,"""" ■ II STRATEGY ma

RESEARCH
The views expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the PROJECT
Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This
document may not be released for open publication until
it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or
government agency.

TRANSFORMATION: TRANSITION FROM A HEAVY TO A

LIGHTER FAMILY OF ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES

BY

; THOMAS M. PETTY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2001

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

" ■ ■■■■■I»»I» ir

20010514 070
 USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSFORMATION: TRANSITION FROM A HEAVY TO A LIGHTER FAMILY OF

ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES

by

THOMAS M. PETTY
U.S. Army Civilian

Colonel James E. Gordon

Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those

of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of it agencies

U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
(This page is intentionally blank)
 ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Thomas Michael Petty

TITLE: Transformation: Transition from a Heavy to Lighter Family of Armored
Fighting Vehicles
FORMAT: Strategic Research Project
DATE: 19 March 2001 PAGES: 45 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Since the end of World War II, the single event with greatest impact on the development
of armor was the war that did not happen-the expected conflict between the United States and
the Soviet Union across the central front in Europe. This Cold War legacy meant the design of
armor vehicles was driven by a competition that led to production of faster, more heavily
armored, and more powerfully and accurately armed tanks. Since the end of the Cold War, the
Army has responded to a number of crisis situations throughout the world. These responses
are revealing that the Army's organizations and equipment platforms were not optimized for
current missions. In October 1999, GEN Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, announced an Army
transformation from a legacy force; to an interim force that serves as the Army's bridge to the
future; and to an objective force that uses the best of science and technology to develop the
Future Combat System.
Will transformation of the Army's armored forces into the objective force be evolutionary
or revolutionary? Will the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) be available in sufficient quantities and
types to impact the development doctrine, training and initial deployment of the Interim Brigade
Combat Team (IBCT) in the schedule set by GEN Shinseki? Will technology be mature enough
to support Engineering, Manufacturing and Development decisions for the FCS by FY 2006?
(This page is intentionally blank)

IV
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii
LIST OF FIGURES ix
TRANSFORMATION - TRANSITION FROM A HEAVY TO A LIGHTER FAMILY OF ARMORED
FIGHTING VEHICLES 1
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE - LEGACY ARMORED VEHICLES 3
ARMOR DEVELOPMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II 3
NEED FOR CHANGE - INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLE (IAV) 13
INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLE 14
INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 16
A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE - FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS) 19
A CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF THE FCS 22
CONCLUSIONS 24
ENDNOTES 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY 31
(This page is intentionally blank)

VI
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A lot of people gave me support and encouragement as I worked through this project.
First, my faculty advisor COL Jim Gordon for sharing with me great ideas, encouragement, and
his "red pen" on the various drafts I floated to him. Dr. Robert Cameron, Historian, U.S. Army
Armor Center and Mr. Randy Talbot, Historian, U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command shared
their time and provided me with a wealth of information on the history of armor and armor
doctrine since World War II. They responded to every e-mail and call for help in a truly
professional manner. Captain Kenneth Strayer, U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command took
time out of his busy schedule working on the Future Combat System (FCS) to send me every bit
of available information on its development.
Several War College faculty members and classmates took the time to review this paper
and provide helpful and constructive comments. These outstanding individuals are COL Don
Yates, COL Terry (Chip) Carroll and Professor Patricia Pond.
One special person, my wife Sandi, wisely inspired me to stop researching and start
writing; gave up part of Christmas vacation so I could finalize the first draft; and went through
several "red pens" so I could ultimately finish this paper. Sandi is at the top of the list. I love
you.
Finally, this paper is dedicated to all the soldiers of our armored force (past, present, and
future). Their selfless service and dedication to freedom is a primary reason why we have the
finest Army in the world.

VII
(This page is intentionally blank)

VIII
 LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. ARMY TRANSFORMATION 2

FIGURE 2. IBCT ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT 18

IX
(This page is intentionally blank)
 TRANSFORMATION: TRANSITION FROM A HEAVY TO A LIGHTER FAMILY OF ARMORED
FIGHTING VEHICLES

We have heavy forces that have no peer in the world, but they
are challenged to deploy rapidly. The Army has the world's
finest light infantry, but it lacks adequate lethality, survivability,
and mobility once in theater in some scenarios. We must
change.

—General Shinseki

Since the end of World War II, the single event with the greatest impact on the
development of armored vehicles has been the war that did not happen-the expected conflict
between the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union across the central front in Germany.1
This Cold War legacy meant that the design of armored vehicles was driven by a game of one-
upsmanship during which tanks became faster, more heavily armored and armed with more
lethal main guns.
Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of a confrontation with a major world power
has significantly diminished. Consequently, the Army has reduced its forward presence and
now projects power using a force primarily based in the U.S. This lack of forward presence
means that we must move our forces over greater distances in order to respond with a full
spectrum force to meet the requirements of our warfighting CINCs. To meet these
requirements, the Army has responded to a number of crisis situations throughout the world in
regions such as Southwest Asia, Africa, Central and South America and the Balkans.
Our armored forces were designed to meet the Cold War threat posed by the Soviet
Union. However, due to the distances our forces must deploy and their mammoth size, it is
difficult to transport and field these weapons in support of these Small Scale Contingencies
(SSC). Further, once deployed, these heavy armored forces require extensive logistical support
to remain active in these operations. It has become evident that the Army's organizations and
equipment platforms are not optimally capable of limiting expansion of a crisis or stabilizing a
conflict.
In October 1999, GEN Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, announced Army
transformation. In his announcement, GEN Shinseki declared that the Army would seek to
develop solutions which optimize smaller, lighter, more lethal, yet more reliable, fuel efficient,
and more survivable forces. Army transformation currently includes a legacy force, which are
those current systems that will be modernized and recapitalized to provide strategic capability
out to 2025. An interim force will serve as the Army's bridge to the future. The cornerstone of
the interim force is the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). Finally, Army transformation will yield an
objective force, which uses the best of science and technology to develop the Future Combat
System (FCS). Figure 1 depicts GEN Shinseki's vision for Army transformation.

The Army Transformation

Legacy
Force

Objective
Force

Interim
Force

First Unit
2000 Equipped
Objective

Responsive, Deployable, Agile, Versatile,

Lethal, Survivable, Sustainable
FIGURE 1. ARMY TRANSFORMATION

Will transformation of the Army's armored forces into the objective force be evolutionary
or revolutionary? Will the IAV be available in sufficient quantities and types to support the
development of doctrine, training, and ultimate deployment of the IBCT as scheduled by GEN
Shinseki? Will technology be mature enough to support Engineering, Manufacturing and
Development (EMD) decisions for the FCS by FY 2006? This study addresses these questions
by reviewing tank development since World War II, analyzing the Army's efforts to transform its
armored forces, and the concepts support development of the FCS. In addition, this study will
propose capabilities the FCS should provide to the Joint Force Commander.
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE - LEGACY ARMORED FORCE
Before we can look into the future, we must understand the past. Since the end of World
War II, the single event with the greatest impact on the development of armored vehicle has
been the warthat did not happen-the expected conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
across the central front in Germany. Had this Super Power conflict erupted, it would have
featured tank-heavy forces, mechanized infantry armed with handheld anti-tank guided missiles,
tactical air support (aided by modern target acquisition systems), attack helicopters, and
perhaps the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons.2 This Cold War legacy
makes it impossible to think of the tank as merely a single combat system. The tank is now
viewed as an integral part of a combined arms system, which includes infantry, artillery, and
aviation support designed to operate across a full spectrum of operations.

