.
Among typographers and designers of the twentieth century, Stanley
Morison has been a strong forming influence, as typographical
adviser to the English Monotype Corporation, as a director of two
distinguished English publishing houses, and as a writer of
sensibility, erudition, and keen practical sense.
In 1930 Morison wrote: "Type design moves at the pace of the most
conservative reader. The good type-designer therefore realises that,
for a new fount to be successful, it has to be so good that only very
few recognise its novelty. If readers do not notice the consummate
reticence and rare discipline of a new type, it is probably a good
letter." It is now generally recognized that in the creation of Times
Roman Morison successfully met the qualifications of this theoretical
doctrine.
Composed, printed, and bound by h. wolff, New York. Paper
manufactured by s.d. warren co., Boston.
A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Drew Middleton was born in New York City in 1913. After being
graduated from Syracuse University, he went into newspaper work,
and in 1938 became a foreign correspondent. Since then he has
been chief of The New York Times bureaus in England, Russia, and
Germany. In 1940, during the Battle of Britain, he was in London
covering the operations of the Royal Air Force, and he later sent his
dispatches from Supreme Headquarters of the AEF. In the decade
since the war, Mr. Middleton's reporting and interpreting of the Cold
War struggle between East and West have earned him a wide and
respectful audience both here and abroad. His earlier books include
The Struggle for Germany (1949) and The Defense of Western
Europe (1952).
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