ARMOR DEVELOPMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II

Since the end of World War II, the design of armored vehicles has been driven by the
Cold War. As one side would increase the survivability of its armor, the other side would
counter with increased lethality of its main gun. This game of one-upsmanship led to faster,
more heavily armored, and more powerfully and accurately armed tanks.
In early 1945, the Army Ground Forces (AGF) Equipment Review Board convened to
consider the Army's postwar equipment requirements. In June 1945, the AGF Board
recommended the development of three classes of tanks - light (25 tons), medium (45 tons),
and heavy (75 tons). They also recommended an experimental 150-ton super-heavy class. In
addition, the AGF Board recommended tanks with the following characteristics: main gun
stabilization for both azimuth and elevation; radar range finder with the ability to identify friendly
and enemy vehicles; an automatic loader; and special multi-fuel power plants developed
specifically for armored vehicles.3
A few months after the AGF Board's recommendations, a more senior board was
appointed to perform another review of post war equipment requirements. Although officially
designated the War Department Equipment Review Board, it was referred to as the Stilwell
Board (after its president GEN Joseph W. Stilwell). The Stilwell Board generally concurred with
the recommendations of the AGF Board, but dropped the experimental 150-ton super-heavy
class. As a result, the Army began development of the T37 light tank, the T42 medium tank,
and the T43 heavy tank4 The Stilwell Board also recommended that weapons be specifically
developed for tanks and armor be designed to defeat both shaped charge and kinetic energy
projectiles. Generally, post-war tank development followed the Stilwell Board
recommendations.
Despite the Army's efforts to plan for the future, the end of World War II marked
significant reductions in expenditures for military hardware (including armored vehicles) as the
U.S. returned to a peacetime footing. For example, by April 1946 the Detroit Arsenal was
closed and turned over to a small maintenance crew.5 Between the end of 1945 to 1951, no
new tanks were produced. The Army's standard tank at the end of World War II was the M26
Pershing, which was significantly under-powered and had the same engine as the M4 Sherman.
A 500-horsepower engine was sufficient to power the 35-ton M4 Sherman, but struggled to
serve the 45-ton Pershing. With 2,000 Pershings in the Army's tank inventory and no funding
for a replacement tank, the Army undertook a modernization program including a new engine.
The V-12 gasoline engine under development by Continental Motors Corporation offered the
best solution to increase the Pershing's power. Following testing, this vehicle (with the V-12
gasoline engine) was standardized as the M46.6 In 1949, Congress authorized an initial
production run of 800 M46s, and the Army proposed converting an additional 1,215 M26s to the
M46 in 1950/
Events in Korea significantly changed the Army's tank development plans. The outbreak
of hostilities in Korea caught the Army unprepared. The first tank force rushed to Korea was
cobbled together from vehicles held in supply depots or assigned to infantry divisions stationed
in Japan. U.S. involvement in the Korean War (coupled with a building fear of a Soviet threat in
Europe) increased the demand for tanks. These demands far outstripped the number of M26s
available for conversion to the M46, so only 319 of the new M46s became available for service.8
The immediate need for additional tanks caused by the outbreak of the Korean War and the
strategic situation in Europe did not allow the Army sufficient time to develop a new tank design.
Therefore, in September 1950 the Army decided to produce an interim tank by mounting
the turret from the T42 on the hull and chassis of the M46, which was modified to provide
increased armor protection. This resulted in the M47. The first pilot M47 was shipped to
Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG) for testing in March 1951, and production began at the
Detroit Arsenal in June 1951, well before testing was completed.9 Testing of the production
vehicles began in August 1951 and ran for almost a year.10
This testing revealed a number of problems that had to be corrected before the M47
could be issued to field units. These problems included the complex and fragile nature of the
range finder, the turret stabilization system, and the automatic loader, all of which ultimately
were eliminated from final production. A total of 8,576 M47s were produced before production
ended in November 1953.11 The M47 was intended as a stopgap measure. It was the last
medium tank to retain the five-man crew with the hull machine gun reminiscent of World War II
tanks.12 Eventually, all but a few hundred M47s would be exported under the Military
Assistance Program to provide the backbone of the NATO tank force for nearly 15 years.13
Design work on the replacement for the M47 began in late 1950. This new tank design,
designated the T48, featured an elliptical hull and one-piece cast dome turret which provided
improved armor protection. It also featured wider tracks, a fire control system incorporating a
range finder, a ballistic computer and ballistic drive, a 90mm main gun that permitted 15-minute
gun tube change, and a four-man crew.14 The same 810 horsepower gasoline engine (AV-
1790-5B) and cross-drive transmission (CD-850-4) used by the M47 powered this vehicle.15
Chrysler Corporation was given a letter order to produce six pilot models and 542 production
vehicles.
The Army planned to produce 9,000 M48s by mid-1954 to counter the imbalance
between the Soviet and American tank forces. To meet this goal, production proceeded while
testing and evaluation was ongoing. The first pilot M48 was completed one year after the initial
letter order was issued, and the first production vehicle rolled off the line at Chrysler's new
Newark, Delaware plant in March 1952.16 The rush to produce the M48 resulted in significant
operational readiness problems. These M48s suffered from engine, transmission, track, and
suspension problems.
Between March 1952 and December 1954, approximately 7,000 M48s were produced,
with an additional 2,500 completed by the end of 1956. Combat units started receiving the M48
in 1953, but correction of problems discovered after production delayed full fielding for some
time.17 The vehicles issued to combat units suffered from heavy oil consumption and engine
failures after 1,000 miles. The gasoline engines consumed significant amounts of fuel, which
limited their range to 75 miles. In addition, the M48s were too wide for many European tunnels,
complicating rail transportation.18 The operational readiness rates for these units were
extremely low. These problems led the Army to establish integrating committees to coordinate
tank and component development.19 In addition, the Army also established special modification
centers to correct design defects in the initial production vehicles.
Correction of mechanical and technical problems resulted in continuous improvement of
the M48 series during the 1950s. In an attempt to increase the range of the M48, external fuel
drums were added. These proved very unpopular with the units. Finally, modifications to the
engine, by adding fuel injection, increased the range to 170 miles.20 Lack of effective range
would severely limit the M48 during its operational life. Production of the M48 ended in 1959;
however, the Army concluded that it was technically feasible to upgrade some M48A1s with
M60 series components, which included the AVDS-1790-2 diesel engine and CD-850-6 cross-
drive transmission, aluminum fuel tanks, 105mm main gun, and the coincidence range finder,
ballistic computer and articulating telescope. This combination of components significantly
increased combat range and modernized the fighting capabilities of the M48. The resulting
vehicle tests demonstrated that the upgraded vehicle compared favorably with the M60 and
outperformed other M48 series tanks. In 1961, the Army ordered conversion of 600 M48A1s.
However, these tanks were armed with the 90mm main gun because of the large stock of 90mm
ammunition on-hand and because of a lack of funds to purchase sufficient quantities of 105mm
ammunition to support conversion. These tanks were designated M48A3.
In the mid-1970s production delays in the M60A2 program and depletion of the M60A1
contingency stock inventory due to shipments to Israel in the wake of the 1973 war, meant the
Army was unprepared to counter an increase of Soviet tank strength.21 To meet this need for
additional tanks, the Army decided to modernize its remaining M48 fleet to M60A1 standards.
These modernized M48s were designated M48A5. The M48A5 program ran through 1979, with
2,069 being produced. A majority of these vehicles went to Army National Guard units.
However, 140 M48A5s were sent to the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea to replace their aging
M60A1 fleet.
In 1957, the Army reevaluated the direction that its tank development programs would
take into the 1960s. Army Chief of Staff GEN Maxwell Taylor established the Ad Hoc Group on
Armament for Future Tanks or Similar Combat Vehicles (ARCOVE). ARCOVE was tasked to
study the tank armament requirements for the period after 1965, giving consideration to the
effects of atomic weapons. ARCOVE recommended that maximum effort be given to equip
tanks with guided missiles that used line-of-sight command guidance. To provide funding for
this system, ARCOVE recommended that conventional weapons programs (such as hyper-
velocity guns and penetrators) be sharply curtailed. ARCOVE also recommended further
research on chemical energy warheads, target detection, armor and personnel protection.22
In August 1957, GEN Taylor approved many of ARCOVE's recommendations. He
directed that tank design efforts focus on two vehicles: an armored airborne
reconnaissance/assault vehicle (a light tank that would ultimately become the M551) and a
universal main battle tank that merged the capabilities of the medium and heavy tanks. Both of
these vehicles were to be equipped with guided missile systems.
Pending development of the new missile-firing main battle tank, which was expected to
be the T95, the Army continued to produce the M48A2. In 1958, the Bureau of the Budget
(BoB) pressed the Army to speed up its tank modernization programs. BoB wanted the Army to
pursue all means possible to replace its M48A2s and prohibited their further procurement after
Fiscal Year (FY) 1959.23 The BoB decision essentially killed further development of the T95
because of its cost and experimental status. To fill the void, the Army opted to build a new tank
based on design concepts from the M48 program. This new tank would serve as an interim
vehicle until the new missile firing main battle tank could be developed. This vehicle combined
the M48A2 chassis, AVDS-1790 engine, and 105mm main gun. In March 1959 it was
designated as the M60.
Combat units in Europe received the first M60s in December 1960, despite severe
limitations on the availability of spare parts and ammunition.24 A total of 2,205 M60s were built
at Chrysler's Newark, Delaware, and Detroit Tank Plants. Further modifications improved the
M60s performance. These included a longer turret to improve frontal protection and one more
suited to the 105mm main gun, better suspension, redesigned commanders cupola,
replacement of a steering wheel with T-bar, an electrical ballistic computer, and a coincidence
range finder. These modifications resulted in the M60A1, whose production started in October
1962 and ended in 1980 after 7,948 had been produced.
During the early 1960s the Army decided to mount the newly developed Shillelagh
missile system on the M60 chassis. This was the same missile system mounted on the M551.
A new turret with smaller profile, better ballistic shape, and improved armor protection was
developed for this vehicle. The Army considered this program to have a low-risk of failure
because it mated two existing systems (M60 and Shillelagh missile) with a new turret.25 Two
pilot vehicles were delivered between November 1965 and February 1966. Vehicle testing
revealed significant problems with both the Shillelagh system and the turret. These included
problems with the combustible-cased ammunition for the 152mm gun-launcher, and when
conventional ammunition was fired, the recoil of the main gun jarred the turret, throwing the fire
control system off target. In 1966 and 1967, the Army placed orders for 540 of these vehicles,
designated M60A2. However, due to the length of time required to resolve problems with the
test vehicles, production did not start until 1973. The M60A2 did not reach combat units until
1974. Ultimately, six armored battalions in Europe were equipped with the M60A2. The M60A2
had low operational readiness rates due to the complexity of the gun/missile system. It was
finally phased out of active service in 1982.
In 1969, the Senior Officers Materiel Review Board recommended an extensive product
improvement program for the M60A1. These recommendations included improving reliability,
mobility, night operability, and fire on the move capability. The Army implemented a majority of
these recommendations between 1971 and 1975. In 1978, the Army added a ruby laser range-
finder and solid-state ballistic computer, along with a more reliable coaxial machine gun to the
M60A1 and redesignated this vehicle as the M60A3.26 These vehicles were provided to combat
units in Europe starting in 1979. Shortly after production started, the passive night sight was
replaced with a thermal sight, and a meteorological sensor was added. The M60A3 was the
first tank outfitted with these systems, so it had a significant first-round hit advantage over any
Soviet tanks at that time. This was proven under combat conditions in 1983 when Israeli's
M60A3 successfully engaged the Syrian T72 (the standard Soviet tank). The M60A3 marked
the end of the M60 series tanks. This interim tank served almost an entire generation of Army
armor soldiers and leaders.27
Two factors guided the Army's program to develop a new main battle tank. The first was
ARCOVE's recommendation that maximum effort be given to equip new tanks with guided
missiles that used line-of-sight command guidance. The second was Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara's directive that the new main battle tank be a joint effort with Germany.
Secretary McNamara felt the U.S. should work closely with Germany and the other NATO allies
because only 5 percent of weapons were then jointly produced. This presented significant
interoperatability challenges because the U.S., United Kingdom, and French all produced their
own tanks. Only Germany used U.S. tanks, but they also wanted to develop their own
equipment. Secretary McNamara hoped that other NATO nations would join this effort so
NATO would field a tank jointly produced and shared by all their armies.28 Agreement was
reached with Germany in 1963 to jointly produce this new main battle tank. The objective of this
agreement was to produce a main battle tank that incorporated the latest design concepts and
that would be available for production by both countries by 1970.29 This joint effort was
designated the MBT70 and was specifically intended to operate in the combat environment in
central Europe.30
Development of joint military characteristics for the MBT70 required resolution of several
conflicting requirements. For example, Germany wanted a high-velocity gun, while the U.S.
opted for a missile system. Also, Germany preferred the driver in the standard front hull
position, while the U.S. team wanted the driver in the turret. Even though these conflicts were
resolved, both countries continued to go their own ways on some components. For example,
the Germans did not abandon their work on a 120mm cannon, and the U.S. continued work on
a gas turbine engine.
Lockheed Missile and Space Company won a contract to perform a parametric
design/cost effectiveness analysis on the design concepts. This analysis recommended five

8
candidate vehicles for further study. A full-scale mock-up was made for each candidate vehicle.
These vehicles underwent further study, from which two vehicle designs were given final
consideration. The final selection contained features from both candidates.
Initially, eight pilot tanks were to be produced for each country. The first pilot vehicle
was completed in the U.S. in July 1967. It was displayed simultaneously with the German
prototype in September 1967.31 These were automotive pilots and were not fitted with
armament or fire control systems. This new main battle tank featured, for the first time, a crew
of three. This was accomplished by incorporating an automatic loader, another first for a U.S.
tank. The entire crew was located in the turret, with the driver in a counter-rotating capsule.32
The MTB70 was armed with a 152mm gun-launcher. This was the long-barreled version
of the gun-launcher used in the M60A2 and the M551. It fired the Shillelagh missile and all the
conventional ammunition available for the short-barreled version. It had a secondary armament
of a remote controlled 20mm automatic cannon, which retracted under armored covers when
not in use. The MBT70 featured a sophisticated fire control system which included a laser
range-finder, a ballistic computer with digital analyzer, sensors to signal powder temperature,
gun deflection due to temperature changes and ambient air data, and night-vision sights. The
MTB70 also featured a hydropneumatic suspension system that could raise, lower, or tilt the
tank in any direction.33
The first full pilot arrived at Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG) for testing in late 1969.
As anticipated, significant developmental problems surfaced in the complex systems in the
MBT70. These problems and their ultimate changes resulted in further delays and increased
costs. Congress criticized the MBT70 program as being too complex because it used risky
technology. In addition, Congress was very concerned about increased program costs. The
initial cost for developing the MBT70 was $80 million. However, by late 1969, the estimated
cost for development and production had climbed to $544 million, and each vehicle would cost
$1.2 million.34 Also in 1969, David Packard became Deputy Secretary of Defense. Based on
his strong business background, he was charged with increasing efficiency and saving money in
DoD. After reviewing the MBT70 program, he became convinced that further development of a
joint tank was not warranted. In early 1970, after several months of negotiations, Germany and
the U.S. agreed to terminate their joint venture and cooperate closely as each developed their
own tank.35
Following termination of the joint program, the Army initiated efforts to develop the
second-generation main battle tank following the general design configuration of the MBT70.
This vehicle was simplified to improve reliability and reduce cost.36 All German components
were replaced with those made in the U.S., and it retained the 152mm gun-launcher. This
vehicle was designated the XM803. Two of these vehicles were authorized for construction;
however, only one was completed. The XM803 was simplified from the MBT70, but it did have
such innovative features as spaced armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, and blow-off vents for
ammunition storage. However, cost was still a significant problem. In addition, problems with
the 152mm gun-launcher system encountered during operations of the M551 and M60A2
resulted in a loss of favor for a combination gun-missile system.37 As a result, in late 1971
Congress cancelled funding for the XM803 and directed the Army to initiate development of a
less costly main battle tank.
Cancellation of the MBT70/XM803 programs closed a ten-year period during which no
new U.S. tanks were produced to counter the threat posed by the next generation of Soviet
tanks. The design of the MBT70 outpaced the technical capabilities of the 1960s. However,
many of the components from the MBT70/XM803 would ultimately be incorporated into the M1
series design.
Although Congress cancelled the XM803 program, it authorized the Army $20 million to
procure prototypes of two new main battle tank designs for test and evaluation. Congress
provided these funds because the Soviets were continuing to build large numbers of tanks and
improving their capabilities, which threatened to outpace the capabilities of the M60. In addition,
costs of the Vietnam War had virtually stalled heavy force modernization programs, allowing the
Soviets to increase their lead further.38
In January 1972, the Main Battle Tank Task Force was established to develop the basic
characteristics for the new tank. In March 1972, the Army Chief of Staff directed that this new
main battle tank be fielded within six years, which was significantly shorter than the normal ten-
year development period.39 The following table specifies the Task Force's key characteristics:

Weight 46-52 tons combat loaded

Operating radius 275-325 miles
Survivability armor protection against the Soviet 115-mm gun, internal
compartmentalization, external fuel stowage, interior spall liner
Armament 105-mm or 120-mm main gun; 1x .50 caliber MG; coaxial 25-
mm Bushmaster cannon; turret mounted 40-mm grenade
launcher
First round hit probability (service test with kinetic energy Stationary vehicle vs stationary target: 92%
round at 1500 meters range) Moving vehicle vs. moving target: 58%
Road speed 25 miles per hour
Dash speed 40-50 miles per hour
Mobility 35% of operation off roads

TABLE 1. DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS FOR A NEW MAIN BATTLE TANK40

10
 These characteristics reflected the Task Force's analysis of current available tank
capabilities and known threats. In addition, the Task Force sought to provide a low-cost solution
that could accommodate technological improvements as they became available.41 Selecting a
conventional gun as the main armament reversed the trend established by the
recommendations of ARCOVE in 1957.
During the 1973 Yom Kipper War, hollow-charged rocket-propelled grenades and anti-
tank guided missiles defeated a significant amount of Israeli armor. Citing an analysis of the
results of this war, the Army placed crew survivability at the top of its priority list for the new
main battle tank. As a result, the design of the XM1 included lower vehicle profile, armored
bulkheads between the crew and fuel cells, ammunition storage behind armored doors, blow-off
panels in the turret roof to vent explosions up and away from the crew and a spall liner and
Halon fire extinguisher system. In addition, GEN Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff,
decided to increase the XM1s weight to 58 tons, to include a new composite armor developed
by the British. This Chobham armor contained a combination of various materials designed to
defeat hollow-charged weapons.
The XM1's fire control system benefited from developmental work on the MBT70/XM803
and M60A3 programs. It included an analog computer, stabilization, thermal sights, a laser
range-finder, and sensors for environmental inputs. The system also featured a muzzle
reference sensor to detect gun tube droop. The XM1 was armed with the same 105mm gun as
the M60A3.
In 1973, the Army launched the first phase of the XM1 program validation competition
between two contractors-Chrysler and General Motors. This phase required each contractor to
deliver a prototype tank, automotive test vehicle, and ballistic hull and turret to APG for testing.42
The completed validation prototypes were delivered to APG and were tested from January-May
1976. During this same period, the automotive test vehicles underwent driving tests of more
than 3,000 miles. Both contractor's vehicles performed well, but the Chrysler vehicle, powered
by a gas turbine engine, showed slightly greater acceleration.43 All testing of the prototypes was
completed in July 1976; however, the winner of the competition was not announced until
November 1976. This delay allowed both contractors to refine their designs and better
determine their manufacturing costs.44
Chrysler was awarded a 36-month contract for full-scale engineering development of 11
pilot tanks. All of the pilot vehicles were delivered during 1977. The development phase ran
from February 1978 to September 1979. From April 1978 to February 1979 soldiers from the
2nd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, manned test vehicles. Results from these tests

11
were generally poor. Engines failed because dust clogged air filters; and track was easily
thrown due to buildup of soil between the sprocket hub and sponson. These technical problems
were solved and further tests at Fort Knox went well. In addition, survivability tests were
conducted at APG. During these tests various types of ammunition were fired at the test
vehicle. Upon completion of these tests, the vehicle was driven off under its own power.
In May 1979, the XM1 was approved for low-rate production, and Chrysler received a
contract to build 110 more vehicles for extensive field testing in various weather, topographical,
and radioactive environments. These tests went well, with the exception of continued reliability
problems with the gas turbine engine. This vehicle was standardized as the M1 in 1981, with
production approved for 7,058 tanks. The first M1s were provided to combat units in Europe in
late 1982 and fielding continued throughout the 1980s.
As mentioned earlier, the M1 was designed to accommodate upgrades as new
technology became available. The first upgrade included increased frontal armor, more external
stowage and suspension improvements. The upgrades yielded the Improved Performance (IP)
M1. In 1985, the first M1A1s were delivered to the Army. The M1A1 featured a 120mm smooth
bore main gun, a microclimate crew cooling system, and NBC overpressure system. By 1989,
all armor units in Europe were equipped with the M1A1,45 The addition of depleted uranium
armor mesh resulted on the M1A1 Heavy Armor (HA). However, not all M1A1s were provided
this additional armor protection. The M1A1 production run ended with 2,329 M1A1s and 2,140
M1A1(HA) being produced46
The Gulf War occasioned the use of the M1A1 in combat, demonstrating its value in
combat situations. While M1A1s suffered from some mechanical problems due to desert
conditions, they consistently maintained operational readiness rates of over ninety percent. In
addition, the thermal sights allowed engagement of targets at night, in sandstorms, and in
smoke. First round kills at ranges from 2,000 to 3,000 meters and in some instances through
berms built to protect enemy vehicles were documented.
The first set of upgrades resulted in the M1 (IP), M1A1, and M1A1 (HA). The second
upgrade package included improvements in the vehicle's electronic systems. The M1A2
incorporated digital technology to improve navigation, tactical operations, and fire control. In
addition, this technology has the capability to ran a continuous series of diagnostic tests to
determine mechanical and electronic failures. The M1A2 retains the 120mm gun and
incorporates a Commanders Independent Thermal Viewer that allows the commander to select
one target and the gunner to select a different target. This capability was originally developed
for the MBT70, but eliminated in the M1 for cost reasons.47

12
 The Army received the first prototype M1A2 in 1990. Initial operational tests showed
only marginal improvements over the M1A1. Given the drawdown of the Army after the Gulf
War, the M1A2 was almost scrapped. However, sales to foreign countries kept the production
of M1A2s open until 1993. The Army only received a few prototypes and sixty-two new M1A2s.
The rest of the M1A2 fleet is now being produced through conversion of M1s. The first M1 A2s
were provided to the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry in 1995. The remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division
started receiving the M1A2s in 1996.
In 1994, the Army decided to upgrade the M1A2 with a System Enhancement Package
(SEP). The M1A2 SEP features a second-generation Forward-Looking Infrared Radar gunner's
primary sight and commander's independent thermal viewer, Force XXI Battle Command for
Brigade and Below system (FBCB2), a thermal management system, and the latest armor
package. The M1A2 SEP entered production in 1999 at the rate of 120 vehicles per year.
Although the M1A2 SEP will be the most modern heavy vehicle in the armored force until 2011
or later, budget restrictions have limited its production to 1,150 vehicles. To better provide a
force that can respond across the full spectrum of operations, the Army is currently undergoing
a transformation of its armored force.

NEED FOR CHANGE - INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLE (IAV)

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has responded to a number of crisis situations
in regions such as Southwest Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and the Balkans. To
meet these challenges, the Army responded with a full spectrum of forces. However, in
responding to these situations, it has become apparent that the Army's organizations and
equipment platforms are not responding optimally to limit expansion of a crisis or to stabilize a
conflict.
The Army's heavy forces were designed to gain and hold ground through the use of their
direct fire capabilities in an Major Theater War (MTW). Now these heavy forces are challenged
to rapidly get to and operate in SSCs. Further, once deployed, these heavy forces require a
significant logistical effort to sustain their operations. The Army's light forces can rapidly deploy
anywhere in the world, but they have insufficient staying power, lethality, and mobility once
inserted. In addition, the Army's logistical footprint for deployed forces is extremely large
because of significant demands and a complex inventory of multiple types of equipment. So
large inventory stockage levels are needed for numerous lines of repair parts. These conditions
were evident during Army operations in Desert Storm, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. They

13
hinder the Army's ability to provide a full spectrum of responses to meet the requirements of the
warfighting CINCs.
In October 1999, GEN Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff announced an Army
transformation. In his announcement, GEN Shinseki stated that:

We will begin immediately to turn the entire Army into a full spectrum
force which is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the
spectrum of operations. We will jump-start this process by investing in
today's "off-the-shelf equipment to stimulate the development of doctrine,
organizational design, and leader training even as we begin a search for
new technologies for the objective force.48 Further, he stated that when
technology permits, we will erase the distinction, which exists today,
between heavy and light forces ...49

GEN Shinseki's transformation effort seeks to significantly improve the Army's strategic
responsiveness by providing a combat-ready brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a
division on the ground within 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.

INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLE

The cornerstone of the Army's near term transformation effort is the acquisition of an
"off-the-shelf IAV. In December 1999 and January 2000, the Army invited various armored
fighting vehicle manufacturers to Fort Knox to demonstrate their equipment. The Army
reviewed both tracked and wheeled armored fighting vehicles during these demonstrations.
Following these demonstrations, in April 2000, the Army issued a request for proposal (RFP) for
its IAV. Competitors were advised that their proposals must address the following performance
characteristics:50
• Interoperability - IAV must be capable of hosting and effectively integrating existing
and planned Army Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.
• Deployability - IAV must be transportable in a C-130 aircraft with a combat capable
deployment weight not to exceed 38,000 pounds gross vehicle weight (19 tons).
• Mobility - IAV must be capable of sustained hard surfaced speed of 40 miles per
hour; maintain cross-country mobility as outlined in the Operations Mode
Summary/Mission Profile; provide cruising range of at least 300 miles without
refueling; climb 18 inch vertical obstacles; climb and descend hard surface 60 percent
frontal slopes and negotiate a hard surface 30 percent side slope; ford one meter
water depth; and move 50 meters from a standing start in less than eight seconds.

14
 • Survivability - IAV must provide integral protection from 7.62mm Armor Piercing (AP)
rounds; provide scalable add-on armor capable of defeating 14.5mm AP or hand-held
HEAT round up to RPG 7; provide overhead protection against 152mm high explosive
air burst; full crew protection from blast and overpressure from anti-personnel mines;
integrated NBC sensor suite; and crew compartment provided with spall lining.
• Sustainability - IAV capable of rapid refueling in four minutes or less; and provide an
auxiliary power source to power critical systems for at least 12 hours.
• Lethality - (Infantry Carrier Vehicle) armament capable of day and night operation
with a range of 1500 meters.
The Army issued 200 RFPs to interested parties and received 20 proposals. After
reviewing each proposal and conducting an evaluation of sample lAVs at APG, the Army chose
the Light Armored Vehicle 3 (LAV 3) built by General Dynamics Land Systems/ General Motors
- Canada (GDLS/GM). The LAV 3 was selected over other competitors (wheeled and tracked)
because it surpassed the Army's requirements for speed, mobility, and armor protection. In
addition, the LAV 3 meets the goal of reducing the Army's logistic footprint by using the same
repair parts and engine as the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles.51 However, the LAV 3, may
provide insufficient survivability if it encounters large-caliber tank main gun weapons and anti-
tank guided missiles.
During the next six years, the Army plans to purchase up to 2,131 LAV 3s at a total cost
of $4 billion.52 In addition to the Infantry Carrier, the LAV 3 will provide the basic platform for a
number of variants - including a mortar carrier, anti-tank guided missile carrier, reconnaissance
vehicle, fire support vehicle, engineer support vehicle, commander's vehicle, medical
evacuation vehicle, NBC reconnaissance vehicle, and mobile gun system.
The Army originally planned to equip the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with the
LAV 3 family of vehicles by 31 December 2001. However, delays in selecting a contractor
coupled with the contractor's inability to meet delivery schedules have resulted in slippage of
time lines, moving equipping the first IBCT until 31 March 2003. The date may further slip for
two reasons:
• United Defense L.P., an unsuccessful contractor in the competition to supply the IAV
has filed a contract protest with the General Accounting Office (GAO). United
Defense's protest is based on their ability to meet the Army's delivery time lines and
the lower cost/value factors in their proposal. The GAO has 100 days to review the
issues raised by United Defense and make recommendations to the Army.

15
 However, adjudication of contract protests typically adds at least six months to any
established delivery times.
• The FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act required a side-by-side testing program be
undertaken to test the LAV 3 against the troop-carrying medium armored vehicles
currently in the Army inventory. The M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier equipped
with Force XXI Battle Command for Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system will be used
for comparison with the LAV 3. The purpose of this testing program is to prove that
acquisition of the LAV 3 is a sound investment compared to the Army's inventory of
Vietnam era tracked vehicles.53 The schedule for this testing program is pending the
resolution of the contract protest.
Additionally, equipping the first Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with all 10
variants of the LAV 3 will be significantly difficult because the Mobile Gun System, Fire Support
Vehicle and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) vehicles are still in the development
phase. Currently, the Army anticipates these vehicles to be initially fielded in the FY 2004 to
FY 2006 time frame. It will be very difficult for the IBCT to be fully mission-capable with three of
its vehicle types being unavailable until the FY 2004 to FY 2006 time frame.

INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Concurrent with the acquisition of the LAV 3, the Army is transforming two brigades
stationed at Fort Lewis into IBCT, in a two-phased process. During Phase One, the brigades
cross-attach battalions, turn in equipment, reorganize and begin dismounted training. Mounted
training for the first IBCT is being conducted with vehicles on loan from several sources
including several foreign countries. During Phase Two, the brigades receive and train in the IAV
and conduct a training certification event.54 The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, was
designated as the first IBCT. It began reorganization, turning in equipment and training starting
in April 2000. It was projected to be trained and ready for employment by 31 December 2001.
However, we have noted, this date has slipped at least 16 additional months, and perhaps as
much as two years.
Fully equipped, the IBCT is designed as a full-spectrum early-entry combat force. It will
have the capability to operate in all operational environments and against all projected future
threats. However, the IBCT is primarily designed for employment in SSC in complex and urban
terrain to confront low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both conventional and
asymmetrical capabilities.55 The IBCT can participate in a MTW as a maneuver element within
a division or corps with heavy armor augmentation. In addition, IBCT can participate in military

16
operations other than war as an initial entry force or guarantor force to provide security for
stabilization operations.56 The IBCT will be capable of conducting all major doctrinal operations:
offense, defense, stability, and support.57
The IBCT brings to the fight the following operational characteristics:58
• Dismounted assault and the close fight - The IBCT achieves tactical superiority
through combined arms action at the company level. These actions feature
dismounted assault supported by direct fires from organic IAV platforms and the
integration of mortar, artillery, mobility support, and joint fires.
• Enhanced situational understanding - Situational understanding is the fundamental
force enabler across all IBCT battlefield operating systems and the foundation for
risk mitigation with respect to its vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of substantial
armor protection. The IBCT will employ an integrated suite of intelligence,
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and digitized battle command systems
to develop and disseminate a common operational picture.
• Lethality - The IBCT will possess an array of direct and indirect fire systems to
shape the battlespace. These include mobile gun system; TOW 2B anti-tank guided
missiles; Javelin anti-tank missiles; 120mm, 81mm and 60mm mortars; and 155mm
artillery.
• Holistic force protection and survivability - The IBCT will meet force protection
challenges through the application of a variety of capabilities - including early
warning, situational understanding, avoidance of surprise, deception, rapid mobility,
signature control, nontemplatable operations, avoidance of enemy fires, mutual
support, use of cover and concealment, and implementation of innovative tactics,
techniques and procedures.
• Force effectiveness - The IBCT will offset the limitations of its IAV platforms through
the integration of is capabilities, particularly the intemetted actions of the company
combined arms teams.
• Reachback - The effectiveness of the IBCT is enhanced by its capability to reach
back for non-organic supporting resources. The IBCT executes reachback in five
primary areas: fires and effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis,
force protection, and sustainment.

17
 IBCT Organizational Concept

IBCT Common Family

of Vehicles:
• Interim Armored
Vehicle:
•Infantry Carrier
•Reconnaissance
•Anti-tank
•Mortar
•Commander
•Fire Support
•Engineer
•NBC
•Medical
* Mobile Gun System

'Maybe a separate variant

FIGURE 2. IBCT ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

The IBCT is a combined arms organization, organized as follows:

Three infantry battalions
Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition squadron
Anti-tank company
Field artillery battalion
Engineer company
Signal company
Military intelligence company
Brigade support battalion
As the interim force, the IBCT will test doctrine, organization, and training systems to
serve as a bridge to the future Army (the objective force). Upon certification, the IBCT will be
capable of executing missions in support of the National Military Strategy (NMS). However, the
IBCT will not be capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of operations as envisioned until it
receives a full complement of lAVs.
What happens to the current armored force and the Abrams and Bradley during
transformation? As part of the transformation plan, the Army will maintain essential legacy
warfighting capabilities to execute the NMS. This capability is called the Counter Attack Corps,

18
which will consist of three heavy Divisions and one Armored Cavalry Regiment. This force will
support the two MTW strategy of the NMS. Ill Corps (with its two heavy divisions) and the 3rd
Infantry Division will make up the bulk of the Counter Attack Corps.59
Current plans call for the modernization and recapitalization of the Abrams main battle
tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles assigned to these units. Modernization requires developing
and/or procuring new systems with improved warfighting capabilities. Recapitalization is
accomplished by rebuilding and selectively upgrading current fielded systems to ensure
operational readiness and a zero time/zero mile maintenance standard.
For example, the Army recently started fielding the M1A2 SEP and will continue this
effort until 2011 or later.60 The M1A2 SEP features a second-generation Forward Looking
Infrared Radar gunner's primary sight and commander's independent thermal viewer, Force XXI
Battle Command for Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system, a thermal management system, and
the latest armor package. In addition, the Army is rebuilding some M1A1s and conducting
selective upgrades, such as replacing analog with digital systems, adding FBCB2, and providing
far-target locating capabilities.61
Since initial fielding of the Abrams in the early 1980's, the Army has not improved the
engine. The last new engine was produced in 1993; since then, the program has focused on
rebuilding existing engines.62 Each time an engine is rebuilt, it loses some capability. To
address this problem, the Army recently awarded a contract to Honeywell/General Electric to
produce the LV100 turbine engine, which offers 30 percent lower fuel consumption, 43 percent
fewer parts, and 100 kg less weight.63
The Army is also improving the ammunition used by the Abrams to increase lethality and
extend the close fight. Some of the proposed ammunition improvements include a 120mm
canister round to provide rapid area suppression; an improved 120mm sabot round that can
defeat any modern armor that may come onto the scene over the next ten years; and a 120mm
Tank Extended Range Munition that has the capability of shooting direct line-of-sight or beyond
line-of-sight up to 10 kilometers, giving the Abrams significantly greater stand-off capability.
Army leadership decided not to incrementally improve the M1 series into a future main
battle tank. Instead, the Army opted to focus its research and development resources on a
completely new platform called the Future Combat System (FCS).

A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE - FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

In 1995, leadership within the Army's armor community developed an initial set of
operational characteristics for the FCS, including the ability to destroy multiple targets at five

19
kilometers and beyond; a cross-country dash speed of one hundred kilometers per hour; a
digital communications system; capability for continuous operations in all battlefield
environments; a logistics tail of half that currently required for the M1 series tanks; and ease of
air transportability. The FCS would rely less on armor protection and more on active systems
that detect and destroy incoming projectiles before they hit the vehicle.64
In 1996, an integrated concept team was formed at the Armor Center. This team
examined available technologies and possible alternatives for the FCS. To meet the Army's
need for deployability and great mobility, the weight of the FCS was decreased from 40 tons to
the 20-ton range. By 1998, the Armor Center's work on the FCS prompted the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to create an overarching Future Combat Vehicle
effort. TRADOC focused their efforts on the FCS, along with modernization of the industrial
base, future force structure and design, and development of doctrine based on an analysis of
potential threats.
Accordingly, TRADOC developed a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) for the FCS. This
MNS analyzes future threats out 25 years and describes the capabilities FCS must provide the
Joint Force Commander. A summary of capability requirements for the FCS follows:65
• The FCS equipped force must provide increased capability for strategic
responsiveness; operational maneuver; and tactical flexibility for mounted operations
by conducting and supporting direct close combat, delivering precise line-of-sight
and non-line-of sight munitions, performing and supporting reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition, and tactically transporting infantry, combat
engineers, and materiel.
• The FCS force will be structured to exploit information dominance through a
collection of fighting ensembles.
• The FCS force will be equipped with a seamless tactical network of information
within and between units, between leaders and soldiers within the unit, and between
individual platforms and individual sensors.
• The FCS force must be able to achieve combat overmatch by seeing the enemy first,
responding first, and destroying or neutralizing any target or command using a broad
range of lethal and non-lethal options.
• The FCS equipped force must be capable of surviving first-round engagements from
future armored platforms, anti-armor systems, shoulder-fired antitank systems, direct
energy weapons, rockets, artillery and mortar munitions, and mines.

20
 • The FCS force should be capable of traversing all anticipated land environments,
open, restricted and complex terrain without compromising tactical unit integrity.
• The FCS platforms must be smaller and lighter, compared to current platforms. They
must be transportable in unit sets on C-130 like platforms, including the Future
Transport Rotorcraft.66
• The FCS force must be capable of operating at a high operational tempo for at least
three days and at a medium operational tempo for at least seven days without
maintaining, rearming, or resupply.
• The FCS must deliver rested, situationally aware, fully charged, and equipped
soldiers to the required point on the battlefield.
• The FCS units must include internetted embedded training without increasing the
training burden on Army institutions or operators.
On 1 June 1999, the Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) entered into a collaborative effort to develop the FCS. The objective of the FCS
Program was to develop a lightweight, overwhelmingly lethal, strategically deployable, self-
sustaining and survivable combat and combat support force, systems and supporting
technologies for the 2012-2025 timeframe and beyond.67 This program was envisioned to be a
significant departure from the Army's past armor modernization programs, which focused on a
series of incremental product improvements. The FCS program is designed to achieve a
leap-ahead in operational capabilities and significant reductions in supportability requirements
through the use of innovative technologies. This is a high-risk venture because many of these
technologies must mature before they are usable in a production FCS. The FCS program
philosophy is based on the competition of ideas between capabilities derived from combined
changes in operational concepts and technological solutions that are or will be available in the
near future.68
In January 2000, DARPA, on behalf of the Army, issued a solicitation for the
development of design concepts for the FCS. In May 2000, DARPA awarded contracts, worth
$10 million each, to four contractor teams. Within 24 months, these contractor teams are to:
• Develop the FCS design concept and its associated concept of operations.
• Provide a preliminary design to support a decision to proceed to critical design review
and development of Program Objective Memorandum funding for engineering,
manufacturing and development by FY 2006.
• Fabricate and test a FCS demonstrator.
• Develop innovative enabling technologies for insertion into the demonstrator.

21
 The Army and DARPA have programmed $916 million over six years (FY 2000 to FY
2005) for development of the FCS program.69

A CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF THE FCS

The Army does not know what design concepts the contractors will propose or what the
FCS will ultimately look like. However, we can use our imagination to develop our own
conceptual view of the FCS. My conceptual view of the major capabilities a FCS might bring to
the battlefield of the future is stated below. These concepts are public knowledge. Many were
discussed in a series of articles on the FCS and the Future Scout and Cavalry System by Dr.
Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon. These articles appeared in Armor magazine from
1997 to 1999.
Lethality
• Primary Armament System: The FCS will be armed with an electromagnetic (EM)
gun. The EM gun utilizes pulse electrical energy to launch a light projectile (30-
60mm) at hypervelocities between 4,000/8,000 meters per second. The EM pulse
travels at near the speed of light (186,000 miles per second) so it is inherently
immune to natural limits of gas expansion.70 The gun consists of two or more highly
conductive rails with the projectile positioned between them and enclosed in a
leading bore. As high current is supplied to the rails, the arc creates a strong
magnetic field across the rails, which accelerates the projectile down the barrel.71
Several technological issues must be resolved before the EM gun is practical.
However, the scientific community is working on fixes to resolve these issues so EM
gun technology is the preferred future choice.
• Secondary armament systems: The FCS will be equipped with a high-energy
laser gun for use against close-in targets such as helicopters, soft skin vehicles, and
infantry. The FCS will also be equipped with dual-purpose fire-and-forget anti-
air/anti-armor missiles. These missiles will provide beyond-line-of-sight capabilities
to ranges as much as 50 kilometers.
Battle Management System: The FCS will be equipped with a peripheral, multi-sensor-aided
target acquisition and fire control system. This system will have day/night capability to
automatically engage and provide management of up to 10 to 20 active and passive targets
simultaneously and autonomously. Automatic air/ground target acquisition will be achieved
through thermal imagery, millimeter-wave radar, and direct optical sights. This system will offer
full fire-on-the-move capability for engaging multiple targets.72

22
Survivability: The FCS hull/turret will be constructed with advanced composites and metallic
materials, combined to promote ballistic capabilities and reduce weight. The hull/turret will be
designed to reduce the overall signature by utilization of stealthy materials and design contours.
Survivability will be enhanced through the use of an advanced add-on modular armor kit which
can be installed by the crew before entering combat. Crew survivability will be enhanced by
having them encased deep inside the hull.
The FCS will be equipped with an all-around day/night 360-degree array of
television/thermal cameras and computer processed vision, which will enable the crew to see
through the fog of battle.
The FCS will be equipped with a signature management system that will manage radar,
acoustic, visual, thermal/infrared and magnetic emissions. In addition, the FCS will be equipped
with a counter-measurers suite, which can generate false target images, and passive and active
decoys, which can divert incoming homing missiles.
The FCS will be equipped with a self-defense hit-avoidance suit, which would
automatically detect, prioritize, counter and intercept enemy missiles, helicopters, vehicles, high
performance aircraft, top-attack anti-tank munitions and other anti-tank threats.
The FCS will be equipped with an automatic detection, alert, avoidance and protection
system for areas contaminated by weapons of mass destruction. The FCS will also be
equipped with a passive/active mine detection, avoidance and destruction system that will work
while the vehicle is on the move.
Multi-net communications: The FCS will be equipped with voice, data and imagery
communications systems that can operate on multiple channels to collect, send, receive, and
integrate information from a variety of sources.
Deployability: Reduced weight and lower silhouette will enable the FCS to be transported in
C-130 like aircraft. Once in the combat zone, the crew can install the advanced add-on modular
armor kit to enhance survivability.
Mobility and agility: The FCS will be powered by a hybrid electric power system. This system
would provide the capability for generation and storage of electricity. The FCS will be driven by
an all-electric power train that will provide between 800 and 1,200 HP. The power train will
propel the FCS at 100 kilometers per hour cross-country and provide the energy to drive the EM
gun and high-energy laser gun. The FCS will have a computerized hydropneumatic suspension
that will provide a smooth ride at high cross-country speeds.
Sustainability: The all-electric power system will be driven by the power train and/or alternate
energy sources, such as solar collectors, to minimize the dependence of conventional fuels.

23
The EM and high-energy laser guns will significantly reduce reliance on resupply of
conventional ammunition. The FCS platform will have embedded diagnostics, prognostics, and
repair capabilities to reduce the supply chain and sustainment tasks and time. Major system
and component design will consider ease of maintenance, self-repair, self-recovery, and aerial
resupply. In addition, all components will incorporate plug-in replacement that requires no
special equipment and minimal common tools.73
This envisioned FCS meets all the capabilities specified by the Army. In addition, it
provides a platform to meet the strategic needs of the joint force commander. The actual
configuration is not as important as the features incorporated in its design concept. Design and
development of FCS is a high-risk venture that is highly dependent on the science and
technology community to provide these capabilities to support EMD decisions by FY 2006.
What the future will bring depends in part on what we ask of it.

CONCLUSIONS
Tank development since World War II has been based on Cold War threats, an evolution
driven by one-upsmanship and steady advances in technology. Global and political changes
since the end of the Cold War now required the Army to transform its armored forces.
Transformation of the Army's armored forces will be evolutionary in that the processes of
change are very much the same as those used since the end of World War II. However, the
ultimate transformation will be revolutionary for it will create an armored force that is versatile,
agile, and lethal, capable of meeting the full spectrum of future battlefield challenges. This force
will be radically different from the heavy armored force designed to counter the Soviet threat on
the central plains of Europe.
General Shinseki's timelines for Army transformation are based on equipping the IBCT
with a "off-the-shelf family of armored fighting vehicles. This has not happened. The
acquisition of the LAV 3 family of vehicles has been delayed by the inability of GDLS/GM to
meet the Army's production schedule; by filing of a contract protest by United Defense L.P.; and
by the inability of GDLS/GM to provide three of ten LAV 3 variants until the FY 2004 to FY 2006
time frame. These delays will significantly impact the development of doctrine, training of
personnel, and mission capabilities of the IBCT.
History has provided us with many examples of problems caused by implementing
technologies before they have been thoroughly tested. We should anticipate that all desired
technologies to be incorporated into the FCS will not be available to support EMD decisions by

24
FY 2006. We should implement only those technologies which are mature on a platform which
is designed to accept future capabilities as they become available.

America has some big choices to make as we prepare for the

challenges and dangers of modern warfare. Battles will no
longer be won by size alone - stealth and speed will matter
more.
—President George W. Bush

Word Count = 9,503

25
(This page is intentionally blank)

26
 ENDNOTES

1
Robert M. Citino, Armored Forces, History and Source Book (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press), 107.
2
Ibid.
3
Oscar C. Decker, "The Patton Tanks", Camp Colt to Desert Storm (Lexington, Kentucky: The
University Press of Kentucky), 299 and R. P. Hunnicutt, Patton (Novato, California: Presidio Press), 308.
4
Dr. Robert S. Cameron, "American Tank Development During the Cold War Maintaining the
Edge or Just Getting By?" Armor (July-August 1998), 30.
5
Decker, 300.
6
Ibid., 301-303.
7
Hunnicutt, 14.
8
Decker, 303.
9
Ibid., 304.
10
Hunnicutt, 55.
11
Ibid., 59.
12
Cameron, 32.
13
Steven J. Zaloga, The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd.), 5.
14
Cameron, 32.
15
Hunnicutt, 100.
16
Decker, 305.
17
Cameron, 32.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Decker, 306.
21
Zaloga, 11.
22
Decker 308 and Hunnicutt 149.
23
Decker, 309.
24
Hunnicutt, 165.
25
Jim Mesko, M60 Patton in Action (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.), 21.

27
 26
Hunnicutt, 208.
27
Decker, 319.
28
Orr Kelly, King of the Killing Zone (New York: W. W. Norton and Company), 25.
29
R. P. Hunnicutt, Abrams (Novato, California: Presidio Press), 115.
30
Cameron, 35.
31
Hunnicutt, Abrams, 120.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 130-141.
34
Ibid., 142.
35
Orr, 38.
36
Hunnicutt, Abrams, 143.
37
Ibid., 158.
38
Robert j. Sunell, "The Abrams Tank System." Camp Colt to Desert Storm (Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky), 435.
39
Ibid.
40
Dr. Robert S. Cameron, "Pushing the Envelop of Battlefield Superiority: American Tank
Development from the 1970s to the Present," Armor (November-December 1998), 9.
41
Ibid.
42
Sunell, 438-440.
43
Hunnicutt, Abrams, 181.
44
Ibid., 195.

^Cameron, 10.
46
Sunell, 463.
47
Cameron, 11,
48
General Eric K. Shinseki, "Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon of the Association of the
United States Army," October 12,1999, Available from <http://www-
tradoc.army.mil/transformation/Data%20Pa.. ./address_to_the_eisenhower luncheon.htm>. Internet.
Accessed November 15,2000.
49
Ibid.

28
 50
Department of the Army, Operational Requirements Document for a Family of Interim Armored
Vehicles (IAV) ACAT 1, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 6,
2000). 6-18.
51
Mathew Cox, "Army Selects Wheeled, Speedy LAV as Interim Vehicle." Defense News,
December 4, 2000, 36.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Department of the Army, FORSCOM Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Transformation
Operations Order, (Fort McPherson, Georgia: U. S. Army Forces Command, April 7, 2000), 9.

55
U.S. Department of the Army, The Interim Brigade Combat Team Organization and Operational
Concept, (U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 12, 2000), 7.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid., 14-18.
59
"Army Transformation Panel Institute for Land Warfare." Briefing slides with script comments,
U.S. Department of the Army, October 17, 2000.
60
COL James H. Nunn, "Abrams Update: Vital and Improving." Armor, (November-December
2000), 48.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Cameron, "Pushing the Envelop of Battlefield Superiority: American Tank Development from
the 1970s to the Present," 13.
65
Department of the Army, Mission Needs Statement for Future Combat System (FCS)
Capability, Date unknown, 6-14.
66
Ibid., 11.
67
Department of the Army, Information Paper, "The Future Combat Systems," Date unknown, 1.
68
Ibid., 2.
69
Department of the Army, Memorandum of Agreement for the Collaborative Demonstration
Portion of the Future Combat Systems, Between the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and
the United States Army, February 28, 2000, 1-5.
70
Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon, "The Future Combat System (FCS), A
Technology Evolution Review and Feasibility Assessment (Part 2)." Armor (September-October 1997),
31.

29
 71
Ibid.
72
Dr. Asher H. Sharoni and Lawrence D. Bacon, "The Future Combat System (FCS), A
Technology Evolution Review and Feasibility Assessment (Part 1)." Armor (July-August 1997), 11.
73
Mission Needs Statement for Future Combat System (FCS) Capability, Date unknown, 12.

30
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Mike., "Bush Reiterates Support for GIs." Washington Post, February 11, 2001, A9.

Andreus II, Dr. Michael A. and Killion, Dr. Thomas, "Accelerating the Pace of Transformation."
Army AL&T (March-April 2000): 13-16.

"Army Transformation Panel Institute for Land Warfare." Briefing slides with script comments,
U. S. Department of the Army, October 17, 2000.

Bacon, Lawrence D. and Sharoni, Asher H., "The Future Combat System (FCS), A Technology
Evolution Review and Feasibility Assessment (Part 1)." Armor (July-August 1997): 7-13.

Bacon, Lawrence D. and Sharoni, Asher H., "The Future Combat System (FCS), A Technology
Evolution Review and Feasibility Assessment (Part 2 Armament)." Armor (September-
October 1997): 29-33 and 49.

Bacon, Lawrence D. and Sharoni, Asher H., "The Future Combat System (FCS), A Satellite
Fueled, Solar-Powered Tank? (Part 3 Power the System)." Armor (January-February
1998): 37^2.

Bacon, Lawrence D. and Sharoni, Dr. Asher H., "The Future Scout and Cavalry (FSCS),
Technology Overview, Critical Program Issues and Design Considerations." Armor
(January-February 1999): 9-17 and 49-50.

Bell, Major General B. B., "Abrams Main Battle Tank Now and Into the Future." April 2000.
Available from <http://www.knox.army.mil/center/cgpg/abrams.htm>. Internet. Accessed
December 12, 2000.

Bell, Major General B. B., "Chief of Armor Update." September 12, 2000. Available from
<http://www.knox.army.mil/center/cgpg/12_sep.htm>. Internet. Accessed December 12,
2000.

Bell, Major General B. B., "Getting There From Here: The Mechanized Force Modernization
Plan." Armor (July-August 2000): 6-7.

Bell, Major General B. B., "Medium Weight Force Interim Brigade Combat team - What it Means
to the Armor Force." Available from
<http://www.knox.army.mil/center/mwfi/what_it_means_.htm>. Internet. Accessed
December 12, 2000.
Bell, Major General B. B., "The Armor Center Proponency Includes Three Vehicles for the New
Interim Brigades." Armor (May-June 2000): 5 and 44.

Boiler, Major Michael, "A Common Understanding of Transformation Brigades." Military Review
(September-October 2000): 29-36.

31
Bolte', Philip L, "Post-World War II and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness." Camp Colt to
Desert Storm, ed. George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, 217-262. Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1999.

Caldera, The Honorable Louis and Shinseki, General Eric K., "Army Vision." Military Review
(September-October 2000): 3-5.

Caldwell, Jim, "Initial Brigade to Receive German, Italian Loaners." Armor (November-
December 2000): 43-44.

Cameron, Dr. Robert S., "American Tank Development During the Cold War: Maintaining the
Edge or Just Getting By?" Armor (July-August 1998): 30-36.

Cameron, Dr. Robert S., "Pushing the Envelope of Battlefield Superiority: American Tank
Development from the 1970s to Present." Armor (November-December 1998): 8-14.

Candil, Colonel Antonio J., "Spanish Cavalry will Acquire Italian Centauro AFVs." Armor
(November-December 2000): 41-43.

Citino, Robert M., Armored Forces - History and Source Book, Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1994.

Clemens, John, "Soldiers Try Out Medium Armor in Fort Knox Demonstration." Armor (March-
April 2000): 30-32.

Combat Studies Institute, "History of Transformation." Military Review (May-June 2000): 17-29.

Combat Studies Institute, Sixty Years of Reorganization for Combat: A Historical Analysis, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 2000.

Cosumano, Major General Joseph M. Jr., "Transforming the Army to a Full-Spectrum Force."
Army AL&T (March-April 2000): 5-7.

Cox, Matthews, "Army Selects Wheeled, Speedy LAV as Interim Vehicle." Defense News,
December 4, 2000, 36.

Cullinan, Colonel Michael E., "Light Armor in Light Force Operations." Military Digest (May
2000): 22-25.

Decker, Oscar C, "Patton Tanks - The Cold War Learning Series." Camp Colt to Desert Storm,
ed. George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, 298-323. Lexington, KY: The University Press
of Kentucky, 1999.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Future Combat Systems Final Reguest for
Proposals, January 2000.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, The Defense of Fombers Ford, Date Unknown.

32
Doughty, Major Robert A., The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine. 1946-1976, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979.

Dubik, Major General James, "IBCT at Fort Lewis." Military Review (September-October 2000):
17-23.

Ervin, Colonel Kent E. and Decker, Lieutenant Colonel David A., "Adaptive Leaders and the
Interim Brigade Combat Team." Military Review (September-October 2000): 24-28.

French, Mark A., "Composite Materials for AFVs." Military Technology (Vol. XXIV, Issue 8,
2000): 49-57.

Hornbeck, Paul, "Problems Persists, But Continuous Band track Shoes Promise in Light armor
Applications." Armor (January- February 1999): 21 and 50.

Hunnicutt, R. P., Abrams - A History of the American Main Battle Tank - Volume 2, Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1990.

Hunnicutt, R. P., Bradley-A History of American Fighting and Support Vehicles, Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1999.

Hunnicutt, R. P., Pattern - A History of the American Main Battle Tank - Volume 1, Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1984.

Kelly, Orr, King of the Killing Zone. New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1989.

Kirk, Brigadier General John (Retired), "Controlling Armor's Destiny." Armor (March-April1999):
8-15.

Klug, Captain J. P., "Armor's Role in Future U.S. MOUT Defense." Armor (May-June 2000):
7-11.

Makowski, Mr., "12-18 Month Delay of IAV Fielding." Information Paper, AFOP-AC, November
6, 2000.

McKay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert and Flowers, Kathy, "Transformation in Army Logistics."
Military Review (September-October 2000): 44-50.

Mehaffey, Colonel Michael, "Vanguard of the Objective Force." Military Review (September-
October 2000): 6-16.

Mesko, Jim, M48 Patton in Action, Carrollton, Texas: Sguadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1984.

Mesko, Jim, M60 Patton in Action, Carrollton, Texas: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc., 1986.

Nunn, Colonel James H., "Abrams Update: Vital and Improving." Armor (November-December
2000): 48.

Park, Captain Francis J., "A Second Look at the Armored Gun System." Armor (July-August
2000): 12-15.

33
Reardon, Lieutenant Colonel Mark J., "Developing Cavalry Reconnaissance Doctrine for the
Next Century." Armor (August-Septemberl 999): 19-24.

Ricks, Thomas E., "The Wheels Turn in Army Strategy." Washington Post, November 16, 2000,
A1 and A22-A23.

Shinseki, General Eric K., "Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon of the Association of the
United States Army," October 12,1999, Available from <http://www-
tradoc.army.mil/transformation/Data%20Pa.../address_to_the_eisenhower
luncheon.htm>. Internet. Accessed November 15, 2000.

Shinseki, General Eric K., "Intent of the Chief of Staff," June 23, 2000, Available from
<http://www-tradoc.army.mil/transformation/Data%20Pages/lntent%20/%20CSA.htm>.
Internet. Accessed November 15, 2000.

Shinseki, General Eric K., "Statement by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, United States
Army, before the Airland Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, United States
Senate, Second Session, 106th Congress, On Army transformation, March 8, 2000.

Sorley, Lewis, "Adaptation and Impact - Mounted Combat in Vietnam." Camp Colt to Desert
Storm, ed. George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, 324-359. Lexington, KY: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1999.

Starry, Donn A., "Reflections." Camp Colt to Desert Storm, ed. George F. Hofmann and Donn A.
Starry, 531-561. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999.

Sunell, Robert J., "The Abrams Tank System." Camp Colt to Desert Storm, ed. George F.
Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, 432-473. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,
1999.
Swain, Richard M., "AirLand Battle." Camp Colt to Desert Storm, ed. George F. Hofmann and
Donn A. Starry, 360-402. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999.

The Interim Armored Vehicle." Briefing slides. U. S. Tank Automotive Command, November
2000.

Tolson, Major Todd, "Designing the Future Scout/Cavalry System. Will it be a Scout or Cavalry
Vehicle?" Armor (July-August1999): 25-29.

Urbina, Diane L., "Lethal Beyond all Expectations." Camp Colt to Desert Storm, ed. George F.
Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, 403-431. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,
1999.

U.S. Department of the Army, FORSCOM Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Transformation
Operations Order U. S. Army Forces Command, April 7, 2000.

U.S. Department of the Army, FRAG01 to FORSCOM Initial Brigade Combat team (IBCT)
Transformation Operations Order 071700RAPR00, U. S. Army Forces Command, June 9,
2000.

34
U.S. Department of the Army, Information Paper, "The Future Combat Systems." Date
unknown.

U.S. Department of the Army, Memorandum of Agreement for the Collaborative Demonstration
Portion of the Future Combat Systems, Between the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency and the United States Army, February 28, 2000.

U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Needs Statement for Rapid Deployment Armored
Combat Force, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 22, 2000.

U.S. Department of the Army, Mission Needs Statement for Future Combat System (FCS)
Capability, Date unknown.

U.S. Department of the Army, Operational Reguirements Document for a Family of Interim
Armored Vehicles (IAV) ACAT 1, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 6,
2000.

U. S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5, Washington, DC: U. S.

Department of the Army, June 1993.

U.S. Department of the Army, "Planning Directive #2, Planning Guidance for Transformation
Campaign Plan." March 2000, Available from <http://www-
tradoc.army.mil/transformation/Data%20Pages/Planning%20Directive%20.htm>. Internet.
Accessed November 15, 2000.

U.S. Department of the Army, Talking points prepared for Army leadership to use in discussions
with Congressional members/staffers. IAV Award, November 2000.

U.S. Department of the Army, Talking points prepared for Army leadership to use with soldiers,
IAV Award. November 2000.

U. S. Department of the Army, Tank Platoon, Field Manual 17-15, Washington, DC: U. S.
Department of the Army, April 1996.

U.S. Department of the Army, The Interim Brigade Combat Team Organization and Operational
Concept, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, April 12, 2000.

U.S. Department of the Army, "Transformation Campaign Plan." Available from <http://www-
tradoc.army.mil/transformation/Data%20Pages/Charter.htm>. Internet. Accessed
November 15, 2000.

Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.

Zaloga, Steven J., The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks, London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1980.

35